Anda di halaman 1dari 5

Logic of Phantasy 68

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Lacan Seminar 14:

The Logic of Fantasy 16
Seminar 16: Wednesday, April 12, 1967

To introduce it, we start from the idea, that in the sexual act there is no question at all that this small o,

in which we indicate this something which is in a way the substance of the subject ... (if you understand

this substance, in the sense that Aristotle designated it in the ousia, namely - which is forgotten - the fact

is that what specifies it is precisely the following: that it cannot in any way be attributed to any subject,

the subject being understood as upokeimenon). This little o-object, in so far as it serves us as a module

to question the one who is supported by it, does not have to search for its complement in the dyad -

what it lacks in order to be two - which would be very desirable. The fact is that the solution to this

relation, thanks to which the two can be established, depends entirely on what is going to happen in the

reference of the small o, the golden number, to the One in so far as it generates this lack, which is

inscribed here from a simple effect of continuation (report) and, at the same time, of difference, under a

form of one minus o which, by calculation (very simple calculation that I already wrote on this board so

that I can ask you to find it yourselves) is formulated by o-squared.










I am only recalling it here, in order to put - at the start of what I want to introduce, about what it is

essential to articulate, for you, as I said earlier - at the beginning, at the start of our science, namely,

what necessarily, although paradoxically, introduces us to this sexual knot, in which there flees and

makes off from us the act which, for the moment, constitutes our question. The link of this small o, in so

far as here you see it represents, darstellt, supports and makes present first of all the subject himself.

That this is the same as is going to appear in the exchange, whose formula we are now going to show

as being able to make use of this object that we touch in the dialectic of the treatment, under the name

of partial object.






The relation then of these two aspects of the function small o, with this index, this form of object, which

is at the principle of castration.


I will not close this cycle today. That is why I want to introduce it by two formulae responding to a sort of

problem that we pose a priori. What value should be given to this little o-object - if it is indeed there as

having to represent, in the sexual dyad, the (8) difference - for it to produce two results between which

there is suspended our question today?




A question that can only be tackled along the path that I am leading you , in so far as it is the logical

path. I mean the Path of logic. The dyad and its uncertainties is what logic itself develops from the

beginning, if one knows how to follow its trace.



I cannot retrace for you here the history of logic, but let it be enough for me to evoke here, at the dawn

of the Aristotelian Organon, which is something quite different to simple formalism, if you know how to

plumb it. At the first point of the logic of the predicate, there is established the opposition between

contraries and contradictories.




We have made, as you know, a good deal of progress since, but this is not a reason for not interesting

ourselves in what constitutes the importance and the status of their entry into history.



It is moreover not ... (I am saying it also in parenthesis, for those who sometimes open books on logic)

to prevent us - when we take up line by line what Aristotle stated at the same time, not even in the

margin - introducing what, for example, Lukasiewicz has since completed. I am saying this, because in

the excellent book of the two Kneale's, moreover, I was struck by a protestation, like that, which arose in

turning a page. Because to say what Aristotle said, Mr. Lukasiewicz, for example, is lead to distinguish

what belongs to the principle of contradiction from the identity principle, and from the principle of

bivalence! There you are.






The identity principle, is that A is A. You know that it is not clear that A should be A. Luckily, Aristotle

does not say it, but that it should be pointed out is all the same interesting!



Secondly, that a thing can be at once, at the same time, A and not A, is again something quite different!

As regards the principle of bivalence, namely, that a thing ought to be either true or false, this is a third

thing again!



I find that to point it out rather illuminates Aristotle. And to point out that Aristotle surely never thought of

all these niceties, has nothing to do with the question! For it is precisely what allows its importance to be

given to what I am going to start again from now, namely, this crude business of contraries. First of all, in

so far as, for us - I mean as regards what is not in Aristotle, but which is already indicated in my

previous teaching - we will designate it by the not without (pas sans). (This will be of use of us later. Do

not worry! Allow me to lead you a little bit.)





Contraries and this is what gives rise to the logical question of whether, yes or no, the particular

proposition implies existence. This has always shocked people enormously. In Aristotle it incontestably

implies it. It is even on this that his logic depends. It is curious that the universal proposition does not

imply it!




I can say, "every centaur has six limbs". It is absolutely true! Except there are no (9) centaurs. It is a

universal proposition. But if I say, (in Aristotle!): "there are centaurs who have lost one", this implies that

centaurs exist, for Aristotle. I am trying to reconstruct a logic that is a little less lame as regards

centaurs! But this does not interest us for the moment.





Simply there is no male without a female. This is of the order of the real. This has nothing to do with

logic. At least in our day.



And then, there is the contradictory, which means the following: if something is male, then it is not non-

male, nothing else.



It is matter of finding our way in these two distinct formulae. The second is of the symbolic order; it is a

symbolic convention, which has a name, precisely, the excluded third.