POLITICAL LAW NOTES
WHAT IS WRIT OF CONTRA HOMO SACER?
It is a writ that prevents the execution of a class of
persons who have no right at all before the law, or
those persons deprived of protection normally afforded
by law to ordinary citizens.
Homo sacer in Roman times are class of persons with
no rights before the law, deprived of protection
normally afforded by law to ordinary citizens, thus,
marked for execution anytime and anywhere.
See: Letter-Petition filed by the lawyers of the Center
for International Law (Center-Law) Philippines before
the Supreme Court. Said letter aimed for the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules on criminal procedure
pursuant to its rule-making power to help prevent the
disturbing emergence of a class of people who, harking
back to ancient Roman times, are no more than homo
sacer, or beings reduced to mere biological existence,
denied of all rights, marked for execution anytime and
anywhere.
EPISTOLARY JURISDICTION
Q: Do the marine mammals together with humans have
legal standing to file a suit in the enforcement of
environmental law?
A: In one case decided by the Supreme Court, it was
held that the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. After all, they were joined by humans. The
Stewards, having shown in their petition that there may
be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of
the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared
to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
(Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of DENR, GR
No. 181572)
WHO ARE THE IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS?
1. President
2. Vice-President
3. Members of the Supreme of Court
4. Members of the Constitutional Commission;
and
5. Ombudsman
All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT?
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution
2. Treason
3. Bribery
4. Graft and corruption
5. Other high crimes; and
6. Betrayal of public trust
page 1 of 65
WHO SHALL INITIATE AND PROSECTUTE ALL CASES OF
IMPEACHMENT?
- The House of Representatives (Sec. 3 (1),
Article 11, 1987 Constitution)
WHO SHALL TRY AND DECIDE THE IMPEACHMENT
CASE?
- The Senate (Sec. 3 (6), Art. 11, 1987
Constitution).
The senate shall not be acting as legislative
body but rather as an impeachment court.
WHO SHALL PRESIDE THE IMPEACHMENT FILED
AGAINST THE PRESIDENT?
- The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
(Sec. 3 (6), Art. 11, 1987 Constitution).
WHO SHALL PRESIDE THE IMPEACHMENT FILED
AGAINST THE VICE-PRESIDENT?
- The Senate President (As per rules of the
Senate)
WERE FORMER PRESIDENT ESTRADA AND CHIEF
JUSTICE CORONA BOTH IMPEACHED?
Yes, they were both impeached. In the case of Estrada,
he was impeached but not found guilty. In the case of
Corona, he was likewise impeached and found guilty.
QUESTION: GINA LOPEZ WAS APPOINTED BY
PRESIDENT DUTERTE AS SECRETARY OF THE DENR, IF
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT REJECTED OR
DISAPPROVED HER APPOINTMENT, MAY SHE STILL BE
RE-APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT? HOW ABOUT IF
SHE WAS MERELY BY-PASSED?
Once Gina is rejected or disapproved by the
Commission on Appointment, the President can no
longer re-appoint her since the rejection or disapproval
of the Commission on Appointment has an effect of a
judgment on the merits.
If however, she was merely by-passed, the President
may still re-appoint her since the act of the Commission
bypassing her is not a judgment on the merits.
MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO
Ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
by the president because it takes effect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has been qualified into Office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does not
alter its permanent character.
A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the
disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and not because a reappointment is
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 2 of 65

prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can
be revived by a new ad interim appointment because
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will
not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed
term of seven years.
Moreover, the AFP has issued regulations which listed
therein the persons disqualified to have their remains
interred in the LNMB. The late President Marcos had
not been dishonorably separated or discharged from
military service, or convicted by final judgment of any
offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, none of the
disqualifications can apply to the late President Marcos.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AD SELF-EXECUTING AND NON-SELF EXECUTING

INTERIM APPOINTMENTS FROM APPOINTMENTS IN PROVISIONS
AN ACTING CAPACITY?
General rule: All provisions of the Constitution are self-
The two appointments are both effective upon executing. “Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended provisions of the Constitution should be considered
only during recess of Congress, where as acting self-executing.”
appointments may be extended any time there is
vacancy. Moreover, ad-interim appointments are Exception: Statements of general principles, such as
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for those in Art. 2 of the 1987 Constitution are usually not
confirmation or rejection, acting appointments are not self-executing.
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
AMENDMENT VS. REVISION
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of  Revision broadly implies a change that alters a
circumventing the need for confirmation by the basic principle in the Constitution, while
Commission on Appointments. (Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., amendment broadly refers to a change that
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: adds, reduces, deletes, without altering the
A Commentary 772) (1996) basic principle involved.
 There is also revision if the change alters the
QUESTION: RECENTLY, A GROUP OF PERSONS FILED A
substantial entirety of the Constitution.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
 Revision generally affects several provisions of
QUESTIONING PRESIDENT DUTERTE IN AUTHORIZING
the Constitution while amendment generally
THE INTERMENT OF THE REMAINS OF THE LATE
affects only the specific provision being
PRESIDENT MARCOS IN THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI
amended. (Lambino vs. Comelec)
(LNMB). IF YOU WERE A JUDGE AND THE SAID PETITION
WAS RAFFLED IN YOUR SALA, HOW WILL YOU DECIDE STEPS IN THE AMENDATORY PROCESS:
THE PETITION?
1. Proposal by: (Sections 1-3, Article XVII)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:  Congress: by a vote of ¾ of all its
members. (constituent assembly)
I will dismiss the Petition. The decision of President
 Constitutional Convention, which
Duterte allowing the interment of the remains of the
may be called into existence either
late President Marcos involves a political question. It is
by:
a question arising from the principle of separation of
o 2/3 vote of all the members
powers, where the Judicial Branch cannot decide
of Congress; or
questions in regard to which, full discretionary
o If such vote is not obtained,
authority has been delegated to the President, unless
by a majority vote of all the
otherwise proven that the President has gravely abused
members of Congress with
his discretion amounting to lack or excess of
the question of whether or
jurisdiction.
not to call a Convention to
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: (Concurring Opinion of Justice be resolved by the people in
Lucas Bersamin in the Marcos Burial) a plebiscite.
 People, through the power of
I will dismiss the petition. The Supreme Court has held initiative:
that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Requisites:
Marcos interred (buried) at the LNMB involves a o A petition of at least 12% of
political question which courts should not interfere. the total number of
Besides, the character of the LMNB as the resting place registered voters, of which
for the war dead and other military personnel under every legislative district must
the care and control of the AFP has placed the LNMB be represented by at least
under the control of the President. Plainly enough, the 3% of the registered voters
President thereby exercised such control through the therein.
AFP Chief of Staff.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 3 of 65

People’s initiative applies only to an I. There is a grave violation

amendment, not a revision of the of the Constitution.
Constitution, inasmuch as the II. There is an exceptional
Constitution itself limits initiative to character of the
amendments. situation and paramount
public interest is
2. By ratification: involved.
Constituent assembly: ratification by a III. The Constitutional issues
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite. raised require
Constitutional Convention: ratification by formulation of
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite. controlling principles to
guide the bench, the
JUDICIAL REVIEW
bar, and the public.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 IV. The case is capable of
 The power of the courts to test the validity of repetition yet evading
executive and legislative acts in light of their review. (David vs.
conformity with the Constitution. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R.
 This is not an assertion of superiority by the No. 171396)
courts over the departments but merely an
expression of the supremacy of the 2. The Constitutional question must be raised by
Constitution. the proper party:

JUDICIAL POWER - A proper party is one who has sustained

 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. (Sec 1, Art. VIII)
REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. There must be an Actual case or controversy:
- A conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims which can be
resolved on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. (Guingona vs. CA, G.R. No.
125532)
o The actual controversy must exist
at all stages of the review, not
merely at the time the complaint
is filed. (John Hay People’s
Alternative Coalition vs. Lim, G.R.
No. 119775)
o The issues raised in the case must
not be moot and academic.
(Province of Batangas vs. Romulo,
G.R. No. 152774)
or is in imminent danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of.
(IBP vs. Zamora)
LOCUS STANDI
Refers to a party’s personal and substantial
interest in a case, arising from the direct injury
it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the
challenged governmental action. Unless a
person’s constitutional rights are adversely
affected by a statute or governmental action,
he has no legal standing to challenge the
statute or governmental action. (CREBA vs.
Energy Regulatory Commission)
Direct injury test – a person who impugns
validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil.
56)
In David V. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Supreme
Court summarized its earlier rulings and
declared that petitioner may be accorded
standing to sue provided that the following
requirements are met:

 INSTANCES WHERE THE a) The case involves constitutional issues;

COURT ALLOWED THE b) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of
JUDICIAL REVIEW EVEN IF illegal disbursement of public funds or
THE ACTUAL CASE IS that the tax measure is unconstitutional
ALREADY MOOT AND (the prevailing doctrine is that taxpayers
ACADEMIC: may question contracts entered into by
the national government or by
government owned or controlled
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 4 of 65

corporations allegedly in contravention of the determination of the case itself; and in

law;
c) For registered voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the validity
of the election law in question;
d) For concerned citizens, there must be a
showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must
be settled early; and
e) For legislators, there must be a claim that
the official action complained of infringes
their prerogatives as legislators.
FACIAL CHALLENGE
General Rule:
A party can question the validity of a
statute only if, as applied to him, it is
unconstitutional.
Exception:
The only time a facial challenge to a
statute is allowed is when it operates in
the area of freedom of expression,
freedom of religion, or other fundamental
freedoms. It does not apply to penal
laws/statutes.
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
A kind of facial challenge which permits a
party to challenge the validity of a statute
even though, as applied to him, it is not
unconstitutional, but it might be if applied
to others not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected.
every case, except when there is estoppel, it
can be raised at any stage if it involves the
jurisdiction of the court. (People vs. Vera)
4. The constitutional issue must be the lis mota
of the case or the very main issue of the
controversy.
- No way by which the entire controversy
be resolved unless the Court first resolves
the constitutional issue raised.
EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Orthodox view
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative, as if it had not been passed at all.
Modern View
Courts simply refuse to recognize the law and
determine the rights of the parties as if the
statute had no existence.
DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE
Literally, parent of the people. As such, the
Government may act as guardian of the rights of people
who may be disadvantaged or suffering from some
disability or misfortune.
NATIONAL TERRITORY

VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS What comprises National Territory?

This doctrine holds that a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible
applications.
3. The Constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity:
The National Territory comprises Philippine Archipelago
and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction. (Art. 1, 1987 Constitution)
Is Spratly’s island (Kalayaan Island) part of the
Philippine Archipelago?
No. Spratly’s island is outside the Philippine archipelago
and even outside the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines.

In Matibag vs. Benipayo, it was held that the Is it part of the National Territory?
earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional
Yes, the Philippines has sovereignty over the Spratly’s
issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a
island. Under the Constitution, the national territory
competent court that can resolve the same,
includes all other territories over which the Philippines
such that, if not raised in the pleadings, it
has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
cannot be considered at the trial and, if not
considered in the trial, it cannot be considered
on appeal.

However, in criminal cases, the question can

be raised at any time at the discretion of the
court. In Civil cases, the question can be raised
at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 5 of 65

COMPONENTS OF A TERRITORY OF STATES What is the Right of Arrival Under Stress:

It is an arrival of a foreign vessel at a port of another

State on account of a (1) lack of provisions or supplies;
(2) well-founded fear of seizure; (3) by reason of
TERRESTRIAL OR MARITIME OR AERIAL DOMAIN accident of the sea disabling it to navigate.
LAND DOMAIN FLUVIAL
DOMAIN It is unlawful when any of the following circumstances
occurred:

1. Lack of provisions due to negligence to carry

according to usage and customs
INTERNAL WATERS 2. Risk of enemy not well known or manifest
3. Defect of vessel due to improper repair
4. Malice, negligence, lack of foresight or skill of
captain.

TERRITORIAL CONTIGUOUS EXCLUSIVE MODES OF ACQUISITION OR DIMMINUTION OF LAND

SEA (12 ZONE (24 ECONOMIC TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
nautical nautical miles ZONE or
miles from from the CONTINENTAL 1. Discovery and occupation of a territory
the shore) shore) SHELF (200 which is terra nullius; terra (land) nullius
nautical miles (belonging to no one)
from the
What is the doctrine of effective
shore)
occupation?

Under this doctrine, discovery alone is not

THE STATE HAS enough to acquire land territory. It merely
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT gives the discoverer an inchoate right over
THE STATE HAS TO EXPLOIT
THE STATE HAS JURISDICTION TO
the territory. For title to finally vest in the
RESOURCES BOTH
SOVEREIGNTY OVER ENFORCE CUSTOMS, LIVING AND NON-
discoverer, the discovery must be
ITS TERRITORIAL SEA FISCAL, LIVING OVER THE followed within a reasonable time by
IMMIGRATION, AND SEABED, THE effective occupation over the territory.
SANITARY RULES SUBSOIL, AND
OTHER SUBMARINE 2. Cession (Treaty);
AREAS.
Example: Treaty of Paris
3. Prescription; and
4. Accretion

What are the examples of internal waters?
- Lakes, Rivers, Canals, Ports, and Harbors.
DOCTRINE OF RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
HIGH SEAs
Beyond the Economic zone of a state or the 200
nautical miles from the shore of a State is the high seas
which is considered as res communes not susceptible of
appropriation of any state.

It is the continuous and uninterrupted passage of a
foreign vessel into the territorial sea of another state
without however entering the internal waters of the
said state.
Question: May a foreign vessel enter into the Manila
bay invoking the Right of Innocent Passage?
Answer: No. The right of innocent of passage may be
invoked only when a foreign vessel is passing through
the territorial sea of a State. Since Manila bay is internal
water which form part of the land domain of a State,
the foreign vessel is not allowed to enter thereto.
QUESTION: CHINA CREATED ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS IN
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WHICH IS BEYOND THEIR
ECONOMIC ZONE TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER
STATES. CAN CHINA CLAIM OWNERSHIP OVER THE
SAID SEA?
No. Since the high seas is res communes not susceptible
of appropriation of any state, the only option of China is
to exercise the freedom of the high seas which is
limited to (1) freedom of navigation over flight; (2)
fishing; (3) Mining; (4) Freedom to do scientific
research; and (5) laying down of underwater cables.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
QUESTION: WHO HAS JURISDICTION OVER A VESSEL
SAILING IN THE HIGH SEAs?
Answer: Only the flag State may exercise jurisdiction
over a vessel sailing in the high seas.
Flag State is a state whose nationality the vessel
carries. The nationality is determined by its registration.
FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
Is a practice whereby a vessel is registered in a country
other than that of the vessel’s own nationality. This
practice is not allowed in the international law.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT ONLY A FLAG STATE
HAS JURISDICTION OVER A VESSEL SAILING IN THE
HIGH SEAs: (any State may assume jurisdiction over a
vessel sailing in the high seas)
1. If the vessel is a Pirate ship;
2. If the vessel is engaged in the slave trade;
3. If the vessel is sailing without any flag at all or
it is sailing under false flag or refused to show
its flag when required to do so;
4. If the vessel is engaged in unauthorized
broadcast; and
5. Doctrine of Hot Pursuit.
DOCTRINE OF HOT PURSUIT
This doctrine presupposes that a foreign vessel entered
the internal waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous
zone of another state and the latter has a reasonable
ground to believe that the foreign vessel has committed
violation of its laws in which case the state may pursue
the foreign vessel even if the latter already reached the
high seas. However, the pursuit once commenced, must
be continuous and uninterrupted.
AERIAL DOMAIN
A state has absolute jurisdiction over its aerial domain.
Thus, a foreign aircraft may not pass through the aerial
domain of a state even if invoking the right of innocent
passage.
Beyond the aerial domain is the outer space which is
res communes not susceptible of appropriation by any
state.
ARCHIPELAGO DOCTRINE
The waters around, between and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines. Under Article 49 (1) of the UNCLOS, these
waters do not form part of the territorial sea but are
described as archipelagic waters.
page 6 of 65
BAR QUESTION (2006)
Congress passed Republic Act No. 7711 to comply with
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
In a petition filed with the Supreme Court, Anak Ti
Ilocos, an association of Ilocano professionals, argued
that Republic Act No. 7711 discarded the definition of
the Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and in
related treaties; excluded the Kalayaan Islands and the
Scarborough Shoals from the Philippine Archipelagic
baselines; and converted internal waters into
archipelagic waters.
Is the petition meritorious? (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the petition is not meritorious. UNCLOS has nothing
to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It merely
regulates sea-use rights over maritime zones,
contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and
continental shelves which it delimits. The Kalayaan
Islands and the Scarborough Shoals are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago. A straight baseline loped around
them from the nearest baseline will violate Article 47(3)
and Article 47(2) of the UNCLOS III. Whether the bodies
of water lying landward of the baselines of the
Philippines are internal waters or archipelagic waters,
the Philippines retains jurisdiction over them
(Magallona vs. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476).
QUESTION: ARE FOREIGN VESSELS ALLOWED TO PASS
THROUGH THE SEA IN BETWEEN LUZON AND VISAYAS?
No. The sea in between Luzon and visayas is considered
internal waters of the Philippines. However, under the
UNCLOS, an archipelagic state like the Philippines, they
are mandated to designate between the islands of the
archipelago an archipelagic sea lane where the foreign
vessels may pass through but subject to the regulations
and control of the Archipelagic States.
DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF ALL STATES
(SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT)
It is a concept in which every sovereign state possesses
the same legal rights as any other sovereign states in
international law. Thus, every state prevents one state
from being sued in the courts of another state without
the consent of the first state. Likewise, this means that
no other state can question the legality of official acts
of another state.
QUESTION: Professor Merlin Magallona et al.
questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,
among others, that the law decreased the national
territory of the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional. Thus, the classification of the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (panatag shoal) (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen, is the contention of Magallona,
et al. tenable?
ANSWER:
No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or
UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose,
territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to
do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of
the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to
acquisition or loss of territory is the international law
principle on occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our
territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area
that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq.
na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the
exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime
was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi.
WHAT IS AN ACT OF NAKED POLITICAL
AGGRANDIZEMENT?
It is an act of the politicians enlarging or expanding
their power or status.
QUESTION: DOES THE PHILIPPINES HAS LEGITIMATE
CLAIM OVER SABAH?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Philippines has claim over Sabah. The deed
entered into by the Sultan of Sulu with the British
company was a mere lease and not a cession. Lease is
not one of the grounds in acquiring ownership over a
territory. When the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu ceded all
rights, title, and dominion to the Republic of the
Philipipines, the latter had acquired sovereignty over
the said territory, and thus, forms part of the National
territory of the Philippines.
Saguisag vs Executive Secretary Ochoa
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former
legislators, questioned before the SC the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into
by the executive department with the US and ratified
page 7 of 65
on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide
the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from
the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the
US may undertake the following types of activities
within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation
exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such
other activities that as may be agreed upon by the
parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive
agreement as medium of agreement with US violated
the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since
the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and
facilities whose entry into the country should be
covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The
Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed
its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as “citizen’s suit” satisfy the
requirements of legal standing in assailing the
constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental
act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the
requirement of having to establish a direct and
personal interest if they show that the act affects a
public right. But here, aside from general statements
that the petitions involve the protection of a public
right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens
would be violated, the petitioners failed to make
any specific assertion of a particular public right that
would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For
their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be
considered by the Court as citizens’ suits that would
justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as
“taxpayers”
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA
is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed
at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in which the official
act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. Here, those challenging the act must
specifically show that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and
that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle
to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show
that there has been neither an appropriation nor an
authorization of disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as “legislator’s suit”
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international
agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the
Constitution to the Senate. In a legislator’s suit, the
injured party would be the Senate as an institution or
any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senate’s
constitutional function that is allegedly being
violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former
senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial
Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise
matters of transcendental importance which justify
setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The
challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution
itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which
provides for a stricter mechanism required before any
foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be
allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public
interest that the Court is behooved to determine
whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners
satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting
that a public right has been violated through
the commission of an act with grave abuse of
discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the act of the Executive Department in not
submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate
concurrence not because of the transcendental
importance of the issue, but because the petitioners
satisfy the requirements in invoking the court’s
expanded jurisdiction.
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA
agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the
Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for
concurrence because it is in the form of a mere
executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the
Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into
executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops
or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument
that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it
merely involves “adjustments in detail” in the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are
existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S.
that have already been concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the
Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the
status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be
transmitted to the Senate.
De Castro Dissent
page 8 of 65
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and
distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the stay of
the foreign troops in the country is permanent
or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution
does not distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the
entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
country. Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to
the agreement makes it an invalid treaty.
DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION
The generally accepted principles of international law
automatically form part of the law of the land without
requiring enabling act from the legislative body.
ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF DISHONESTY
There can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the laws on which the right depends.
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
ARIGO VS. SWIFT
The waiver of State immunity under VFA pertains only
to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions
such as writ of kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of
environmental law is to be filed separately.
General rule: the State may not be sued without its
consent.
Exception:
1. Express consent (only by the Congress)
a. General law – Act no. 3083
b. Special law – Art. 2180 Civil code
2. Implied consent (E-P-I-C)
a. When the State Commences
litigation, it becomes vulnerable to a
counterclaim;
b. State enters into a business contract
or when it is exercising in its
Proprietary functions; (OLD RULE)
NEW RULE: USA vs. RUIZ
When the state enters into a business
contract, one must distinguish
between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) from private,
commercial, and proprietary acts
(jure gestiones).
DOCTRINE OF RESTRICTIVE STATE
IMMUNITY
The restrictive application of state
immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given to its
consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates
to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
c. When it is used as a tool to
perpetrate Injustice; and
d. In Expropriation cases (Power of
Eminent domain).
SUABLITY v. LIABILITY
Suability is a matter of State waiving its immunity from
suit; on the other hand the state does not automatically
admits Liability, the state merely gives the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The state may raise possible legal defenses in order to
avoid liability.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO v. FIRME
1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and
cities, are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and
therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to
suit even in the performance of such functions
because their charter provided that they can
sue and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by
them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in
a proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the State merely gives the
claimant the right to show that the defendant
was not acting in its governmental capacity
when the injury was committed or that the
case comes under the exceptions recognized
by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to
the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and
gravel for the repair of San Fernando's
municipal streets." In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed.
Hence, the driver of the dump truck was
page 9 of 65
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his
office.
IN THE MATTER OF EXECUTION TO SATISFY THE
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE STATE
Q: Can a person garnish/levy the government
funds/property of the government to satisfy the
judgment?
A: No. Because it will be contrary to public policy. When
it comes to the execution to satisfy the judgment, one
cannot garnish/levy government funds/property; such
act will require another waiver from the government.
Q: What will be the remedy of the person to execute
the judgment in his favor?
A: The remedy is to make representation before the
congress to appropriate an amount to satisfy the
judgment. If however, the Congress does not
appropriate an amount, the remedy would be
Mandamus. (See Municipality of Makati vs.
Intermediate appellate court)
SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS
General rule: The doctrine of immunity from suit
applies to complaint filed against public officials in the
performance of their duties. The official is merely acting
as an agent of the State.
Exception:
1. When the Official was sued in his official capacity for
acts that are unlawful and injuries to the rights of
others;
2. When public officials were sued in their personal
capacity.
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
What are the characteristics of a public office?
1. Public office is a public trust, not a privilege
2. Public office may not be inherited
3. Public office is outside the commerce of men
4. Public office is not a property
What is the difference between abolition of an Office
and Removal of an Office?
Abolition of an office refers to the office itself being
abolished, while the later refers to the officer being
removed from an Office.
Prohibitions imposed under the Constitution against
the holding of 2 or more positions
A. Members of Congress shall not:
1. Appear as counsel before any court, electoral
tribunal, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies;
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 10 of 65

2. Be interested in any contract with, or in any of salaries only reprimand, the

franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs, or its
subsidiary;
3. Intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may
be called upon to act on account of his office.
B. The President, Vice President, Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants, unless
otherwise allowed by the Constitution, shall not:
1. Directly or indirectly practice any other profession;
2. Participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including GOCCs, or its subdivisions; shall avoid conflict
of interest in the conduct of their office.
suspension pending
appeal becomes illegal
and he is entitled to back
salary corresponding to
the period of suspension
Q: Is a public officer entitled to backwages during his
suspension pending appeal when the result of the
decision from such appeal does not amount to
complete exoneration but carries with it a certain
number of days of suspension?
A: No. Although entitled to reinstatement, he is not
entitled to back wages during such suspension pending
appeal. Only one who is completely exonerated or
merely reprimanded is entitled to such back wages.
(Sec. of Education, etc. v. CA. G.R. No. 128559, October
4, 2000)

Conditions before an employee may be entitled to

C. Members of the Constitutional Commission shall not:
back salaries
1. Hold any other office or employment or engage in
1) The employee must be found innocent of the charges
the practice of any profession or in the active
and 2) His suspension must be unjustified (Civil Service
management or control of any business that may be
Commission v. Cruz GR No. 187858, August 9,2011)
affected by the functions of his office;
2. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any De jure officer
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, A de jure officer is one who is in all respects legally
agencies or instrumentalities including GOCCs, or their appointed or elected and qualified to exercise the
subsidiaries. These shall also apply to the Ombudsman office.
and his deputies during his term.
De facto officer

A de facto officer is one who assumed office under the

Doctrine of Ratification
color of a known appointment or election but which
It provides that, although the acts of a public officer appointment or election is void for reasons that the
may not be binding on the State because he has officer was not eligible, or that th ere was want of
exercised his powers defectively, his acts may be power in the electing body, or that there was some
ratified. other defect or irregularity in its exercise, wherein such
ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to
The doctrine does not apply where: 1. There is a want the public.
of power in the public officer to perform the original
act. 2. An act which was absolutely void at the time it De jure Officer De facto Officer
was done. 3. If the principal himself could not lawfully Has lawful title to the Has possession and
have done the act, or 4. If it could not have lawfully office performs the duties under
a colorable title without
been done by anyone.
being technically qualified
in all points of law to act
Preventive suspension pending investigation v.
Holding of office rests on Holding of office rests on
Preventing suspension pending appeal right reputation
Pending Investigation Pending appeal
Officer cannot be Officer may be ousted in a
Not a penalty but only a Punitive in character removed through a direct direct proceeding against
means of enabling the proceeding (quo him.
disciplinary authority an warranto).
unhampered investigation
After the lapse of 90 days, If exonerated, he should
the law provides that he be reinstated with full pay Effects of the acts of de facto officers
be automatically for the period of
reinstated suspension 1. The lawful acts, so far as the rights of third persons
During such preventive If during the appeal he
are concerned are, if done within the scope and by the
suspension, the employee remains suspended and
is not entitled to payment the penalty imposed is
 POLITICAL LAW NOTES
apparent authority of the office, are considered valid
and binding.
2. The de facto officer cannot benefit from his own
status because public policy demands that unlawful
assumption of public office be discouraged.
NOTE: The general rule is that a de facto officer cannot
claim salary and other compensations for services
rendered by him as such. However, the officer may
retain salaries collected by him for services rendered in
good faith when there is no de jure officer claiming the
office.
3. The de facto officer is subject to the same liabilities
imposed on the de jure officer in the discharge of
official duties, in addition to whatever special damages
may be due from him because of his unlawful
assumption of office.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA, BINAY, 2015
Five (5) issues were discussed in this case, namely:
1. Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without
resorting to the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
was the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject
matter jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition;
3. Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue
a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”) enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension issued by
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;
4. Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in
issuing said TRO and WPI; and
5. Whether the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt was
improper or illegal.
In dispensing the First Issue, the SC ruled that the
Ombudsman’s petition falls under the exceptions that a
prior motion for reconsideration must be filed, citing
the case of Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, 5 June
2013, which held as follows: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or
the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved.
page 11 of 65
As to the Second Issue, the SC still ruled thatthe remedy
of Binay, Jr. – the filing of petition for certiorari
pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to assail the
Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order – was valid,
citing the cases of Office of the Ombudsman v.
Capulong, G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and Dagan
v.Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, 19
November 2013. It’s just sad that the sorry end of
Second Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770 came as
collateral damage in this case. The SC justified its taking
up this issue on its own motion, or ex mero motu, which
it canrightfully do, since it is, after all, the SC.
As to the third issue, the SC ruled that Congress’
passing of the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770,
which prohibits the issuance of an injunction, is an
encroachment of the SC’s rule-making authority. An
injunction, after all, is merely a provisional and auxiliary
relief to preserve rights in esse. However, the SC noted
that it has not consented to this as it has not issued
rules of procedure through an administrative circular.
Thus, pending deliberation, the SC declared the First
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective, “until it is
adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor.”
The Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine
was taken up. To go right at it, the SC abandoned the
condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act
in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so
based on good case law, considering that the
abandonment is prospective in nature.
The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to
comment directed to the Ombudsman was illegal, was
refused to be resolved on the ground there are no
contempt proceedings yet. It is the claim of the
Ombudsman that since she was an impeachable officer,
she could be subjected to contempt. However, no due
course has been given to the contempt action, thus, the
Ombudsman’s claim was premature.
DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION
Reyes v. Comelec
If a public official is not removed before his term of
office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is
thereafter reelected for another term. Removal cannot
extend beyond the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed. The doctrine of
condonation is a limited empowerment of the
electorate over the accountabilities of their elective
local officials. It is limited because it does not cover
criminal accountabilities. It is a legal fiction grounded
upon a presumed knowledge of all the activities and
behavior of the elective local official. It is presumed
that when the electorate exercised their right to
choose, they were all aware of “all” the misconducts of
the public official.
Pascual v Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
“The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. To do
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right
to elect their officers. When the people have elected a
man to office, it must be assumed that they did this
with the knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by
reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.”
Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992
The rule that public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior
term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefore, has no application to pending criminal
cases against petitioner for the acts he may have
committed during a failed coup.
Fabian v. Desierto
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it
states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final
judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the
courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does
not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Civil Service v. Dacoycoy
Q: Who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of
the appellate court in an administrative civil service
disciplinary case?
A: There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may
appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of
the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was
the respondent official meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service.
Yabut v. Ombudsman
A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman
by virtue of his authority under Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 6770, in relation to Section 9 of Administrative
Order No. 07, is not meant to be a penalty but a means
taken to insure the proper and impartial conduct of an
investigation. The SC has ruled in a number of times
before, that a preventive suspension may be ordered
even before the charges are heard, as well as before
the official concerned is given an opportunity to prove
his innocence, being merely a measure that is precisely
designed in order not to hamper the normal course of
an investigation through the use of influence and
authority.
Layno v. Sandiganbayan
page 12 of 65
A preventive suspension may be justified. Its
continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of
time raises a due process question. For even if
thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his
right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there
would be in such a case an injustice suffered by
him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice
inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to
serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice
Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive
suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and
resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is
thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of
suspension should be lifted.
Section 24, RA 6770
Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The
Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b)
the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case
is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not
more than six (6) months, without pay, except when
the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of
such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.
Q: ACE ran as congressman of Cagayan Province. His
opponent, Mark, however, was the one proclaimed as
the winner by the COMELEC. ACE filed seasonably a
protest before the HRET. After two years, the HRET
reversed the COMELEC’s decision and ACE was
proclaimed finally as the duly elected Congressman.
Thus, he had only one year to serve in Congress.
1. Can ACE collect salaries and allowances from the
government for the first two years of his term as
Congressman?
2. Should Mark refund to the government the salaries
and allowances he had received as Congressman?
3. What will happen to the bills that Mark alone
authored and were approved by the HoR while he was
seated as Congressman? Reason and explain briefly.
A:
1. ACE cannot collect salaries and allowances from the
government for the first two years of his term, because
in the meanwhile Mark collected the salaries and
allowances. Mark was a de facto officer while he was in
possession of the office. To allow ACE to collect the
salaries and allowances will result in making the
government pay a second time.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 13 of 65

2. Mark is not required to refund to the government FLORES V DRILON

the salaries and allowances he received. As a de facto
officer, he is entitled to the salaries and allowances
because he rendered services during his incumbency.
3. The bills which Mark alone authored and were
approved by the House of Representatives are valid
because he was a de facto officer during his
incumbency. The acts of a de facto officer are valid
insofar as the public is concerned. (Rodriguez v. Tan,
G.R. No. L-3913, August 7, 1952)
FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S
facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec.
13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992 which directs the President to appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the
SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations,
the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be
appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic
Authority.”

Recovery of the salary received by a de facto officer ISSUES: (1) Whether the proviso violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or
during a wrongful tenure
designation of elective officials to other government
As a rule, the rightful incumbent of the public office posts. (2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex
may recover from a de facto officer the salaries officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and
received by the latter during the time of the latter's thus an excepted circumstance. (3) Whether or not the
wrongful tenure even though he entered into the office Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to
in good faith and under a colorable title. The de facto receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would
be useless if no elective official may be appointed to
officer takes the salaries at his risks and must therefore
another post. (4) Whether there is legislative
account to the de jure officer for the amounts he
encroachment on the appointing authority of the
received. However, where there is no de jure officer, a President. (5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any
de facto officer shall be entitled to the salaries and and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
emoluments accruing during the period when he which he may have received pursuant to his
actually discharged the duties. (Monroy v. CA, G.R. No. appointment.
L-23258, July 1, 1967)
HELD: (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution
Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for
NOTE: In Monroy v. CA, the Supreme Court said that
appointment or designation in any capacity to any
the Rodriguez ruling cannot be applied for the absence public office or position during his tenure. Unless
of factual and legal similarities. otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any
QUO WARRANTO UNDER QUO WARRANTO IN subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
RULE 66 ELECTORAL PROCEEDINGS including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The
Issue is legality of the Issue is eligibility of the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
occupancy of the office by person elected elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to
virtue of a legal other government post (as Chairman and CEO of
appointment SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits.
It seeks to prevent a situation where a local
Grounds: usurpation, Grounds: ineligibility or elective official will work for his appointment in an
forfeiture, or illegal disqualification to hold executive position in government, and thus neglect his
association (Sec. 1, Rule the office (Sec. 253, constitutents.
66, Rules of Court) Omnibus Election Code)
Presupposes that the Petition must be filed (2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the
respondent is already within 10 days from the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of
actually holding office and proclamation of the the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase
action must be candidate. “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent
commenced within 1 year to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
from cause of ouster or merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
from the time the right of
petitioner to hold office (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of
arose. the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
Petitioner is person Petitioner may be any example, an elective official who may be appointed to a
entitled to office voter even if he is not cabinet post, may receive the
entitled to the office. compensation attached to the cabinet position if
Person adjudged entitled Actual or compensatory specifically authorized by law.
to the office may bring a damages are recoverable
separate action against in quo warranto (4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the
the respondent to recover proceedings under the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA,
damages. (Sec. 11, Rule Omnibus Election Code. he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of
66, Rules of Court) Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress
clothes the President with the power to appoint an
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of
the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed
that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e.,
he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly
an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can
qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for
appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first
from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be considered
fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is
ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman
and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not
necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is
entitled to such benefits.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF
AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, et al. vs. GREENPEACE
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Greenpeace Southeast Asia filed a petition before the
SC to issue a writ of kalikasan against the production of
BT Talong. The SC issued a writ of kalikasan and
referred the case to the CA. The CA ruled that the
Greenpeace possesses legal standing, the case is not
yet moot and academic since it is capable of repetition
yet evading review, the alleged non-compliance with
environmental and local government laws present
justiciable controversies for resolution by the court.
page 14 of 65
WHAT IS A HOT-TUB HEARING?
It is a process of whereby the Court Justices seat in a
panel and asks expert witnesses from both sides of the
parties for the purpose of having expert testimonies
coming from the both sides.
EXPLAIN PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The Precautionary Principle is a tool for making better
health and environmental decisions. It aims to prevent
harm from the outset rather than manage it after the
fact. In common language, this means “better safe than
sorry.”
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIO-SAFETY, 2000
“In accordance with the precautionary approach the
objective of this Protocol is to contribute in ensuring an
adequate level of protection in the field of the safe
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms
resulting from modern biotechnology that may have
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity, taking into account risks to
human health, and specifically focusing on trans-
boundary movements.”
QUESTION: WHEN DOES LIFE BEGINS?
Life begins at fertilization. (Imbong v. Ochoa)
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory
construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by
the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical
sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
In essence, the separation of powers means
that the making of the laws belongs to Congress,
the execution of the laws is to the executive and the
settlement of controversies rests in the Judiciary. Each
is prevented from invading the domain of the others.
The purpose of the separation of powers is to prevent
concentration of authority in one department and
thereby avoid tyranny.
PRINCIPLE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
Under the system of checks and balances, one
department is given certain powers by which it may
definitely restrain the others from exceeding
constitutional authority. It may object or resist any
encroachment upon its authority, or it may question, if
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
necessary any act or acts which unlawfully interferes
with its sphere of jurisdiction and authority. (Suarez,
2005)
BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA (PDAF
CASE)
ISSUE/S:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated
petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy
not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners have legal
standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar
the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation
of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative
power, (c) checks and
balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in the cases. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality
of the pork barrel system.
 The case is ripe for adjudication since the
challenged funds and the laws allowing for their
utilization are currently existing and operational and
thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms
on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The
President does not have constitutional authority to
nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
 The “moot and academic principle” cannot
stop the Court from deciding the case considering
that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the
constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system presents a situation of exceptional character
and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is
a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s
constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the
public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the
national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork
Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
page 15 of 65
wisdom of the political branches of the government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept
of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue
 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of
being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from
the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are
matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
 The present case is not barred by the ruling
in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case
was a limited response to a separation of powers
problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring
post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress.
 On the contrary, the present cases involve a
more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation
between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each
other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF
article, including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering that
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form
of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This
power cannot be exercised by individual members of
Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be
exercised after the GAA has already been passed.
 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and
Management[2] does not also bar judgment on the
present case because it was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and hence no controlling doctrine was
rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK
BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the
Executive and the Legislative Departments has been
violated.
 The post-enactment measures including
project identification, fund release, and fund
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the
executive department.
 Legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, including ―the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities and the ― regulation and release of funds in
violation of the separation of powers principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
 That the said authority to identify projects is
treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law.
 Respondents also failed to prove that the role
of the legislators is only recommendatory in
nature. They even admitted that the identification of
the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative
powers has been violated
 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which
– as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress as a
body. Therefore, since the same is delegated by the
Constitution to the Congress, it cannot be further
delegated to the members of the Congress.
(c) Checks and balances
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of
P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA
is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on
their own discretion.
 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts
the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item
veto.
 It forces the President to decide between (a)
accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing
the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
page 16 of 65
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.
 In fact, even without its post-enactment
legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would
then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation. This is because the appropriation law
leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore,
does not readily indicate a discernible item which may
be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially
prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of
checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given
post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating
or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation
law.
 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as
said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in
which they themselves participate.
 The concept of post-enactment authorization
violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government,
because it renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
 The Court, however, cannot completely agree
that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would
allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is
a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding
political dynasties is not self-executing.
 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that the state shall prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-
executing provision.
 Since there appears to be no standing law
which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this
issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates
constitutional principles on local autonomy
 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national
officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public
funds for local development.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division
is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
account the specific interests and peculiarities of the
district the legislator represents.
 The allocation/division limits are clearly not
based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration.
 This concept of legislator control underlying
the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are
already legally mandated to―assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that
have no law-making authority except only when acting
as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK
BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD
No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law”, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets
apart a determinate or determinable amount of money
and(b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose.
 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law
because it set apart a determinable amount: a Special
Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of
the [Energy Development] Board from any and all
sources.
 It also specified a public purpose: energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid
appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of
[PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be
less thanP150,000,000.00.
 It also specified a public purpose: priority
infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines.
page 17 of 65
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD
No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of legislation
powers.
 The phrase “and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits
of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
 This phrase gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law.
 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored
that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government, remains legally effective and
subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of
the delegating law.
 The law does not supply a definition of
“priority infrastructure development projects” and
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of
“infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the
said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
(What has been delegated cannot be further delegated)
General Rule: What has been delegated cannot be
further delegated.
Exceptions: PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION OF POWERS (P
E T A L)
1. Delegation to the People through plebiscite
and Referendum
2. Delegation of Emergency powers to the
president
3. Delegation of Tariff/Taxing powers to the
president
4. Delegation to Administrative bodies or
agencies of power of subordinate legislation
5. Delegation of power to Local governments
QUESTION: MAY PRESIDENT DUTERTE VALIDLY
EXERCISE EMERGENCY POWERS MOTU PROPRIO?
Answer: NO. Emergency power of the president is a
mere delegated power which needs an enabling law to
be enacted by the Congress. Thus, without a law
enacted by the Congress authorizing the President to
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
exercise emergency powers, it cannot be validly
exercised by President Duterte motu proprio.
REQUISITES FOR CONGRESS TO VALIDLY DELEGATE
EMERGENCY POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT:
1. There must be a war or other national
emergency;
2. The delegation must be in limited
period;
3. It must be subject to such restrictions
as Congress may prescribe;
4. It must always be in pursuant to
national policy.
Q: WHAT IF LATER CONGRESS REVOKED OR
WITHDRAW THE DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS TO
THE PRESIDENT, IS ANOTHER LAW REQUIRED TO
WITHDRAW SUCH POWER?
A: No. Another law is not required by the Congress if
sooner they withdraw or revoke such power, a mere
resolution will suffice.
POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
What is delegated to the administrative bodies is not
the law-making power but the rule-making power,
limited to (a) filling up the details of the law or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation.
TESTS FOR VALID DELEGATION
1. COMPLETENESS TEST – the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is enforce it
2. SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST – there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference
of legislative authority to the delegate or undue
influence, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
Q: DO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE INHERENT
POWERS?
No. Since only the State has the inherent powers. The
powers can be exercised by the local governments are
those powers that have been delegated to them by the
Congress.
Q: CAN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXERCISE POLICE
POWER?
Yes. The Congress has delegated police power to the
local government units to enact ordinances necessary
and proper for the health, safety, morals, prosperity,
page 18 of 65
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
local government units and its constituents, and for the
protection of their property.
MOSQUEDA, et al v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS AND
CORPORATION
Section 16 Local Government Code comprehends two
branches of delegated powers, namely: the general
legislative power and the police power proper.
General legislative power refers to the power delegated
by Congress to the local legislative body, or the
Sangguniang Panlungsod in the case of Davao City, 105
to enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances
and make regulations. This power is limited in that the
enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and
the power must be exercised to effectuate and
discharge the powers and duties legally conferred to
the local legislative body. The police power proper, on
the other hand,. authorizes the local government unit
to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the local
government unit and its constituents, and for the
protection of their property.
There are two different types of taking that can be
identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property.
Q: An ordinance banning aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice was enacted by the local
government of Davao City invoking their police power.
Representatives from the Pilipino Banana Growers and
Corporation filed a petition before the RTC of DAVAO
City challenging the constitutionality of the said
Ordinance alleging therein that the ordinance
exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power;
violated the equal protection clause amounting to
confiscation of property without due process of law. If
you were the RTC judge, how will you resolve the issues
posited by the representatives of Pilipino Banana
Growers and Corporation?
IS THE LEGISLATIVE POWER EXCLUSIVELY VESTED IN
THE CONGRESS?
No. The 1987 Constitution reserved the legislative
power to the people through initiative and referendum.
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
It is a mechanism used to reconcile or compromise
certain differences or conflicting provisions of both
versions of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Q: FROM THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE, WHERE
WOULD THE BILL GO? IS THE BILL AUTOMATICALLY
TRANSFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE?
A: No. From the bicameral conference committee, the
bill will have to descend back to the both houses of
congress. It will now be subject to votation of both
houses, and if the yeas prevail over the nays, it will be
then signed by the senate president and the house
speaker where the same will be transmitted to the
president for signature. Conversely, if ever the nays
prevail over yeas, the bill is not automatically killed but
a new bicameral conference committee is convened
until they have come up with an acceptable proposals.
See: Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
WHAT ARE THE BILLS ORIGINATED FROM THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES? – A P R I L
1. Appropriation bills
2. Private bills
3. Revenue or tariff bills
4. Bills authorizing Increase of the public
debt
5. Bills of Local application
 Here, the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the
sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA
7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution,
because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not
pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section
24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
RA 7716 did not violate the Constitution. The
phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the
revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives
initiated the passage of the bill which may
undergo extensive changes in the Senate. After
all, the Constitution provides that the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
page 19 of 65
SB. No. 1630 likewise did not violate the
Constitution. Having been certified as urgent by
the President, it need not meet the requirement
not only of printing but also of reading the bill on
separate days.
Question: A law (RA 9054) was passed amending
ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to
create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.
Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly
created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with
the exception of Cotabato City.
A. Is RA 9054 creating Shariff
Kabunsuan Constitutional or
not?
B. Is the creation of Shariff
kabunsuan entitled to one
representative in the House
of Representatives?
Answer:
(A) RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Only Congress can
create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of
legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise
under the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a province without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that every province
shall have a legislative district.
(B) No. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a
law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative
powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only
within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in the
Constitution.
See: Sema vs. COMELEC
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from
13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as
members of the House of Representatives. Upon
petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system
on the ground that under the Constitution, it is
mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.
 POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 20 of 65

Issue: General rule: Political parties can participate in party-

Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the
time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to
define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system
to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party
list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress.
 For every 4 district
representatives, there should be
1 party-list. (4:1).
 Fractional representation is not
allowed.
THESE ARE THE PARTIES THAT MAY PARTICIPATE IN
THE PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS (ATOM PAGLAOM CASE)
NATIONAL REGIONAL SECTORAL
PARTIES OR PARTIES OR PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS ORGANIZATIONS ORGANIZATIONS
list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections.
Exception: A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
Example: Liberal Party (LP), as a national party, may not
participate in the party-election if they filled candidates
in the election. However, they may still participate in
the party-list elections through their sectoral wing, like
the youth sector of the LP, the women sector of the LP,
provided that they are registered in the COMELEC as
independent sectoral party and is linked to the LP
through a coalition.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations

shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
Those that belong to Those that lack well-
disqualified, provided that they have at least one
marginalized or defined political
nominee who remains qualified.
underrepresented sectors constituencies
 Religious sectors shall not be allowed to be
registered as political parties (Sec. 2 (5), Art. 6,
Consti)
Labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
Professionals, women,  Religious denominations and sects may not be
Indigenous cultural
youth, elderly registered as political parties. (Sec 2 (5), Art. 18
communities, veterans,
Consti)
OFWs, urban poor
 The prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party, not as to pries
running as a candidate. (Ang bagong bayani vs.
Three different groups may participate in the party-list COMELEC)
system: (a) national parties or organizations,  The party or organization must not be an
(b) regional parties or organizations, and (c) sectoral adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
parties or organizations. funded or assisted by, the government. (Ang
bagong bayani vs. COMELEC)
National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC
lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized
The Supreme Court granted the petition and
and underrepresented” sector.
set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application
for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified to register as a party-list organization under
any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section
5 that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality
in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.”
Laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in
the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires
the laws of general application relating to elections be
applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
PRIVILEGED ARREST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
CONGRESS
PEOPLE v. JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-
fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the
basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his
constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
page 21 of 65
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art.
VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free
man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would
be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Q: Congressman Jalosjos was convicted by the RTC of
the crime of Statutory rape, but he was able to appeal
seasonably. During the pendency of the appeal, should
he be still allowed to post bail?
A: No. Bail is a matter of right before conviction. On the
other hand, bail is a matter of discretion upon a
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Here,
Jalosjos was already convicted by the RTC of the crime
of Statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua disqualifying him to apply for bail as a matter
of right. Likewise, he cannot avail bail as a matter of
discretion since the penalty of statutory rape is
reclusion perpetua.
 In the MTC, the right of bail is always a matter
of right since the crimes punishable therein are
less than 6 years.
PROHIBITION AGAINST HOLDING OF DUAL OR
MULTIPLE OFFICES APPLY AS WELL TO TEMPORARY
DESIGNATIONS
Funa vs Agra
Case Digest GR 191644 Feb 19 2013
Facts:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel
when Pres Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor
General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who
has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again,
Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of
Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra
then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and
continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor
General.
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment.
Agra argued that his concurrent designations were
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he
was holding multiple offices at the same time, his
designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to
a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and
emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
Issue 1: W/N Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of
Justice is valid
No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General violates the constitutional prohibition
under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting
or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the
Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in GOCCs is
concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as
to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, because the objective of
Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in
the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members
and their deputies and assistants.
Issue 2: W/N Agra may concurrently hold the positions
by virtue of the “hold-over principle”
No. Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice
was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would
have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the
two positions due to the holding of one office being the
consequence of holding the other.
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in
Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the
broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of
the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as
Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient
for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was
“allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position.” To claim the exemption of his concurrent
designations from the coverage of the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish
that his concurrent designation was expressly
allowed by the Constitution.
Issue 3: W/N the offices of the Solicitor General and
Secretary of Justice is in an ex officio capacity in
relation to the other
No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General
are neither required by the primary functions nor
included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The
OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of
the latter, as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987
page 22 of 65
decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous.
With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is
now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same
qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives,
allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding
Judges of the Court of Appeals.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
CONGRESS
OSMEÑA v. PENDATUN
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.
delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In
the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos
Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in
order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña
during his speech and that if his allegations were found
to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to
disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said
resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers
that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity
for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman
Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred
that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the
matter and Congress has the power to discipline its
members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been
violated?
HELD:
No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of
the legislature which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does
not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member
therein.
Sec. 11, Article 6 (1987 Constitution)
A senator or member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Q: Congressman X delivered his privileged speech in the
Congress, in the course of his speech, he maligned Y, a
private individual. Y subsequently filed a complaint
against Congressman X. The latter invoked his freedom
of speech. Can Congressman X invoke freedom of
speech? If yes, what would be the remedy of Y?
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
A: Yes. Congressman X may not be held liable since he
is protected by his privileged speech enshrined under
the Constitution. Thus, the remedy of Y is to file an
action against Congressman X for disorderly behavior
before the House Ethics Committee.
INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE
No legislator is allowed to hold office or positions in any
government agency including government-owned or
controlled corporations without forfeiting his seat in
the Congress. Meaning, a member of the Congress is
not prevented from accepting other government posts
as long as he forfeits his seat as a legislator. What is not
allowed is the simultaneous holding of a government
office and the seat in the Congress. The purpose is to
prevent owing loyalty to another branch of the
government, to the detriment of the independence of
the legislature and the doctrine of the separation of
powers. Forfeiture of the seat is automatic. Thus for
example, a congressman who was appointed as
secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management is deemed to have automatically forfeited
his seat in the House of Representatives when he took
his oath as secretary for DBM. No resolution is
necessary to declare his legislative post as vacant.
FORBIDDEN OFFICE
No members of the Congress shall be appointed to any
office in the government that has been crated or the
emoluments thereof have been increased during his
term. The purpose is to prevent public trafficking in
public office. Some legislators who do not opt to run
again in the public office might create or improve
lucrative government positions and in combination with
the President, arrange that they be appointed in those
positions, all at the expense of public good.
The appointment however to the forbidden office is not
allowed only during the term for which a certain
legislator was elected, when such office was created or
its emolument thereof. After such term, and even if the
legislator is re-elected, the disqualification no longer
applies and he may therefore be appointed to the
office.
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT
Senate President – ex officio chairman
12 Senators and 12 members of the Congress
 The Commission shall meet only when the
Congress is in session.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IN THE CONGRESS
1. Senate electoral tribunal
2. House of Representative electoral tribunal
 Each electoral tribunal shall be composed of:
3 Justices of SC
6 members of the House of Representatives or
Senate. (a total of 9 members)
page 23 of 65
 The senior justice shall be automatically be the
chairman.
 The electoral tribunal shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective
Members.
 There will be no appeal in the decision of the
electoral tribunal since the latter shall be the
sole judge to decide all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. The remedy therefore
will be special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
BONDOC v. PINEDA
These electoral tribunal in Congress, although attached
in the Congress, they are a body separate and
independent from that of the Congress.
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS
(Legislative power)
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS
Macalintal v. COMELEC (Justice Puno)
The power of oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding
of and influence over the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. This means that the work of Congress
does not end upon the enactment of the law. Congress
has a continuing interest to see to it that the law
enacted has properly implemented.
3 categories of Congressional Oversight Functions:
1. Legislative Scrutiny – implies a lesser intensity and
continuity of attention to administrative
operations. Its primary purpose is to determine
economy and efficiency of the operation of government
activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny,
Congress may request information and report from the
other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration
of the agency involved.
2. Congressional Investigation – the power of the
congress to conduct investigation in aid of its legislation
under Sec. 21, Article VI.
3. Legislative Supervision – power of the Congress to
exercise legislative veto. However, this legislative veto
was later on declared unconstitutional in the case of
abakada-guro party list v. Purisima
QUESTION HOUR v. INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
Inquiries in aid of legislation
The Senate or the House of Representatives may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected (Sec. 21, Art. 6, Consti)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
(Senate v. Ermita)
Legislative Contempt
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty
in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation. But it must be herein established that a
witness who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty but the detention
should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to
due process of law. (Arnault v. Nazareno)
Question Hour
The heads of departments may upon their own
intiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House
shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
(Sec. 22, Art. 6, Consti)
5. In Question hour, the attendance is
discretionary. On the other hand, the
attendance is mandatory in cases when
Congress is conducting in aid of legislation.
6. In Question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function. The aim of Congress in aid
of legislation is to elicit information that may
be used for legislation.
7. In Question hour, the executive officials may
invoke executive privilege. On the other hand,
the executive officials may not invoke
executive privilege. (Senate v. Ermita)
Bengzon v. SBRC
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute
or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-
quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be “in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of
Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify
against one’s self.
page 24 of 65
PORK BARREL SYSTEM
LUMP-SUM DISCRETIONARY FUND
CONGRESSIONAL PRESIDENTIAL
PORK BARREL PORK BARREL
PDAF
SOURCES:
1. Malampaya
200Million-
SENATORS fund
2. Presidential
70Million- Social fund
CONGRESSMEN (PAGCOR)
Reasons why PDAF was declared unconstitutional:
1. Violation of the Separation of powers
- As a rule, the budgeting power lies in
Congress. It regulates the release of funds
(power of the purse). The executive, on
the other hand, implements the laws –
this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is
a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork
barrel system, what’s happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted,
the legislators themselves dictate as to
which projects their PDAF funds should be
allocated to – a clear act of implementing
the law they enacted. Thus, a violation of
the principle of separation of powers.
2. Violation of non-delegation of powers
- As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative
power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are
concerned). That being, legislative power
cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.
3. Violation of the principle of Checks and balances (It
denied the President’s item veto or selective veto)
- Under Section 27 (2), Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution, the President shall have the
power to veto any item or items in an
Appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. Thus,
since PDAF is an approp riation bill,
it encroach upon the power o/f the
President to exercise his selective veto.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
- One feature in the principle of checks and
balances is the power of the president to
veto items in the GAA which he may deem
to be inappropriate. But this power is
already being undermined because of the
fact that once the GAA is approved, the
legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under
such system, how can the president veto
the appropriation made by the legislator if
the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA – again, “Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless.”
4. It subverted local autonomy
- As a rule, the local governments have the
power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils
(LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own
programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly
on the part of the members of the House
of Representatives, what’s happening is
that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance
where the national government (note, a
congressman is a national officer) meddles
with the affairs of the local government –
and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is
happening under the pork barrel system
but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a
personal fund on the part of legislators.
 PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL was likewise
declared unconstitutional: The phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s
authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
- The law creating the Malampaya funds
shall be used by the president for energy
related purposes and other purposes he
may deemed fit. Does it have standards?
No. The term “other purposes he may
deem fit” was an undue delegation to the
President since it does have no standards
at all; the term is very broad where the
President may use the funds even in his
personal transactions.
page 25 of 65
POWER OF AUGMENTATION
Who may exercise this power?
1. President
2. Senate President
3. Speaker of the House of Representatives
4. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
5. Heads of the Constitutional Commissions
What are the requisites to validly exercise this power?
1. There must be a law authorizing the
augmentation
2. It must come from the savings in their
respective departments
3. There must be no cross-border transfer.
Question:
The DEPED implemented the K-12 program. However,
the DEPED lacks the enough budget to implement the
same. Thus, the Secretary of DEPED went to the
President to seek funds to properly implement k-12. In
return, the President augmented the funds of the DENR
to fund the K-12 program. Was there a cross-border
transfer?
Answer:
No. Since the funds augmented came from DENR which
belongs to the same executive department.
EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT
It refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason.
ARAULLO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO (Justice Bersamin)
1. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional.
- The transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the
government) is allowed by the Constitution to
make realignment of funds; however, such transfer
or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But
under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.
- Further, transfers “within their respective offices”
also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive,
these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA
is concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these
projects may be legitimate, they are still non-
existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such
projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
2. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
applicable.
- The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes
the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate
the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If
the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than
good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone.
The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they
relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to
the authors, implementers, and proponents of the
DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals
(civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have
not acted in good faith.
3. On the issue of what are “savings”
- These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to
what was being declared by the Executive. Under
the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only
occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is
completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as
funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus,
since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at
all for the transfers. Further, savings should only
be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under
the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then
being declared as “savings” by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.
DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT
Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently
declared unconstitutional remain valid, but not when
the acts are done after the declaration of
unconstitutionality.
Q: Since the DAP was declared unconstitutional, what
will happen to the projects funded by the DAP? Should
the projects funded by the DAP destroyed?
A: No. Applying the Doctrine of Operative Fact, the
projects funded by the DAP should not be destroyed
since at the time the projects were funded, it comes
with a presumption that it is constitutional. Thus, the
projects remain valid.
The issue on whether or not the Doctrine of Operative
Fact is applicable to the authors of the DAP (Motion
for Reconsideration, Araullo vs. Aquino)
The mere nullification of an act has no bearing
on individual liability precisely because the doctrine
primarily seeks to ensure that acts performed prior to
page 26 of 65
nullification are still deemed valid on the theory that
judicial nullification is a contingent or unforeseen
event.
The policy behind the operative fact doctrine is
consistent with the idea that regardless of the
nullification of certain acts and practices under the DAP
and/or NBC No. 541, it does not operate to impute bad
faith to authors, proponents and implementors who
continue to enjoy the presumption of innocence and
regularity in the performance of official functions and
duties. Good faith is presumed, whereas bad faith
requires the existence of facts. To hold otherwise
would send a chilling effect to all public officers
whether of minimal or significant discretion, the result
of which would be a dangerous paralysis of
bureaucratic activity.
Question: A law was passed by the Congress increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Senator Mitumara questioned the Constitutionality of
the said law arguing that it is a violation of the
separation of the powers of the government. (1) Is
Senator Mitumara correct? (2) Assuming that the
Supreme Court gives its advice and concurred with the
said law; will your answer be the same?
Answer: (1) Yes. The law passed by the Congress is
unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that no law
shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court without its advice and concurrence.
(2) No. The Constitution allows the passage of a law
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court provided that the latter gives its
advice and concurrence.
NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS:
1. Impeachment cases, the House of Representatives
shall initiate the same and acts as a prosecutor
body, on the other hand, Senate shall sit as an
Impeachment Court.
2. Congress may propose amendment or Revision of
the Constitution; in such case, the Congress shall
convene as a Constituent Assembly.
3. The Congress shall canvass the election for
president and vice president. In such case, the
Congress shall act as National Board of Canvasser.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
(Alter ego of the President)
The members of the cabinet shall be deemed the alter
ego of the President. Thus, their acts performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
REASON:
Since the President is a busy man, he is not expected to
exercise the totality of his power of control all the time.
He is not expected to exercise all his powers in person.
He is expected to delegate some of them to men of his
confidence, particularly to members of his Cabinet.
EXCEPTIONS:
(1) In cases wherein the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or by the law to act in person; or (2)
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments.
(Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary Reyes)
Question: A service contract No. 46 was agreed by
Secretary Rokaya of Energy Department and the
MAMANTIYADUN, a Japanese corporation, which
allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation
of petroleum resources within the Tañon Strait, a
narrow passage of water between the islands of Negros
and Cebu. A group of persons (Takuleng gang)
questioned the constitutionality of the said agreement
specifically Sec. 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution, according
to them only the President may enter into an
agreement involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilizations of minerals within the country. In his
defense, Secretary Rokaya averred that as a cabinet
secretary, she is deemed to be an alter ego of the
president so that her acts performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business are presumptively the
acts of the President, unless disapproved by the
President. Is Secretary Rokaya correct?
Answer: No. Since it is the Constitution itself requires
that the President himself be the signatory of service
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
the exploration, development, and utilization of our
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. Thus, the
alter ego principle is not applicable in cases wherein the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or by the
law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally. (See: Resident Marine
Mammals vs. Secretary Reyes)
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law
or contract violates any norm of the constitution that
law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect.
What are the conditions/requisites before the
Philippines may enter service contract into foreign
corporations involving exploration, development, and
utilizations of minerals, and other mineral oils?
page 27 of 65
1. The president himself shall enter the
agreement
2. The agreement must be according to
the general terms and conditions
provided by law
3. The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with Sec. 2, Art. 12,
1987 Consti)
FAITHFUL EXECUTION CLAUSE
The president as chief executive, he shall ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
The immunity applies only to Domestic law, it does not
apply to international law. With the creation of
International Criminal Court, the President’s immunity
from suit cannot be applied.
Officers whose appointments will require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments:
1. Heads of Executive Department
2. Ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consults
3. Officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain
4. Other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution.
MANALO vs. SISTOZA
The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The police
force is different from and independent of the armed
forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to
those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors
and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the
herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the
first category of presidential appointees requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
Persons who are required to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appeal once appointed by the
President:
1. Heads of the executive department
2. Ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls
3. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain
4. Other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. (Chairman and
commissioners of the three Constitutional
Commissions and the regular members of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
Composition of JBC
1. Chief justice (ex-officio chairman)
2. Representative of the Congress (ex-officio
members)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 28 of 65

3. Secretary of Justice (ex-officio members) vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments
4. A representative of the Integrate bar (regular to the Judiciary. (De Castro v. JBC, Appointment of Chief
member) Justice Corona)
5. A professor of law (regular member)
6. A retired member of the Supreme Court POWER OF CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT
(regular member)
The president shall have control of all the executive
7. A representative of the private sector (regular
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
member)
the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 17, Article 7, 1987
 The 4 regular members of the JBC
Constitution)
shall be appointed by the president for the
terms of 4 years and their appointment shall
“Control” includes authority to act directly whenever a
require confirmation by the CA.
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
 The appointment of justices and
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
judge no longer required to be confirmed by
the commission of acts; review, revise, reverse, modify
the CA.
or affirm acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units.
AD-INTERIM APPOINTMENT
- An appointment made by the President
Thus, the President may direct all executive
when the Congress is in recess or not in
departments, bureaus and offices to perform a duty, to
session.
restrain the commission of acts, or to review revise,
- The Commission on Appointment shall sit
reverse, modify or affirm their acts and decisions.
only when the Congress is in session. If
there would be vacancy in the executive
The President has no power of control over the LGUs,
departments which is ought to be filled
he has only general supervision which is to oversee that
immediately, the President may be
their powers and functions are exercised in accordance
precluded from filling the position and
with law.
that’s why ad-interim appointment was
embodied in the Constitution, to allow the
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT under Section 18 of
president to appoint even when the
Article VII
Congress is not in session.
1. Calling-out power
2. Martial law power
AD-INTERIM v. REGULAR APPOINTMENT
3. Power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
- The appointee in the ad-interim is
effective immediately. Thus, the
Grounds of the Calling-out power of the President
appointee may assume office
1. Lawless violence
immediately. On the other hand, regular
2. Invasion
appointment does not take effect
3. Rebellion
immediately. Thus, the appointee shall
have to wait for the confirmation of the
Grounds to declare martial law or suspend the privilege
CA before he can assume office.
of the writ of habeas corpus
1. Invasion; or
AD-INTERIM v. APPOINTMENTS IN AN ACTING
2. Rebellion, when public safety requires it.
CAPACITY (see page 1)

