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Red Armor at Kursk, July 1943

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Guards Tank: Design Corner • Greek Civil War: Prequel to Cold War
The Soviet Army at Kursk Guards Tank: Prokhorovka, 1943 • Bzura Counteroffensive, Poland
Kursk is often considered the decisive by Joseph Miranda • Japanese Production Strategy
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6 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
 Guards Tank:
The Soviet Army at Kursk
by Joseph Miranda

Chronology of the Campaign Background

15 April 1943: Hitler authorizes Operation Citadel, an offensive The year 1943 opened with the
to be launched against the Kursk salient. stunning Soviet victory at Stalingrad,
4 July: the preliminary stage of the battle begins. where the Red Army surrounded and
5 July: the Germans begin their full-scale offensive. Ninth Army (of Army destroyed the German Sixth Army, while
Group Center) attacks from the north; Second Panzer Army and Army also destroying the Romanian, Italian
Detachment Kempf (Army Group South) attack from the south. and Hungarian forces on its flanks.
11 July: the northern German pincer effectively stopped by Soviet defenses. In the aftermath, the Soviets drove
12 July: in the south, II SS Panzer Corps breaks through and engages Soviet armor at Prokhorovka. into the Ukraine, stopped only after
Meanwhile, the Soviets launch their counteroffensive against the Orel salient (Operation Kutuzov). a desperate German counterattack at
13 July: Hitler allows Manstein to continue a limited attack to attempt to destroy Kharkov in March. As the spring thaw
Soviet reserves. In the north, Ninth Army goes over to the defensive. set in, operations ground to a halt. Both
17 July: Hitler orders an end to Citadel. sides’ armies rebuilt, and both sides’
25 July: II SS Panzer Corps is shifted away from the Kursk front high commands planned for a new
to deal with a Soviet offensive elsewhere. and decisive battle in the summer.
3 August: Soviets launch Operation Rumyantsev against Army Group South. In the Kremlin there was debate
5 August: Soviets recapture Orel. about the strategic direction for the
23 August: Manstein abandons Kharkov. remainder of the year. One faction
called for a two-pronged offensive, the
first driving into Byelorussia via Orel,

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 7

 and the second moving deeper into the
Ukraine where the Dnepr River could
be crossed by the end of the year. That
course of action was also expected to
preempt any German summer offensive.
Another faction, headed by Marshal
G.K. Zhukov and Chief of Staff A.M.
Vasilevsky, advocated temporarily
standing on the defensive. They believed
the experience of the 1941 Moscow
battle, as well as that of Stalingrad,
showed the best way to deal with the
still tactically and technically superior
Germans was to allow them to attack
first, waiting until their divisions became
pinned down against Soviet defenses,
and then — once the “correlation of
forces” had clearly shifted in the Reds’
favor — launch a massive counterattack.
Stalin was at first a proponent
of the former position, but he came
around to accept the latter. The reason
for his change in attitude was Soviet
intelligence showed the Germans were
indeed planning a major summer
offensive for 1943, called Zitadelle
(Citadel). It was to be launched against
above — The commander: Leonid Brezhnev (left) consults with an officer
below — Predecessor to Kursk: Soviet infantry fighting in Stalingrad the salient centered on the city of Kursk

8 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

in the middle of the front. The German The 1941 German invasion of the fought, keep up morale, and suppress
plan was to concentrate powerful panzer USSR had seen the Soviet Union hold any signs of dissatisfaction. The com-
units on the salient’s north and south together despite suffering some of the munists also used appeals to traditional
shoulders, break through there and greatest military disasters in history. Part Russian patriotism to mobilize support.
envelop all the nearby Soviet forces in a of that was due to the ruthless discipline All of that was then given further impe-
battle of annihilation. Hitler’s objectives imparted by Stalin and the Communist tus by Nazi atrocities that pushed the
were limited: Citadel’s main purpose Party. Massive propaganda work was rank and file into supporting Moscow.
was to eliminate sufficient Red forces, conducted among the armed forces, via As the war progressed and the
especially armored reserves, to prevent the commissar system, to explain the question of simple national survival
the Soviets from attacking later in the purposes for which the war was being continued on page 11 »
year. Unlike the 1941 and 1942 German
campaigns in the east, Citadel was not
intended as a war-winner. Given that
it would be fought in the summer, in
range of German air cover, and well
within reach of German lines of supply,
Citadel seemed to favor the Wehrmacht.
The Soviet high command sought
to think beyond the coming battle: they
wanted to turn the fighting around Kursk
into an operation that would serve as the
opener for their own counteroffensive.
They would let the Germans wear
themselves down in attritional fighting,
then counterattack on the flanks toward
Orel and Kharkov. Accordingly, orders
were given to fortify all around Kursk
and, beyond that, to prepare reserves
for the coming counteroffensive.
There were several factors favoring
the Soviets as the summer approached.
One was the overall balance of forces
on the eastern front in the aftermath of
Stalingrad. The Germans had lost their
Sixth Army in that campaign. Also lost
were numerous Hungarian, Italian and
Romanian divisions, amounting to the
equivalent of several more armies. While
those Axis-allied forces hadn’t been at
the level of their German equivalents,
they did hold down considerable
sectors of the front in 1941-42. Those
divisions wouldn’t be there in 1943,
and that made a difference when the
Germans themselves needed to provide
the manpower to hold all 950 miles
(1,500 km) of the front. That situation
also lends some credibility to Hitler’s
motivation to launch Citadel for political
purposes: he believed he had to show
Germany was still capable of gaining
victories in the east in order to keep his
already battered allies from defecting.
Stalingrad had also provided a
tremendous morale boost to the Soviets.
It showed the Germans could not
only be held, but also outmaneuvered
and destroyed. Stalingrad, in fact,
had been the first time since the
Napoleonic wars an entire German
army was completely destroyed in
the field. That also enhanced the
reputation of Stalin’s regime by
demonstrating it was capable of fighting
and winning major campaigns.

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 9

Soviet Organization
The “Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army” was the official
name of the armed force of the USSR (the title would be changed
to the “Soviet Army” in 1946). As described in the main body
of the article, the Red Army went through much reorganiza-
tion in the two years following the German invasion.
When first organized in late 1942, each new tank corps had three
tank and one motorized infantry brigade, with little in the way of
supporting units. By 1943, tank corps had received some powerful
support elements, including assault gun, rocket launcher, anti-tank
and mortar regiments or battalions. Unlike German panzer divisions,
tank corps didn’t have central divisional artillery pools that could make
concentrated fires. That was because the Red Army lacked sufficiently
trained personnel to coordinate such fires in mobile situations.
To bolster the tank corps on the defensive, the Red Army created
mechanized corps. They consisted of three mechanized and one tank bri-
gade, plus a mix of support elements along the same lines as a tank corps.
The mechanized brigades were similar to motorized brigades, except they
also had assigned a tank regiment within them. That made mechanized
corps powerful formations, with both defensive and offensive capabilities.
Tank armies constituted the next higher level of Soviet organization.
They generally consisted of two tank and one mechanized corps, plus
other strong armored and artillery formations. On paper, they were the
equivalent of a German panzer corps; in reality, they had both advantages
and disadvantages when compared to those German formations. A
primary advantage of the tank armies came from the fact they were
kept under the direct control of the Soviet Military high command.
That meant they were held in reserve and committed only for critical
operations. (In some cases, individual tank and mechanized corps were
temporarily detached to lower command echelons for lesser operations.)
Tank armies were intended to fight the deep battle: once the
breakthrough had been made on the front by the infantry, the tanks would
drive deep, destroying enemy reserves and logistical installations. The
mechanized corps would follow along, holding ground and waiting for
the infantry divisions to catch up. Incidentally, as the Soviets received
10 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
increasing numbers of Lend-Lease trucks from the US, their rifle divi-
sions became increasingly mobile, at least more so than their German
counterparts, which increasingly suffered from fuel and vehicle shortages.
Soviet rifle divisions were considerably weaker than their Western
counterparts. Their paper strength was 9,600 men in 1943, as compared
to the roughly 13,000-man strength that was the on-paper norm for the
Germans (though those numbers were rarely seen once combat losses
began to be suffered). Soviet divisional artillery relied on direct fire 76mm
and 122mm guns. The German divisions used 105mm and 150mm guns,
and they had a much more efficient fire control system. That was one rea-
son for the high ratio of Soviet to German casualties. Even when winning a
battle, the Red Army could expect to suffer more losses to German artillery
than the enemy would be taking from Soviet guns. The Red Army concen-
trated its indirect fire artillery in non-divisional brigades, divisions and
corps. In that way the scarce technically trained artillery personnel could be
concentrated for the coordination of powerful indirect fires. While German
divisional artillery gave them another tactical advantage, the Soviet
non-divisional artillery proved effective as an operational arm of war.
When comparing the Soviet and German orders of battle, a
caveat must be kept in mind. That is, the numbers often weren’t so
dramatically in favor of the Soviets as they would at first appear. That
was due to the Red Army practice of designating units by a higher
echelon term than its size would warrant in Western military parlance.
As mentioned, tank and mechanized corps were about the size of
Western armored divisions. Similarly, Red Army tank and assault gun
regiments were actually the equivalents of small panzer battalions.
That has interesting implications for the analysis of campaigns on
the eastern front. For example, in 1943 the Germans deployed about a
dozen panzer corps in the USSR. The Red Army had five equivalent units
(tank armies); so the Germans had the edge in numbers of corps-level
armored formations — and yet, the Soviets clearly outmaneuvered
the Germans that year. What that indicates is the actual deployment
of units was more critical than mere numbers, and by 1943 the
Red Army was demonstrating superiority in that regard.  ★
» continued from page 9 sized units. In 1943 they followed up by pools they would be committed for
receded into the background, the building tank armies (Western corps decisive actions, such as counterattacks
Kremlin implemented some intelligent equivalents), each generally consisting against enemy breakthroughs, or for
policies to maintain morale while of two tank and one mechanized corps. counterattacking deep into enemy rear
further enhancing their armed forces’ The doctrine behind those units was area echelons. On the offensive, infantry
efficiency. By 1943, much of the power critical: the tank armies and their armies (confusingly termed “combined
of the political commissars had been component corps were to be employed arms armies” in Soviet military parlance)
cut back, and officers were allowed as independent maneuver units. In would make the actual breakthrough
to use some tactical initiative in the order to perform that mission, they were of the enemy front. That was done in
field. Another move was to recognize to be held in reserve at the strategic or order to avoid unnecessary attritional
the achievements of individuals and “front” levels (army group), from which continued on page 14 »
units that performed well in combat
via promotions and awarding medals.
Units with a demonstrated record of
proficiency were given the honorific
of “Guards,” after the elite units of the
old Czarist army. Guards units were
provided with an upgraded organiza-
tion along with better equipment and
the best of the recruits. Thus there
soon came to be Guards regiments,
brigades, divisions, corps and armies.

Command & Intelligence

One reason for the disastrous

performance of the Red Army in 1941
was the abysmal state of its command
control. Stalin’s purges of the late
1930s had eliminated many of the best
leaders in the USSR’s armed forces,
including innovative thinkers such as
Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky, a pioneer
of deep operations theory (which was
a correlate of the German blitzkrieg
doctrine). To make matters worse,
Soviet armored forces were going
through one of series of reorganiza-
tions when the Germans struck.
For example, though the mechanized
corps in June 1941 looked strong on
paper (consisting of two tank and one
motorized infantry division each) their
commanders and staffs were almost
entirely inexperienced, logistics were
inadequate, and combined-arms
training non-existent. Those units fell
apart in the face of the well-coordinated
German assault. As a result of that
experience, the Soviets broke up their
surviving mechanized corps, using
their equipment and manpower to
form smaller tank brigades which
were employed almost exclusively
for infantry support. That effectively
made it impossible for the Red Army
to conduct large-scale armored
operations for over a year, thereby
giving the panzer corps an easy run at
the operational and strategic levels.
By mid-1942 the Soviets felt confi-
dent enough to again organize larger
armored units. They were termed tank
and mechanized “corps,” but by Western
standards they were actually division-

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 11

The Germans in 1943
By the time of Citadel, the Germans’ pan-
zer arm had undergone fundamental changes
from the force with which they’d begun the
war. In 1939-41, the Germans utilized “panzer
groups,” each consisting of several motorized
or panzer corps. Panzer groups were committed
as theater-level and army group-level maneu-
ver units. Starting late in 1941, the panzer
groups were upgraded to panzer armies. While
theoretically that should’ve led to an increase
in their strength, it actually degraded their effi-
ciency because — as “armies” — they were
expected to hold sectors of the front rather
than simply being on hand for exploitations.
Panzer armies also came to have ever
increasing numbers of non-motorized infantry
divisions assigned to them, further limiting
their overall mobility. Meanwhile, the panzer
divisions tended to be parceled out as mobile
“fire brigades” to meet emergencies both
within and without the panzer armies. During
Kursk, Second Panzer Army, which was holding
the front east of Orel, had no panzer corps
assigned to it, while Ninth (Infantry) Army,
which was making the assault against the
northern face of the salient, had three. Of
course, the exigencies of the war increasingly
gave the Germans little choice but to keep their
panzer armies in the line, since they lacked
the infantry divisions to defend the entire
front. That situation can be compared to the
Soviet practice of employing their tank armies
as front-level maneuver units. Effectively, by
1943 the Germans had lost the advantage in
operational and strategic maneuver warfare.
Ironically, the Germans were gaining on
Into the east: SS Panzer troops prepare for an assault
12 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
the tactical side at that time. That is, both their
panzer (armored) and panzergrenadier (armored
infantry) divisions were much more heavily
armed compared to previous years. That was
especially true when it came to armored
fighting vehicles (AFVs). The panzer divisions
had dropped their obsolescent inventory of
Mark I and II tanks, with which they’d fought
throughout the war’s early stages. Both of
those machines were little more than prewar
tank prototypes, but the Germans had been
forced to use them in 1939-41 out of necessity.
The main German tanks at Kursk were Mark
IIIs and IVs. While the III was showing its age,
it was reliable and armed with an upgraded
50mm gun. The IV had a high-velocity 75mm
that was one of the best tank guns of the
war. There were also small numbers of Mark
VI Tigers on the field with their 88mm guns.
The Mark V Panther made it debut at Kursk,
though they were rushed to the front before all
its mechanical “bugs” had been worked out.
Aside from the better tanks, panzer units in
1943 had assigned to them numerous assault
guns, tank destroyers (such as the massive
Porsche Ferdinands), and self-propelled artil-
lery, as well as a much more lavish equipage
of armored personnel carriers (halftracks,
though there never were enough of them).
That was a reversal of the tactical
situation of 1941 and 1942, when the Red
Army had the armored edge with its T-34
and KV tanks. Moreover, in 1943 the Soviets
still fielded many light tanks, such as the
T-70, which were vastly inferior to new
German AFVs. Even the T-34 was showing
its age at Kursk; the upgraded version with
an 85mm gun didn’t appear until 1944.
The improved panzers were one reason for
the high AFV kill ratio at Kursk. That kill ratio
was also due to superior German training, and
the greater initiative allowed to lower-level
commanders, though continuing experience
in the field was allowing the Soviets to begin
to catch up in those areas. On the technical
side, German guns had superior optics, which
allowed their weapons to engage at longer
ranges and more accurately. The Germans
also had superior and more numerous
radios, which enabled better communica-
tions and enhanced command control.
The real shortfall among the Germans at
that time in the war wasn’t in their panzers,
but their infantry divisions. From January
to June 1943 the German forces in the east
received 370,000 individual replacements to
cover 690,000 losses. The infantry divisions
had a lower priority than the panzer and
panzergrenadier units. The inevitable result
was infantry units came to be habitually
under-strength. The Germans attempted to
deal with that through reorganization. Infantry
regiments were reduced from their 1942
organization of three battalions each down
to two. There were similar cuts in strength
throughout other divisional units. That was bal-
anced, in part, by assigning heavier weapons
to the divisions, including assault guns. The
problem was that the increase in firepower
couldn’t make up for the lack of riflemen to
hold the line. That meant, when the Soviets
went over to the offensive, the German front
was inevitably brittle, lacking the manpower
and depth to stop breakthroughs. Often, it
was only the timely intervention by panzer and
panzergrenadier divisions that prevented the
front from collapsing altogether. That, in turn,
meant the mobile units were being tied down
and suffering increasing attrition, and thus
couldn’t be employed for major operations.
All that reflected the even bigger picture.
As the Soviets rationalized their army organiza-
tion in 1943, the Germans were going in the
opposite direction. With the manpower crisis
generated by the losses on the eastern front in
1941 and 1942, the German Army took a step
backward. In late 1942 the German Army (Heer)
requested the Air Force (Luftwaffe) turn over
200,000 personnel to be retrained as replace-
ments to rebuild depleted divisions. Hermann
Goering was loathe to give up his service com-
mand’s manpower. Instead, he came up with an
alternative plan by which Air Force personnel
would be formed into Luftwaffe Field Divisions
and committed to the front to fight as infantry.
Despite the objections from the Army
high command, Goering won Hitler’s
consent for his scheme. Twenty-two of those
divisions were formed and sent to the front,
where they proved to be generally useless
in combat. They lacked both experienced
combat leaders and unit cohesion. As a result,
they fell apart in sustained fighting. The
experiment wasted both time and resources
the Germans couldn’t afford to lose.
While much has been made of the Waffen
SS as being the elite fire brigade of the
German ground force, in mid-1943 it was still
a relatively small part of the armed forces. The
Waffen SS had but three beefed-up panzer-
grenadier divisions involved at Kursk. A fourth
division was in Army Group South reserve and
defended the Kharkov front against Soviet
attacks. Overall, there were less than a dozen
SS divisions fully active in mid-1943. Several
of those units were composed of volunteers
(more or less) recruited from the Germanic pop-
ulations that then still lived in various areas
around Europe. At Kursk the II SS Panzer Corps
gave a good accounting for itself, making one
of the few major breakthroughs of the battle.
But there would prove to be more to that
picture. In the latter part of the war, the SS
would recruit various non-German nationalities
on a large-scale, but that had yet to go into
high gear at the time of Kursk. Oddly enough,
that move was an error on the converse of the
decision to build the Luftwaffe field divisions.
That is, the SS recruiting campaign in Nazi
occupied countries didn’t impact on the Army’s
replacement pool in Germany. So, had the
SS buildup begun earlier, it could’ve created
a pool of divisions that could’ve effectively
bolstered the front, but the Germans did not
seize on this opportunity until too late.   ★

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 13

» continued from page 11
losses to the tank armies by not having
them involved in frontal assaults.
As for the Soviet infantry armies,
the standard 1941 structure had
consisted of two to four rifle corps, each
of three or so divisions plus numerous
sub-divisional units. As with the 1941
mechanized corps, those infantry armies
suffered from inexperienced leadership,
politically mandated rigid tactics, and
abysmal logistics. There simply weren’t
enough well trained commanders and
staff personnel to effectively plan and
control combat operations. As a result,
armies often went into battle with
their components uncoordinated and
disjointed. The Soviets dealt with that, as
best they could, by the use of emergency
expedients. One was to reduce the
size of their infantry (“rifle”) divisions.
That made them easier for the officers
on hand to maneuver them. Another
Between battles: Soviet unit receives new tanks in the field
14 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
measure was to temporarily eliminate
the corps organization. Divisions
came to be directly con ed by army
headquarters. That elimination of the
corps echelon also meant the small
pool of trained officers could be better
concentrated at one level. While that
wasn’t as efficient as the former division-
corps-army system would’ve been had
it been properly manned, it nonetheless
worked well and long enough to allow
the Soviets to rebuild their officer ranks.
One way that process was facilitated
was by Stalin ordering the release of
numerous officers from the gulag and
restoring them to rank. Another was
via the rapid promotion of men who
showed their worth in the field. That was
accompanied by the removal of many
untalented “party hack” officers, often
by the simple expedient of transferring
them to behind-the-line jobs in which
they couldn’t do much damage. By 1943,
then, sufficient numbers of qualified
officers were on hand to allow the
Soviets to restore the corps echelon in
the combined arms armies. That consid-
erably improved their level of efficiency.
A further advantage the Soviets built
up by 1943 was in communications. In
1941 the Red Army had relied mainly
on landline networks, but telephones
couldn’t keep pace with mobile opera-
tions. Moreover, the Luftwaffe made a
priority of attacking communication
centers, often completely knocking out
telephone exchanges. By the time of
Kursk, however, the Soviets were fielding
increasing numbers of radios while add-
ing numerous communications units to
their tables of organization. To be sure,
they still weren’t up to the technical
level of the Germans, but it was enough
to make mobile warfare possible.
There was also the intelligence war,
in which the Soviets made good use of
espionage networks, such as the Rotte
Kapelle (Red Orchestra) and the Lucy
Ring. There was also intelligence from
the Anglo-American ULTRA program
the Allies passed on to Moscow. As
a result, the Soviets were aware of
major German operations ahead of
time and could plan accordingly.
On the front line, the Soviets also
increased their tactical intelligence
capabilities. Reconnaissance and aerial
photography gave them a good picture
of German positions and potential
axes of advance prior to Citadel. They
exploited that information to build
defenses arrayed so as to channel the
anticipated German advances directly
into preset kill zones. The Soviets also
proved adept at maskirova (deception)
operations, which ranged from simply
camouflaging tactical positions up to
concealing the identity and location
of entire armies. For example, German
intelligence believed the Soviets’ Steppe
Front, in reserve behind the Kursk
salient, contained only a total of five
tank or mechanized corps when it actu-
ally had twice that number. The request
by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein,
commander of Army Group South, to
Hitler to be allowed to continue the
offensive after the Battle of Prokhorovka
on 12 July was predicated on that
officer’s mistaken belief the Soviets
had no powerful reserves available
to counter his panzer spearheads.
Further aiding Soviet intelligence
were the partisan formations operat-
ing in the German rear areas. They
passed on information about enemy
dispositions, as well as conducting
sporadic raiding. By 1943, German
security operations had contained the
direct threat from the partisans, but
their primary impact was more subtle.
With a large partisan force in the field,
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 15
the average German soldier understood
there was really no safe rear area until
the Reich’s frontier was reached. That
imparted a sense of isolation to the men
at the front, and aided in undermining
German morale when the Red Army
attacked, since there was an enemy
both in front of and behind the lines.
Tactics
German armored doctrine called for
mobile units to make the breakthrough
and then to drive deep into the enemy
rear, destroying headquarters, artillery
and logistical installations, thereby
causing his front line to collapse for lack
of command and support. Combined
arms tactics were emphasized. Tanks
attacked in combination with motor-
ized infantry accompanied by anti-tank
guns, artillery and flak in support. That
doctrine proved its effectiveness in
the 1941 and 1942 campaigns in the
USSR. By 1943, however, the Soviets had
also learned many doctrinal lessons.
In preparation for Citadel, the
Soviets built successive belts of
fortifications within the Kursk salient,
each held by infantry heavily reinforced
with anti-tank guns. Artillery was
pre-registered on its target areas. The
intent wasn’t so much to instantly stop
the Germans, but rather to disrupt
their tactical formations. Artillery
fire would force the non-armored
units in the panzer divisions to halt
and take cover, thereby causing the
tanks to advance without support into
positions where they could be picked
off by anti-tank teams. Further, if their
infantry couldn’t keep up with the
panzers, the Germans couldn’t securely
hold whatever ground they did take.
Once the Germans had been
weakened and disrupted in that way,
the Soviet high command would com-
mit tank and mechanized corps to a
decisive counterattack. That approach
also took advantage of an often
overlooked point about German tanks.
That is, most of them were designed for
mobile warfare, moving deep into the
enemy rear area to destroy command
and support echelons, but they were
not intended to act as the primary tank
killers. Destroying enemy tanks was the
job of Germans’ anti-tank guns and the
88mm flak pieces. To be sure, by 1943
the Germans were fielding numerous
self-propelled armored tank destroyers
and assault guns, and also had tanks
such as the Mark VI Tiger as dedicated
tank killers; but even so, the Soviets
structured their defense so the mass
of German tanks wouldn’t be able to
16 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
accomplish their primary mission of
making breakthroughs. While the Red
Army lost several times more tanks
at Kursk than did the Germans, that
didn’t really matter when the Germans
found themselves unable to continue
their advance. The Soviets had devised
a system that thwarted the blitzkrieg.
Conclusions
What happened at Kursk was that
the Germans lost the strategic initiative
on the Russian front. The Soviets were
also able to prepare a counter-cam-
paign that was soon to engulf the entire
front. They launched the northern
arm of their counteroffensive against
Orel on 12 July, and in the south on 3
August. Those drives made the entire
German position around the Kursk
salient untenable, as the Reds advanced
to threaten the deeper flanks of both
German army groups involved. The
Germans then had to shift their mobile
units and air support to deal with those
threats, making it impossible for their
spearheads at the salient to exploit even
the limited successes they’d gained.
In the end, Hitler had no alternative
other than to shut down Citadel,
which he did officially on 17 July.
The Soviets won at Kursk because
they were better prepared than the
Germans for the campaign that was
actually fought. They had a strategy
that translated into an operational
advantage that negated German tacti-
cal superiority. They also employed a
more effective operational doctrine.
At Kursk, the Germans attacked on
ground of the Soviets’ choosing,
thereby ceding the advantage to the
defense. Conceivably, had the Germans
destroyed sufficient Soviet armored
formations at Kursk, they might thereby
have regained the operational advan-
tage, allowing them to contain the
ensuing Soviet counteroffensives. Kursk
demonstrated, however, that German
tactical and technical superiority over
the Soviets was no longer enough.
The Battle of Kursk also had a
further tremendous effect on Soviet
morale. It proved the Red Army could
defeat the Germans in a fair weather
campaign, which did much to sustain
the willingness of the “Ivans” to fight
on until total victory was achieved.  ✪
Sources
Barbier, M.K.
Kursk: the Greatest Tank Battle.
Heasham: 2002.
Dear, I.C.B., ed.
The Oxford Companion to World War II.
Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1995.
Dupuy, Col. T. N. & Paul Martell.
Great Battles on the Eastern Front.
New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1982.
Glantz, David.
Colossus Reborn.
Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press, 2005.
Von der Heydte, Friedrich.
Modern Irregular Warfare.
1986.
Manstein, Erich von.
Lost Victories.
St. Paul: Zenith, 2004.
Muller, Richard.
The German Air War in Russia.
Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation, 1992.
Murray, Williamson.
Strategy for Defeat.
Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Univ. Press, 1983
Newton, Steven.
Kursk: The German View.
Cambridge: DaCapo, 2002.
Zalaga, Steven & Leland Ness.
Red Army Handbook, 1939-45.
Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1998.
Zetterling, Niklas & Anders Frankson.
Kursk 1943.
London: Cass, 2000.
Ready for action: T-34 tanks
 The Numbers:
1943 Production of
Selected Weapons Systems
Soviet German
Tanks & Assault Guns 24,090 12,060
Artillery Pieces 130,000 46,100
Aircraft 34,850 25,530
Trucks 45,600 74,180
One explanation for the German defeat on the eastern front
is the Soviets had superior numbers; however, what often gets
missed is that the reason the Soviets had those numbers was
their system for mobilizing manpower and industrial strength was
superior to that of the Third Reich. As 1943 opened, Hitler had
control of all of Europe from the Pyrenees to the Ukraine. Yet his
Reich couldn’t produce the number of weapons constructed by
the USSR — and that despite the fact the Germans were also
holding some of the industrial areas of the Soviet Union.
The chart above shows the 1943 production of several types
of major military items. Actually, there is more to those numbers
than meets the eye. For example, equipment that was damaged and
returned to the factory for repair was sometimes included among
“new” production statistics. At the same time, simply because a vehicle
was produced doesn’t mean it actually made it to the front. Many
were lost on the way due to enemy air action, while others had to be
diverted to training units, or broke down and were simply abandoned.
The chart also doesn’t show the employment of
captured equipment, or of materiel confiscated from occupied
countries. For example, the Germans captured thousands of Red
Army 76mm guns in 1941 and used them in the construction of
a tank-hunter AFVs. The Soviets meanwhile received numerous
armored vehicles and trucks from the US and Great Britain.
Yet another point to consider when looking at the numbers is AFVs
that were knocked out in battle could often be repaired and returned to
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 17
service by whichever side held the field at the end of a day’s fighting.
The Germans had an efficient organization for doing just that; however,
as they were forced back during ever more continuous retreats, such
recoveries became more and more difficult for them to accomplish.
On the technical side, German AFVs were better engineered than
those of the Soviets in 1943, with superior guns and armor. That made
them more effective in the field, but it also meant German tanks took
longer to produce than an equivalent number of Soviet vehicles. The
Soviets went in for numbers, but not simply to overwhelm the Germans.
Their main battle tank, the T-34, was a good general purpose AFV, and
was efficient off road. Its mass production meant the Soviets could
create a reserve of tanks with which they could quickly rebuild depleted
units. After a few weeks of combat, German panzer divisions were
often worn down to a couple dozen surviving AFVs. That meant the Red
Army could sustain its offensives, while the Germans couldn’t. So, while
one superior tank might be able to outfight three mediocre opponents,
one operational, though inferior, AFV is certainly better than none.
Then there was the population numbers. While the population of
the USSR was larger than that of Nazi Germany, what’s often overlooked
is Hitler’s allies included Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland.
Of those countries, only Finland conducted a full mobilization and
commitment of forces to the eastern front for the entire war, nearly
wrecking the Finnish economy in the process. Romania came close, but
after their losses at Stalingrad they, as well as the Hungarians, would
be a negligible presence on the front in 1943. The Italians collapsed
over the summer when the Western Allies invaded their homeland.
In 1941-42 the Germans could also draw on their divisions
garrisoning western Europe as a strategic reserve, rushing units
to the east in emergencies. With the Allied offensive against first
Sicily (July 1943) and then the Italian mainland (September), that
was no longer an option. The panzer divisions, and newly reformed
airborne corps, stationed in the west had to be committed to the
Mediterranean Theater to keep it from collapsing. What that meant for
the Germans in 1943 was they were on their own in the east.   ★
Spearhead of victory:
Soviet combined arms
forces advance
Design Corner
Joseph Miranda
Guards Tank:
Prokhorovka, 1943
O
ne of the reasons for playing
wargames is to figure out what
happened historically. That can
be seen in this issue’s game, Guards
Tank: Prokhorovka, 1943, which is
set within the larger Battle of Kursk
in July of that year. Kursk has gone
down as the archetypal tank battle
between the Germans and Soviets,
with a wide range of claims made
about its outcome and its significance.
Some historians state the battle was
the death-ride of the panzers; others
say it was a German tactical victory
that was then overturned by events
elsewhere. Guards Tank covers the
Battle of Prokhorovka, which was a
major turning point within the Kursk
campaign. It has the SS Panzerkorps
taking on a Soviet tank army. It also
shows where both sides were, in terms
of combat efficiency, at the mid-point
of the overall war in the east.
When designing the game, I looked
at how the armies actually fought on
this level in order to be able to model
their grand tactics. That’s where the
game’s first and second wave combat
phases come in. They reflect both
tactical doctrine and the actual
execution of armored tactics at the
time, when there would be an initial
penetration and then a follow-on
fight. Both sides executed attacks
using that echeloning; so I made it the
centerpiece of the combat system.
Despite that similarity, there were
also differences between the Red
Army and Germans, both material and
non-material. The Germans had an
18 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
edge in the non-material sense. For
example, each German division in the
game has more headquarters than its
Soviet counterpart. That represents
the greater efficiency of command-
control on the German side, as well
as various logistical issues. What that
means is, if the German player sets
up his formations correctly, he will
get more out of those units than a
simple examination of their combat
factors would otherwise indicate.
Combat factors are based on relative
firepower and training, but they also
represent tactical organization. For
example, Soviet armored brigades
have low attack factors compared to
those of the Germans, due to the fact
that the former included a lot of light
tanks that could no longer hold up well
on mid-war battlefields. At the same
time, though, those formations get an
extra point or two in defense factors,
representing the organic submachine-
gun battalions assigned to them.
Supply is handled in unobtrusive
ways. One, as mentioned, is with the
headquarters units, which are assumed
to be coordinating logistical support.
Another way is in the replacement
rule. Most tank losses were due to
breakdown or damage that left the
vehicle repairable. Such vehicles could
be returned to combat if pulled off
the battlefield and repaired. In the
game, the Germans have an edge in
replacements owing to their superior
repair organization. As for the Soviets,
you can see, by examining the game’s
order of battle, how the mid-war
Red Army had become a reasonably
effective combined arms outfit.
Then there’s airpower. At the high
point of Prokhorovka, the Germans
pulled out several of the Luftwaffe
formations that were supporting the SS
panzers in order to help the deteriorat-
ing situation around Orel. Of course,
that had an impact on the ground
battle, and it shows how aspects of the
larger Kursk battle fought elsewhere had
their effect on the tactical situation here.
As with any other battle, fog of war
and friction also had impact. They’re
modeled by the Random Events Table,
and can include things like units
running into unanticipated enemy
defenses, to changes in the weather.
Using a table was the easiest way to
integrate all those factors without a lot
of special rules. Weather represents not
only meteorological effects, but also the
impact of dust and smoke rising above
the battlefield, all of which diminished
visibility and command-control.
Overall, Guards Tank shows how
two different military systems engaged
one another at the mid-point in the
war. That way, gamers can come to
their own conclusions about which
school of historical interpretation is
correct concerning Kursk and this
battle-within-a-battle at Prokhorovka.
This is the first in a series of
east front battle designs using
this system. Future games will
cover scenarios drawn from differ-
ent years, and will show how both
German and Soviet forces changed
over the course of the war.  ✪
Guards TANK: Prokhorovka, 1943
Guards Tank: Prochorovka, July 1943 (GT), designed by To purchase the game that covers the battles featured
Joseph Miranda, is the first of our new East Front Battles Series. That in this issue send your name and address along with:
series will present operational simulations of medium-to-large-sized $30 US Customers
battles fought during World War II on that front. There will be $36 Canadian Customers
two players in each game, and solitaire play is easily doable. $38 Overseas Customers
The action in GT is focused on the Kursk offensive’s southern front,
as the SS Panzer Corps breaks through the Soviet main line of resistance, All prices include postage for first class or airmail
held by elements of 6th Guards Army. The German spearheads are then shipping. CA residents add $1.98 sales tax. Send to:
met by a counterattack from 5th Guards Tank Army. What followed Decision Games
was one of the more controversial battles of World War II. There’s still ATTN: WaW Game Offer
historical debate about its significance. Some historians claim German PO Box 21598
tank losses here made it the turning point of the war in the east. Others Bakersfield CA 93390
say German losses were exaggerated; it was the Red Army that suffered
massively, and the Germans actually called off the offensive for strategic
reasons. Here is your chance to explore those interpretations.
 Bigger Isn’t Always Better
by Stefen Styrsky
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Alexpl
O
ne of the lessons taught by
World War II was bigger
isn’t always better. That was
especially true for naval forces, where
the race to larger size seemingly always
came with an immediate payoff: the
larger the vessel, the larger could be its
guns, with their associated greater range
and increased destructive power. Even
so, that desire to outclass opponents by
constructing “super” vessels resulted
from an inability to anticipate changing
tactical needs (especially how aircraft
and radar would alter the nature of naval
combat), and the belief that unique
weapons could be war changing.
Three particular standouts in this
category are the French submarine
Surcouf, Germany’s battleship
Bismarck, and the Japanese Navy’s
twin super-battleships Yamato and
Musashi. All serve as counter-examples
to the “bigger is always better” argu-
ment, and demonstrate how grand
ambition often succumbs to wartime
reality. They were actually all more
notable for their dramatic failures
rather than any particular success.
20 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
Underwater Cruiser
The submarine Surcouf was built
in 1929 and commissioned in 1934.
She was 361 feet in length, carried
110 crewmen, and could sail 10,000
nautical miles before refueling. At the
time Surcouf was the largest submarine
ever built, and she still rivals many
modern-day craft for length. For
example, the current US Virginia-class
ballistic submarines measure 377 feet.
Surcouf was essentially a submersible
cruiser. She mounted two eight-inch
guns in a forward watertight turret —
the same size guns employed on
French heavy cruisers — along with two
anti-aircraft cannon, four anti-aircraft
machineguns, and six torpedo tubes.
She even carried a spotter plane that
was transported stowed in a compart-
ment behind the conning tower. That
plane was intended to direct fire for
Surcouf’s main guns, which had a range
of 15 miles. The sub’s role was to be
as a commerce raider, a terror of the
world ocean. She even contained a
brig meant to hold up to 40 prisoners,
the captives she was expected to pick
up after sinking enemy vessels.
Problems plagued Surcouf from the
start. The ship rolled badly in high seas
and took two minutes to dive to 40 feet,
making her vulnerable to anti-subma-
rine patrols. Amazingly, she was never
outfitted with radar and, because she sat
so low to the water, her main battery had
an effective range of only seven miles.
Surcouf escaped to England just
ahead of Germany’s conquest of
France. The British tried to put the
boat to use as a convoy escort in the
North Atlantic, but found her useless
in that role; so they transferred her to
patrol duty around Bermuda and the
Caribbean. Throughout her wartime
career, she functioned only as a surface
vessel, having lost the ability to dive
due to mechanical problems. Her
most notable combat mission was
as part of a four-ship group of Free
French vessels sent to take control of
three undefended pro-Vichy islands
off the coast of Newfoundland.
After Newfoundland, the Free
continued on page 22 »
 (below) Musashi
Length (overall) 863', 263 m
Length (waterline) 840', 256 m

Bismarck
Length (overall) 823', 251 m
Length (waterline) 794', 242 m

(page 22) Surcouf

Length (overall / waterline) 361', 110 m

Emperor Hirohito of Japan (front row, center), with officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy, on board the Japanese battleship
Musashi off Yokosuka Naval Base on June 24, 1943. Admiral Osami Nagano is sixth from left in the front row.

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 21

» continued from page 20
French government ordered Surcouf to
proceed to Tahiti via the Panama Canal.
On the night of 18 February 1942, the
US freighter Thomas Sykes struck an
object in the water believed to have been
Surcouf. Neither ship possessed radar,
and both were running without lights
to avoid German U-Boats. It’s thought
the impact badly damaged Surcouf,
making her unable to avoid local anti-
submarine patrols. The next day the
US 6th Heavy Bomber Group, operating
out of Panama, sank a large submarine
in the same area where the Thomas
Sykes reported striking a vessel. Since
no German U-Boats were ever recorded
lost in that vicinity, it’s supposed the
vessel was Surcouf. In any case, the
submarine that was once the pride of
the French fleet vanished along with her
entire crew before reaching Panama.
She never fulfilled her intended role and
never once fired her guns at an enemy.
Sink the Bismarck
A nobler end came to Bismarck,
Nazi Germany’s super battleship. That
ship displaced 50,000 tons and was
the world’s largest battleship when
commissioned. Bismarck was meant
to be faster and better-armed than any
British warship, though her main use
was to have been as a commerce raider.
22 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
Her size and armament meant she could
confront typical merchant vessel escorts,
as well as dealing destruction with her
long-range guns among enemy convoys.
German naval commanders origi-
nally imagined Bismarck running amok
among the Atlantic convoys, effectively
cutting off supply routes to Britain and
bringing the island nation to its knees.
Bismarck’s first and last mission
was Operation Rheinubung (Rhine
Exercise), meant to divert British forces
away from Germany’s invasion of Crete
and temporarily halt critical shipping
to Britain. She set sail on 18 May 1941
with only one escort, the heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen. Other potential support
vessels were either in for repair or
undermanned at the time. German
Fleet Commander Adm. Gunther
Lutjens had requested a delay to ensure
additional support, but the timing of
the Crete invasion made it necessary
for Bismarck to leave port before those
other ships could be made ready.
The key to Bismarck’s success was for
her to break out into the open waters of
the Atlantic where she could move about
undetected; however, British aerial and
improved radar surveillance spotted the
two warships sailing from Denmark,
and a screen of cruisers successfully
located Bismarck before she and Prinz
Eugen slipped into the wider Atlantic.
Despite a terrific battle in which the
German ships sank the venerable British
heavy cruiser Hood and damaged the
new Prince of Wales, the Bismarck found
herself on the run rather than hunting
merchant convoys. During several days
in the Atlantic she came under torpedo
attack from planes off the carriers Ark
Royal and Victorious. A single torpedo
hit on Bismarck’s stern jammed the
control rudders. After that the ship
could only steam in a huge circle.
Unable to maneuver, Bismarck was
relentlessly pounded by British warships
until her captain, Ernest Lindemann,
gave the order to scuttle. Bismarck
went down on 27 May 1941, nine
months after her commission, along
with 1,995 German sailors, including
Lindemann — the pride of the German
Navy undone by a single torpedo.
Last Voyage of the Yamato
The greatest instance of outsized
ambition compared to relative
effectiveness were the Japanese Navy’s
twin super battleships Yamato and
Musashi. They were true behemoths,
the largest battleships ever built.
Yamato and Musashi sported 16-inch
thick armor plating and nine 18.1-inch
guns as primary armament. That was
a full two inches larger than anything
else afloat, capable of firing shells
over 25 miles. Secondary armament
consisted of a dozen 6.1-inch guns,
another dozen 5-inch guns, and
two-dozen 1-inch anti-aircraft guns.
A refit in 1944 — after it had become
apparent carrier-based aircraft were
the war’s most effective anti-ship
weapons — increased Yamato’s anti-
aircraft complement to 162 such guns.
They were meant to outclass all
other enemy warships and thereby
make up for Japan’s inability to keep
pace with American production.
While the US Navy might field a
greater number of ships, Yamato and
Musashi were believed able to confront
multiple foes at once, thus negating
numerical superiority. Since the
Panama Canal couldn’t accommodate
anything as large as Yamato or Musashi,
Japanese planners also assumed
the Americans, forced to patrol two
oceans, would never build a ship that
could only effectively operate in one.
Despite impressive armament
and armor, the Yamato spent most of
the Pacific War as an escort and troop
The Surcouf
transport. During the Solomon Islands
campaign, she was forced to remain in
port at Truk because her enormous fuel
needs simply made her impractical for
use against American forces landing at
distant Guadalcanal. Japanese crews
assigned to cruisers and destroyers in
the area nicknamed her “Hotel Yamato.”
Her only combat against enemy
vessels occurred late in October 1944,
at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese
attempt to thwart a US landing in the
Philippines. Spotted on the way there,
Yamato, Musashi and their escorts
were attacked by American warplanes.
The Musashi sank after hits from 17
torpedoes and 19 bombs. By simple
good luck, the Yamato and her escorts
later slipped through the US line to sink
three destroyers and an escort carrier —
hardly the devastation of which she was
supposedly capable. Further damage
to Allied forces was prevented when
torpedoes forced Yamato to maneuver
away from the battle. She fled before
American forces could counterattack.
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 23
Her last mission was Operation
Ten-Go in April 1945, another sortie to
disrupt an Allied landing, this time on
Okinawa. The plan called for Yamato’s
captain to beach the ship at Okinawa,
turning the vessel into an unsinkable
gun platform that would pound the
invaders with her heavy weapons. Since
it was to be a one-way trip, the Yamato
carried only enough fuel for the journey
to Okinawa; retreat was impossible.
On 7 April 1945, American subs
spotted Yamato en route, and alerted
American carriers. For over two hours,
waves of attack aircraft, totaling almost
400 planes, pounded Yamato and her
escorts. At the end, having suffered
10 torpedo and seven bomb hits,
Yamato’s forward magazine detonated.
The explosion sent up a cloud visible
from the Japanese island of Kyushu
100 miles away. With her went 2,500
crewmen, fleet commander Vice
Adm. Seiichi Ito, and the final hope
of a proud navy that once dreamed of
dominating the Pacific Ocean.  ✪
RAF
The Battle of Britain, 1940
England stands alone against Germany,
defended only by the Royal Air Force.
Hitler orders his Luftwaffe to destroy
the RAF in preparation for the invasion
of England. You command the RAF
or Luftwaffe in history’s greatest air
campaign — the Battle of Britain.
Improving on his award-winning solitaire
classic, designer John Butterfield ramps
up the historical accuracy, tension and
play options with three complete games.

RAF: Lion puts you in control of

Fighter Command, responding to
German raids. The game’s system
generates targets and forces, which
remain hidden until you commit your
squadrons. Scenarios range from one
day, taking an hour to complete, to the
full campaign, playable in 12 hours.

RAF: Eagle puts you in control of

the Luftwaffe raiding England. You
schedule raids and assign missions to
your bombers and fighters, attempting
to deliver the knockout blow. The
game controls the RAF response.

RAF: 2-Player allows for two-players,

one controlling Fighter Command
and the other the Luftwaffe.

Features include: German priorities,

close escort, free hunt, the Channel
Patrol, day and night bombing, radar,
the Observer Corps, weather, ULTRA
intercepts, squadron patrols, “big
wings,” altitude advantage, ace
squadrons, and flak. Each game turn
equals a “raid day” with six two-hour
segments. Units are British squadrons
and German groups. On the map, one
inch equals 20 miles (32 kilometers).

CONTENTS:
176 Die cut counters, 165 Cards, three
34” x 22” Map, Rule booklets, Historical
Study Booklet, Player Aid cards &
display, 2 Dice and Storage bags.

Retail price: $75.00

PO Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390 | (661) 587-9633 | www.decisiongames.com

The Battle for Hurtgen Forest
by Ken MacFarlane
Mobile firepower: US self-propelled artillery battery takes up position
Sprint to the Border
The Allied armies had roared across
France in the late summer of 1944
finally coming up against the Westwall,
sometimes called (erroneously) the
Siegfried Line. The Westwall was a line
of defenses that stretched across the
German frontier from the Dutch to the
Swiss border. It consisted of mutually
supporting concrete bunkers and tank
obstacles built mainly during the
pre-war years. Allied leaders recognized
the necessity of getting past those
fortifications before the Wehrmacht,
which had been shattered in Normandy,
could recover and properly man the
line. Yet the Allies didn’t have enough
troops or supplies to break through the
Westwall on a wide front. They had to
choose specific regions that seemed to
be most favorable to their offensive.
The Twenty-First British Army
Group, commanded by Field Marshal Sir
Bernard Montgomery, was given the task
of attacking across Belgium and Holland
into the north German plain. Because
they’d been advancing on the Allied left
since Normandy, those Canadian and
British armies were assigned the sector
flanked by the sea. They therefore also
became responsible for capturing the
Channel Ports, especially Antwerp. Those
ports were key to landing supplies and
other logistical support sufficient to
maintain the strength of the offensive.
Without the ports, any Allied drive
would exhaust itself before the war
could be won, because the Allied base in
Normandy was too far away to provide
sufficient support to the formations
at the ever more distant front.
US First Army, under command
of Gen. Courtney Hodges, was
assigned a sector of the front from
the Belgium-Dutch border through
the Ardennes to Luxembourg. First
Army was tasked with protecting the
southern flank of Montgomery’s army
group from any German counterof-
fensive. Simultaneously, it was to
close on the German border and, if
possible, prevent the enemy occupa-
tion of the Westwall in that area.
SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces Europe)
commander Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
also specified the primary focus of all
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 25
Allied armies should be destruction of
German combat forces. The seizure of
geographic objectives was only to be
considered second to that goal (other
than the vital supply ports). Because
German combat formations appeared
to be scattering everywhere across
France, ‘victory fever’ began to take
hold in the Allied camp. Nevertheless,
Eisenhower remained more wary of the
recuperative capacity of the Germans.
He continued to demand a broad front
strategy that would keep pressure
on the entire front. Of course, such a
strategy also dispersed Allied strength
and prevented concentration in any
one spot. The only exception permitted
was the Market-Garden operation, the
airborne landings in Holland that were
supposed to fully and finally breach the
German northern flank. Market-Garden
failed, though, to achieve its objectives
in the face of strong German resistance.
As US First Army drove toward
the German frontier, Hodges and his
superior, Gen. Omar Bradley of Twelfth
Army Group, selected the ancient city
of Aachen and the open terrain east of
it as their first objective upon entering
German national territory. Since
Roman times that area had served as
a staging area and invasion route for
armies heading east. Two formations
were assigned the task of encircling
Aachen and then advancing beyond
it to the Rhine. The VII Corps, com-
manded by Gen. J. Lawton Collins,
was to screen the southern part of the
city and advance through Stolberg
to Duren. The northern flank was
covered by the newly formed XIX
Corps, commanded by Gen. Charles
Corlett. It was made responsible for
linking up with the British at Maastricht
and screening along the Wurm
River from the transport hub of
Geilenkirchen south to Aachen.
The VII Corps was comprised of
the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, 3rd
Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry
Group. Following a hard-fought battle
near Mons, Belgium, where remnants of
five German divisions were surrounded
and destroyed, early September found
VII Corps crossing the Meuse River.
Liege, Spa, Eupen and Rotgen fell to the
Americans after only light opposition.
Rotgen, on the western edge of the
Hurtgen Forest, was the first German
town to be occupied by Allied forces.
Task Force Lovelady, of 3rd Armored
Division, took it on 12 September,
while 1st Infantry Division advanced
northeast to the outskirts of Aachen.
That was the first large German city to
be reached by the Americans. It sits at
the western side of a corridor of open
At the Reich’s frontier: American GI at the West Wall
26 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
terrain that passes north of the Hurtgen
Forrest, extending to the cities of Duren
and Julich and then spreading out
across the Rhineland to the Rhine River.
Green Hell
The area known as the Hurtgen
Forest lies at the northern extreme
of the Ardennes-Eifel massif (high
plateau), terminating just south of
Aachen. The forest is crisscrossed
with deep draws and gorges filled with
old-growth conifers, dense forest litter
and spongy soil. The largest gorge is
cut by the Roer River, which rises near
the Belgian-German border town of
Monschau. Flowing north and east to
the Rhine River, the Roer marks the
southern and eastern boundaries of
the Hurtgen Forest. Prominent along
the medium-sized river were the
massive dams at Schwammenauel
and Urft, which together restrained
123,000 acre-feet of water. Spreading
across the forest like the fingers of a
hand are ridges that run southwest
to northeast, the largest of them
being the Monschau corridor, which
extends from Monschau to Duren
on the other side of the forest. The
ridges are largely composed of open
meadows with villages sprinkled
throughout. That 10x20-mile forest
presents an atmosphere that’s been
likened to the mood of the frightening
fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm.
The terrain north of Aachen and
behind the Westwall was mostly open
plain dotted with towns and villages.
Due to heavy and relentless autumn
rains in 1944, that normally ideal
tank country was boggy. Two rivers
crossed that part of the Rhineland,
the Wurm — about 30 feet in width,
and the larger Roer to the east. The
Wurm had been incorporated into the
Westwall as a natural tank obstacle.
The Germans initially considered
the Hurtgen a low priority during their
retreat in front of the Allied advance.
Their focus was on the city of Aachen,
where a breakthrough of the under-
manned Westwall could lead to loss
of the Rhineland and, soon thereafter,
the industrial Ruhr. In September,
therefore, only weak and inexperienced
units were fed into the forest to act
as roadblocks, because the Germans
felt their enemy wouldn’t waste any
serious effort in such bad terrain.
When First Army crossed the
German frontier, American morale
hit a high pitch. Unfortunately,
supplies weren’t keeping up. In spite
of appropriating trucks from every
source (including newly arriving
American divisions that were stripped
of their transportation), supplies
became so scarce at the front that
troops were relying on captured
food. Gasoline was the commodity
in greatest demand, while artillery
ammunition received lowest priority
due to the low level of combat.
The truck convoy system, the
famous Red Ball Express, was a historic Enter Ninth Infantry Division commander. As each division burned
innovation to try to keep the frontline out, it was replaced by a new one
troops supplied; however, it fell short As the southernmost division of VII whose headquarters cooked up a totally
of delivering what was needed for a Corps, 9th Infantry was assigned the task new plan. As higher-level American
continued full-blown offensive. Gen. of clearing the Hurtgen to shield the commanders focused their attention
Hodges therefore ordered his divisions offensive units in the Aachen corridor to the north, they provided little
to hold at the border to allow the troops from counterattack. Little was known direction or support to the effort in the
to rest, refit and resupply. The orders to about the forest at that time other forest, resulting in failure and wasted
stop before breaching the Westwall dis- than the fear it might hide large enemy combat units. The 9th Division was the
turbed the subordinate commanders formations from easy detection. Allied first victim of that deficient strategy.
so much that Gen. Collins requested airpower ruled the skies; so German for- The 47th Infantry Regiment of the
permission to continue the advance mations tried to stay out of open terrain. 9th Division was ordered to move to
under the guise of a reconnaissance in The forest offered sanctuary from air the high ground in the north of the
force. In that capacity, then, Task Force attack while also denying the Americans Hurtgen abreast of Task Force Lovelady,
Lovelady was allowed to continue into their mobility advantage. It was an so that unit could resume its attack
the Hurtgen, along the Rotgen-Stolberg infantryman’s environment with few on 16 September. While the task force
road, in order to flank forces opposing trails or roads. Bunkers and minefields was roughly handled by some German
the 1st Infantry Division near Aachen enhanced the defensive capability of assault guns, the 47th managed to slip
and open an additional supply route. poorly trained and equipped Germans. through the fringe of the forest and
The task force consisted of tanks The American army and corps take Schevenhuette, a village four
and armored infantry from Combat commanders had little interest in the miles to the east. That proved to be
Command B (CCB) of 3rd Armored Hurtgen, beyond denying it to the the largest single advance of the entire
Division. Once concrete dragon’s Germans out of a vague fear they might battle. The sudden advance surprised
teeth and road crater obstacles were otherwise use it as a base from which to the Germans. A colonel on forward
eliminated, the unit moved north until launch a counterattack. They therefore reconnaissance from the 12th Infantry
it encountered a Panther tank. The assigned a series of single divisions Division was surprised to find the
German crew destroyed four Sherman the task of taking the forest, but left Americans so far into the forest. The
tanks before the GI’s eliminated it. TF the planning as to exactly how to do arrival of his division was intended to
Lovelady left the knocked out vehicles that up to each succeeding division plug the hole in the German lines.
behind as they continued about two
miles into the forest before stopping
for the night. In that way, the first of
two bands of the Westwall had been
penetrated on 13 September, less than
a month after the Battle of Falaise.
Meanwhile, CCA of the 3rd Armored
Division shad penetrated the Westwall
just south of Aachen. Both combat
commands were losing tanks and half-
tracks at a prohibitive rate, however,
considering their replacements were
100 miles behind the spearheads.
The Germans were scrambling to
man their fortifications before the
Allies made irrevocable penetrations
through them. In Aachen itself, 116th
Panzer Division attempted to hold the
city as well as an escape route out of
it to the east. The battered 9th Panzer
Division was tasked with holding off
3rd Armored’s penetration to the south.
Many of its replacement armored fight-
ing vehicles went into combat as they
unloaded from the trains that brought
them directly from German factories.
Hitler had appointed Field Marshal
Walter Model, skilled in desperate
defenses in Russia, to take charge of
the west front defense. Hitler devoted
the full production output of armor
to rebuilding West Front units. Home
guard, training, naval and Luftwaffe
units were also dispatched in a desper-
ate race to man the defensive works
before the Americans overran them.

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 27

 To the south of 47th Regiment the
Allied Strategy Assessed remainder of the 9th Division had to
advance through the forest on a front
When the Allied armies were racing across France in the summer of of 18 miles. The 39th and 60th Regiments
1944, an air of victory began to infect the troops with a belief the Germans were first assigned to clear the area
wouldn’t be able to stop them; however, Gen. Eisenhower respected this south of Monschau and then move
recuperative ability. He insisted the Allies maintain a broad front, which was onto the Monschau corridor to the
the strategically conservative but safe approach. Montgomery was then able, east. Those GIs were forced to halt at
however, to tempt Eisenhower with a gamble to use First Allied Airborne the forest edge, where dragons teeth
Army to jump the Rhine River at Arnhem, Operation Market-Garden. prevented vehicles from continuing.
The decision to bet everything logistically on a single-road attack Pillboxes spouted machinegun fire that
exposed the Allies to delay on their other advances, most notably that of forced the Americans to become expert
clearing the Scheldt Estuary so supplies could be delivered via Antwerp. at combined-arms bunker busting
Supplies were siphoned from other armies and vital transport had to be tactics. The advance was effective but
devoted to Market-Garden. The Airborne Army was thus drawn into a fruit- slow, requiring every bit of regimental
less sideshow when it represented the only Allied strategic reserve. manpower and armored assets. There
First Army commander Gen. Hodges chose the Aachen corridor, a traditional were no reserves remaining to enter the
invasion route into Germany, as his main objective. The 9th Infantry Division unoccupied forest in the gap between
was assigned to screen his southern flank by occupying the Hurtgen Forest, the 39th and 47th Regiments; so the
a reasonable strategy. Since the Germans were still in full retreat, the Allied next day elements of the 353rd Division
generals hoped they could slip through the forest without meeting substantial were able to occupy those defenses
resistance, but Model was able to place just enough troops into the Westwall without interference. That pattern of
defenses to stop the weakened American effort. Terrible autumn weather and managing to get reinforcements where
forest terrain denied the Americans their trump advantages of airpower and they were vitally needed “just in the
armor. Artillery support was further hampered by wet radios and grounded aerial nick of time” characterized German
reconnaissance. So the battle became an infantry fight with the defenders in operations for the rest of the battle.
prepared positions, armed with numerous automatic weapons, and well aware Opposing the American regimental
of the restricted avenues of approach. That allowed the Germans to mine, booby thrusts in the south was the 89th
trap, and set-up artillery or infantry ambushes along those few trails and roads. Infantry Division and units of LXXIV
Division after attacking division was gutted of infantry while their command- Corps, led by Gen. Erich Straube.
ers ordered one more push in operations reminiscent of World War I. Veteran With a cadre of veterans, the 1056th
troops disappeared from the units as casualties, and most replacements in turn Regiment acquitted itself well by
became casualties after a few hours of combat. Whole divisions became combat holding the American advance to the
ineffective in that way within a couple weeks, and then were replaced with fresh west slope of the gorge. Even so, that
units to repeat the process. American higher-level commanders failed to provide a German unit was so poorly equipped
coherent strategy for the battle and were piecemeal in their commitment of force. it had but a single old Italian artillery
Another glaring omission of the Allied planners was the Roer River dams. piece, which quickly ran out of ammo.
Control of the dams allowed the Germans to flood the Roer at their discretion to As a ruse, they dragged the useless
create a water barrier that lasted for weeks. Any Allied unit unwary enough to cannon back and forth to impress
be caught on the river at that time the Americans. The attack stalled
could be trapped and annihilated after five days of heavy casualties.
within the flood zone. With the dams In the north, 12th Infantry Division
in Allied hands, the tables would went into counterattack immediately
be turned and the Germans would upon arrival. Assisted by some anti-
have to withdraw to the east. There tank units, the fresh troops managed
they would have to defend in open to stall the progress of 3rd Armored’s
terrain, exactly where they were most task forces. The battle on the northern
vulnerable. The German Ardennes fringe of the forest devolved into a
counteroffensive would thereby also slugging match, a situation that would
have lost its north shoulder and all remain unchanged until after the
chance for success. By the time the fall of Aachen. The Americans had
Allied generals finally organized to await reinforcements, consolidate
an operation to take the dams in and re-supply. By adroit generalship,
mid-December, they’d almost lost luck and desperate reinforcement, the
the 2nd Division while it was mired Germans held the Allies at the Westwall.
deep in the forest. Gen. Robertson By late September the front started
barely saved his command from being solidifying. Gen. Collins of VII Corps
surrounded in the opening days of the still believed he could make progress
Battle of the Bulge. Since the dams in the forest. He therefore ordered 39th
went unsecured, the autumn battle for Regiment to cross Weisser Weh Creek,
the Hurtgen Forest was a monumental seize the village of Germeter along
waste of American blood.  ★ the Simmerath-Duren road, and then
move east to take Vossenack, a village
Gen. Collins stretching along a windswept ridge.
That was actually an overwhelming

