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Accommodating the Other's Conscience:
Saint Paul's Approach to Religious Tolerance
Joyce S. Shin
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4 • Joyce S. Shin
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 5
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6 • Joyce S. Shin
The Greek term for conscience issyneidesis. Paul used this term in Romans 2:15,
9:1, and 13:5; in 1 Corinthians 8:7, 8:12,10:25, and 10:27-29; and in 2 Corinthi
ans 1:12, 4:2, and 5:11. In none of these occurrences did Paul offer a defini
tion. Attempting to specify the meaning of conscience in Paul's letters, New
Testament scholars have turned to Jewish, Greek, and Hellenistic texts as pos
sible sources for Paul's thinking. They have looked for traces of Judaism, Pla
tonism, Stoicism, Hellenistic Judaism, and popular Greek philosophy in Paul's
usage of "conscience."
There is no word for conscience in Hebrew. C. Maurer offered the follow
ing explanation for the absence of this term: "It is an astonishing fact that the
OT [Old Testament] did not develop any word for conscience. This is con
nected with its specific anthropology. Man is basically governed by his relation
to the God of revelation, Yahweh. ... If it is asked where this knowledge of
self comes from, the reply is to be sought, not in a reference to man, but in a
reference to the God who speaks and who reveals Himself in His Word. . . .
In the OT the reflection of the I about itself is thus obedient listening to
God."7
Although there is no Hebrew word for conscience, there is a notion expres
sive of, and perhaps related to, the concept of conscience. Expressing an idea
similar to syneidesis is the Hebrew word for heart, Z~[ (lev). In his book An
thropologie des Alten Testaments, Hans Walter Wolff suggests the same: "Da im
Herzen die Kriterien der Plane und des Handelns zu bedenken sind, kommt
es dazu, dass leb die Bedeutung 'Gewissen' annimmt."8
The term syneidesis originated in the ancient Greek world. Derived from the
reflexive verb synoida emauto ("I am aware"), which appeared as early as the sev
enth century BCE, syneidesis began to appear occasionally from the fifth to the
third centuries BCE.9 It was not until near the beginning of the Christian era
that the term appeared more prominently.10 Originally the term meant aware
ness, or consciousness, and it applied without distinction to both moral and
nonmoral issues.11 Only later did a specifically moral connotation emerge,
though never becoming the sole meaning of the term. In the Hellenistic pe
riod, the ethical connotation became associated with developing notions of
personal responsibility, self-determination, and the acceptance of individual
guilt.12
By the time Paul was writing, it seems that conscience had already become
a popular notion in the Greco-Roman world. This conclusion is supported by
studies of non-Pauline Hellenistic texts in which syneidesis appears.13 Given
that the term appears in these texts without technical definition or analysis, it
can be assumed that Hellenistic writers, such as Philo, Josephus, and Stoic au
thors, were drawing upon a term in common parlance.14 That Paul neither de
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 7
fined nor explained the term supports the conclusion that he was appropriat
ing a ready-made notion of conscience from his Hellenistic environment.15 It
is not surprising, then, that his rhetoric made reference to what was probably
a contemporary idiom in the Corinthian community when he exhorted the
Corinthians to act, in this case to abstain from eating meats, dia ten syneidesin
("for the sake of conscience").
Just what the popular Hellenistic concept of conscience was is difficult to
determine. Part of the difficulty is due to the fact that different writers appro
priated the notion of conscience into their distinctive religious and/or philo
sophical frameworks, thereby developing the meaning of conscience along sig
nificantly different trajectories. For example, within a religious framework of
God's uprightness in relation to human sin, the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher
Philo drew out a moral and legalistic notion of conscience.16 He depicted the
nature of conscience with metaphors of the court of law.17 The conscience
played roles involved in the whole legal process: that of judge,18 witness,19 ac
cuser,20 and punisher. Distinctive to Philo's usage of conscience was its frequent
association with the term elenchos, meaning "conviction."21
The attempt to define the popular notion of conscience is complicated even
further by the fact that, as we find in Paul's writings and other Hellenistic lit
erature, the meaning of the term "conscience" depended on varying contexts.
In some cases, conscience was associated with past deeds. The following is a
Pythagorean formula used commonly during the Hellenistic period as a daily
exercise of self-examination: "Thou shalt not take sleep to thy gentle eyes un
til thou hast considered each of the day's acts: Where did I fall? What was a
right act? What was left undone? Begin with the first, go through them, and
finally when thou hast done wrong rebuke thyself and when thou hast done
good rejoice."22 As this passage attests, conscience dealt with both bad and good
past actions.
In other contexts, it seems that the conscience guided future action. Epicu
rus, Cicero, and Seneca spoke of the good conscience as directing a person to
ward happiness in life. For Philo, too, the conscience not only convicted and
judged past actions but also functioned as a guide for future actions. Similarly,
late Stoics, such as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, spoke of the guardian dae
mon that closely resembled the idea of a guiding conscience.23
In a study of the koine usage of conscience, C. A. Pierce concluded that in
moral contexts conscience was "the pain felt when man oversteps the moral
standard which he himself accepts."24 He argued that in such contexts this pain
was thought to be sufficient punishment for a past action. According to Pierce,
conscience functioned as an inner counterpart for the principle of retribution
inherent in a moral universe.
It is likely that Paul absorbed the various definitions of conscience current
in the Hellenistic world. The occurrences of the word "conscience" in his
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8 • Joyce S. Shin
letters reflect the forensic role of conscience as witness (Rom. 2:15, 9:1; 2 Cor.
1:12), the notion of a painful awareness of transgression (1 Cor. 10:25, 27, 28;
Rom. 13:5), as well as a gnostic definition of conscience as the agent of knowl
edge (1 Cor. 8:7, 10, 12)."
This is not to say, however, that Paul did not contribute to the evolving
meaning of conscience. New Testament scholars have offered various propos
als about what his contributions were.26 At the end of the nineteenth century
Martin Kahler provided an analysis asserting that Paul was the first to attribute
autonomy to the individual's conscience. He wrote: "Die Erôterung des engen
Gewissens fiihrt den Apostel aber ferner zu der wichtigen und durchaus neuen
ausdriicklichen Anerkennung der Individualitât des Gewissens, in welcher mit
dem Rechte auf Eigenart und Selbststàndigkeit seines Urteiles auch die Pflicht
zu deren Behauptung gegeben ist."27 Kahler's conclusion has continued to res
onate in later scholarship on Paul's understanding of conscience.
Scholars have offered, however, different explanations regarding how Paul
grounded the autonomy of conscience. For W. Gutbrod and J. Stelzenberger,
Paul's main contribution to the popular Hellenistic usage of conscience was his
theological grounding of the autonomy of conscience.28 Understood within a
theological framework, conscience was knowledge of one's conduct with respect
to the transcendent demands of God. Perhaps Rudolf Bultmann best repre
sented this view. Bultmann defined Pauline conscience as "a man's knowledge
('consciousness') of his conduct as his own" "in respect to a requirement which
exists in relation to that conduct."29 According to this view, the individual took
responsibility for his or her own conduct subject to the demands of God.30 That
the demand originated in the divine will obligated the individual to obey his or
her conscience; its divine origin rendered the individual's conscience inviolable.
Against this view stood the views of Kahler in the nineteenth century and
Spicq, Bornkamm, Maurer, and Jewett more recently.31 They argued that for
Paul conscience was a thoroughly human concept. Robert Jewett wrote: "But
it is one of the most striking facts about Paul's use of syneidesis that he never
refers to it as God's voice or as having been instilled by God.... Thus the fact
that Paul considers the conscience of the individual to be inviolable will have
to be explained in another way."32
Paul, according to Jewett, rejected the belief that conscience was identical
with the pneumatic self and therefore had salvific significance. Rather, the au
tonomy of the individual's conscience was derived from Paul's eschatological
perspective, according to which God alone judged and elected those with weak
consciences. From this perspective, the conscience was subject to neither ed
ucation nor judicial review, including self-examination. Jewett wrote: "Sub
jecting persons to cross-examination with the intent of judging them is acting
pro kairou (1 Cor. 4:5); it is a usurpation of the coming last judgment when the
Lord alone will reward each according to his deeds."33 Other than its eschato
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 9
logical grounding, Paul provided another reason for the autonomy of the in
dividual conscience, according to Jewett. For Paul, the conscience guaranteed
the integrity of the individual. Forcing enlightenment upon another whose
conscience was weak would risk disrupting this integrity. For the sake of pro
tecting the inner unity of the person, Paul held the autonomous conscience to
be inviolable.34
Despite the differences among their theories, Pauline scholars have come
to a general consensus: Paul's primary contribution to the popular Flellenistic
concept of conscience was the autonomy of conscience. In the rest of this es
say I reexamine this conclusion. Without denying that Paul desired the con
science of each person to be respected or that he was concerned about the in
tegrity of the individual person, as Jewett argued, I argue that the emphasis on
the autonomy of conscience has resulted in a false portrayal of Paul's ethic as
an individualistic ethic, an ethic concerned solely with the individual's right to
act according to what he or she knows to be true and good.
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10 • Joyce S. Shin
abstain from what have been sacrificed to idols and from blood and from what
have been strangled and from fornication." Food regulations appearing in the
Didache (6:3) also prohibited the eating of foods sacrificed to idols: "And con
cerning food, endure what you can, but keep strictly away from the food sac
rificed to an idol, for it is worship of dead gods." Though the author of the Di
dache seems to have acknowledged the difficulty in abiding by all the food
regulations, he nevertheless stated clearly that no exceptions were to be made
when it came to abstaining from foods sacrificed to idols.
