G.R. No.

1641 January 19, 1906 for the purpose of signing, and when I was near the door I happened to turn my
face and I saw that he had his hand with the pen resting on the will, moving it as if
GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET for the purpose of signing.
AL., defendants-appellees.
Q. 1641 State positively whether Julio moved his hand with the pen as if for
CARSON, J.: the purpose of signing, or whether he was signing
In these proceedings probate was denied the last will and testament of Macario A. I believe he was signing.
Jaboneta, deceased, because the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence
adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his The truth and accuracy of the testimony of this witness does not seem to have been
signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as questioned by any of the parties to the proceedings, but the court, nevertheless,
required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. found the following facts:

The following is a copy of the evidence which appears of record on this particular On the 26th day of December, 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed under the
point, being a part of the testimony of the said Isabeo Jena: following circumstances the document in question, which has been presented for
probate as his will:
Q. 1641 Who first signed the will?
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that
A. 1641 I signed it first, and afterwards Aniceto and the others. the document in question be written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena,
and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as his will. They were all
Q. 1641 Who were those others to whom you have just referred?
together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he
A. 1641 After the witness Aniceto signed the will I left the house, because I signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request,
was in a hurry, and at the moment when I was leaving I saw Julio Javellana with the and in his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto
pen in his hand in position ready to sign (en actitud de firmar). I believe he signed, Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in the
because he was at the table. . . . presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment
Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was
Q. 1641 State positively whether Julio Javellana did or did not sign as a witness leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in
to the will. position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo
Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed
A. 1641 I can't say certainly, because as I was leaving the house I saw Julio
as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
Javellana with the pen in his hand, in position ready to sign. I believe he signed.
We can not agree with so much of the above finding of facts as holds that the
Q. 1641 Why do you believe Julio Javellana signed?
signature of Javellana was not signed in the presence of Jena, in compliance with
A. 1641 Because he had the pen in his hand, which was resting on the paper, the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that Jena was
though I did not actually see him sign. still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of
affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining
Q. 1641 Explain this contradictory statement. witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the
will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact
A. 1641 After I signed I asked permission to leave, because I was in a hurry, that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the
and while I was leaving Julio had already taken the pen in his hand, as it appeared, name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other
witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the
testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the
moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and
physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see
everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and
without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of
opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.

The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the
testator is said to be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of
the instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted
tests of presence are vision and mental apprehension. (See Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law,
vol. 30, p. 599, and cases there cited.)

In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the
witnesses are together for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and
in a position to actually see the testator write, if they choose to do so; and there are
many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not whether the
testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign,
considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the
subscription. (Spoonemore vs. Cables, 66 Mo., 579.)

The principles on which these cases rest and the tests of presence as between the
testator and the witnesses are equally applicable in determining whether the
witnesses signed the instrument in the presence of each other, as required by the
statute, and applying them to the facts proven in these proceedings we are of
opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the instrument were
complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on the
ground stated in the ruling appealed from.

We are of opinion from the evidence of record that the instrument propounded in
these proceedings was satisfactorily proven to be the last will and testament of
Macario Jaboneta, deceased, and that it should therefore be admitted to probate.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, without especial condemnation of costs,
and after twenty days the record will be returned to the court form whence it
came, where the proper orders will be entered in conformance herewith. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 15566 September 14, 1921
EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the
minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia,objectors-appellants.
STREET, J.:
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of one Esteban
Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for
the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the
will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified — with details not necessary to be
here specified — that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator
was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was
corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting
witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.
When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose
testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the
testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about.
After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof thus presented, the trial judge
found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory
and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate.
From this judgment an appeal was taken in behalf of the persons contesting the will, and the only errors
here assigned have reference to the two following points, namely, first, whether a will can be admitted
to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or
accounting for the absence of the other two; and, secondly, whether the will in question is rendered
invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are
written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
Upon the first point, while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay be proved by the
testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil.,
291), this court declared after an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that
when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of
the process of the court.
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses
were not produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the
probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which
was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable
that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate would not be contested,
repaired to the court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the
will was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of
the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself
supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact
now to be mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that
the execution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.
It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower court either upon the
submission of the cause for determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion
for a new trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee that this question cannot now be raised for the
first time in this court. We believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment of error must be
declared not be well taken. This exact question has been decided by the Supreme Court of California
adversely to the contention of the appellant, and we see no reason why the same rule of practice should
not be observed by us. (Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.)
There are at least two reason why the appellate tribunals are disinclined to permit certain questions to
be raised for the first time in the second instance. In the first place it eliminates the judicial criterion of
the Court of First Instance upon the point there presented and makes the appellate court in effect a
court of first instance with reference to that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial. In the
second place, it permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to trifle with the administration of justice by
concealing from the trial court and from their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is placed,
while they are engaged in other discussions more simulated than real. These considerations are, we
think, decisive.
In ruling upon the point above presented we do not wish to be understood as laying down any hard and
fast rule that would prove an embarrassment to this court in the administration of justice in the future.
In one way or another we are constantly here considering aspects of cases and applying doctrines which
have escaped the attention of all persons concerned in the litigation below; and this is necessary if this
court is to contribute the part due from it in the correct decision of the cases brought before it. What we
mean to declare is that when we believe that substantial justice has been done in the Court of First
Instance, and the point relied on for reversal in this court appears to be one which ought properly to
have been presented in that court, we will in the exercise of a sound discretion ignore such question
relates a defect which might have been cured in the Court of First Instance if attention had been called
to it there. In the present case, if the appellant had raised this question in the lower court, either at the
hearing or upon a motion for a new trial, that court would have had the power, and it would have been
is duty, considering the tardy institution of the contest, to have granted a new trial in order that all the
witnesses to the will might be brought into court. But instead of thus calling the error to the attention of
the court and his adversary, the point is first raised by the appellant in this court. We hold that this is too
late.
Properly understood, the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, contains nothing inconsistent with the
ruling we now make, for it appears from the opinion in that case that the proponent of the will had
obtained an order for a republication and new trial for the avowed purpose of presenting the two
additional attesting witnesses who had not been previously examined, but nevertheless subsequently
failed without any apparent reason to take their testimony. Both parties in that case were therefore fully
apprised that the question of the number of witnesses necessary to prove the will was in issue in the
lower court.
The second point involved in this case is whether, under section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645, it is essential to the validity of a will in this jurisdiction that the names of the
testator and the instrumental witnesses should be written on the left margin of each page, as required in
said Act, and not upon the right margin, as in the will now before us; and upon this we are of the opinion
that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the
general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully
complied with. The same doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court.

Still some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial it would be absurd to
suppose that the Legislature could have attached any decisive importance to them. The provision to the
effect that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page
— rather than on the right margin — seems to be this character. So far as concerns the authentication of
the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the
left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or the other. In Caraig vs. Tatlonghari (R. G. No.
12558, decided March 23, 1918, not reported), this court declared a will void which was totally lacking in
the signatures required to be written on its several pages; and in the case of Re estate of Saguinsin (41
Phil., 875), a will was likewise declared void which contained the necessary signatures on the margin of
each leaf ( folio), but not in the margin of each page containing written matter.

The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point of
deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin instead
of the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated and
guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been protected by being
signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted without discovering the
slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other.

The same could not be said of a case like that of Estate of Saguinsin, supra, where only the leaves, or
alternate pages, were signed and not each written page; for as observed in that case by our late
lamented Chief Justice, it was possible that in the will as there originally executed by the testratrix only
the alternative pages had been used, leaving blanks on the reverse sides, which conceivably might have
been filled in subsequently.

The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (40
Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures
were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends.
But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as
attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too
trivial to invalidate the instrument.

It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed from will be
affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.
C.A. No. 4 March 21, 1946
In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra. TRINIDAD NEYRA, petitioner-
appellee, vs. TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE BLANCO, oppositors-
appellants.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. BLANCO, petitioners-appellants, vs.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
DE JOYA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree rendered by the Hon. Gervasio Diaz, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila, on December 3, 1943, admitting to probate a will dated November 3, 1942,
executed by the deceased Encarnacion Neyra; at the same time denying the probate of a previous will
dated September 14, 1939, alleged to have been executed by the said testatrix.
Trinidad Neyra, beneficiary in the will executed on November 3, 1942, filed, on November 10, 1942, a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the probate of said will.
On December 19, 1942, Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman, and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, who had not
been named as beneficiaries in said will, filed on opposition to the probate of the said will dated
November 3, 1942, alleging (1) that at the time of the alleged execution of the said will, the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra no longer possessed testamentary capacity; (2) that her thumb marks on said
instrument had been procured by means of fraud by petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and that Encarnacion
Neyra never intended to consider said document as will; (3) that the alleged will, dated November 3,
1942, had not been executed in the manner and form prescribed by law; and(4) that Encarnacion Neyra,
since September 14, 1939, had executed a will, naming as beneficiaries said oppositors and others, and
that said will had never been revoked or amended in any manner whatsoever.
On December 26, 1942, petitioner Trinidad Neyra filed a reply denying the allegations in the opposition.
Subsequently, said oppositors filed a counter petition, asking for the probate of the first will executed by
Encarnacion Neyra, on September 14, 1939, marked as Exhibit 16. On March 16, 1943, the legatees
Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza filed their opposition to the probate on said will marked as
Exhibit 16, and amended said opposition, on September 15, 1943, to which Teodora Neyra and the
others filed a reply, on September 20, 1943.
On the dates set for the hearing on the petition filed by Trinidad Neyra, and the counter petition
mentioned above, said petitioner as well as the oppositors, presented evidence, testimonial and
documentary. The witnesses presented by the petitioner Trinidad Neyra were Mons. Vicente Fernandez,
Rev. Fr. Teodoro Garcia, Sor. Andrea Montejo, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio A. Aldecoa, Atty. Ricardo
Sikat, petitioner Trinidad Neyra herself, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, who had acted as scrivener in the
preparation of said will dated November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors also presented several witnesses, the principal among whom
were Presentacion Blanco, Caferina de la Cruz, Acislo Manuel, Dr. Dionisio Parulan, an alleged medical
expert, and the oppositors Teodora Neyra and Pilar de Guzman themselves.
After considering the evidence, the lower court rendered a decree admitting to probate the will dated
November 3, 1942; at the same time denying the probate of the will dated September 14, 1939.
From said decision Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals for the City
of Manila, assigning several errors, which may be reduced to the following, to wit, that the trial court
erred (1) in finding that Encarnacion Neyra wanted to make a new will; (2) in declaring that there was
reconciliation between Encarnacion Neyra and her sister Trinidad; (3) in accepting as satisfactory the
evidence submitted by the petitioner; (4) in ignoring the evidence submitted by the oppositors; and (5)
in not admitting to probate the will dated September 14, 1939.
The evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced during the trial of the case in the court below, has
satisfactorily and sufficiently established the following facts:
That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and
two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and several other
relatives; that after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra,
had serious quarrels, in connection with the properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were
their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, concerning said properties (Exhibits 8 and 9): In the first case, filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad
Neyra and others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra et al. the annulment of the sale of the property
located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, and it was finally decided in favor of the defendants in the Court
of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R. No. 8162, Exhibit 9).
In the second case, filed on October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra demanded from Encarnacion Neyra, one-
half (½) of the property described therein, and one-half (½) of the rents, and the Court of First Instance
decided in favor of the plaintiff, but at the same time awarded in favor of the defendant P727.77, under
her counterclaim; and Trinidad Neyra again elevated the case to the Court of Appeals for Manila (G.R.
No. 8075) Exhibit 8, which was decided, pursuant to the document of compromise marked as Exhibit D;
and the petition for reconsideration filed therein still remains undecided.
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants, executed a
will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion
de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her other relatives named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and
Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said will in favor of her only sister
Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy; that when the said will was brought to the attention
of the authorities of said Congregation, after due deliberation and consideration, said religious
organization declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation
was duly communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said religious
organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to make a new will,
and for that purpose, about one week before her death, sent for one Ricardo Sikat, an attorney working
in the Law Offices of Messrs. Feria and LaO, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will;
that Attorney Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, in accordance with the express instructions given by
Encarnacion Neyra, merely prepared a draft in the form of a codicil, marked as Exhibit M, amending said
will, dated September 14, 1939, again naming said religious organization, among others, as beneficiary,
and said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of the said religious organization, for
their consideration and acceptance.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's disease, and on
October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the
Quiapo Church to make confession, after which she expressed her desire to have a mass celebrated in
her house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy communion, in view of her
condition; that following the request of Encarnacion Neyra, Mons. Fernandez caused the necessary
arrangements to be made for the celebration of holy mass in the house of Encarnacion Neyra, and, as a
matter of fact, on November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house, Fr. Teodoro Garcia, also of
the Quiapo Church, officiating in said ceremony, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in
bed, took holy communion; that after said religious ceremony had been terminated, Father Garcia talked
to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and
Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion Neyra accepted said advice and at about noon of the same day (November
1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad Neyra, who came at about 2:30 that same
afternoon; that on seeing one another, the two greeted each other in a most affectionate manner, and
became reconciled; that the two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which the two
sisters also talked about the properties left by their deceased father and their litigations which had
reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, and they agreed to have the said appeal dismissed,
on the condition that the property involved therein, consisting of a small house and lot, should be given
exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, on the condition that the latter should waive her claim for her share in the
rents of said property, while under the administration of Encarnacion Neyra, and that the two should
renounce their mutual claims against one another. It was also agreed between the two sisters to send
for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document embodying the said agreement, but
Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when
Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and
other instructions relative to the disposition she wanted to make of her properties in her last will and
testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise or agreement marked as Exhibit
D, as well as the new will and testament marked as Exhibit C, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio
Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to the express instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, and
said instruments were ready for signature on November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day,
November 3, 1942; Attorney Panis read said will and testament marked as Exhibit D to Encarnacion
Neyra slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Fr. Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio
Aldecoa, herein petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if its terms were in
accordance with her wishes, if she had anything else to add, or anything to be changed in said will; and
as Encarnacion Neyra stated that the terms of said will were in accordance with her wishes and express
instructions, she asked for the pad and the will Exhibit C and, with the help of a son of herein petitioner,
placed her thumb mark at the foot of said will, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Dr.
Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which the attesting witnesses
signed at the foot of the document, in the presence of the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, and of each and
everyone of the other attesting witnesses. Fr. Teodoro Garcia and petitioner Trinidad Neyra and several
others were also present.
On November 4, 1942, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, due to a heart attack, unexpectedly died.
Although the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" had again decided not to accept the
provision made in its favor by the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra in the proposed codicil prepared by Atty.
Ricardo Sikat, said decision could not be communicated to the testatrix, before her death.
Mons. Vicente Fernandez and Fr. Teodoro Garcia testified as to the request made on October 31, 1942,
by Encarnacion Neyra for the celebration of holy mass in her house, on November 1, 1942; that said
mass was in fact solemnized in her house, on that date, in the course of which the testatrix Encarnacion
Neyra took holy communion; that on the same day, after the mass, Encarnacion held a long conversation
with Father Garcia, in the course of which, said priest advised her to have reconciliation with her sister
Trinidad; and that said advise was accepted by Encarnacion.
But the testimony of Trinidad Neyra, it has been shown that Encarnacion sent Eustaquio Mendoza to
fetch her, and that in fact she came to the house of Encarnacion, at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon
that same day, November 1, 1942, with said Eustaquio Mendoza; that on seeing one another,
Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra greeted each other most affectionately, forgiving one another, after
which they talked about the property left by their deceased father and the litigation pending between
them; and the two sisters agreed to settle their case, which had been elevated to the Court of Appeals
for the City of Manila, concerning a certain house and lot, on the understanding that said property
should be given exclusively to Trinidad, and that the latter should renounce her claim against
Encarnacion, for her share in the rents collected on said property, and, at the same time, Encarnacion
renounced her claim for P727.77 against Trinidad; and that it was also agreed between the two sisters
that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis should be called to prepare the necessary papers for the settlement of said
case. Presentacion Blanco, a witness for the oppositors, also testified substantially to the foregoing facts.
By the testimony of Trinidad Neyra and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, and the other attesting witnesses, it has
also been shown that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis came in the afternoon of the following day, November 2,
1942, and received instructions from Encarnacion Neyra, not only for the preparation of said agreement,
but also for the preparation of a new will, and consequently Attorney Panis prepared said document of
compromise and the will, dated November 3, 1942, which were both thumb marked, in duplicate, in the
afternoon of that day, by Encarnacion Neyra, who was then of sound mind, as shown by her appearance
and conversation, aided by a son of Trinidad Neyra, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the
attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, who signed
in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the will, at the request of Encarnacion Neyra,
and so was Trinidad Neyra.
On November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack as a consequence of Addison's disease, perhaps,
Encarnacion Neyra expired, at about 3 o'clock in the morning.
Oppositor Teodora Neyra, her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of
oppositor Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, practically corroborated the testimony of the witnesses of the
petitioner, with reference to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, on
November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz, witnesses for the oppositors, testified,
however, that when the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed, as stated above, to the
document of compromise in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala;
and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.
But Ceferina de la Cruz, witness for the oppositors, also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the
documents thumb marked by Encarnacion Neyra, in the sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and
Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also testified that
Encarnacion Neyra's thumb mark was affixed to the will, only in the morning of November 4, 1942, by
Trinidad Neyra and Ildefonso del Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature and effects of Addison's
disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.
According to the medical authorities, the cause or causes of the sleeping sickness, known as Addison's
disease, are not yet fully known: that persons attacked by said decease often live as long as ten (10)
years after the first attack, while others die after a few weeks only, and that as the disease, progresses,
asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and
complications of the heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250, 1252, 1253;
MaCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V. pp. 272-279).
And it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, at the age of 48,
died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, after an illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the testimony of
witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged
medical experts.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator
is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of, and the persons who would naturally
be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument
will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. (Bugnao vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the opponents to the probate of a
will, who stated that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of
the mental faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil.,
400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's testimony to the
contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap
Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony testimony of the attending physician
that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose for several days, prior to his
death, was held not sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of
several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what said to him and to
communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.) Where the mind of the
testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to
guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will. (Amata and
Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will, the testator
intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to move or
stand up unassisted, but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances
show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of executing the will.
(Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and
also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her and that
they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time
of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's
disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the
sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients
suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments
of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the conclusion made the trial court that the testatrix Encarnacion
Neyra was of sound mind and possessed testamentary capacity, at the time of the execution of the will,
cannot be properly disturbed.
The oppositors also claim that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time that the testatrix
thumbed marked the will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in
the caida. But it has been fully shown that the attesting witnesses were present at the time of the
signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on
her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the signing of the will,
but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses
actually saw it in this case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix
on the will is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
The oppositors as well as their principal witnesses are all interested parties, as said oppositors had been
named legatees in the will dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated from the will dated November 3,
1942.
On the other hand, the witnesses for the petitioner are all trustworthy men, who had absolutely no
interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while the three
attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable character, who had known and seen and
talked to the testatrix.
Furthermore, the testimony of the oppositors and their witnesses, to the effect that there could have
been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was
affixed to the document embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in
their presence; and that her thumb mark was affixed to the will in question, when she was already dead,
in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view is preposterous, to say the least. Said testimony is
contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. The oppositors and their witnesses could
not have told the truth; they have testified to brazen falsehoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely
unworthy of belief. And to the evidence of the oppositors is completely applicable the rule falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.)
In the brief presented by counsel for the oppositors and the appellants, to show the alleged
improbability of the reconciliation of the two sisters and the execution of the will, dated November 3,
1942, they have erroneously placed great reliance on the facts that, up to October 31, 1942, the two
sisters Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking evidently on the
common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent. Dreadful indeed are the feuds of relatives,
and difficult the reconciliation. But they had forgotten the fact that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious
and pious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of Christian faith and hope and charity, and that it was
godly to forgive and better still to forget.

It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The
approach of imminent death must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of childhood. And
believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always been fair to her sister who in fact, had had
successively instituted two suits against her, to recover what was her due, and for which Encarnacion
believed she must atone, she finally decided upon reconciliation, so that she might depart in peace.

The record shows that, of the two, Encarnacion lived in greater opulence, and that Trinidad had been
demanding tenaciously her share; and as a Christian woman, Encarnacion must have known that no one
has any right to enrich himself unjustly, at the expense of another. And it was, therefore, natural that
Encarnacion should desire reconciliation with her sister Trinidad, and provide for her in her last will and
testament.

As for Eustaquio Mendoza, who, according to the evidence, had served Encarnacion Neyra for so many
years and so well, it was also natural that she should make some provision for him, as gratitude is the
noblest sentiment that springs from the human heart.

The conduct of Encarnacion Neyra, in making altogether a new will, with new beneficiaries named
therein, including principally her bitterest enemy of late, which is completely incompatible with the will,
dated September 14, 1939, may really seem strange and unusual; but, as it has been truly said, above
the logic of the head is the feeling in the heart, and the heart has reasons of its own which the head
cannot always understand, as in the case of intuitive knowledge of eternal verity.

As Encarnacion Neyra felt the advent of immortality, she naturally wanted to follow "the path of the just,
which is as the shining light that shineth more and more unto the perfect day," so that her memory may
be blessed. As a Christian woman, she must have loved justice, mercy and truth and to follow the law,
for this is the whole duty of man.

In the present case, the court cannot find any reason or justification to alter the conclusions set forth in
the decree appealed from. This court will not reverse any findings of fact by the trial court made upon
conflicting testimony and depending largely upon the credibility of witnesses, who testified in the
presence of the trial judge, unless the court below failed to take into consideration some material facts
or circumstances, or to weigh accurately all of the material facts and circumstances presented to it for
consideration. (Baltazar vs. Alberto, 33 Phil., 336; Melliza vs.Towle, 34 Phil., 345; Caragay vs. Urquiza, 53
Phil., 72, 79; Garcia vs. Garcia de Bartolome, 63 Phil., 419.)

After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we find it legally impossible to
sustain any of the errors assigned by the appellants. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed,
with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-
appellants..
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate the document and its
duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte,
deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the person named therein as such.
This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance and admission to
probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the
appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof.
The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused notice thereof to be
published for three (3) successive weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila
chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and on
November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which
proponent objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing the Philippine
Trust Company as special administrator.1äwphï1.ñët
On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his
own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his evidence; but on June
1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the
decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959.
On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint
opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order of July 20, 1959,
the court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959, oppositor Natividad Icasiano filed her amended
opposition. Thereafter, the parties presented their respective evidence, and after several hearings the
court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors
appealed directly to this Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground that the
same is contrary to law and the evidence.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila
on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and
testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila,
published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and
Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said
three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and
for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also
present during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former
Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental
witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad
were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and
authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the
testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the
document. The latter also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies
of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one
original and one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of
the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every
page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page
three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and
marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every
page.
The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will and its
duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the
testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's
presence and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad
on page three (3) of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly
numbered; that the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein
and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language known to and
spoken by the testatrix that the attestation clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the
witnesses; that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the
original and the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila
on the same date June 2, 1956.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may
have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was
signed in his presence.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the
testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same
occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were
executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived
into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the
provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of
the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from
properties held by them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein,
while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and
not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed both
original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same
in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty.
Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog,
a language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix
and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in
a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. The opinion of expert for oppositors,
Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original were not written
by the same had which wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us unconvinced, not merely
because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but principally because of
the paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion that the differences between the
standard and questioned signatures are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The
expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix besides those affixed to
the original of the testament (Exh. A); and we feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and
the signatures in the duplicate could not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is
particularly so since the comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are radical
differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the
testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being
signed right the original. These, factors were not discussed by the expert.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures
does not appear reliable, considering the standard and challenged writings were affixed to different
kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find the
testimony of the oppositor's expert sufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental
witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the United States during the trial, did not testify).
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither (see In re Butalid, 10 Phil. 27; Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163;
Pecson vs. Coronal, 45 Phil. 216). Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament;
otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary dispositions that the heirs should
not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under
penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence.
They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary
experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non-heirs
and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occassion.
It is also well to note that, as remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco vs. Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz. 168,
fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for
opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.
signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary
Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal
tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator
and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil.
476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to
make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order
to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary
privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate
(Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one
signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the
original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate
(Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to
the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said
duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original
testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new publication does not
affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the petition
for probate. The amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed, but merely
supplemented it by disclosing the existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests
were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly
notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that the amendment deprived the
appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in admitting the amended petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one
page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se
sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact
that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the
coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix
and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control,
where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to
the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off.
Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or
bungling it or the attestation clause".