Q: A bomb exploded in the Davao City where many

MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS (see Section 15, Article 7,
people died and injured. President Duterte later
1987 Constitution)
proclaimed Martial law since there is lawless violence.
General rule: Two months immediately before the next
Is the proclamation of Martial law valid?
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
A: No. Lawless violence is not one of the grounds
appointments.
allowed by law in order for the President validly
declares martial law. For him to declare martial law,
Exception: there can be temporary appointments to
there must be invasion or rebellion, and public safety
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
requires it. Thus, since there is no rebellion or invasion
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
involved, President Duterte cannot validly declare
martial law.
Is Midnight appointment also applicable in the
judiciary department?
Q: IS POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO DECLARE MARTIAL
No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII, 1987
OR SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
Constitution does not apply to appointments to fill a
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
CORPUS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OR POLITICAL
QUESTIONS?
A: It is subject to judicial review. Under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof. (Section 18 (3), Article 17
1987 Constitution; Lansang v. Garcia)
Q: IS THE CALLING-OUT POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
POLITICAL QUESTION OR SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW?
IBP v. ZAMORA
The calling-out power of the President is a political
question not subject to judicial review since the
President is exercising his exclusive power to call-out
his power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
It is a question in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated by the Constitution to the
President as the sole commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.
Limitations of the Martial law
1. The President may raise the ground of invasion
or rebellion only, when public safety requires
it;
2. The proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not exceed 60 days;
3. Within 48 hours from proclamation of the
martial law, the President shall submit a report
in person or in writing to the Congress.
Jamar Kulayan, et al. v. Gov. Abdusakur Tan
The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise
by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government
Code.
Q: In a martial law declared by the President, the
Congress did not convene jointly because of the
thinking that the declaration of martial law is valid
and that there is no need for them to convene. A
group of lawyers came to the SC urging the latter to
compel the Congress to convene in a joint session to
review the President’s martial law proclamation in
Mindanao arguing that the act of the Congress in not
convening jointly gravely abused their discretion. Is
the contention correct?
Suggested Answer:
No. The contention is not correct. The duty of the
Congress to convene jointly and vote is limited to
instances where Congress intends to revoke or extend
any proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
page 29 of 65
privilege of writ of habeas corpus. Thus, since the
Congress believed that there is no need to convene as
they validly agree with the proclamation of martial
law, there will be no grave abuse of discretion on its
part.
PARDONING POWER (see Section 19, Article 7, 1987
Constitution)
The powers of the President under Section 19
of Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution:
1. Reprieves – the power to suspend the
execution of a death convict. Note: not
applicable anymore, death penalty is
suspended.
2. Commutation – lowering the penalty
3. Pardons
4. Remit fines and forfeiture
5. Amnesty
The president may grant amnesty to an
accused whose conviction has not yet attained finality,
but with the concurrence of the majority vote of all the
members of the Congress. However, conviction by
finality is not a requirement.
Q: A was convicted by the RTC for the crime of murder
A was able to appeal seasonably. During the pendency
of the appeal, is A allowed to be given amnesty? How
about a pardon, is A allowed to be given pardon?
A:
1. Yes, since the conviction by finality is not a
requirement before an accused be granted
amnesty. Under Constitution, the president
may grant amnesty to an accused whose
conviction has not yet attained finality, but
with the concurrence of the majority vote of
all the members of the Congress.
2. No, an accused whose conviction is pending
appeal cannot be given pardon since the
conviction by finality is a requirement before
one may be given pardon.
Is a pardon official act of the president? How about
amnesty?
- Amnesty is an official act of the president.
Thus, it becomes a matter of judicial
notice. Pardon is a private act of the
president. Thus, it is not a matter of
judicial notice. One who has been granted
pardon has the burden of proving that he
has been granted the same.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of
the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify
the government in the sum of P4, 892.50. The SC
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended by then President Marcos absolute
pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was
that clemency could be given even before conviction).
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog
City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her
former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister
of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new appointment
not earlier than the date she was extended the
absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never
been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension; that she is entitled to back pay
for the entire period of her suspension; and that she
should not be required to pay the proportionate share
of the amount of P4, 892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the
President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first
seek appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position.
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to back pay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding
from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting
out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all
purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness
or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not
erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
page 30 of 65
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It
makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the
offense has been established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were
in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required.” This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive back pay for
lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain
her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-
apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service
of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not
served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil
Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor, compensation and novation.
INSTANCES WHERE THE PRESIDENT MAY NOT GRANT
PARDON
(1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet
resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in
which there was no favorable recommendation coming
from the COMELEC.
ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMELEC (Pardon granted
Joseph Estrada)
- “whereas” clauses do not form part of the
statute, because strictly speaking, they are
not part of the operative language of the
statute. Thus, not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its
effectivity contingent upon the fulfillment
of the aforementioned commitment nor
to limit the scope of the pardon.
- A pardon shall not work the restoration of
the right to hold public office, or the right
of suffrage, unless such rights are
expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
- Former President Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to
former president Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. Thus, it
was not a mere conditional but an
absolute pardon.
AMNESTY v. PARDON
1. In amnesty, the grantee is an individual. In
pardon, the grantee may be a class of persons.
2. In amnesty, concurrence by majority vote of
the members of Congress is required. Such
concurrence does not require in pardon.
3. In amnesty, it is an official act of the president
and thus, has an effect of judicial notice. In
pardon, it is a private act of the president and
thus, one has the burden of proving that he
has been grated the same.
4. In amnesty, it abolishes the offense. While in
pardon, it relieves the offender from the
consequences of the offense.
5. In amnesty, conviction of the accused by final
judgment is not a requirement. In pardon,
before an accused be given pardon, he must
first be convicted with final judgment.
BORROWING POWER
Limitations:
1. The president may contract foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with
the concurrence of the Monetary Board;
2. Subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
TREATY-MAKING POWER
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Senate. (Section 21, Article 7.
Constitution)
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is
vested in the President and not, as commonly believed,
in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only
to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification.
A mere executive agreement does not require
concurrence of the Senate.
Under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Bayan v. Zamora;
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary)
VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA)
 It is an agreement allowing American forces to
conduct joint-military exercises here together
with the armed forces of the Philippines.
page 31 of 65
 Such agreement is considered as treaty. Since
it is the President himself considered the same
as a treaty. (Bayan v. Zamora)
REQUISITES BEFORE FOREIGN MILITARY BASES SHALL
BE ALLOWED IN THE PHILIPPINES:
1. There must be a treaty duly concurred by the
Senate;
2. When the Congress so requires;
3. The other contracting State should recognize
the same as treaty. (Section 25, Article 18,
1987 Constitution)
ENHANCED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT
(EDCA) (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa) See
pages 6-7.
Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the
access and use of portions of PH territory, which are
called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access
and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake
the following types of activities within the Agreed
Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and
combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster
relief activities; and such other activities that as may be
agreed upon by the parties.
Here, the signatories were not the heads of the States.
On behalf of the Philippine government, the Defense
Secretary signed the same. On behalf of the US, the US
ambassador on the Philippines signed the same. The
two heads of the States merely witnessed the signing of
the agreement.
Issue: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement
for concurrence by the Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for
concurrence because it is in the form of a mere
executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the
Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into
executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops
or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument
that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.
BUDGETARY POWER
Although the power of appropriation belongs to the
Congress, the President prepares the budget through
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
(Section 22, Article 7, 1987 Constitution.)
Q: The DBM proposed a budget for the Department of
Education (DEPED). Thereafter, the Congress found that
the budget is too small for the DEPED to exercise its
function taking into consideration that education
should be given priority specially the implementation of
the k-12 program. The Congress thereafter increased
the proposal made by the DBM. Was the act of the
Congress increasing the proposed budget valid?
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
A: No. Under the Constitution, the Congress may not
increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. Thus, the act of the Congress
increasing the proposed budget is invalid. (Section 25
(1), Article 6, 1987 Constitution)
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Q: Is judicial power vested only in the SC?
A: No. The Constitution says that the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
This doctrine holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized
training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the courts is had even if the matter
may well be within their proper jurisdiction.
EXPLAIN JUDICIAL POWER
Judicial power includes (1) the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable
(traditional concept of judicial review), and (2) to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government (Expanded power of judicial review).
Thus, it is not a mere power but a duty imposed by the
Constitution. (See: Section 1, Article 8, 1987
Constitution)
How is the political question doctrine adversely
affected by the expanded power of judicial review?
Despite the issue appears to be a political question,
once it is shown or determined that there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, the Court may enter jurisdiction
through its expanded power of judicial review.
WHAT ARE POLITICAL QUESTIONS?
Tañada v. Cuenco
In ordinary parlance, it is a question of policy. It refers
to those (1) questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or (2) questions in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
executive or legislative branch of the government.
Example of (1) political question:
In recall election, it is a question to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity through initiation of
a recall election on the ground of loss of confidence.
page 32 of 65
Example of (2) political question:
The Calling-out power of the President, as the
commander-in-chief of the AFP. The Constitution has
delegated to the President the power to call-out the
power as commander-in-chief. Thus, the president has
the full discretionary authority to call such power.
IBP v. Zamora (2000)
The SC upheld deployment of the Marines. Calling out
armed forces is discretionary power solely vested in the
President’s wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by
the Court to see whether or not there was grave abuse
of discretion.
REQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(See, Page 3.)
Q: May the Courts of Justice render advisory opinions?
A: The Courts may not render advisory opinions, since
there is no yet actual controversy to be resolved.
Q: May the International Courts of Justice render
advisory opinions?
A: Yes. Under the United Nation’s Charter and under its
own statute, it has two functions. (1) to render advisory
opinions to the general assembly, the security council
and other organs of the United Nations, (2) to resolve
contentious cases. Evidently, the International Courts of
Justice may render advisory opinions.
RULE-MAKING POWER
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrate bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. (Section 5. (5), Article 8 of the
Constitution)
GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero
The Supreme Court has now the sole authority to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts.
NOTE: The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of
judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(Section 6 (2), Article 8, Constitution)
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Theory of judicial interpretation that encourages judges
to limit the exercise of their own power.
In terms of legislative acts, the principle of judicial
restraint means that every intendment of the law must
be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last
resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question
of constitutionality.
SC AS PRESUDEBTUAK ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Q: During the impeachment proceedings against the SC
Chief Justice, the House Impeachment Panel, through
letters, asked for the examination of records and the
issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the
Agenda and Minutes of Deliberations of specific SC-
decided cases. Also, the same panel requested for the
attendance of court officials including judges, justices,
and employees as witnesses under subpoenas. May
judges, justices, and Court officials and employees
testify in an impeachment proceeding against a
Member of the Court on confidential matters learned in
their official capacity?
A: No. Members of the Court may not be compelled to
testify in the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about
information acquired in the performance of their
official adjudicatory functions and duties; otherwise,
their disclosure of confidential matters learned in their
official capacity violates judicial privilege as it pertains
to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of
adjudication.
XPN: If the intent only is for them to identify or certify
the genuineness of documents within their control that
are not confidential and privileged, their presence in
the Impeachment Court may be excused.
EXTRADITION CASES
Extradition
The right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other State to surrender
No notice requirement
Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not
inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
The foregoing procedure will “best serve the ends of
justice” in extradition cases.
NOTE: An extraditee does not have the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of an
extradition proceeding. The nature of the right being
claimed is nebulous and the degree of prejudice an
extraditee allegedly suffers is weak. (US v. Purganan,
G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002)
Requisites for granting bail in extradition cases:
page 33 of 65
The possible extraditee must show upon a clear and
convincing evidence that:
1. He will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community,
2. There exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances. (Government of Hongkong v. Judge
Olalia)
Does an extraditee have a right of access to the
evidence against him?
It depends. During the executive phase of an
extradition proceeding, an extraditee does not have the
right of access to evidence in the hands of the
government. But during the judicial phase he has.
WHAT IS AN ATTENTANT CLAUSE?
It is a provision/stipulation in extradition treaty which
provides that a murder or assassination of a head of
State or any member of his immediate family will not
be considered as political offense, thus, extraditable.
POLICE POWER
Requisites for a valid exercise of police power
1. Lawful subject – The interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the exercise of the police power
2. Lawful means – The means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. (NTC v.
Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257)
Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the
right of the State and of the public to self-protection.
For this reason, its scope expands and contracts with
the changing needs. (Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580,
602-603, 1915)
Generally, police power extends to all the great public
needs. Its particular aspects, however, are the
following: 1. Public health 2. Public morals 3. Public
safety 4. Public welfare
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Power of the state to forcibly acquire the needed
property in order to devote it to the intended public
use, upon payment of just compensation.
Conditions for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain
1. Taking of private property 2. For public use 3. Just
compensation 4. Observance of due process
Requisites for a valid taking (PMAPO)
1. The expropriator must enter a Private property
2. Entry must be for more than a Momentary period
3. Entry must be under warrant or color of legal
Authority 4. Property must be devoted to Public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
5. Utilization of property must be in such a way as to
Oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property (Republic v. vda. De
Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20620, Aug. 15, 1974)
Expansive concept of “Public Use”
The requisite of public use does not necessarily mean
“use by the public at large.” Whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement. Moreover, that only few people
benefit from the expropriation does not diminish its
public-use character because the notion of public use
now includes the broader notion of indirect public
benefit or advantage. (Manosca v. CA, G.R. 166440, Jan.
29, 1996).
Does filing an action for payment of just compensation
prescribes?
No. The right to recover just compensation is enshrined
in no less than Bill of Rights, which states in clear and
categorical language that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. Thus
constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by a mere
statutory prescription.
Q: An ordinance of Quezon City requires memorial park
operators to set aside at least 6% of their cemetery for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
residents of Quezon City. The same ordinance also
imposes fine or imprisonment and revocation of permit
to operate in case of violation. Is this a valid exercise of
police power?
A: No. It constitutes taking of property without just
compensation. The power to regulate does not include
the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under
Sec. 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision
thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment
and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate
and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
cancelled’. The confiscatory clause and the penal
provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial
park cemetery. Moreover, instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries. (City
Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-34915,
Jun. 24, 1983)
NPC v. Maria Mendoza San Pedro, G.R. No. 170945
Sept. 26, 200
There can be expropriation in the right of way
easement. Expropriation is not limited to the
acquisition of real property with a corresponding
transfer of title or possession – the right of way
easement resulting in a restriction of limitation on
property right over the land traversed by transmission
lines also falls within the ambit of the term
expropriation.
page 34 of 65
POWER OF TAXATION
Process by which the government, through its
legislative branch, imposes and collects revenues to
defray the necessary expenses of the government, and
to be able to carry out, in particular, any and all
projects that are supposed to be for the common good.
Simply put, taxation is the method by which these
contributions are exacted.
The power to tax includes the power to destroy only if
it is used as a valid implement of the police power in
discouraging and in effect, ultimately prohibiting
certain things or enterprises inimical to public welfare.
But where the power to tax is used solely for the
purpose of raising revenues, the modern view is that it
cannot be allowed to confiscate or destroy. If this is
sought to be done, the tax may be successfully attacked
as an inordinate and unconstitutional exercise of the
discretion that is usually vested exclusively in the
legislature in ascertaining the amount of tax.
NOTE: Except only in the case of poll (community)
taxes, non-payment of a tax may be the subject of
criminal prosecution and punishment. The accused
cannot invoke the prohibition against imprisonment for
debt as taxes are not considered debts.
Can taxes be subject to off-setting or compensation?
No. Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the
simple reason that the government and the taxpayer
are not creditors and debtors of each other. Debts are
due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while
taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign
capacity.
BILL OF RIGHTS
Yrasegui v. PAL
Bill of rights cannot be invoked against private
individuals. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill
of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals.
Zulueta v. CA
Where the husband invoked his right to privacy of
communication and correspondence against a private
individual, his wife, who had forcibly taken from his
cabinet and presented as evidence against him
documents and private correspondence, the Supreme
Court held these papers inadmissible in evidence,
upholding the husband’s right to privacy.
DUE PROCESS
Article 3, Section 1, 1987 Constitution
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Q: A complaint was filed against respondent Camille
Gonzales, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the
National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The DECS investigating committee was created to
inquire into the charges against Gonzales. Is she
entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of the investigating committee?
A: No. It must be stressed that the disputed
investigation report is an internal communication
between the DECS Secretary and the investigation
committee, and it is not generally intended for the
perusal of respondent or any other person for that
matter, except the DECS Secretary. She is entitled only
to the administrative decision based on substantial
evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity
to meet the charges and the evidence presented
against her during the hearing of the investigation
committee. (Pefianco v. Moral)
Effect of Waiver/Estoppel
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the
party seeking due process was in fact given several
opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by
his own fault or choice he squanders these chances,
then his cry for due process must fail.
WHAT IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE?
(see page 4)
Ang Tibay v. CIR (1940)
Ang Tibay laid off workers belonging to the NLU. NLU
protested this alleged unfair labor practice to the CIR,
which ruled in its favor despite the lack of evidence.
The SC in the instant case remanded the case to the CIR
for a new trial, finding that the NLU may have been
deprived of some primary rights when it tried to prove
its case before the CIR. This case is considered to have
codified the 7 elements of Administrative Due Process,
namely: 1. Hearing 2. Tribunal must have considered
evidence presented. 3. Decision must find support in
evidence. 4. Evidence must be substantial. 5. Decision
must be rendered based on evidence presented at the
hearing. 6. Administrative agency must act on its own
opinion on the law and facts of the controversy, and 7.
The decision must be made in such a manner that the
parties know the issues involved and the reasons
behind the decision made.
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra.
The prohibition against quick-time stays in hotels is
unconstitutional, being violative of due process and the
right to privacy. While upholding morals is a valid state
purpose, there are other purposes for renting a hotel
for less than 5 hours. As an unreasonable means
towards a valid end, the ordinance is unconstitutional
and void. 3. Constitutional and statutory due process 4.
Hierarchy of rights
page 35 of 65
EQUAL PROTECTION
All persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights.
Requisite for valid classification
People v. Cayat
The classification must:
1. Rest on substantial distinctions
2. Be germane to the purpose of the law
3. Not be limited to existing conditions only
4. Apply equally to all members of the same class
International School Alliance v. Quisumbing (2000)
A group of local hired teachers working at the
International School of Manila claim that the fact that
they are paid less than their foreign hired counterparts
violates equal protection. The SC agreed, not on the
ground that local hires and foreign hires should be
treated similarly, in fact holding that the foreign hired
teachers were part of a different bargaining unit, but
because it upheld the principle of “equal pay for equal
work” as enshrined in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Demore v. Kim
The legislature may not validly classify the citizens of
the State on the basis of their origin, race, or parentage.
But the difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.
Tests in determining compliance with the equal
protection clause:
1. Rational Basis Test – the traditional test, which
requires “only that government must not
impose differences in treatment except upon
some reasonable differentiation fairly related
to the object of regulation.” Simply put, it
merely demands that the classification in the
statute reasonably relates to the legislative
purpose.
2. Intermediate scrutiny test – it requires that the
classification must serve an important
governmental objective and is substantially
related to the achievement of such objective.
A classification based on sex is the best
established example of an intermediate level
of review.
3. Strict scrutiny test – refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with
the regulation of speech gender, or race as
well as other fundamental rights as expansion
from its earlier applications to equal
protection.
4. Balancing of Interest/Equality Test/Intensified
Means Test – test which does not look solely
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
into the government’s purpose in classifying
persons or things nor into the existence of an
overriding or compelling government interest
so great to justify limitations of fundamental
rights but closely scrutinizes the relationship
between the classification and the purpose,
based on spectrum of standards, by gauging
the extent to which constitutionally
guaranteed rights depend upon the affected
individual’s interest.
Quinto v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698, 2010)
The petitioners were appointed officials who
intended to run in the elections. Prior to the
elections, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678
pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 9369, which
amended Section 11 of R.A. 8436. The third
paragraph of Section 13 provided that all persons
holding a public appointive office would be
considered ipso facto resigned from office upon
filing of his certificate of candidacy. The petitioners
argued that this provision violated equal
protection. Although initially the Court agreed with
them, upon MR it ruled that the provision and the
COMELEC Resolution were valid.
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
Article 3, Section 2, 1987 Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
Salazar v. Achacoso (1990)
Petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment. Law
enforcers went to her residence where it was
discovered that she was operating a dance studio.
Documents and other personal property were seized.
The warrant was not issued by a judge, but by the
Secretary of Labor; and, assuming that the Secretary of
Labor is authorized to issue warrants, the same is
invalid for being “general”.
Stonehill v. Diokno (1967)
42 search warrants were issued, ordering police officers
to search for documents, articles, etc., which could be
used to violate the laws. The evidence found via the
searches led to convictions for violations of Custom
Laws, Tax Laws, and the Revised Penal Codes. The SC
page 36 of 65
ruled that the warrants, being general warrants, were
void.
Does “reliable information” satisfy the “personal
knowledge” requirement?
No. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied
with a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable
information” alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under section 5 (a) of Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
Instances of a valid warrantless search
1. Visual search is made of moving vehicles at
checkpoints
2. Search incidental to a lawful arrest
3. Search of passengers made in airports
4. Plain view doctrine
5. Stop and frisk
6. Valid waiver
7. Customs search
8. Exigent and emergency circumstances
Plain View Doctrine
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
“plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence.
Requisites of plain view:
1. The law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area
2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent
3. It is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes mat be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.
Stop-and-frisk search
Malacat v. CA
Limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons
is valid. Probable cause is not required but a genuine
reason must exist in light of a police officer’s experience
and surrounding conditions to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed.
Manalili v. CA (1997)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Manalili was charged with Illegal Possession of
marijuana. He was arrested after being stopped and
frisked, because he had reddish eyes and was walking in
a swaying manner. He was convicted. Ruling on the
validity of his arrest due to “stop-and-frisk,” the SC
upheld the arrest. When dealing with a rapidly
unfolding and potentially criminal situation where there
is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant,
policemen should employ limited, flexible responses —
like "stop-and-frisk" — which are graduated in relation
to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen
being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to
treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against
unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
Checkpoints
Valmonte vs. De villa
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Between
the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
A checkpoint is akin to a stop-and-frisk situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of suspicious
individuals or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officers seek to obtain more
information.
People v. Vinecario
As a rule, motorists and their vehicles passing through
checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine
inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively
searched when there is probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief among those at the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense.
Q: Jamie was a lady frisker whose duty is to frisk
departing passengers, employees, and crew and check
for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband
goods, and explosives. When she frisked Rozanne, a
boarding passenger, she felt something hard on
Rozanne’s abdominal area which was later found to be
3 packs of shabu. Can Rozanne Dela Cruz invoke a
violation of the search and seizure clause?
A: No. Persons may lose the protection of the search
and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airport. (People v. Leila Johnson)
page 37 of 65
Pollo v. David
A search by a government employer of an employee’s
office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.
Q: Does an officer charged with a crime in connection
with his office have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his office and computer files?
A: No. Government agencies, in their capacity as
employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly
conduct search and seizure in the governmental
workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or
warrant requirement for search and seizure. Moreover,
he failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his
personal files. (Pollo v. David)
Q: While sleeping in his room, Rex was arrested by
virtue of a warrant of arrest and he was dragged out of
the room. Thereafter, some police officers ransacked
the locked cabinet inside the room where they found a
firearm and ammunition. Are the warrantless search
and seizure of the firearm and ammunition justified as
an incident to a lawful arrest?
A: No. The scope of the warrantless search is not
without limitations. A valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of
the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control. The purpose of the exception is to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence with reach. In this case, search was made in
the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been
within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search
exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest. (Valeroso v. CA)
INSTANCES OF A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST
1. In flagrante delicto – the person to be arrested
has either committed, is actually committing,
or is about to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officer.
2. Hot pursuit – When a n offense has in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances
indicating, that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
3. Escaped Prisoner or Detainee – when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
or has escaped whole being transferred form
one confinement to another.
4. Waiver – When the right is waived by the
person arrested, provided he knew such right
and knowingly decided not to invoke it.
5. Continuing Offenses – a peace officer can
validly conduct a warrantless arrest in crimes
of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes of
offenses committed in furtherance thereof.
Note: An application for or admission to bail shall not
bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or
from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence
of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea.
Q: SPO2 Luigi Morales and PO2 Yael Padilla received
information that Neil Banzon was about to deliver
drugs at the Thunder Bird Resort in Angeles City. When
Neil Banzon arrived at the resort, he was carrying a
sealed zest-o juice box. The police men hurriedly
accosted him and introduced themselves as police
officers. When SPO2 Morales peeked in to the contents
of the zest-o box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance. He instantly confiscated the said box. Neil
was then found guilty of illegal possession of shabu.
Was the search lawful?
A: NO. Neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and
frisk principle is applicable to justify the warrantless
arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the
police operatives on accused-appellant. In inflagrante
delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or
has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact
that the law requires that the search be incidental to a
lawful arrest. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings.
People v. Sucro
When a police officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby,
and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may
effect an arrest without a warrant. There is nothing
unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance
with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Thus, the
fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in
evidence.
ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST
There is an administrative arrest when there is an arrest
as an incident to a deportation proceeding.
SJS v. DDB
page 38 of 65
A law requiring mandatory drug testing for students of
secondary and tertiary schools is not unconstitutional.
It is within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.
A law requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and
employees of public and private offices is not
unconstitutional.
However, mandatory drug testing for persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses
punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment would
violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under
Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution. Worse still,
the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDECE
General rule: Right to privacy of communication and
correspondence is inviolable.
Exception:
1. By lawful order of the court; 2. When public
safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
Alejano v. Cabuay, et al.
AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The
letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’
personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case,
since the letters were not confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials
of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If
the letters are marked confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention
officials should not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of the
detainees.
As long as the letters are not confidential
communication between the detainee and his lawyer,
the detention officials may read them. But if the letters
are marked confidential communication between
detainee and the lawyer, the officer must not read
them but only inspect them in the presence of
detainees. A law is not needed before an executive
officer may intrude into the rights of privacy of a
detainee or a prisoner. Bu the very fact of their
detention, they have diminished expectations of
privacy rights.
Ayer Productions v. Capulong
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Q: Ayer productions wanted to produce a mini-series
about the EDS Revolution. Juan Ponce Enrile did not
approve the project and said that no reference to him
or his family should be made. The filmmakers acceded
to his demand, the script was changed and they
proceeded to film the movie. Enrile filed a complaint
with TRO alleging that the production without his
consent constitutes a violation of his right to privacy.
Ayer countered that the injunction is curtailment of the
right of free expression. Is the right to privacy absolute?
A: No. The right of privacy or “the right to be let alone,”
like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right.
A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy has long been
regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from
him or to be published about him constitute of a public
character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be
invoked to resist publication and dissemination of
matters of public interest. The interest sought to be
protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free
from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an
individual which are outside the realm of legitimate
public concern.
Disini v. Secretary of Justice (2014)
Q: Under the Cybercrime law, cybersex is the willful