Paul himself wrote: "You cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of
demons. You cannot partake of the table of the Lord and the table of demons"
(1 Cor. 10:21). This verse expresses his vigilant opposition to idolatry, which
he stated more clearly in 1 Corinthians 8:4: "We know that an idol has no real
existence," and that "there is no God but one."
Compared with his concrete exhortations concerning eating meats sacrificed
to idols, a contradiction in Paul's thought becomes apparent. In 1 Corinthians
10:25 he advised Jewish Christians, who had been taught to inquire carefully
into the religious history and preparation of meats, "Eat whatever is sold in the
meat market without raising any question on the ground of conscience." In 1
Corinthians 10:27 he wrote, "If an unbeliever invites you to a meal and you are
disposed to go, eat whatever is set before you without raising any question on
the ground of conscience." Pauline scholars have tried in various ways to ex
plain the apparent contradiction between his opposition to idolatry and his con
doning the eating of meats sacrificed to idols. C. K. Barrett argued that Paul
never required abstinence from eating foods sacrificed to idols: "At no point in
1 Cor. viii, ix, x does he admit the view that a Christian must never eat what
has been sacrificed to an idol, still less that he must never eat meat that has not
been slaughtered in conformity with the Jewish regulations. On the contrary,
he specifically states that sacrificial food may be eaten."36
Interpreting 1 Corinthians 10:21 as referring to actual participation in the
worship of idols, Barrett concluded that Paul distinguished the eating of sac
rificial food, which he permitted, from direct participation in the worship of
idols, which he did not permit.37 As Barrett convincingly argued, Paul con
cerned himself with preventing Christians from isolating themselves from so
ciety at large. "The question of the place of the Christian in ordinary life was
raised, and Paul decisively took the view that the Christian (though his rela
tion to the world is governed by the coç fir/ of 1 Cor. vii. 29 ff.) must not sep
arate himself from it. There is to be no Christian ghetto."38 Whether buying
meats sold in the market or being a guest at a non-Christian's home, the Chris
tian could eat foods sacrificed to idols because there was no such thing as an
idol.
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 11
Paul's advice was "nowhere more un-Jewish."39 Yet it would be a mistake to see
Paul's response as having been motivated by dogma alone. From his perspec
tive, the conflict over food was not a dogmatic issue of whether or not it was
proper for a Christian to eat sacrificial food. On the contrary, his concern was
pastoral, taking into consideration the appropriateness of his teaching for mem
bers whose ideas about what was true, false, right, and wrong differed. He re
ferred rhetorically to those who thought they had the proper knowledge as the
"strong" and to those who were insecure in their knowledge as the "weak."
There is no doubt that he agreed with and affirmed the doctrine known by the
strong, that "no idol in the world really exists," and that "there is no God but
one" (1 Cor. 8:4). These were the well-known teachings of Christianity that he
quoted to the Corinthians. These were the teachings that permitted the knowl
edgeable, "strong," Christian to share meals with non-Christians and to eat
meats sacrificed to idols without defiling his or her conscience. Nevertheless,
Paul concerned himself more with those whose knowledge was less secure than
with protecting the liberty of persons to act according to what they knew to be
true or right. If it simply had been the case that everyone was acting according
to his or her conscience, eating or abstaining from sacrificial foods accordingly,
there would have been no problem. After all, Paul considered what one ate a
matter of indifference. The problem was not that the weak thought it necessary
to abstain from eating meats sacrificed to idols, while the strong knew that, be
cause idols were nothing, what they ate would make no difference. Rather, the
problem arose when the weak, observing the strong eating meats either in the
temple of an idol (in which case the meat had been sacrificed to idols)40 or in
the home of a pagan host (in which case the nature of the meat was unknown)41
and influenced by their example, would also eat sacrificial meats against what
they themselves knew to be right, thereby defiling their consciences.
Whereas the Corinthians perceived the conflict to be between having and
not having proper knowledge,42 Paul understood the conflict to be between two
different ethics: a gnostic ethic, by which individuals are primarily concerned
with acting according to what they know to be true and right, and a social ethic,
by which people acknowledge the claims that others make on them as they try
to live according to what they know to be true and right. The latter, I suggest,
is an ethic of accommodation.
Paul's rhetorical usage of the concept of conscience testifies to his concern.