28 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

assignment, considering the terrain
was cut by gorges and sprinkled with
bunkers and minefields. Only muddy
trails and firebreaks provided vehicle
access. A portion of the 60th Regiment
was also to strike southeast across
the Kall River gorge toward a ridge
northwest of Monschau. The American
command didn’t expect significant
opposition; otherwise, so small a force
would’ve only been tasked to screen
the area, not conduct a full assault.
Automatic weapons fire confronted
the GIs at every turn. A steady rain of
mortar rounds fell as defenders fought
from log-covered positions that were
all but invisible to the attacking troops.
The US infantry also got their first taste
of another dangerous weapon: artillery
rounds set to explode on impact with
the tops of trees. Those “tree bursts”
caused severe casualties to anyone
without shelter as the shrapnel and
splinters rained down. Merely going
to ground, as the soldiers were trained
to do, did nothing to decrease the
chance of being wounded. Instead,
they had to hug tree trunks and hide
under their helmets to survive. Attrition
among small-unit leaders was high.
Privates sometimes found themselves
in charge of platoons that were
reduced below 50 percent strength.
It took all of October for the attack
to take Germeter and, even then, the
GIs could go no farther. Groups of
Germans roamed the forest, sometimes
encountering American headquarters
and supply troops. Firefights broke
out unexpectedly, as the lines were
fluid and many became lost in the
woods. Counterattacks and ambushes
were the order of the day. For a gain
of a mere 3,000 yards during the
Field Marshal Walter Model
first half of October, 9th Division lost
some 4,500 total casualties. German
losses were estimated at 3,300.
It was time to regroup for both
sides. The Germans were able to place
the 275th Volksgrenadier Division in
the center of the forest, get the 272nd
Volksgrenadier Division into the Kall
Gorge, and pull out the 9th and 116th
Panzer Divisions for refitting. Just
as importantly, supplies, mines and
artillery arrived to support those units.
Gen. Hodges was able to bring XIX
Corps into the line north of Aachen in
hopes of developing an attack through
that corridor. That corps was instead
forced to merely deal with its open
northern flank as the British moved off
in that direction during Market-Garden.
Brest, a major German-held French port
in Brittany, finally capitulated, which
released VIII Corps to take station in the
Ardennes, thereby allowing V Corps to
slide north into the Monschau area. The
28th Infantry Division replaced the 39th
and 60th Regiments, while the 47th was
attached to the 1st Infantry Division.
Food, gasoline and ammo started to
catch up to the units at the front.
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 29
Aachen Encircled
1st Infantry Division and 3rd Armored
Division of VII Corps penetrated
the Westwall south of Aachen and
attempted to rush through the Stolberg
corridor to take Duren on the Roer River.
The 1st Infantry made a shallow penetra-
tion east of Aachen, to the town of
Verlautenheide, while the combat com-
mands of 3rd Armored made a deeper
move, taking Solberg before running
into stiff resistance. By 20 September,
American progress was halted by a heav-
ily reinforced LXXXI Corps, lead by Gen.
Friedrich Kochling. The 12th Infantry
Division launched several counterat-
tacks in cooperation with some leftovers
from 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions.
Model, recognizing the direction of the
main American thrust, rushed reserves
to the Stolberg area as fast as he could,
including newly arrived King Tiger tanks.
By 25 September, 3rd Armored had been
forced to go over to the defensive.
The XIX Corps was reinforced with
the 7th Armored and the 29th Infantry
Divisions, which went into the line in
the north. The 30th Infantry Division
was assigned to cross the Wurm River,
penetrate the Westwall and close
the ring around Aachen by making
contact with 1st Infantry. Meanwhile, 2nd
Armored made a deeper penetration
to the left and attempted to close
with the 3rd Armored in the Stolberg
corridor. Facing the Americans, LXXXI
Corps still controlled five infantry
divisions, even as 9th and 116th Panzer
Divisions were withdrawn for refitting.
The 30th Infantry Division launched
a textbook river crossing and fortified
line assault on 2 October. Using boats,
ladders, log mats and culverts, they
pushed across the 30-foot river behind
a massive barrage to close with the
bunker line. Well rehearsed teams
destroyed the bunkers while other
infantry and armor overwhelmed the
supporting trench system by fire and
assault. By end of day the area was in
American hands. As expected, a strong
counterattack was conducted the next
morning using two battalions from the
49th Infantry Division and one from the
246th Volksgrenadier Division. A curtain
of artillery fire helped turn back the
attack on the newly won American
positions. The next day, task forces from
2nd Armored passed through the 30th
Infantry’s lines to capture Waurichen
German assault gun: Stug IIIs on the move
30 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
on the road to Duren. The LXXXI Corps
front began to tear apart at the town
of Alsdorf, so Kochling rushed every
unit he could find to mend the break.
As XII and VII Corps closed the
pincers on the east side of Aachen,
Model and Kochling assembled
forces to attempt to hold open the
last road to the beleaguered city.
Panzer units were paired with local
infantry battalions to stop the American
advance and push them back from
the Stolberg corridor. Stolberg was
recovered and a battle shaped-up in
the town of Bardenberg, where the
men of the 30th Infantry replayed the
gallant stand they’d made during the
summer in the Battle of Mortain. The
1st Infantry was also hard pressed to
hold its positions. Curiously, the army
command seems to have remained
oblivious to the strength of the German
commitment, and those American
generals continued to harangue their
units to close the gap and renew the
offensive. By 16 October, the gap was
closed by 30th Infantry, three days
after an attack into Aachen itself had
been launched by the 26th Regiment.
A stalemate settled over the front in
late October, giving the leaders on both
sides an opportunity to reevaluate their
strategies and plan new operations.
The Americans brought their Ninth
Army into the line between the British
in the north and the First Army near
Aachen. The Ninth took control of XIX
Corps, with the 29th and 30th Infantry
Divisions, 2nd Armored Division and
the 113th Cavalry Group. The 7th
Armored Division, along with the 84th
and 102nd Infantry Divisions, were
also assigned to the new XIII Corps to
cover the northern part of the front.
Simultaneously, Model decided
to assign Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel,
in command of Fifth Panzer Army, to
take responsibility for the front from
Maastricht to Duren. As both sides built
up their forces along the Rhineland
frontier, it had become evident Seventh
Army couldn’t by itself control the
long front that stretched from the
Dutch border to south of Luxembourg.
Additionally, because most of the pan-
zer formations were in the north, they
would benefit from Fifth Panzer Army’s
mechanized support formations. During
the respite, thousands of mines were
laid and buildings across the front were
converted to strongpoints. Hundreds of
panzerfausts and many anti-tank guns,
the latter both self-propelled and towed,
were distributed to the frontline units.
28th Infantry Repulsed
In early November the 28th Division
was assigned the objective of securing
the town of Schmidt. In addition, it was
also assigned the tasks of capturing the
town of Hurtgen and the fortification
zone west and south of Schmidt. The
division’s attack plans called for its 109th
Regiment to take Hurtgen, its 110th
Regiment to capture the western and
southern fortified zone, and its 112th
Regiment to take the main objective of
Schmidt. Inexplicably, it was the only
First Army offensive action planned
for early November, which allowed
the Germans to concentrate to defeat
it. Planning was left to the division
staff, with little guidance coming from
above despite the fact the operation
had huge strategic implications.
The attack on Hurtgen succeeded
after a vicious struggle, but the 109th
Regiment was then frozen in place by
strong counterattacks. The attack by the
110th stagnated with heavy casualties,
primarily due to lack of fire support
for the infantry attacking the bunkers.
The division reserve was committed
to reinvigorate that effort, but that
battalion bogged down as well.
The 112th Regiment, with armor sup-
port, captured the town of Vossenack in
order to establish a line of departure for
the move across the Kall River gorge to
the village of Kommerscheidt and then
up the hill to Schmidt. The next day,
that regiment launched its main attack
with two battalions into the gorge,
across the swift, chilly little river and
up the steep hill to Kommerscheidt. GIs
routed a small group of German service
troops and then continued uphill to
move into the largest Hurtgen Forest
settlement of Schmidt. After clearing
some snipers, the exhausted soldiers
established their defensive perimeter;
however, instead of digging foxholes as
ordered, the squads simply nested in
the warmer houses. None of the com-
manders thought to send out patrols
that night, which was a disastrous
oversight. A battalion of engineers was
assigned the daunting task of convert-
ing the only supply route through the
Kall River valley to Schmidt from a
wagon trail to a road, so it could accom-
modate tanks. The 112th Regiment was
fully committed with no reserve.
The Germans had been caught
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 31
unprepared by the sudden surge of
American troops through their line, but
several senior German commanders
were conducting a wargame a few
miles from that part of the front. In
fact, they were examining what actions
they should take against a renewed
American offensive into the Roer
River valley. Field Marshal Model, who
sponsored the wargame, was one of the
few senior officers aware of the plans
for the upcoming Ardennes counterof-
fensive, set to start in six weeks. The
Schmidt area was the linchpin on the
north flank of that offensive. Its loss
wouldn’t only threaten the defensive
line all the way north to the Dutch
border; it would unhinge Hitler’s
great gambit. That threat demanded
a strong and immediate reaction,
which was made easier because there
were no other threats along the whole
Seventh Army front at that time.
The 116th Panzer Division was
refitting after its recent tour of duty in
the Aachen area north of the Hurtgen
Forest. It was ordered to counterat-
tack the 28th Division and restore the
fortification line. The 89th Grenadier
continued on page 33 »
 Miracle in the West
The recovery of the Germans on the west front at the
end of summer 1944 puzzled and surprised the Allies.
Following the Wehrmacht’s collapse in France, the Germans
were able to cobble together a new line of resistance along
the Westwall in time to halt the victorious Allies at the
border. Long a topic of speculation, this recuperation, known
as the “Miracle in the West,” had several sources.
Beginning in 1944, the German economy went to a full
wartime footing directed by its organizational genius, Albert Speer.
Production of advanced armor, aircraft and infantry weapons
peaked that year in spite of supreme efforts by Allied bomber
forces to suppress German industry. Most of those weapons were
of new designs that often out-classed their Allied counterparts.
Perhaps the greatest factor of all was the German soldiers’
psychological imperative to defend the Fatherland. Coupled with
a call of devotion to the Fuehrer, embodied by mandatory sworn
allegiance to Hitler, propaganda programs had distorted the
German psyche into unquestioned service to the Reich. Wonder
weapon programs also promised to revive the dreams of German
dominance. Germanic cultural affinities for organization and
service contributed to social fidelity and unit cohesion. Friendly
populations living near the frontlines were used to provide
labor for defensive works, while internal security organizations
like the Gestapo prevented any expression of dissent.
Because of Allied air and naval superiority, Luftwaffe and
Kriegsmarine manpower became available to ground commands
as their original missions became superfluous. Those men
were already accustomed to military rigors; so they required
minimal time for additional infantry training to qualify for
defensive roles. Nazi use of forced labor and foreign workers
also freed native manpower to be mobilized for military duty.
Loss of substantial territory during the summer of 1944 allowed
German armies to contract their defensive lines, concentrating
remaining troops along a shorter line. The Westwall marked a
rally position to which scattered remnants made their way without
Finale for the Desert Fox: Rundstedt attends Rommel’s funeral
32 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
needing detailed guidance. Most of the headquarters staffs were
able to escape from France while the frontline soldiers bore the
brunt of the Allied attacks. Those staffs provided a core of talented
leaders who were able to direct reinforcement troops and survivors
into a coherent defense. The generally excellent quality of German
field grade and non-commissioned officers was instrumental
in rebuilding the frontlines using under-trained manpower.
There was also another factor that’s often gone overlooked.
That is, Gen. Friedrich Fromm and Maj. Gen. Herrmann von
Tresckow had increased the strength of the Replacement Army
to a previously unknown level. That army was responsible for
providing trained units and replacements to the depleted front
lines. That increased strength had been kept secret from other
German officials, including the Fuehrer, as part of the July Bomb
Plot to assassinate Hitler — Operation Valkyrie. The expanded
Replacement Army was to be used by the victorious plotters
take charge of the country following the Fuehrer’s demise.
Fromm was the commander of the Replacement Army, within
which recruits were trained and organized into replacement groups
for front line service. His chief of staff, Claus von Stauffenberg,
the key man in the July Bomb Plot, was also instrumental in
increasing the size of the Replacement Army so it could overwhelm
domestic Nazi organizations to take control of Germany. Fromm
became aware of Stauffenberg’s conspiracy, yet permitted it to
develop in hope of reaping power and credit if the plot succeeded.
Maj. Gen. Herrmann von Tresckow was a key organizer of the
resistance effort against Hitler. He assisted in several plans to
assassinate the Fuehrer culminating in the July Bomb Plot. One
of his major contributions was to organize the enlargement of the
Replacement Army and plan for its role in the government takeover.
Following the failure of the Bomb Plot, the engorged
Replacement Army constituted a trained force that
enabled formation of many new divisions. Those divisions
comprised a substantial portion of the reinforcements
that stabilized the German defense that autumn.  ★
» continued from page 31
Division and smaller German forma-
tions were also ordered into the attack.
Before dawn on 4 November,
Kommerscheidt and Schmidt were sub-
jected to an intense artillery barrage. As
the shelling lifted, tanks and German
infantry attacked from both sides of the
town. The American defenses crumbled
as tanks fired directly into foxholes and
buildings. The stunned Americans were
simply overwhelmed by the attacking
force. Remnants of the battalion fell
back on the village of Kommerscheidt,
where their sister battalion had dug in,
while the rest of the Schmidt defenders
were killed or captured. The defenders
were forced out of Kommerscheidt two
days later in another overwhelming
attack that routed the remaining GIs
who scattered down the hillside.
The 28th Division as offensive had
ended with its infantry battalions
shattered. It had to be withdrawn for
rehabilitation along a quiet sector of
the Ardennes Forest. Gen. Hodges
ordered the 12th Infantry Regiment of
4th Infantry Division to relieve the 109th
in its attack on Germeter through the
Wild Sau minefield. But the 12th was
also caught in an attack by elements
of the 116th Panzer Division, and
was surrounded for several hours.
November Offensive
The Allied November offensive
opened with a carpet bombing
mission, Operation Queen, which
employed 1,204 American and 1,188
British heavy bombers along with
hundreds of medium-bombers
and fighters. On 16 November, sev-
eral Rhineland cities and towns were
reduced to rubble as over 10,000 tons
of bombs were dropped on Eschweiler,
Langerwehe, Julich, Heinsberg and
Duren among others. Extensive
precautions allowed the Allies to
avoid friendly casualties, and artillery
barrages suppressed German flak. It
was the largest such support operation
of the war. While some German units
were disrupted, though, most of their
strength was well protected due to their
experience with Allied air supremacy.
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 33
Their rear area communications were
drastically affected, as roads were
clogged with rubble and bomb craters.
The 1st Infantry Division, with the
attached 47th Regiment, was given the
task of clearing the northern Hurtgen
Forest to protect the southern flank
of the offensive. From 16 November
through the end of the month, those
veteran GIs struggled to clear the
towns and hills to advance their lines
two miles to the eastern edge of the
forest. A particularly nasty battle was
fought with the 12th Volksgrenadier
Division for the town of Hamich. That
fight turned into a cat and mouse
battle, with the US troops taking
the upper stories of each building
while the Germans slowly retreated
through tunnels dug among their
basements. Many veterans of the
summer fighting claimed that, other
than Omaha Beach, it was the worst
fighting they’d experienced in Europe.
Opposed every foot of the way by
the 47th Volksgrenadier Division, the 1st
Infantry Division had to bash its way
through the final forest villages before
emerging onto the Roer River plain. Fighting was as strenuous as it had into Linden, where they caught 3rd
The weather continued to deprive the been in Normandy five months earlier. Panzergrenadier during its withdrawal,
GIs of their favored method of attack: Both sides made maximum use of capturing an entire battalion. That
strong tactical air support combined their artillery and mortars, which put loss alarmed von Rundstedt so
with armor and infantry assaults. every soldier not under cover at great much he released 9th Panzer and 15th
While clouds grounded aircraft, risk. On 22 November, by conducting Panzergrenadier Divisions to move to
muddy trails often caused the armor a night assault, the 104th Division limit the new American penetration.
to be late or useless. The one asset was able to slip into Eschweiler On 21 November the Luftwaffe
remaining to the Americans was used and advance about two miles. That sent 45 aircraft to strafe and bomb
to full advantage: as many as 30 bat- was the single biggest gain for the the advancing Americans in order to
teries of artillery were targeted against corps during the whole offensive. buy time for the defenders. Engineers
single resistance points, and with Farther north, XIX Corps made fair were hurriedly building a new fortified
devastating results. Nevertheless, both initial headway, except at Wurselen, line on the east bank of the Roer
sides suffered staggering losses. The where 3rd Panzergrenadier Division River for the next fall-back position.
1st Division suffered 3,993 casualties stopped cold 30th Division’s attack. The Battle for Geilenkirchen
while the entire 47th Volksgrenadier The next night the Germans had to started on 18 November, as Gen. Brian
Division effectively ceased to exist. withdraw due to danger from the Horrocks’s British XXX Corps took
The troops of VII Corps had to south caused by the 104th Division’s charge of the US 84th Infantry Division
claw every yard from the Germans. advance. The 30th Division then surged in its debut attack. Though the 183rd
Volksgrenadier Division had weeks to
prepare, they didn’t fight with enthu-
siasm, retreating into their pillboxes
Bunker Busting as the Allies drew near. The Americans
seized the center of town the next
As the Americans approached the Westwall, they recognized modifications had to day, while troops from the British 43rd
be made to their tactics for reducing enemy bunker systems. Existing doctrine called Infantry Division took towns to the
for frontal assaults by infantry/engineer teams covered by artillery barrages. Just prior north. Unfortunately, a counterattack
to the attack on the Westwall, formations like the 30th Infantry Division found they by 15th Panzergrenadier Division and
had to retrain their troops because the old tactics weren’t effective and they were part of 10th SS Panzer Division then
short of experienced infantry, due to casualties suffered in the battle for France. trapped and destroyed the Duke of
Typical Westwall bunkers measured 25 by 40 feet and were 25 feet in height. They Cornwall’s Light Infantry Battalion. GIs
were constructed of reinforced concrete with three to eight foot thick roofs covered with from the 84th Infantry were unable to
soil and flora. Half of the structure was underground. There were rooms for ammunition break through to rescue them in time.
storage and sleeping quarters for 20 troops. A steel door was located in the back, with two The 4th Infantry Division was
or more firing embrasures in the front and sides. Several hundred German bunkers were brought in to bolster and then replace
scattered along the French and Belgium borders, organized to provide mutual protection. the 28th Division, once the severity
The new tactics also had to deal with numerous German defenders who occupied sup- of its casualties became evident. The
porting positions among the bunkers. The new doctrine therefore called for combined-arms 4th Division moved into the deepest
attacks using artillery, armor and infantry assault teams. In addition to their normal weap- portion of the forest, aligning with
ons, each 20-man assault team would carry six satchel charges, a bazooka or flamethrower, Weisser Weh Creek as a jump-off point
two additional automatic rifles and smoke grenades. Weapon and mission cross-training for their mid-November offensive
was an essential aspect for the teams. Armor support would consist of tank or tank destroy- to take the villages of Hurtgen and
ers that would provide suppression fire on supporting positions and bunker embrasures. Kleinhau. The key objective was to
Artillery and mortar fire would conduct pre-assault bombardments, followed by providing a control the road through the forest
curtain of fire beyond the bunker line that would isolate them from enemy reinforcement. to the city of Duren on the Roer
Sometimes self-propelled 155-mm guns could be positioned for direct fire into the bunkers. River. Rather than considering the
The moment the preparatory artillery fire lifted its curtain fire mission, the infantry potential threat of the dams, the Allied
teams would go forward to take the supporting entrenchments while the armor provided leadership was still focused on gaining
suppression fire on the bunkers and fighting positions. Flamethrowers and bazookas supply lines to break through to the
would contribute to keeping the Germans from targeting the assaulting infantry. Rhine. The forest and the Germans
Once the supporting entrenchments were taken, four-man demolition teams would once again disappointed their hopes.
set their satchel charges at the rear entrances of the bunkers, the weak point of the The regiments stumbled along,
structures. Usually, when the doors were blasted open, the occupants would surrender. encountering more minefields, log
Barring that, grenades and flamethrowers overwhelmed remaining resistance. bunkers and automatic weapons,
A further critical modification to the earlier assault tactics came into play after marking their gains in feet before run-
a bunker line was taken: the assault troops had to take up defensive positions just ning out of riflemen. Support troops
beyond the bunker line to repel the inevitable German counterattack. Colored smoke were pressed into service to fill out the
grenades would mark the new American positions, so air and artillery fire could be decimated rifle companies, but those
directed against counterattacks while the armor would move forward in support inexperienced soldiers weren’t enough
as minefields were cleared. When the German counterattacks could be broken, the to tip the scales in favor of the offense.
Americans would make further advances because the local enemy strength would then They confronted fighting positions
have been exhausted. The Westwall could thereby be busted through careful planning so well disguised the Germans could
and the use of trained soldiers operating under aggressive tactical leadership.  ★ hold their fire until the GIs came
within a few feet. Once again, using
continued on page 36 »