engagement, maintenance, control, or operation,
directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of
sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a
computer system, for favor or consideration.
Petitioners expressed their fear that private
communications of sexual character between
consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes
under the penal code, would now be regarded as
crimes when done “for favor” in cyberspace. Is the
argument of the petitioners valid?
A: No. The deliberations of the Bicameral Committee
on Congress show a lack of intent to penalize a private
showing between and among two private persons
although that may be a form of obscenity to some. The
understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime
law is that the element of “engaging in a business” is
necessary to constitute the crime of illegal cybersex.
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College (2014)
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her Online Social Network activity, it is first necessary
that said user, manifest the intention to keep certain
posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. Thus, a
Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool
to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile
detail should not be denied the informational privacy
right which necessarily accompanies said choice.
Spouses Hing v. Choachuy (2013)
page 39 of 65
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are
installed practically everywhere for the protection and
safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent
of the individual, whose right to privacy would be
affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be
used to pry into privacy of another’s residence or
business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under RA No. 4200 or
the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
ANTI-WIRE TAPPING ACT (RA 4200)
Prohibited Acts under RA 4200
1. To tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described by
any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or
spoken word.
2. To knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record,
or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or
3. To replay the same for any other person or
persons; or
4. To communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing; or
5. To furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person.
NOTE: Anti-wiretapping act only protects letters,
messages, telephone calls, telegrams and the like.
Ramirez v. CA (1995)
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute; the substance of the same need
not be specifically alleged in the information. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of
a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of RA 4200. The phrase “private communication” in
Section 1 of RA 4200 is broad enough to include verbal
or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
“meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office.
Q: DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned the reporters
who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held
liable under the Anti-wiretapping act. Secretary
Gonzales also ordered the NBI to go after media
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
organizations “found to have caused the spread, the
playing and the printing of the contents of a tape” of an
alleged wiretapped conversation involving the
President about fixing votes in 2004 national elections.
Can the DOJ Secretary use the Anti-Wiretapping Act as
a regulatory measure to prohibit the media from
publishing the contents of the CD?
A: No. The court ruled that not every violation of a law
will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press. There are laws of great
significance but their violation, by itself and without
more, cannot support suppression of free speech and
free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital
one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging
whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the
press. (Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales, 2008)
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
A remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
When writ of Habeas data is not applicable
A writ of habeas data may not be issued to protect
purely property and commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefore
are vague or doubtful.
In cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
1. Any member of the immediate family of the
aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children,
and parents; or
2. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Sec. 4, Article 3, 1987 Constitution
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or of the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (2014)
Q: Are the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on Libel
and the provision of the Cyber Crime Law on cyber libel
constitutional?
A: Yes. Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech
and that the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel
is actually not a new crime since Art. 353, in relation to
Art. 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In
page 40 of 65
effect, Sec. 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing
libel. Furthermore, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee did not actually enjoin the Philippines to
decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that defamation
laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not
stifle freedom of expression. Free speech is not
absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be
necessary and as may be provided by law.
Q: Nestor posted on Facebook that Juan Dela Cruz, a
married person, has an illicit affair with Maria. Dexter
liked this post and commented: “Yes! This is true! What
an immoral thing to do?!” This post was likewise liked
by 23 people. Juan Dela Cruz filed a case for online libel
against Nestor, Dexter and 23 other people who liked
the post using as his basis Sec. 5 of the Cybercrime law
which penalizes any person who willfully abets or aids
in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in
the said law. Is this provision of the law constitutional?
A: No. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who
express themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of
its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.
The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep
that generates chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and
other messages. Hence, Sec. 5 of the cybercrime law
that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity. But Nestor, the author, is still
liable for the defamatory words he posted.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION v. CA
The school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on
the basis of the articles he has written except when
such article materially disrupts class work or involves
substantial disorder r invasion of rights of others.
DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT
General rule: Every discreditable public imputation is
false because every man is presumed innocent, thus,
every false imputation is deemed malicious, hence,
actionable.
Exception: When the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity,
such is not necessarily actionable.
NOTE: For it to be actionable, it must be shown that
either there is a false allegation of fact or comment
based on a false supposition.
Exception to the Exception: If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, it is
immaterial whether the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably inferred from
facts.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Q: A national daily newspaper carried an exclusive
report stating that Senator Ryan Christopher received a
house and lot located at YY Street, Makati, in
consideration for his vote to cut cigarette taxes by 50%.
The Senator sued the newspaper, its reporter, editor
and publisher for libel, claiming the report was
completely false and malicious. According to the
Senator, there is no YY Street in Makati, and the tax cut
was only 20%. He claimed one million pesos in
damages. The defendants denied "actual malice,"
claiming privileged communication and absolute
freedom of the press to report on public officials and
matters of public concern. If there was any error, the
newspaper said it would publish the correction
promptly. Are the defendants liable for damages?
A: No. Since Senator Ryan Christopher is a public
person and the questioned imputation is directed
against him in his public capacity, in this case actual
malice means the statement was made with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. Since there is no proof that the report
was published with knowledge that it is false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, the
defendants are not liable for damages. (Borjal v. CA,
G.R. No. 126466, Jan. 14, 1999)
Q: Erika Ong penned several articles in Malaya
newspaper regarding alleged bribery incidents in the
Supreme Court and characterizing the justices as
“thieves” and “a basket of rotten apples”. The Court En
Banc required Erika to explain why no sanction should
be imposed on her for indirect contempt of court. Did
the order of the Court violate freedom of the press?
A: No. While freedom of speech, of expression and of
the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be
protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these
freedoms are not absolute. For, if left unbridled, they
have the tendency to be abused and can translate to
licenses, which could lead to disorder and anarchy.
Erika crossed the line, as hers are baseless scurrilous
attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of
press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in
furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing
but damage the integrity of the High Court, undermine
the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary,
and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. (In
Re: Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr.
Amado P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, Aug. 8,
2008)
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
Whether the words are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.
Content-based Restraint
 The restriction is based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech. The cast of the
page 41 of 65
restriction determines the test by which the
challenged act is assailed with.
 There is presumption of unconstitutionality.
 Clear and present danger test is applicable.
Secretary of Justice v. Estrada (2001)
Live Media Coverage of Court Proceedings
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant’s
right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice and considering further that
the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satisfied by less
distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio
and television coverage of court proceedings shall not
be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their
counsel taken prior to the commencement of official
proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be
permitted during the trial proper.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is right that
belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life
or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial
aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public
trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who
wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with proper decorum and observe the trial
process.
Q: Can an offensive and obscene language uttered in a
prime-time television broadcast which was easily
accessible to the children be reasonably curtailed and
validly restrained?
A: Yes. In Soriano v. MTRCB, G.R. No. 165636, Apr. 29,
2009, the Court, applying the balancing of interest
doctrine, ruled that the government’s interest to
protect and promote the interests and welfare of the
children adequately buttresses the reasonable
curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner’s prayer to
continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during
the suspension period. Soriano’s offensive and obscene
language uttered on primetime television broadcast,
without doubt, was easily accessible to the children.
His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such,
the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to
protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute
a substantial and compelling government interest in
regulating Soriano’s utterances in TV broadcast.
Content-neutral regulation
Merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards. This has no presumption
of unconstitutionality.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Heckler’s Veto
Occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of
speech is curtailed or restricted by the government in
order to prevent a reacting party's behavior.
The best known case involving the heckler's veto is
probably Feiner v. New York, handed down by the
Supreme Court in 1951. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson,
writing for the majority, held that police officers acted
within their power in arresting a speaker if the arrest
was "motivated solely by a proper concern for the
preservation of order and protection of the general
welfare." 340 U.S. 315.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
The right to assembly is not subject to prior restraint. It
may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a
permit or authorization from government authorities.
The right, however, must be exercised in such a way as
will not prejudice the public welfare.
Note: Before one can use a public place, one must first
obtain prior permit from the proper authorities.
Permits are not required for designated freedom parks,
universities, and private places.
Evangelista v. Earnshaw
The mayor revoked permits he already granted because
the group Communist Part of the Philippines, was found
by the fiscal to be an illegal association. When the
intention and effect of the act is seditious, the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
press and of assembly and petition must yield to
punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the
Constitution and the laws, and the existence of the
State.
Q: Exec. Sec. Pat Alampay issued a policy via press
release. The policy pertains to the strict
implementation of BP 880 also known as the Public
Assembly Act of 1985. It provides for the strict
enforcement of “no permit, no rally policy”, and arrest
of all persons violating the laws of the land, and
dispersal of unlawful mass actions. Is BP Blg. 880
unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the
constitutionality guaranteed right to peaceful
assembly?
A: No. BP 880 is constitutional. It does not curtail or
unduly restrict the freedom. It merely regulates the use
of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum
tolerance” is for the benefit of the rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the
power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is
subject to the constitutionally sound “clear and present
danger” standard. (Bayan Karapatan v. Eduardo Ermita,
et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006)
page 42 of 65
Maximum Tolerance
The highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peace keeping authorities shall observe
during a public assembly or in dispersal of the same.
IBP v. Atienza
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the
matter of perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the
venue. Respondent failed to indicate how he had
arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of clear and present danger which is an
indispensable condition to such modification.
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Art. III, Sec. 5 “No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.”
NOTE: The non- establishment clause means that the
state should adopt a “position of neutrality” when it
comes to religious matters. (Political Law Reviewer,
Suarez ,p. 252 citing CJ Fernando, 2011)
Right to believe is absolute. However, right to act on
one’s belief is subject to regulation. Where the
individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions
that affect the public and the rights of others, his
freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of
the State. The inherent police power can be exercised
to prevent religious practices inimical (which will cause
damage) to society.
The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC (2015)
Q: The petitioners Diocese of Bacolod, et al. posted 2
tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One tarp contained the
message “ibasura RH Law” while the other tarp
contained the words “Team Buhay” and “Team Patay”,
classifying the electoral candidates according to their
vote on the adoption of the RH Law. The COMELEC
issued an order and letter ordering the immediate
removal of the tarpaulin, otherwise it will be
constrained to file and election offense against the
petitioners. Petitioners contend that the order to
remove the tarps constitutes an infringement on
freedom of speech and violates the separation of
church and state.
a. Did the order violate the
separation of church and
State?
b. Did the Order violate
petitioner’s rights to
freedom of expression?
A:
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
a. No. The tarpaulin and its message are not
religious speech. Article 3, Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution has two aspects: First, non-
establishment clauses; second, the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship. The second aspect is the issue in
this case. Clearly, not all acts done by those
who are priests, bishops, ustadz. Imams, or
any religious make such act immune from any
secular regulation.
b. Yes. The COMELEC is incorrect in assuming
that the tarps are election propaganda. While
the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted “in return for consideration”
by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
Every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection. The preferred freedom of
expression calls all the more for the utmost
respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
Speech with political consequences is at the
core of the freedom of expression and must be
protected by this court.
General rule: No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, indirectly or
directly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher.
Exception: When they were assigned to army, penal
institutions, government orphanage, and leprosarium.
Q: Angel, a court interpreter, is living with a man not
her husband. Ben filed an administrative case against
Angel as he believes that she is committing an immoral
act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it
might appear that the court condones her act. Angel
admitted that she has been living with CA without the
benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have
a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as
the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten
years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness. Should Angel’s
right to religious freedom carve out an exception from
the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which
government employees are held administratively
liable?
page 43 of 65
A: Yes. Angel’s conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption
from the law based on her fundamental right to
freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that State
interests must be upheld in order that freedoms –
including religious freedom – may be enjoyed. In the
area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom,
however, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the State, and so the State interest sought
to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode (destroy) the very fabric of the State that will
also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing
that such State interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite. Furthermore, our Constitution
adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. The benevolent
neutrality doctrine allows accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. (Estrada v. Escritor)
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582,
Apr. 8, 2010
It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Qur’an to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Our Constitution
provides in Art. III, Sec. 5 that “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is government neutrality
in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.
Dominador Taruc, et al. v. Bishop Perfirio Dela Cruz
The church and the state are separate and distinct from
each other. Said matter involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of the
Philippine Independent Church should be left to the
discretion of the officials of said religious institution in
line with the doctrine that the court should not
interfere on doctrinal and disciplinary differences.
Conscientious Objector Test
An individual who has claimed the right to refuse to
perform military service on the grounds of freedom of
thought, conscience, and/or religion.
Requisites:
1. The person is opposed to war in any form
2. He must show that this opposition is based
upon religious training and belief
3. He must show that this objection is sincere.
Q: Shery, Julia, Paula, Joanne, Lisette and Angela were
minor school children and member of the sect,
Jehovah’s Witnesses. They were expelled from their
classes by various public school authorities for refusing
to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the “Panatang Makabayan” required by RA 1265.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
According to them, the basic assumption in their
universal refusal to salute the flags of the countries in
which they are found is that such a salute constitutes
an act of religious devotion forbidden by God's law and
that their freedom of religion is grossly violated. On the
other hand, the public authorities claimed that the
freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not mean exception from non-
discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and the
singing of the national anthem. To allow otherwise
would disrupt school discipline and demoralize the
teachings of civic consciousness and duties of
citizenship. Is the expulsion justified?
A: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of
highest priority. The two- fold aspect of right to
religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an
absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.) Freedom
to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to
external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is
the existence of grave and present danger to public
safety, morals, health and interests where State has
right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from
the school is not justified.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Rights guaranteed under Sec. 6 of the Bill of Rights:
1. Freedom to choose and change one’s place of
abode; and
2. Freedom to travel within the country and
outside.
Q: The military commander in charge of the operation
against rebel groups directed the inhabitants if the
island which would be the target of attack by the
government forces to evacuate the area and offered
the residents temporary military hamlet. Can the
military commander force the residents to transfer
their places of abode without a court order?
A: No. The military commander cannot do so without a
court order. Under Section 6 of the Bill of Rights, a
lawful order of the court is required before the liberty
of abode and of changing the same can be impaired.
Right to Travel
Right of a person to go where he pleases without
interference from anyone.
Limitations:
1. Interest of national security
2. Public safety
3. Public health
NOTE: With respect to the right to travel, it is settled
that only a court may issue a hold departure order
against an individual addressed to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. However, administrative
authorities, such as passport-officers, may likewise
curtail such right in the interest of national security,
page 44 of 65
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
WATCH-LIST AND HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS
Watch-list Order
Order issued to prevent an individual from travelling. It
may be issued by the Secretary of Justice motu proprio
or upon request.
The Secretary of Justice may likewise issue a WLO
against any person, either on his own, or upon the
request of any government agency, including
commissions, task forces or similar entities created by
the Office of the President, pursuant to the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" (R.A. No. 9208)
and/or in connection with any investigation being
conducted by it, or in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health. (Sec. 2, DOJ Circ. 41,
s.2010)
NOTE: WLO is available for (a) criminal cases pending
before lower courts, or even for (b) cases still under
preliminary investigation.
A WLO is good for sixty (60) days. (Sec. 4, DOJ Circ. 41,
and s.2010)
Hold Departure Order (HDO)
An order issued to prevent an individual from travelling.
It may be issued by the Secretary of Justice motu
proprio or upon request.
The Secretary may likewise issue an HDO against any
person, either on his own, or upon the request by the
Head of a Department of the Government, the head or
a constitutional body or commission, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court for the Judiciary, the Senate
President or the House Speaker for the Legislature,
when the adverse party is the Government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, or in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health.” (Sec.
1, DOJ Circ. 41, s.2010)
NOTE: A Hold Departure Order can be issued against (a)
an accused in criminal cases under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts and even (b) against aliens
whose presence is required either as respondents or as
witnesses.
A HDO is valid for five (5) years from issuance.
NOTE: A watch-list order doesn’t totally bar a person
from travelling. A person listed in the watch-list order
must obtain a clearance to be able to travel. In contrast,
a hold-departure order totally prevents a person from
travelling.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
The right to return to one’s country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to
travel. Nevertheless, the right to return may be
considered as a generally accepted principle of
International law, and under the Constitution, is part of
the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate
from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC
CONCERN
It pertains to access to official records, documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, as well as to government research date used
as basis for policy development.
NOTE: The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity
to inspect and copy them at his expense. The exercise is
also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the
integrity of public records and to minimize disruption of
government operations.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. National security matters
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions
3. Criminal matters
4. Other confidential information
HIDALGO v. REYES
The right to information on matters of public concern is
a constitutional right. However, such is not absolute.
Under the Constitution, access is subject to limitations
as may be provided by law. Therefore, a law may
exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny such as national security. The privilege against
disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on the military, diplomatic and similar matters.
Since intestate proceedings do not contain any military
or diplomatic secrets which will be disclosed by its
production, it is an error on the part of the judge to
deny O’jay’s motion.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects
the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid
symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of
Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section
28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements
the right of access to information on matters of public
page 45 of 65
concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the
duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a
concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public
affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the
people‘s right to know as the centerpiece.
POWER OF EXPROPRIATION
CANORECO v. CA
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls
within the purview of the power of eminent domain.
Thus, the government cannot acquire an easement of a
right-of-way without payment f just compensation.
CONTRACT CLAUSE
The law impairs the obligation of contracts if
1. It changes the terms and conditions of a legal
contract either as to the time or mode of performance
2. It imposes new conditions or dispenses with those
expressed if it authorizes for its satisfaction something
different from that provided in its terms
NOTE: Mere technical change which does not change
the substance of the contract, and which still leaves an
efficacious remedy for enforcement does NOT impair
the obligation of contracts. A valid exercise of police
power is superior to obligation of contracts.
Non-impairment clause cannot be invoked if there is
neither public interest involved nor a law that supports
the claim. It can only be invoked if it is against the
government or when the government intervenes in
contract between the parties. (Pacific Wide Realty and
Development Corp. v Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No.
180893, Nov 25, 2009)
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Section 12, Article 3, 1987 Constitution:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
RIGHTS OF THE SUSPECT (NOT ACCUSED)
Miranda rights
These are the rights to which a person under custodial
investigation is entitled. These rights are:
1. Right to remain silent
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
2. Right to competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice
3. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford the
services of counsel, he would be provided with one
4. Right to be informed of his rights
5. Right against torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will 6. Right against secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or similar forms of detention 7. Right
to have confessions or admissions obtained in violation
of these rights considered inadmissible in evidence
(Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 1966)
NOTE: Even if the person consents to answer questions
without the assistance of counsel, the moment he asks
for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under
custodial investigation is to curb the police-state
practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant
to make self-incriminating statements. (People v.
Rapeza, G.R. 169431, April 3, 2007)
MIRANDA RIGHTS SHALL NOT BE APPLICABLE TO THE
FOLLOWING INSTANCES:
1. During a police line-up, unless admissions or
confessions are being elicited from the suspect
2. During administrative investigations
3. Confessions made by an accused at the time
he voluntarily surrendered to the police or
outside the context of a formal investigation
4. Statements made to a private person
5. Forensic investigations
People v. Cabiles
A spontaneous statement made by a person is not a
violation of custodial investigation. It was not elicited
through questioning by the authorities. Thus, one who
spontaneously admits his guilt will be used as evidence
against him.
People v. Andan
A confession given to the mayor may be admitted in
evidence if such confession by the suspect was given to
the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer. In such a case, the uncounseled confession did
not violate the suspect’s constitutional rights. What the
constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions.
People v. Lauga
A barangay bantaybayan is considered a public officer
and any extrajudicial confession made to him without
the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence as
provided for under Sec. 12, Article 3, 1987 Constitution.
People v. Obrero
page 46 of 65
Appellant was convicted of robbery with homicide.
He executed a written confession as a result of a
custodial investigation. The issue is whether such is
valid.
Held:
The extrajudicial confession was invalid. The
perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights is inadequate
to transmit information to the suspect. Also, Art III, Sec.
12 (1) requires an independent and competent
counsel of the suspect’s choice. Atty. de los Reyes was
not an independent counsel being the PC Captain and
Station Commander. As held in P v Bandula, the
independent counsel cannot be a special prosecutor,
private or public prosecutor, municipal attorney or
counsel of the police whose interest is adverse to the
accused.
While there is evidence to the homicide consisting of
the corpus delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery
except the confession. The lack of objection of
appellant to the introduction of the constitutionally
proscribed evidence did not satisfy the burden of proof
which rested on the prosecution.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
1. Due process
2. 2. Be presumed innocent
3. Be heard by himself and counsel
4. Be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him
5. A speedy, impartial and public trial
6. Meet the witnesses face to face
7. Have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and production of
evidence on his behalf
8. Against double jeopardy
9. Bail
Q: Pakauteg, Talad, and Tatalung were arrested by
Marangit, a police officer, for possession of marijuana
and shabu. They were later brought to Camp Mawlad
and were subjected to a drug-dependency test and
were asked to give a sample of their urine to which
they complied. Their urine samples all tested positive
for shabu. Talad and Tatalung voluntary submitted
themselves for treatment, rehabilitation and
confinement. On the other hand, Pakauteg pleaded not
guilty and argued that the urine sample is inadmissible
in evidence because he had no counsel during the
custodial investigation when it was taken. In effect, it is
an uncounselled extra-judicial confession and a
violation of Constitution. Is pakauteg correct?
A: No. The urine sample is admissible in evidence. The
right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken
into custody and placed under investigation for the
commission of crime. Such right is guaranteed by the
Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel. What the Constitution
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused, but not an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material to ascertain physical attributes determinable
by simple observation and not to unearth undisclosed
facts. (Gutang v. People of the Philippines)
Under R.A. 7438, “custodial investigation” shall include
the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the “inviting” officer for any violation of law.
Thus, in People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April
14, 1999, it was held that from the time Del Rosario
was “invited” for questioning at the house of the
barangay captain, he was already under effective
custodial investigation. Because he was not apprised
nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers,
and because the prosecution failed to establish that Del
Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal
admissions were inadmissible against him. In People v.
Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000, the Supreme
Court held that custodial investigation began when the
accused Ordono and Medina voluntarily went to the
Santol Police Station to confess, and the investigating
officer started asking questions to elicit information
from them. In People v. Lugod, G.R. No. 136253,
February 21, 2001, it was held that the accused should
have been entitled to the Miranda rights, because even
assuming that he was not yet under interrogation at the
time he was brought to the police station, his
confession was elicited by a police officer who
promised to help him if he told the truth. Furthermore,
when he allegedly pointed out the body of the victim,
the atmosphere was highly intimidating and not
conducive to a spontaneous response as the whole
police force and nearly 100 townspeople escorted him
there. Not having the benefit of counsel and not having
been informed of his rights, the confession is
inadmissible. In People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822,
May 4, 2001, when the accused was brought to the
station and made to sign the confiscation (of the
marijuana) report, he was already under custodial
investigation.
Police Line-up. A police line-up is not considered a part
of any custodial inquest, because it is conducted before
that stage of investigation is reached [People v. Bravo,
G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999], People v.
Amestuzo, G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001, reiterates
this rule, because in a police line-up, the process has
not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory
stage, and it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the
course of the line-up. In People v. Piedad, G.R. No.
131923, December 5, 2002, it was held that the right to
counsel accrues only after an investigation ceases to be
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
commences an interrogation aimed at a particular
subject who has been taken into custody and to whom
page 47 of 65
the police would now propound questions. Thus, in
People v. Dagpin, G.R. No. 149560, June 10, 2004,
where three eyewitnesses identified the accused at the
police station as the person who shot the victim at the
scene of the crime, the accused cannot claim that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights even if he was
without counsel at the time, because he was not yet
then under custodial investigation.
RIGHT TO BAIL
Bail
The security given for the release of a person in custody
of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned
upon his appearance before any court as required.
(Sec.1, Rule 114, Rules of Court)
Teehankee v. Rovira
The right to bail may is available from the very moment
of arrest (which may be before or after the filing of
formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by
final judgment (which means after appeal). No charge
need be filed formally before one can file for bail, so
long as one is under arrest.
Section 13, Bill of Rights
All persons, except those charge with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended.
Rule 114, Rules of Court
In the MTC, Bail is always a matter of right before or
after conviction. (See, Section 4)
Instances when bail is a matter of right or of discretion
Bail as a matter of right
a. Before or after conviction by the metropolitan and
municipal trial courts, and
b. Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment (Sec. 4, Rule 114).
c. Before final conviction by all children in conflict with
the law for an offense not punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
Bail as a matter of discretion
a. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment
b. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, a
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is not strong (Sec. 7, Rule 114);
and
c. A child in conflict with the law charged with an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong (Sec.
28, A.M. No. 02-118-SC).
Grounds for denial of bail
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall
be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused,
of the following or other similar circumstances:
a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia
The right to bail is available to an alien during the
pendency of deportation proceedings provided that
potential extradite must prove by clear and convincing
proof that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
orders and processes of the extradition court.
Baylon v, Judge Sison
A hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by
the judge to determine whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong.
Q: In bail application, if the prosecutor interposes no
objection to the accused charged with capital offense,
may the judge grant the application without court
hearing?
A: No. Judges are required to conduct hearings if the
accused is being charged with a capital offense.
Absence of objection from the prosecution is never a
basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge
has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows
what he is doing on a ccount of familiarity with the
case. (Joselito v. Narciso v Flor Marle Sta. RomanaCruz,
G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000)
Cortes v. Judge Catral
Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given the
prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his
recommendation, because in fixing the amount of bail,
the judge is required to take into account a number of
factors.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial
judge is expected to comply with the following
guidelines, to wit:
page 48 of 65
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right
or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct
a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bail bond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2015)
Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before
the Sandiganbayan for their alleged involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriation under the PDAF.
When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and
detained at the PNP General Hospital, he then filed a
motion to fix bail where he argued that:
1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of
right;
2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would
only be reclusion temporal considering that there
are two mitigating circumstances, his voluntary
surrender and that he is already at the age of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition
must be seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the
grounds that:
1. He is charged with a capital offense;
2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount
of his bail because the prosecution have not yet
presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail and
unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health
and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to
ensure the personal appearance of the accused during
trial or whenever the court requires and at the same
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 49 of 65