We can assume from his rhetoric in 1 Corinthians 10:28-29a that the common
saying of his day was something like, "Act for the sake of conscience" (dia ten
syneidesin). Paul, however, writes: "But if someone says to you, 'This has been
offered in sacrifice,' then do not eat it, out of consideration for the one who
informed you, and for the sake of conscience—I mean the other's conscience, not your
own." Rhetorically turning the ordinary Hellenistic notion of conscience on its
head, Paul challenged the gnostic tendency of some who thought that their only
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12 • Joyce S. Shin
and most important duty was to behave according to what they knew to be true.
In cases when he and others disagreed with the content of the standard by which
someone else's conscience judges and guides, he exhorted the Corinthians not
merely to respect the other person's conscience but more radically to act for
the sake of the other person's conscience, to not scandalize the weak. For Paul,
the role of conscience cannot be understood independendy from a social ethic
of accommodation. Accommodating the other person's conscience, rather than
stressing the autonomy of conscience, was Paul's significant contribution to the
role of conscience in ethical reflection.
An Ethic of Accommodation
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 13
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14 • Joyce S. Shin
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 15
8:1), making deeper social divisions between those with knowledge and those
without knowledge, but also that knowledge lacked the power to save humanity.
Fundamental to Paul's soteriology was the belief that God alone could save hu
manity. Sin had so penetrated humanity that human beings were incapable of
saving themselves. It is helpful here to turn to Paul's Letter to the Romans, in
which we find his description of the human condition (Rom. 1:18-3:20). It is
within the context of this description that he spoke about the limits of con
science (Rom. 2:12-16): "All who have sinned apart from the law will also per
ish apart from the law, and all who have sinned under the law will be judged by
the law. For it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous in God's sight, but
the doers of the law who are justified. When Gentiles, who do not possess the
law, do instinctively what the law requires, these, though not having the law, are
a law to themselves. They show that what the law requires is written on their
hearts, to which their own conscience also bears witness; and their conflicting
thoughts will accuse or perhaps excuse them on the day when, according to my
gospel, God, through Jesus Christ, will judge the secret thoughts of all."
The recognition that those apart from the law acted, in many cases, as the
law required must have raised the question of whether or not the law was nec
essary for salvation. Paul acknowledged that in many cases pagans and Jews
shared the same morals. Knowing or not knowing the law, however, was not
the primary issue for Paul. Fitzmyer recognized that "Paul seeks to explain how
it will be that Gentiles who do not have the Mosaic law will yet be judged as
if they had some sort of law. They have, indeed, a law: if not written precepts,
at least the law of conscience, and by such a law they will be judged when the
living and the dead stand before God's tribunal."50 On the basis of either the
Mosaic law or the law of conscience, each person was to be held accountable
at the time of God's judgment.
Given this situation, no one had reason to boast. Apart from Jesus Christ,
everyone—Jew or Gentile—was a sinner deserving of God's condemnation.
Therefore, Paul was suspicious of tendencies to puff persons up by knowledge,
as if persons could attain salvation by acting according to their human knowl
edge. Interpreting the role of conscience in the light of Paul's eschatology and
soteriology helps us to make sense of his statement in 1 Corinthians 4:1-5. Tes
tifying to his apostolic authority, he wrote: "Think of us in this way, as servants
of Christ and stewards of God's mysteries. Moreover, it is required of stewards
that they be found trustworthy. But with me it is a very small thing that I
should be judged by you or by any human court. I do not even judge myself.
I am not aware [emauto sunoida] of anything against myself, but I am not thereby
acquitted. It is the Lord who judges me. Therefore do not pronounce judg
ment before the time, before the Lord comes, who will bring to light the things
now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart. Then each
one will receive commendation from God." Acknowledging the impotence of
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16 • Joyce S. Shin
A Divine Accommodation
For the most part, Paul's letters were situational. This is not to say, however,
that these situationally oriented letters lacked theological content. On the con
trary, we are able to discern Paul's theology and soteriology in his practical ex
hortations. On this point, Barrett considered that " 1 Corinthians is anything
but a work of systematic theology. It is a practical letter ... aimed at telling its
readers not so much what they ought to think as what they ought to do—or
ought not to do. The practical advice, however, is consciously grounded in the
ological principles which can usually be detected."51
First Corinthians 8 and 10 present Paul's advice about eating foods sacri
ficed to idols. Interpreting these passages, so far we have detected an ethical
principle of accommodation. As Barrett pointed out, however, one can also de
tect the theological principles grounding Paul's practical advice. In this section,
I hope to show that what Paul wrote about eating foods sacrificed to idols and
acting for the sake of the other person's conscience was consistent with and
rooted in his most profound beliefs about God's relationship with and salva
tion of humanity.
In Paul's world, the idea of divine accommodation was popular among Jew
ish and Greek thinkers. Philo, a Hellenistic Jew and contemporary of Paul, em
ployed the idea of accommodation as an interpretive device to explain anthro
pomorphisms of God in scripture. An instance of this occurs in his commentary
on Genesis 11:5. Philo wrote: "The lawgiver talks thus in human terms about
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 17
God, even though he is not a human being, for the advantage of us who are
being educated, as I have often said in other passages."52 Here we find the el
ements of divine condescension for the benefit of human beings.