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown
by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
TUASON, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate of what
purports to be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in
Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in question was executed.
In the court below, the present appellant specified five grounds for his opposition, to wit: (1) that the
deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3)
that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity
due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as
required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it
was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and
the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or
trick.
In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these words: "That the court a
quo erred in holding that the document Exhibit "A" was executed in all particulars as required by law." To
this objection is added the alleged error of the court "in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence
that Exhibit "A" was written in a language known to the decedent after petitioner rested his case and
over the vigorous objection of the oppositor. The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is
written on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic
numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of
preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil.,
476.) In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or
characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its
contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the
first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the
Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the
logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as
page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator
and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other than
page one. Abangan vs. Abangan,supra, and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this
issue.
Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first assignment of error, the matter of the
credibility of the witnesses is assailed under this heading. On the merits we do not believe that the
appellant's contention deserves serious consideration. Such contradictions in the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses as are set out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of which every one of
the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.
Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the field of experimental psychology show that the
contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of a certain incident, after a long series of
questioning, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith.
Inasmuch as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in
relating their impressions they should not agree in the minor details; hence, the contradictions in their
testimony. (People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil., 99.)
The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this
was that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place might have
directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing
curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating
his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be
"signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53
Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)
With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion that the trial court
communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of
Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case
and after the opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party
offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly
been abused. (64 C. J., 160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not it will
allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a
nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened after the court has announced its
intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the same,
or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon the minutes or
signed. (64 C. J., 164.)
In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective direct
proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good
reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its
ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong and Co.
vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when
it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the
purpose of the evidence is to the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. (I Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The omission to present evidence on the
testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight.
Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will for its silence on the
testator's understanding of the language used in the testament. There is no statutory requirement that
such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof
aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will
written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there
was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog
region, from which the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.
The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez is
affirmed, with costs
G.R. No. L-17304 May 22, 1922
In re will of Maria Roque y Paraiso, deceased.
CEFERINO ALDABA, petitioner-appellee, vs. LUDOVICO ROQUE, opponent-appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
It appears from the record of the case that on July 9, 1918, Maria Roque y Paraiso, the widow of Bruno
Valenzuela, resident of the barrio of Mambog, municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, executed
her last will and testament in the Tagalog dialect with the help of Vicente Platon and in the presence of
three witnesses who signed the attestation clause and each of the four pages of the testament. Maria
Roque died on December 3, 1919, and when her will was filed in court for probate, it was contested by
Ludovico Roque on the ground that it had not been prepared nor executed in conformity with the
requirements and solemnities prescribed by law.
After due proceedings had been had, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by its decision rendered on
February 27th of the following year, pronounced the testament in question valid, and ordered its
probate, appointing Ceferino Aldaba as the administrator of the estate.
The errors assigned by the appellant are two, to wit: "That each and every folio of the said testament is
not paged correlatively in letter," and "that the said will lacks the attestation clause required by law."
We have examined document Exhibit 4 which is the will in question and we find at the end thereof the
following in Tagalog which translated into English reads:
This document expresses my last and spontaneous will, and is my last will and testament, which was
drawn by the lawyer, Don Vicente Platon, at my direction, and everything contained in this testament
has been ordained and directed by me to said Vicente Platon in order that it might be embodied in this
testament, and after this testament has been drawn up, I directed him to read it so that I might hear all
its contents, and I have heard and understood all the contents of this document which is my last will,
wherefore, and not knowing how to write, I have requested Don Vicente Platon to write and sign my
name in my stead hereon; I declare that this testament is composed of four sheets, actually used, that
the sheets are paged with the letter A, B, C, and d, and above my name I have placed the thumb mark of
my right hand in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, and that all the witnesses have signed in my
presence and of each other here at Malolos, Bulacan, this 9th day of the month of July, 1918; and I also
declare that at my request Don Vicente Platon has written my name on the left margin of all pages of this
testament, in the presence of the witnesses, and all the witnesses have also signed all the pages of this
testament on the left margin in my presence and that of each other.
X (Her thumb mark)
MARIA ROQUE Y PARAISO,
Per VICENTE PLATON.
(Sgd.) REGINO E. MENDOZA,
Witness.
(Sgd.) CEFERINO ALDABA.
Witness.
In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points contained in the
above described paragraph; however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said
declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute
a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides that:
The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In regard to the other assignment of error, to wit, that each of the folios of the said testament is not
paged correlatively in letters "one." "two," "three," etc., but only with the letters A, B, C, etc., we are of
the opinion that this method of indicating the paging of the testament is a compliance with the spirit of
the law, since either one of the two ways above-mentioned indicates the correlation of the pages and
serves to prevent the loss of any of them. It might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the
paging be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the
pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of
forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more or less degree of facility
to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signature.
And as in the present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of the testament, consisting in
the signatures on the left marging of the testament and the paging thereof as declared in the attestation
clause, the holding of this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil, 476), might as well be repeated:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends.
But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecesary, useless, and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause on another. Neither one
of these pages was numbered in any way; and it was held:
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is
signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be
further signed on their margings by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
This means that, according to the particular case, the omission of paging does not necessarily render the
testament invalid.

(Sgd.) IGNACIO ANIAG, The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on the upper part of the
Witness. sheet, but if the paging should be place din the lower part, would the testament be void for his sole
reason? We believe not. The law also provides that the testator and the witnesses must sign the left
margin of each of the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would this fact
also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has already held in Avera vs. Garcia and
Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145):lävvphì1·né+

It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on
the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that
all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same doctrine is
also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court

Still some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial that it would be absurd to
suppose that the Legislature could have attached any decisive importance to them. The provision to the
effect that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page
— rather than on the right margin — seems to be of this character. So far as concerns the authentication
of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible different whether the names appear on the
left or on the right margin, provided they are on one or the other. In Caraig vs. Tatlonghari (R. G. No.
12558, decided March 23, 1918, not reported), this court declared a will void which was totally lacking in
the signatures required to be written on its several pages; and in the case of Re estate of Saguinsin (41
Phil., 875), a will was likewise declared void which contained the necessary signature on the margin of
each left (folio), but not on the margin of each page containing written matter.

We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of no importance. But since its
principal object is to give the correlation of the pages, we hold that this object may be attained by
writing "one." "two," "three," etc., well as by writing A, B, C, etc. Following, therefore, the view
maintained by this court in the case ofAbangan vs. Abangan, supra, as regards the appreciation of the
solemnities of a testament, we decide that the judgment appealed from must be, as is hereby, affirmed
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 211972 July 22, 2015
WILSON GO and PETER GO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, represented by RESURRECCION A. BIHIS,
RHEA A. BIHIS, and REGINA A. BIHIS; and RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS,
in their personal capacities, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 212045
ELLA A. GUERRERO, DELFIN A. GUERRERO, JR. and LESTER ALVIN A. GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, herein represented by RESURRECION A.
BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, and RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A.
BIHIS, in their personal capacities, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated1 petitions for review on certiorari2 are the Decision3 dated December 19,
2013 and the Resolution4 dated April 1, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
96697, which modified the Decision5 dated June 8, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 224 (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, and thereby ordered: (a) the nullification of the Deed of
Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson Go (Wilson) and Peter Go (Peter), petitioners in G.R. No.
211972; (b) the reconveyance of the disputed property to the Estate of Felisa Tamio; and (c) the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-1704 75, as well as the issuance of a new title in
the name of the Estate of Felisa Tamio by the Register of Deeds.
The Facts
On March 17, 1959, the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura (Felisa) purchased from Carmen Zaragosa,
Inc. a parcel of land with an area of 533 square meters, more or less, situated at Retiro corner Kanlaon
Streets, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City (subject property) and, thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 was issued in
her name. Thereafter, she constructed a three-storey building thereon, called D'Lourds Building, where
she resided until her death on February 19, 1994.6 On February 10, 1960, Felisa supposedly sold the
subject property to one of her daughters, Bella Guerrero (Bella), the latter's husband, Delfin Guerrero,
Sr. (Delfin, Sr.), and Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. (Felimon, Sr.), Felisa's common-law husband.7 Bella, co-
petitioner in G.R. No. 212045, and Delfin, Sr. paid P15,000.00 as consideration therefor.8 Thus, TCT No.
45951/T-233 in the name of Felisa was cancelled and TCT No. 498699 was issued in the names of
Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin, Sr..
Sometime in 1968, Resurrecion A. Bihis10 (Resurrecion), the other daughter of Felisa, sister of Bella, and
respondent in both G.R. Nos. 211972 a nd 212045, began to occupy the second floor of the D'Lourds
Building and stayed therein until her death in 2007.11
As it appears that TCT No. 49869 in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., was
irretrievably destroyed in the interim, Bella caused its reconstitution and was issued TCT No. RT-74910
(49869),12 again registered in their names.
When Felisa died on February 19, 1994, she allegedly bequeathed, in a disputed last will and testament,
half of the subject property to Resurrecion and her daughters, Rhea A. Bihis (Rhea) and Regina A. Bihis
(Regina), corespondents in both G.R. Nos. 211972 and 212045 (collectively, the Bihis Family). Thus, on
April 19, 1994, the Bihis Family caused the annotation of an adverse claim on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869).
Felisa's purported will likewise declared Bella as the administrator of the subject property.13
On the strength of such appointment, Bella filed, on May 24, 1994, a petition for the probate of Felisa's
will. She was eventually appointed as the administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and, in an inventory of
Felisa's properties, Bella included the subject property as part of said estate.14
On January 22, 1997, the adverse claim of the Bihis Family was cancelled. The following day, January 23,
1997, Felimon Buenaventura, Jr. (Felimon, Jr.) and Teresita Robles, a.k.a. Rosalina Buenaventura
Mariano15 (Teresita), apparently the heirs of Felimon, Sr. (Heirs of Felimon, Sr.), executed a purported
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Felimon Buenaventura, Sr., and caused its annotation on TCT
No. RT-74910 (49869). By virtue thereof, TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was cancelled and TCT No. N-170416
was issued in the names of the Heirs of Felimon, Sr., Bella, and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 212045,
Delfin A. Guerrero, Jr. (Delfin, Jr.) and Lester Alvin A. Guerrero (Lester) (collectively, Bella, et al.).16
On the very same day, January 23, 1997, through a Deed of Sale of even date, the subject property was
sold to Wilson and Peter by Bella, et al. for the amount of P4,500,000.00, a transaction completely
unknown to Felisa's other heirs, the Bihis Family. Thus, TCT No. N-170416 was cancelled and, in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 170475 was issued in the names of Wilson and Peter. Thereafter, Wilson and Peter filed
ejectment cases against the occupants and/or lessees of the subject property.17
In July 1997, the probate court revoked the appointment of Bella as administratrix of the Estate of Felisa
and eventually, granted letters of administration to Resurrecion.18 Hence, on October 17, 1997, herein
respondents, the Estate of Felisa, as represented by the Bihis Family, and the Bihis Family, in their
personal capacities (collectively, respondents), filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, against Bella, et al., Wilson, Peter, and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that Felisa, during her lifetime, merely entrusted the subject property to
Felimon, Sr., Bella, and Delfin, Sr. for the purpose of assisting Bella and Delfin, Sr. to obtain a loan and
mortgage from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). To facilitate the transaction, Felisa
agreed to have the title over the subject property transferred to Bella and Felimon, Sr. However, Felisa
never divested herself of her ownership over the subject property, as evidenced by her continuous
residence thereon, as well as her act of leasing several units to various tenants. In fact, in a letter19 dated
September 21, 1970 (September 21, 1970 letter) addressed to Delfin, Sr., Felisa reminded Bella, Delfin,
Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted to them for Bella and Delfin, Sr. to
procure a loan from the GSIS.20 At the bottom of the letter, Bella's and Delfin, Sr.' s signatures appear
beside their names.21
Likewise, respondents alleged that Wilson and Peter were buyers in bad faith, as they were aware of the
facts and circumstances that would have warranted further inquiry into the validity of the title of the
sellers, Bella, et al. They averred that Wilson and Peter knew that the building was occupied by
individuals other than the sellers, as in fact, the Bihis Family was residing therein.22
In their defense, Bella and Felimon, Jr. claimed that the subject property was owned by Bella and (the
late) Felimon, Sr., as evidenced by TCT No. RT-74910 (49869), which title was issued to them as early as
February 10, 1960. Such title has therefore subsisted for almost thirty seven (37) years without having
been voided or nullified by a court decree. Moreover, they have exercised acts of ownership over the
subject property, such as m01igaging the same and leasing the building to third parties. Finally, they
asserted that Bella's act of including the subject property in the inventory of properties of the Estate of
Felisa was merely because of inadvertence.23
For his part, Wilson claimed that when he and his brother, Peter, purchased the subject property from
Bella, et al. on January 23, 1997, he was not aware of the judicial settlement of the Estate of Felisa. He
testified that before they acquired the subject property, he verified the validity of the title covering the
same with the Registry of Deeds, and that a period of two (2) months had lapsed before the sale was
consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella to cancel the encumbrance annotated on
the title over the subject property. However, he asserted that .his lawyer merely advised him to ask for
the cancellation of the annotation but he was not aware of the details surrounding the same. Eventually,
the annotation was cancelled and that he only knew that the subject property was included in the Estate
of Felisa when herein respondents' complaint before the RTC was filed. As such, he maintained that he
and Peter were purchasers in good faith.24
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision25 dated June 8, 2009, the RTC found that there was an implied trust between Felisa, on the
one hand, and Bella and Felimon, Sr., on the other, created by operation of law. The RTC concluded that
it was the intention of the late Felisa to merely entrust to Bella and Felimon, Sr. the subject property for
the sole purpose of using the same as collateral to secure a loan with the GSIS. As such, while it is true
that a title was issued in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. by virtue of the sale of the
subject property to them, it was clear that Felisa never intended to relinquish her ownership over the
subject property. In concluding so, the RTC gave probative weight to the September 21, 1970 letter
executed and signed by Felisa which not only reminded Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the
subject property was merely entrusted to them for purposes of securing a loan from the GSIS, but also
expressed Felisa's desire to have the subject property divided equally among her heirs.26
However, the R TC held that reconveyance can no longer be effected since the subject property had
already been transferred to Wilson and Peter, whom it found to be purchasers in good faith. The RTC
found that through Wilson's testimony, they were able to disprove respondents' allegation that they
were aware of an infirmity in the title of the sellers when they acquired the subject property.27
Consequently, as Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. were unjustly enriched at the expense of the
respondents who, as compulsory heirs, were also entitled to their share in the subject property, the RTC
directed Bella, et al. to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the amounts of: (a) P2,000,000.00 as
compensatory damages, representing half of the purchase price of the subject property considering that
reconveyance can no longer be granted; (b)P200,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) P200,000.00 as attorney's fees.28
Dissatisfied, the following parties filed their separate appeals before the CA: the Estate of Felisa; the
Bihis Family; the Estate of Rosalinda B. Mariano;29 and Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester.30 The CA simplified
the issues raised in the separate appeals, as follows: (a) whether or not there was a trust established by
Felisa in favor of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr.; (b) whether or not the action for reconveyance had
already prescribed; and (c) whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith.31
The CA Ruling
In a Decision32 dated December 19, 2013, the CA modified the RTC Decision, and thereby ordered: (a) the
nullification of the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson and Peter; ( b) the
reconveyance of the disputed property to the Estate of Felisa; and (c) the cancellation of TCT No. N-
170475 in the name of Wilson and Peter, as well as the issuance of a new title in the name of the Estate
of Felisa by the Register of Deeds.33
In its ruling, the CA upheld the RTC's finding that an implied trust was constituted between Felisa, during
her lifetime, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. when the former sold the subject property to the
latter. Like the RTC, it gave substantial weight and credence to the September 21, 1970 letter executed
by Felisa which expressed her intention to convey the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr. only for the purpose of obtaining a loan from the GSIS. The CA similarly found that Felisa had not
intended to relinquish her ownership over the subject property in their favor, as evidenced not only by
the said letter but also by her contemporaneous and subsequent acts of ownership, i.e., leasing the
building to tenants, instituting ejectment suits, having business permits issued in her name, and
including the subject property in her last will and testament.34
Moreover, the CA ruled that the issuance of TCT No. 49869 in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and
Felimon, Sr. did not operate to vest ownership of the subject property upon them, as a certificate of title
is not equivalent to title. Hence, the presentation of TCT No. 49869 does not conclusively prove their
claim of ownership over the subject property.35
With respect to the issue of whether or not the action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had
already prescribed, the CA found that prescription has not set in. Citing jurisprudence, it held that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten ( 10) years, to be counted from the
date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property. However, the rule applies only when the claimant
or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. When the claimant is in actual
possession of the property, the action for reconveyance, which is effectively an action for quieting of
title, is imprescriptible. In this case, it has been indubitably established that the Bihis Family have been in
actual possession of the subject property; hence, their action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.36
Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith, the
CA ruled in the negative. It took into consideration the admission made by Wilson that he has knowledge
of the adverse claim of the Bihis Family annotated on the title of the subject property but denied
knowledge of its contents. Likewise, he admitted that he directed his lawyer to have the said annotation
cancelled before purchasing the subject property. Records also show that he knew that the Bihis Family
have been occupying the second floor of the D'Lourds Building. However, despite knowledge of the
foregoing facts, he and his brother failed to make the necessary inquiries as to the validity of the title of
the sellers, Bella, et al. Consequently, he and Peter cannot be considered as buyers in good faith.37
Wilson and Peter, Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester, Felimon, Jr., and the Estate of Rosalinda Buenaventura
Mariano filed separate motions for reconsideration,38 which were all denied in the Resolution39 dated
April 1, 2014; hence, these petitions.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues advanced for the Court's consideration are: (a) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that
there was an implied trust created between Felisa, on one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr.,
on the other; (b) whether or not the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed; and (c) whether or
not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith.
The Court's Ruling
The petitions are bereft of merit.
The following facts are undisputed: in 1960, Felisa, as owner of the subject property, transferred the
same to her daughter Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. to assist them in procuring a loan
from the GSIS. In view thereof, her title over the property, TCT No. 45951/T-233, was cancelled and a
new one, TCT No. 49869, was issued in the names of Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. After it
was lost, TCT No. 49869 was reconstituted and TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was issued in their names.
Upon Felisa's death in 1994, the Bihis Family, Felisa's other heirs who have long been occupying the
subject property, caused the annotation of their adverse claim over the same on TCT No. RT-74910
(49869). Subsequently, however, or on January 22, 1997, the said annotation was cancelled, and the next
day, the Heirs of Felimon, Sr. executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of his estate and caused its annotation
on said title. TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was then cancelled and TCT No. N-170416 was issued in the
names of Bella, et al. Finally, by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997, the subject property was
sold to Wilson and Peter, in whose names TCT No. 170475 currently exists. Months later, or on October
17, 1997,40 the complaint for reconveyance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, was
instituted.
From the foregoing factual milieu, the Court holds that: one, a trust was established between Felisa, on
the one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other, albeit not an implied trust as
concluded by the RTC and the CA but an express one; two, the present action for reconveyance has not
yet prescribed; and, three, Wilson and Peter are not purchasers in good faith.
I.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is
a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the
beneficiary.1âwphi1 Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is
created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by
operation of law.41
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the
Civil Code, "[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that
a trust is clearly intended." It is possible to create a trust without using the word "trust" or "trustee."
Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create
a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of
relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the
relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.42
Further, in the case of Tamayo v. Callejo,43 the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or
implied nature in the beginning, but the registered owner's subsequent express acknowledgement in a
public document of a previous sale of the property to another party effectively converted the same into
an express trust.44
In the present case, both the R TC and the CA found that an implied trust was established, heavily giving
credence, among others, to the September 21, 1970 letter executed by Felisa during her lifetime, which
partly reads:
Dear Delfin,
Ipinaaabot ko sa iyo ang sulat kong ito upang malaman mo ang aking nagiging damdamin. Hinihiling ko sa
iyo at ipinakikiusap sa iyo tungkol doon sa late at building ng D 'lourds.
Hindi naman kaila sa ivo kung papaano ko ito naisalin sa inyong pangalan nina Filemon C. Buenaventura
Sr., Bella Alvarez Guerrero at Delfin Guerrero Sr. Ang dahilan nito ay dahil sa pag-utang sa GSIS.
Kaya gusto kong malaman mo na ito ay nagpapatotoo na ito ay sarili kong pag-aari at walang sinumang
nagbigay o tumulong sa akin sa lupang ito. At maski si Ka Fe ling mo ay walang naibigay na pera dito.
Kaya hinihiling ko ang gusto kong mangyari sa ngayon ay maging kaparehong-kapareho ang paghahati ng
bawat isa sa anumang aking kabuhayan.
Kaya hinihiling ko sa iyo Delfin na kung maaari lamang ay ang lahat ng nakatala dito ay pirmahan ninyo.
x x x x45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Beneath the letter appear the signatures of Bella and Delfin, and the signature of Felisa signing as
"MOMMY" as well.46
Taking the contents of the foregoing letter into consideration – the validity and due execution of which
were never put in issue, hence, indubitably established - the Court therefore differs from the finding of
the courts a quo that an implied trust was established; instead, the Court rules that an express trust was
duly proved in this case.
The words of Felisa in the above-quoted letter unequivocally and absolutely declared her intention of
transferring the title over the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. in order to merely
accommodate them in securing a loan from the GSIS. She likewise stated clearly that she was retaining
her ownership over the subject property and articulated her wish to have her heirs share equally therein.
Hence, while in the beginning, an implied trust was merely created between Felisa, as trustor, and Bella,
Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., as both trustees and beneficiaries, the execution of the September 21, 1970
letter settled, once and for all, the nature of the trust established between them as an express one, their
true intention irrefutably extant thereon.
Bella's attempt to thwart the express trust established in this case by claiming that she affixed her
signature on the September 21, 1970 letter only "to appease" her mother, Felisa, and that she could
afford to sign the letter since the title covering the subject property was in their name as owners
anyway,47 does not hold water. As correctly ruled by the CA, citing Lee Tek Sheng v. CA, 48 the "[m]ere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the ce1iificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title,"49 as in this case.50 Registration does not vest title; it is merely the
evidence of such title.51 Moreover, the Court notes that even during the proceedings before the RTC,
Bella never denied the purpose for which the sale to them of the subject property was effected. Instead,
they relied heavily and anchored their defense on the existence of their certificate of title covering the
subject property, which, to reiterate, was insufficient to prove their ownership over the same
independent of the express trust.
presumption of good faith on the part of Wilson and Peter when they purchased the subject property. A
person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value,58 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated December 19, 2013 and the Resolution dated
April 1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96697 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