time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is
the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty.
The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the
crime charged should be allowed independently of the
merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is
injurious to his health and endangers his life. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile
be granted the right to bail it will enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and attended,
which will then enable him to attend trial therefore
achieving the true purpose of bail.
Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, Jan. 31,
2008)
VARIANCE DOCTRINE
In spite of the difference between the crime that was
charged and that which was eventually proved, the
accused may still be convicted of whatever offense that
was proved even if not specifically set out in the
information provided it is necessarily included in the
crime charged. (Teves v. Sandiganbayan)

NOTE: The denial of the right to speedy trial is a ground

Q: Manolet was arrested for child abuse. She filed a
for acquittal.
petition for application of bail. The court granted her
The right to speedy trial [Sec. 14 (2)] particularly refers
application with a condition that the approval of the
to criminal prosecutions which are at the trial stage,
bail bonds shall be made only after her arraignment. Is
while the right to speedy disposition of cases (Sec. 16)
the court’s order valid?
applies to all cases before judicial, quasi-judicial or
A: No. The grant of bail should not be conditioned upon
administrative bodies.
prior arraignment of the accused. In cases where bail is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
Writ of Habeas Corpus
otherwise the accused will be precluded from filing a
Is a writ directed to the person detaining another
motion to quash which is to be done before
commanding him to produce the body of the detainee
arraignment. If the information is quashed and the case
at a designated time and place, and to show the cause
is dismissed, there would be no need for the
of his detention.
arraignment of the accused. (Lavides v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000)
Q: One morning, Michael, Estrelita’s husband, was
abducted by a group of people. Someone gave a tip
EQUIPOISE RULE
that he saw Michael at CIDG at Camp Crame, being
When the evidence of both sides is equally balance, the
questioned for the death of Nida Blanca. Michael is
constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
reported to be detained in Camp Crame. In view
scales in favor of the accused. (Corpuz v. People)
thereof, Estrelita then filed a petition for habeas corpus
in the RTC, requesting to produce the body of Michael.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Will the petition prosper?
Q: The RTC QC rendered a decision convicting Judge
Bueno of violation of R.A. 7610. The criminal cases are
A: No. The Court held that the grant of relief in a
now on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the
Meanwhile, Senior State Prosecutor Guinto (SSP
disappearance of a person, but on his illegal detention.
Guinto) suggested the immediate suspension of Bueno.
It may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on
SSP Guinto posited that since Judge Bueno stands
the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding
convicted of two counts of child abuse, her moral
out who has specifically abducted or caused the
qualification as a judge is in question. Judge Bueno
disappearance of a certain person. When forcible taking
manifested that she still enjoys the presumption of
and disappearance – not arrest and detention – have
innocence since the criminal cases are on appeal. Does
been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus
she still enjoy the presumption of innocence if the
proceedings, but criminal investigation and
judgment convicting her is on appeal?
proceedings. (Martinez v. Mendoza 499 SCRA 234,
A: Yes. Judge Bueno still enjoys the constitutional
2006)
presumption of innocence. Since her conviction of the
crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the
Writ of Amparo
CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she
A remedy available to any person whose right to life,
still enjoys the constitutional presumption of
liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened
innocence. It must be remembered that the existence
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
does not in itself destroy the constitutional
The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced
presumption of innocence unless the inculpating
disappearances or threats thereof. (Rule on Writ of
presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack
Amparo)
of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused’s
Extralegal killings
guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of
Killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
innocence continues. (Re: Conviction of Judge
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Enforced disappearance
An arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government. It is further
characterized by the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law.
Q: Engr. Peregrina disappeared one day and his wife
filed a petition for the Writ of Amparo with the CA
directed against the PNP, claiming that the
“unexplained uncooperative behavior” of the
respondents request for help and their failure and
refusal to extend assistance in locating the
whereabouts of Peregrina were indicative of their
actual physical possession and custody of the missing
engineer.” The PNP was held responsible for the
“enforced disappearance” of Engr. Peregrina. Is this
valid?
A: Yes. The government in general, through the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these
organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held
fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of
Peregrina. Given their mandates, the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG officials and members were the ones who were
remiss in their duties when the government completely
failed to exercise extraordinary diligence that the
Amparo rule requires. (Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No.
182498, Dec. 3, 2009)
Q: Almarius and Aaron were abducted by the CAFGU.
They were taken to various military camps, put in
chains and tortured. While detained, they were
threatened that if they escape, they and their families
would be killed. While in captivity they met April, Mela,
and Sol who were also prisoners then eventually,
Almarius and Aaron were able to escape.
Presently, Almarius and Aaron are now in protective
custody under private individuals. Almarius and Aaron
then filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo, implicating several officers of the military as
their abductors. They allege that their cause of action
consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty,
and a violation of their right to security. Considering the
fact that they have already escaped, will the petition
still prosper?
A: Yes. While Almarius and Aaron were detained, they
were threatened that if they escaped, their families,
including them, would be killed. In time, they were
able to escape. The condition of the threat to be killed
has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are
now free from captivity not because they were released
by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their
abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end
of their ordeal their captors even told them that they
were still deciding whether they should be executed.
page 50 of 65
Nonetheless, the circumstances of their
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat
that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their
liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition
for a Writ of Amparo. (Sec. of National Defense and AFP
Chief of Staff v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, Oct. 7, 2008)
Writ of Kalikasan
A remedy available to a natural or juridical person,
entity authorized by law, people’s organization,
nongovernmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces. (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
Nature of the writ of kalikasan
The Writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy which
may be issued depending on the magnitude of the
environmental damage. The environmental damage
must be one which prejudices the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces, or that which transcends political and
territorial boundaries. It is also a remedy which
enforces the right to information by compelling the
government or a private entity to produce information
regarding the environment that is within their custody.
INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
Basis
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. (Sec. 17, Art. III of the Constitution)
NOTE: This constitutional privilege has been defined as
a protection against testimonial compulsion, but this
has since been extended to any evidence
“communicative in nature” acquired under
circumstances of duress (People v. Olvis, G.R. No.
71092, Sept. 30, 1987)
Q: Fiscal Jessa Bernardo petitioned the lower court to
order Art to appear before the former to take dictation
in Art’s own handwriting to determine whether or not it
was Art who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified. The lower court granted the petition of the
fiscal. Art refused what the fiscal demanded and sought
refuge in the constitutional provision of his right against
selfincrimination. Is Art’s contention valid?
A: Yes. Under Sec. 17, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution,
“no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.” Since the provision prohibits
compulsory testimonial incrimination, it does not
matter whether the testimony is taken by oral or
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 51 of 65

written. Writing is not purely a mechanical act because
it requires the application of intelligence and attention.
The purpose of the privilege is to avoid and prohibit
thereby the repetition and recurrence of compelling
a person, in a criminal or any other case, to
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction. (Bermudez v. Castillo, July 26, 1937; Beltran
v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, Sept. 23, 1929)
US v. TAN TENG
The court held that the taking of a substance from his
body was not a violation of the said right. He was
neither compelled to make any admissions or to
answer any questions. The substance was taken from
his body without his objection and was examined by
competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-
incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his
body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be
the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief
and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence
against him.
NOTE: The main purpose of this constitutional provision
is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination in order to extort unwilling confessions
from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a
crime. (Harris v. Coats)
It is not available to juridical persons as “it would be a
strange anomaly to hold that a state having chartered a
corporation to make use of certain franchises, could
not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these
franchises had been employed, and whether they have
been abused, and demand the production of the
corporate books and papers for that purpose.” (Bataan
Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. PCG, GR. No.
75885, May 27, 1987)
IMMUNITY STATUTES
Use-and-derivative-use Immunity
A witness is only assured that his or her particular
testimony and evidence derived form it will not be used
against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
Transactional Community
A witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense
whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
EXCESSIVE FINES AND CRUEL AND INHUMAN
PUNISHMENTS
A penalty is cruel and inhuman if it involves torture or
lingering suffering (example: being drawn and
quartered)
A penalty is degrading if it exposes a person to public
humiliation (example: being tarred and feathered, then
paraded throughout town)