Margaret Mitchell examined the notion of divine accommodation in the writ
ings of Philo and Philo's student Origen.53 In these texts divine accommodation
found expression in the terms of condescension, katabainein/sugkatabainein. In
one Philonic passage, God "came down" (katabainein) as the divine Word: "Up
and down throughout its whole extent are moving incessantly the 'words' of
God, drawing it up with them when they ascend and disconnecting it with what
is mortal, and exhibiting to it the spectacle of the only objects worthy of our gaze;
and when they descend not casting it down, for neither does God nor does a di
vine Word cause harm, but condescending [sugkatabainontes] out of love for man
and compassion for our race, to be helpers and comrades."54
For Philo the descent of God in the form of the Word was not physical but
rather a mode of communication. According to Mitchell the notion of the con
descending Logos eventually found its way into Christian incarnational Chris
tology.55 She wrote: "Such thinking, and its expression in the term sugkatabainein,
becomes very important for early Christian incarnational Christology, which ap
plies this logic to the Logos, Christ. The roots for this Christological reflection
are clearly to be found in Philo's theology, which is itself (as are so many of his
creations) a curious admixture of Jewish theological presuppositions and Greek
philosophical and literary notions."56
In particular, Origen and Clement of Alexandria translated the idea of the
condescending Logos into the notion of Incarnation.57 Interpreting even non
Pauline texts, Origen used Pauline language in treating the Incarnation as an
instance of the "condescension" of the Logos. In a commentary on John, he
wrote: "Therefore the Savior, in a more divine fashion than Paul, has become
'all things to all people,' so that he might either 'gain' or perfect 'all things,'
and clearly he has become a human being to human beings and an angel to an
gels."58 It is obvious from this passage that Origen interpreted Paul's mission
ary strategy as an imitation of Christ's condescension.
Paul himself regarded Christ as the model to be imitated: "So, whether you
eat or drink, or whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God. Give no
offense to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God, just as I try to please every
one in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of many, so that
they may be saved. Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ" (1 Cor. 10:32-11:1).
As an apostle of Christ, Paul modeled himself after Christ and called oth
ers to do the same. The motif of accommodation running throughout Paul's
thought—his missionary strategy, his self-defense as a trustworthy and author
itative apostle, and his ethical exhortations—found its perfect expression in
the Gospel he preached: in the good news that God accommodated God
self to human capacity through the incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of
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18 * Joyce S. Shin
Jesus Christ for the sake of saving humanity. For Paul, Christ was the ultimate
event of divine accommodation.
Conclusion
In this essay I have addressed the issue of religious tolerance beginning with
the concept of conscience and ending with the motif of accommodation as they
appear in Paul's letters. I have argued that a correct understanding of conscience
in his thought requires an interpretation of the role of conscience in the light
of a principle of accommodation. For the most part, New Testament scholars
studying conscience have concentrated on determining its conceptual mean
ing. They have come to the general consensus that Paul's main contribution to
the evolving concept of conscience was his recognition of the autonomy of the
individual's conscience. Interpreting conscience in the light of accommodation,
however, challenges this consensus. From this perspective, the exhortation to
act for the sake of the other person's conscience supersedes the duty to act for
the sake of one's own conscience.
The notion of accommodation, however, is not without its dangers. In his
book Footprints of God: Divine Accommodation in Jewish and Christian Thought,
Stephen Benin traced the various usages of divine accommodation from the first
to the sixteenth centuries. As his historical overview showed, religious writers
have employed accommodation to justify both religious tolerance and religious
intolerance. Using accommodation as a hermeneutical device, for example,
early Christian apologists interpreted the history of salvation in their own fa
vor and against Jews, pagans, and schismatics. Benin attributed accommoda
tion's wide range of applicability to its flexible nature: "What occurs within early
Christianity is the phenomenon which accommodation exhibits repeatedly,
namely, its resilient and supple nature. It was a pliable and potent weapon that
would be wielded deftly by disparate groups."59
As I have argued in this essay, Paul used accommodation for an inclusive,
rather than a divisive, end. For him, accommodation was not a neutral strat
egy or device that could be wielded for any end. Its end was clearly the edifi
cation and salvation of others. Accommodation found expression in metaphors
of doctor-patient, teacher-student, parent-child, and friend-friend relation
ships. These relationships nurture the physical and spiritual well-being of other
persons. Within the context of these kinds of intimate relationships, accom
modation is an intuitively familiar experience. The question remains, however,
whether accommodation is a viable approach to religious tolerance among re
ligiously disparate parties. I would like to propose that it is.
Paul's formulation, within the context of his eschatology and soteriology, I
would assert, can contribute to contemporary discourse on religious tolerance
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 19
in the following ways. First, for Paul, conscience is fallible, and it is powerless
to justify persons before God. His view of human nature as sinful and his es
chatological perspective, in which God, not the conscience, is the only trust
worthy judge of persons, calls for a self-critical humility whenever persons as
sert a belief on the basis of conscience. Second, although conscience is not
salvific, it plays an important role in genuine relationships of accommodation.
The conscience of another person functions as a starting point and guidepost
in social interactions and dialogue, informing one person about another per
son's religious background and present state. In his letter to the Corinthians,
Paul admonishes people to take seriously the conscience of others, even to the
point of acting for the sake of their conscience. Third, an ethic of accommo
dation encourages an active concern for the well-being of others. Acting for
the well-being of others is a critical criterion whereby Paul distinguishes ac
commodation primarily from hypocrisy. In addition to his primary concern, the
active concern for the well-being of others is significant because it overcomes
the problem of indifference into which religious tolerance can easily slide.
Fourth, Paul provides an approach to religious tolerance that is coherent within
his understanding of salvation, thereby grounding religious tolerance in his
most profound religious beliefs. He interpreted the way God saves humanity
in the event of Jesus Christ as a divine act of accommodation to be imitated
whenever people interact with others whose beliefs about what is true and
good differ from their own. For Christians, Paul's formulation of the role of
conscience in the light of a theology of accommodation provides a resource for
shaping a genuine subjective attitude of religious tolerance that can arise out
of core Christian beliefs. Finally, insofar as the Christ event makes apparent
the radical transformation that the divine underwent in accommodating human
capacity, it can serve as a model for the potential transformation that Chris
tians may need to undergo when they engage in dialogue with persons of other
religious traditions.
Notes
1. Member States of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
"The Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, 1995," in Tolerance between Intolerance and
the Intolerable, Diogenes, no. 176, ed. Paul Ricoeur (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996),
211.
2. Kaisa Puhakka, "The Roots of Religious Tolerance in Hinduism and Buddhism," Temenos
2 (1976): 51.
3. Article 18 of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intol
erance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief was adopted in 1981 and adapted
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See David Little, "Religious Tolerance
and the Challenge of Peace," Church and Society 88 (March/April 1998): 60.
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20 • Joyce S. Shin
6. The term "conscience," or "syneidesis," appears in the New Testament thirty-one times:
once in John 8:9; fourteen times in Pauline letters; and sixteen times in post-Pauline let
ters. Given this, as C. Maurer writes: "One may assume that it was Paul who first estab
lished the word in the Christian Church." C. Maurer, "tjvvoiôa, ameiâtjaiç," in Theologi
cal Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 7 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 914. Cf. W.
David Stacey, The Pauline View of Man: In Relation to Its Judaic and Hellenistic Background
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956), 206. Jewett and Pierce argue that the Corinthians,
not Paul, were responsible for introducing the concept of conscience into Christian the
ology. Robert Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings,
(Leiden: Brill, 1971), 436-37; C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, Studies in Bib
lical Theology 15 (London: SCM, 1955).
7. Maurer, "avvoiôa, avveiSt]aiç," 908.
8. Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropologie des Alten Testaments (Giitersloh: Kaiser, 1994), 85.
9. Maurer, "ovvotSa, oweiât/mç," 902: The oldest example of "syneidesis" comes from the
fifth century B.C.E., appearing in Democritus, Fragment 297, Doxograpbi Graeci, ed. H.
Diels (Berlin: Weidmann, 1879), 2.206.19ff. In that context conscience seems to mean "a
moral awareness of one's own bad deeds."
10. Maurer, "avvoiôa, avveiSr/oig," 898-907. Cf. W. D. Davies, "Conscience," in The Inter
preter's Dictionary of the Bible, vol. 1, ed. George Arthur Buttrick (New York: Abingdon
Press, 1962), 671-74; Robert W. Wall, "Conscience," Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 1, ed.
David Noel Freeman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 1128-30.
11. Henry Chadwick, "Gewissen," in Reallexikon fiir Antike und Christentum, vol. 10, ed.
Theodor Klauser (Leipzig: K. W. Hiersemann, 1978), 1025.
12. Ibid., 1027: "Im griech. Denken und Schreiben entwickelt sich die Vorstellung vom Gewis
sen gemeinsam mit der Ausbildung der persônlichen Verantwortlichkeit im Sinne von
Selbstbestimmung und Annahme individueller Schuld."
13. Don E. Marietta, "Conscience in Greek Stoicism," Numen 17, no. 3 (1970): 186. Mari
etta argues that since Philo and Saint Paul held views similar to the Stoics, conscience must
have been a commonly held notion during the Hellenistic period. "Syneidesis" seems to
have been part of the syncretistic religious and ethical thought that permeated the Graeco
Roman world.
14. Ibid.
15. Holding this view are J. Stelzenberger, Syneidesis im Neuen Testament (Paderborn: Schdn
ingh, 1961), 94; Stacey, Pauline View, 210; C. Spicq, "La Conscience dans le Nouveau Tes
tament," Revue Biblique 47 (1938): 51-55; Günther Bornkamm, "Gesetz und Natur: Rom
2:14-16," in Studien zur Antike und Urchristentum (Munich: Kaiser, 1959), 112-13; Joseph
A. Fitzmyer, Romans, The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 128; Jewett, Paul's
Anthropological Terms, 436-38; Davies, "Conscience," 674-75.
16. Maurer, "ctvvoiSa, avvst5r¡aiQ," 911: Maurer considers Philo to be "the first to think through
theologically a doctrine of conscience." Cf. Richard T. Wallis, "The Idea of Conscience
in Philo of Alexandria," Studia Philonica 3 (1974-75): 27-40. Wallis intends to demonstrate
that Philo's extant writings, without presenting a coherent metaphysics of conscience, do,
nevertheless, suggest that conscience in the moral life originates in a transcendent source.
17. See Philo, In Flaccum, 7; Philo, De opificio mundi, 128; Philo, Quod Deussit immutabilis, 128;
and Philo, De decálogo, 87.
18. See Philo, Decal., 87; Philo, Opif, 128; and Philo, Quod Deus, 128, 182-83.
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience • 21
19. Cf. Josephus Against Apion, 2.218; and Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 4.286.
20. See Philo, Decaí., 87; and Philo, Quod Deus, 128; cf. Josephus, Jew. Ant., 2. 25.
21. Philo, Quod deteriuspotiori insidari soleat, 22-23, provides the fullest description of eleg
chos. Cf. Philo, Quod Det., 146; Philo, Quod Deus, 182-83; Philo, De ebrietate, 125; Philo,
De confusione linguarum, 121; and Philo, De specialibus legibus, 3.54. For a discussion on
Philo's association of syneidesis and elegchos, see Wallis, "Idea of Conscience in Philo,"
35; and Maurer, "cwvoiôa, auvstStjaiç," 911-13.
22.Maurer, "avvoiôa, auveihrjaiç," 906.
23. See Wallis, "Idea of Conscience in Philo," 34-35.
24. Pierce, Conscience, 108.
25. Here and in the pages to come, I use the adjective "gnostic" to mean having to do with
the primacy of knowledge for one's salvation. I do not use the term "gnostic" to refer to
a group of people associated with writings from the second century CE that have a partic
ular mythology about the heavenly world and the origins of the physical world.
26. Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms, 402-60; Jewett provides an overview of the history of
New Testament research on Paul's usage of conscience.
27. Martin Kahler, "Das Gewissen," in Realencyklopddie furprotestantische Theologie und Kirche,
vol. 6, ed. J. J. Herzog, Albert Hauck, and Herman Caselmann (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs,
1899), 648.
28. Walter Gutbrod, Paulinische Anthropologie (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1934), 67: "Die au
veiôrjaiç kann deswegen ein Urteil iiber die Entsprechung des Menschlichen Tuns mit der
Wahrheit und dem Willen Gottes abgeben, weil sie es ist, durch die der Mensch um Gott
als seinen Herrn und Schôpfer weiss." Cf. Stelzenberger, Syneidesis, who theologically
grounded one of the six different definitions of conscience that he discerned in Paul's writ
ings: In Rom. 9:1 and 2 Cor. 1:12, conscience is "Bewusstheit als Zeuge," a consciousness
of a religious connection with God, which can affirm the correctness of one's decisions
(Stelzenberger, Syneidesis, 52). For Stelzenberger, the theological use of conscience was
Paul's main contribution: "Meist wird eine kontinuierliche Verbindung mit der Antike
angenommen.... Es ergibt sich jedoch bald, dass das Neue Testament den Terminus nicht
einfach übernimmt. . . . Die Htilse ist antik, der Inhalt aber neu. Er hat eine vollig neue
theologische Note" (Stelzenberger, Syneidesis, 94).
29. Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. I (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1951), 216-17.
30. Ibid., 220: "Conscience means the selfs knowledge of itself (the conduct that is demanded
of it, or its conduct subject to the Judge's verdict) in responsibility to the transcendent
power (of God)."
31. Bornkamm, "Gesetz und Natur," 116: "Der Gewissensbegriff ist darum bei Paulus, weil
fur ihn der innere Gerichtshof des Menschen und das gottliche Gericht nicht zusammen
fallen, ein rein menschlicher Begriff. Niemals kônnte der Apostel von der auvaôrjaiç wie
Philo sage, sie Gottes eigener 'Logos.'"
32. Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms, 410.
34. Ibid., 438: Jewett argued that Paul's eschatological grounding of the autonomous con
science was connected with the role of conscience as the guarantor of individual integrity
by Paul's understanding of spirit "as a divine gift which retains its connection with God
and thus its autonomy from the individual, but which nonetheless can become the center
of the individual person."
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22 • Joyce S. Shin
35. C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Harper's New Testament Commentaries
(New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 2: "No doubt there were Greeks among them, but it
is impossible to think of the Corinth of Paul's day as in any way distinctively Greek. That
there were Jews in Corinth is shown by an inscription consisting of the broken words
'[Syn]agogue of the Hebr[ews],' and probably part of the lintel of the door of the syna
gogue."
36. C. K. Barrett, "Things Sacrificed to Idols," New Testament Studies 11 (1964—65): 143.
37. Ibid., 237; "Only it is not the eating of sacrificial food (which Paul permits) but direct par
ticipation in idolatry that will separate the Christian from Christ...." Cf. Richard B. Hays,
First Corinthians, Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching
(Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997), 159. Hays explained the apparent contradiction by
arguing that Paul was involved in a balancing act. On the one hand, concerned about the
weaker members of the church who might be influenced by the strong to eat idol meats,
Paul condoned the eating of sacrificial food as generally harmless (chap. 8). On the other
hand, concerned that casual participation in idolatrous practices would put Christ to the
test and provoke the Lord to jealousy, Paul admonished them to "flee from the worship
of idols" (1 Cor. 10:14).
38. Barrett, "Things Sacrificed," 147.
39. Ibid., 146.
40. See 1 Cor. 8:10, where Paul wrote, "For if others see you, who possess knowledge, eating
in the temple of an idol, might they not, since their conscience is weak, be encouraged to
the point of eating food sacrificed to idols?"
41. See 1 Cor. 10:27-28, where Paul wrote, "If an unbeliever invites you to a meal and you
are disposed to go, eat whatever is set before you without raising any question on the
ground of conscience. But if someone says to you, 'This has been offered in sacrifice,' then
do not eat it, out of consideration for the one who informed you."
42. Barrett, "Things Sacrificed," 150-51.
43. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press,
2000), 1.
44. Clarence E. Glad, Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psych
agogy (New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), 7.
45. Margaret Mitchell, "Pauline Accommodation and 'Condescension' (avyKaza/Iaaiç): 1 Cor.
9:19-23 and the History of Influence," in Paul beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed.
Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 2001), 5.
46. Ibid., 18.
47. Stromata 7.9, Die griechische christliche Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte,
Clemens Alexandrinus 3.39, ed. Otto Stáhlin and L. Fruchtel. I am citing Mitchell's trans
lation of this text, 9.
48. John Chrysostom, Horn, in 1 Cor. 22.3, Patrología graeca 61.185, ed. J.-P. Migne. I am cit
ing Mitchell's translation of this text, 16-17.
49. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 208-9.
50. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans, The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 312.
51. C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Harper's New Testament Commentaries
(New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 17.
52. Philo, De confusione linguarum, 135, cited by Ford Lewis Battles, "God Was Accommo
dating Himself to Human Capacity," Interpretation 31, no. 1 (1977): 23.
53. Mitchell, "Pauline Accommodation," 10-17.
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Accommodating the Other's Conscience * 23
54. Philo, Desomniis, 1.147 (Colson and Whitaker), cited by Mitchell, "Pauline Accommoda
tion," 11.
5 5. See also Samuel Vollenweider, Freiheit als neue Schopfung: Eine Untersuchung zur Eleuthe
ria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und
Neuen Testaments, vol. 147 (Gôttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 218: "Im Blick
auf das jiidische Theologumenon der Selbsterneidrigung Gottes einerseits, auf hellenis
tiche kosmologische Formeln anderseits ware diese Môglichkeit immerhin zu erwàgen.
Jedenfalls hat die altkirchliche Theologie in 1 Kor 9,22 eine fundaméntale christologis
che Dimension wahrgenommen und gibt dazu Anlass, sich die Aufmerksamkeit fiir die
christologiefáhige Sprache, zu welcher sich der Apostel in seiner Rechenschaft iiber sein
missionarisches Verhalten aufschwingt, schàrfen zu lassen." Cited in Mitchell, "Pauline Ac
commodation," 35.
56. Mitchell, "Pauline Accommodation," 11-12.
57. Ibid., 13.
58. Origen, Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 1.217 (Sources chrétiennes 120.166). I am cit
ing a translation by Mitchell, "Pauline Accommodation," 15.
59. Stephen D. Benin, The Footprints of God: Divine Accommodation in Jewish and Christian
Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), xvi-xvii.
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