Republic of the Philippines After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail.
SUPREME COURT There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL
MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action
for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional,
and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain
an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by
the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general
manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and
duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged
that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than
2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It
was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par.
3).
City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to
motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00
fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the
provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter
to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and
middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality,
the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with
such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided
that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds,
not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy
and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process
clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies
to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room;
that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern
or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction
would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect
causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again
a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on
July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the
provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on
statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to
state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation,
to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the
police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could
complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self
incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex
parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the
dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation
of facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila,
while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel
del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City,
all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor
and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of
operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of
the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-
b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was
submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the
Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05
from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein
petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress
was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden
of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails
it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such
a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the
petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities
and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners
association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party,
the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of
law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter,
to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that
without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged
infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of
authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that
"the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued
against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for
constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence
to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is
all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people
cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should
not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal
or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is
void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better
expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a
subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void
on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact
may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case,
the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The
mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it
could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote
public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put,
police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. 7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of
the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to
check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other
amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its
approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and
12
monte; prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any
person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place
where opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect
public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest
the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of
any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be
considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection
is raised to the question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or
any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is
the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings
for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of
reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of
legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a
clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to
meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to
govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public
morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need
for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged
ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth,
none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance
No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees
for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in
certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by
the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%
for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-
class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was explained more
in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are
also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from
the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than
in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale
of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the
doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be
made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had
occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy
Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range
of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just
and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City
of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here
the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with
this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of
the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of
their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or
cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions
is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community
may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons
licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected
by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged
ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again,
such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary
or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable
existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts
to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute.
Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in
the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within
the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may
be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of
undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way
to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if
the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground
by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital
in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is
that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain.
Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain
in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions
referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry
or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite
time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether
the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its
owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a
guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease
thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these
allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or
uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld
that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation
before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all
the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is
no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity
of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by
this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued
lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.