In light of the foregoing, while the Court agrees with the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that Bella, Delfin,
Sr., and Felimon, Sr. only hold the subject property in trust for Felisa, the Court however finds that an
express trust, not an implied one, was established in this case.

II.

Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by
respondents has not yet prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in ten
(10) years from the time the trust is repudiated.52

In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee, sold the
subject property to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997.53 As the complaint for reconveyance and
damages was filed by respondents on October 17, 1997,54 or only a few months after the sale of the
subject property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the same has prescribed.

III.

Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers of the subject
property in good faith, the Court concurs with the CA' s finding that they are not.

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or an interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of some other person's claim or interest in the
property.55 Corollary thereto, when a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than the
seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without making
such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with
realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there upon it and what his
rights are. A want of caution and diligence, which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to
exercise in making purchases, is in contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed
to know or discover that the land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.56

In his testimony57 before the R TC, Wilson claimed to have verified the validity of the title covering the
subject property before the Registry of Deeds. However, he also admitted that two (2) months had
lapsed before the sale could be consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella, one of
the sellers, to cancel the encumbrance annotated on the title of the subject property. He also claimed
that he had no knowledge about the details of such annotation, and that he was aware that individuals
other than the sellers were in possession of the subject property.

As aptly concluded by the CA, such knowledge of the existence of an annotation on the title covering the
subject property and of the occupation thereof by individuals other than the sellers negates any
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA
SANTIAGO, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division, 1 promulgated on May
4, 1973 in CA G.R. No. 36523-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated
December 15, 1964 and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel
Gabriel. *
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged
to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal
beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue
in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of
eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent
Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private
respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d
up to the time of her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been
executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel
Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear
at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause, which is
found on page four, reads as follows:
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan
at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at ipinahayag
sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang
dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan
ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa
ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat
dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at
kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa
amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng testamentong
ito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia,
Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their
respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas,
Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The
WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang
Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal
in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that
all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides
Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud,
Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa,
Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda
Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki,
inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were
bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her
testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the document
purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the court a
quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of which read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds:
1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported will of the deceased was
procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some
other person for her benefit;
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time of the alleged execution
of the purported will, the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the purported will of the
deceased was not executed and attested as required by law;
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the
purported win allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three
attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig and testament of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only
issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required
by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the
decision now under review, holding that the will in question was signed and executed by the deceased
Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and
of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.
3
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision and such
motion was opposed 4 by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their
respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by
Resolution 6 denied the motion for reconsideration stating that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wig
and testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed
on several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental
witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of
the evidence. We have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is no
reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside. 7
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that respondent Court
abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact
and conclusions of the trial court. The Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due
course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon,
which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations, the issues raised and
the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private respondent thereon, We
denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and for
insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial
evidence.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for
Reconsideration 10 which private respondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11 filed on
January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to
give due course to the petition.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and
attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses
were credible witness
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation and
execution of the win Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names
and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit
"F".
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the
typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three
attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that Isabel
Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia was not
physically present when the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased
Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture
takings as proof that the win was improperly executed.
VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and
misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been
explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said testimonies.
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit
"F", the alleged last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in character
and content. Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule
that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being
binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases
enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L-22202,
February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo and CA (L32192,
July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November
26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has
been well-settled that the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.
More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking through the then Justice
Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement
with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ...
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are
not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be
disturbed by Us particularly because its premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial
evidence and what is more, when such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues
cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because only legal questions may
be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of
the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven
evidence becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some
recognized exceptions.
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider petitioner's
assignments of errors.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no
proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment
in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be
complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a
credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his
community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to
petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be
favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent"
for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as
required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil
Code should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the
latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications
of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the
qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from
being a witness to a win. These Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of
this Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by
the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony ,
or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is
able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications
under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in
the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless
the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code
should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that
the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good
standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and
uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that being
citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the
period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and
is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth
Act No. 473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest
the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We
agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning
character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely,
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily
supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this
Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification
of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age,
of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner submits
that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to his
qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas
Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the
term credible requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition
to being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not synonymous
terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no
evidence on record to show that the instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they
are of good standing in the community since one was a family driver by profession and the second the
wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his
wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild
of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of
a person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable
vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses mentioned
in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious
from that portion of Article 820 which says "may be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in
Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are
concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme
Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and
not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and
not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasissupplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held that "Section
620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the
execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The
relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify
one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other
qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible,
that is to say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point,
a few of which we may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause.
Historical Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and
Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of
Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness that is, one
competent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs.
First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342)
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible
witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to
testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being
determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the timr it is offered for probate,Smith
vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses — that is, such
persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity,
interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or
rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs.
Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by
the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of
his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth.
Thus, in the case ofVda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3,
1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to
be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a
person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide
whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental
witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the
Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that
is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on
record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is
established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their
testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We,
therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and
independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good
standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors, petitioner disputes
the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will was
expected and not coincidental, in finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names
and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit
"F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan" and
"tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in
the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or
document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was
signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that
the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been
explained away.
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that the findings
of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain
exceptions which We win consider and discuss hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's
findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged
unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the
witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it was
coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals
that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on
April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment with him, but he explained that he
was available for any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him
to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso
Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will but that it
was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as
well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to
Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office,
which testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya
obtained residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence
certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence
certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court
correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing of these
residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15,
1961, far from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they
would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will.
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso
was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya
spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel
Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch
her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel
Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to
Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day that. the will
was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will
and that he told her that if she really wanted to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the
Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical
certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and disposition
mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the
presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya
including the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was
pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and
residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L
which the petitioner assails as contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty.
Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and their respective residence
certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was corroborated
by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from
Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the,
respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given
immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date
prior to April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the
witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was
executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public
Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation
clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial
will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public
document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public
document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed
by petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines
under the typewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the
three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion merits Our approval because tills
conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of
Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the
only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at
Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers,
dates and places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally
handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to
close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will
without bond. The technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and
the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed and the
docket number of a special proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were
supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have
dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel
Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a
brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the
execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of
the respondent appellate court in determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is,
therefore, beyond Our power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by
the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to be
fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her
age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie
business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death.
She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as
coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in
Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with
the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact
unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial and
documentary is, according to the respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically
present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the
contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was
signed by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of
the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for
which reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will on that — day is purely conjectural.
Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday and
Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano
lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of
occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence
at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude
her from giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was
present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand
margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation
clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde
Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by signing her name
thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation
clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in
permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very
purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a
record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132;
Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court
gave undue importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree
with the reasoning of the respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as
"Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty.
Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to
lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The
fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from
her testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what matters here is not the
photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses
Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance
to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The
evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961
which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite
emphatic and positive when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs
wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was disclosed at the
cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first
incident upon the insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly
no longer present was wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was
duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's
rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require picture-taking as one
of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of witnesses in their
respective testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held
that said contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies
as in the description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him
meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which was Identified by
witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by
Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr.— these are indeed
unimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true
execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the
testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an
incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human experience teach us "that
contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long series of
questionings, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as
much as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in
relating their impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their
testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been disturbed by
the respondent appellate court because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the
evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to
well-established exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of
the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and
circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which
have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts
particularly when they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of
credibility of contending witnesses hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the
appellate court should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals
found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in
the record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's
unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the
trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or
that she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she
witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial
court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will
was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire record to support the conclusion of the
court a quo that the will signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an
appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over the lower courts.
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree
with the petitioner that among the exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as
required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to
the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on
the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty.
Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be made; that
Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in the will and the attorney
wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that Atty.
Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then
typed the will and after finishing the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that
thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every
page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia
attested the will by signing her name at the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of
pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the bottom of the attestation
clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel,
Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of
the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel,
Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book
No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the
will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel,
Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the will, and
another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel
to bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not
know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law
office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was not controverted that he
wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt
that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could
have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the
contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by
the evidence on record as stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports the
trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso.
On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will
to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or
document. This fact jibes with the evidence — which the trial court itself believed was unshaken — that
Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory when she executed her will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple. The first was
Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay
her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and
P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces
including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee the fifth was the
institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general
terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in
favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in
extreme situations in which judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al.,
G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967;
Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of the evidence
on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in
question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya
and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered
the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial register. A few days
following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the
office of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first
picture did not turn out good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already
signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was performed during
which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.
Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the witnesses for
the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at
bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of the will making have testified
in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in
the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand to
receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been
identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that
they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the
rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any of the
exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate
court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial
evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent
Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the decision of the Court
of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal
and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation.
The above holding simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's
previous assignments of error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.

The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the respondent
Court acted properly and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find
that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate
Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of
Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his
deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch
VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of sound and
disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and testament.
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance with
the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named provide and erect at the expose of
my state a suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that
the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication
by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so
that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3, reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The
NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were
made by one and the same person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent,
Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to probate
although the alterations and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned were not authenticated by the
full signature of the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends that the
oppositors are estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the ground that they themselves agreed
thru their counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties
did not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be in estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C".
Finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by the full
signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or
insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will would be contrary to her right
of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the
ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity for
interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated November 2, 1973
denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari on the sole legal question of
whether or not theoriginal unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the
Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not,
with her as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave
an Identical commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla
de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which
was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite
of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided
or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To
state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of
the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in
the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not
the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made
by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in
his commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new Civil Code was
derived:
... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que no declara la nulidad de
un testamento olografo que contenga palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no salvadas por
el testador bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal omision
solo puede afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al testamento mismo, ya por estar
esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez del
testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que pequefias
enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a
anular este, y ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta armonia y
congruencia con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones apostillas
entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras matrices, siempre que no se salven en la
forma prevenida, paro no el documento que las contenga, y con mayor motivo cuando las palabras
enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del
pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin
trascendencia alguna(l).

Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en este ultimo fallo, es preciso que las
tachaduras, enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4 alteren ni
uarien de modo substancial la express voluntad del testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte
la sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento olografo por no estar salvada
por el testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo del año en que fue extendido 3(Emphasis ours).

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated September
3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE
SAND, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and
the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on
November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private
respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand,
and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not
acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her
estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not
duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and
undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the
will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not
be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It
found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the
will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason
at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor
for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually
executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not
written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and
not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix
other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity of the will
presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will
actually executed by the testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been
disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in
question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3)
witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been
presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic
will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then the
aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and
signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand
himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her
during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was
executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the
will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and thecharacter of
the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the
nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed
by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even
written a nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more
than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein
holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not
shown any instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private
respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of
the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established
that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to
some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of
her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that
the undue influence or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as
to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of another proceeding.
Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will
herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of doubt,
testate succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing
grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand,
the aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed.
The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It
held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as
follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated,
and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it,
whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not
dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been
authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its
execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of
some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of
some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at
the time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a
holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at
the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the
voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription,
attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that
they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the
New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave
an identical commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla
de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack
of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to
Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic
wills are taken. They read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the
requisites required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its
execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the
year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his
signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article
810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are
essential to the probate of a holographic will.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and
lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench,
decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name
of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the
same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole
property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of
the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to
probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification
as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
JOSE RIVERA petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On July
28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition
was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred
that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills. 1
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, a
petition for the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed as SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn
opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate. 2
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed special
administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the
decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose
estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido.
Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father. The holographic wills
were also admitted to probate.3
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court. 4 Its
decision is now the subject of this petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent court.
In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose sought to show that the
said person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this purpose
Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate where the
couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who testified that
Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together several times. 5 Jose
himself stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-brother and kissed his hand as a sign of respect
whenever they met. He insisted that Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were illegitimate children,
sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson. 6
Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born to Venancio Rivera and
Maria Jocson, who were legally married and lived as such for many years. He explained that he could not
present his parents' marriage certificate because the record of marriages for 1942 in Mabalacat were
destroyed when the town was burned during the war, as certified by Exhibit 6. 7 He also submitted his
own birth certificate and those of his sisters Zenaida and Yolanda Rivera, who were each described
therein as the legimitate children of Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson. 8 Atty. Regalado P. Morales, then
71 years of age, affirmed that he knew the deceased and his parents, Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los
Reyes, and it was during the Japanese occupation that Venancio introduced to him Maria Jocson as his
wife. 9 To prove that there were in fact two persons by the same name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido
offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate showing that his parents were Magno Rivera and
Gertrudes de los Reyes, 10as contrasted with the marriage certificate submitted by Jose, which indicated
that the Venancio Rivera subject thereof was the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. 11 He also
denied kissing Jose's hand or recognizing him as a brother. 12
We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate because, as he explained it, the
marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the war. Even so, he could
still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson
lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting seven children in all during that time.
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, ... .
The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.
By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio was described therein
as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he was not the same Venancio Rivera described in Exhibit 4,
his baptismal certificate, as the son of Magno Rivera. While we realize that such baptismal certificate is
not conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue here) it may nonetheless be
considered to determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are one and the same
person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be called by different names. The Court is not
convinced. There is no evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio. What is
more likely is that two or more persons may live at the same time and bear the same name, even in the
same community. That is what the courts below found in the cases at bar.
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the legitimate son of
Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his father was still alive. By his own account,
Jose supported himself — and presumably also his mother Maria Vital — as a gasoline attendant and
driver for many years. All the time, his father was residing in the same town — and obviously prospering
— and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with another woman and raising
another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without protest, taking no step whatsoever to
invoke his status. If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, there is no reason why
the father did not help the son and instead left Jose to fend for himself as a humble worker while his
other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life. Such paternal discrimination is difficult to
understand, especially if it is considered — assuming the claims to be true — that Jose was the oldest
and, by his own account, the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Venancio's legitimate wife
— if indeed she was — she should have objected when her husband abandoned her and founded
another family by another woman, and in the same town at that. Seeing that the children of Maria
Jocson were being raised well while her own son Jose was practically ignored and neglected, she
nevertheless did not demand for him at least support, if not better treatment, from his legitimate father.
It is unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in favor of another woman and for a
caring mother not to protect her son's interests from his wayward father's neglect. The fact is that this
forsaken wife never demanded support from her wealthy if errant husband. She did not file a complaint
for bigamy or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, the alleged partners in crime and
sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and complaisant.

Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even presented at the trial to
support her son's allegations that she was the decedent's lawful wife. Jose says this was not done
because she was already old and bedridden then. But there was no impediment to the taking of her
deposition in her own house. No effort was made toward this end although her testimony was vital to
the petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this Court does not
agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to Venancio Rivera was null and void, Jose had the
burden of proving that serious allegation.

We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the Venancio
Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria Vital, Jose's
legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with
the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and prominent. Except for the
curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is no evidence linking the two families or showing
that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to
have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811
because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose
Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No.
1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both
proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that
they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article
811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the
deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the
three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as
having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA
deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET
AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final
determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was
opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita
Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to
produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule
75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore
it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be
produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil.
509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and
attested as required by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case
Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April
4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees
moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent
Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence
unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in
its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order
was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court,
to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set
aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of
the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is
lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the
matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on
January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse
of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the
decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to our
mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court
of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is
contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground
that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court
committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY
NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED
BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.

The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be
found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the
Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court
after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is
available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed
and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and
only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that
there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will
may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the
testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of
said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means,
if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox
copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate
court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated
July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B.
Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.