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1. Union Carbide Labor Union V Union Carbide Phil.

Facts:

etition for review of the decision of the then Secretary of Labor Blas Ople handed down on February
7, 1975 which set aside the decision of the Arbitrator ordering reinstatement with backwages, and
instead adjudged the payment of separation pay; and the resolution dated July 24, 1975 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

'It appears that the Company is operating on three (3) shifts namely: morning, afternoon and night
shifts. The workers in the third shift normally work from Monday to Saturday, the last working day
being Friday or forty (40) hours a week or from Monday to Friday.

'Sometime in July 1972, there seems to be a change in the working schedule from Monday to Friday
as contained in the collective bargaining agreement aforecited to Sunday thru Thursday. The change
became effective July 5, 1972. The third shift employees were required to start the new work
schedule from Sunday thru Thursday.

'In manifestation of their dissention to the new work schedule, the three respondents Duro, Torio,
and Javillonar did not report for work on November 26, 1972 which was a Sunday since it was not a
working day according to the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Petitioner alleges that the change in the company's working schedule violated the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement of the parties. Hence, complainants cannot be dismissed since their refusal to
comply with the re-scheduled working hours was based on a provision of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Petitioner further contends that the dismissal of the complainants violated Section 9,
Article II of the 1973 Constitution which provides "the right of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work."

Issue: whether or not the complainants could be validly dismissed from their employment on the
ground of insubordination for refusing to comply with the new work schedule.

Ruling: The petition has no merit.

Although Article XIX of the CBA provides for the duration of the agreement, which We quote:

"This agreement shall become effective on September 1, 1971 and shall remain in full force and
effect without change until August 31, 1974. Unless the parties hereto agree otherwise, negotiation
for renewal, or renewal and modification, or a new agreement may not be initiated before July 1,
1974."

this does not necessarily mean that the company can no longer change its working schedule, for
Section 2, Article II of the same CBA expressly provides that:

"SECTION 2. In the exercise of its functions of management, the COMPANY shall have the sole and
exclusive right and power, among other things, to direct the operations and the working force of its
business in all respects; to be the sole judge in determining the capacity or fitness of an employee
for the position or job to which he has been assigned; to schedule the hours of work, shifts and work
schedules; to require work to be done in excess of eight hours or on Sundays or holidays as the
exigencies of the service may require; to plan, schedule, direct, curtail and control factory operations
and schedules of production; to introduce and install new or improved production methods or
facilities; to designate the work and the employees to perform it; to select and hire new employees;
to train new employees and improve the skill and ability of employees; to make rules and
regulations governing conduct and safety; to transfer employees from one job to another or from
one shift to another; to classify or reclassify employees; and to make such changes in the duties of
its employees as the COMPANY may see fit or convenient for the proper conduct of its business."

Further, the incident complained of took place sometime in 1972, so there is no violation of the 1973
Constitution to speak of because the guarantee of security of tenure embodied under Section 9,
Article II may not be given a retroactive effect. It is the basic norm that provisions of the
fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its
retroactive application is so provided.

As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:

"Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only a
prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights
already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence of an
unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution." (p. 10, Constitutional
Law, Isagani Cruz, 1991 Edition)

We agree with the findings arrived at by both Arbitrator and the Secretary of Labor that there is no
unfair labor practice in this case. Neither was there gross and habitual neglect of complainants'
duties. Nor did the act of complainants in refusing to follow the new working hours amount to
serious misconduct or willful disobedience to the orders of respondent company.

Although no serious objections may be offered to the Arbitrator's conclusion to order reinstatement
with backwages of the complainants, We now refrain from doing so considering that reinstatement
is no longer feasible due to the fact that the controversy started more than 20 years ago aside from
the obviously strained relations between the parties.
2. Francisco Jr V House Of The Representatives

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issue: Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Ruling:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and
is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.


1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power
to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules.

2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office
of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Collector V Campos Rueda

FACTS: In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone [foreign
country] in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of
Tangier. She however left some personal properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the
Philippines. The designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.

In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax
amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the
estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which
provides:

That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death
did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property
of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of
which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer
taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens
of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country.

Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.

However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is
not a “state” as contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not
recognize Tangier as a foreign country.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.

HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.

A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community


independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a
nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality.

Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De
Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax
Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such
exemption to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the
exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.
4. Free Telephone Worklers Union V Ople

FACTS: In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union
(the Union) and the Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople)
assumed jurisdiction over the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the
provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue delegation of power by Congress to the
Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or
not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it
also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.

ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet
to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional
application of the law.

The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be,
however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration,
it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental
principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. But as to whether or not
there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to be determined since the Minister of
Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor dispute in issue.

There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient
standard. The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely
affecting the national interest.”
5. Legaspi v Sec of Finance

FACTS: Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare
Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and
some other purposes” unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the
fact that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’
(Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President (PM) can issue such decrees.

HELD: It is to be observed that the original text mentions President (Prime Minister). This is so
because ‘. . . The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall
continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready
to discharge its functions, and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives
under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under
this Constitution.’Parenthetically, the term “Incumbent President’ employed in the transitory
provisions could only refer to President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Aquino vs. Commission on Elections,
62 SCRA 275). “After the April 7 amendments there exists no longer ‘a President (Prime Minister)’
but ‘A President’ and ‘A Prime Minister.’ They are now two different offices which cannot be held by
a single person – not a transitory one but a regular one provided for and governed by the main
provisions of the newly amended Constitution. Subsequent events accept the reality that we are no
longer governed by the transitory provisions of the Constitution.” This form of government is
essentially parliamentary with presidential features.

6. Bacani V Nacoco

FACTS: Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court in Manila.
During the pendency of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of the parties, National
Coconut Corporation or NACOCO, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Bacani et al complied with the request and
sent 714 pages and thereafter submitted to said counsel their bills for the payment of their fees. The
National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said
transcripts at the rate of P1 per page.

However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse said amounts on
the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice. It was expressed that NACOCO, being a
government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. Bacani et al counter that
NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
NACOCO set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section
2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.


HELD: No. Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the status of
being part of the government because they do not come under the classification of municipal or
public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it was organized with the purpose of
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States”
and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of
coconut by-products“, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the
coconut industry, it was, however, given a corporate power separate and distinct from our
government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its
corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518 – the law creating NACOCO). It may sue and be sued in the same
manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government.

The Supreme Court also noted the constituent functions of the government. Constituent functions
are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature. According
to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, they are as follows:

1. The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and
robbery.

2. The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.

3. The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination
of its liabilities for debt or for crime.

4. The determination of contract rights between individuals.

5. The definition and punishment of crime.

6. The administration of justice in civil cases.

7. The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.

8. Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or
encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.

On the other hand, ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the
general interests of society, and are merely optional. The most important of the ministrant functions
are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of
trade and industry. The principles to consider whether or not a government shall exercise certain of
these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things
which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these
things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals.
7. ACCFA V CUGCO

FACTS: In September 1961 a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was agreed upon by labor
unions (ACCFA Supervisors’ Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers’ Association (AWA), (ASA and
AWA) )and ACCFA (Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration). The said CBA was
supposed to be effective on July 1, 1962. Due to non-implementation of the CBA the unions held a
strike on October 25, 1962. And 5 days later CUGCO (Confederation of Unions in Government
Corporations and Offices), the mother union of ASA and AWA filed a complaint against ACCFA due to
unfair labor practices, among others, which CUGCO was able to win in court.

In April 1963, ACCFA appealed the decision and while the appeal was pending, Republic Act No. 3844
was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA (Agricultural Credit Administration). In
March 1964, ASA and AWA then petitioned that they may have sole bargaining rights with ACA.
While this petition was not yet decided upon, in the same month of March 1964, Executive Order
No. 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration (LRPA).
Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of
ASA and AWA and ruled that they have bargaining rights with ACA..

ISSUE: Whether or not ASA and AWA can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA.

HELD: No. The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by
virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a
governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal
privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA.

The Supreme Court also made a pronouncement which recognized the growing complexities of
modern society which have rendered the classification of the governmental functions (ministrant
and constituent) as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functions continue to
lose their well-defined boundaries and are absorbed within the activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and
move towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Hence, gone are the days where
constituent functions are exclusively performed by the government and not delegated to private
institutions. In this case, a constituent function is left to be performed by a private entity like ACA
(formerly ACCFA).

Separate Opinion on the Free Enterprise System

J. Fernando – This country never practiced the free enterprise system and it has abandoned the
concept of laissez faire. It is the welfare state concept which is being followed as shown by the
constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to labor and others that provide for
the social welfare.
8. Government of the Philippine Islands vs El Monte de Piedad Y Caja De Ahorras De Manila

FACTS: In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish
Government then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine
Treasury. Out of the said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte
de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government
later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government
then filed a complaint. The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party
hence has no right to institute a complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the
intended beneficiary of the said amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank.

HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this
is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the
rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the
public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people
the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

9. Cabanas V Pilapil

FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be
his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his
benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age
when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the
benefit of the child.

On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery
of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco
asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations
must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the
insurance policy.

HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and
that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the
best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she
was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more
care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance
with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the
parent (mother) is observed.
10. Aquino V Comelec

Facts: In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification of some
Presidential Decrees issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos. It was alleged that Marcos does
not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the
1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees
and orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government.

HELD: Yes. First of, this is actually a quo warranto proceedings and Benigno Aquino, Jr. et al, have no
legal personality to sue because they have no claim to the office of the president. Only the Solicitor
General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a quo warranto
petition.

On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081
issued on September 22, 1972 by President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the
issuance of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that the factual bases (the
circumstances of lawlessness then present) had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated;
that the question as to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by Section
3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can continue in office beyond 1973.
While his term of office under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973,
by the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to
continue in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on
January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial
Law; and as aforestated, as this was the decision of the people, in whom “sovereignty resides . . .
and all government authority emanates . . .,” it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. The
logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the
Philippines.