34 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

 Roer River Dams
There were two major dams on the upper Roer River and its
tributaries. The Urft Valley Dam regulated the flow of the Urft River
and provided hydroelectric power to the cities of Aachen, Duren
and the surrounding towns. The more massive Schwammenauel
Dam was built in the 1930s to regulate the Roer River. Fifty
yards high, it was constructed of earth over a concrete core and
contained an 81,000 acre-foot reservoir south of Schmidt.
The first written American report, filed by Maj. Jack Houston
on 2 October 1944, identified the dams’ great importance to the 9th
Infantry Division. He noted that, “demolition of the dams would result
in great destructive flood waves which would destroy everything in
the populated industrial valley as far as the Meuse and into Holland.”
Houston’s report was largely ignored by First Army
headquarters, though XIX Corps engineers estimated the release
of the reservoir would cause a flood up to 500 yards in width.
The Americans launched two attacks in the fall of 1944 that
could’ve gained access to the dams even though their objective
was actually to capture road networks. The first, made by the 60th
Regiment of 9th Division in October, was too weak and barely got up
to the Westwall fortifications. The second attempt, by 28th Division
in early November, penetrated to the town of Schmidt, near the
dams, but was then repulsed by alarmed German defenders.
Only at the end of November did the American leadership
finally come to recognize the importance of the dams for their future
strategy. They realized whichever side controlled the dams could
flood the Roer valley and isolate units caught on the wrong side
A half track of the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, makes its way through a
muddy road in the devastated Hurtgen Forest at the end of the battle, 15 February 1945.
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 35
of that water. If the Germans released the flood after American
units crossed the Roer, the Germans could counterattack and wipe
out those exposed formations. Similarly, if the Americans gained
control of the dams, the Germans would be forced to withdraw
across the Roer. The Germans also had to worry about losing
a staging area vital to their upcoming Ardennes offensive.
The first offensive that intentionally targeted the dams
was conducted by the 78th Infantry’s assault on Kesternich,
made in conjunction with an advance from the south by 2nd
Infantry Division in mid-December. The timing of that attack was
unfortunate, as the German Ardennes counteroffensive almost
isolated the 2nd Division while it was deep in the forest. The dams
then had to wait until the Battle of the Bulge was resolved.
In early February, the 78th Division captured Kesternich and
cleared the area west of the upper Roer River to the town of
Schmidt, assisted by elements of 7th Armored Division. The 9th
Infantry Division struck south of the reservoir to take the Urft Dam
on 5 February, while the 78th struggled to break through Schmidt.
The final assault was conducted by the 309th Regiment of 78th
Division on the night of 10 February, when the 1st Battalion, along
with some engineers, rushed the Schwammenauel Dam amid the
noise of rushing water and artillery fire. Though the attack was
successful, the Germans had demolished the control valves, releasing
a steady torrent of water from the reservoir. The dam itself was
made safe and secure, but high water hampered the American
operations to cross the lower Roer River for two weeks.  ★
» continued from page 34
the difficult terrain and murky weather
to maximum effect, the Germans
were able to prevent a breakthrough
to the open plains of their country.
The next infantry division to be
called north from Luxembourg was the
8th. Traveling in open trucks through
rain and sleet, those troops had to be
summoned when the weakness of the
28th Division became apparent. Fresh
soldiers were called on to once again
make what was once more hoped
would be the final push through the
forest to the Roer River plain. This time
an armored division was to help the
infantry push through to the east edge
of the forest and then exploit onto the
plain beyond. The assignment of CCR
of 5th Armored to help take Hurtgen
and the Brandenberg-Bergstein
ridge still demonstrated how little
understanding the American generals
had of the battlefield. Tanks and tank
destroyers were tasked to negotiate
narrow, muddy trails through forest
and villages teeming with panzer-
faust-armed German soldiers. Mines
claimed an extraordinary number of
vehicles because trees prevented them
from leaving the trails. Tree bursts
were a constant threat to crews in
A brief interlude: American soldiers eat a meal in the field
36 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
open-topped M10 tank destroyers.
As part of the US V Corps, the
8th Division’s attack began on 21
November with strong artillery prepa-
ration; however, most targeted bunkers
and minefields remained intact and
as lethal as ever. Veterans complained
the dense forest muffled their combat-
bred sixth sense, which contributed
to an increase in casualties. Their
reaction time suffered as the sound
of incoming fire was reflected by the
trees. November 23 was Thanksgiving
Day. Turkeys had been sent forward to
the front line in fulfillment of political
promises to parents that all soldiers
would be treated to a traditional
dinner. The Germans, with intelligence
gleaned from American radio broad-
casts, treated the front-line troops to
Thanksgiving artillery barrages. The GIs
recalled with disdain how they spent
the day in their foxholes watching as
just out of reach thawing turkeys were
splattered with mud and shrapnel.
On 28 November, Hurtgen finally
fell, followed by Kleinhau the next day.
At last those villages were in friendly
hands after defying capture by four
other US divisions. 8th Division and
CCR 5th Armored then turned east
to clear the Brandenberg-Bergstein
ridge. The 121st Regiment attacked
north and east to the fringe of the
forest as the 28th Regiment advanced
to the bank of the Kall River in the
south. It was a slender US victory: 8th
Division resorted to sending hospital
dischargees to the town who were told
to pick up weapons from the dead.
To supplement the devastated
units, the 2nd Ranger Battalion was
brought forward to take the final
position, Hill 400 (Castle Hill), which
overlooked the junction of the Kall
and Roer Rivers. A barrage preceded
the attack, but the Germans countered
with a mortar barrage of their
own. Two Ranger companies fixed
bayonets and charged. They arrived
as the American artillery fire lifted
and carried the position, albeit with
substantial casualties. The Germans
didn’t give up the hill. They conducted
six major counterattacks, which were
each defeated by American valor
supported by 18 battalions of artillery.
The Bulge
The newly arrived 83rd Infantry
Division exchanged positions with
the weakened 4th Infantry Division,
continued on page 38 »
Battle for Aachen
Aachen, the ancient capital of Charlemagne,
was the first major German city the Americans
came upon as they closed the frontier on 12
September 1944. The city was virtually undefend-
ed as 1st Infantry Division of VII Corps approached
from the southwest. Residents of Aachen had
been ordered by their Nazi leaders to evacuate,
while the city itself was designated as the first
“fortress city” inside the Reich. The commander
of the unit then responsible for the city’s defense,
116th Panzer Division, Gerhard Graf von Schwerin,
countermanded the evacuation order. He then
offered surrender of the city to the Americans
if they would guarantee good treatment of the
occupants. His offer was intercepted by Nazi
officers and never reached the Americans.
Gen. Clarence Huebner ordered his 1st Infantry
Division to work around the south side of the city
to the high ground to the east. He was trying to
avoid a frontal attack into the built-up urban area
until the city was encircled in order to prevent
German reinforcement. Ironically, 1st Division
could’ve probably taken the city then with few
casualties, as it had few defenders at the time.
The 16th Infantry Regiment screened the city while
the other two regiments of the 1st fought through
the fortified lines to reach the eastern high ground.
Meanwhile, 3rd Armored Division penetrated the
fortified lines farther to the east and south in a futile
effort to take the Roer River town of Duren. The
XIX Corps, northernmost of 1st US Army, had the
task of crossing the Wurm River north of Aachen,
then completing the encirclement of Aachen to
the north. Desperate counterattacks by 116th
Panzer Division were brushed aside as 1st Infantry
Division moved into Aachen’s eastern suburbs.
Over the next three weeks, 30th Infantry
Division (XIX Corps) crossed the Wurm River and
closed the gap with 1st Infantry Division to pull
within site of those VII Corps soldiers. In spite
of multiple division-sized counterattacks, those
troops were able to complete the encirclement
and seal off German access to the city.
The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of 26th Infantry
Regiment, backed by the 634th Tank Destroyer
Battalion and the 745th Tank Battalion,
launched their attack from the eastern portion
of Aachen on 13 October. The 2nd Battalion’s
objective was to sweep the south side of the
city while the 3rd attacked in the north toward
the hills inside of it. Col. Gerhard Wilck then
held responsibility for defending Aachen with
two depleted regiments from the 246th VG
Division (689th and 404th), 1st SS Battalion,
600th Sturm Pioniere Regiment, a fortress
battalion, an assault gun brigade, and a few
miscellaneous troops and artillery pieces.
That amounted to about 3,000 defenders, who
were short on ammo but had good morale. The
attackers were actually outnumbered by the
defenders; however, the GIs had substantial
quantities of artillery, armor and air support.
The Americans advanced into the city
using tanks and tank destroyers to suppress
enemy fire while the infantry worked
behind them from building to building.
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 37
A platoon would be responsible for taking
houses on a single street, staying aligned with
units to either side. As the tanks would blast any
spotted machinegun nest or sniper, the troops would
toss grenades through windows and then move
in to clear every room. They found it was safer to
blow holes between buildings, using bazookas or
explosives, and then work from the upper stories
down to the basement. Defenders forced below
ground were less dangerous and more liable to
surrender. Progress was steady, but methodical and
slow. Help from self-propelled 155mm guns assisted
in overcoming positions impervious to tank shells.
The strongest German counterattack overran
Observatory Hill in the 3rd Battalion’s zone when
a few panzers and the 1st SS Battalion attempted
to break the encirclement to make contact with
3rd Panzergrenadier Division to the northeast.
The 3rd Battalion was able to seal the breach,
assisted by some M10s that destroyed the
panzers. For two days SS men used sewers and
underground passages to infiltrate past the front
line, dragging out the battle for the hill. Severe
losses finally spelled an end to the German
resistance as American soldiers in other parts of
the city squeezed the defenders onto the heights.
On 19 October, Gen. Collins ordered elements
of 3rd Armored Division and a battalion from
28th Infantry Division to aid in the final effort
to capture the city. Col. Wilck surrendered his
forces on 21 October, commenting: “When
the Americans start using 155s as sniper
weapons, it is time to give up.”  ★
left — City fight:
American infantry in support of a tank
» continued from page 36
moving north from Luxembourg
to the northern Hurtgen Forest
alongside the revitalized 9th Infantry
Division. Their objectives were
the towns of Gey and Strass in the
northeast corner of the forest, just
shy of the Roer River and a mere four
miles from Duren. Cold rain and sleet
added to the misery of the GIs as they
repeated the desperate combat the
earlier divisions had endured. They
persevered until the northern reaches
of the forest fell to American control.
Bitter struggles were also taking
place in the south, where Allied lead-
ers had finally realized the flooding
threat the Roer Dams represented
to the units about to cross the river
farther north. The 78th, 2nd and 99th
Infantry Divisions were designated to
mount a pincer attack on the dams,
with the 78th approaching through
38 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
the towns of Kesternich and Schmidt
as the northern pincer, while the 2nd
would approach the dams through
the wooded terrain in the south.
The untried 99th Division was to
provide flank protection for the 2nd,
since it would be vulnerable with
just one trail as a supply line.
The novice 78th Division set out
on 12 December to take Kesternich
from the experienced but battered
272nd Volksgrenadier Division. The
78th’s baptism of fire began well when
they captured the border town of
Simmerath, surprising Germans who
didn’t expect the fresh Americans to
attack so soon after they’d arrived at
the front. The Germans were once
again fortunate, though, in that
they were in the process of moving
assault troops forward for their big
Ardennes counteroffensive and
were thus able to divert Grenadier
Regiment 980th to backstop the nearly
destroyed 982nd Regiment. Fighting
in the town of Kesternich was
brutal, as the adversaries struggled
amid houses and a strong German
position (Bunker 47) on the east
edge of town. Emergency (“alarm”)
companies made up of cooks and
auxiliary troops were rushed into
combat along with a battalion from
the 326th Volksgrenadier Division to
stem the American advance on 15
December. Grenadier Regiment 981
was also called forward, even though
it hadn’t yet replaced the troops
lost in the defeat it suffered from 4th
Division at Gey the previous week.
The Kesternich counterattack was
conducted with great violence and
skill. The grenadiers were supported
by tank destroyers and armored
flak guns as they overwhelmed two
companies of the 310th Regiment,
capturing 300 prisoners and retaking
the town. The unseasoned Americans
had been caught in warm houses,
without having set-up observation
posts; so they were trapped in base-
ments and out of communication
with their artillery. A similar disaster
had happened to the 112th Regiment
the month before in Schmidt.
An important result of the
78th Infantry’s attack was to
spoil the German Ardennes
counteroffensive’s north flank attack
against Monschau by significantly
weakening two of their divisions.
To the south the 2nd Infantry
Division had to channel its attack
up a single dirt road through the
forest to the Wahlerscheid customs
post and on to Hofen. The single
supply route was so limiting that
division commander Gen. Walter
Robertson assigned all his engineers
to improve the road and restricted
access to vital vehicles. The 9th
Infantry Regiment moved cautiously
down the forest road until it met
resistance on December 15th. The
following dawn a massive barrage and
infantry attack on the neighboring
99th Division marked the beginning of
the Battle of the Bulge and an urgent
withdrawal of the 2nd Division regi-
ments from their exposed position.
Epilogue
Following the defeat of the
German Ardennes counteroffensive
in January, the 78th Infantry Division
renewed its attack on Kesternich.
Planning was so detailed the troops
were given assignments to take
individual buildings. Starting on 30
January 1945, the attack broke though
the 272nd Volksgrenadier Division’s
lines and, over the next week, rolled
toward the Roer dams. The 311th
Regiment seized the west bank of the
reservoirs to the Paulushof Dam. The
310th Regiment, backed by CCR of 7th
Armored Division, blitzed through
the town of Schmidt and rolled to
the west bank of the Roer. The 309th
Regiment drew the task of taking the
huge Schwammenauel dam. A nearly
flawless night attack on 9 February
secured it, but not before the gate
controls were damaged beyond repair.
High water would restrict operations
along the Roer River for the next
two weeks; but the Hurtgen Forest
had finally been conquered.  ✪
Sources
Doubler, Michael D.
Closing with the Enemy:
How GI’s Fought the War in Europe. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1994.
Fussell, Paul
Wartime: Understanding and
Behavior in the Second World War.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989.
MacDonald, Charles B.
The Battle of the Hurtgen Forest.
New York: Jove Publications, 1983.
MacDonald, Charles B.
The Siegfried Line Campaign.
Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History,
United States Army, 1963.
MacDonald, Charles B.
A Time for trumpets:
The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge.
New York: Morrow, 1985.
McGinnis, Major Thomas Michael.
Unit Collapse: A Historical Analysis of
Two Division Battles in 1918 and 1944.
School of Advanced Military Studies: United States
Army Command and General Staff College, 1987.
McManus, John C.
The Deadly Brotherhood:
The American Combat Soldier in World War II.
Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998.
Miller, Edward G.
A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hurtgen Forest
and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945.
College Station, TX: Texas A & M Press, 1995.
Nash, Douglas E.
Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp:
With the 272nd Volksgrenadier Division from the
Hurtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich.
Bedford, PA: The Aberjona Press, 2008.
Rush, Robert Sterling.
Hell in the Hurtgen Forest.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001.
Troup, Major Paul A.
The Operations of the 112th Infantry in the Hurtgen
Forest, Germany, 2 November — 14 November 1944.
Fort Benning, GA: The Infantry School, 1948.
Whitaker, W. Dennis & Whitaker, Shelagh.
Rhineland: The Battle to End the War.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989.
Whiting, Charles.
West Wall: The Battle for Hitler’s Siegfried Line.
Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount Ltd, 1999.
Yeide, Harry.
The Longest Battle: September 1944 to February 1945
From Aachen to the Roer and Across.
St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2005.
Cross for the victims of the Battle of
Hurtgen Forest in Vossenack, Germany
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 39
Near Duren, Germany, American Infantrymen, carrying heavy weapons on their backs, give one another a
helping hand as they climb a steep trail. Co. I. 3rd Bn., 8th Regt, 4th Armored Div., 18 Nov. 44.

40 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

Introducing the Decision Games
Folio Game Series
The Folio Game Series provides dozens of games using the same 8-page Standard rules
(Musket & Saber for 19th century battles, Fire & Movement for 20th century battles) with a short
Exclusive rules sheet for each individual game to capture the unique aspects of each battle. Each game can
be played in about 90 minutes allowing for multiple games to be played in an afternoon or evening.

Chalons: The Fate of Europe | Marengo: Morning Defeat, Afternoon Victory

Leipzig: Napolean Encircled | Chickamauga: River of Death | Stones River: Turning Point in Tennessee
Frayser’s Farm: Wasted Opportunity | Shiloh: Grant Surprised | Arnhem: The Farthest Bridge
NEW
Cauldron: Battle for Gazala | Kasserine: Baptism of Fire | Saipan: Conquest of the Marianas
RELEASES
Bastogne: A Desperate Defense | Aachen: First to Fall (below) | Crusader: Battle for Tobruk AVAILABLE
Naktong Bulge: Breaking the Perimeter | Golan: The Last Syrian Offensive | DMZ: The Next Korean War
Showdown: The Coming Indo-Pakistani War

AACHEN
WORLD W
First to Fa ll AR II BATT
LES
Before October
1944, no large FOLIO GA
had been direc
tly assaulted
German city
ME SERI
army. German
fight stubbornly
soldiers were
by any Allied
continuing to
ES
throughout Europ
after Germany’s e, even
defeat became
so US comm a certainty;
ande
worr y resistance rs had every reason to
on German soil
tenacious. In would be
the city of Aach

Aachen
street fighting en itself, the
was expected
just as it had to be severe,
been in other
cities. The situa hard-fought
tion along the
was even wors border itself
e; the infamous
loomed in front West Wall
of Aachen, enclo
the city with sing
miles of conc
casemates and rete bunkers,
“dragon’s teeth
of foreboding
the attack, as
generals, was
among the GIs
.” The sense
assig
well as their comm ned to First to Fall
evident and warra anding
nted.
Aachen utilize
s the new Fire
combat syste & Movement
m that’s desig
can augment ned so players
their units with
fire” during the “support
course of the
mortars to self-p turns. From
ropelled artille
receive support ry, units can
assets to enga
positions and ge
formations, allow enemy
to develop at ing combat
all levels. A singl
battalion, for e
example — perha recon
by tanks — could ps supported
enemy paratroopebe tasked to assault a lone
landing zone. r battalion defen
As that attack ding a
however, the gets underway
recon battalion ,
itself strafed may find
by enemy fighter
More support -bombers.
will be necessary
the landing zone to take
, but assets are
limited.
In Aachen, the
attritional desig
new Combat n of the
Results Table
true nature of simulates the
battle
are typically two- s in Europe. Units
sided formation
can incur casu s that
alties without
eliminated, accu being
rately replicating fully
realities of comb the
at and the high
sustained by
both sides durin losses
fighting aroun g the actual
d the cauldron.
the battle is thus Winning
a matter of mane
firepower and
asset manageme uver,
nt.

Game Conten
ts: Aachen
• 17 x 22” (43 x 56
cm) terrain map
• 120 die-cut coun
ters PLAYERS
• One Standard
Rules booklet 2
• One Exclusive for this series
Rules booklet
for this title
LEVEL II III X XX XXX
BATTALION
HEX SCALE
2 mi (3.2 km)
PLAYING TIME
Each counter repres
ents 1-2 hrs
formation from among an individual historical
forces that fough the German and
US COMPLEXITY
t across Holland, •••••
armor regiments, including LOW
1613 infantry battalions,
paratroopers, recon
elements, and more. Minutes to lea
SOLITAIRE ••••• rn. Quick to pla
HIGH
y. Historicall
A FOLIO SERIES
A product of
GAME
Decision Games
y Accurate.
Copyright © ,
2010. All Rights Inc.
Reserved.

1/6 th Actual Size Copyright ©

2010, Decisio
n Games, Inc.
www.decision
All Rights Reserve
d. Made & Printed
games.com in U.S.A.

Each game under $25 (most under $20)

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | www.decisiongames.com

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 41

Manchuria, 1945:
Last Stand of the Japanese
by John Walker

42 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

Background

When World War II broke out in Europe

an uneasy calm settled in the Far East,
broken only by an occasional skirmish
along the Manchurian frontier, or fighting
deep inside China. In April 1941, Moscow
and Tokyo signed a five-year neutrality
pact. That occurred because, the Japanese
had come to believe a war with the Soviet
Union would accomplish little after their
force in Manchuria, the Kwangtung Army,
suffered heavily in border clashes with
the Red Army in 1938 and 1939. Tokyo
thereafter changed the direction of its
territorial ambitions to the south and
east. Stalin, anticipating the Soviet Union
would become involved in a major war in
Europe, wanted no distractions in Asia.
above — Lieutenant Colonel Ishihara (center); Leader of the Mukden Incident in 1931
Both Tokyo and Moscow remained
scrupulous about keeping the agreement, below — Soviet propaganda poster: “Joseph Stalin”
at least until 8 August 1945. For example,
the Soviets required American B-29
bombers that force-landed on Soviet
territory after bombing targets in Japan
to remain in the USSR in accordance
with international conventions on
neutrality. The Japanese wouldn’t allow
the Germans to conduct long-range
flights between their two nations if
they had to over-fly Soviet territory.
By 1944 the pact no longer suited the
United States. The million-plus Japanese
soldiers deployed to garrison Manchuria
and to sustain the occupation of eastern
China constituted 45 percent of Japan’s
total fighting forces. The concern was
they might be deployed against the
Allies in their drive across the Pacific.
An invasion of Manchuria by the Red
Army was the best way to deflect that
threat. Through the winter of 1944-45,
with increasing urgency, Washington
solicited Soviet participation in the war
against Japan. That war was expected to
end with a cataclysmic invasion of the
Japanese home islands in which divisions
shifted from Manchurian and Chinese
bases would make their weight felt.
In September 1944, Stalin promised
the Allies he would invade Manchuria with
60 divisions 90 days after the Germans
were defeated in Europe. At the Yalta
Conference in early February 1945, Stalin
presented territorial demands for his com-
mitment to the war on Japan: the Kuril
Islands, a mostly uninhabited chain that
ran from the USSR’s Kamchatka peninsula
to the northern tip of the Japanese home
island of Hokkaido; southern Sakhalin
Island; the lease to Port Arthur; access
to Dalian as a free port; control over the
southern Manchurian railway; and the
recognition of Soviet suzerainty over Outer
Mongolia. Stalin’s purpose, beyond simply

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 43

 territorial gain, was to erase the ignominy
of Russia’s 1905 defeat at the hands of the
Japanese. He was prepared to have the Red
Army pay heavily for a new victory. After
abrogating the neutrality pact in April
1945, the Soviets made medical provision
for 540,000 casualties in their Manchurian
incursion, including 160,000 dead, a
forecast almost certainly founded on an
assessment of Japanese on-paper strength.

Tokyo’s View

On 15 March 1945, with the

Americans in control of Iwo
Jima, Japanese Imperial General
Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders for
the withdrawal of all remaining elite
divisions from Manchuria to the home
islands, including 1st Tank Division,
the last remaining armored division
in Manchuria. The Kwangtung Army
was thus reduced to a shadow of its
former self, with its most seasoned
remaining division having been
formed only in the spring of 1944. To
accommodate that steep decline in
above — Somewhere in the Far East: Red armor advances combat effectiveness, IGHQ drew up
new plans in May 1945 to counter a
below — Warm water port: Soviet naval infantrymen raise a banner continued on page 46 »

44 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

Geo-Strategic Manchuria

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 had placed Manchuria, also known as the Northeast
Chinese Provinces, within the Japanese sphere of influence, though it remained nominally
part of China. In 1931, extremists in the Imperial Japanese Army staged an incident on
the Manchuria railroad as an excuse to take full control of the province. Japan announced
Manchuria’s official transformation into a client state the next year. Called Manchukuo, it was
nominally ruled by the last Manchu emperor, Pu Yi. Covering almost a million square miles,
Manchuria was by virtue of its location and natural resources an area of strategic value. It
had long been coveted by Japan, China and Russia for its coal, iron ore, lumber, industry, rail
lines and warm water ports. When the Japanese took over, they moved in administrators,
colonists and the Kwangtung Army. In 1937 Japan extended its mainland empire by occupying
most of the Chinese coastline. That gave them China’s ports and industrial cities, but the
Chinese resisted, leading to endless war on the Asian mainland for Japan. During World Into Manchuria: Soviet SU-152mm self-
War II, Manchuria continued to be a major center for the Japanese war economy.  ★ propelled gun with a column of infantry

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 45

» continued from page 44 reached that Tunghua redoubt. to be mobilized only 10 days prior
possible Soviet invasion. These plans That final plan was issued only in to the Soviet offensive (eight of 24
called for a delaying action along the June, which proved too late to allow divisions and seven of nine brigades).
border by a fraction of the Kwangtung, for completion of all the required rede- Ammunition and weapons were
while the main body withdrew to ployments and fortifications. Making in such short supply, the Japanese
prepared defensive lines. The main matters worse, the Kwangtung Army’s resorted to arming some troops with
stand was to be made in a stronghold lower-echelons of command were kept bamboo spears. Of the 24 divisions
area near Tunghua, in southeastern ignorant of the new plan, and neither in Manchuria, the Japanese rated
Manchuria. The Japanese hoped the were the millions of Japanese civilians only eight as combat effective. By
inhospitable terrain, the long lines in Manchuria warned they were to be August 1945 the Kwangtung Army
of communication involved, and abandoned when the army withdrew. had patched together a force with
determined resistance would exhaust On top of that, more than a fourth of a strength of 1,155 tanks, 5,360
advancing Soviet forces before they the entire Japanese combat force was artillery pieces, and 1,800 aircraft.
Discounting Japanese forces in South
Sakhalin, Korea and the Kuriles,
The Kwangtung Army the Soviets faced an inexperienced
army totaling about 710,000 men.
Opposing the Soviet Far East Command was the Japanese Kwangtung Army, backed by
its Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian auxiliaries. (Kwangtung means “East of Shanhaiguan,” The Attack
one of the passes on the Great Wall and a gateway to Manchuria.) Responsible for all of
Japanese-occupied Manchuria after 1931, the Kwangtung grew into a formidable force of On the morning of 9 August 1945
a million men by 1941. Though Moscow had concluded a neutrality pact with Tokyo, Soviet the Red Army crossed the Soviet-
concerns about the Kwangtung Army led Stalin to keep over 40 divisions in the Far East. Manchurian frontier and attacked,
The Kwangtung was originally an efficient force with an aggressive leadership; however, it as per plan, from the west, east and
eroded in numbers and quality as the requirements of other theaters drew off veteran soldiers northeast. Japanese outposts found
and modern equipment. Many experienced formations were replaced by units formed from draft themselves under heavy shelling, then
levies, reservists, and cannibalized small units.As the end of 1944 approached, the strength of attacked by infantry and tanks. The
the former vanguard of Japanese military prowess had been reduced to some 700,000 second- Red Army quickly broke through with
line troops. Gen. Otozo Yamada’s Kwangtung Army was severely deficient in aircraft, engineer tank and motorized formations while
support, communications, anti-tank weapons and armor, and was suffering crippling shortages columns of horse cavalry advanced
of ammunition, including both artillery and small arms. What few tanks the Kwangtung Army along multiple axes across a broad
possessed were armed with 57mm guns and were grossly overmatched by Soviet T-34s. When front of more than 2,730 miles. The
Japanese forces on Okinawa were annihilated in March 1945, IGHQ withdrew all remaining advance was further supported by river
elite divisions from Manchuria, including 1st Tank Division, the last major armored unit in flotillas, air fleets and guns in the tens of
Manchuria, leaving the Kwangtung Army a shadow of its former self. The Soviet invasion of thousands. In all, the offensive traversed
Manchuria would therefore pit a modern, fully mechanized force of over a million men against every type of terrain from the arid
an occupation force of 700,000 light infantry operating under a 16th century samurai mentality. deserts of Inner Mongolia to the densely
IGHQ hadn’t heeded the lessons of the 1939 Battle of Nomonhan. The absence of armor forested shores of the Sea of Japan.
and modern anti-tank weapons in Manchuria was the result of their pre-war decision to IGHQ issued an emergency
weight the production of aircraft over the procurement of tanks. Five years after its defeat statement, reporting the Soviet Union
at Nomonhan, the Japanese had done little to modernize its infantry divisions to make had declared war and the Red Army
them capable of engaging modern Soviet rifle divisions, much less tank or mechanized had begun entering Manchurian
corps. Whether through complacency or overconfidence, the Japanese demonstrated territory, absurdly concluding: “The
a tendency to underestimate the Soviets, dooming the defenders of Manchuria. scale of these attacks is not large.”
Facing a Soviet juggernaut whose arsenal numbered 28,000 artillery pieces and 3,704 The initial Japanese response
main battle tanks, the Japanese had only 1,155 total armored vehicles – armored cars and verged on self-delusion. They had
light tanks – and 6,700 artillery weapons, most of which were obsolete, and light field guns. convinced themselves the USSR
The Kwangtung Army fielded only two weak tank brigades. The Soviet air force totaled wouldn’t be ready to attack Manchuria
3,800 aircraft against the Kwangtung Army’s 1,800. The latter, however, were mostly training until the autumn 1945 or, most
aircraft and obsolete types. The Japanese had 50 front-line aircraft and quickly lost control likely, not until the spring of 1946.
of the skies over Manchuria. The Soviet Navy (Pacific Fleet and Amur River flotilla) also had Meanwhile, advanced elements of
superiority on the seas due to the Imperial Japanese Navy’s total absence from the theater. the Soviet Trans-Baikal Front (army
The Kwangtung Army’s senior officers were clearly unprepared to face their Soviet group) forces crossed the Manchurian
counterparts. David Glantz, one of the foremost experts on the Soviet invasion, has been border at 12:10 a.m. on 9 August with
especially harsh in his assessment of senior Japanese leadership, charging them with neither artillery nor air preparation in
engineering the army’s overall mediocre performance. For whatever reasons, Japanese order to gain surprise. Experiencing
commanders failed their army. Confusion reigned at the top, and orders from various scant resistance from the Japanese,
higher-level headquarters often conflicted. Thus, some units withdrew from combat who believed heavy armor formations
while others allowed themselves to be swallowed up in desperate static defenses. couldn’t operate in such rugged terrain,
Supporting the Kwangtung Army was the 170,000-strong Manchukuo Defense Sixth Guards Tank Army advanced in two
Force, composed of eight under-strength, poorly equipped and indifferently trained columns 60 miles apart as the spearhead
Manchukuoan divisions. That force consisted of local Chinese collaborators, possessing of the front’s offensive. Each of that
neither the will nor the means to give ardent support to the Japanese. Also backing army’s component corps advanced in
the Kwangtung Army were 44,000 cavalry troopers in Inner Mongolia.   ★ four to six columns, presenting a front
of armor eight to 12 miles wide. They

46 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

swept aside small detachments of Inner vicinity of Hailar. The 80th Independent infantrymen rushed forward and fired
Mongolian cavalry, and by nightfall for- Mixed Brigade (IMB), consisting of five pointblank into the embrasures. Still the
ward elements had reached the foothills infantry battalions and support units, attackers had trouble breaking through.
of the Grand Khinghan Mountains, 90 and the 119th Infantry Division, backed Finally, on 18 August, 3,827 shell-
miles inside the border. By 11:00 p.m. by cavalry units of the Manchukuo shocked survivors surrendered at Hailar
on 10 August, Soviet armored columns Defense Force, defended the Hailar On the southern front in Mongolia,
reached the highest point in those fortified region. Bypassed and isolated by on 15 August a Soviet Outer Mongolian
mountains and began to move down the Soviet first echelon, those Japanese cavalry-mechanized group ran into
toward the central Manchurian plain. fought a stubborn but losing battle heavy opposition from three Inner
Due to the rapid Soviet advance and against follow-on units. Though rated Mongolian cavalry divisions at Kanbao.
hurried Japanese redeployments, two IJA only 15 percent combat effective, the After two days of fighting, Gen. Pliyev’s
divisions in the area never engaged the Japanese 80th IMB required the strength southern column defeated the
Soviets. The only significant resistance of two Soviet divisions and an imposing pro-Japanese Mongolians, took 1,634
took place on the front’s left flank, where arsenal of artillery to pound it into prisoners, and occupied the city. On 18
Thirty-Sixth Army’s route of advance submission. Red Army sappers crawled August, Soviet Mongolian units reached
traversed fortified border installations. forward to lay charges on Japanese the outskirts of Kalgan. Though the
The bold strike by the Trans-Baikal emplacements. As they exploded, Japanese had by then announced the
Front enabled the Soviets to obtain their
objectives on the central Manchurian
plain by the fourth day of the offensive, a
full day ahead of schedule. By that time,
however, their supply lines had to run
almost 500 miles to the rear, and all units
began to suffer fuel shortages. The Trans-
Baikal Front therefore halted its advance
on 13 August to re-supply by airlift. Late
that day the Soviets resumed operations,
hindered only by weather and some
desperate Japanese suicide attacks.
On the front’s left, Japanese defend-
ers continued fierce resistance in the

right — The far horizons:

Soviet infantry observe a barrage

below — Last stand of the Samurai:

Japanese truck-borne infantry

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 47

 capitulation of the Kwangtung Army, the
Red Army Planning resistance offered by the defenders of
the fortified region northwest of Kalgan
In the summer of 1945, Stalin reinforced the army and air forces he already had in wasn’t snuffed out until 21 August.
the Far East. Three thousand locomotives sped along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, as men,
tanks and guns fresh from victories in Europe were loaded onto trains for the month-long August Storm
journey. Moscow took great pains to disguise the significance of the buildup. As units
approached the frontier, elaborate camouflage and deception schemes, as well as night Sixth Guards Tank Army continued
movements, were employed to mask the deployment. After traveling 5,600 miles from its advance against desultory opposition,
Europe by rail, some units marched the last 200 miles to the Manchurian border across capturing Mukden and Chanchun on
the treeless Mongolian desert in blazing heat. During the months of May, June and July 21 August, two days after the arrival
1945, more than 40 infantry, tank and mechanized divisions, plus artillery and combat there of Soviet airborne detachments.
support units, were transferred. Sixth Guards Tank Army, which would spearhead the Movement to Port Arthur and Dalian
Soviet invasion from the west, left behind all its tanks, self-propelled artillery and vehicles, was made by rail due to fuel shortages.
picking up new equipment manufactured by Soviet Ural factories along the way. In that Organized Japanese resistance in that
way, almost completely unnoticed by the Japanese, Soviet Far East forces were increased sector effectively ceased, after which
to a total of 1.6 million men, 26,137 guns, and 5,556 armored fighting vehicles. The air the Soviets busied themselves collecting
forces numbered 3,800 aircraft, while the Soviet Navy added more weight at sea. prisoners, disarming enemy units,
The Soviets created a separate theater of operations for the first time in the war. In and occupying the remaining areas of
June 1945, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky became coordinator of overall operations in the Far central and southern Manchuria.
East and Trans-Baikal regions. His plan was simple but massive, calling for envelopments Marshal Kirill Meretskov’s First Far
of the Japanese defenses on three axes of attack, followed by the capture of Sakhalin East Front faced conditions far different
and the Kuril Islands, and then possibly a move onto northern Hokkaido. The huge pincer from those of the Trans-Baikal Front. Its
movements would be carried out by the 650,000-strong Trans-Baikal Front, commanded 435-mile area of operations was shorter,
by Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, from the west, while the First Far East Front, commanded but the enemy’s border districts in eastern
by Marshal K.A. Meretskov and numbering 586,589 men, attacked from the east. Manchuria were more heavily fortified,
The Trans-Baikal Front would attack across the Inner Mongolian desert and over the including some sophisticated reinforced
Greater Khinghan Mountains, secure the city of Mukden, and link up with the First Far East concrete emplacements. In darkness
Front in the Changchung area of south-central Manchuria. Once the city of Changchung and under a torrential downpour, the
was captured, those fronts would turn south and attack the Liaotung peninsula and First began its advance at 12:30 p.m. on
seize Port Arthur. Thirty-Sixth Army, on the Trans-Baikal Front’s left (northern) flank, 9 August, again attacking over terrain
would also attack from the west, but would link up with forces of the Second Far East the Japanese believed impassable by
Front at Harbin and Tsitsihar. The First Far East Front’s First Red Banner Army, Fifth Army large formations. Backed by tanks and
and 10th Mechanized Corps would strike toward the vital road junction of Mutanchiang. self-propelled guns, three corps of the
Once that city was secured, the advance would continue toward Jilin, Changchung Fifth Army had by nightfall torn a hole 25
and Harbin. The First Front’s secondary objective would be to prevent Japanese forces miles wide in the defenses and exploited
from escaping to Korea, and then would itself invade Korea up to the 38th parallel. That 15 miles beyond the enemy front line.
latter move would lay the basis for what would become the nation of North Korea. The First’s primary objective was
In the northeast, Gen. M.A. Purkaev’s Second Far East Front, 337,096-men strong, would the heavily fortified road junction of
launch supporting attacks against the center. The Second Front’s objectives were to link up Mutanchiang, the First Area Army’s
with other Soviet units at the cities of Harbin and Tsitsihar and to prevent an orderly with- headquarters and a vital communication
drawal of Japanese forces to the south, where the main offensives were taking place.  ★ center. Supported by the First Red Banner
Army’s advance on its right, advanced
units of Soviet Fifth Army approached
the outer fortifications of Mutanchiang
on the night of 11 August, setting the
stage for one of the few multi-division,
set-piece battles of the entire campaign.
Two Japanese divisions, waiting behind
a barrier of heavily forested terrain, were
unaware they’d recently been ordered
to withdraw and instead they fought to
the death. After heavy fighting that raged
for four days and accounted for half of
the campaign’s Soviet casualties, the city
was cleared on the night of 16 August.
On 20 August the First Red Banner
Army arrived at Harbin and linked up
with Soviet airborne forces as well as
amphibious units of the Second Far East
Far east Front. When the announcement of the
mastermind: Japanese capitulation arrived soon after,
General
the Soviets deployed to receive and pro-
Vasilevsky
cess surrendering units. Meanwhile, in the
southern sector, combined-arms Soviet

48 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 49
forces attacked to the west and southwest, forces deployed along three axes, with the and preventing them from intervening
one objective being to cut IJA communi- main assault coming in the center where in the main attacks farther south.
cations from Manchuria to Korea. Soviet Fifteenth Army crossed the Amur River The Japanese air force in Manchuria
ground forces reached the 38th parallel, and overwhelmed the fortified positions numbered only 50 combat-ready
the agreed-on demarcation line for a near Fuchin after vicious fighting. The aircraft and never became a factor
shared occupation of the Korean penin- Fifteenth then advanced along the in the campaign. With most of their
sula with the US, by the end of August. strategic Sungari River to Harbin, via a fighters deployed to the south to counter
The Second Far East Front’s support- gap in the mountains, linked up with American B-29 raids, the Japanese
ing missions took place over a broad units of the First Far East Front, tying up mounted minimal reconnaissance flights
area and a wide variety of terrain. Those Japanese units in northern Manchuria and almost no attack missions. Their
maximum effort took place on 12 August
with 184 sorties flown, resulting in 27
enemy guns and 42 trucks destroyed
and 500 enemy soldiers killed. Soon
thereafter, the air force ceased operations
altogether. The Imperial Japanese Navy
contributed nothing to the defense of
Manchuria, the occupation of which it
had always opposed on strategic grounds.
The emperor’s surrender decree was
issued over the radio on 14 August. IGHQ
didn’t issue a formal ceasefire for the
Kwangtung Army until 17 August, result-
ing in continued fighting in some areas,
surrender in others, and confusion every-
where. The Japanese finally capitulated in
Manchuria on 19 August. As the occupa-
tion of Manchuria was taking place, Soviet
amphibious units assaulted the Pacific
The victory: Soviet infantry
islands promised to Stalin at Yalta. Some
8,000 untested troops – the Soviets knew
little of opposed landings from the sea
Soviet Logistics and possessed no specialized amphibious
equipment – were dispatched over 500
The phenomenal Soviet build up in the Far East required maximum utilization sea miles to the Kuriles, a chain of some
of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Some 136,000 railroad carloads moved the assault 50 islands northeast of Japan. The north-
force from Europe to Asia. That extraordinary endeavor resulted in the Red Army’s ern Kuriles were garrisoned by 25,000
fielding a force comprised of 11 combined-arms armies, one tank army and three air Japanese soldiers, of which 8,500 were
armies.Providing adequate logistical support to that far-flung and often overextended deployed on the northernmost island
force was the most serious challenge facing Soviet commanders. The length of the of Shanshir. A Soviet division assaulted
western sector facing the Trans-Baikal Front was a staggering 1,428 miles. there on 18 August and encountered
The Far East Command and its subordinate fronts had anticipated the problems of severe resistance; assault craft were
balancing their operational capacity against logistical support limitations. Fuel shortages sunk and others were set aflame from
headed the list of problems, particularly for the forces operating in the empty regions of the fire of shore batteries. It took until
western Manchuria. Sixth Guards Tank Army, whose vehicles guzzled fuel at an enormous the night of 21 August for the attackers
rate, ran low even before it began crossing the Grand Khinghan Mountains. After that to overwhelm the Shanshir defenders,
crossing, the shortages persisted until the army reached Mukden. Other units, including who surrendered after losing 614 killed.
the Trans-Baikal Front’s Thirty-Ninth Army and the First Far East Front’s Thirty-Fifth Sakhalin Island represented a less
Army, experienced similar problems. The Soviets also found themselves dealing with difficult challenge. Its nearest point lay
the problems of shortages of water containers and motor transport for supplies. only six miles off the Asian coast, and
The main elements of Sixth Guards Tank Army had crossed the mountains faster its northern half was already Soviet
than planned and captured two towns over 270 miles from the army’s main supply base. territory. The Japanese had expended
Those spearheads desperately needed fuel, lubricants and water. Since motor transport considerable resources to fortify the
couldn’t deliver over that distance or match the pace of the advance, two air transport area, all of which was inhospitable;
divisions flew in tons of needed supplies, allowing the tank army to continue its advance. swamp-ridden, mountainous, densely
Problems also surfaced regarding the supply of river-crossing and ferrying equipment to forested. The Soviets began their advance
the Second Red Banner Army, Fifteenth Army, and 5th Separate Rifle Corps. Shortages on 11 August but made scant headway.
of bridging equipment led to lengthy crossing times and piecemeal commitment of Only after heavy fighting were they able
forces to battle. It took five days for the Amur Flotilla’s ships to transport all of Second to take the key strongpoint of Honda,
Red Banner Army’s assault forces across the Amur River. Subordinate commanders whose defenders fought to the last man.
were forced to commit their units piecemeal as they reached the south bank. Harsh weather inhibited air support
Despite it all, the Red Army demonstrated it had the logistical skill to and many tanks bogged down, obliging
conduct a mobile campaign across an entire theater of operations.  ★ Russian infantrymen to struggle through
on foot to outflank enemy positions.
Though the Japanese surrender had

50 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

already been broadcast, the defenders
launched human-wave counterattacks,
allowing the Soviets to inflict appalling
losses. Yard by yard, Soviet soldiers forced
passages through the forest, battering the
enemy with artillery barrages. Though
isolated garrisons continued to resist, on
17 August the local Japanese commander
in the frontier sector surrendered and
Sakhalin was secured on 26 August.
In Manchuria and the island opera-
tions the Soviets claimed to have killed,
wounded, or captured 674,000 Japanese
troops at a cost to the Red Army of 12,031
dead and 24,424 sick and wounded.
Stalin’s massive Far East conquests thus
incurred about the same human cost as
the Americans had suffered during the
seizure of Okinawa. The First Far East
Front bore the heaviest losses with 6,324
dead; the Second Far East Front lost 2,449
killed; the Trans-Baikal lost 2,228, and
the Soviet Pacific Fleet lost 9,987 naval
infantry. The Japanese admitted to having
21,000 of their own killed, though the
true figure is probably closer to 80,000.
Aftermath
The Soviets withdrew from Manchuria
between January and May 1946, after
having systematically pillaged the
region for every scrap of industrial plant.
Claiming their booty was not Chinese
property but, rather, Japanese-owned,
the victors took home everything they
could move. They dismantled steel mills
and other industrial plants, and used the
Manchurian railway to ship the spoils to
the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands
of Japanese captives, civilian and military
alike, found themselves laboring in
Siberia for long periods of time, enduring
harsh conditions on substandard rations.
With the Soviet departure, Chiang
Kai-shek rushed Nationalist Army units
into Manchuria transported by American
aircraft. Confronting them were Mao
Tse-Tung’s communists, who would
soon be on the offensive. The end of
World War II in Manchuria thus hastened
the renewal of civil war in China.  ✪
Sources
Coox, Alvin D.
Nomonhan, Japan Against Russia, 1939.
Stanford Univ. Press, Palo Alto, 1985.
Frank, Richard B.
Downfall, The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire.
Random House, NewYork, 1999.
Glantz, David M., Lt. Col.
Leavenworth Papers Nos. 7 & 8.
Combat Studies Institute,
US Army Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1983.
Hastings, Max.
Retribution, The Battle for Japan, 1944-45.
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008.
Soviet Blitzkrieg
The Soviet blitzkrieg of Manchuria in 1945 provides a classic example of what the Soviet high
command could do in the way of high-speed ground operations: armor-heavy columns making
lightning-fast movements along several axes of advance without undue concern about their
flanks. They were supported by airborne forces dropping into the depth of the theater. Surprise
attacks were intended to rapidly split the enemy’s forces and destroy them piecemeal.
The Red Army that attacked into Manchuria in 1945 had been hardened by four years of unrelenting
warfare across Europe. The German invasion of 1941 had shattered the Soviet force structure, forcing
them to reorganize. Heavy losses in manpower and materiel, and the inability of commanders to control
large formations, drove them to simplify their force structure. The program worked; the Soviets survived
the winter of 1941-42, and during that latter year they began including new tank and mechanized
corps in their force structure. They also created tank armies using a common table of organization and
equipment (TO&E). Throughout 1944 the Red Army expanded its ability to execute complex operations.
The number of tank corps, mechanized corps and tank armies grew, and Soviet forces
developed a capability absent in the war’s first two years: to fully implement a doctrine of strategic
offensive operations. By 1945 the Soviet army had matured, turning to firepower, mobility, and
machine warfare to compensate for the growing shortage in manpower. (Losses from four
years of fighting the Germans had taken their toll.) Nowhere was all of that more evident than
in Manchuria, where final adjustments to the force structure were implemented.
In August 1945 the basic formation subordinate to the front was the combined-arms
army. Those armies usually each contained three rifle corps totaling seven to 12 rifle divisions,
one or two artillery brigades, a tank destroyer brigade, an anti-aircraft division, a mortar and
signal regiment, an engineer brigade, two or three tank brigades or regiments, and a tank
or mechanized corps. Each such army ranged in strength from 80,000 to 100,000 men, with
320 to 460 tanks, 1,900 to 2,500 guns and mortars, and 100 to 200 self-propelled guns.
The experience in Manchuria also demonstrated the Soviet tendency to tailor the size of
armies to the conditions and missions they faced. In Manchuria, they deployed their largest
armies in the main attack sectors or against heavily fortified Japanese positions. Those
assault units received massive amounts of firepower in support. Conversely, small armies
tailored to suit local conditions operated on the secondary axes. The tank armies, along
with the separate tank and mechanized corps, provided the mobile offensive punch.
The tank armies of 1945 consisted of two tank corps, a mechanized corps, a light
artillery brigade, two mortar and two anti-aircraft regiments, a self-propelled artil-
lery brigade and signal, transport and logistical units. Each one’s 21 tank battalions
and 15 motorized rifle battalions totaled 808 tanks and self-propelled guns.
The Red Air Force quickly established air superiority in the sky over Manchuria. The Red
Air Force flew reconnaissance and re-supply missions for the most part, providing close air
support during the breakthrough. Air superiority allowed the Soviets to take greater risks on the
ground, dropping battalion-sized airborne formations to seize cities and vital communication
centers. Soviet airborne forces often captured airfields in advance of their land forces, and
then opened them for air transport to ferry fuel to units that had outrun their supply lines.
Later in the campaign, airborne landings brought Soviet paratroopers to major Manchurian and
Korean cities and against Japanese command installations. In Manchuria those airborne detachments
ranged in size from 150 to 500 men. All were landed without reconnaissance, and sometimes in an
atmosphere of uncertainty about enemy reactions. The landings were as much a form of psychological
warfare as they were military in their aims, in that they sought to hasten the surrender of often recal-
citrant Japanese units and to establish a general Soviet presence across Manchuria. The Manchurian,
in turn, became the basis for much of Soviet military doctrine during the ensuing Cold War.  ★
Rolling on:
Soviet troops
catch a ride on a
self-propelled gun
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 51
Game Preview

Leningrad ‘41

T
he game appearing in issue
number 17 will be an alternative
history design by Joseph Miranda
titled Leningrad ’41: What If Manstein
had Attacked? (L’41). It’s a two-player
game of intermediate complexity that
simulates a hypothetical German
attempt to seize the city of Leningrad in
late July through August 1941. To control
complexity and present an overall-
force-commander’s-view of the battle,
the game uses a tactically scaled map
and units of maneuver coupled with an
operationally scaled game turn length.
The German player is generally on
the offensive, trying to clear the Soviet
defending force from the city prior to
the end of the game. It uses an evolution
of the system originally presented in
Manila ’45: Stalingrad of the Pacific.
Each game turn of L’41 equals three
days. Each large-size hexagon on the
34x22” mapsheet represents 0.3 miles
(0.5 km) from side to opposite side.
The units of maneuver in the game for
the Germans are mainly battalions,
while those for the Soviets range from
battalions to regiments and brigades.
There are 228 medium-sized NATO-
style counters (iconic markers).
The rules contain fewer than 10,000
words. Two players can finish a match
in about four hours. Rules cover such
things as: defensive and offensive fire,
fog of war, command-control, German
divisional organization, indirect fire,
air support, leaders, optional airborne
assault, variable reinforcements, Soviet
gunboats and the cruiser Aurora, the
city’s Komsomol units, the Metro,
fanaticism and much more.   ✪

52 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

 Observation Post

I Remember east coast with Coastal Command, B-24s in my case — became available.
Number 10 Bomber Reconnaissance At first I was flying out of Gander,
Air War Over the Atlantic (BR) Squadron. The big battle at the Newfoundland. At that time the enemy
time was against submarines in the was in the ascendancy. We couldn’t
I was born in Glasgow, Scotland, Atlantic. The Germans were starving cover the convoys during the entire
on December 13, 1919. My parents England to death, and we had to Atlantic crossing because of the limited
emigrated to Canada less than a help the Navy escort merchant ships range of our aircraft, and we were
year later, when I was still a baby. through to keep her fed and in the fight. often grounded by foul weather.
Upon arriving in Canada, my parents Initially we flew ad hoc bombers, which The mechanics did a tremendous
settled in Haileybury, a small town were commercial airplanes that had job keeping our planes airborne, but
in northern Ontario. There they been hastily modified into maritime most were older than we were and
survived harsh weather and a fire patrollers. They weren’t suited to the they began to break down. That’s when
that destroyed most of the town, job; They had limited range and carried they sent us down to Dartmouth, Nova
while my father found backbreaking a small weapons payload, but they Scotia, to do harbor patrols around
work in the area’s silver mines. filled the role until true bombers — Halifax. We’d clear the entrance of
During the depression, I left high
school in search of employment.
I found part-time work, first as a
butcher’s assistant and then a delivery-
man. I also enlisted as a reservist in
the Algonquin Regiment, drilling two
nights a week for one dollar. The money
came in handy at the time, and it also
gave me my first taste of the military
and prepared me for things to come.
The outbreak of World War II gave
me new direction. When the war
started, my regiment made ready
for overseas duty. Unfortunately for
me, a routine physical examination
discovered I lacked a particular
muscle in my upper chest, and it
was determined I couldn’t physically
perform the duties of a soldier. My
regiment shipped out without me.
I still wanted to do my share,
though. When the Germans kicked us
out of Dunkirk in 1940, everyone got
excited about joining up. The army still
wouldn’t take me, so I thought perhaps
the air force would take me. In June
1941 I went to Toronto and enlisted
in the Royal Canadian Air Force.
They were eager for replacements to
make up for losses among bomber
crews; so they overlooked my medical
condition and sent me for training in
wireless radio operation and gunnery.
I completed my training early in
1942. We were really still only partly
trained when we deployed, but the
need was so great we did a lot of on the A Consolidated B-24 Liberator from Maxwell Field, Alabama, four engine pilot school,
job training. I was posted to Canada’s glistens in the sun as it makes a turn at high altitude in the clouds

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 53

Observation Post
subs, flying out five miles, across
five miles, and back again. It was the
most monotonous thing you could
do. Our planes would literally begin
falling apart while we were in the air.
That’s when we got our “Libs”
(B-24 Liberator bombers). We trained
on the aircraft in Montreal, but
only got about six to eight hours of
flight time before we were sent to
operational duty. We were losing
the submarine war; so two weeks of
training was all they could allow. As a
result, once again we were only partially
trained and learning on the job.
I returned to Newfoundland
again. As soon as we got the Libs, the
submarines’ days were numbered. We
could cover the entire Atlantic, carry
a huge payload, and bomb accurately
with the new equipment. German
subs usually wouldn’t remain on the
surface to fight it out with a four-engine
bomber. As soon as they saw us,
they’d almost always crash-dive.
We flew 12-hour patrols over the
North Atlantic. It was an experience of
boredom and monotony interrupted
by seconds of terror as you flew low
over a surfaced submarine to drop
your bombs. We were only 150 yards
above the subs; so they’d be shooting
at us with their machineguns, and at
that range they really couldn’t miss.
I was involved with four encounters
with submarines, including one
probable kill. We’re sure we got him;
there were sounds of explosions
and I saw debris, but the Navy guys
wouldn’t include it as a verified kill.
The story of our probable kill was
one of the highlights of my war. It began
when we picked up signs on radar of a
submarine running on the surface, and
we dove down through the clouds to get
visual confirmation. We made a pass
over the sub but they remained on the
surface, deciding to fight it out with us.
They were firing at us with machine-
guns and we were firing back. We
passed over the conning tower so low
they couldn’t help but fill the plane with
bullets, but we released a torpedo and it
54 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
seemed to hit. The submarine appeared
to be listing, so we came around again
and dropped a second torpedo, pulling
up hard in case the sub exploded
below us. The sub either sank or crash
dived — it was hard to tell when you’re
100 feet in the air and flying 150 miles
per hour — but the amount of debris
convinced us something had happened.
It was up to the Navy to determine
if we had a kill, because they would
investigate with surface ships and get
a better view of the remains. It wasn’t
simply a matter of looking for debris,
because by then the Germans had got
foxy and would shoot garbage out of the
torpedo tubes to simulate wreckage. To
verify a kill, the Navy would look for a
combination of bodies, debris and oil.
That wasn’t the most frightening
incident I went through, though,
not by a long shot. While attacking
submarines could be frightening, far
worse was the prospect of getting lost.
We didn’t have the best navigation then;
so we often relied on radio bearings to
determine our course. There were times
when that wasn’t possible, however.
On one occasion we were south of
Iceland when we ran into a storm. The
antennas became thick with ice and
broke off, meaning we couldn’t broad-
cast far. We were lost and in trouble,
and fuel was running low. I began
transmitting to anyone who could hear.
If we were forced to ditch in the sea,
our chances of survival would be near
zero. Finally we got a reply, but it took
a while to verify it wasn’t a German
because they would send out false radio
broadcasts to run us off course. When
we finally arrived at Gander, we had
only 20 minutes of fuel left. It was my
closest brush with death in the war.
After about 600 hours in the
Liberator and 500 in earlier planes,
I had done my two tours and was
destined for an administrative job.
Keep in mind that the duration of tours
for Coastal Command and Bomber
Command were different because of
the nature of their tasks. In Bomber
Command, 30 trips was one tour and 45
amounted to two. In Coastal Command,
it was 100 trips per tour, simply because
the danger and stress were less intense.
At any rate, I wasn’t looking forward to
a desk job at Training Command; so I
jumped at the chance to fly as a chief
instructor with American crews. It kept
me flying, and I enjoyed my time with
the Americans. They were nice guys,
and I enjoyed the luxuries they had.
I flew in a lot of different planes
during the war. Our first planes were
Digbys, lend-lease commercial planes
that were converted into bombers.
Everything on them was manual. To
drop a radio antennae, you had to reel
it out by hand. It was time-consum-
ing and kept you from other tasks.
They just weren’t modern aircraft.
Flying Liberators was like buying
a new car. Everything was so new and
modern, especially after the primitive
planes we’d been flying. The B-24 was
a first-class plane all round, a real
pleasure to serve on. The endurance
of a Digby was typically eight to 10
hours, but with the Liberator we could
fly 17 hours and at twice the speed.
Everything was automated, which
made it easier to perform numer-
ous jobs. The Lib was by far the
best anti-sub plane of the war.
I wasn’t excited about the Flying
Fortress. It was no good for accurate
bombing, and it was unsettling to see
the wings bouncing up to 14 inches
in turbulence, as they tended to do.
Looking back today, it seems
the work of Coastal Command is
less-remembered by the public than
other arms of the military. There’s no
doubt people forget about the air war
against the submarines. I think it was
one of the most important battles of
the war. If we’d lost, the war would’ve
been lost; there would’ve been no stra-
tegic bomber offensive and no D-Day,
because England would’ve surrendered.
I think it’s forgotten today because even
during the war we didn’t have a whole
lot of publicity. That was a matter of
operational security. We didn’t want
the enemy to know our tactics or the
capabilities of our equipment. Publicity
would’ve given away a lot of that type
of information. So, to win the war we
had to remain in the background.
But regardless of how the war
against the U-boats is remembered,
I’m proud to have served. I wouldn’t
have missed it for a million bucks.
It was something that had to be
done. The fact is we went out, did
our job to the best of our ability,
and tried to come home again.
The end of the Second World War
didn’t spell the end of my military
service. When the Korean War began,
I was offered a six-year commission in
administration and public relations.
During that time I worked to create
and coordinate a Ground Observer
Corps that used civilian volunteers
to watch the skies for enemy aircraft.
Though no enemy planes were ever
spotted, the corps played a vital role
in the search and rescue of several
downed aircraft. Later I rejoined the
Algonquin Regiment as a first
lieutenant; so I did four years in the
Army on top of 10 in the Air Force.

 — William Scott
as told to Andrew Hind

On the Seas

Pre-Dreadnoughts in
the WW2 USN

The American battleship Oregon is

best known for her service during the
Spanish-American War. Newly commis-
sioned, it raced from the builder’s yard
in San Francisco sailed around Cape
Horn, and joined the American fleet off
Cuba. There it was one of the victors of
the Battle of Santiago. Oregon saw lim-
ited service in World War I as a training
ship, but by the 1920s was as obsolete
as the wooden frigate Constitution.
The majority of other US Navy
pre-dreadnought battleships were
scrapped or used as gunnery targets
during the 1920s. Sentiment, especially
in its namesake state, spared Oregon Bow view of the Oregon (BB-03) on the day of sailing for Cuba on 19 March 1898

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 55

Observation Post
that fate. Instead, in 1925 the Navy
turned the ship over to the state of
Oregon on permanent loan for use
as a museum and monument.
To comply with the naval treaties
of those times, the ship’s propellers
were cut up and its engine disabled.
She was then towed to Portland,
Oregon, to be the centerpiece of a
projected Battleship Oregon State Park.
Progress toward building the park
had gotten no further than anchoring
the ship at Portland when the Great
Depression intervened. From 1928 to
1941 the ship itself was simply open
for visitors at the Portland waterfront.
By 1938, a basin and channel were
dredged for the ship at the site of the
still-projected park, and the Oregon
was moved in. Plans called for the
channel and basin to be filled in, with
Oregon thus permanently landlocked.
That work hadn’t yet started,
though, when the US found itself in
a new war in the Pacific in 1941.
In the surge of patriotism that
followed the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, Oregon offered the ship back to
the Navy. Even as just a floating battery,
though, Oregon’s utility would’ve been
limited. Her main battery of 13-inch
guns used ammunition of a size and
type long since abandoned by the Navy.
In 1942 the need for scrap iron
became acute; so that October the
Navy revoked the loan of the ship and
ordered her sold as scrap. In December,
Oregon was purchased by a pair of
Portland businessmen for just $35,000.
The foremast was removed and left
at the stillborn park as a monument.
Oregon then was towed to Kalama,
Washington, for disassembly.
News of the sale sparked outrage.
The historic value of the vessel far
exceeded the utility of the 10,000
tons of steel she would yield. The sale
itself also struck people as having
been dodgy. Bids had been limited,
and the final selling price worked out
to only about $3.50 per ton. (In 1942
scrap iron and steel sold for nearly
$19 per ton.) As 1943 stretched on,
56 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
then, the ship continued to exist in
administrative limbo, while the need
for scrap iron became less acute.
By September the Navy, embar-
rassed by the continuing uproar,
revoked the sale. By then, however,
some of the Oregon’s machinery and
superstructure — including the
gun turrets — had been removed.
Nevertheless, the Navy placed Oregon
back on its rolls as the IX-22.
The “IX” category was for “unclas-
sified ships,” which included historic
relics such as the Constitution. It was
also used for miscellaneous utility
ships: test beds, fuel and ammo barges,
and barracks ships. The classification
permitted the illusion Oregon would be
restored to its old status, which helped
the public relations furor to die down.
Reality was different: the old battleship
was little more than a gutted hull bereft
of engines, turrets and superstructure.
Restoring it to its 1940 appearance was
impossible. Oregon might well have
ended the war at some stateside naval
base, but then a mission came along
for which she was ideally suited.
Airfields were a major reason for
taking the Marianas, as bases there
would allow B-29s to reach the Japanese
home islands. Those bases did not
then exist; nor did the port or other
facilities required to protect, support
and supply the B-29 fields. All would
require construction when the islands
were taken. Such construction used
dynamite — lots of dynamite. Since the
military would be building facilities in
wholesale lots, construction required
hundreds of tons of dynamite.
That dynamite needed to be moved
to the Marianas, preferably in a hull
designed to store large quantities of
explosives in armored magazines. The
IX-22 fit that profile. Additionally, it was
expendable. If a Japanese bomb pen-
etrated the magazines, the loss of the
ship would not impair naval operations.
In July 1944, Oregon therefore went
to war for a final time. Ballasted with
gravel and loaded with 1,400 tons
of explosives, it was towed to Guam
where it was anchored in Port Merizon.
Landing craft made visits to the ship
every night, unloading the next day’s
worth of dynamite from its bunkers.
Fifteen tons of explosives were unload-
ed daily, always at night when it was
cooler. While not as glamorous a task as
fighting the enemy fleet, it was just as
vital to an ultimate American victory.
By the start of 1945, Oregon’s maga-
zines were empty and its usefulness
ended. As the war moved west, Oregon
remained moored at Port Merizon.
After the war ended, Oregon was
placed under the command of Naval
Operations Base Apra. Various uses
were proposed for her — most of which
involved sinking it as part of a breakwa-
ter — but nothing was actually done.
In November 1948, Typhoon Agnes
struck Guam. When the winds died
down, Oregon was gone. The ship had
snapped its moorings and had been
swept out to sea. It was presumed
sunk, as the 50-year-old hulk had
been untended. A month later, a
patrol aircraft spotted Oregon, still
afloat, 500 miles southeast of Guam,
drifting toward the Philippines. A tug
was sent to recover the wayward ship,
and it was towed back to Guam.
The escapade once again drew
attention to Oregon, especially from
its namesake state. Over the next few
years, efforts were made to have the
ship returned to Oregon and restored
to its former state. It came to nothing
because only the hull was left. In 1956
the Navy again sold Oregon for scrap. It
was towed to Japan and melted down.
The Japanese appreciated the
historic significance of the ship, and
they preserved the anchor chain.
In 1957 the mayor of Yokosuka,
Japan, presented the links, as a
monument to Oregon, to the United
States Naval Base at Yokosuka.
Oregon was not the only pre-
dreadnought battleship that survived
into World War II. Four others were
still in existence at the start of the
war: Kearsarge (BB-5), Illinois (BB-7)
Mississippi (BB-23) and Idaho (BB-
24). Two survived into the 1950s. served in the Royal Hellenic Navy as Flattery. The next day the I-25 appeared
Kearsarge, built only a few years after first-line warships through the 1920s. off Astoria, Oregon, and shelled Fort
Oregon, survived the 1920s massacre of Both ships went into reserve in 1932. Stevens. That coastal defense instal-
pre-dreadnought battleships because Lemnos was demilitarized and was lation received some minor damage.
she had been converted to a crane ship used as an accommodation ship, while To counter the threat, the US Navy
in 1920. Her guns were removed, as Kilkis became a training ship in 1935. began building a new design of sub
was much of her superstructure, and Both were still in the RHN, stationed chasers designated the PC-class. The
a massive crane, capable of lifting 250 at Salamis, when Germany invaded new ships were steel hulled and 173 feet
tons, was placed amidships. Kearsarge Greece in April 1941. They were sunk by long. They replaced the SC-class, which
was chosen for conversion because Stuka dive bombers on 23 April 1941. were smaller and had wooden hulls.
the ship was militarily obsolete, but The PC-class were powered by twin die-
the hull was still sound and capable — Mark N. Lardas sel engines and capable of 20 knots. The
of mounting the crane. For the next main armament consisted of one three-
20 years she was used as a mobile Mysteries Revealed inch gun forward, one 40mm Bofors,
crane. Among its accomplishments three 20mm Oerlikon cannon, and
was refloating the Squalus, after that The Battle of Cape Lookout depth charges. They were also equipped
submarine sank off New Hampshire. with the latest sonar. Five shipyards
In 1941, Kearsarge was renamed In response to the Doolittle raid produced 362 of them during the war.
Crane Ship No. 1, to free the name on Tokyo, the Imperial Japanese Navy The USS PC-815 was built at the
for new construction. She assisted ordered its submarines to operate Albina Engine and Machinery Works
in the construction and repair of along the California and Oregon coast. in Portland, Oregon. Fitted out and
many of the Navy’s warships during Japanese submarines I-25 and I-26 commissioned on 20 April 1943, her
World War II, surviving to 1955 soon thereafter began patrolling off skipper was Lt (j.g.) L. Ron Hubbard.
when she was sold for scrap. British Columbia and Oregon. On 20 Lt. Hubbard received orders to sail to
Illinois also escaped scrapping June they shelled the lighthouse on Bremerton, Washington, to receive
in the 1920s because she had been Estevan Point on Vancouver Island some additional equipment. After
transferred to the New York Naval Yard and damaged a freighter off Cape participating in a rescue operation the
for use by the New York State Naval
Militia in 1922, before the Washington
Naval Limitation Treaty was negoti-
ated. To keep Illinois under those new
treaty limitations, the navy removed her
weapons, machinery and much of the
superstructure. The ship was converted
to an accommodation ship, with a
barn-like barracks structure added.
Renamed Prairie State on 8 January
1941 to release her name for a new
battleship Illinois, she served as Navy
Reserve Midshipman Training School
through World War II, and served as an
accommodation ship for a naval reserve
unit after the war. She, too, was finally
struck from the Navy Register in 1955,
and was broken up for scrap in 1956.
Idaho and Mississippi, the last
pre-dreadnought battleships built for
the US Navy, proved so unsatisfactory
they were sold to Greece in 1914. The
money from the sale was used to build
a new dreadnought, BB-42 Idaho.
Respectively renamed Lemnos and Loading a depth-charge launcher aboard the USS PC-548.
Kilkis, those two pre-dreadnoughts The scene aboard the USS PC-815 would have been much the same.

World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 57

Observation Post
PC-815 was ordered to San Diego.
At 3:40 a.m. on the morning of 19
May, the night was moonlit and the
sea calm. Suddenly the sonar operator
on the PC-815 reported a suspicious
contact. Lt. Hubbard listened to the
contact and declared it was an enemy
submarine. He ordered the crew to
general quarters. At 4:50 a.m. a lookout
spotted something in the water and
Hubbard ordered the crew to open fire.
After repeated hits, the crew deter-
mined they were firing on a floating log.
The PC-815 then made six depth charge
attacks. By dawn they had expended
all of the depth charges on board.
By early afternoon a second sub
chaser and two Navy patrol blimps were
on the scene. The second sub chaser,
SC-536, reported it couldn’t make any
sonar contacts. Hubbard told the SC-
536 to begin dropping depth charges
according to his directions. Soon all of
SC-536’s depth charges were expended.
At 4:00 p.m. the US Coast Guard patrol
boat 78302 arrived with 27 more depth
charges. Hubbard maneuvered along-
side and reloaded for additional attacks.
Shortly thereafter another sub
chaser, SC-537, and Coast Guard
patrol boat Bonham arrived. Hubbard
was frustrated by his reinforcements’
lack of enthusiasm for continuing
the fight. The inability of the other
ships to locate any sonar contacts
caused their captains to suspect there
were no submarines in the area.
A sudden report of a submarine sur-
facing nearby resulted in a high speed
run by the SC-53, but it turned out to be
a local fishing boat. The search contin-
ued through the night and day. During
that time the PC-815 received its first
battle damage. The crew was exhausted
after being at general quarters for
nearly 24 hours. One of the 20mm
cannon malfunctioned: it was pointed
at the bridge when it discharged its
entire magazine. The executive officer
of the PC-815, Lt. Thomas Moulton, was
on the mast as the cannon went off,
and he narrowly avoided being killed.
The ship’s radio antenna was shot off.
58 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
At 7:00 a.m. on the 21st the PC-815
reported a submarine was attempting
to surface, and then also reported
a second submarine contact. The
ship opened fire from 50 yards on a
report of a periscope breaking the
water. The periscope disappeared.
The PC- 815 and SC-536 made
another depth charge run. A fourth
sub-chaser, the PC-788, arrived but
couldn’t detect any submarine contacts.
The other commanders began
suggesting the search be discontinued.
After 96 hours the PC-815 was
ordered to return to port. The Battle
of Cape Lookout was over, but the
controversy and colorful career of the
PC-815 and her captain continued.
Hubbard submitted a detailed report
on the incident that was reviewed
by Adm. Frank Fletcher. Fletcher’s
follow-up investigation revealed the
other commanders and sonar crews
at the scene couldn’t substantiate any
sightings or sonar contacts of any
submarines. None of the customary
debris or oil normally recovered from
a destroyed submarine was found.
Another revelation came from the fact
that the seabed in the area had large
magnetic deposits that could generate
mistaken sonar contacts. Fletcher’s
conclusion was there had been no
submarines in the area at the time.
The PC-815 was ordered to San
Diego. On arrival there, she was
assigned patrol duties protecting
the entrance to that bay. On 28
June, during a training exercise,
Lt. Hubbard anchored off South
Coronado Island southwest of San
Diego. As the exercise concluded, he
decided to take the opportunity for
extra gunnery practice and began
shelling the island. Unfortunately,
that island is Mexican territory; so the
gunnery practice resulted in a formal
protest by the Mexican government.
A second board of inquiry was
convened, again chaired by Adm.
Fletcher. His recommendation was:
“[I] Consider this officer lacking in the
essential qualities of judgment, leader-
ship, and cooperation. He acts without
forethought to the probable results.”
Fletcher concluded with by
writing: “Recommend duty [for
Hubbard] on a large vessel where
he can be properly supervised.”
Hubbard was relieved of command,
but he maintained throughout the rest
of his life the submarines were real.
The US Navy, though, also continued
to deny that claim, and no awards or
battle stars were awarded the ship.
After the war a review of Japanese
naval records indicated no submarines
were operating or lost off the Oregon
coast during the period in question.
Hubbard, of course, went on to much
greater success after the end of his
Navy career, becoming the founder of
the Church of Scientology in 1953.
— Roger Mason
Strategic
Backwaters
Midget Sub Action
at Diego Suarez
On 20 February 1942, the German
Ambassador in Tokyo, Gen. Eugen Ott,
cabled Berlin that Tokyo was consider-
ing taking over Madagascar from the
Vichy French. In March, German Adm.
Raeder reported to Hitler the Japanese
appeared to have recognized the great
strategic importance of Madagascar
and were planning on establishing
bases there. Hitler’s only comment
was that the French wouldn’t agree to
such a scheme. Therefore, prompted by
German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop,
Japanese Ambassador to Germany
Oshima Hiroshi promised to obtain
clarification on his government’s
intentions in regard to Madagascar.
Ribbentrop conveyed to the Japanese
ambassador that, if Japan did attack
Madagascar, presenting it to the
Vichy French as a fait accompli,
Germany would back Japan. He
also took the opportunity to request
Japan launch offensive operations
against Allied convoys in the Indian
Ocean in order to help relieve
pressure on the Kreigsmarine.
On 8 April, the Japanese Naval
Attaché in Berlin, Adm. Kichisaburo
Nomura, told the Germans that,
while there was as yet no set date for
Japanese operations against Ceylon
or Madagascar, they certainly would
be attacked if evolving Axis strat-
egy required it. The Japanese further
studied the feasibility of attacking
Madagascar during March and April
1942, but postponed the project due
to a lack of forces. Then, on 5 May,
both Germany and Japan learned
the British had beaten them to the
punch and invaded Madagascar. The
Germans were disappointed in the lack
of Japanese action, pointing out the
British had substantially improved the
Allied position in the Indian Ocean.
Concurrently, they acknowledged
the British position on Madagascar
was still weak, as the Vichy French
continued to hold much of the island,
and that offered favorable prospects
for a Japanese counter-measure.
The Japanese felt they had to do
something to appease the Germans.
Fortunately, the British naval ship-
ping currently anchored within the
Madagascar harbor of Diego Suarez
offered potential for just such an action.
The British believed that anchorage
was safe from attack, precisely
because of the difficulties they had
encountered when they planned their
attack there; however, those Royal
Navy planners had never envisioned
action by midget submarines.
As early as 18 December 1941,
Japanese Combined Fleet headquarters
had authorized planning for a midget
submarine operation designated
“Divine Dragon Operation No. 2,”
and targeted the British Far Eastern
Fleet. The operation was projected to
occur sometime between 20 May and
10 June 1942. Intensive training took
place in Hiroshima Bay, emphasizing
night operations, penetrating net
defenses and negotiating narrow straits.
At least one midget submarine was
lost during that training. By April it
was decided the midget submarines
would be sent to the African coast.
In the wake of Vice Adm. Chuichi
Nagumo’s brief fleet carrier operations
in the Bay of Bengal (carrier air strikes
against Trincomalee and Colombo on
Ceylon, and the sinking of HMS Hermes,
Cornwall, Dorsetshire and HMAS
Vampire), IJN Submarine Squadron 8
(Subron 8) was detached from Kwajalein
and assigned to Penang, Malaya, for
operations in African waters. The
midget submarines were sent to Penang
aboard the tender Nisshin, where
they were attached to Subron 8 as “A
Detachment.” On 30 April, five I-class
submarines sortied west from Penang;
three were loaded with a midget
submarine, and two carried recon-
naissance aircraft to seek out targets.
By 10 May the three midget-carrying
submarines (I-16, I-18 and I-20) learned
Diego Suarez had been captured by the
British. On 29 May, the floatplane from
I-10 reconnoitered that anchorage,
spotting the battleship HMS Ramillies
and nine other vessels. That night the
Japanese submarine flotilla command-
er, Capt. Noboru Ishazaki, issued orders
Japanese submarine I-10 (A-class), at Penang Port. April 1942.
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 59
to submarines I-16 and I-20 to launch
their midget submarines on 31 May for
an attack, scheduling it for 2:30 a.m.
Launching approximately 10 miles
east of the harbor entrance, midget
submarine M-16b, off the I-16, headed
toward Diego Suarez, but was never
heard from again. An unidentified body
was found on 1 June, washed ashore
on a beach just outside Diego Suarez,
and some remains of what appeared to
be the aft section of a small submarine
were located on a reef in an area of
violent turbulence and surf. The M-20b,
launched from I-20 approximately nine
miles east of the harbor entrance, took
three hours and 15 minutes to cover
that distance and penetrate the harbor.
At 8;25 p.m. M-20b launched a 17.7
inch torpedo, hitting HMS Ramillies,
and then fired her second torpedo at
the 6,993-ton tanker British Loyalty.
The battleship suffered significant
damage, with a 30-by-30 foot hole in the
port bulge forward of turret A, losing
power throughout the ship. The tanker
was even less fortunate, and sank.
The M-20b was subjected to depth
charging, but escaped the bay heading
north/northwest. Its battery depleted,
the craft commander, Lt. Saburo Akieda,
Observation Post
grounded his submarine at Nosy Antali
Keli islet, where he attempted to scuttle
it but the charge failed to explode.
He and Petty Officer 1st Class Masami
Takemoto managed to contact some
natives, who assisted them to the main-
land. On 2 June 1942, the two Japanese
sailors were intercepted by a patrol of
Royal Marines from No. 5 Commando,
48 miles from where they’d come ashore.
During the ensuing gun battle, one
Marine and both sailors were killed.
“Divine Dragon Operation No.
2” was over. For the loss of two
midget submarines and four sailors,
the Japanese sank an oil tanker and
significantly damaged a battleship. The
HMS Ramillies was declared seaworthy
on 9 June and departed for Durban,
South Africa, for temporary repair.
That done, she departed in August
1942 for Plymouth, England, where she
underwent full repair, finally completing
those in September 1943. The tanker
Happy Japanese army veterans with captured Russian gear (Nomonhan 1939)
60 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010
British Loyalty, sunk in 65' deep water,
was later refloated. The submarine I-18,
using its last midget submarine (M-18b),
sank the Norwegian merchant steamer
Wilford on 9 June, then scuttled the
midget submarine before returning.
— Vernie Liebl
On the Battle Line
Nomonhan, 1939
For five months in 1939 the armed
forces of the Soviet Union and Japan
clashed over a disputed sector of the
Mongolian-Manchurian border near
the Khalkin Gol River and the village
of Nomonhan. The enormous losses
suffered by their ground forces there had
a profound effect on Japan’s ruling clique.
The faction that had dominated strategic
thinking up to mid-1939, the so-called
“Strike North” group, fell from favor. With
that, the “Strike South” faction, led by
the Imperial Navy, became ascendant.
The exceptional tactical successes of
the Soviet commander on the scene in
1939, Lt. Gen. Georgi Zhukov, would be
replicated by other Soviet commanders
during the devastating Soviet invasion
of Manchuria in August 1945.
Deficiencies that severely hampered
the Japanese in 1939 — poor logistics and
communications, lack of heavy weapons
and armor — wouldn’t be corrected by
1945, with disastrous consequences for
that nation. Indeed, Japan’s Kwangtung
Army in Manchuria was scarcely better
equipped to conduct mobile warfare
in 1945 than it had been in 1939.
The Kwangtung Army’s command-
ers had insisted the border between
their client state, Manchukuo, and the
Mongolian People’s Republic (backed
by the Soviet Union) was the Khalkin
Gol River. The Mongolians claimed an
area some 12 miles east of the river,
including the village of Nomonhan. In
early June, the aggressive Gen. Zhukov
arrived and immediately put his forces
on the offensive. Soviet armored thrusts
quickly secured the area and threw
Japanese ground units across the
river. A Japanese counterattack failed,
in large part because the Kwangtung
Army lacked adequate anti-tank
weapons. The Japanese then resorted
to suicide attacks, with squads of men
hurling satchel charges and Molotov
cocktails; however, they still couldn’t
stop the wedge of Soviet armor.
Between late May and 25 July, the
Japanese suffered 5,000 casualties
along a 19-mile front. Soviet losses were
higher, but the Red Army could call on
greater resources. The real battle was
logistics, at which Zhukov excelled. His
nearest base was on the Trans-Siberian
Railway, some 465 miles away over dirt
roads. Over time, though, Zhukov built
up a fleet of 2,600 trucks, including
1,000 fuel-transporting vehicles. The
Japanese supply system, meanwhile,
was badly managed. Soldiers went for
days without water in temperatures that
reached 104 degrees Fahrenheit. The
Japanese were never able to overcome
the difficulties created by the 200-mile
distance to their supply base in Hailar
and their lack of motorized transport.
By early August the Japanese had
committed 75,000 Imperial Army and
Manchurian auxiliaries, the Soviets per-
haps 100,000. The Kwantung Army reor-
ganized its forces and planned an offen-
sive to begin on 24 August. Soviet dictator
Josef Stalin meanwhile made a crucial
decision: alarmed by Hitler’s threats
against Poland, Stalin wanted to free
himself from distractions in the Far East.
In early August, therefore, he sent Zhukov
an additional 1,625 trucks, thus giving
that commander the logistical where-
withal necessary for a decisive strike.
All through early and mid-August,
Zhukov quietly moved up reinforce-
ments. By mid-August he’d massed five
divisions and four armored brigades
in positions fronting just over two
Japanese divisions. At 6:00 a.m. on 20
August, Zhukov struck. Supported by
500 tanks and 216 artillery pieces, his
Soviet and Mongolian soldiers moved
forward along a 30-mile front. Surprise
was total. Japanese artillery batteries,
short on ammunition, were outgunned.
Some 200 Soviet SB-2 bombers, heavily
supported by fighters, struck Japanese
defenses and lines of communication.
The Japanese had been hampered
by a limited manufacturing base and
were unable to build both aircraft and
tanks in sufficient quantities at the same
time. They had opted to concentrate
on the development and production of
Khalkhin Gol. Soviet offensive 1939
aircraft, and now paid the price, as Soviet was set up to resolve disputes along
T-26 and T-28 tanks ravaged them. the length of the border. As World War
In savage fighting the Red Army II engulfed Europe, Stalin was free
columns turned both Japanese flanks to focus his attention on the west.
and got behind the Japanese forces, The Japanese failed to learn from their
linking up at the village of Nomonhan defeat. The vital lesson, that modern war-
and trapping the Japanese 23rd Infantry fare depended heavily upon supply and
Division. The Japanese fought back equipment, was ignored. The suicidal
viciously but in vain. Soviet tanks, bravery displayed by Japanese infantry in
equipped with flamethrowers and the Nomonhan fight would be witnessed
supported by infantry, shredded one again on battlefields in Manchuria in
strongpoint after another. Soviet armor 1945, but so too would the Kwangtung
halted all Japanese counterattacks. On Army’s critical deficiencies in heavy
27 August the Japanese 23rd Infantry weapons, organization and logistics. The
Division made a last attempt to break out Japanese conviction that willpower could
to the east but was defeated, suffering overcome even profound material disad-
over 70 percent losses. By 31 August the vantages wouldn’t finally be discredited
Japanese had been driven from all dis- until the end of a much larger war.
puted territory with massive casualties.
Those figures are still disputed: the — John Walker  ★
Japanese acknowledge almost 9,000
killed and 9,000 wounded, while the
Russians claim they had inflicted at
least 60,000 casualties. The Russians
concede having suffered a total of 9,284
casualties of their own.The Red Army
could have pushed into Manchuria,
but Zhukov halted and dug in instead.
Aware the Japanese wanted a rapid
end to the fighting (thanks to spies in
Tokyo), the Soviets offered a cease-fire.
Meanwhile, on 23 August the Soviet
Union had signed a non-aggression pact
with Nazi Germany, agreeing to divide
Poland. On 15 September, as German
armored columns closed in on Warsaw,
the Japanese and Soviets agreed to a
cease-fire in Manchuria. Prisoners were
exchanged and a joint commission
World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 61
Mega Feedback

Results from issue 11

The Mega-Feedback survey
for the games to be added to the
schedule out to issue 37 ran in issue
11 and concurrently on the S&T
Press web site. We appreciate all
of the feedback about what readers
would like to see in the magazine,
the frequency and content of Special
Editions, and it was especially help-
ful to update our demographic data
and reader interests. Thanks again
for all the feedback responses, sug-
gestions, and letters of encourage-
ment. We appreciate your support!
Before we review the updated
game schedule, let’s look at the
results regarding Special Editions
(double-map, double counter
sheet) since it impacts the updated
schedule. An overwhelming 70%
of respondents wanted Special
Editions to appear once a year and
another 17% every two years. On
that basis, we are adjusting the
schedule to have one Special Edition
every seventh issue. Why seventh
issue instead of every sixth issue?
Mainly because we gang print
counters in groups of eight and so
we effectively will do six regular
issues plus one Special Edition
each print cycle. This schedule
will also make it possible for the
4% who responded they did not
want Special Editions to subscribe
for six issues and skip the Special
Editions and for the 9% who
wanted a choice to make their
decision with each Special Edition.
The other question we asked
in regard to Special Editions was
format: should we favor two-map
games (such as Cobra) or multiple
scenario games (such as French
Foreign Legion). The response was
46% said either was fine, with a
range of 10-15% for exclusively
one format or the other, or mostly
one format or the other, so we
will continue to present a range
of topics and formats. Based
on this round of feedback, the
Special Editions that were added
to the schedule include Famous
Divisions: Gross Deutschland
(20), Operation Downfall: Olympic
& Coronet (27), and Famous
Divisions: Guards Armour (34).
Below is a listing of the issues
and topics. Newly added games are
in italics. They have been grouped
into fours following the category
rotation (East, Pacific, West/Med,
Other) with a Special Edition
inserted every seventh issue. At the
bottom of the page is a schedule
by year and month of release.
We asked about articles types and
frequency. Those that garnered the
strongest interest were Strange
Facts, Leader Profiles, and Military
Equipment. We already do these as
either FYI/OP pieces or sidebars, but
with the interest in shorter articles,
we will work on developing these
types into regular short feature
articles. The Letters to the Editor
garnered the least interest and so
this will be a rare type of article.
First Person account was on the
fence and so we’ll run one of those
perhaps once a year. As indicated
previously, we expect to add another
16 pages to the magazine later
this year and the expectation is for
an evolution towards 3-4 feature
length articles and 2-3 shorter
articles in the long run.
In other questions, we asked
about interests and were surprised
to see how much interest there
is in travel. We also see the
increasing use of computers and
the internet as a primary means
of productive and leisure activity.
Yet book reading continues to be a
strong leisure time activity as well
with over half reading one book
or more per month. Finally, it was
not a surprise to learn an amazing
77% of respondents have kept their
back issues for over 10 years.
Thanks again for your support
and taking the time to respond.
We do read every response and use
these surveys as our primary guide
to the direction of our magazines
and games. We will continue to run
additional feedback surveys on our
web site:
www.strategyandtacticspress.com
so please stop by and
complete these surveys.
We expect the next
Mega Feedback will appear
in 19 or 20.  ★

# MONTH CATEGORY GAME TOPIC & LEAD ARTICLE

13 AUG 2010 East Guards Tank (the first of the East Front Battles series)
14 OCT 2010 Pacific Invasion Pearl (What-if the Japanese followed their raid with a landing?)
15 DEC 2010 West / Med Soft Underbelly (1943 Italian Campaign)
16 FEB 2011 Other Partizan! (Resistance is not futile!)
17 APR 2011 East Leningrad (Miranda gives us Manila on the Baltic)
18 JUN 2011 Pacific South Seas Campaign (using the Red Dragon system from S&T250)
19 AUG 2011 West / Med Hardest Days (John Butterfield focuses on the critical period of the Battle over Britain)
20 OCT 2011 — Famous Divisions: Gross Deutschland (Special Edition)
21 DEC 2011 Other Rhineland (What-if the reoccupation had been opposed?)
22 FEB 2012 East East Front Battles 2: Minsk
23 APR 2012 Pacific Guadalcanal (first of the Pacific Battles series)
24 JUN 2012 West / Med Sedan (the decisive battle of the 1940 French campaign)
25 AUG 2012 Other Savoia (battle of Keren)
26 OCT 2012 East Race to the Reichstag (now a two-player Battle for Germany style format)
27 DEC 2012 — Operation Downfall (Special Edition with an update of Olympic plus Coronet)
28 FEB 2013 Pacific Green Hell (two battles drawn from Admin Box, Imphal, Operation Thursday, and Meiktila)
29 APR 2013 West / Med Norway 1940 (Miranda design based on Red Dragon Rising system)
30 JUN 2013 Other 1939: Hinge of Fate (Bomba looks at the alternatives)
31 AUG 2013 East East Front Battles 3
32 OCT 2013 Pacific Pacific Battles 2 (Nomonhan)
33 DEC 2013 West / Med Operation Accolade (solitaire game of the Dodecanese Campaign)
34 FEB 2014 — Famous Divisions: Guards Armour (Special Edition)
35 APR 2014 Other Strike North (What if Japan attacks the USSR in 1941?)
36 JUN 2014 East Stalingrad: The Pocket Battle
37 AUG 2014 Pacific Bloody Ridge (Bomba looks at this turning point in the struggle for Guadalcanal)

62 World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010

 SUBSCRIBE GUARDS TANK
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| HURTGEN FORE
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World at War magazine provides a sharp focus on WWII,

with the same in-depth format as Strategy & Tactics.
The Strategy &
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#13 AUG-SEP 2010

Going beyond the usual narratives, the articles focus

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World at War 13 | AUG-SEP 2010 63

Introducing the Decision Games
Folio Game Series
The Folio Game Series provides dozens of games using the same 8-page Standard rules
(Musket & Saber for 19th century battles, Fire & Movement for 20th century battles) with a short
Exclusive rules sheet for each individual game to capture the unique aspects of each battle. Each game can
be played in about 90 minutes allowing for multiple games to be played in an afternoon or evening.

Chalons: The Fate of Europe | Marengo: Morning Defeat, Afternoon Victory

Leipzig: Napolean Encircled | Chickamauga: River of Death | Stones River: Turning Point in Tennessee
Frayser’s Farm: Wasted Opportunity | Shiloh: Grant Surprised | Arnhem: The Farthest Bridge
NEW
Cauldron: Battle for Gazala | Kasserine: Baptism of Fire | Saipan: Conquest of the Marianas (below)
RELEASES
Bastogne: A Desperate Defense | Aachen: First to Fall | Crusader: Battle for Tobruk AVAILABLE
Naktong Bulge: Breaking the Perimeter | Golan: The Last Syrian Offensive | DMZ: The Next Korean War
Showdown: The Coming Indo-Pakistani War

SAIPAN
WORLD W
Conquest of AR II BATT
LES
the Mariana
s FOLIO GA
ME SERI
Saipan was a
Navy’s “islan
critical objective
d hopping” camp the US
in ES
Pacific; its two aign in the
airfields were
for heav y bomb suita
ers. Hence three ble
divisions were US
sche
on 15 June 1944 duled to invade Saipan
,
two- dozen battle supported by nearly

Saipan
ships that had
bombardment begun a
two days befor
30,00 0 fanatic e. More than
Japanese were
on the island, entrenched
dug
formidable defen into caves and other
sive positions.
battle for Saipa The
n proved to be
fiercest battle one of the
s of the Pacifi
deadliest up to
that time for
c War, and the
Conquest of th
e Marianas
both sides.
Saipan utilize
s the new Fire
combat syste & Movement
m that’s desig
can augment ned so players
their units with
fire” during the “support
course of the
naval bombardm turn.
ent to bazookas From
can receive supp , units
ort to engage
positions and enemy
formations, allow
to develop at ing combat
all levels. A singl
battalion, for e engineer
example — perha
by flamethrow ps supported
ers — could be
assault a lone tasked to
enemy infantry
defending atop regiment
a plateau. As
underway, howe its attack gets
ver, the engin
may suddenly eer battalion
come under fi
mortars. More re from enem
support will be y
take the plate needed to
au, but asset
s are limited.
In Saipan the
attritional desig
Combat Resu n of the new
lts Table simu
nature of the lates the true
battle
are typically two- s in the Pacific. Units
sided formation
can incur casu s that
alties before
fully eliminated becoming
, accurately replic
the realities of ating
combat and the
losses sustained high
by both sides
the actual fightin during
g
the battle is thus on Saipan. Winning
a matter of mane
firepower and
asset manageme uver,
nt.

Game Conten
ts:
• 17 x 22” (43
x 56 cm)
• 80 die-cut coun terrain map
• One Standard
ters Saipan
Rules booklet
• One Exclusive for this series
Rules booklet PLAYERS
for this title
2

LEVEL II III X XX XXX

BATTALION
HEX SCALE
mi (536 m)
PLAYING TIME
1-2 hrs
Each counter repres
ents
formation from among an individual historical COMPLEXITY
that fought for Saipa the Japanese and US forces •••••
LOW
1611 n, including armor
marine battalions,
engineers, amtra
regiments,
Minutes to lea
cs and more. SOLITAIRE ••••• rn. Quick to pla
HIGH
y. Historicall
A FOLIO SERIES
A product of
GAME
Decision Games
y Accurate.
Copyright © ,
2010. All Rights Inc.
Reserved.

1/6 th Actual Size Copyright ©

2010, Decisio
n Games, Inc.
www.decision
All Rights Reserve
d. Made & Printed
games.com in U.S.A.

Each game under $25 (most under $20)

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | www.decisiongames.com