Lambino Vs.

Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support
of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18.
the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion
on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the
initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying
with RA 6735
OCCENA VS. COMELEC
SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings
against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an
amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own
a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No.
2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a
vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such
resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments:

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be
exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim
National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister
by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments
similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a

revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the
present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the
new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one
... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part
or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above
questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition
to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the
constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and
27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is
thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
 50 SCRA 30 – Political law – Constitutional Law – Political Question – Validity of the 1973
Constitution – Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution.
Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet
secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said
constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the
President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there
being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices
expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president
of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no
competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be
assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The
question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the
people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.

March/June 1997

Amendment to the Constitution

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend
the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The
COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said
petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars
to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec
1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the
Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on people’s
initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed
provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made
for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as
pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on

amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.

HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to

the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of
Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs
an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot
operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still
dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly stated, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for
its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006 when ten
justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a people’s
initiative.
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R.
No. 179267, 25 June 2013
posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the
part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer,
the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in
futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised
in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on
a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by

not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the
Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is
so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other
law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

GARCIA v. DRILON

G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away
their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would
not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This
deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent
and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.
Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them
on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and
men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The
gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the
1987 Constitution.

VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO