CASE DIGEST: EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding

) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to

people, such as tax revenue measures, fall only a portion of the national territory and directly
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA within this category. Other presidential issuances which affects only the inhabitants of that place;
G.R. NO. L-63915 apply only to particular persons or class (5) Monetary Board circulars to ³fill in the details´ of
DECIDED ON: APRIL 24, 1985 of persons such as administrative and executive orders the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
PONENTE: ESCOLIN, J. need not be published on the assumption enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no
that they have been circularized to all concern. publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Tanada and others, seek a public of the contents of the laws.
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the of general application, which have Reasoning: The Supreme Court declared that all laws as
Official Gazette of various presidential not been published, shall have no force and effect. above defined shall immediately upon
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
proclamations, executive orders, letters of published in full in the Official Gazette, to
implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, Tanada v. Tuvera become effective only after 15 days from their
through the Solicitor General would GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 publication, or on another date specified by the
have this case dismissed outright on the ground that (146 SCRA 446) legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
petitioners have no legal personality or Code.
standing to bring the instant petition. The view is Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the
submitted that in the absence of any showing necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all
that the petitioner are personally and directly affected unpublished presidential issuances which are of general Gonzaga vs David
or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the application, and unless so published, they shall have no GR no. L-14858
presidential issuances in question. binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by December 29, 1960
3 judges. Petitioners move for reconsideration /
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: Said laws needs clarification of the decision on various questions. FACTS: Mariano Gonzales, as owner of a cargo truck and
publication requirement. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for passenger bus, registers the vehicles and pays the first
advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which installment for registration fees due on 1957. To cover
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: They argued that subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a the second installment for registration fees, he remitted
while publication was necessary as a rule, rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the to the provincial treasurer of Cagayan, by registered
it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when Rules of Court). mail, the amount of P500.00, under postal money
decrees themselves provides for their own orders. The postal cancellation mark on the envelope
effectivity dates. (Effective immediately upon approval) Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of containing the remittance bears the date August 31,
the clause ³unless otherwise provided´. 1957. The registrar of the Motor Vehicle Office ruled
ISSUE: Whether the presidential decrees in question that pursuant to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second
which contain special provisions as to the date they are Held: The clause ³unless it is otherwise provided,´ in installment for registration fees was payable on or
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of before the last working day of August. The last working
indispensable for their effectivity. effectivity and not to the requirement of publication day of August 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957. And
itself, which cannot in any event be consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga which bears
RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature cancellation mark dated August 31, 1957was made
in those cases where the legislation itself does may make the law effective immediately upon approval, beyond time fixed by law.
not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of or on any other date, without its previous publication.
publication is material for determining its The legislature may in its discretion provide that the ISSUE: Whether or not the remittance for second
date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. installment of registration fees was made beyond the
publication, but not when the law itself Publication requirements applies to time fixed by law.
provides for the date when it goes into effect. (1) all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws; RULING: The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of (2) presidential decrees and executive orders office on Saturday, August 31, 1957. However, it was
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the promulgated by the President in the exercise of immaterial the last working day contemplated in the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. legislative powers whenever the same are validly Revised Motor Vehicle Law should not necessarily mean
delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the the last working day of Motor Vehicle Office. The fact
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public Constitution; that August31, 1957 was declared a special public
nature or of general applicability is (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose holiday did not have the effect of making the preceding
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also day, August 30, the last day for paying registration fees
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties to a valid delegation;
without penalty. Moreover, under the said law, for
payment of registration fees by mail, the date of
cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope
containing the remittance is considered the date of
application.
Rural Bank of Caloocan vs CA
GR no. L-32116
April 21, 1981
FACTS: Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino
Valencia, went to Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for
industrial loan. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage on Castor’s house, after that, the bank
approved the loan of P3000. Valencia obtained from the
bank an equal amount of loan affixing Castro’s signature
as co-maker without its knowledge. The sheriff then
sent a notice announcing the property would be sold at
public auction to satisfy the obligation. Upon request,
the auction sale which was scheduled for March 10,
1961was postponed for April 10, 1961. But April 10 was
subsequently declared a special holiday so the sheriff
sold the property on public auction on April 11, 1961
which was the next succeeding business day following
the special holiday. Castro prayed for the annulment of
sale alleging that there was fraud on the part of
Valencias who induced her to sign as co-maker of a
promissory note since she is a 70-year old widow who
cannot read and write and it was only when she receive
the notice of sheriff, she learned that the encumbrance
on her property was P6000 and not for P3000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public auction sale was null
and void for transferring the date already set by law.
RULING: The sale is null and void for not having in
accordance with Act 3135 which states that a notice
shall be given by posting notices of sale for not less than
20 days in at least 3public places and if the property is
worth more than P400 such notice shall also be
published for in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city once a week for 3 consecutive
weeks. The pretermission of a holiday applies only
‘where the day, or the last day for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a holiday or when
the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on
holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an office or
officer of the government for an act to be done. Since
April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set by law
for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor the last day of
a given period but a date fixed by deputy sheriff, the
sale cannot be legally made on the next succeeding 2. Appellant could not be held liable for the
business day without the notice of the sale in violation of Circular No. 20 for it was not
accordance with Act no. 3135. binding at the time he was found to have failed
to sell the foreign exchange.
PEOPLE vs QUE PO LAY
G.R. No. L-6791, CASE DIGEST: WAIVER OF RIGHTS
29 March 1954
EMETERIO CUI VS. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
FACTS: G.R. NO. L-15127
Que Po Lay was convicted at the Court of First Instance DECIDED ON: MAY 30, 1961
of Manila for violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in PONENTE: CONCEPCION,J .:
connection with Section 34 of Republic No. 265. The
appellant was in possession of foreign exchange FACTS: Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant
consisting of U.S dollars, checks and money orders university where plaintiff finished his law studies in the
amounting to about $ 7,000. He failed to sell the said up to and including the first semester of the fourth
currency to the Central Bank through its agents one day year. During all the school years in which
following the receipt of such currency as required by plaintiff was studying law in defendant Law College, he
Circular No.20. The appellant was sentenced to six was awarded scholarship grants and his
months imprisonment and a fine of Php 1, 000. semestral tuition fees were returned to him after ends
of the semester. Plaintiff left the defendant's
The appellant based the appeal on the claim that said law college and enrolled for the last semester of his
circular was not published on the Official Gazette prior fourth year law in the college of law of the
to the act of omission of the appellant, thus, said Abad Santos University graduating from the college of
circular has no force and effect. law of the latter university. He applied to
take the bar examination in which he needed the
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
year 1949. It was not published until November 1951, or University. The defendant refused until after he had
after three months after appelant’s conviction of its paid back the P1,033 87, noting the contract
violation. that he signed which stated that in consideration of the
scholarship granted to him by the
ISSUES: University, he waives his right to transfer to another
Whether or not: school without having refunded to the
1. Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, not being a defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash and
statute or a law should be subjected to followed by Memorandum No. 38 that the
publication requirement stated in Article 2 of Director of Private Schools issued.
the Civil Code;
2. The appellant is liable to the said Circular No. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Cui and the
20 when the latter was only published after respondent university, whereby the former
about three months of his conviction. waives his right to transfer to another school without
having refunded to the defendant the
HELD: equivalent of the scholarship cash valid or not.
1. Circular No. 20 is not a statute or a law but it is
being issued for the implementation of the law RULING: The contract of waiver between the plaintiff
authorizing its issuance, therefore it has the and respondent on September 10, 1951, is a direct
force and effect of the law. Circulars and violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and
regulations which prescribe a penalty for its void. The contract was contrary to sound
violation should be published before becoming policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in
effective. It is based on the general principle Memorandum No.38, s. 1949 is sound policy.
that before the public is bound by penal When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is
provisions, the people should be officially understood that such scholarships are
informed of its contents and penalties. merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other
fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient Facts: ISSUES:
students when they decide to quit school or to Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Whether or not:
transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not Inc., fell 14 floors from the 1. The petitioner can be held liable under the
be offered merely to attract and keep Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego‘s widow grounds of negligence.
students in a school. then filed a petition for damages in the 2. The injured employee or his heirs have the
Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The right to choose between availing themselves of
employer raised the defense that Maria the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
CASE DIGEST: PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the Compensation Act and suing in the regular
LAW, EXCEPTIONS State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker in cases of employer’s negligence.
MARIA J. JUEGO has a choice of either to recover from the
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010 employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen‘s HELD:
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “the thing or
Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but transaction speaks for itself” recognizes that prima
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the he cannot pursue both actions facie negligence may be established without direct
Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego‘s widow simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a proof. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident
then filed a petition for damages in the decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
employer raised the defense that Maria affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the Court. of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the
State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker Issue: action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
has a choice of either to recover from the Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering All the requisites for the application of the rule of res
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen‘s damages under the Civil Code. ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but Ruling: negligence arises.
he cannot pursue both actions No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages
simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a under the Civil Code although she Claims for damages sustained by workers in the course
decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance of their employment could be filed only under the
On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals Fund. The respondent‘s case is an exception Workmen´s Compensation Law. In availing its remedies,
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial because private respondent was not aware of claimants are deemed to have waived their right of the
Court. petitioner‘s negligence when she filed her claim for remedies provided by other laws. However, this is an
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not exception because private respondent was unaware of
Issue: Whether or not respondent is prohibited from only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for
recovering damages under the Civil Code. well. The decision of the court is affirmed. death benefits, otherwise, she would have opted to
avail of a better remedy than that of which she already
Ruling: No. Respondent is not barred from recovering had.
damages under the Civil Code although she CONSUNJI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance GR No. 137873,
Fund. The respondent‘s case is an exception 20 April 2001 Case Digest
because private respondent was not aware of Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule
petitioner‘s negligence when she filed her claim for FACTS: Aznar vs Garcia
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a G.R. No. L-16749
only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 Decided on: January 31, 1963
well. The decision of the court is affirmed. floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his Ponente: LABRADOR, J.:
death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, a complaint for damages at the RTC of Pasig against the FACTS: Edward Christensen, though born in New York,
EXCEPTIONS deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. migrated to California, where he resided (and
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and The employer raised, among other defenses, the consequently was considered a California citizen) for a
MARIA J. JUEGO widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010 Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the
the widow Maria Juego.
time of his death . However, during the entire the determination of the meaning of the domiciled in other jurisdictions.
period of his residence in this country he had always term ―national law‖ is used therein. It is argued on appellees‘ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that
considered himself a citizen of California. In The next question is: What is the law in California the clause ―if there is no law to the
his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an governing the disposition of personal contrary in the place where the property is situated‖ in
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy property? Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
Christensen as her only heir, but left a legacy of sum of The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
money in favor of Helen Christensen the executor-appellee that under the and that the law to the contrary in the
Garcia (who in a decision rendered by the Supreme California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the
Court had been declared another property by will in the form and manner he national law of the deceased should govern.
acknowledged natural daughter of his). Counsel for the desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 This contention cannot be sustained.
acknowledged natural daughter Helen of the Civil Code of California, which As explained in the various authorities cited above, the
Claims that under Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code, is as follows: national law mentioned in Article 16 of
California law should be applied; that under If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California law, the matter is referred back to the law of personal property is situated, it is deemed to California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
the domicile; that therefore Philippine law follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the authorizes the reference or return of the question to the
is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen law of his domicile. law of the testator‘s domicile. The conflict
must be increased in view of the of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
successional rights of illegitimate children under It is argued on executor‘s behalf that as the deceased precisely refers back the case, when a
Philippine law. Upon the other hand, consel for Christensen was a citizen of the State of decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
the child Maria Lucy contends that inasmuch as it is California, the internal law thereof, which is that given domicile, the Philippines in the case at
clear that under Art. 16 par.2 of our Civil in the Kaufman case, should govern the bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not
Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our determination of the validity of the testamentary refer the case back to California; such action
courts must immediately apply the provisions of Christensen‘s will, such law being would leave the issue incapable of determination
internal law of California on the matter, that under in force in the State of California of which Christensen because the case will then be like a football,
California law there are no compulsory heirs was a citizen. Appellant, on the other tossed back and forth between the two states, between
and consequently a testator could dispose of any hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and the country of which the decedent was a
property possessed by him in absolute dominion in accordance therewith and following the citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of court must apply its own law as directed in
to anything under california law, the will the testamentary provision in question the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
of the deceased giving the bulk of the property to Maria should be referred back to the law of the decedent‘s the question has to be decided, especially
Lucy must remain undisturbed. domicile, which is the Philippines. as the application of the internal law of California
ISSUE: What law should govern? Philippine law or We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is provides no legitime for children while the
California law? its conflict of laws rule, while the rule Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision apealed from is hereby applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on Philippines, makes natural children
reversed and the case returned to the lower succ ession and the conflict of laws rules legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
court with instructions that the partition be made as the of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own recognizing them.
Philippine law on succession provides. intended and appropriate sphere, the We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens Edward, a citizen of California, is the
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the living in the State, but Article 946 should Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows: apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in depriving his acknowledged natural child,
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is California but in other jurisdictions. The rule the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
subject to the law of the country laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
where it is situated. determination of matters with foreign 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both element involved is in accord with the general principle law of California..
with respect to the order of succession and of American law that the domiciliary law
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic should govern in most matters or rights which follow the RENVOI
validity of testamentary provisions, shall person of the owner. AZNAR vs. GARCIA
be regulated by the national law of the person whose Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
succession is under consideration, whatever the Philippines pointed out as the
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the national law is the internal law of California. But as Facts:
country where said property may be above explained the laws of California have Edward Christensen was born in New York but he
found. prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for migrated to California where he resided
The application of this article in the case at bar requires residents therein and another for those for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his the remainder shall go to his seven surviving G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural children by his first and second wives EDWARD A. Facts:
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen BELLIS, HENRY A. BELLIS, Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of ALEXANDER BELLIS, and ANNA BELLIS-ALLSMAN, EDWARD the United States. By his first wife
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia G. BELLIS, WA LTER whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by
(illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under S. BELLIS, and DOROTHY E. BELLIS in equal shares. his second wife, who survived him, he had
Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS filed three legitimate children, and three illegitimate
California law should be applied; that under California their respective oppositions children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
law, the matter is referred back to the law of to the project of partition on the ground that they were disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing
the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
averred that the national law of the deceased children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the illegitimate children were not given anything. The
must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to deceased. illegitimate children opposed the will on the
anything under California law. The LOWER COURT issued an order overruling the ground that they have been deprived of their
oppositions and approving the executor‘s legitimates to which they should be entitled, if
Issue: final account, report and administration, and project of Philippine law were to be applied.
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should partition. Relying upon Article 16 of the Issue:
be applied in determining the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, Whether or not the national law of the deceased should
successional rights of his heirs. which in this case is which did not provide determine the successional rights of
for legitimes. the illegitimate children.
Ruling: ISSUE: Which law must apply in executing the will of the Ruling:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional deceased – Texas Law or Philippine Law? The Supreme Court held that the said children are not
rights to Helen said in effect that RULING: The said illegitimate children are not entitled entitled to their legitimes under the
there are two rules in California on the matter; the to their legitimes under the Texas Law(which is Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased,
internal law which applies to Californians the national law of the deceased), here are no there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for legitimes. The renvoi doctrinecannot be applied. decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Californians domiciled outside of California. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law a national of one country ad a domiciliary Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
of his domicile must be followed. The case of another. In the said case, it is not disputed that the Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
was remanded to the lower court for further deceased was both a national of Texas and a of the will and the amount of successional rights are to
proceedings – the determination of the successional domicile thereof at the time of his death. be determined under Texas law, the
rights under Philippine law only. Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
the national law of the decedent, in testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
Case Digest four items: (a) the order of succession, (b) render applicable the national law of the
Nationality principle the amount of successional rights, (c) the intrinsic decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
Bellis vs. Bellis validity of provisions of will, and (d) the regard to four items: (a) the order of
G.R. No. L-23678 capacity to succeed. succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
Decided on: June 6, 1967 They provide that: the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
Ponente: BENGZON, J.P., J.: ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
subject to the law of the country to Intestate and testamentary successions, both with
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of where it is situated. However, intestate and respect to the order of succession and to
Texas at the time of his death. He executed a will in testamentary successions, both with respect to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
the Philippines, in which he directed that after all the order of successions and to the amount of validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
taxes, obligations, and expenses of successional rights and to the intrinsic regulated by the national law of the person whose
administration are paid for, his distributable estate validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated succession is under consideration, whatever may
should be divided, in trust, in the following by the national law of the person be the nature of the property and regardless of the
order and manner whose succession is under consideration, whatever may country wherein said property may be found.
a) $240,000.00 to his first wife MARY E. MALLEN be the nature of the property and
b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate childrenAMOS regardless of the country wherein said property may be
BELLIS, JR., MARIA CRISTINA found. PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
BELLIS, MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,or $40,000.00 each, and YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES
c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, RENVOI G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
BELLIS vs. BELLIS
Facts: legitimate recognized in this jurisdiction.
Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977, children. However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage
leaving behind real and personal 5. The court likewise ruled that respondents are the of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China,
properties here in the Philippines worth more or less acknowledged illegitimate offspring of Sy Kiat with they
Php 300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Asuncion cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a Gillego. only that of acknowledged natural children. petitioners
petition alleging that they are the children of 6. On appeal, the lower court’s decision was set aside are
the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However, Yao Kee declaring petitioners as the acknowledge natural natural children, it appearing that at the time of their
testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on children of Sy conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by
Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with Sze Sook Kiat and Asuncion Gillego. any
Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Chun Yen as their 7. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged natural impediment to marry one another. [See Art. 269, Civil
children. Petitioners provided that fact of marriage children of the deceased since the legality of the Code] And they are acknowledged children of the
through evidences like Yao Kee‘s and Gan alleged deceased
Ching‘s testimony, Sy Kiat‘s Master Card of Registration marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China had not been because of Sy Kiat’s recognition of Sze Sook Wah and its
stating his marriage with Yao Kee, and the proven to be valid to the laws of China. extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her
certificate by the Embassy of the People‘s Republic of ISSUE: sisters of the full blood.
China affirming the fact of the marriage. Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China Private respondents on the other hand are also the
Issue: proven as a custom? deceased’s acknowledged natural children with
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was HELD: Asuncion
valid. Custom is defined as “a rule of conduct formed by Gillego , a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years
Ruling: repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a without the benefit of marriage. They have in their
Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to establish the social rule, favor their
validity of foreign marriages the existence legally binding and obligatory.” The law requires that “a father’s acknowledgment, evidence by a compromise
of the foreign law as a question of fact must be proven custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules agreement entered into by and between their parents
and the alleged foreign marriage must be of and
proven by convincing evidence. The petitioners have evidence. [Article 12, Civil Code] On this score the approved by the CFI wherein Sy Kiat not only
provided the fact of marriage however the Court had occasion to state that “ a local custom as a acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego
same do not suffice to establish the validity of said source of but likewise
marriage with Chinese Law or custom. In such right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless made provisions for their support and future
absence of foreign law, the doctrine of processual such custom is properly established by competent inheritance.
presumption must be applied. The Supreme Court evidence
then held that in the absence of a foreign law it must be like any other fact. The same evidence, if not one of a
presumed as the same as ours. In the higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW
Philippine Laws, a marriage cannot be valid without the Construing this provision of law the Court has held that FLORESCA vs. PHILEX MINING CORP.
presence of a solemnizing officer; therefore to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was null and void. proven, namely 1) the existence of the foreign law as a Facts:
question of fact; and 2) the alleged foreign marriage by Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees
YAO KEE VS. GONZALES convincing evidence. of Philex Mining Corporation
167 SCRA 736 In the case at bar petitioners did not present any (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working
FACTS: competent evidence relative to the law and custom of at its copper mines underground operations
1. Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Calooocan City China on at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of
where he was then residing leaving behind real and marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of
personal (brother) cannot be considered as proof of China’s law the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that
properties here in the Philippines. or custom Philex, in violation of government rules and
2. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.,) filed a on marriage not only because they are self serving regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take
petition for the grant of letters or administration evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing the required precautions for the protection of
alleging that that they are the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al
they were the children of the deceased with Asuncion competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure moved to claim their benefits pursuant to
Gillego. to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the Workmen‘s Compensation Act before the Workmen‘s
3. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao Kee the Compensation Commission. They also
et al.,) alleging that they were the legitimate family. validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for
4. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat additional damages. Philex invoked that they
married to Yao Kee and that their 3 offsprings were the cannot be
can no longer be sued because the petitioners have Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because partition of the estate. Juan Miciano,
already claimed benefits under the WCA. the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a
Issue: WCA. scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo‘s
the same time sue. ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim opposition is based on the fact that the
Ruling: benefits and at the same time sue. partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. Joseph Brimo‘s will which are not in
If they filed for benefits under the HELD: accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. which reason they are void as being in
civil case before the regular courts. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then be prohibited from proceeding with a civil case before Issue:
they would also be estopped from claiming the regular courts. On the contrary, if they sued before Whether or not the national law of the testator is the
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that the civil courts then they would also be prohibited from one to govern his testamentary
Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency claiming benefits under the WCA. disposition.
due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of Ruling:
such then they may have not availed of such a The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in
remedy. However, if in case they‘ll win in the lower from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had his will that Philippine laws must
court whatever award may be granted, the they been aware of such then they may have not availed govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must
amount given to them under the WCA should be of such a remedy. The SC ruled that the dismissal of the not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would case in the lower court be reversed and case is Therefore, the testator‘s national law must govern in
go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of remanded for further proceedings. accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
the law may be defeated. Idolatrous Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human However, if in case the petitioners win in the lower will expressly said that ―it be made and
being. The spirit of the law insures man‘s court, whatever award may be granted, the amount disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The Philippine Island‖, this condition, described
letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life. SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not
the book in this case then the purpose of the law may imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
be defeated. (Refer to excerpt below) legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
PERFECTO FLORESCA VS PHILEX testator otherwise provide. Impossible
G.R. No. L-30642 “WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER OF DISMISSAL conditions are further defined as those contrary to law
April 30, 1985 IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS or good morals. Thus, national law of the
136 SCRA 141 REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR The court approved the scheme of partition submitted
FACTS: OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE by the judicial administrator, in such
On June 28, 1967, some employees of Philex Mining TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN’S manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
Corporation died as a result of the cave-in that buried COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.” legatees.
them in the tunnels of the copper mine (Tuba, Benguet)
during underground operations. Allegedly, Philex was in Justice Gutierrez dissenting TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN
violation of government rules and regulations for No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under MICIANO, Administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs
negligently and deliberately failing to take the WCA. If employers are already liable to ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant
the required precautions for the protection of the lives pay benefits under the WCA they should not be 50 Phil. 867
of its men working underground. compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or get November 01, 1927
insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by
The Petitioners (Floresca et al) are the heirs of the the WCA can only be properly removed by the Facts:
deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation. legislature NOT the SC. Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of Juan Miciano,
Petitioners moved to claim their benefits pursuant to administrator of the estate of the deceased Joseph
the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Brimo. The property was said to be in the Philippines
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION, EXCEPTION and the testatrix wished that the distribution of his
petitioned before the regular courts and sued Philex for MICIANO vs. BRIMO properties and everything in connection with it be in
additional damages. G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927 accordance with the Philippine laws. Oppositor-
Facts: appellant Brimo claimed that the will of the testatrix is
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality. The errors he (oppositor) assigned in his
opposition were the following: (1) the approval of said
scheme partition, (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance, (3) denial of the motion for reconsideration
of the order approving the partition, (4) the approval of
the purchase made by the Pietro Lanza of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business, and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws
are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and
the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza
until the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine laws shall be applied on the
estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen who have
resided for a considerable length of time in the
Philippines.
Held:
Article 10 of the old Civil Code of the Philippine law was
applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, where it was
provided, “nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of succession as well
as to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated.” However,
the oppositor did not prove, though was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, that said
testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with
the Turkish laws. Therefore, there is no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testatrix was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed; thus, the approval of the
scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it
is directed that the distribution of this estate be made
in such a manner as to include the herein appellant
Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
National marketing corporation V Tecson
GR no. L-20131
27 August 1969
Facts:
December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation
filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701 on
the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization
Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years
ago. Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said
complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of that and prescription of action. The
court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards
the article 13 of the civil code. However, National
Marketing Corporation appealed to the court of appeals
from such order. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964
is a leap year, they insisted that a 3year4 means a
3calendar year4 and a leap year would still be counted
as 1 year even if it consists of 366 days. The case
reached its conclusion with the appellant5s theory with
regards to the article 13 of the civil code.
Issues:
Whether or not the term 3year4 as used in the article 13
of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
Ruling:
The term 3year4 as used in the article 13 of the civil
code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be
unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to
the policy embodied in the revised administrative code,
this may be done through legislative process and not by
judicial decree.
ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed
Industries Inc. A Pacific BankingCorporation Check was
paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks.
Check waslater dishonored for the reason “Account
Closed.” Company traced source of check and
laterdiscovered that the signature belonged to one
Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made anextrajudical demand
upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check
or that thesignature was his. Company filed a complaint
against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It waslater
discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene
Baltao III, who manages thebusiness establishment, EL
Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform
Albenson of suchinformation. Rather the father filed
complaint for damages against Albenson.
ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against
Albenson Enterprise.
RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners
didn’t have the intent to cause damageto the
respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what
was due to them.
There wasno abuse of right on the part of Albenson on
accusing Baltao of BP 22.Albenson Corp. honestly
believed that it was private respondent who issued
check based onff inquiries:
SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was
Eugene Baltao
Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in
fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and theIII.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of
Albenson: there must be proof that:
the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate aperson and
that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant
knowing that his chargeswere false and
groundlessElements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1. there is a legal right or duty
2.exercised in bad faith
3.for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
1.there is an act which is legal
2.but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order or public policy
3.it is done with intent to injure
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to
him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to
pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to
make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In
the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or
bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that
the adverse result of anaction does not
per se
make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of damages, for the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
 h u mi l i a t e a person and Violeta Filart, a long-time friend,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision -that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant approached him and invited him to a party at the
of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.C.V. No. 14948 knowing that his charges were false penthouse where the hotel‘s former manager‘s
dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. and groundless.Elements of abuse of right under Article birthday was being celebrated. He consented and
Costs against respondent Baltao. 19: carried the latter‘s present. At the party, when he
1. There is a legal right or duty was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one
2 . E x e r c i s e d i n b a d f a i t of the petitioners, approached him and asked
Case Digest 3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those
Albenson vs. Court of Appeals Elements under Article 21: around the buffet table. Then, a Makati
G.R. No. 88694 1 . T h e r e i s a n a c t wh i c h i s l e g a l policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in
Decided On: January 11, 1993 2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public leaving the penthouse.
Ponente: BIDIN, J.: order or Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to
Facts: Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to public policy leave but not in the manner he
Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific 3 . It i s d o n e wi t h i n t e n t t o i n j u r e a p e r s o claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish
Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against n wh o h a s n o t b e e n his food and leave the party as the celebrant
the account of EL paidanobligationowedtohimwillnat wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not
Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason u r a l l y s e e k wa ys t o invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied
―Account Closed.‖ Company traced compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for Amay Bisaya‘s claim that she invited him to the party.
source of check and later d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e s petitioners to find means to Issue:
i g n a t u r e b e l o n g e d t o o n e make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In Whether or not petitioner Lim‘s conduct was abusive
E u g e n i o B a l t a o . A l b e n s o n m a d e a n the absence of a enough to make the petitioners liable for
extrajudical demand upon Baltao but wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages caused to plaintiff.
later denied that he issued the check or that the damages Ruling:
signature was his. Company filed a cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which
complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was action does not Mr. Reyes might have suffered
later discovered that private per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor through Ms. Lim‘s exercise of a legitimate right done
respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the to the payment within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
business establishment, EL of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose must be his to bear alone.
Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform a penalty on the right to The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the
Albenson of such information. Rather the father litigate petitioners. It was from his confession
filed complaint for damages against Albenson. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very
Issue: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages of the Court of Appeals in C.A. close that they nearly kissed each other.
against Albenson Enterprise. G.R.C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff
Ruling: Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. when she requested the latter to leave the
petitioners didn‘t have the intent to cause damage to Costs against respondent Baltao. party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be
the heard by him only and there could have been
respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It
was due to them. was plaintiff‘s reaction to the request that
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on must have made the other guests aware of what
HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES
accusing Baltao of BP 22.Albenson transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left
GR. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent the party as requested, there was no need for the police
Facts:
who issued check based on the following to take him out. Therefore, we find the
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding
inquiries: petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of
the reversing decision of the Court
-SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was the Civil Code.
of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus,
Eugene Baltao making the petitioners liable for damages
-Bank said signature belonged to EB through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing
-Eugene Baltao did not do his part in clarifying that NIKKO HOTEL vs. REYES
upon them P200,000 as exemplary
there were in fact 3 Eugene Baltao‘s: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as
Jr., Sr. and the III. FACTS:
attorney‘s fees.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee
Albenson: there must be proof that: coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by
at the Nikko Hotel lobby on
-t h e p r o s e c u t i o n wa s p r o mp t e d b y a s i n i Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According
October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr.
s t e r d e s i g n t o v e x a n d to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday
party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart
agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits,
the latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon
as it was ready but to his embarrassment, Ruby Lim,
Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a
loud voice enough to be heard by the people around
them. He was escorted by a policeman out of the
hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to
his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff.
Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s
sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as
the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with
Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally
with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the
phone and doesn’t want to interrupt. She asked Mr.
Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically
ordered that the party should be intimate consisting
only of those who part of the list. She was even polite
in asking the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the
party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked
how close Ms.Lim was when she approached him at the
buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because
we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close
proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the
request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who
made a scene causing everybody to know what
happened.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr.
Reyes to leave the party.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act
abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the
part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to
ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in
requesting him to leave the party. Petitioners cannot be
held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20
of the Civil Code.
Under the doctrine of violenti non fit injuria, to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury. The
doctrine refers to self-inflicted injuries or to consent to
it which precludes the recovery of damages by one
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM,
petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY
BISAYA”, respondent
G.R. No. 154259
February 28, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals
in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the
petitioners liable for damages through the abusive
conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000
as exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and
P10,000 as attorney’s fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya)
was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October
13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta
Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited
him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel’s
former manager’s birthday was being celebrated. He
consented and carried the latter’s present. At the party,
when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby
Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked
him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those
around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman
accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving
the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she
asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he
claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish
his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the
party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On
the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s claim
that she invited him to the party.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct
was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for
damages caused to plaintiff.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any
damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through
Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the
bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear
alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-
motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession
that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very
close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering
the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she
requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent
that the request was meant to be heard by him only and
there could have been no intention on her part to cause
him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the
request that must have made the other guests aware of
what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left
the party as requested, there was no need for the police
to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not
guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution
dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
QUISUMBING vs MERALCO
GR No. 142943, 3 April 2002
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are
owners of a house located at Greenmeadows Avenue,
Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995,
defendant’s inspectors were conducting a routine on the
spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house.
Permission was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. It
was found that the meter had been tampered with and
the information was relayed to the secretary who
conveyed the information to the owners of the house.
The inspectors brought the meter to their laboratory for
further verifications. If proven that the meter was
indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily
disconnect the electric services.
The inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the
findings of the laboratory. And unless they pay the
amount of P178, 875.01 representing the difference in
the bill, their electric supply will be disconnected.
The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
despite the immediate reconnection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
 1. MERALCO acted without due process and lack
of regard for Quisumbings’ rights and
reputation.
2. The Quisumbings be entitled for damages.
HELD:
Moral damages may be recovered when rights of
individuals including right against the deprivation of
property without due process of law are violated.
Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by
way of example or correction for public.
The Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in
preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any
action must be done in strict observance of the rights of
the people. Meralco may immediately disconnect service
in cases of meter tampering, but it has to be personally
witnessed and attested by an officer of the law or by a
duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory
Board. During the inspection, no government official or
ERB representative was present.
Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to pay respondent
the billing differential 0f P193, 332. 96 while MERALCO
was ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary
damages including attorney’s fees.
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING,
petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO), respondent
G.R. No. 142943
April 3, 2002
Facts:
This is a petition for review filed by
petitioners regarding the February 1, 2000 Decision and
the April 10, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
where the decision of the trial court is set aside, the
complaint against MERALCO is dismissed, and plaintiffs-
appellees are ordered to pay defendant-appellant the
differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the
value of used but unregistered electrical consumption.
Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing,
plaintiffs-appellees in this case, are the owners of a
house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue,
Quezon City which they bought from Ms. Carmina
Serapio Santos. On March 3, 1995, around 9am,
defendant-appellant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel
C. Orlina were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot
inspection of all single phase meters at the house owned
by the spouses. The inspectors performed their standard
operating procedure by first asking permission from the
secretary of the couple before they proceed to the
inspection of the house. Later, the inspectors found out
that there were few ‘illegal’ markings on the meter
which made defendant-appellant temporarily disconnect
electrical services that will only be restored unless the
couple will pay P178, 875 representing the differential
bill. However, at around 2pm, the electric service was
reconnected as instructed by defendant-appellant’s
officer. Plaintiff-appellees filed a complaint for
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction despite the immediate
reconnection.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of the defendant-
appellant’s inspectors in immediately disconnecting the
electrical service of MERALCO constituted a violation of
rights of the plaintiffs-appellees, making the respondent
liable to pay damages to petitioner.
Held:
Yes. Respondent had no legal right to
immediately disconnect petitioners’ electrical supply
without observing the requisites of law which, in turn,
are akin to due process. Public utilities have a clear
duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress
the rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that
militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair
play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an
action for damages. Such is the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision is MODIFIED as
follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the
billing differential of P193, 322.96; while respondent is
ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages,
P50,000 as exemplary damages, and P50,000 as
attorney’s fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and
HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
176 SCRA 778
August 25, 1989
Facts:
10 November 1972, herein private respondent
Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager,
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He
reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T.
Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and
General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the
report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one
suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When
Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called
him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a
lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his
handwriting, signature and initials for police
investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private
investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete;
the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports
from Manila police investigators and from the Metro
Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of
Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of
Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private
respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his
employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective
December 1972. He sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry
wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias,
then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in
favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay
him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as
moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages
to private respondent.
Held:
Yes. The Court, after examining the record and
considering certain significant circumstances, finds that
all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry
told Tobias to just confess or else the company would
file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in
jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You
Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias
(“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to
RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe
Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal
cases by petitioners against private respondent. All
these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious
and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt
without basis and the pattern of harassment during the thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual preparation for the bar exam, he took a
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30,
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. moral damages, twenty thousand pesos 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU.
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and classes and was not able to take the bar
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral
09055 is AFFIRMED. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages shock, mental anguish, and serious anxiety,
to private respondent. besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and nights when he was not able to take the
Case Digest considering certain significant circumstances, finds 1988 bar examinations due to UE‘s negligence.
Globe Mackay vs. CA that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that Issue:
G.R. No. 81262 they invoke, causing damage to private Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a
Decided on: August 25, 1989 respondent and for which the latter must now be student into believing JADER satisfied
Ponente: CORTES, J.: indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just all the requirements for graduation when such is not the
Facts: 10 November 1972, herein private respondent confess or else the company would file a hundred more case. Can he claim moral damages?
Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and cases against him until he landed in jail; Ruling:
administrative assistant to the engineering operations his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of
manager, discovered fictitious purchases Filipinos cannot be trusted.‖) as well as negligence and this liable to respondent for
and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe against Tobias (―crook‖, and ―swindler‖); the writing of the latter‘s actual damages. Educational institutions are
Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias duty-bound to inform the students of their
several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire
immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the filing of six criminal cases by from the former. However, respondent should
the Executive Vice President and General Manager petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal not have been awarded moral damages though JADER
Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, that petitioners are motivated by malicious suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he
Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause was informed that he could not graduate and will not be
ordered him one week forced leave. damage to private respondent. The imputation allowed to take the bar examinations as
When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment what Court of Appeals held because it‘s also
called him a ―crook‖ and a ―swindler‖, during the investigations of Tobias transgress respondent‘s duty to verify for himself whether he has
ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for
specimen of his handwriting, signature and of the Civil Code. the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his
hired a private investigator. Private the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV affairs specifically those in relation with his
investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests No. 09055 is AFFIRMED. academic achievement are in order. Before taking the
yielded negative results; reports from bar examinations, it doesn‘t only entail a
Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila mental preparation on the subjects but there are other
Police Chief Document Examiner are in prerequisites such as documentation and
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal‘s Office submission of requirements which prospective examinee
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER
of Manila a total of six (6) criminal must meet. Wherefore, the assailed
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
cases against private respondent Tobias, but were decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
Facts:
dismissed. modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-
Tobias received a notice of termination of his respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four
19988. During his last year, 1st
employment from petitioners in January 1973, Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal
semester, he failed to take the regular final
effective December 1972. He sought employment with interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of
examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an
the Republic Telephone Company filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for
(RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's
removal of the incomplete grade given by
stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe fees; and the costs of the suit. The award
Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was
Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil of moral damages is deleted.
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
case for damages anchored on alleged
the payment of required fees. He took the exam on
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988 the
petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
professor gave him a grade of 5.The commencement
Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL,
exercise of UE College of law was held April
rendered judgment in favor of private respondents
16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In
respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty
133 SCRA 179 219 SCRA 115 respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a
November 14, 1984 FACTS: complaint for damages against petitioner for the
Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
Facts: 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged alleges in said complaint that she is 20
This case is about the recovery of damages breach of their agreement to get married. She met the years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
for a wrongful advertisement in the December 15, 1968 petitioner in Dagupan, he was an Iranian medical character and reputation duly respected
and January 5, 1969 issue of the Sunday Times where St. exchange student. He later courted her and proposed in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is
Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano
of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. to secure approval of her parents. Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
Arcadio. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him in student, before August 20, 1987 the latter
to privacy. his apartment. She filed a complaint because the courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his
Trial court through Judge Leuterio petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He love on the condition that they get married;
awarded P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner
damages and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Had it not been in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became forced her to live with him in the Lozano
a late action for publication of rectification and pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week
apology––which only took place 15 April 1969 issue of abort the baby. before the filing of complaint, petitioner‘s
Manila Times–– Doctor Aramil could have not suffered Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated
mental anguish and his income would have not been Marilou to not live with him since he is already married and threatened to kill her; as a result of the
reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Petitioner to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage
assailed the decision of the Appellate Court when it proposed marriage, neither sought consent and approval agreement and asked her not to live with him
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Furthermore, the of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou anymore and that the petitioner is already married to
corporation contends that the decision is contrary to law to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived someone in Bacolod City. Private
and that the case was decided in a way not in him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
conformity with the rulings of this Court and still respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand,
continues to argue that the case is not covered by actual expenses. petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to
article 26. ISSUE: or agreed to be married with the private
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to respondent and denied all allegations against him. After
Issue: cause claim for damages. trial on the merits, the lower court
Whether or not the case filed against St. HELD: ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent
Louis Realty Corporation is covered by Article 26 of the damages.
new Civil Code. Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code
wrong. The court held that when a man uses his applies to the case at bar.
Held: promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
Yes, this case is covered by Article 26 of his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
the Civil Code. injures the woman. In that instance, the court found Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts
negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences to surrender her virtue and womanhood. in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to for the untold number of moral wrongs
Through that negligence, persons who know the marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the with the woman and actual damages should be paid for enumerate and punish in the statute
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines
residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of quasi-delicts thus:
from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly the country. ―Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of there being fault or negligence, is
income and mental anguish. obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Case Digest negligence, if there is no pre-existing
Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS COURT OF APPEALS 219 contractual relation between the parties, is called a
petitioner. SCRA 115 quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 97336 of this Chapter.‖
Decided on: February 19, 1993 In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.: the court held that where a man‘s
GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the
1987, without the assistance of counsel, private acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter se is not an actionable wrong. The P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage litigations. Costs against appellee.
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, to deceive a woman to consent to his
in reality, no intention of marrying her and malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO
that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive the woman. In that instance, the court PE, defendant-appellee
device to entice or inveigle her to accept found that petitioner‘s deceptive promise to marry led 5 SCRA 200
him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify Marilou to surrender her virtue and May 30, 1962
the award of damages pursuant to Article womanhood.
21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to Facts:
but because of the fraud and deceit behind marry was a deceptive ploy to have This is an appeal brought before the Court of
it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages Appeals upon the decision of the trial court dismissing
which followed thereafter. It is essential should be paid for the wedding preparation the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants, who are the
however, that such injury should have been committed expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita, based on their
in a manner contrary to morals, good disregard of the laws of the country. claim that defendant Alfonso––a married man who works
customs, or public policy. Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding as an agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory,
damages to the respondent. staying in Gasan, Marinduque, an adopted son of a
Chinese named Pe Beco who is a collateral relative of
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY Lolita’s father––deliberately and in bad faith tried to win
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS Case Digest Lolita’s affection, causing moral damages to plaintiff.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 Pe vs Pe 5 SCRA 200 Because of the frequency of his visits to
Facts: G.R. No. L-17396 Lolita’s family who has allowed free access because he
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint Decided on: May 30, 1962 was a collateral relative and was considered as a
dated October 27, 1987 for Ponente: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: member of her family, the two eventually fell in love
damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of FACTS: Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs
their agreement to get married. She met the agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in both in Gasan, and Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian GasanMarinduque who was treated like a son by barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
medical exchange student who later courted CecilioPe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access forbidden from going to their house and even from
Marilou‘s house to secure approval of her to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was defendant frequented the house of Lolita national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love
a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
filed a complaint because the petitioner started teach him how to pray the rosary. parental home on April 14, 1957.
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the Eventually they fell in love with each other.
respondent in the apartment while he was in Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and Issue:
school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and Whether or not defendant caused moral
pregnant but the petitioner administered a in bad faith tried to win Lolita‘s affection. The case on damages to plaintiff, when as a married man, he
drug to abort the baby. moral damages was dismissed. pursued his love affair with Lolita.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita‘s
Marilou to not live with him since he family on the ground of moral, good custom and Held:
is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed public policy due to their illicit affair. Yes. No other conclusion can be drawn from
that he never proposed marriage or agreed to HELD: Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita‘s family in this chain of events than that defendant not only
be married neither sought consent and approval of a manner contrary to morals, good customs and deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded
Marliou‘s parents. He claimed that he asked public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent
Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter code. The defendant took advantage of the of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has
deceived him by stealing money and his trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
passport. The private respondent prayed for damages reason to get close with Lolita. The considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he
and reimbursements of actual expenses. wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering has committed an injury to Lolita’s family contrary to
Issue: the fact that he is a married man. morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
cause for damages. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
Ruling: plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and
P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations. absence of proof on this point, the court may not
Costs against appellee. presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes WASSMER vs. VELEZ
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
CECILIO PE ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply Facts:
G.R. No.L-17396 May 30, 1962 fell in love with each other, not only without any desire Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their
Facts: on their part, but also against their better mutual promise of love, decided to get
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept.
Lolita Pe. At the time of her to both of them. This is specially so with 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his
and unmarried. Defendant is a married man love with defendant who is a married man." mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But
and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told
Factory. He used to stay in the town of Issue: her that nothing has changed, that he is
Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to moral, returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not
occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents compensatory, exemplary and corrective appear nor was he heard from again.
in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a damages. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer
Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral and was declared in default.
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the Ruling: Issue:
similarity in their family name, defendant The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a which defendant tried to win Lolita's Ruling:
member of their family. Sometime in 1952, affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or marry. As stated, mere breach of
that he wanted her to teach him how to trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with fall in love with him. This is shown by the formally set a wedding and go through all the
each other and conducted clandestine trysts not fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita the pretext that he wanted her to teach him the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
used to teach in a barrio school. They how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
exchanged love notes with each other the contents of visits to the latter's family who was allowed contrary to good customs for which defendant
which reveal not only their infatuation for free access because he was a collateral relative and was must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
each other but also the extent to which they had carried considered as a member of her family, the Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that
their relationship. The rumors about their two eventually fell in love with each other and "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan in a manner that is contrary to morals,
sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio good customs or public policy shall compensate the
forbidden from going to their house and from further school. When the rumors about their illicit latter for the damage."
seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a was forbidden from going to their house
Chinese national. The affair between defendant and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed Case Digest
and Lolita continued nonetheless. deportation proceedings against defendant who is a WASSMER VS VELEZ 12 SCRA 648
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his G.R. No. L-20089
brothers and sisters at their residence at love affairs with Lolita until she Decided on: December 26, 1964
54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other Ponente: BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Lolita disappeared from said house. After conclusion can be drawn from this chain of FACTS: Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following
she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing events than that defendant not only deliberately, but their mutual promise of love, decided to get
and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to her
paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, illicit relations with her. The wrong he has that they have to postpone their wedding because his
written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable mother opposed it. And on the next day he
in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be considering the fact that he is a married man. sent her the following telegram ―Nothing changed rest
that of defendant's. The disappearance of Lolita was Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a assured returning very soon apologize
reported to the police authorities and the NBI manner contrary to morals, good customs mama papa love Paking‖. Thereafter Velez did not
but up to the present there is no news or trace of her and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the appear nor was he heard from again, sued by
whereabouts. The trial court said: "In the new Civil Code.
Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no answer and was YES. Breech of promise to marry per se is not an marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
declared in default. The record reveals that actionable wrong however, that the extent to which defendant married one Romanita Perez.
on August 23, 1954, plaintiff and defendant applied for acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable
a license to contract marriage, which was impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code under our laws for breach of promise to marry.
subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or HELD: It appearing that because of the defendant-
distributed to relatives, friends and injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, appellant‘s seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee
acquaintances. The bride-to-be‘s trousseau, party good customs or public policy shall compensate the overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual
dresses and other apparel for the important latter for the damage.” desires in spite of her age and self-control.
occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor Plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract In the present case, the court is unable to say that
and the flower girl were prepared, but marriage, which was subsequently issued and their petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
two days before the wedding he never returned and was wedding was set. Necessary preparation and publicity only because he is approximately ten years younger but
never heard from again. were done only for the defendant to walk out of it when also because the CFI found that
ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of the matrimony is about to be solemnized. This is complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner
mere breach of promise to marry. contrary to good customs for which defendant must be because overwhelmed by her love for him she
HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of held answerable in damages. wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their
promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New engagement even before they had the benefit of
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases clergy.
wedding and go through all the abovedescribed mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. This Court’s
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when opinion, considering the particular circumstances of this
the matrimony is about to be case, P15, 000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and deemed to be a reasonable award. FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for APPEALS ET AL.
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. Case Digest Facts:
The lower court‘s judgment is hereby affirmed. HERMOSISIMA VS COURT OF APPEALS 103 Phil 629 Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917.
G.R. No. L-14628 Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in
Decided on: September 30, 1960 the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and
WASSMER vs. VELEZ Ponente: CONCEPCION, J.: petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
12 SCRA 648 FACTS: An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, than she, used to go around together and were regarded
FACTS: Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as as engaged, although he had made no
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up
married. They applied and acquired marriage license acknowledgment of her child, Chris teaching and became a life insurance
and set the wedding on September 4, 1954. Necessary Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy
publication and preparations including sending off well as for support of said child and moral developed among her and the petitioner, since one
invitations were done. damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies;
Two days before the scheduled wedding, Francisco went Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
home to his province without properly notifying Beatriz. expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as
He sent a telegram that they have to postpone the having ever promised to marry apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad
wedding because his mother opposes it. He gave an complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
assurance that he will return but he never did. July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Beatriz sued for damages, Francisco filed no answer and teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a
was declared in default. The Court ordered Francisco to younger than her used to go around together and private maternity and clinic. However,
pay for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages were regarded as engaged, although he made no subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married
and attorney’s fees. Francisco filed a petition for relief promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954,
from orders and motion for a new trial. The court then up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris
proposed for amicable settlement. where intimacy developed between her and Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages
Francisco contended that his failure to marry beatriz petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when after coming for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the
was due to fortuitous event and circumstances beyond from the movies, they had sexual paternity of child and expressed willingness to
his control. intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he support the latter, but denied having ever promised to
ISSUE: was then attached as apprentice pilot. In marry the complainant. Upon her motion,
Can a person be held liable for walking out of his own February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to
wedding? pregnant, whereupon he promised to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a
HELD: month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to
P30.00 a month. working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at HELD:
The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and
the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the having sexual intercourse with Amelita, convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact
pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to of that, they repeated their sexual contact. of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of
the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even
(P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day from work. established on direct examination as she merely
of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the
the sum of four thousand five hundred moral damages, acknowledging months of September, October and November, 1974.
pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory Michael as Ivan‘s illegitimate child and giving monthly More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to
damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) support to the latter which was set aside Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated
as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand by CA. that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was
pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for ISSUE: Whether or Not the alleged illegitimate child is the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.
plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken entitled for the monthly support. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed HELD: Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and
this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory convincing evidence her claim that Ivan
damages and the moral damages, which were Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAÑO
increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
Issue: first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial FACTS:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under point that was not even established on Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly
our laws, for breach of promise to direct examination as she merely testified that she had married by a military chaplain in one of Pastor’s friend’s
marry? sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months house. Upon learning about the secret marriage,
Ruling: of September, October and November, 1974. More so, Vicenta’s parents arranged for them to be married
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in Amelita admitted that she was attracted to properly in a church so as to validate their marriage as
the present case thus the petitioner Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated advised by a priest. Vicenta opposed to a second
is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is that passion and not alleged promise to marriage after receiving an anonymous letter alleging
approximately ten (10) years younger than marriage was the moving force to submit herself with that Pastor and is having an amorous relationship with
the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of Ivan. matchmaker Pacita Noel. Vicenta continued to live with
age, and as highly enlightened as a former The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. her parents and Pastor went back to work in Manila.
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are Although still solicitous of her husband’s welfare in her
supposed to be — when she became intimate with letters, she was not as endearing and becomes less and
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, CONSTANTINO vs. MENDEZ less until they became estranged.
because, the court of first instance found that, 209 SCRA 18 Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it
Persons and Family Relation 89 FACTS: was dismissed for non-prosecution because she never
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as went to any of the set hearings. Without informing her
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint application that she was single and left for the United
even before they had the benefit of clergy." on damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant States. She filed for divorce (1950) against Pastor in
Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan Nevada on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely
damages. invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage mental in character” which the Nevada court granted
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita. even when she was not yet an American citizen (1958).
Afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against
Case Digest of that, they repeated their sexual contact. Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents Mamerto and Mena
Constantino vs Mendez 209 SCRA 18 Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
G.R. No. 57227 from work. discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
Decided on: May 14, 1992 Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and alienating her affections. He asked for legal separation
Ponente: BIDIN, J.: moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s and one million pesos in damages.
FACTS: Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the ISSUES:
represented by Amelita, her mother, sought latter which was set aside by CA. 1. Whether or not the divorce decree granted by
monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia‘s ISSUE: the Nevada Court is valid
complaint on damages. The latter and 2. Can the parents be held liable for the failure of
Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was Whether or not the alleged illegitimate child is entitled the marriage
for the monthly support.
HELD:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party.
That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-
habitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one party entitles the other to recover
damages;
That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs Cleofe Janiola and
Hon. Arthur Famini, GR No 184861, June 30, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las
Piñas City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Afterwards, private respondent, together with her
husband, filed a complaint against petitioner for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for
damages. Thereafter, private respondent filed for a
Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages.
ISSUE
WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the inferior court
when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on the basis o f “prejudicial
question” in Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.[
RULING
Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code.
The Court does not agree with private respondent’s
argument that a prejudicial question exists when the
civil action is filed either before the institution of the
criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal
action and that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in
that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a
prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded
the filing of the civil case.
it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a
“change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of
law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning
of the provision from that it originally had.”In the
instant case, the phrase, “previously instituted,” was
inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved
in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal
action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the
insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term
criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for
the amendments except to qualify the relationship of
the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction
that “a statute should be construed not only to be
consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other
laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system.”This
principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.[17]In other words, every effort
must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws.
It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort
must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of
law. The phrase “previously instituted civil action” in
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not
susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause
“before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed” in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however,
be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the
criminal action may be filed during the preliminary
investigation with the public prosecutor or court
conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the
court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned
laws. Thus, under the principles of statutory
construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the
Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to
all the relevant provisions of law.
PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060, September
13, 2010 Facts: Respondent, Maria Chrysantine
Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide against
petitioner, Joselito R. Pimentel. The Information for
Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004 and was
raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004. The pre-
trial and trial was set on 14 February 2005. She also
filed on 5 November 2004, a petition, dated 4 November
2004, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity Petitioner received summons to
appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City
on 7 February 2005, for the pre-trial and trial of the
Civil Case. He then filed an urgent motion to suspend
the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question
asserting that the relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City. The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of
the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case before it. The Court of Appeals also denied the
petition holding that the issue in the criminal case for
frustrated parricide differs from the issue in the civil
action for annulment of marriage. It ruled that even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent would
be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal
case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed. At the time of
the commission of the crime, the marriage is still
subsisting. Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the
action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. Ruling: The elements of a
prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed, were not met. Civil action must be
instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.
In this case, the civil case for annulment was filed after
the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a
prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension
of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question
when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case. The relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide. However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether RTC DENIED the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply ground of the existence of a Prejudicial Question Prejudicial Question Definition:
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in • One that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In Motion for Reconsideration was also denied logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated • cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts CA ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
of execution which would have killed respondent as a and respondent would be declared void, it would be crime but so intimately connected with it that it
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
by reason of causes independent of petiti declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
oner’s crime of frustrated parricide had already been only that said case involves facts intimately related to
will. At the time of the commission of the alleged committed. all that is required for the charge of those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The frustrated parricide is that at the time of the based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
petition in Civil Case is granted, will have no effect on Issue the accused would necessarily be determined. The
the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the : Whether or not the resolution of the action for relationship between the offender and the victim
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that distinguished the crime of parricide from murder or
marriage between petitioner and respondent is warrants the suspension of the criminal case for homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable frustrated parricide against the petitioner marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
since at the time of the commission of the alleged Held in the criminal case of parricide. The issue in the civil
crime, he was still married to respondent. : case is whether petitioner is psychologically
NO Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
Procedure: obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
Section 7. accused killed the victim. In this case, since the
Criminal Procedure: Rule 111 (Civil Aspect of a Criminal Elements of Prejudicial Question petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the
Case), Prejudicial Questions . - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution
Pimentel v. Pimentel previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar which would have killed respondent as a consequence
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010 or intimately related to the issue raised in the but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
Facts subsequent criminal action and (b)(b) the resolution of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of
: such issue determines whether or not the criminal the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
• action may proceed. The Rule is clear that the civil respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
October 25, 2004: Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap action must be instituted first before the filing of the their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime
(respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide criminal action. In this case: hat was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC • marriage. In short, even if the marriage between the
of Quezon City (Criminal Case) The Information for the Criminal Case was dated 30 petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could
• August 2004. still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
February 7, 2005: Petitioner received summons to • commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
appear before the RTC of Antipolo for the pre-trial and It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as respondent. The Court ruled in Tenebro v. CA that
trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 for Declaration of Nullity per the stamped date of receipt on the Information “there is a recognition written into the law itself that
of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the • such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
ground of psychological incapacity (Civil Case) The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court
• for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005 declared that “a declaration of the nullity of the second
February 11, 2005: Petitioner filed an urgent motion to • marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
suspend the proceedings before the RTC of Quezon City Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws
(Criminal Case) on the ground of the existence of a on 7 February 2005. are concerned.”
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20
• March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
• Respondent’s petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was SP No. 91867.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November
the offender and the victim is a key element in 2004 Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed
parricide, the outcome of the Civil Case would have a after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated JULIANA P. YAP, Petitioner,
bearing in the Criminal Case filed against him parricide. As such, he requirement of Section 7, Rule G.R. No. 101236
• 111 was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
vs. (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or but the court ruled that ―no amendment was
January 30, 1992 not the criminal action may proceed. allowable since the original complaint averred no cause
MATIN PARAS AND ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises of action‖.
Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South in a case the resolution of which is a logical Issue:
Cotabato, Respondent. antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen‘s
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The complaint.
prejudicial question must be determinative of the Ruling:
case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and Yes. The Supreme Court held that ―a conceive child,
According to Yap, Paras sold IN 1971 to her his share resolve the question must be lodged in another court although as yet unborn, is given by law
in the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale was or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years and separate from the crime but so intimately favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
later, (in 1990), Paras sold the same property to connected with it that it determines the guilt or 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines‖. The conceive
Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced innocence of the accused. child may also receive donations and be
by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. It was held that "for a civil case to be considered accepted by those persons who will legally represent
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the them if they were already born as prescribed in
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a suspension of the criminal action pending the Article 742.
complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with determination of the civil action, it must appear not Lower court‘s theory on article 291 of the civil code
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General only that the civil case involves the same facts upon declaring that support is an obligation
Santos City. On the same date, she filed a complaint which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that of parents and illegitimate children does not
for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
Trial Court of General Santos City. would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or article 40 aforementioned.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor innocence of the accused". Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao
instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Indeed, the civil case at bar does not involve the being a married man forced a woman
Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan- same facts upon which the criminal action is based. not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a
Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo There was no motion for suspension in the case at clear violation of Carmen‘s rights. Thus, she is
D. Barcelona, Sr., who dismissed the criminal case on bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
the ground that the issue in the civil case is had not been informed of the defense Paras was WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and
prejudicial to the criminal case for estafa. raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not set aside. Let the case be
Issue: Is the Judge correct in motu proprio dismissing have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
the criminal case? action would determine the guilt or innocence of the conformable to this decision. Costs against
Ruling: The judge is wrong. First, he should not have accused in the criminal case. appellee Felix Icao.
dismissed the criminal case but only suspended it.
Second, it was wrong for him to dismiss the criminal
case outright, since it requires a motion first from the WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT Case Digest
proper party. QUIMIGING vs. ICAO Quimguing vs Icao 34 SCRA 132
The rule provides: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 2970 G.R. No. 26795
prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of Facts: Decided On: July 31, 1970
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J.:
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in defendant, were neighbors in Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents,
the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action Despite the fact that Icao was married, he from the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff complaint for support and damages and
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at several times under force and intimidation and request for amendment of complaint. Quimiguing
any time before the prosecution rests. Third, there is without her consent. As a result, Carmen became averred that the then already married Felix Icao
actually no prejudicial question here. pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and succeeded in having sexual relations with her through
Anent the issue of prejudicial question, the rule as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff force and intimidation. As a result, she
provides that: claimed for support at P120 per month, became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal damages and attorney‘s fees. The complaint was Icao and had to stop studying. She then
Procedure as amended provides: dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney‘s
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff fees.
essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the moved to amend the complaint that as a The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl light of Quimiguing‘s failure to allege the
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The
lower court dismissed the case and ISSUE:
subsequently denied further amendment to the Whether plaintiff has a right to claim support and Issue:
complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed damages. Whether or not the case is covered by Article 40
for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of HELD: of the New Civil Code which will entitle the child to
action. claim support through the mother.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, yet
for support and damages from defendant despite unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its Held:
failure to allege fact of birth in complaint. own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly Yes.
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers
right to support of the child she was carrying Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given
and an independent cause of action for damages. This is donations and be accepted by those persons who will birth to a baby girl. The Supreme Court says that since,
because the Civil Code (Art. 40) legally represent them if they were already born as as provided in Article 40 of the New Civil Code (the
recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn prescribed in Article 742. conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
child, which includes its right to support Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code favorable to it, provided, it be born later with the
from its progenitors, even it is only ―en ventre de sa declaring that support is an obligation of parents and conditions specified in following article), petitioner
mere.‖ Article 742 of the same Code holds illegitimate children does not contemplate support to Quimiguing’s child, since time of conception, and as
that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations children as yet unborn violates article 40 having fulfilled the requirement of having been born
through persons that legally represent it. aforementioned. later, has a right to support from its progenitors,
Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao particularly of the defendant-appellee.
29 of the Spanish Code also being a married man forced a woman not his wife to Thus, independently of the right to Support of the
further strengthen the case for reversal of order. yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of
Additionally, ―for a married man to force a woman not Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim action for damages under the terms of the complaint;
his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes compensation for the damage caused. and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of
a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles action was doubly in error.
her to claim compensation for damage WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed
caused‖ per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of
supported by Article 2219, which provides ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs- origin for further proceedings conformable to this
moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee. decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
or other lascivious acts. G.R. No. 26795
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for July 31, 1970
proceedings conformable to the decision; with GELUZ vs. CA
costs against Icao. 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Facts: Respondent Oscar Lazo’s wife Nita Villanueva, came to
QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO This is an appeal on points of law from an order know petitioner physician Antonio Geluz, through her
34 SCRA 132 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in
FACTS: (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), dismissing a 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. To
The petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and the defendant complaint for support and damages, and another order conceal the pregnancy from her parents, she decided to
Felix Icao, were neighbors in Dapitan City. They had denying amendment of the same pleading. have it aborted by Geluz. She had an abortion again on
close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was
Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex employed at COMELEC.
knowledge with plaintiff several times under force and with Quimiguing, a student, several times by force and After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got pregnant
intimidation and without her consent. Carmen got intimidation and without her consent. As a result, she again and had yet another abortion at Geluz’ clinic.
pregnant despite of the drugs supplied by defendant. As became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan
a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Icao, and had to stop studying. Quimiguing claims campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, support at P120.00 monthly, damages and attorney’s doesn’t have any idea nor has he given consent on the
damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was fees. Icao moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of abortion.
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on cause of action since complainant did not allege that ISSUE:
the ground of lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved the child had indeed been born; trial judge sustained
to amend the complaint that as a result of the defendant’s motion. Plaintiff amended the complaint Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court but trial court sustained the dismissal and ruled that no her abortion, could recover damages from the physician
ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the amendment to complaint is allowable. Hence, this who caused the same.
original complaint averred no cause of action”. appeal.
HELD: husband is only intent on recovering money from the
The concept of provisional personality cannot be doctor.
invoked to obtain damages in behalf of an aborted child. DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA
Both trial court and Court of Appeals were unable to G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933
find any basis for an award of moral damages. Oscar’s ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF FACTS:
indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop owned by
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration 2 SCRA 801 the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar
of his parental affections. July 20, 1961 Syquia, the defendant was an unmarried scion of a
Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case prominent family in Manila. He got acquainted with
against Geluz, he turned his wife’s indiscretion to FACTS: Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a
personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of Oscar Lazo, now husband of Nita Villanueva, consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was
which not only he but, including his wife would be the impregnated her before they were legally married. born on June 17, 1931.
beneficiaries. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant
It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even
from the payment to be made since he sued Geluz for her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was wrote a letter to a Rev Father confirming that the child
P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child.
as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was proved to be inconvenient, she had herself an abortion Though he was out of the country, he continuously
clearly exaggerated. again by Geluz. Less than two years later, Nita incurred wrote letters which are solicitous of Antonia and the
a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in baby’s welfare. He made hospital arrangements
consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband knew through his friend for Antonia’s delivery.
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY not, nor consented to the abortion. Private respondent After giving birth, they lived together for about a year.
GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy,
G.R.No . L-16439 July 20, 1961 abortion. The trial court rendered judgment ordering defendant suddenly departed and married another
Facts: Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as woma.
Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals It should be noted that during the christening of the
were married Nita got pregnant to affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition for child, the defendant who was in charge of the
which she had got an abortion from private respondent certiorari. arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael
Oscar Lazo. After Nita‘s marriage with Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was
plaintiff, she again became pregnant but due to her ISSUE: first planned.
work priorities, she again had again had abortion Whether the husband of a woman, who ISSUES:
with the same doctor. She had a third abortion done by voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover 1. Whether the note to the padre and the other
the same. The plaintiff now sues an award damages from physician who caused the same to their letters written by defendant to Antonia during
for damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did unborn child. her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of
not know of, nor gave his consent to the paternity.
abortions. He is suing for damages for the unborn child. HELD: 2. Whether the defendant should be compelled to
Issue: No. It is no answer to invoke the presumptive acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco.
Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the HELD:
on behalf of the unborn child. Civil Code because that same article expressly limits The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father and the
Ruling: such provisional personality by imposing the condition other letters to Antonia are sufficient proof of
No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the paternity. The mere requirement is that the writing
the unborn child on account of the present case, the child was dead when separated from shall be indubitable.
injuries it received; no such action could derivatively its mother’s womb. This is not to say that the parents “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in
accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights are not entitled to damages. However, such damages the continuous possession of the status of a natural
can take place from on due to the lack of juridical must be those inflicted directly upon them, as child; and the period in this case was long enough to
personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the reveal the father’s resolution to admit the status”.
application of the presumptive civil personality by deceased child. Even if a cause of action did accrue on The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower
imposing the condition that the child should be behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished court compelling Syquia to provide support for the child
subsequently born alive. However, moral damages could by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone Ismael Loanco.
be awarded for the illegal arrest of the can take place from one that lacked juridical
normal development of the fetus on account of distress personality.
and anguish attendant to is lost, and the The decision appealed from is reversed, and the ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs.
disappointment of their parental expectations. The complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs. CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant
records do not bear such case. It is clear that the
58 Phil. 866
November 28, 1933
Facts:
This is an appeal by plaintiff and defendant
regarding the trial court's decision of denying part of the
relief sought by plaintiffs, where Antonia compels Cesar
to recognize Ismael and Pacita, and of requiring
defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.
Cesar Syquia, twenty-three years old, and an
unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila,
courted Antonia de Jesus who was 20 years old. Amorous
relations between them resulted in de Jesus giving birth
to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. They lived together for
one year until Antonia got pregnant again. Cesar left to
marry another woman, but he recognized his paternity
of the first child in writing with a letter to the priest
and uninterrupted possession of natural child status for
one year. Regarding Pacita, no recognition mentioned.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in holding that
Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession
of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct
of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to
acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of
article 135 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The trial court was right in refusing to give
damages to de Jesus for supposed breach of contract.
Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may
add that the action for breach of promise to marry has
no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff
upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none
of the features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco.
The judgment appealed from is in all
respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Continental Steel v. Montaño
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
Doctrines:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could
die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in
favor of labor.
Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant
to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn
child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while
she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female
fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.
Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits.
It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor
Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically
state that the dependent should have first been born
alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that
his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA
death benefits.
Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA
did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there
are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits,
namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate
dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case.
Continental Steel contended that only one with civil
personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42
of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with
the conditions specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered
born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of
the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by
will.
Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child
never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead
from the moment of delivery was not a person at all.
Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality.
Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the
right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on
another for support; he/she could not have existed or
sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother.
Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the
Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can
die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a
dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall
be settled in favor of the employee
Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40,
41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived
child acquires personality only when it is born, and
Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is
not relevant in this case.
The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at
all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that
only those who have acquired juridical personality could
die.
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could
die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to
the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its
parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. The CBA did
not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such
that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality. Without such qualification,
then child shall be understood in its more general sense,
which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in
enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation
of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be
interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA
and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of
labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning
the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities
and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
(1991)])
Bereavement leave and other death benefits are
granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible,
lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family
who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the
death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery,
is any less than that of parents whose child was born
alive but died subsequently.
Continental Steel Mfg. Corp vs. Montano et.al. etc.,
G.R. 182836, October 13, 2009
Brazen move
A LAW EACH DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C.
Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated August 12, 2010
12:00 AM Comments (2)
As expected, and despite protestations to the
contrary, they are now floating the idea of legalizing
abortion or the taking of the life of an innocent,
defenseless, unborn child in the mother’s womb. This
latest move just confirms the long held view that the so-
called reproductive health and reproductive rights of
women, provided for in the RH bill, necessarily
presupposes access not only to contraception but also to
abortion.
This is indeed a brazen and aggressive move as it is
directly in violation of the constitutional mandate
protecting the life even of an unborn child in the womb
(Article 2, Section 12). In fact in this latest case, the
Supreme Court has clearly and categorically declared
that the term “child” as used in this Section includes
the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
This is the case of Rolly, an employee of a steel
manufacturing company (CSMC) and a member of a
labor union (Union) which has a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with CMSC. Among the provisions in
the CBA are the grant of 7 to 11 days bereavement leave
with pay and death and accident benefits amounting to
P11,550 to any employee in case of death of the
employee’s legitimate (dependent) parents, spouse,
children brothers and sisters.
On January 5, 2006, Rolly’s wife Fe who was then on the
38th week of pregnancy had a premature delivery.
According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated
January 7, the female fetus died during labor due to
fetal Anoxia secondary to utero-placental insufficiency.
So on January 9, 2006 Rolly filed a claim for
Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent pursuant to the CBA.
CSMC granted Rolly’s claim for paternity leave but
denied his claims for bereavement and other death
benefits particularly the death and accident insurance.
According to the CSMC, the CBA did not contemplate
the death of an unborn child, a fetus without legal
personality. It reasoned out that a fetus that was dead
from the moment of delivery was not a person at all.
Hence the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus
that was delivered dead could not be considered
dependent since it never needed any support, nor did it
ever acquire the right to be supported. Was CSMC
correct?
No. The rights to bereavement leave and other death
benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the
parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
Death is the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with
the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,
then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a
dependent under the CBA. Even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Rolly’s child could not have
reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without
depending upon its mother for sustenance. The CBA did
not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such
that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality. Without such qualification,
then child should be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s
womb. So Rolly is entitled to the bereavement leave pay
of P4,939 and other death benefits amounting to
P11,550.
LIMJUCO vs. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his
death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to
install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued
a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of
the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through
its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and
operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the
granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended
an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial
judicial personality because under the Civil Code,
“estate of a dead person could be considered as
artificial juridical person for the purpose of the
settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should
be noted that the exercise of juridical administration
includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death. One of those
surviving rights involved the pending application for
public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes
of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public
Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must
be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of
the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution.
Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his
death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to
install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued
a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of
the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through
its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and
operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the
granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be
extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial
judicial personality because under the Civil Code,
“estate of a dead person could be considered as
artificial juridical person for the purpose of the
settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should
be noted that the exercise of juridical administration
includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death. One of those
surviving rights involved the pending application for
public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes
of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public
Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must
be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of
the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed”.
DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC
G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
FACTS:
On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a
judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro
Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from
November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case
the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its
decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. “is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit
A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the
judgment”.
Upon defendants’ failure to pay the amount of the
judgment and after the decision had become final, the
lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
ordered the “foreclosure” of the surety bond and the
sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he
had given as security under the bond. The sale was
confirmed by the lower court in its order of November
20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long
before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria’s
death was not known to Quality Plastic AND that Testate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. On
March 1, 1963 all testamentary heirs in Oria’s duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for
the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land.
ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of
Oria’s estate?
HELD:
The lower court’s judgment against Oria is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person. He had no more civil
personality and his juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The execution sale of Oria’s land is also void. However,
Quality plastics cannot be held liable for damages and
other costs because they were in good faith in including
Oria as defendant for no one informed them of his
death.
Dumlao v Quality Plastics
CITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on
February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro
Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity
Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of
interest from November 1958 before its decision became
final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to
foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the
amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and
has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on
September 24, 1962 which he has given as security
under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before
June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria’s
death. The summons and copies of complaint was
personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff
to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in
his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed
Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on
March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873).
Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of
Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution
against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in
juridical capacity.
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873
just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662
was filed. The Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation
that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death
and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-
defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus,
the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower
court’s judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was
concerned. He had no more civil personality and his
juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order
to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that
they are entitiled to claim attorney’s fees against the
corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and
set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against
Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The
execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732
is also void.