Q: During custodial investigation, Jez was asked to sign

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
letters without the assistance of the counsel. The
letters were admitted in evidence and Jez was
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
convicted. On appeal, Jez’s counsel Zenia argued that
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and
the signing of Jez’s and her co-accused’s names was not
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
a mere mechanical act but one which required the use
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
of intelligence and therefore constitutes self-
act
incrimination. Is there a violation of the accused’s right
against self-incrimination?
Requisites
1. Valid complaint or information
A: None. The purpose for securing the signature of
NOTE: Double jeopardy does not attach in preliminary
petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate
investigation.
the envelopes as the ones seized from him. Moreover,
2. Filed before a competent court
when the signatures of the accused were affixed, such
3. To which the defendant had pleaded
signatures were actually evidence of admission
4. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or
obtained from the petitioner and his co-accused under
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
circumstances constituting custodial investigation.
express consent
Under the Constitution, among the rights of a person
under custodial investigation is the right to have
NOTE: Consent of the accused to the dismissal cannot
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
be implied or presumed; it must be expressed as to
own choice and if the person cannot afford the services
have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity. (Caes v.
of a counsel, that he must be provided with one. It is on
Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54)
this ground that the letters with the signature of the
accused could be rejected (Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan,
Q: Hans, a writer in Q Magazine, published an article
G.R.No. 109242, January 26, 1999).
about Carlo’s illicit affairs with other women. The
magazine also happened to have a website where the
Inapplicability of the right against self-incrimination to
same article was published. Carlo then filed a libel case
juridical persons
against Hans both under the Revised Penal Code and
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
the Cybercrime Law. Is there a violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy?
A: Yes. There should be no question that if the
published material on print, said to be libelous, is again
posted online or vice versa, that identical material
cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two
offenses, one, a violation of Art. 353 of the Revised
Penal Code and the other a violation of Sec. 4(c)(4) of
R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and
are in fact one and the same offense. Online libel under
Sec. 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already
punished under the Art. 353. Sec. 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another means of
publication. Charging the offender under both laws
would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014)
Jason Ivler y Aguilar v. Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Art. 365 is
a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of
its various resulting acts. Reason and precedent both
coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as
the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
Q: Allan was charged with a criminal case in the court.
He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Later the
prosecution moved to dismiss the case. The counsel for
the accused wrote “No Objection” at the bottom of the
prosecutor’s motion. The court granted the motion and
dismissed the case against Allan. A year after Allan was
charged for the same case. May Allan invoke the right
against double jeopardy?
A: No. The act of Allan’s counsel in writing “No
Objection” constituted an express consent to the
termination within the meaning of Sec. 9 of Rule 117
Rules of Court. He could not thereafter revoke that
conformity since the court had already acted upon it by
dismissing the case. Allan was bound by his counsel’s
consent to the dismissal. (People v. Pilpa, G.R. No. L-
30250, Sept. 22, 1977)
page 52 of 65
Q: Upon arraignment, Arwin pleaded not guilty to the
charge of serious physical injuries. Days later, the victim
died. Hence, the Fiscal moved for the amendment of
the information so as to charge the accused with the
crime of homicide. The accused objected on the ground
that he had been put in jeopardy of being convicted of
the crime of serious physical injuries; and that another
prosecution for homicide for the same act under the
amended information would constitute double
jeopardy. If you were the judge, how would you resolve
the motion? Explain. (1984 BAR QUESTION, Political
Law Reviewer, Suarez, 2011).
A: There is no double jeopardy and the motion of the
accused should be therefore be denied. His plea was
only with respect to the charge of physical injuries but
not with respect to the crime of homicide.
Q: After a long and protracted trial, the accused
involved in the murder of then Senator Benigno S.
Aquino were acquitted by an independent commission
whose members were appointed by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. After the EDSA People Power
Revolution, a commission was appointed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino, recommended the re-
opening of the Galman-Aquino murder case. Was there
double jeopardy?
A: No. There was no double jeopardy, the proceedings
that took place before was a sham and a mock trial
which resulted in the denial of the State’s right to due
process. (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 72670,
Sept. 12, 1986)
EX-POST FACTO LAW
Kinds of ex post facto law
It can be a law that: 1. Makes an act, which was
innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action
2. Aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it
was committed 3. Changes the punishment and inflicts
a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed 4. Alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the defendant 5. Assumes to
regulate civil rights and remedies only. In effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful 6. Deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which
he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty
Bill of attainder
A legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial,
its essence being the substitution of legislative fiat for a
judicial determination of guilt.(People v. Ferrer)
NOTE: It is only when a statute applies either to a
named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
without a judicial trial that it becomes a bill of
attainder.
CITIZENSHIP
Sec.1 The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
a. Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris;
b. Those declared citizens by judicial declaration
applying the jus soli principle, before Tio Tam v.
Republic, 25 Apr. 1957, G.R. No. L-9602. c. Those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Act
2927) d. Those who are citizens under the 1935
Constitution. e. Those who are citizens under the
1973 Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or others are citizens of the
Philippines
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Modes of acquiring citizenship
1. By birth
a. Jus sanguinis – acquisition of citizenship on
the basis of blood relationship.
b. Jus soli – acquisition of citizenship on the
basis of the place of birth.
2. By naturalization – the legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born
citizen.
3. By marriage
NOTE: Jus sanguinis and naturalization are the modes
followed in the Philippines.
Naturalization
Act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political
body of a nation by clothing him or her with the
privileges of a citizen.
Q: Wilfreda, a Fil-Am citizen, born in USA with Filipino
parents, wishes to run as Mayor in City of Manila. She
was able to exercise such right periodically. She also
spent majority of her lifetime here in the Philippines.
She successfully made her oath of allegiance as well,
electing Philippine citizenship. The people of Manila
loved her so much, that she was able to garner the
highest votes the moment she ran for public officer.
However, one of her adversaries challenged her
citizenship and invoked Section 40 paragraph (d) of the
Local Government Code stating that “dual citizens” are
page 53 of 65
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Should Wilfreda be disqualified from holding public
Office?
A: No. Clearly, in including Section 5 in Article 4 oon
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se buy with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Thus, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160,
section 40 (D) and in RA No. 7854, Section 20 must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” (Mercado
v. Manzano, 1999)
Grace Poe vs COMELEC
(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8,
2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections,
Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day
before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines
after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to
and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in
1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally
adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18,
2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She
registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an
appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA
9225 requirement. From then on, she stopped using
her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or
cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her
biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The
COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6
votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote
on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on
the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for
the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and
deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a
candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET
and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the
election contests, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members, whereas over the President and
Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole
jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for
such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is
simply no authorized proceeding in determining
the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such
lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and
for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds
for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule
25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the
intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of
Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation
of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born
Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-
born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born
Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s
parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical
of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than 99% chance that a child born in
such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial
evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd,
if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that
foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is
based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in
the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt
the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with
natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and
page 54 of 65
the general principles of international law. Although
the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these
treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus
manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a
new domicile.
Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of
May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the
BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an
alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she
acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her
Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which
Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her
family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over
the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on
May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be
denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the
ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to
grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior
authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that
the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations regarding
her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace
Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false
representations in her COC regarding her citizenship
and residency.
Dissenting opinion of Justice Brion on whether Grace
Poe is a natural-born citizen:
Grace Poe is NOT a Natural-born Filipino Citizen:
1. There is no Philippine law automatically conferring
Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even if
there were, such a law would only result in the
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
foundling being a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
2. Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of
Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or
naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a matter
of fact and any doubt is resolved against the person
claiming Philippine citizenship.
3. Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution
clearly excluded foundlings from being considered
natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts
the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born
Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers
are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that
either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen.
4. Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international
law or a general principle of international law granting
automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at
birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a
customary international law. At best, there exists a
presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in
the country where the foundling is found.
5. Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary
international law presuming that a foundling is a citizen
of the country where the foundling is found, or is born
to parents possessing the nationality of that country,
such presumption cannot prevail over our Constitution
since customary international law has the status merely
of municipal statutory law. This means that customary
international law is inferior to the Constitution, and
must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since
the Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and
identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those
whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, then
petitioner must prove that either her father or mother
is a Filipino citizen for her to be considered a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Any international law which
contravenes the jus sanguinis principle in the
Constitution must of course be rejected.
6. Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to
prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Being a
foundling, she admitted that she does not know her
biological parents, and therefore she cannot trace
blood relation to a Filipino father or mother. Without
credible and convincing evidence that petitioner’s
biological father or mother is a Filipino citizen,
petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
7. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is,
prove his or her status as a foundling, to acquire
Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can
only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because
the foundling has to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law
specifically governing the citizenship of foundlings, their
citizenship is addressed by customary international law,
page 55 of 65
namely: the right of every human being to a nationality,
and the State’s obligations to avoid statelessness and to
facilitate the naturalization of foundlings.
Power of the Ombudsman to directly dismiss a public
officer
Under Sec. 13(3) of Art. XI, the Ombudsman can only
recommend to the officer concerned the removal of a
public officer or employee found to be administratively
liable. (Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
129124. March 15, 2002) Be that as it may, the refusal,
without just cause, of any officer to comply with such
an order of the Ombudsman to penalize erring officer
or employee is a ground for disciplinary action. Thus,
there is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s
recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but
actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This
should not be interpreted as usurpation of the
Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or
any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority, but a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged. (Ledesma v.
CA, GR 161629, 29 July 2005
Q: For three consecutive terms, Conrad was elected as
a Punong Barangay. During his third term, he ran for
Municipal Councilor. He won and later assumed office
and served the full term. After serving his term as
Municipal Councilor, he filed his COC for the position of
Punong Barangay. His opponent filed a Petition for
Disqualification on the ground that he had already
served the three-term limit for the position of PB.
Should Conrad be disqualified?
A: YES. Conrad was serving his third term as PB when
he ran for Municipal Councilor and, upon winning,
assumed the position, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his
office as PB. There was a voluntary renunciation of
office and not one by operation of law. Under Sec. 8of
Article 10 of the Constitution, voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Q: Ryan Cristopher was elected City Councilor for three
consecutive terms. During his last term, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days
in relation with a criminal case he then faced. The
Court, however, subsequently lifted the suspension
order, hence he resumed performing his functions and
finished his term. He filed his COC for the same
position. April sought to deny due course to Ryan
Cristopher’s COC on the ground that he had been
elected and he served for three terms. Is preventive
suspension considered an interruption of the three-
term limit rule?
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
A: NO. The intent of the three-term limit rule demands
that preventive suspension should not be considered an
interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in
office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in the office
although he is barred from exercising his functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.
The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity
in office is the absence of a permanent replacement
and the lack of authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists (Aldovino v. COMELEC, 2009)
Abundo v. COMELEC, 2013
The conversion of a municipality into a city does not
constitute an interruption of incumbent official’s
continuity of service. Henry did involuntarily relinquish
his office as municipal mayor since the said office has
been deemed abolished due to the conversion.
However, the very instant he vacated his office as
municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor.
The elective officials of the Municipality of Digos
continued to exercise their powers and functions until
elections were held for the new city officials. True, the
new city acquired a new corporate existence separate
and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city
mayor.
Instance where a transfer may be considered violative
of employee’s security of tenure
When the transfer is a preliminary step toward his
removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly
terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision that
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the
Civil Service. (CSC v. PACHEO, G.R. No. 178021, January
25, 2012)
NOTE: Acceptance of a temporary appointment or
assignment without reservation or upon one’s own
volition is deemed waiver of security of tenure.
(Palmera v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 110168,
August 4, 1994)
Q: Sol was first employed as private secretary in the
GSIS in1960 on a “confidential” status. In 1962, Sol was
promoted to Tabulating Equipment Operator with
“permanent” status. In 1986, she was appointed
corporate secretary of the Board of Trustees (BOT) of
the corporation. In 2001, she opted for early
retirement. In 2002, Sol, who was 64 years old at the
time, was reappointed by GSIS President (with approval
of BOT) as corporate secretary. The BOT classified her
appointment as “confidential in nature and the tenure f
office is at the pleasure of the Board.” On October 10,
2002, CSC issued a resolution invalidating the
page 56 of 65
reappointment of Sol as corporate Secretary, on the
ground that the position is a permanent, career
position and not primarily confidential.
May the courts determine the proper classification of a
position in government? Is the position of corporate
secretary in a GOCC primarily confidential in nature?
A: The courts may determine the proper classification
of a position in government. A strict reading of the law
(EO 292) reveals that primarily confidential positions
fall under the non-career service. The tenure of a
confidential employee is coterminous with that of the
appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure.
However, the confidential employee may be appointed
or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Non-applicability of notice and hearing in the issuance
of an administrative rule or regulation
General rule: An administrative body need not comply
with the requirements of notice and hearing, in the
performance of its executive or legislative functions,
such as issuing rules and regulations. (Corona v. United
Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines)
Exception: The legislature itself requires it and
mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain
facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation
The power of Administrative Agencies to promulgate
rules and regulations on matters within their own
specialization.
Law on Nepotism
The law (Sec 59 Nepotism, (1) ) defines nepotism as all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned
or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative
of the
1.Appointing or 2. recommending authority, or of the
3. chief of the bureau or office, or of
4. the persons exercising immediate supervision over
him.
The word "relative" and members of the family referred
to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.
Exceptions:
1. Persons employed in confidential capacity
2. Teachers
3. Physicians
4. Members of the AFP; and
5. a member of any family who, after his or her
appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in
the same office or bureau, in which event the
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
employment or retention therein of both
husband and wife may be allowed.
NOTE: if the prohibition on law of nepotism involves
appointment to the LGUs, apply Section 79 of the LGC.
(within 4th civil degree)
Laurel v. Civil Service Commission
This Court held that the appointment or designation as
Acting Provincial Administrator was violative of the
prohibition against nepotism, then embodied in Section
49, P.D. No. 807. Moreover, the Court emphatically
agreed with the Civil Service Commission
that "although what was extended to Benjamin was
merely a designation and not an appointment, . . . the
prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include
designation, because what cannot be done directly,
cannot be done indirectly:"
Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission
The conclusion we reach is that Section 59, Book V, E.O.
No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain and
ordinary language: it refers to "all appointments"
whether original or promotional in nature. The public
policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in
importance, and the Court has neither authority nor
inclination to dilute that important public policy by
introducing a qualification here or a distinction there.
It follows that the promotional appointment of
petitioner Victoria by her husband, petitioner Mayor,
falls within the prohibited class of appointments: the
prohibited relationship between the appointing
authority (petitioner Mayor) and the appointee (wife
Victoria) existed at the time the promotional
appointment was issued. It is scarcely necessary to add
that the reasons which may have moved petitioner
Mayor to issue the prohibited appointment are, as a
matter of law, not relevant in this connection.
Sec. 13, Article 7, Constitution
The Spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not
during his tenure be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen, or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
Lingating v. Comelec
The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong
prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan
from becoming final. There is thus no decision finding
Sulong guilty to speak of. Neither can the succession of
the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the
office of mayor be considered proof that the decision in
AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to
have been made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of the Local
Government Code, which makes decisions in
administrative cases immediately executor
page 57 of 65
Here, the decision removing a person from office
should have attained finality before the prohibition
under Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC may apply.
Marquez v. COMELEC
"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it
may be so conceded as expressing the general and
ordinary connotation of the term.
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that
it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only
to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by
final judgment" is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
The Supreme Court reiterated that a “fugitive from
justice” includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that animates one’s flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be intent to
evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.
ELECTION LAWS
Stages:
BEFORE ELECTION
a. Registration of voters
Macalintal v. Comelec
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters
are required to physically reside in the Philippines
within the period required for non-absentee voters.
Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and
resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a
resident of his domicile (insofar as an election law is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one has
the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines
for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee
voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute
the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee
voter.
What is Election Campaign or Partisan Political
Activity?
Refers to an act designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a
public office.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
NOTE: GR: The Commission, provincial election
supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by
the Commission or board of election inspectors shall
have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of the certificate of candidacy. (Sec. 76,
Omnibus Election Code)
EXP: 1. Nuisance candidates, 2. Petition to
deny due course or to cancel a COC, and 3. Filing of a
disqualification case on any of the grounds enumerated
in Sec. 68, OEC.
NOTE: No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy
within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a
certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election,
withdraw the same by submitting to the office
concerned a written declaration under oath. (Sec. 73,
Omnibus Election Code)
Monsale v. Nico
In the present case the protestant withdrew his
certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, and
requested the Commission on Elections that it "be
considered as though it has never been filed at all."
There is no question as to the right of a candidate to
withdraw or annul his own certificate of candidacy,
there being no legal prohibition against such
withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-one
days before the election, the protestant ceased to be a
candidate by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of
fact the boards of election inspectors of the
municipality of Miagao were duly notified of his
withdrawal. His letter to the Commission on Elections
dated November 6, 1947, which he subscribed and
swore to before a notary public on November 1,
whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate
of candidacy, can only be considered as a new
certificate of candidacy which, having been filed only
four days before the election, could not legally be
accepted under the law, which expressly provides that
such certificate should be filed at least sixty days before
the election.
NOTE: Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy, (Sec. 66, Omnibus
Election Code)
PNOC-EDC v. NLRC
Sec. 66 applies to officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, even
those organized under the general laws on
incorporation and therefore not having an original or
legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under
the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code.
page 58 of 65
Miranda v. Abaya
Under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code,
not just any person, but only an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party may be
substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840,
November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that a
cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid
candidacy (p.13).
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy
cannot be considered a candidate in much the same
way as any person who has not filed any certificate of
candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
The law clearly provides:
SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be
eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law
is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say that any
person who attempts to run for an elective office but
does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a
candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult
him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431
[1980]), the Court held that a certificate of candidacy
filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the
person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in
the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of
candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a
person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or
denied due course is no candidate at all. No amount of
votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired
for.
DOCTRINE OF REJECTION OF 2ND PLACER
Q — Rev. Nardo B. Cayat filed his certificate of
candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet for the May
2004 elections. Thomas Palileng, another candidate for
Mayor filed a petition to annul/nullify his certificate of
candidacy and/or to disqualify on the ground that Cayat
has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Twenty three days before the election,
Cayat’s disqualification became final and executory. He,
however won and was proclaimed and assumed office.
Palileng filed an electoral protest contending that Cayat
was ineligible to run for mayor. The Vice-Mayor
intervened and contended that he should succeed
Cayat in case he is disqualified because Palileng was
only a second placer, hence, he cannot be declared as
the winner. Is the contention of the Vice-Mayor
correct? Why?
ANS: No, because there was no second placer, hence,
Palileng should be proclaimed as the winner on the
following grounds:
First, the COMELEC’s Resolution of 12 April 2004
cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to
disqualification became final and executory on 17 April
2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee.
Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Twenty-three days before the election day, Cayat was
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor
in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate,
Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary,
Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none.
The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer,
which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in
the present case because Palileng is not a second-placer
but the only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s
proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond
question.
Second, there are specific requirements for the
application of the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s
favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case,
if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s
disqualification remained pending on election day, 10
May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty
candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and
(2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final
only after the elections. (Cayat v. COMELEC, April 27,
2007).
REMEDIES BEFORE ELECTION
Disqualification cases before election
1. Nuisance candidates
2. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC,
and
3. Filing of a disqualification case on any of the
grounds enumerated in Sec. 68, OEC.
NOTE: In section 68, OEC, the candidate is qualified to
run, hence, if later on disqualified, substitution is
proper. In Section 69, OEC, a nuisance candidate is not
allowed to be substituted since at the first place he
does not qualify to be a candidate. In Section 78, OEC, a
person whose candidacy was cancelled due to material
misrepresentation is considered as a disqualified
candidate in the first place, thus substitution as to him
is not proper.
Section 6, RA 6646
Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong.
CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007
FACTS:
page 59 of 65
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only
mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in
Buguias Benguet. Palileng filed a petition for
cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of
misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat
misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that
he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not
because he is serving probation after being convicted
for the offense of acts of lasciviousness. Comelec,
granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a
motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied
because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it
was declared final and executory. Despite this decision,
Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng
filed a petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec
declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo
Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor. Bayacsan
argues that he should be declared as mayor because of
the doctrine of rejection of second placer.
ISSUE: WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is
applicable.
HELD: The doctrine cannot be applied in this case
because the disqualification of Cayat became final and
executory before the elections and hence, there is only
one candidate to speak of. The law expressly declares
that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before
an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only
candidate and the duly elected mayor. The doctrine will
apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention
in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending
on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence
of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in
the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s
disqualification became final only after the elections.
NOTE: The HRET’s jurisdiction of all contests relation to
elections, returns, and qualifications of members of
congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives. Althout
Imelda Marcos won as congresswoman, she has not yet
been proclaimed and thus, she is not yet considered as
member of the congress. (Imelda Marcos-Romualdez v.
Comelec)
Once a candidate has been proclaimed, taken is oath,
and assumed office in the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends and HRET’s jurisdiction
begins.
DURING ELECTION
Instances where a failure of election may be declared
1. The election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes;
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
2. The election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; and
3. After the voting and during the preparation
and transmission of the election returns or
canvass thereof such election results in failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
fraud or analogous causes. (Banaga Jr. vs
Comelec, G.R. No. 134696, July 31, 2000)
NOTE: There is a failure to elect when nobody can be
declared as winner because the will of the majority has
been defiled and cannot be ascertained.
Power to declare a failure of election
The COMELEC has the power to declare a failure of
election and this can be exercised motu proprio or
upon verified petition. (Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
107814-15, May 16, 1996)
NOTE: The hearing is summary in nature and the
COMELEC may delegate to its lawyers the power to
hear the case and to receive evidence. (Ibid.)
Q: Is low turn-out of voters enough basis to grant a
petition to declare a failure of election?
A: No. All the law requires is that a winning candidate
must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless
of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less
than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts
cast their votes, the same must still be respected.
(Mitmug v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 106270-73, February
10, 1994)
REYES v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro
Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all
election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in
division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the
decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that,
in accordance with Art. IX, A, §7, "may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari."
NOTE: If what is involved is a mere Interlocutory Order
issued by the COMELEC, the aggrieved party may go
directly to the SC by way of certiorari under Rule 65.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES
They refer to any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers, and the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly
with the COMELEC in relation to the preparation,
page 60 of 65
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns. (Sec. 241, BP 881 OEC)
It shall be heard summarily by the COMELEC. Its
decision shall be executory after 5 days from receipt by
the losing party, unless contrary orders from the SC.
POST-ELECTION DISPUTES
They are disputes which arise or are instituted after
proclamation of winning candidates and which issues
pertain to the casting and counting of votes (Election
Protests), or to the eligibility or disloyalty of the
winning candidates (Quo warranto).
Nature of an election contest
It is a special summary proceeding the object of which
is to expedite the settlement of controversies between
candidates as to who received the majority of legal
votes.
Where election protests can be filed
1. COMELEC – sole judge of all contests relating to
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial and city officials. (reviewable by SC
under Rule 64 using Rule 65.)
2. Presidential Electoral Tribunal – President and Vice
President
3. SET – Senator
4. HRET – representative
5. RTC – over contests for municipal officials which may
be appealed to COMELEC 6. MeTC or MTC – for
barangay officials which may be appealed to COMELEC
ELECTION PROTEST v. QUO WARRANTO
1. Both remedies are post-proclamation of
candidates
2. In the former, the issue is “who really won the
election?”, while the latter is “is the winning
candidate really qualified?”
3. In the former, only the candidate himself may
file an election protest. On the other hand, in
quo warranto, it may be filed by any registered
voter
4. In the former, if the protested candidate is
removed, the one protesting shall be
proclaimed as the winner. Conversely, once
the winner declared disqualified, he will be
removed from office.
LABO v. COMELEC
Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the
quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared
the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because
Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote.
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed
as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in
all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election.
Q: Should the Vice-mayor succeed the Mayor if latter
be disqualified because it was later found that he is
ineligible to run for the position?
A: No. The candidate for the same position who
garnered the next highest vote shall be proclaimed as
the winner. Technically, such candidate is the first-
placer for the reason that a void COC cannot produce
any legal effect and therefore, an ineligible candidate is
not considered a candidate at all. (Maquiling v.
COMELEC, 2013)
Q: What if the Mayor was disqualified because of an
election offense under Sec. 68 of the OEC? Who will
succeed?
A: Vice Mayor. The effect of the Mayor’s
disqualification is a permanent vacancy in the position.
Under Sec. 44 of the LGC, in case of permanent vacancy
in the position of Mayor, the Vice Mayor will succeed.
MAQUILING v. COMELEC
The old doctrine was that the vice mayor shall succeed
the disqualified winning candidate, not the candidate
for the same position who had received the next
highest vote. In recent cases, SC ruled that a void CoC
cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in
favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at
all in determining the winner of an election. Knowledge
by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed
second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually
the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
Furthermore, that the disqualified candidate has
already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of
no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a
substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
CoC voids not only the CoC but also the proclamation.
Effect of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship as to
the domicile/residence requirement for running as a
mayoralty candidate
Under RA 9225, it has no automatic impact or effect on
a candidate’s residence/domicile. He merely has an
option to again establish his domicile in the
municipality, which place shall become his new
domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein
page 61 of 65
shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice and it shall not retroact to the time
of his birth. (Japson v. COMELEC, G.R .No. 180088,
January 19, 2009)
ER EJERCITO v. COMELEC, 2014
The rule on succession provided for in Sec. 44 of RA
7160 or the Local Government Code applies in this case
because what occurred here after his disqualification is
a permanent vacancy in the position. What is involved
in this case is the commission of an election offense
(overspending) provided for in Sec. 68 of OEC which, in
effect, disqualifies the candidate from holding Office.
Here, the candidate possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to run for the office.
Therefore, he is a valid candidate.
Q: Maratay Buntal, a dual citizen, run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Balindong and won. Mapiyay Buntal,
another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to
disqualify Maratay Buntal on the ground that the latter
continued to use his US passport. However, according
to Maratay Buntal, the COMELEC must uphold the
sovereign will of the people of Balindong who
expressed, thru their ballots, their overwhelming
support for him as a mayor considering that he
garnered 8, 500 votes while his opponent garnered only
1,200 votes. Rule on Maratay Buntals contention.
A: Maratay Buntal’s contention is not correct. While it
is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath
and began to discharge his functions, his victory cannot
cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most
number of votes does not validate the election of a
disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. Thus, in
one case decided by the SC, it was held that election
victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain
provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become
toothless.
ARNADO v. COMELEC, 2015
In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote
does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus,
while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority
during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total
votes cast, the same “cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications.” In Velasco v.
Comelec, this Court pronounced that election victory
cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of
laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. One
of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of
1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of
local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled
that popular vote cannot override the required
qualifications under Section 39, a fortiori, there is no
reason why the Court should not follow the same policy
when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Section 40 of the same law. After all, “[t]he
qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of
the requirements for election to local public offices. The
other half is contained in the succeeding section which
lays down the circumstances that disqualify local
candidates.”
Disqualifications under Sec. 68, OEC
1. Given money or other material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions
2. Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy
3. Spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this code
4. Solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104.
MERCADO v. MANZANO
Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state that follows jus saguinis and was
born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a
concurrent application of different two laws or more.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation where
a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more
states. In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his
act of filing a certificate of candidacy tantamount to his
election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he forswears
allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating
their status as dual. The Court stressed that
participating in the election is an express renunciation
of American citizenship.
AZNAR v. COMELEC
FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged
respondent’s right to hold public office on the ground
that the latter was an alien. Respondent maintains that
he is a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a valid
subsisting passport, a continuous resident of the
Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. He was,
however, also a holder of an alien registration
certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien.
HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a
Filipino, it is presumed that he was a Filipino and
remained Filipino until proof could be shown that he
had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In
addition, possession of an alien registration certificate
unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts
whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is not
adequate proof of loss of citizenship.
TECSON v. COMELEC, 2004
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses
that "No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
page 62 of 65
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is
defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ
appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of
the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes
of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made
by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate
of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn
with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20
August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The
father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the
time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe
was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and
the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding
the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
Section 8. Article 10, Constitution
The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Borja v. Comelec
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros
on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served
as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On
March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy
for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was
also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification on the ground that Capco would have
already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by
June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve
for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec
declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc
reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible
to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and
proclaimed as mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the
office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of the three-term
limit.
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve the same elective position. Consequently,
it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can
apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the
next election because he was not elected to the office
of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served
the full term because he only continued the service,
interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The
vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event
of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of
design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC
There are 2 conditions before the disqualification under
Sec. 8, Article 10 of the Constitution may apply:
1. That the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and
2. That he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
NOTE: The proclamation or the assumption of office of
a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification
is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the
page 63 of 65
COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case
and to resolve it on the merits. (Sunga vs. Comelec)
Socrates v. COMELEC
After three consecutive terms,
an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a
fourth term, The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the same office following the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like
a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election
like a recall election, is no longer an immediate
reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The
intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.
Mendoza v. COMELEC
A winner who dislodges in a recall election an
incumbent elective local official merely serves the
balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full
three-year term. Thus, he may run for the 4th time.
Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was
elected to the said office for three consecutive terms:
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September
2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan
issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension
against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court,
and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of
his office. Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same position in 2007. His disqualification was
sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had
been elected and had served for three consecutive
terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional
limit.
ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the
three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?
RULING: NO. The preventive suspension of public
officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of
the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the
Local Government Code (RA 7160). The candidacy of
Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term
in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-
term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since
his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the
preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted
the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve
an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-
term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that
preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more
potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the
POLITICAL LAW NOTES
Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term
limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be
dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been
imposed.
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC
During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the
conversion of municipalities into component cities were
filed before the House of Representatives. However,
Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During
the 12thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective
revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It
increased the income requirement to qualify for
conversion into a city from P20 million annual income
to P100 million locally-generated income. In the
13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through
their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each
of the cityhood bills contained a common
provisionexempting the particular municipality from
the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A.
No. 9009. Are the cityhood laws converting 16
municipalities into cities constitutional?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the
City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution requires that such exemption must be
written into the LGC and not into any other laws. “The
Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.” “The criteria,
as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly
followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are
material in determining the “just share” of local
government units (LGUs) in national taxes.” (League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951,
November 18, 2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration.
7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a
second motion for reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008
decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood
Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16
municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress’
deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the
then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale
of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million
page 64 of 65
that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would
not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood
bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality
into a city will only affect its status as a political unit,
but not its property as such, it added. The Court held
that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial
distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were
qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of
RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income
requirement after what they have gone through would
appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of
fairness dictate that they should be given a legal
remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that
they have all the necessary qualifications for city status
using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior
to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League
of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499,
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No.
178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC,
December 21, 2009) NOTE: TheNovember 18, 2008
ruling already became final and executory and was
recorded in the SC’s Book of Entries of Judgments on
May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for
reconsideration of the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18,
2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood
Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16
municipalities into cities. “Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did
not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18
November 2008, as well as the prior majority en
bancResolution of 31 March 2009 denying
reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for
reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the
main decision where there is no prior decision,” the
Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated
its November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws
violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which
expressly provides that “no city…shall be
created…except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code.” It stressed
that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must
be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code,
the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption
from the increased income requirement for the
creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. “The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact
that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the
express language of the Constitution….Congress
exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering
the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of
the Constitution,” the Court held.
The Court further held that “limiting the exemption
only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement
POLITICAL LAW NOTES page 65 of 65

that the classification must apply to all similarly
situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as
worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood
Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.” (GR No.
176951,League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec;
GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling
Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011
resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first
resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011 Ruling
Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.
“We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16
cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had
conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but
have also complied with the requirements of the [Local
Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its
amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave
these cities all the considerations that justice and fair
play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by
stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable
legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain
collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said.
the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of
both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption
clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws
are but the express articulations of the clear legislative
intent to exempt the respondents, without exception,
from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009,
and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by
repeal but by way of the express exemptions being
embodied in the exemption clauses.”
The Court held that the imposition of the income
requirement of P100 million from local sources under
RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the Constitution
mandates that the creation of local government units
must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it
cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must
have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite
such amendment imminently producing effects
contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote
autonomy, decentralization, countryside development,
and the concomitant national growth.”(GR No.
176951, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC;
GR No. 177499, League of City of the Philippines v.
COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of City of the
Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that

the local government units covered by the Cityhood
Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009,
which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100
million for the creation of cities.

“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being

deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the
pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities,
including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It
pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001,
when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the
clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities
covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt
Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in
Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to
act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House
readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the
same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to
prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents
were individually filed in the Lower House and
fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and
favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate,