Assignment 11

D. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

1. Partner’s/Agent’s Admissions

(a) Rule 130, Section 29

Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or

declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of
his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of
a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with
the party.

Co-conspirator’s Statements

(a) Rule 130, Section 30

Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of

a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of
declaration.

Cases:

People vs. Cabrera

57 SCRA 714 (1974 )
Admissions and Confessions: Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta
Rule:
Co-conspirator’s Statements

G.R. No. L-37398 June 28, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSARIO CABRERA and CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendants, CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendant-
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pio
C. Guerrero for plaintiff-appellee.

Jesus E. Mendoza & Raul M. Aviso for defendant-appellant.

BARREDO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of conviction of Robbery-Hold-up with Homicide of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III, in its Criminal Case No. O423-V, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado
Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime as charged in the
information and hereby sentence each of them to life imprisonment; to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00; and also jointly and severally to
pay the amount of P8,000.00, the cost of the jeep stolen; and the further amount of P30,000.00
representing actual, moral and exemplary damages; to suffer all the accessory penalties prescribed
by law and to pay the costs.

Accused shall be entitled to full credit for the preventive imprisonment they have already undergone
in accordance with Rep. Act 6127.

SO ORDERED.

Accused Rosario Cabrera did not appeal. Only defendant Conrado Villanueva's appeal is before Us.

Accused Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva were charged in an information reading:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado
Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc of the crime of robbery holdup with homicide, penalized under the
provisions of Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1972, in the municipality of Valenzuela, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Rosario
Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc, with John Doe alias
Ben and Peter Doe alias Abay, who are still at large, armed with knives or ice picks, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, holdup, take, rob
and carry away with them a jeep with plate number 84-26 S'71, Bulacan, being driven by Luis dela
Cruz y de Jesus and owned by one Reynaldo Santos, Jr., with a value of P8,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the said amount of P8,000.00; that during the commission of this
crime, and on the occasion thereof, the said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie and stab several times with the said knives or ice
picks the said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and thereafter was abandoned, thereby inflicting upon the
said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus stabbed wounds which caused his death after a few days of
confinement in the hospital.

Contrary to law.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are briefly stated in the brief of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza assisted by
Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero as follows:

At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, while on a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to
proceed immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned
 person who was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds (pp. 12-13, tsn.,
May 11, 1972).

This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz (pp. 6-7, tsn., May 11,
1972). He gave an ante mortem statement (Exhibit A; p. 11, tsn., May 11, 1972). In the ante-
mortem statement the deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his
jeep (Exhibit A) but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his money
and jeep (pp. 11-72, tsn., May 11, 1972; Exhibit A).

In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police (p. 18,
tsn., May 18, 1972). On January 20, 1972 she executed an extra-judicial confession (Exhibit B, to
B-3, inclusive). In the said extra-judicial confession she pointed to appellant Conrado Villanueva as
the mastermind of the robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the
robbery and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant and his two unidentified
companions (Ibid).

Lt. Carlos Palomares of the Valenzuela Police Department who took the extra-judicial confession of
defendant Rosario Cabrera testified to identify and to read the contents of the said extra-judicial
confession (pp. 3-37, tsn., May 18, 1972). Dr. Ernesto G, Brion of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) testified regarding the post-mortem examination conducted on the body of the
deceased (pp. 310, tsn., September 7, 1972). Reynaldo Santos Jr. testified on the ownership and
value of the jeep stolen (pp. 4-14, tsn., June 9, 1972). Alejandro de la Cruz testified on the
expenses and damages suffered by the family of the deceased (pp. 15-27, tsn., June 9, 1972) on
account of the deceased's untimely death. Dante Marcelo testified that in the early evening before
the robbery took place he saw defendant Rosario Cabrera riding on the jeep of the deceased (pp.
29-41, tsn., June 9, 1972) but did not notice whether there were other passengers (p. 33, tsn., June
9, 1972).

Defendant Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva did not take the witness stand.
Neither did they present any evidence. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
together with their respective cross-examination and objections to some of the exhibits, particularly
appellants objection to the admission of Exhibits B to B-3 (defendant Cabrera's extra-judicial
confession) insofar as he was concerned, the case was considered submitted for decision." (Pp. 2-
4, Brief for the Appellee)

xxx xxx xxx

The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Villanueva was the
extra-judicial confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over
the continuing objection of appellant's counsel (p. 10, tsn., May 18, 1972). Appellant reiterated his
objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in evidence (p. 12, tsn.,
September 7, 1972)." (Id.)

In their prayer, counsel for the People, joining appellant's counsel, ask for the reversal of appellant's conviction and
his acquittal.

After carefully going over the record and minutely reviewing the evidence, We are fully convinced that the prayer for
acquittal is in order.

The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and perpetrator, together
with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased Luis dela Cruz and the taking of the
jeep he was driving. But said statement is obviously inadmissible against appellant, who made timely objection
thereto.

There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation conducted by
the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question. For this reason alone,
that is, that said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant,
but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorities,
Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said provision reads:
 Admission by conspirator.— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

There being no other evidence against appellant, We have no alternative but to reverse the judgment appealed from
and to acquit him, as prayed for by his counsel as well as counsel for the People.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, appellant Conrado Villanueva is acquitted,
and his immediate release from confinement is ordered, unless he is lawfully held for another case, with costs de
oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

People v. Yatco
97 Phil 941 (1955)
Co-Conspirator’s Statements

G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN
CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman, City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and
Assistant City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and Rufino Navarro for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso
Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder
of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case
started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the
progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier
of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly
made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore
incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence
objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the
confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior
proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the
transcript, the following remarks were made:

FISCAL LUSTRE:

May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as
against the accused Consunji himself?

COURT:
 That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession
unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required
by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9

The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion was
denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the review
and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the
prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the
ruling was made.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused,
freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to
the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against
his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64
Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123,
providing that:

The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil.,
416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as
evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet
even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions),
much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming,
therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent
Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection
interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issuedmotu proprio.
Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on
the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own
objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban
without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and
completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a
mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the
objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella vs.
Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions
of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the
confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered
in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given
in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy,
in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the
charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to
distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co.,
52 Phil., 807, 816-817:

In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of
the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the
early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not;
and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may
as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a
judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the
Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the
error without returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the
other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality,
or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed
to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material
from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme
Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of
evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled
and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this opinion. Costs
against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion,
JJ.,concur.

People v. Serrano
105 Phil 531 (1959)
Co-Conspirator’s Statements

G.R. No. L-7973 April 27, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants.
DOMINGO CADIANG, SANTIAGO YUMUL and FILEMON CENZON, defendants-appellants.

First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for appellee.

Santos, Valencia and Cenzon for appellants.
PADILLA, J.:

Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga finding them and their co-defendants, who did not appeal, guilty of murder for the death of Pablo Navarro
and sentencing them to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay indemnity and the proportionate share in the costs
(Criminal Case No. 1262).

In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano aliasPiping,
Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes then gathered at the sala of the house of
the first in the barrio of Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, that Pablo Navarro had been including and prompting people to
call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason he manifested to
them his desire and plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio Serrano instructed them to wait for Navarro in the town of
Bacolor, lure him to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. After disclosing to them his plan, Eulogio
Serrano told them to go to sleep at the post of the civilian guards near his house. In pursuance of the plan, the next
day (17 October), Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio
Reyes waited for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to
hang around. Navarro did not show up that day. The following day (18 October), the group waited for him at the same
places. This time Navarro showed up at the gambling casino and Cenon Serrano alias Piping promptly invited him to
a drink but Navarro declined saying that he was going somewhere. On 19 October, the group again waited for their
quarry at the same places but failed to make contact with him as he did not show up. At about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of 20 October, the group waited for Navarro in the same places. Navarro arrived at the gambling casino
between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Cenon Serrano alias Piping asked him for some drinks. Navarro
ordered some drinks and all in the group except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank. After drinking the contents of six
bottles of Black Dog gin, Orange Wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine, Navarro asked Cenon Serrano alias Piping whether
what they had drunk was enough, and the latter answered "No, look for some more." Navarro left the gambling
casino, went to the market place about 20 meters away and came back accompanied by Simplicio Manguerra
bringing four bottles of Orange wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine. Simplicio Manguerra joined the party and all except
Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank the four bottles of wine. While the spree was going on, Cenon Serrano alias Piping
suggested to Pablo Navarro that they should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which suggestion Navarro
agreed. Cenon Serrano aliasPiping sent out Domingo Cadiang to look for a jeep, and Cading returned with an auto
calesa jeep driven by Marcelino Sicate. After drinking the four bottles of wine, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo
Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon, Pablo Navarro, Simplicio Manguerra and Anastacio Reyes boarded the
jeep, the first and the last sitting at the front with the driver and the rest inside. From the gambling casino the party
repaired to Don Q gasoline station to refuel and proceeded to San Fernando. But before reaching San Fernando,
Cenon Serranoalias Piping remarked that "there is no use having a good time" in San Fernando and suggested that
they should proceed to Angeles for the "good time" which suggestion Navarro approved. On the way to Angeles
Cenon Serrano alias Piping ordered the driver to stop at Tony's Place in San Fernando to buy some more wine. After
buying another jar of San Miguel gin, part of which Navarro who was already drunk was made to drink, the party
resumed their trip; but upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon
Serrano aliasPiping told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores, Bacolor, where they arrived at about 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon. There Cenon Serrano alias Piping dismissed the driver of the jeep. At barrio Dolores, the group passed
by the house of Simeon Dizon, the barrio lieutenant, told him to come down and ordered him to call for some
temporary policemen. Upon seeing Benjamin Tolentino at the house of Dizon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping beckoned
and ordered Tolentino to tie Navarro's hands with rope. Upon Cenon Serrano's order Felipe Garcia, a civilian guard
who came with Simeon Dizon, pointed a gun at Navarro. The latter asked Cenon Serrano aliasPiping why he was
being tied and Cenon Serrano alias Piping answered "You deserve to be tied up because you are against us."
Navarro was brought to the stockade of the civilian guards where he was questioned and accused Cenon
Serrano alias Piping of bringing witnesses to the house of Senator Pablo Angeles David to testify on the Maliwalu
massacre. As Navarro denied the charge, Cenon Serrano alias Piping hit Navarro with his fist, struck him with the
butt of his .45 caliber pistol and ordered Domingo Cadiang to beat up Navarro. Cadiang did as he was ordered by
beating up Navarro with a piece of bamboo about 4 inches in diameter and less than a meter long. As a result of the
beating Navarro fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping kicked him and ordered him to rise, and as Navarro was rising
Cadiang hit him on the back, so Navarro again fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping then told Filemon Cenzon to
beat up Navarro and Cenzon with the same piece of bamboo struck Navarro on his back about the waistline as he
made an effort to stand up. Cenon Serrano alias Piping returned to where the jeep was parked and ordered Felipe
Garcia to tie the hands of Simplicio Manguerra. Upon hearing the order of Cenon Serranoalias Piping, Simplicio
Manguerra asked whether he was to be killed. Cenon Serrano answered "I will also have you killed, you son of a
whole." Manguerra clung to Anastacio Reyes begging for mercy but the latter disengaged himself from him. Cenon
Serrano alias Piping pushed Manguerra and ordered Santiago Yumul to beat him up. Santiago Yumul hit Manguerra
with a pestle on the back. Manguerra fell to the ground. Then Cenon Serrano aliasPiping ordered Domingo Cadian
and Felipe Garcia to bring Manguerra to the post behind the stockade. At this juncture Basilio de Guzman arrived and
was ordered by Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill Manguerra. De Guzman and Garcia brought Manguerra to a field in
Dolores where De Guzman dug a pit while Garcia stood guard; and after digging the pit De Guzman shot Manguerra
twice and shoved Manguerra's body in the pit and covered it with earth. Afterwards, Cenon Serrano alias Piping,
Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes repaired to the house of Eulogio Serrano
in barrio Potrero to report to him that the two victims were already in barrio Dolores, arriving at barrio Potrero at past
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As Eulogio Serrano was not in his house when Cenon Serrano alias Piping arrived, the
latter boarded the jeep of the late Maximino Serrano and drove on it to the town of Bacolor together with Domingo
Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes. Upon reaching the second bridge at barrio San
Antonio on the way to Bacolor, Santiago Yumul alighted. The rest resumed driving to town and met Eulogio Serrano
that the two men were already in barrio Dolores. Eulogio told Cenon that he would go to Dolores. Domingo Cadiang
was left in the barrio of San Antonio while Filemon Cenzon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes
proceeded to the town of Bacolor.

In the afternoon of 20 October 1950, while Emiliano Manalo known also as Isaias, a civilian guard, was in his house
at barrio Dolores, Bacolor, Pampanga, Benjamin Tolentino came and asked him to help him dig a pit at Sitio
Castilang Malati, barrio Dolores, to bury a dead horse of Atilano Gopez. He acceded to his request and helped
Tolentino did it. After digging the pit he went home and then proceeded to his post in Sitio Pigulut Mauli, barrio
Dolores. Upon reaching his post he was called by Eulogio Serrano who was outside the stockade together with
Atilano Gopez, Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino talking with another person inside the stockade who he
later on learned was Pablo Navarro. He heard Eulogio Serrano ask "Ambo, are you the one bringing those people
from Maliwalu to Don Pablo? Navarro answered that he was not the one. Eulogio Serrano then told Atilano Gopez to
take Pablo Navarro out of the stockade and to bring him along with them (Eulogio Serrano, Atilano Gopez, Benjamin
Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra and Emiliano Manalo) to barrio Potrero. When they reached sitio Castilang Malati
Eulogio Serrano ordered Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino to shoot Pablo Navarro from behind. Melchor
Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino fired one shot each simultaneously. Navarro fell down dead. Eulogio Serrano
ordered them to bring the dead body of Pablo Navarro to the pit that Benjamin Tolentino and Emiliano Manalo had
dug and to cover it with earth. Afterwards, they walked back to barrio Dolores. Sometime after the elections in
November 1951, Atilano Gopez ordered Emiliano Manalo and Benjamin Tolentino to exhume the bones of the late
Pablo Navarro, put them in a sack and threw them into a creek. On 6 December 1951 the chief of police of Bacolor,
Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Eulogio Serrano and Emiliano Manalo, accompanied by Constabulary
soldiers, exhumed the bones of the late Pablo Navarro.

On 17 December 1951, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang,
Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes were charged with illegal detention with murder for the death
of Pablo Navarro in an information filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga. On 12 February 1952, upon motion of
the assistant provincial fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of Anastacio Reyes from the information to testify as
witness for the prosecution. Eulogio Serrano was charged with the same crime in criminal case No. 1819 but has not
yet been apprehended. Cenon Serrano alias Piping charged with the same crime was also at large but later on
arrested and brought to trial with his co-defendants in both criminal cases for the death of Pablo Navarro (case No.
1262) and for the death of Simplicio Manguerra (case No. 1263). The evidence for the prosecution heard against his
co-defendants before his arrest and arraignment was again presented to afford him the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses.

After a joint trial with criminal case No. 1263 for the death of Simplicio Manguerra, the Court found. —

. . . Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul
and Filemon Cenzon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1262 (for
the death of Pablo Navarro) and, appreciating No aggravating or mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences
each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also sentenced to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Pablo Navarro in the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.

Only Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon have appealed.

The appellants deny having been in the house of Eulogio Serrano at barrio Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, in the
evening of 16 October 1950, when Eulogio Serrano told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to kill him
there. Domingo Cadiang claims that on 16 October 1950 he was at the farm of Paquito Liongson in the barrio of San
Antonio helping his in-laws thresh palay that they had promised and agreed to do; and that on 17, 18 and 19 October
he was in the yard of his house cutting kapok trees for fuel. Filemon Cenzon claims that on 16 October 1950,
between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock in the evening, he was on the market place of Bacolor; that on 17 October up to the
early morning of 18 October, he was at Bagac Bay hauling lumber; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 18
October he was already in Bacolor where he refilled the tank of his truck with petrol and thereafter he together with
Juanito Bognot proceeded to Dagupan to deliver lumber for his employer, Manuel Joseph, to the Liberty Lumber; and
that he returned to Bacolor at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of the next day, 19 October, and brought his truck to
the garage of the company and went home. Santiago Yumul, claims that from 16 to 19 October 1950 he was working
as laborer for Martin Tuason and Martin Yumul, claims that from 16 to 19 October 1950 he was working as laborer for
Martin Tuason to remove a railroad track of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company leading to Magalang,
Pampanga; and from that reason he could not have been with Eulogio Serrano, Cenon Serrano alias Piping,
Domingo Cadiang and Filemon Cenzon in the evening of 16 October at the house of Eulogio Serrano, and from 17 to
19 October in the town of Bacolor waiting for Pablo Navarro to carry out the plan of luring him to barrio Dolores and
there kill him. And although they admit to have been in the company of Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio
Reyes, who they claim brought Pablo Navarro and Simplicio Manguerra to barrio Dolores in the jeep driven by
Marcelino Sicat on 20 October 1950, yet they disclaim any knowledge of the plot to kill them, and that if they ever
took a hand in maltreating the victims it was out of fear to Anastacio Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping, the latter
ordering them to inflict injury upon the victims at the point of a gun.

The weak defense of alibi put up by the appellants to disprove complicity in the murder of Pablo Navarro cannot
overcome the clear and positive testimony of Anastacio Reyes that they were at the house of Eulogio Serrano in the
evening of 16 October 1950 when the latter told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and there kill him; and
that they were together on 17, 18 and 19 October waiting for Pablo Navarro in the town of Bacolor to lure him to
barrio Dolores, and on 20 October when they finally succeeded in luring him to barrio Dolores where they killed him. It
is difficult to believe that a man who had made up his mind to kill another would bring along with him other persons
who know nothing about the plan just to witness the commission of the crime. If they were not in the know, as they
contend, they also would have been done away with right then and there, in the same way Simplicio Manguerra, who
was not to be killed, had been done away with, to prevent him from reporting to the authorities or from testifying
against them in Court; or they also would have been sent away upon arriving at barrio Dolores, in the same way that
Marcelino Sicat, the driver of the jeep on which they rode in going to the said barrio, was sent away. The way the
appellants were seated in the jeep in going to barrio Dolores-Anastacio Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping at the
front seat with the driver and the three appellants on the two parallel seats inside the jeep-belies the assertion that
they were prevented by Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes from running away upon learning that
criminal act was to be committed. The assertion that Cenon Serrano alias Piping pointed his gun at them at the
gasoline station, where they stopped to refuel, to prevent them from deserting, is unbelievable, because the gasoline
station is located in the heart of the town of Bacolor, in a busy street where the slightest commotion or any sign of
distress would easily draw the attention of the nearby traffic officer directing the traffic.

The fact that in the evening of 16 October 1950, the three appellants and their co-defendants were gathered at the
house of Eulogio Serrano, over-all commander of the civilian guard and temporary police organizations, who ordered
them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to kill him there, because he had been including and prompting
people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David to inform him about and to testify on the Maliwalu massacre; that
pursuant to the plan laid out by Eulogio Serrano, from 17 to 20 October 1950 the appellants joined Cenon
Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes in waiting for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in
the town of Bacolor where he used to frequent; that they were actually with Cenon Serrano alias Piping and
Anastacio Reyes when Pablo Navarro was lured to go to Dolores on the pretext of going to San Fernando and then to
Angeles for a "good time" after a drinking spree in bacolor; that they took turns in manhandling the victim as he was
hogtied and rendered helpless; and the fact that the appellants went into hiding after the incident together with Cenon
Serrano alias Piping in the barrio of Escribania, show that they were in league with Eulogio Serrano and Cenon
Serrano alias Piping to kill Pablo Navarro. Each of them is, therefore, guilty as co-principal.

The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against
his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy
actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there
is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in
finding that conspiracy has been established and in convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of their
co-conspirator. The contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," 1 applies only to extra-judicial acts or
declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, 2 where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave
suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly
examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.3
The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of sufficient number of votes to impose the death
penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the proportionate costs against the appellants.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

3. Admission By Privies

(a) Rule 130, Section 31

Sec. 31. Admission by privies. — Where one derives title to

property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.

Cases:

Alpuerto v. Perez Pastor and Roa

38 Phil 785 (1918)
Admission by Privies

G.R. No. L-12794 October 14, 1918

ELADIO ALPUERTO, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
JOSE PEREZ PASTOR and MANUEL ROA, provincial sheriff of Cebu, defendants-appellants.

Jose Martinez de San Agustin for appellants.

Gullas & Briones for appellee.

STREET, J.:

The three parcels of real property which constitutes the subject matter of the contention in this case formerly
belonged to Juan Llenos, and both the interested parties in this action claim titled under, the plaintiff as party in
possession under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and the defendant as purchaser at a public sale under an
execution directed against Llenos. the plaintiff, Eladio Alpuerto, asks the court to make a declaration against the
defendant, Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner thereof in full and absolute dominion. He also
prays that the sale of the property effected by the sheriff, Manuel Roa, to said defendant be declared null.

The defendant Pastor denies the right of the plaintiff to the relief sought, and asserts that the transaction by which the
plaintiff claims to have acquired titled was simulated or fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected for
the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Juan Llenos. This defendant therefore in turn prays the court
to declare that he himself is the true owner of the property and that a judgment be entered condemning the plaintiff to
surrender possession to him. From a judgment entered in the Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the plaintiff ,
the defendants have appealed. It appears that, pending the proceedings, the defendant Pastor has died and an
administrator, Eustaquio Lopez, has been substituted in his stead. Throughout the opinion, however, Pastor, the
name of the original party defendant, will be used in referring to the interest now represented by the administrator.

The plaintiff claims by virtue of the document (Exhibit A), which purports to be a contract of sale with the privilege of
repurchase. It recites a consideration of P2,500 the payment of which is acknowledged; and the stipulated period
within which is acknowledge; and the stipulated period within which the vendor may repurchase the property is fixed
at two years. This documents is signed by the two contracting parties (Juan Llenos and Eladio Alpuerto) and is
attested by two subscribing witnesses. It purports on its face to have been executed on July 3, 1912; just it was not
acknowledged before a notary until December 3, 1914. The property in question is assessed for the purposes of
taxation at P5,000 or P6,000; and is worth more than twice the amount which the plaintiff claims to have paid for it.

At the time of the supposed sale to Eladio Alpuerto there had been pending for nearly two years, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, an action in which Jose Perez Pastor was plaintiff and Juan Llenos was defendant. In this action
the plaintiff sought to recover from Juan Llenos a considerable sum of money; and Eladio Alpuerto, as son-in-law of
Juan Llenos, was aware of this litigation from the beginning. On January 27, 1913, or about six months after the
alleged sale of the property in question to Eladio Alpuerto judgment was rendered in said action in favor of the plaintiff
for the sum of P3,789.13, with interest and costs. This judgment was affirmed upon appeal to the Supreme Court on
November 20, 1914. 1 An execution was thereafter issued on April 12, 1915, from the Court of First Instance upon
said judgment was levied upon the property in question as the property of Juan Llenos. Before the sale was effected
the plaintiff herein, Eladio Alpuerto, notified the sheriff that he claimed the property as his own. Nevertheless, the
sheriff proceeded under indemnification and sold the property at public sale to Jose Perez Pastor for the sum of
P1,100.

The case stated in the cross-complaint as a ground of relief to the defendant has its basis in the rule stated in
subsection 3 of article 1291 of the Civil Code, which declares generally that a contract executed in fraud of creditors
is subject of rescission; and upon this issue the burden of proof is of course upon Pastor, as the party assailing the
transaction, to show that the transfer was fraudulent; though it should here be remembered that proof on this point
may be accomplished by the aid of presumptions, as in other cases.

The argument against the validity of the conveyance from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto is based on two
propositions, namely: (1) that said conveyance must, under the second paragraph of article 1297, in connection with
article 1227, of the Civil Code, be presumed to be fraudulent; and (2) that furthermore is shown by the evidence to
have been fraudulent in fact.

The second paragraph of article 1297 of the Civil Code says that a transfer of property made by one against whom a
condemnatory judgment has been pronounced in either instance is to be presumed fraudulent. The cardinal question
on this branch of the case is therefore this. Was the transfer in question made after a judgment had been entered
against Juan Llenos in either instance? This in turn depends upon the question whether the contract of sale shall be
considered effective as from the date upon which it purports to have been executed (July 3, 1912) or from the date
when it was acknowledge before a notary public (December 3, 1914) for in the interval between these two dates final
judgment had been rendered against Juan Llenos both in the Court of First Instance and in the Supreme Court.

The solution of the problem thus presented requires us to consider the combined effect of articles 1225 and 1227 of
the Civil Code. Article 1225 declares that a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to those who
sign it and their privies (causahabientes), the same force as a public instrument.

The expression "legally recognized" (reconocido legamente), as here used, must be taken to mean recognized, or
acknowledged by the person or persons, executing or emitting the document-in this case the vendor, Juan Llenos,
and the vendee-Eladio Alpuerto. The act of legal recognition occurred, we assume, when the document was signed
by parties and delivered in the presence of the attesting witnesses, who were called upon to bear witness to the
transaction.

Concerning the meaning of the expression "privies" (causabientes), in this article, the following passage is found in
the Commentary of Manresa:

The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only be right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but
also that of succession by singular title, derived form acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an
assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, etc., will be privies; in short, he, who by succession is placed
 in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private document and
appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and obligations, is a privy. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp.
492 and 492.)

Under the interpretation thus placed upon the meaning of the term "privies", it is clear that Jose Perez Pastor, the
purchaser at the public sale under an execution directed against Juan Llenos, must be considered a privy or
successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly bound by the instrument which conveyed
the property to Eladio Alpuerto — and this from the date of the execution of that instrument as a private document-
unless this result is prohibited by article 1227 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

The date of a private instrument shall be considered, with regard to third persons, only from the date on
which it may have been filed or entered in a public registry, from the date on which it may have been
delivered to a public official by virtue of his office.

In considering this article it is important to bear in mind that it has reference merely to the probative value of the
document with respect to the date of its execution, and is not intended to lay down any rule concerning the efficacy of
the act or acts evidenced by the document. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. 501.) The importance of the rule here
declared is therefore most conspicuously revealed in the situation where the document itself contains the only
competent evidence before the court bearing upon the date upon which the instrument in question was executed as a
private document.

This can be most conveniently exhibited by means of illustrations based on the language of the text itself. For
instance, let it be supposed that a document is produced bearing the signatures of the parties who participated in it
and purporting to have been executed upon a certain date, prior to the date upon which the document was filed or
inscribed in a public register. In such case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the date
when it was so filed or inscribed in a public register. It is, however, proved that one of the signatory parties has died
upon a certain date subsequent to that upon which case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only
from the date of the death of the deceased signatory party. Again, be it supposed, a document is produced in court
bearing the signatures of the parties and purporting to have been executed upon a certain date. The instrument has
at no time been elevated into a public document and it is not shown that either of the signatory parties is dead. In this
case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the date of the death of the deceased
signatory party. Again, be it supposed, a document is produced in court bearing the signatures of the parties has died
upon a certain dated subsequent to that upon which the instrument purports to have been executed. In this case the
instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the death of the deceased signatory party. Again, be it
supposed, a document is produced in court bearing the signatures of the parties and purporting to have been
executed upon a certain date. The instrument has at no time been elevated into a public document and it is not
shown that either of the signatory parties is dead. In this case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons,
only from the date when the document was filed in court, this being considered to be delivery to a public official by
virtue of his office.

All of these illustrations have reference to the situation where the document itself contains only evidence before the
court bearing upon the date of its original execution; and the execution of the instrument is supposed to be proved by
force of the act of notarial acknowledgment or by proof that the names of the parties signed to the document are
genuine. It must be borne in mind in this connection that article 1227 is not primarily or exclusively concerned with
instruments which after being executed originally as private documents are at a later date elevated to the status of
public documents. On the contrary, it deals primarily with private documents, and the instrument in question may at
all times remain a private document is not converted into a public document either by the death of one of the
signatory parties or by the fact that it is delivered to a public official by virtue of his office. The due execution of such
instruments must therefore be proved when they are introduced in court, if not made self-proving by notarial
acknowledgment, which operate to raise them to the status of public documents.

The commentator Manresa, discussing article 1227, observes with discernment that there may be other facts than
those mentioned in said article which be received as determinative of the date from which the instrument should be
considered to be effective against third person. Thus, if it should appear that, subsequent to the date upon which the
document purports to have been executed, one of the signatory parties had lost his penhand by amputation, this
should be accepted as being fully conclusive that the instrument was in fact executed before such occurrence.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8 p. 503.) In the same connection Manresa says that if a third person is affected with
notice of the existence of a private document or by any act of his own recognizes its existence, it will have effect, as
against him, from the date of such notice or recognition. (Opus citat., id.) These observations all go to show that
article 1227 states a presumption which may be rebutted.
The question then arises. Is there anything in article 1227, or elsewhere, which prohibits the introduction of the
testimony of attesting witnesses, or other persons who may be present when a private document is executed, to
prove that the act was accomplished upon the date stated therein to be date of its execution? We are of the opinion
that such testimony is admissible, even as against third parties.

This conclusion is fully supported by the opinion of the supreme court of Spain in the case of Alvarez vs. Yañez. (177
Juris, Civil, 663, decided April 16, 1910). The facts in that case were that by private documents dated respectively
August 2 and August 3, 1908, Alvarez purchased four tracts of land. On August 17, of the same year Carlos Vega
sold, by public instrument, to Yañez several tracts were adjacent to part of the land purchased by Alvarez who, upon
learning of the sale, brought his action, under article 1523 of Civil Code, to be subrogated to the buyer, exercising his
right of retracto legal. The defendant answered that on August 17, 1908, plaintiff was not the owner of any land
adjacent to that acquired on that date by defendant the contention being that the private documents upon which the
complaint was based, in addition to the fact that they are not proof of ownership, were not presented for the payment
of the tax on real estate, which was fourteen days after defendant purchased the properties in contest . . . .

The trial court permitted plaintiff to produce witnesses for the purpose of proving that the private documents relied
upon by him were in fact executed and delivered upon the dates therein recited and that plaintiff went into possession
under them, and upon that evidence made finding in accordance with plaintiff's contentions, and held that the right to
take over the purchase retracto existed. The defendant appealed to the supreme court of Spain, and argued that by
its ruling the Audiencia had disregarded article 1227 of the Civil Code, the specific contention being that as against
persons who are not parties to them private documents must be treated as though their existence commenced only
from the date upon which they are made of public record. This contention was overruled, the Court saying:

It cannot be denied that the appellant Constantino Vega is to be regarded as a third person, because he was
not a party to the two contracts of sale by virtue of which Vicente Alvarez acquired from Ildefonso Alvarez
the ownership of the three tracts of country real estate from which he derives his right to be subrogated as
purchaser of our other tracts adjacent thereto sold, with others, by Carlos Vega to the defendant by public
instrument dated August 17, 1908. Nevertheless, it is not to be inferred from this fact as appellant contends,
that the legal dates of the two first contracts, evidenced by private documents, are not those which are
recited therein, but that as regards third persons, in accordance with Art. 1227 of the Civil Code, they must
be regarded as dated on the day . . . on which they were noted in the tax office. That article established a
legal presumption which must yield to contrary evidence, and the trial court, basing its conclusion on the
testimony of the witnesses, has established the finding, which we cannot disturb, that the dates recited in
these documents are the true dates upon which the contracts were made.

Clearly articles 1225 and 1227 should be construed in such manner as to harmonize with each other and to give
effect, so far as possible, to the legislative intent expressed in each; and the only interpretation of article 1227 which
can be adopted consistently with the meaning of article 1225 is that the rule announced in article 1227 has reference
exclusively to the situation where there is no accredited evidence before the court, independent of the recitals of the
document itself, showing the date upon which it was in fact executed.

It has been settled in many decisions that a document which originates as private document and never arises above
that status will, under article 1225, be given full effect as such. (Samson vs. Salvilla and Sierra, 12 Phil. Rep., 497,
505; Tanguinot vs. Municipality of Tanay, 9 Phil. Rep., 369, 401; Guillermo vs. Mantiezo, 8 Phil. Rep., 368, 372;
Irureta, Goyena vs. Tambunting, 1 Phil. Rep., 490, 493.) It follows that article 1227 does not, as against the signatory
parties and their successors in interest, postpone the operation of an instrument, proved as private document, if it is
shown by competent evidence that it was in fact executed upon the date recited therein as the date of its execution. If
this were not true, the result would be that a person having rights under an instrument, probable as a private
document, might lose those rights by reason of the happening of some one of the occurrences mentioned in article
1227. The contrary conclusion is evidently the proper one, that is, that if a party has rights under an instrument,
provable as a private document, and it is so proved, it will prevail from the true and proven date of its execution with
all the effect attributable to it under article 1225.

The expression "third parties" (terceros) as used in article 1227, evidently means persons who have not intervened in
the execution of the document. It has been so interpreted by the supreme court of Spain and by this court. (Lao
Simbieng vs. Palencia, 18 Phil. Rep., 325, 328; Easton vs. E. Diaz & Co. and Sheriff of Albay, 32 Phil. Rep., 181;
decision of the supreme court of Spain of April 16, 1910, already cited.) Manresa is therefore in error in supposing
that it has the more limited meaning of persons who have not intervened in the execution of the document and are
neither heirs nor successors in interest of those who signed the same. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. 501.)
In the case now before us the two witnesses examined with reference to the execution of the document in question
testify that it was originally executed and delivered on July 13, 1912, the date stated upon its face. For the purpose of
disposing of this branch of the case without further discussion, we provisionally accept this statement as true and
deduce the conclusion that he presumption stated in paragraph 2 of article 1297 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

This brings us to the question whether the transaction evidenced by Exhibit A should be pronounced fraudulent in
fact. Upon turning to the evidence for the purpose of determining this question, the following circumstances are
revealed, namely; (1) the grantee is the son-in-law of the grantor; (2) at the time conveyance is made an action is
pending against the grantor to recover several thousand pesos of money; and of the pendency of this action the
grantee has full knowledge; (3) the debtor has no other satisfied (4) the consideration for the transfer is less than half
of the value of the property in question. These circumstances are familiar badges of fraud, and their combined effect
is such, we think, as to raise a presumption of fraud, even apart from the legal presumption expressed in article 1297,
and to impose upon the vendee the burden of proving the bona fides of the transaction by a preponderance of
evidence and to the satisfaction of the court.1awph!l.net

We are of the opinion that the proof adduced not only fails to remove the imputation of fraud thus cast upon the
transaction but strongly tends to engender the suspicion that the transaction was wholly fictitious. It is true that both
the plaintiff himself and Simon Batuigas, one of the subscribing witnesses, declared in the clearest terms that the
transaction took place on July 3, 1912, as claimed; that two thousand pesos of the money charged hands in the act;
and that the balance of the consideration consisted in the satisfaction and released of the debt for five hundred pesos
owing from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto. It should not escape notice that neither Juan Llenos nor the other
attesting witness, Geronimo Godinez, were examined as to the circumstances attending the transaction; and no
explanation is given as to why these witnesses were not produced.

Where the law imposes the burden of proof upon the party to established the bona fides of such a transaction as this,
against the presumption of the fraud, it is his duty, if the experts to be believed, to lay before the court, so far as is
within his power, a complete and true revelation of all circumstances surrounding the affair; and where he supresses
evidence or negligently falls to call a witness supposed to know the facts, it may be presumed that the testimony of
the witness, if adduced, would be unfavorable.

The plaintiff did not try to show where or how he acquired the two thousand pesos of ready money with which the
purchased was made, and it does not appear that his resource are sufficient to enable him readily to command that
sum. The proof of the existence of the debt of five hundred pesos which Juan Llenos is supposed to have owed to the
plaintiff and which constituted the balance of the purchase price over and above the amount which was paid in cash
rests almost exclusively in the statement of the plaintiff himself. Upon these important points the testimony of Juan
Llenos, if adduced, might possibly have shed something about what become of the money. the effect of these
observations cannot be evaded by saying that the defendant might himself have summoned Juan Llenos and
examined him in court. The burden of the proof was on the plaintiff; and the defendant could not be expected to call
of the principles in the transaction which was impeached.

It is the course somewhat perplexing to a court to weight the uncontradicted testimony of a witness against mere
presumption of fraud stands as a witness, thought mute, pointing the finger of denunciation at the questioned
transaction, and the imputation thus cast upon it can only be removed by a full and honest revelation sufficient to
convince the court that the fraudulent intent did not exist.

It is not to be denied that the secretary of a transaction like that now under consideration, arising from the fact that the
conveyance was affected by a private document, is a circumstance tending to cast suspicion upon it. strong
consideration of public policy require that in such case the parties should held to strict proof of good faith; and this
court cannot give it approval to a doctrine which would permit the property of a failing and impleaded debtor to be put
beyond the reach of this creditors by a trick such as we believe was attempted in this case. When a legal proceeding
is ended and the sheriff goes to take property of the debtor in execution, he is not infrequently met with the statutory
that the property now belongs to some other persons; and a document is produced to prove it which nobody, except
the immediate parties, ever heard of before. The courts must be executed if they refused to listen with childish
credulity to mentions of this character.

We do not overlook the circumstances that the supposed sale in this case was effected by a contract with pacto de
retro; and where such a sale is made, as frequently occurs, to secure money intended as a mere loan, the
consideration is naturally less than the true value of the property. In such case, if the bona fides of the original
contract is not under suspicion, the fact that the consideration for the sale is less than the value of the property is not
indicative of fraud. But where the original sale is presumptively tained with fraud. But where the original sale is
presumptively tained with fraud, the entire transaction from the time of the making of the contract until the
consolidation of the title in the purchaser should be considered as a whole, and absolutely transferred at once.
otherwise the contract of sale with pacto de retro could be as an instrument to shield parties in their efforts to defraud
creditors. this cannot be permitted.

In the connection reliance is placed by the appellee upon the case of Chiong Veloso vs. Ro and Levering (37 Phil.
Rep., 63); and it is urged that this decision affords support for the view that the transaction in question, having been
accomplished by means of contract of sale with facto de retro, cannot be considered fraudulent. It must be
remember, however, that the original sale to contract of pacto de retro was made in the case last cited to a purchaser
for value and in good faith; and the question was not so much whether the original transaction was fraudulent as
whether the failure of the debtor to redeem was fraudulent as whether, it being the theory of the defendant that the
plaintiff had colluded with the debtor (who as a sister) and had redeemed the property with her money or for her
benefit. Moreover, it was found in that case that at the time of the original conveyance the debtor had other property
more than sufficient to satisfy any judgment that might be recovered in the pending action.

The conclusion to which we come is that the questioned transaction, if actually any simulated, was made in fraud of
creditors and must be annulled. The judgment entered in this cause in the court below must accordingly be reversed;
and judgment will be here entered dismissing the complaint of Eladio Alpuerto and requiring in the complaint to
Eustaquio Lopez, as administrator to be a declared that the documents (Exhibit A), purporting to be a contract of sale
conveying the property in question from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto, acknowledged before a notary public upon
December 3, 1914, was executed in fraud of creditors and the same is hereby annulled. No special adjudication as to
costs will be made. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FISHER, J., dissenting:

While we concur fully with the views expressed in the majority opinion concerning the interpretation of articles 1225
and 1227 of the Civil Code, we are unable to agree with the conclusion that the transaction here in dispute is
fraudulent in fact. Assuming for the sake of the argument that the circumstances surrounding the transaction, if
unexplained, would warrant the presumption of fraud, we consider that the presumption has been overcome in this
case by the positive and uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff of Batuigas that the money was in fact paid as
recited in the deed. The record shows that plaintiff was possessed of sufficient means to permit him to make such
purchase; and while it is true that the consideration named was less than the full value of the property, the different is
not greater is usual in sale under pacto de retro such as this purports to have been. This difference in value, rather
than tending to show a fraudulent intent, tends to negative it. During the period within which the right to repurchase is
reversed, which in this case was two years, any judgment creditors of the vendor may exercise the right to redeem.
Consequently, in case of the simulation of a sale of this kind, it is rather to be expected that the value will be inflated
than understand.

As regards the failure to call the other subscribing witnesses, this court, following the general presumption trend of
judicial opinion, has held that no unfavorable presumption arises in such a case when that no unfavorable
presumption arises in such a case when it appears that the witnesses were equally available to both parties. The fact
that a party refrains from cumbering the record with merely corroborative evidence should not be considered to his
prejudice.

We think the judgment should be affirmed.

City of Manila v. del Rosario

5 Phil 227 (1905)
Admission by Privies
G.R. No. 1284 November 10, 1905

THE CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JACINTO DEL ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. ACTION; DISMISSAL; ERROR. — The defendant is entitled to have the case dismissed where
the plaintiff fails to establish the allegations in the complaint; and an order overruling such
motion is erroneous.

2. REALTY; POSSESSION; EVIDENCE. — Where one derives title to real estate from another, the
declaration act, or omission of the latter to the property is evidence against the former only
when made while the latter holds the title. (Sec. 278, Code of Civil Procedure.)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION; PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP. — A possessory information

recorded in the property register is prima facie evidence of the fact that the person who
instituted the proceedings holds the property as owner; and the presumption, under article 448
of the Civil Code, is that his title is good unless the contrary is shown.

DECISION

This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots describe in the complaint, located
in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant.

The court below entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for
possession and damages in the sum of $2,500, United States currency, and costs.

At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. This motion
was overruled by the court, to which ruling the defendant duly excepted. The question thus
raised puts in issue the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the ownership
and possession of the land in question. We accordingly hold that this point is impliedly
involved in the third and fourth assignments of error.

Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony
of John R. Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness
testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city
(p. 11 of the bill of exceptions). The next witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel
and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central Government
(not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs (pp. 12 and 13 of the bill of
exceptions)). It must be borne in mind that this witness referred to the land included in Calles
Clavel and Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon the
streets referred to, but do not form a part of either. According to the complaint, they are
building lots.

The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the
Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his
testimony is at variance with that of the preceding witness, who testified that the land
belonged to the Central Government. Villegas’ testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of
what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony
was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally
considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership
under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however,
does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned. "Common
reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this
witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.

Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between
the municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central
Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely
the streets on which the property abuts (bill of exceptions, pp. 15 and 16).

The fourth witness (Sotera Roco) testified merely that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid 100 pesos
to her brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory information as to the
property abutting on Calle Clavel. It appears that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from
Cipriano Roco and sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario, the defendant in this case.
Notwithstanding this, and assuming that the hearsay testimony of Sotera Roco is admissible, we
do not see how it can be inferred from her testimony that the plaintiff is the real owner of the
property.

The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership of the
land. They simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence
introduced by the plaintiff.

Of these documents the most important of all is the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario
to the "mayor of the city of manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the letter written by
him on the 9th of October, 1901, to the Municipal Board of Manila. Lorenzo del Rosario in his
testimony, admitted the authenticity of both documents which contain an offer to the
municipality of Manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel. Lorenzo del Rosario admitted also
that he signed the first document under the misapprehension that the land belonged to the
city, but that he had been subsequently informed by some of the city officials that the land did
not belong to the municipality, but to Cipriano Roco y Vera. He stated that he signed the second
document because the President of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to do so in
order to avoid litigation with the city. His testimony in this respect was not contradicted. We
accordingly hold that the provisions of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is not
admissible in evidence.

Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y
Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after
he had transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the
same and had it registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the complaint), on the 23d of
February, 1893. If this is so, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the
documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant, because, under section 278
of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from another, the
declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former only when made while the latter holds the title."

The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of Manila. This map is not before us.
It is sufficient to say, in order to show that it has no value as evidence, that the reliability of the
map was not proven at the trial. The only witness examined with regard to it was the city
attorney. He was unable to say who made it or who caused it to be made, or when it was made.
He said only that he believed the map had been drawn in the month of July, 1880, or prior to
May, 1893. Neither this nor his statement that the map was found among the archives of the
city of Manila is of itself sufficient to show that the map is authentic. No one appears to certify
as to its correctness.

The map identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the plaintiff for the sole
purpose of showing the location of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in
establishing the right of possession claimed by the plaintiff.

On the other hand, the two public instruments executed on March 7, 1900, between the
defendant and Telesfora Apostol y Perea, also introduced in evidence by the plaintiff, show that
the defendant was in possession of the land under a good title and with the status of owner of
the land. In the first instrument if is stated so many words that the defendant is the owner in
fee simple of the land, he having repurchased it from Liberio de Aurteneche y Menchacatorre,
whose title had been recorded in the property register.

From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not prove its
claim of title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by the
plaintiff nor the documentary evidence introduced show that the city of Manila is the owner
of the land, or that it has a right to its possession as claimed in the complaint. Some of the
documents introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been
executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions of the defendant rather than those of
the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that the defendant’s
possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March, 1901, and his possession of
that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that the defendant had been in the adverse
possession of the land. According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed to hold
under a just title, unless the contrary is shown.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in
the complaint, and the court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss.

The order of the trial court overruling the motion of the defendant to dismiss and the judgment
appealed from are hereby reversed. Let the case be remanded to the court of its origin for
action in accordance herewith. The plaintiff shall pay the costs of the Court of First Instance. No
special order is made as to the costs on appeal. After the expiration of twenty days from the
date hereof let judgment be entered in conformity herewith. So ordered.

E. CONFESSIONS

1. Art. III, Section 17, 1987 Constitution

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself.

Rule 130, Section 33

Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused

acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.

Rule 115 (e)

Rule 115, Rights of the Accused.

Sec.1. Rights of the Accused at the Trial. — In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(e) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-

examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence
shall not in any manner prejudice him.

Cases:
 People v. Endino
352 SCRA 307 (2001)
Confessions

[G.R. No. 133026. February 20, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

YIELDING to mans brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of
Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose
love they once shared.
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an
emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and
without warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the
chest. Dennis girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the
unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and
succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards
the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere
Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the
two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim
Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near
death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis
expired even before he could receive medical attention. According to the
autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardio-respiratory
arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which
penetrated the heart."[1]
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed
against Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants
were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial
court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives
without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
 On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined
efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio,
Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo
Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo
Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the
Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station
where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the
interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his
nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking
Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's
mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They
took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded
to Manila where they separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin
appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown
over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through
the testimony of Clara Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis
Aquino standing outside the Soundlab Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by
him, when Galgarin suddenly approached them and without any prior warning
stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned lover who
harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized Edward
and Gerry because the street was sufficiently lighted.[2]
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door
neighbor of Dennis, who testified that a little past six oclock in the evening of 16
October 1991 Gerry Galgarin together with a companion went to her house
looking for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab Recording
Studio as Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she heard a shot and
instinctively, she instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for cover while
she anxiously waited for her seven (7)-year old daughter Josephine who was out
of the house for an errand for her. Soon enough she heard Josephine knocking at
their door. She was crying because she said her Kuya Dennis had been shot and
stabbed.[3]
Josephine confirmed her mothers testimony and even said that she had seen
Gerry Galgarin stab her Kuya Dennis and she could remember Gerry very well
because of the mole below his nose.[4]
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part
in the slaying of Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo
to help his common-law wife Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born. He
stayed with her until the 16th of October when she was discharged from the
Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.[5]
 Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported
the alibi of accused-appellant. However, she admitted that when she registered
the childs birth on 13 December 1993 or more than two (2) years after the delivery,
she informed the civil registrar that the childs father was "unknown."[6] His story was
also confirmed by Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his co-workers at
the Kainan sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who testified that accused-appellant
was fetched by a neighbor from the restaurant in the early afternoon of 14
October with the news that his wife was having labor pains.[7]
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV
Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police
officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed
and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the
Constitution.[8]
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the
testimony of the police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on
accused-appellant and upon a finding that his confession was made before a
group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of hostility towards
him. The court gave credence to the arresting officers assertion that it was even
accused-appellant who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal
on national television for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing
evidence to support his allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the
evening of 16 October 1991. Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was
convicted of murder qualified by treachery[9] and sentenced toreclusion
perpetua. Additionally, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis
Aquino P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual
damages. The case against his nephew and co-accused Edward Endino
remained in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement as soon as he
could be arrested.[10]
In his Appellants Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his alibi
and admitting his videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime
on 16 October 1991 as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth
on the 14th of that month, is not persuasive. Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony
of Cornelio Tejero Jr.,[11] Philippine Airlines Load Controller of the Puerto Princesa
City, that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on their passenger
manifest for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could not be relied
upon inasmuch as he himself admitted that they could not be sure of their
passengers real identities. The testimonies of accused-appellants co-workers that
he was in Antipolo on 14 October 1991 did not fortify his defense either since these
witnesses did not categorically state that they saw him in Antipolo in the evening
of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses as the one who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and
unavailing. Josephine Leongs identification of accused-appellant was given in a
very categorical and spontaneous manner. Her confidence as to the attackers
identity was clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him having a mole below
his nose, which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita
to implicate accused-appellant, a complete stranger to them, if there was no
truth to their assertion. As for Clara, her naming of accused-appellant as her
boyfriends assailant was not done out of spite, but was impelled by her desire to
seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellants guilt, probably with intense
incriminating effect, were his immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt
at jailbreak[12] revealing a guilty conscience, hence, his persistent effort to evade
the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-appellants videotaped
confession, we find such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video
and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of
custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in
an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had
indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the
newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the
trial court stated in its Decision[13]-

Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had
stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is
no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his
will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein.

We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television

as a medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in
several cases,[14] it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution
must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the
police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a
situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus
imperil our criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by
an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques
and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given
under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all
media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of
confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined
and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and
arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in
separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to
be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question
that next presents itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime
as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless, the crime committed is one of
murder considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply standing on
the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the
accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting
victim, without the slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry
the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.[15]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant
GERRY GALGARIN alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery, sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis
Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages andP72,725.35 as
actual damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is
further ordered to compensate the decedents heirs P50,000.00 as moral
damages for their emotional and mental anguish. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

People of the Philippines vs. Marlo Compil y Litaban

244 SCRA 135 (1995)
Confessions

G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE. PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On the belief that the case for the prosecution depends in the main on his own extrajudicial confession which he
claims is inadmissible, accused Marlo Compil y Litaban filed a demurrer to evidence instead of presenting evidence in
his behalf. The trial court however denied his demurrer, admitted his extrajudicial confession, and found him guilty of
robbery with homicide. Now before us, he maintains that his extrajudicial confession was extracted without the
assistance of counsel, thus constitutionally flawed.

As submitted by the prosecution, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitureslocated
along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel
and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the
second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded the two (2) maids of
the owners into the bathroom.

Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood Furniture, along
Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their bedroom. Sensing however that
something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door to peek. Suddenly, a man placed his arms around
her neck while another poked a balisong at her nape. She was pushed back into the bedroom and ordered to open
the drawers where she kept money. A third man ransacked the bedroom. They then tied her hands behind her back,
stuffed her mouth with a towel, and took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth P30,000.00.

Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the bathroom, heard
Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the two (2) men guarding them had
already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho, dashed out of the bathroom and proceeded to the
bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary, the two (2) maids untied her hands and took out the towel from her
mouth. They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of
furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.

In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of the
Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that evening, while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside
an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose
Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police
investigators who also learned that the trio who were all from Samar failed to report for work the day after the
incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his
sister's child.

Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, and Jenelyn Valle went to
the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions. From the records of the
parish they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar Mabini stood as godfather in the baptism of the child of his
sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez. Immediately they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar
Mabini and his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still planning to leave.

After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accused Marlo Compil
who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned
pale, became speechless and was trembling. However after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated,
Compil readily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the
baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further
investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before midnight on 23
October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his
companions were and his participation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the
furniture shop since he would be recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went inside. Compil
said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all met in Bangkal,
Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit, where they shared the loot and
drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go
home to their respective provinces.

From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to the house of Pablo Pakit who
confirmed that his younger brother Rogelio, with some six (6) others including Compil, went to his house past
midnight on 23 October 1987 and divided among themselves the money and jewelry which, as he picked up from
their conversation, was taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. They drank beer until past four o'clock the next morning.

On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz
and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville Compil and brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala, executed a
sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout. He
named the six (6) other perpetrators of the crime as Jose Jacale, Baltazar Mabini, Amancio Alvos, Rogelio Pakit, a
certain "Erning" and one "Lando," and asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by Jose Jacale and
Baltazar Mabini who were the masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work for MJ
Furnitures where he was the foreman.

Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations in Manila, Parañaque and
Bulacan but failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.

On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil. Assisted by a
counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the prosecution had rested, the accused
represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.

On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49, 1 denied the demurrer, found the accused guilty of
robbery with homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his constitutional rights (to
remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the police officers started interrogating him from the time of
his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at the Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he)
was made to confess and declare statements that can be used against him in any proceeding." 2 And, the belated
arrival of counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession did
not cure the constitutional infirmity since the police investigators had already extracted incriminatory
statements from him the day before, which extracted statements formed part of his alleged confession.
He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admission of (his) oral . . . and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions)
. . . (he) cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide based on
the testimonies of other witnesses" 3 which are replete with "serious and glaring inconsistencies and
contradictions." 4

In People v. Rous, 5 the Third Division of this Court held that an extrajudicial confession may be admitted in
evidence even if obtained without the assistance of counsel provided that it was read and fully explained
to confessant by counsel before it was signed. However we adopt our view in Gamboa v. Cruz 6 where the Court En
Banc ruled that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel
to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of
the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense." We maintained this rule in the
fairly recent cases of People v. Macam 7 and People v. Bandula 8 where we further reiterated the procedure —

. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf . . . Any statement obtained in
 violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be in admissible in evidence.

In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his
arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he
was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information.
In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those
instances, he was not assisted by counsel.

The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled
confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from
accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the
police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing
by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus 9 we said that admissions obtained during
custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed
under the Constitution.

What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained to the accused who did
not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the records, the latter's constitutional rights and
the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession.

While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details which could not have
been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot
admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, we find other sufficient factual
circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We give credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Linda Hermoso, Pablo Pakit and Jenelyn Valle. We
believe that Linda Hermoso saw the accused and Mabini in the vicinity of MJ Furnitures just before the commission of
the crime. While Hermoso may have contradicted herself on some minor incidents, she was straightforward on this
specific instance —

FISCAL FORMOSO (re-direct):

Q. You said that you saw Marlo and Puti (Baltazar Mabini) together with Jessie
when you were inside the jeep, is it not?

WITNESS HERMOSO:

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was this before you went to sleep?

A. Yes, sir. 10

Time and again it has been said that minor inconsistencies do not impair the credibility of witnesses, more so with
witness Hermoso who only reached Grade Two and who as the trial court noted had difficulty understanding the
questions being propounded to her. In fine, in the absence of evidence to show any reason why prosecution
witnesses should falsely testify, it is fair to conclude that no improper motive exists and that their testimony is worthy
of full faith and credit.

We have repeatedly ruled that the guilt of the accused may be established through circumstantial evidence provided
that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 11 And there
can be a conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an unbroken
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime. 12
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused through the following circumstances:
First, accused Marlo Compil and Baltazar Mabini who are both from Samar worked in MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz,
Manila, and were familiar with the floor plan of the shop. Second, on the night of the incident, they were seen in front
of MJ Furnitures. Third, they were seen going to the rear of the furniture store. Fourth, robbers forcibly entered MJ
Furnitures through the back window on the second floor. Fifth, some two (2) hours after the commission of the crime,
at around two o'clock the following morning, they were in a house in Bangkal, Makati, dividing between themselves
and their five (5) other companions the money and jewelry taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sixth, they all failed to show
up for work the following day. Seventh, accuses Compil turned ashen, was trembling and speechless when
apprehended in Tayabas, Quezon, for a crime committed in Manila. Certainly these circumstances as gleaned from
the factual findings of the trial court form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime. 13 Hence even disregarding accused-appellant's oral and
written confessions, as we do, still the prosecution was able to show that he was a co-conspirator in the
robbery with homicide.

While it may be true that the arrest, search and seizure were made without the benefit of a warrant, accused-
appellant is now estopped from questioning this defect after failing to move for the quashing of the information before
the trial court. Thus any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. 14

The argument of accused-appellant that the trial court should have convicted the arresting police officers of arbitrary
detention, if not delay in the delivery of detained persons, is misplaced. Suffice it to say that the law enforcers who
arrested him are not being charged and prosecuted in the case at bench.

Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of accused-appellant that granting that he had participated in the
commission of the crime, he should be considered only as an accomplice. Disregarding his extrajudicial confession
and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his behalf, the Court is left with no other recourse but to consider
only the evidence of the prosecution which shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. For, direct proof
is not essential to prove conspiracy 15 which may be inferred from the acts of the accused during and after the
commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest. 16 Thus circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy. 17 And where conspiracy exists,
the act of one is the act of all, and each is to be held in the same degree of liability as the others. 18

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar as it finds accused-
appellant MARLO COMPIL y LITABAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. Consequently, he is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law.

Accused-appellant is also directed to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Manuel Jay in the amount of P50,000.00,
plus P35,000.00 as actual damages. He is further directed to return to Mary Jay the jewelry worth P30,000.00, and if
he can no longer return the jewelry, to pay its value.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., is on leave.

People of the Philippines vs. Wong Chuen Ming

256 SCRA 183 (1996)
Confessions
 [G.R. Nos. 112801-11. April 12, 1996]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WONG

CHUEN MING, AU WING CHEUNG, TAN SOI TEE, LIM CHAN FATT,
CHIN KOK WEE, CHIN KIN YONG, YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG
SONG, CHIN KIN FAH, CHAI MIN HUWA, and LIM NYUK
SUN, accused. WONG CHUEN MING and AU WING
CHEUNG, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND DUE
PROCESS; NOT VIOLATED WHEN THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PREVIOUS COUNSELS,
WAS DIMINISHED BY THE FACT THAT THE LATTER ALSO JOINTLY
REPRESENTED THE OTHER ACCUSED. - Accused-appellants contention that they
were deprived of their right to counsel and due process when their previous counsels
also represented the other accused despite conflicting interests is not well-taken. After
going over the lengthy transcripts taken during the trial, the Court is satisfied that said
counsels tried to present all the defenses available to each of the accused and that
they did not, in any way, put in jeopardy accused-appellants constitutional right to
counsel. It does not appear from the records that the effectiveness of accused-
appellants previous counsels was diminished by the fact that they also jointly
represented the other accused.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION;
VIOLATION THEREOF RENDERS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED INADMISSIBLE.
- At the outset, the Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well
as on the plastic bags containing shabu, are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study
of the records reveals that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights
during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were
not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to
counsel and any statement they might make could be used against them, when they
were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at
the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at
Camp Crame. By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the
plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere
possession of shabu is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount
to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of
Rights (Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore,
inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of
their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTEND TO ALL PERSONS, BOTH ALIENS AND CITIZENS. - The fact
that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the
exclusionary rule because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights
are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
4. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT PREVAILS
OVER THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
DUTIES. - Among the prosecution witnesses, only customs examiner Danilo Gomez
testified that all the seized baggages, including those owned by accused-appellants
Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, contained a box or boxes of shabu. His
testimony was given credence by the trial court since he was presumed to have
performed his duties in a regular manner. However, Gomez testimony inculpating
accused-appellants was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. Customs
collector Zenaida Bonifacio stated during cross-examination that she cannot recall if
each and everyone of accused were found in possession of any box or boxes of Alpen
Cereals. More significantly, the testimony of NARCOM officer Capt. Rustico
Francisco casts doubt on the claim of Gomez that he recovered boxes of shabu from
the baggages of accused-appellants. While Capt. Francisco was categorical in
stating that boxes of shabu were recovered from the baggages belonging to the other
nine (9) accused Malaysians, he admitted that he was not sure whether Gomez
actually recovered boxes of shabu from accused-appellants baggages. Hence, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties accorded to Gomez cannot, by
itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accused-appellants to be presumed
innocent especially in the light of the foregoing testimonies of other prosecution
witnesses.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES;
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILT, MUST BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT; CASE AT BAR.There are other circumstances that militate against the
conviction of accused-appellants. First, accused-appellants are British (Hongkong)
nationals while all the other accused are Malaysians. It is difficult to imagine how
accused-appellants could have conspired with the other accused, who are total
strangers, when they do not even speak the same language.Second, overwhelming
evidence consisting of testimonies of accused-appellant Au Wing Cheungs superiors
was presented to show that he was a bona fide employee of Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. Third, evidence showed that accused-appellant Wong Chueng
Ming was not originally part of the tour group arranged by Select Tours but he was
only accommodated by the latter at the last minute when his package tour to Cebu
was cancelled by Wing Ann Travel Co. Finally, as testified to by Capt. Francisco, both
accused-appellants adamantly refused to sign on the transparent plastic bags
containing shabu. All the foregoing circumstances taken together with the findings of
the Court persuade us to hold that accused-appellants participation in the illegal
transportation of shabu into the country has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. To paraphrase an admonition expressed by the Court in a recent case, [m]uch
as We share the abhorrence of the disenchanted public in regard to the proliferation
of drug pushers (or drug smugglers, as in this case), the Court cannot permit the
 incarceration of individuals based on insufficient factual nexus of their participation in
the commission of an offense. (People vs. Melosantos, 245 SCRA 560, 587)
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Benjamin C. Santos & Ofelia Calcetas-Santos Law Offices and Santos, Parungao,
Aquino and Santos Law Offices for accused-appellants.

DECISION
PADILLA, J.:

Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung appeal from a decision* of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 109 of Pasay City, finding them, as well as their co-accused, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, both British (Hongkong)
nationals, together with Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yang, Yap
Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun, all
Malaysian nationals, were charged with unlawfully transporting into the country
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Eleven (11) separate criminal informations
were filed against all of the accused individually, setting forth similar allegations:

That on or about the 7th day of September, 1991, about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon
in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport without lawful authority [3.40 kilograms in Criminal Case No. 91-1524 filed
against Wong Chuen Ming; 3.45 kilograms in Criminal Case No.91-1525 to 91-1534
filed against all other accused individually], more or less of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, as (sic) regulated drug commonly known as SHABU.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

At their respective arraignments, all accused with the assistance of their counsels,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. The counsel of accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung
earlier filed a petition for reinvestigation and deferment of his arraignment but the same
was denied by the trial court for lack of merit. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung was
arraigned on 20 September 1991 and with the assistance of counsel, he likewise entered
a plea of not guilty.
The trial court conducted a joint and/or consolidated trial of all the cases upon motion
by the prosecution considering that the State had common testimonial and documentary
evidence against all accused. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, (1)
Danilo Gomez, a customs examiner assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Customs Office; (2) Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio, Chief of the Collection Division and
Acting Duty Collector of the Customs Office at the NAIA; (3) Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic
chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, and (4) Capt. Rustico
Francisco, Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Philippine National Police Narcotics Command
Detachment at the NAIA. The case for the prosecution, as culled from the testimonies of
its witnesses, may be summarized as follows:
On 7 September 1991, at about 1:000 clock in the afternoon, Philippine Air Lines
(PAL) Flight PR No. 301 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila. Among the many passengers who arrived on board
said flight were the eleven (11) accused, namely, Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing Cheung
,Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong
Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun. Their respective passports
showed that Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are the only British (Hongkong)
nationals in the group while the rest are all Malaysian nationals. Their passports also
revealed that all the accused Malaysians (except Lim Chan Fatt) originally came from
Malaysia, traveled to Singapore and Hongkong before proceeding to Manila. Upon the
other hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, as well as Lim Chan Fatt, directly
came from Hongkong to Manila. All accused arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged
by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung, an employee
of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. acted as their tour guide.
After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at the NAIA,
the tour group went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in
baggages.They placed the same in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which
at that time was manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed
to Gomez the tour groups passengers manifest, their baggage declarations and their
passports.
Gomez testified that he instructed the tour group to place their baggages on the
examiners table for inspection. They were directed to hold on to their respective
baggages while they wait for their turn to be examined. Chin Kong Songs baggage was
first to be examined by Gomez. Gomez put his hand inside the baggage and in the course
of the inspection, he found three (3) brown colored boxes similar in size to powdered milk
boxes underneath the clothes. The boxes were marked Alpen Cereals and as he found
nothing wrong with them, Gomez returned them inside the baggage and allowed Chin
Kong Song to go. Following the same procedure, Gomez next examined the baggage of
Wong Chuen Ming. Gomez again found and pulled out two (2) boxes of Alpen Cereals
from said baggage and like in the previous inspection, he found nothing wrong with them
and allowed Wong Chuen Ming to go. The third baggage to be examined belonged to Lim
Nyuk Sun. When Gomez pulled out another three (3) boxes of Alpen Cereals from said
baggage, he became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter.
Inside the box was a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez
immediately called the attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector
Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio to his discovery.[2]
Bonifacio testified that upon learning about the boxes containing the white crystalline
substance, she immediately ordered the tour group to get their baggages and proceed to
the district collectors office. Chin Kong Song and Wong Chuen Ming, who were previously
cleared by Gomez, were also brought inside together with the rest of the group. Inside
the collectors office, Gomez continued to examine the baggages of the other members of
the tour group. He allegedly found that each baggage contained one (1), two (2) or three
(3) boxes similar to those previously found in the baggages of Chin Kong Song, Wong
Chuen Ming and Lim Nyuk Sun. A total of thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals containing
white crystalline substance were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the eleven
(11) accused. As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he
bundled said boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed them over to
Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes, Bonifacio called out the names of
accused as listed in the passengers manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking
tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Also
present at this time were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of
Customs and several news reporters. A few minutes later, District Collector Antonio
Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and then NBI Deputy Director Mariano Mison. [3]
Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered,
he conducted a field test on a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed
that the substance was indeed shabu. Capt. Francisco immediately informed the eleven
(11) accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all accused, as well as the Alpen
Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought to Camp Crame. [4]
At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and
after having identified them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance inside the boxes bearing their signatures. The examination by
Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
at Camp Crame, confirmed that the white crystalline substance recovered from accused
was shabu.[5] The total weight of shabu recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms.[6]
For their part, the defense interposed by all accused was basically anchored on the
testimony of their co-accused Lim Chan Fatt, a technician and self-confessed call boy,
who admitted being responsible for bringing the boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country
although he denied any knowledge that they contained shabu. Lim Chan Fatt testified
that except for Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, all other accused were unknown or
complete strangers to him until their trip to the Philippines on 7 September 1991. With
respect to Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, Lim Chan Fatt allegedly met them at his
boarding house in Hongkong where the two (2) temporarily lived a few days before said
trip. According to Lim Chan Fatt, prior to their departure date, a certain Ah Hong, a co-
boarder and a Hongkong businessman, approached him and asked him if he could kindly
bring with him boxes of cereals to the Philippines. Ah Hong promised Lim Chan Fatt that
a certain Ah Sing will get these boxes from him at the Philippine airport and for this trouble,
Ah Sing will see to it that Lim Chan Fatt will have a good time in the Philippines. Ah Hong
allegedly even opened one (1) box to show that it really contained cereals. Lim Chan Fatt
acceded to Ah Hongs request as he allegedly found nothing wrong with it. Consequently,
Ah Hong delivered to Lim Chan Fatt thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals. Since his baggage
could not accommodate all thirty (30) boxes, Lim Chan Fatt requested Chin Kong Song
and Lim Nyuk Sun to accommodate some of the boxes in their baggages. Lim Chan Fatt
claimed that he entrusted five (5) boxes to Chin Kong Song and another five (5) to Lim
Nyuk Sun. He allegedly placed four (4) boxes inside a hand carried plastic bag while the
rest were put inside his baggage.[7]
 On the basis of this testimony, the defense endeavored to show that only Lim Chan
Fatt, Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun were responsible for bringing boxes of Alpen
Cereals into the country and even then they cannot be held liable for violation of
Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, as they allegedly had no knowledge
that these boxes contained shabu.
The defense also presented as witnesses accused Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk
Sun and accused-appellants Au Wing Cheung and Wong Chuen Ming. Accused-
appellants denied that boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered from their baggages. They
claimed that they affixed their signatures on the boxes only because they were threatened
by police authorities who were present during the examination inside the collectors
office. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung maintained that he was a bona fide employee
of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. and that he had no prior knowledge that the tour
group he was supposed to accompany to the Philippines brought boxes containing
shabu.[8] For his part, accused-appellant Wong Chuen Ming tried to dissociate himself
from the other accused by testifying that he was not a part of their group. He claimed that
he was originally booked with another travel agency, Wing Ann Travel Co., for a five-day
Cebu tour. This Cebu tour was allegedly cancelled due to insufficient number of clients
and accused-appellant was subsequently transferred to and accommodated by Select
Tours.[9] The other accused who did not take the witness stand opted to adopt as their
own all testimonial and documentary evidence presented in court for the defense.
On 29 November 1991, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

In view of all the foregoing evidences, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven
the guilt of all the accused in all the criminal cases filed against them for Violation of
Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended and hereby sentences them as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 91-1524 entitled People of the Philippines vs. WONG CHUEN
MING, the Court sentences Wong Chuen Ming to life imprisonment and a fine of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III of R.A.
6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1525 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN KIN
YONG, the Court hereby sentences Chin Kin Yong to life imprisonment and a fine of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation 15 (sic), Art. III, R.A. 6425 as
amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1526 entitled People of the Philippines vs. AU WING
CHEUNG, the Court hereby sentences Au Wing Cheung to life imprisonment and a
fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III,
R.A. 6425 as amended.
In Criminal Case No. 91-1527 entitled People of the Philippines vs. YAP BOON AH,
the Court hereby sentences Yap Boon Ah to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as
amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1528 entitled People of the Philippines vs. TAN SOT TEE,
the Court hereby sentences Tan Soi Tee to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as
amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1529 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN KONG
SONG, the Court hereby sentences Chin Kong Song to life imprisonment and a fine
of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A.
6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1530 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN KOK
WEE, the Court hereby sentences Chin Kok Wee to life imprisonment and a fine of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425
as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1531 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN KIN FAH,
the Court sentences Chin Kin Fah to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as
amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1532 entitled People of the Philippines vs. LIM CHAN
FATT, the Court hereby sentences Lim Chan Fatt to life imprisonment and a fine of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425
as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1533 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHAI MIN
HUWA, the Court hereby sentences Chai Min Huwa to life imprisonment and a fine
of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A.
6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1534 entitled People of the Philippines vs. LIM NYUK
SUN, the Court hereby sentences Lim Nyuk Sun to life imprisonment and a fine of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, R.A. 6425 as
amended.

Likewise, the thirty (30) Alpen cereal boxes found to contain a total of 34.450
kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu is hereby forfeited and the
same is hereby ordered burned and/or destroyed in the presence of this Court,
representative of the Department of Justice, National Bureau of Investigation,
Dangerous Drugs Board, Bureau of Customs and the Narcotics Command (Narcom)
at the San Lazaro crematorium before the same falls in the hands of future victims and
further compound the already epidemic proportions of the drug menace in the country.

SO ORDERED. [10]

Thereafter, all accused through counsel filed with the trial court their joint notice of
appeal.[11] However, on 7 April 1992, accused Chin Kong Song, Lim Nyuk Sun, Chin Kok
Wee and Chai Min Huwa withdrew their notice of appeal.[12] This Court then directed those
accused who did not withdraw their appeal to file their respective appellants brief. Only
accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung filed their joint appeal brief,
hence, the Court was constrained to dismiss the appeal pertaining to accused Lim Chan
Fatt, Ching Kin Yong, Tan Soi Tee, Yap Boon Ah and Chin Kin Fah.[13] Consequently, the
Court is now only concerned with the appeal of accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming
and Au Wing Cheung as the decision of the trial court has already become final and
executory with respect to accused Chin Kong Song, Lim Nyuk Sun, Chin Kok Wee, Chai
Min Huwa, Lim Chan Fatt, Chi Kin Yong, Tan Soi Tee, Yap Boon Ah and Chin Kin Fah.
In their appeal brief, accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung
make the following assignment of errors:
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE

JOINT REPRESENTATION BY PREVIOUS COUNSEL OF APPELLANTS WITH
THE GROUP OF NINE MALAYSIANS ACCUSED NOT ONLY PREJUDICED
THE FORMER BUT ALSO AMOUNTED TO THE DEPRIVATION OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS.
II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE

APPREHENDING CUSTOMS OFFICERS VIOLATED APPELLANTS MIRANDA
RIGHTS.
III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE INADMISSIBLE

EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS MIRANDA RIGHTS.
IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON THE PRESUMPTION OF

REGULARITY IN THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, DESPITE THE
PAUCITY AND LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE.
V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR

ABSENCE OF ANIMUS POSSIDENDI ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANTS. [14]

Accused-appellants contention that they were deprived of their right to counsel and
due process when their previous counsels also represented the other accused despite
conflicting interests is not well-taken. After going over the lengthy transcripts taken during
the trial, the Court is satisfied that said counsels tried to present all the defenses available
to each of the accused and that they did not, in any way, put in jeopardy accused-
appellants constitutional right to counsel. It does not appear from the records that the
effectiveness of accused-appellants previous counsels was diminished by the fact that
they also jointly represented the other accused.
The Court, however, finds merit in the other contentions raised by accused-appellants
in their appeal brief. These contentions shall be discussed jointly considering that the
issues they raise are interrelated and deal with the question of whether or not the guilt of
accused-appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, the Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as
on the plastic bags containing shabu, are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the
records reveal that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the
entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of
their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any
statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix
their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on
the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame.
Prosecution witness Danilo Gomez admitted this fatal lapse during cross-
examination:
Atty. Tomas:
What did you tell these passengers before you made them sign this bunch of
cartons?
A: It was Collector Bonifacio who call (sic) their names and as soon as their
luggages are examined and pulled, the three boxes, I wrap it in a masking
tape and requested them to sign their names.
Q: You just told them to sign this matter?
A: Yes.
Q: No preliminaries?
A: No.
 Q: At that time that each one of the passengers were made to sign, was there
any lawyer representing them?
A: None.
Q: You did not even inform them of their constitutional rights?
A: No.[15] (Italics supplied)
Capt. Rustico Francisco also admitted that he did not inform the accused of their
rights when he placed them under arrest:
Atty. Zoleta:
So, after the result of that sample examined which yielded positive result, you
immediately placed the accused under arrest, is that correct?
A: I informed that that they are under arrest for bringing transporting to the country
suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
x x x xxx xxx
Q: How did you announce your authority to the accused?
A: I told Mr. Paul Au to tell his companions that we are placing them under arrest
for transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride into the country.
Q: And it is at this very moment that you informed them of their right, is that
correct?
A: I did not inform them of their right.[16] (Italics supplied)
It is also not shown from the testimony of Elizabeth Ayonon that accused were
informed of their rights when they were again made to affix their signatures on the plastic
bags:
Atty. Tomas:
You said all the signatures were already there when brought to your
laboratory for examination. With that answer, do you mean to tell even the
signature inside the cereal box and transparent plastic bag were already
there when you examined said specimen?
A: Only the brown box labelled Alpen.
Q: Who made the signature inside the cereal box and on the transparent plastic
bag?
A: Me, sir, because I asked them to identify. The interpreter asked them to identify
their signature. So, in return I have to tell them please affix your signature for
proper identification since they are reflected on the box.
Q: What did you tell the accused when you required them to make their
signatures?
 A: The interpreter told them to affix their signature for proper identification on the
transparent plastic bag since their signature appeared on the carton box. [17]
By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags,
accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of
shabu is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an
uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights
(Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as
evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional
rights is inadmissible against them.[18] The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does
not preclude application of the exclusionary rule because the constitutional guarantees
embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.[19]
Without the signatures of accused on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the
transparent plastic bags, the prosecution is left with the testimonies of its witnesses to
establish that all the eleven (11) accused transported shabu into the country. Among the
prosecution witnesses, only customs examiner Danilo Gomez testified that all the seized
baggages, including those owned by accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing
Cheung, contained a box or boxes of shabu. His testimony was given credence by the
trial court since he was presumed to have performed his duties in a regular
manner. However, Gomez testimony inculpating accused-appellants was not
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
Customs collector Zenaida Bonifacio stated during cross-examination that she cannot
recall if each and everyone of accused were found in possession of any box or boxes of
Alpen Cereals.[20] More significantly, the testimony of NARCOM officer Capt. Rustico
Francisco casts doubt on the claim of Gomez that he recovered boxes of shabu from the
baggages of accused-appellants:
Court:
Clarificatory questions from the Court, you said that you were at the arrival
area immediately after the arrival of all these accused when your attention
was called by the customs examiner, is that correct?
A: Yes. Your Honor.
Court:
So that you can truly say that you could note or witness the actual
examinations of the baggages of all the accused persons here?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
You realize, of course, the seriousness of the charges against these
persons?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
 As a matter of fact, they could stay in jail for life?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Now in all candor and sincerity, did you actually see with your own two eyes
any box being recovered from the bag of Au Wing Cheung? If you are not
sure, dont answer.
A: I am not sure.
Court:
How about from the bag of Wong Chuen Ming, the other tourist from
Hongkong. In all candor and sincerity did you actually see with your own two
eyes a box being recovered from his bag?
A: I am not sure.
Court:
There are nine other accused in these cases. In all fairness and sincerity,
other than the two, did you actually see with your own two eyes boxes of
cereals being recovered from the bags of the other Malaysians accused in
these cases?
A: For the nine others, I am very sure, I am very sure that cereal boxes containing
shabu, I am very sure.
Court:
Without any exception?
A: Yes, Your Honor, for the nine.[21] (Italics supplied)
While Capt. Francisco was categorical in stating that boxes of shabu were recovered
from the baggages belonging to the other nine (9) accused Malaysians, he admitted that
he was not sure whether Gomez actually recovered boxes of shabu from accused-
appellants baggages. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
accorded to Gomez cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accused-
appellants to be presumed innocent especially in the light of the foregoing testimonies of
other prosecution witnesses.[22]
There are other circumstances that militate against the conviction of accused-
appellants. First, accused-appellants are British (Hongkong) nationals while all the other
accused are Malaysians. It is difficult to imagine how accused-appellants could have
conspired with the other accused, who are total strangers, when they do not even speak
the same language.Second, overwhelming evidence consisting of testimonies of
accused-appellant Au Wing Cheungs superiors was presented to show that he was
a bonafide employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Third, evidence showed that
accused-appellant Wong Chuen Ming was not originally part of the tour group arranged
by Select Tours but he was only accommodated by the latter at the last minute when his
package tour to Cebu was cancelled by Wing Ann Travel Co. Finally, as testified to by
Capt. Francisco, both accused-appellants adamantly refused to sign on the transparent
plastic bags containing shabu:
Court:
You made mention about two persons two of the accused who refused to
sign the plastic bags containing the suspected shabu. Did you say that?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Did you not go out of your way to inquire the reasons of the two for not
wanting to sign knowing of course that your duty as a law officer is not only
to see to it that the guilty are prosecuted but to spare the innocent? Did you
inquire why they refused to sign?
A: I inquired.
Court:
What was the reason of the two?
A: They told me their baggages did not contain any prohibited drugs.
Court:
Now again, think very carefully and try to recall vividly the time when these
two refused to sign and go over the faces of the eleven accused and tell the
court if you can remember or recall the looks of the two accused who refused
to sign. Before you do that look very carefully at their faces.
A: Wong Chuen Ming, the one with the tattoo.
Q: Now, you mentioned two persons look at the faces of the 10 others. Aside
from the one with a tattoo and look for the other one.
A: The other one is the tour leader.[23]
All the foregoing circumstances taken together with the findings of the Court persuade
us to hold that accused-appellants participation in the illegal transportation of shabu into
the country has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase an admonition
expressed by the Court in a recent case, [m]uch as We share the abhorrence of the
disenchanted public in regard to the proliferation of drug pushers (or drug smugglers, as
in this case), the Court cannot permit the incarceration of individuals based on insufficient
factual nexus of their participation in the commission of an offense.[24]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another one
entered ACQUITTING Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung of the crime charged,
based on reasonable doubt. Their immediate release is hereby ORDERED unless they
are detained for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Alegre y Cerdoncillo
 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
Confessions

G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and
JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.

ANTONIO, J.:

This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch VII,
Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan
y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and
Mario Comayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with
four (4) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and hereby
sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable
provisions of law, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of
P350,000.00, representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and
severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.

With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law.

During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on August 16,
1970, and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed on
August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla.

This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her
bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26,
1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death
was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.

Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were
open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the
commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on
the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection
with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.

During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning
a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen
pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his
extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2").
In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon,
Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian,
Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, " another Leyteno.
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again
executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the
Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation
in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said
statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and
Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami"
and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an
Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias
"Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y
Arcillas, and one John Doe."

When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered a
plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual
commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly
on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of the crime
were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented
by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.

The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio
Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the
commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing."

Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the
accused Melecio Cudillan with the other suspects'?

A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.

Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio
Cudillan and other suspects whom do you refer to as other suspects?

A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario. There was
another person Eduardo Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but
Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his companion.

Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the

Police Department of Pasay City as his companions?

A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas.

Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three persons
do?

A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October
28, 1966).

According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously and not
merely kept their silence."

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted to him
that they took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.:

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:
Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon
being asked, gave his name as Ramiro Alegre.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where?

A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other.

Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about?

A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also anticipated in the
commission of the killing of Adelina Sajo.

Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less?

A. About the middle of June.

Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?

A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.

Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla,
when did that take place, more or less?

A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June.

Q. What year?

A. 1967.

Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why do you know him?

A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other. Q. If he is
inside the courtroom, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario

Comayas.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario Comayas?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that, more or less?

A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June.

Q. And what did you talk about?

A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he admitted to me that he was one of
those who planned and killed Adelina Sajo.

Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any?

A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to by the
door.

Q. How about the other accused Melencio Cudillan, do you know him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name as

Melecio Cudillan.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan?

A. Because he is with me in one cell.

Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan?

A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case.

Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan, more or less?

A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the

first week of June, 1967.

Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell you about this case?

ATTY. RAMIREZ:

Objection, Your Honor, leading.

COURT:

Witness may answer, there is already a basis.

A. That they were the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-
289, Hearing of July 21, 1967).
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as
the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by
the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at
the time of the incident in question. they were attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote.
According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the Maravilla compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of
July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded
directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and Jesus
Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
when he returned to the bakery where he was employed to resume his work.

Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus, Urbano
Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M. Consunji at the
Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre began working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966, and
that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he knew
this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project. He Identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre
(Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning up to 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas
Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the
number of hours he actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.

Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now
deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "Silence" of appellants when
allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt;
and in giving undue weight and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted
to him their participation in the crime.

The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"), on the basis
of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used
as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of
"res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" 1 there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. 2 As a
general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible
and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the
other accused are concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and
circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only
evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or
failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal
confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.

II

The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in the face of
statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be
considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.

The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be
taken as evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. 5 It has also
been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him
as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona 7 held that the
prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against
self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it
was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed
may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not because he
acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent,
as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament. 8 Other courts have
held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible,
and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an
officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses. 9

We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by
another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such
implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the
crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear
incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.

The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal
right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-incrimination is an
important development in man's struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of
aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment
and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life." 10

In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals: 11

... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of
the court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is
fundamental to our scheme of justice ...

Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission
of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of
facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the
commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine
will.

It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the rights of an
accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and
military personnel are sworn to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under investigation for the commission of an offense, to
remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to force, violence,
threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's detention, and the safeguard that any
confession obtained in violation of the foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 12The 1973 Constitution
gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the
Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such
silence. 13

This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, now
Chief justice, in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 thus:

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had
occasion to declare: 'The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be
used as a presumption of his guilt.' Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through
Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant 'to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted,
unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.'
Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual explained that the
privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to its detriment."

We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in
the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly
admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio
Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt.
Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently
improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous
crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly denied
any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.

WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario
Comayas y Cudillan and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which they are charged.
Their immediate release from detention is ordered, unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for some other
lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concur in the result.

People of the Philippines vs. Yip Wai Ming

264 SCRA 224 (1996)
Confessions

G.R. No. 120959 November 14, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
YIP WAI MING, accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong nationals, came to Manila on vacation on
July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be married. Hardly a day had passed when Lam Po Chun was brutally
beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room. On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was
touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun was left in the hotel room allegedly because she
had a headache and was not feeling well enough to do the sights.

For the slaying, an Information was lodged against Yip Wai Ming on July 19, 1991, which averred :
 That on or about July 11, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Lam Po Chun by then and
there mauling and strangling the latter, thereby inflicting upon her mortal and fatal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.

On May 15, 1995, Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila
and presided over by the Honorable Lolita O. Gal-lang rendered a decision in essence finding that Yip Wai Ming killed
his fiancee before he left for the Metro Manila tour. Disposed thus the trial court:

WHEREFORE, in view of the forgoing established evidence, judgment is hereby rendered

convicting the accused Yip Wai Ming beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged
in the information and as defined in Article 248, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, and in
accordance therewith the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation which attended the
commission of the offense, the said accused Yip Wai Ming is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law.

Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lam Po Chun of Hongkong the death
indemnity for damages at Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos; Moral and compensatory damages
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos each or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00); plus costs of suit.

The accused being detained, he is credited with the full extent of the period under which he was
under detention, in accordance with the rules governing convicted prisoners.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 69, Rollo.)

There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the evidence about the killing is circumstantial. The
key issue in the instant appeal is, therefore, whether or not the circumstantial evidence linking accused-appellant to
the killing is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The evidence upon which the prosecution convinced the trial court of accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is summarized in the Solicitor-General's brief as follows :

On or about 7 o'clock in the evening of July 10, 1993, appellant and his fiancee Lam Po Chun who
are both Hongkong nationals, checked in at Park Hotel located at No. 1032-34 Belen St., Paco,
Manila. They were billeted at Room 210. Angel Gonzaga, the roomboy on duty, assisted the couple
in going up to their room located at the second floor of the hotel (p. 14, tsn, October 13, 1993, p.
66, tsn, September 1, 1993). When they reached Room 210, appellant got the key from Angel
Gonzaga and informed the latter that they do not need any room service, particularly the bringing of
foods and other orders to their room (pp. 67-69, tsn, September 1, 1993).

After staying for about an hour inside Room 210, the couple went down to the lobby of the hotel.
Appellant asked the front desk receptionist on duty to call a certain Gwen delos Santos and to
instruct her to pick them up the following day, July 11, 1993, a Sunday at 10 o' clock in the morning
(pp. 21-25, tsn, September 8, 1993).

At about past 8 o'clock in the same evening of July 10, 1993, Cariza Destresa, occupant of Room
211 which is adjacent to Room 210, heard a noise which sounds like a heated argument between a
man and a woman coming from the room occupied by appellant and Lam Po Chun. The heated
discussions lasted for thirty (30) minutes and thereafter subsided.

In the following morning, that is, July 11, 1993, at around 9:15, the same Cariza Destreza again
heard a banging which sounds like somebody was thrown and stomped on the floor inside Room
210. Cariza, who became curious, went near the wall dividing her room and Room 210. She heard
a cry of a woman as if she cannot breathe (pp. 23-24, tsn, August 30, 1993).
 At about 10 o'clock a.m., Gwen delos Santos, together with two lady companions, arrived at the
lobby of the Park Hotel. The receptionist informed appellant by telephone of her arrival. In
response, appellant came down without his fiancee Lam Po Chun. After a while, he together with
Gwen delos Santos and the latter's companions, left the hotel. Before leaving, he gave instruction
to the front desk receptionist not to disturb his fiancee at Room 210. He also ordered not to accept
any telephone calls, no room cleaning and no room service (pp. 37- 43, tsn, October 18, 1993).

When appellant left, the front desk receptionist, Enriquieta Patria, noticed him to be in a hurry,
perspiring and looking very scared (p. 32, tsn, September 22, 1993).

During the whole morning of July 11, 1993, after appellant left the hotel until his return at 11 o'clock
in the evening, he did not call his fiancee Lam Po Chun to verify her physical condition (p. 44 tsn,
October 18, 1993, p. 18, tsn, November 23, 1993).

When appellant arrived at 11 o'clock p.m. on that day, he asked the receptionist for the key of his
room. Then together with Fortunato Villa, the roomboy, proceeded to Room 210. When the lock
was opened and the door was pushed, Lam Po Chun was found dead lying face down on the bed
covered with a blanket. Appellant removed the blanket and pretended to exclaim "My God, she is
dead" but did not even embrace his fiancee. Instead, appellant asked the room boy to go down the
hotel to inform the front desk, the security guard and other hotel employees to call the police (pp. 8-
27, tsn, October 18, 1993).

When the police arrived, they conducted an examination of the condition of the doors and windows
of the room as well as the body of the victim and the other surroundings. They found no signs of
forcible entry and they observed that no one can enter from the outside except the one who has the
key. The police also saw the victim wrapped in a colored blanket lying face down. When they
removed the blanket and tried to change the position of her body, the latter was already in state
of rigor mortis, which indicates that the victim has been dead for ten (10) to twelve (12) hours. The
police calculated that Lam Po Chun must have died between 9 to 10 in the morning of July 11,
1993 (pp. 2-29), tsn, September 22, 1993).

Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the WPD, conducted an autopsy of the body of the
victim. His examination (Exh. V) revealed that the cause of death was "asphyxia by strangulation."
Dr. Lagonera explained that asphyxia is caused by lack of oxygen entering the body when the
entrance of air going to the respiratory system is blocked (pp. 6-19, tsn, December 14, 1993).

Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was insured with
the Insurance Company of New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hongkong, with appellant as the
beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than the monthly salary of the deceased
as an insurance underwriter in Hongkong (Exh. X).

It was on the bases of the foregoing facts that appellant was charged before the Regional Trial
Court in Manila for the crime of murder committed against the person of Lam Po Chun.

(pp. 3-7, Appellee' Brief, ff. p. 176, Rollo.)

In his brief, accused-appellant offers explanatory facts and argues that the findings of fact of the trial court are based
mainly on the prosecution evidence displaying bias against accused-appellant. He contends that the court made
unwarranted and unfounded conclusions on the basis of self-contradictory and conflicting evidence.

Accused-appellant, at the time of the commission of the crime, was a customer relations officer of Well Motors
Company in Kowloon, Hongkong. He met Lam Po Chun at a party in 1991. Both were sportsminded and after a short
courtship, the two began to have a relationship, living together in the same apartment. The two toured China and
Macao together in 1992. In April, 1993 the two decided to get married. In May 1993, they registered with the
Hongkong Marriage Registry. The wedding was set for August 29, 1993.

An office-mate of accused-appellant named Tessie "Amay" Ticar encouraged him and Lam Po Chun to tour the
Philippines in celebration of their engagement. After finishing the travel arrangements, the two were given by Ticar
the names (Toots, Monique, and Gwen) of her cousins in Manila and their telephone number. Photos of their Manila
contacts were shown to them. In addition to his Citibank credit card, accused-appellant brought P24,000.00 secured
at a Hongkong money exchange and HK$4,000.00. Lam Po Chun had HK$3,000.00.

The two arrived in Manila on July 10, 1993 at about 5:40 P.M. on board Cathay Pacific Flight CX 903. They arrived at
Park Hotel around 7 P.M. From their hotel room, accused-appellant called their contact, Gwen delos Santos, by
telephone informing her of their arrival. The two ate outside at McDonald's restaurant.

Accused-appellant woke up the following morning — Sunday, July 11, 1993 — at around 8 o'clock. After the usual
amenities, including a shower, the two had breakfast in the hotel restaurant, then they went back to their room. At
around 10 o'clock that same morning, accused-appellant received a phone call from the hotel staff telling him that
their visitors had arrived.

He then went to the lobby ahead of Lam Po Chun, introduced himself to the delos Santos sisters, Gwen and
Monique, and their mother. A few minutes later, Lom Po Chun joined them. Two bottles of perfume were given to the
sisters as arrival gifts.

Gwen delos Santos invited the couple to tour the city but Lam Po Chun decided to stay behind as it was very hot and
she had a headache. She excused herself and went up to her room, followed later by accused-appellant to get
another bottle of perfume.

Accused-appellant claims that before leaving, he instructed the clerk at the front desk to give Lam Po Chun some
medicine for headache and, as much as possible, not to disturb her.

Accused-appellant, Gwen, Monique, and the sisters' mother took a taxicab to Landmark Department Store where
they window shopped. Accused-appellant states that from a telephone booth in the store, he called Lam Po Chun but
no one answered his call. From Landmark where they had lunch, the four went to Shoemart Department Store in
Makati. Accused-appellant bought a Giordano T-shirt at Landmark and chocolates at Shoemart. Gwen delos Santos
brought the group to the house of her aunt, Edna Bayona, at Roces, Quezon City. From Roces St., Gwen delos
Santos brought the group to her home in Balut, Tondo. Using the delos Santos telephone, accused-appellant called
his office in Hongkong. The PLDT receipt showed that the call was made at 6:44 P.M. on July 11, 1993. Accused-
appellant claims that, afterwards, he called up Lam Po Chun at their hotel room but the phone just kept on ringing
with nobody answering it. The group had dinner at the delos Santos house in Tondo. After dinner, Gwen delos
Santos' brother and sister-in-law arrived. They insisted in bringing their guest to a restaurant near Manila Bay for
coffee, but it was full so they proceeded to Tia Maria, a Mexican restaurant in Makati.

Finally, the delos Santos family brought Andy Yip back to the Park Hotel, arriving there at around 10:30 PM. Before
the delos Santos group left, there was an agreement that the following morning accused-appellant and Lam Po Chun
would join them in another city tour.

After accused-appellant's knocks at the door of their room remained unanswered, he went back to the hotel front
desk and asked the hotel staff to open the door for him. The room was dark. Accused-appellant put on the light
switch. He wanted to give the roomboy who accompanied him a P20 or P30 tip but his smallest bill was P100. He
went to a side table to get some smaller change. It was then when he noticed the disordered room, a glass case and
wallet on the floor, and Lam Po Chun lying face down on one of the beds.

Accused-appellant tried to wake Lam Po Chun up by calling her name but when she did not respond, he lifted up her
face, moving her body sidewards. He saw blood. Shocked, he shouted at the roomboy to call a doctor.

Several people rushed to Room 210. A foreigner looked at Lam Po Chun and said she was dead. The foreigner
placed his arms around accused-appellant who was slumped on the floor and motioned for him to leave the room.
Accused-appellant refused, but he was made to move out and to go to the lobby, at which place, dazed and crying,
he called up Gwen delos Santos to inform her of what happened. Gwen could not believe what she heard, but she
assured accused-appellant that they were going to the hotel. Policemen then arrived.

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant, through his new counsel, former Justice Ramon C. Fernandez, assigns the
following alleged errors:
 I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT, WAS TORTURED AND WAS NOT INFORMED THAT HE
HAD THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND BE ASSISTED BY INDEPENDENT AND
COMPETENT COUNSEL DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD THE VICTIM
APPLE INSURED AND LATER KILLED HER FOR THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED A

CRIME OF MURDER AGGRAVATED BY EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER

ALEJANDRO YANQUILING, JR.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF CARISA DESTREZA WHO
INCURRED SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS ON MATERIAL POINTS.

VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHER

PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT CONTRADICTED EACH OTHER ON MATERIAL POINTS.

VII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES OF
THE ACCUSED ARE INCREDIBLE.

VIII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

IX

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT COMPLETELY ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.

(pp. 80-82, Rollo.)

The trial court, in arriving at its conclusions, took the various facts presented by the prosecution, tied them up
together like parts of a jig-saw puzzle, and came up with a complete picture of circumstantial evidence depicting not
only the commission of the crime itself but also the motive behind it.
Our review of the record, however, discloses that certain key elements, without which the picture of the crime would
be faulty and unsound, are not based on reliable evidence. They appear to be mere surmises and assumptions rather
than hard facts or well-grounded conclusions.

A key element in the web of circumstantial evidence is motive which the prosecution tried to establish. Accused-
appellant and Lam Po Chun were engaged to be married. They had toured China and Macao together. They were
living together in one apartment. They were registered with the Hongkong Marriage Registry in May 1993. Marriage
date was set for August 29, 1993. This date was only a month and a half away from the date of death of Lam Po
Chun. In the absence of direct evidence indubitably showing that accused-appellant was the perpetrator of the killing,
motive becomes important. The theory developed by the prosecution was not only of a cold-blooded crime but a well-
planned one, including its timing up to the half hour. It is not the kind of crime that a man would commit against his
wife-to-be unless a strong motive for it existed.

The trial court would have been justified in finding that there was evident premeditation of murder if the story is
proved that Lam Po Chun insured herself for the amounts of US $498,750.00 and US $249,375.00 naming accused-
appellant as the beneficiary.

There is, however, no evidence that the victim secured an insurance policy for a big amount in US dollars and
indicated accused-appellant as the beneficiary. The prosecution presented Exhibit "X", a mere xerox copy of a
document captioned "Proposal for Life Insurance" as proof the alleged insurance. It is not a certified copy, nor was
the original first identified.

The authenticity of the document has thus not been duly established. Exhibit "X" was secured in Hongkong when
Lam Chi Keung, the brother of the victim, learned that his sister was murdered in Manila. It is not shown how and
from whom the information about any alleged insurance having been secured came. There is no signature indicating
that the victim herself applied for the insurance. There is no marking in Exhibit "X" of any entry which purports to be
the victim's signature. There is a signature of Apple Lam which is most unusual for an insurance application because
the victim's name is Lam Po Chun. To be sure nobody insures himself or herself under a nickname. The entries in the
form are in block letters uniformly written by one hand. Below the printed name "Lam Po Chun" are Chinese
characters which presumably are the Chinese translation of her name. Nobody was presented to identify the author
of the "block" handwriting. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court made any comparisons, such as the signature of
Lam Po Chun on her passport (Exh. "C"), with her purported signature or any other entry in the form.

It needs not much emphasis to say that an application form does not prove that insurance was secured. Anybody can
get an application form for insurance, fill it up at home before filing it with the insurance company. In fact, the very first
sentence of the form states that it merely "forms the basis of a contract between you and NZI Life." There was no
contract yet.

There is evidence in the record that the family of Lam Po Chun did not like her relationship with accused-appellant.
After all the trouble that her brother went through to gather evidence to pin down accused-appellant, the fact that all
he could come up with is an unsigned insurance application form shows there was no insurance money forthcoming
for accused-appellant if Lam Po Chun died. There is no proof that the insurance company approved the proposal, no
proof that any premium payments were made, and no proof from the record of exhibits as to the date it was
accomplished. It appearing that no insurance was issued to Lam Po Chun with accused-appellant as the beneficiary,
the motive capitalized upon by the trial court vanishes. Thus, the picture changes to one of the alleged perpetrator
killing his fiancee under cold-blooded circumstances for nothing.

There are other suspicious circumstances about the insurance angle. Lam Po Chun was working for the National
insurance Company. Why then should she insure her life with the New Zealand Insurance Company? Lam's monthly
salary was only HK $5,000.00. The premiums for the insurance were HK $5,400.00 or US $702.00 per month. Why
should Lam insure herself with the monthly premiums exceeding her monthly salary? And why should any insurance
company approve insurance, the premiums of which the supposed insured obviously con not afford to pay, in the
absence of any showing that somebody else is paying for said premiums. It is not even indicated whether or not there
are rules in Hongkong allowing a big amount of insurance to be secured where the beneficiary is not a spouse, a
parent, a sibling, a child, or other close relative.

Accused-appellant points out an apparent lapse of the trial court related to the matter of insurance. At page 33 of the
decision, the trial court stated:
 Indeed, Yip Wai Ming testified that he met Andy Kwong in a restaurant in Hongkong and told Yip
and Lam Po Chun should be married and there must be an insurance for her life . . . .

(p. 33, RTC Decision; p. 66, Rollo.)

The source of the above finding is stated by the court as "tsn hearing Sept. 22, 1992." But accused-appellant Yip Wai
Ming did not testify on September 22, 1992. The entire 112 pages of the testimony on that date came from SP02
Yanquiling. The next hearing was on September 29, 1993. All the 100 pages of the testimony on that date came from
Yanquiling. The next hearing on October 13, 1993 resulted in 105 pages of testimony, also from Yanquiling. This
Court is at a complete loss as to the reason of the trial court sourcing its statement to accused-appellant's alleged
testimony.

Lam Po Chun must have been unbelievably trusting or stupid to follow the alleged advice of Andy Kwong. It is usually
the man who insures himself with the wife or future wife or beneficiary instead of the other way around. Why should
Lam Po Chun, with her relatively small salary which is not even enough to pay for the monthly premiums, insure
herself for such a big amount. This is another reason why doubts arise as to the truth of the insurance angle.

Another key factor which we believe was not satisfactorily established is the time of death. This element is material
because from 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993 up to the time the body was discovered late that evening, accused-appellant
was in the company of Gwen delos Santos, her sister Monique, and their mother, touring Metro Manila and going
from place to place. This much is established.

To go around this problem of accused-appellant being away from the scene of the crime during the above mentioned
hours, the prosecution introduced testimonial evidence as to the probable time of death, always placing it within the
narrow 45-minute period between 9:15 and 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993, the time when Cariza Destresa, the occupant of
the adjoining room, heard banging sounds coming from the room of accused-appellant, and the time accused-
appellant left with his Filipino friends.

The prosecution alleges that at 10 A.M., Lam Po Chun was already dead. However, Gwen delos Santos who never
saw the couple before was categorical in declaring that she met both of them at the lobby before the group left for the
tour (tsn, Feb. 14, 1994, p. 64; p. 20, RTC Decision; p. 150, Rollo), but Lam Po Chun asked to be excused because
of a headache. In fact, delos Santos was able to identify Lam Po Chun from pictures shown during the trial. She could
not have done this unless she really saw and met the victim at the hotel lobby at around 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993.

The prosecution introduced an expert in the person of Dr. Manuel Lagonera to establish the probable time of death.
Dr. Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the PNP Western Police District, after extensive questioning on his qualifications
as on expert witness, what he discovered as the cause of death (strangulation), the contents of the deceased's
stomach, injuries sustained, and the condition of the cadaver, was asked to establish the time of death, to wit:

Q. If we use thirty six (36) hours to forty eight (48) hours, will you agree with me
that it is possible that the victim was killed in the morning of July 10, 1993?

A. I cannot, I have no basis whether the victim was killed in he morning or in the
afternoon

(tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, p. 31.)

Dr. Lagonera's testimony on the number of assailants was similar. He had no basis for an answer, thusly:

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q. Would you be able to determine also based on your findings your autopsy
whether the assailants, the number of the assailants?

WITNESS:

A. I have no basis, Sir.

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q. You have no basis. And would it also have been possible, that there were
more than one assailants?

WITNESS:

A. It is possible also.

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q. It is possible also, who simultaneously inflicted the wounds of the victim?

WITNESS:

A. It is possible.

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q. Based also on your autopsy report, were there signs that the victim put a
struggle?

WITNESS:

A. There were no injuries in the hand or forearms or upper arms of the victim. So,
there were no sign of struggle on the part of the victim.

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q. And your basis in saying that there was no struggle on the part of the victim
was that there were no apparent or seen injuries in the hands of the victim?

WITNESS:

A. Yes, sir.

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q. But you did not examine the fingernails?

WITNESS:

A. No, I did not examine, Sir.

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q. Were there also injuries at the back portion of the head of the victim?

WITNESS:

A. No injuries at the back, all in front.

ATTY. PASCUA:
 Q. All in front, meaning in terms of probability and based on your professional
opinion, the attack would have come from a frontal attack or the attacker would
have come from behind to inflict the frontal injuries of the victim?

WITNESS:

A. It can be the attack coming from behind in the front or both, sir.

ATTY. PASCUA:

Q. But in your professional opinion or in your experience, based on the injuries

sustained including the location of the injuries on the body of the victim, would it
be more probable that the attack came from in front of the victim?

WITNESS:

A. Yes, it is possible, Sir.

(tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, pp. 60-63.)

Dr. Lagonera placed the probable time of death as July 10, 1993 (tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, p. 108). It is undisputed that at
around 8:30 A.M. of July 11, 1993 accused-appellant and Lam Po Chun took breakfast together at the hotel
restaurant. She could not have been killed on July 10, 1993. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Lagonera and the
testimony of accused-appellant coincided insofar as the food taken at breakfast is concerned. The couple ate eggs,
bacon, and toasted bread. But the doctor was insistent that the death occurred the previous day.

Where a medico-legal expert of the police department could not, with any measure of preciseness, fix the time of
death, the police investigator was bold and daring enough to establish it. Surprisingly, the trial court accepted this
kind of evidence. SP02 Alejandro Yanquiling testified that he arrived at the Park Hotel at about 11:25 o'clock on the
evening of July 11, 1993 to conduct the investigation of the crime. At the time, the victim showed signs of rigor mortis,
stiffening of the muscle joints, with liquid and blood oozing from the nose and mouth. On the basis of his
observations, he declared that the victim had been dead for 10 to 12 hours.

The trial court stated that if the victim had been dead from 10 to 12 hours at 11:35 o'clock in the evening, it is safe to
conclude that she was killed between 9 and 10 o'clock on the morning of July 11, 1993. The mathematics of the trial
court is faulty. Twelve hours before 11:35 P.M. would be 11:35 A.M.. Ten hours earlier would even be later — 1.35
P.M. Since accused-appellant was unquestionably with Gwen delos Santos and her group touring and shopping in
megamalls between 10 A.M. and 11:35 P.M., the assailant or assailants must have been other people who were able
to gain entry into the hotel room at that time.

The trial court stated that there was no sign of any forcible entry into the room, no broken locks, windows, etc. The
answer is simple. Somebody could have knocked on the door and Lam Po Chun could have opened it thinking they
were hotel staff. Unfortunately, Detective Yanquiling was so sure of himself that after pinpointing accused-appellant
as the culprit, he did not follow any other leads. In the course of his interviews with witnesses, his purpose was simply
to nail down one suspect. His investigation was angled towards pinning down Yip Wai Ming. In fact, Gwen delos
Santos testified that Yanquiling talked to her over the telephone almost daily urging her to change her testimony.

Officer Yanquiling testified on cross-examination that he did not apply any mode of scientific investigation. If a
medico-legal expert of the same police department who conducted an autopsy had no basis for giving the probable
time of death, the police officer who merely looked at the body and saw the blood oozing out of the victim's nose and
mouth must have simply guessed such time, plucking it out of thin air. The trial court accepted the erroneous timing,
conveniently placing it where a finding of guilt would follow as a consequence.

Before a conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to but one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, of
the guilty person (U.S. vs. Villos, 6 Phil. 510 [1906]; People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]). Every hypothesis
consistent with innocence must be excluded if guilt beyond reasonable doubt is based on circumstantial evidence
(U.S. vs. Cajayon, 2 Phil. 570 [1903]; U.S. vs. Tan Chian, 17 Phil. 209 [1910]; U.S. vs. Levente, 18 Phil. 439 [1911]).
All the evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt (People vs. Andia,
2 SCRA 423 [1961]).

The tests as to the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt have not been
met in the case at bar.

The chain of circumstances is not unbroken. The most vital circumstantial evidence in this case is that which proves
that accused-appellant killed the victim so he could gain from the insurance proceeds on the life of the victim. Another
vital circumstance is the time of death precisely between 9:15 and 10 A.M. Both were not satisfactorily established by
the prosecution. Where the weakest link in the chain of evidence is at the same time the most vital circumstance,
there can be no other alternative but to acquit the accused (People vs. Maaborang, 9 SCRA 108 [1963]).

Since the sentence of conviction is based on the crime having been committed within a short time frame, accused-
appellant cannot be convicted on the strength of circumstantial evidence if doubts are entertained as to where he was
at that particular time and reasonable conclusions can be had that other culprits could have entered the room after
accused-appellant left with the delos Santos family. Other people could have killed the victim.

The trial court also relied heavily on the testimony of Cariza Destresa, a 19-year old cultural dancer occupying with
her Australian boyfriend Peter Humphrey, the adjoining Room 211. Destresa testified that while she was in Room 211
at about 9:15 o'clock on the morning of July 11, 1993, she heard banging sounds in Room 210, as if somebody was
being thrown, and there was stomping on the floor. The banging sounds lasted about thirty (30) minutes, an
improbably long time to kill a woman. Destresa stated that she placed her ear near the wall and heard the cry of a
woman having difficulty in breathing.

The witness heard the banging sounds between 9:15 and 9:45 A.M. of July 11, 1993, not before or after. The
unreliability of Destresa's memory as to dates and time is shown by the fact that when asked as to the date of her
Australian boyfriend's arrival in the Philippines, she stated, "July 29, 1993." Pressed by the prosecuting attorney if she
was sure of said date, she changed this to "July 16, 1993." Pressed further:

Q. Are you sure that he arrived in the Philippines on July 16, 1993?

A. I can't exactly remember the date of the arrival of my boyfriend here in the
Philippines because his coming was sudden, Sir.

(tsn, Sept. 30, 1993, p. 10.)

On July 16 and July 19, 1993 Lam Po Chun was already dead. If Peter Humphrey was still in Australia on July 11,
1993, how could he occupy with his girlfriend the next door room, Room 211, on that date at the Park Hotel. If
Destresa cannot remember the date her Australian boyfriend arrived, how could the trial court rely on her memory as
to the 30-minute interval from 9:15 A.M. to 9:45 A.M. of July 11, 1993 when the alleged murder took place. Asked
what time on July 13, 1993 she gave her sworn statement to the police, Destresa answered, "I am not sure, may be it
was in the early morning between 2 or 3 o'clock of that day, Sir." Destresa was asked how she could be certain of
July 13, 1993 as the date of her sworn statement. She answered that this was the day her boyfriend left for Australia
(tsn, Aug. 31, 1993, p. 29). In her testimony given on the same day, Destresa states that she stayed in Room 211 for
3 months. She later changed her mind and said she stayed there only when Peter Humphrey was in the Philippines.
According to the witness, Peter left on May 29, 1993; arrived in June and July; left in June; arrived in July; left on July
13, 1993. Destresa was confused and evasive not only as to dates, but also as to her employment, stating at the start
of her testimony that she was jobless, but later declaring that she was a dancer with the "Rampage" group and
performed in Dubai.

Destresa testified at one point that she heard an argument between a man and a woman in a dialect she could not
understand. This was supposed to be on the evening of July 11, 1993. At that time, the victim had long been dead.
Destresa gave various contradictory statements in her August 30, 1993; August 31, 1993; and September 1, 1993
testimony. To our mind, the trial court gravely erred in relying on her testimony.

Accused-appellant was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing. There was no warrant of arrest. Officer
Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant and he arrested the accused-appellant based on "series of
circumstantial evidence." He had no personal knowledge of Yip Wai Ming having committed the crime. Accused-
appellant stated that five police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked him to undress, forced him to lie
down on a bench, sat on his stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and beer over his face.
When he could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged. participated in a re-enactment, and signed an
extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his
choice to assist him in confessing the crime.

The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible against him." Section 17, Article III provides: "No person shell be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel,
and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981]).

This Court notes that accused-appellant did not file any complaint or charges against the police officers who allegedly
tortured him. But he was a foreign national, a tourist charged with a serious crime, finding himself in strange
surroundings. In Hongkong, there would have been family members and friends who could have given him moral
support. He would have known that he was being questioned in his own country, being investigated under the laws of
that country. The degree of intimidation needed to coerce a person to confess to the commission of a crime he did
not commit would be much less if he is in a strange land. Accused-appellant states that his lawyers told him not to file
any charges against the policemen. He followed their advice, obviously not wanting to get into more trouble.

This Court has carefully gone over the record of this case. We simply cannot state that the circumstantial evidence is
in its entirety credible and unbroken and that the finding of guilt excludes any other possibility that the accused-
appellant may be innocent.

Most of the circumstantial evidence in this case came from the investigation conducted by Officer Alejandro
Yanquiling or from the prodding by him of various witnesses. The desire of a police officer to solve a high profile
crime which could mean a promotion or additional medals and commendations is admirable. However, an
investigator must pursue various leads and hypotheses instead of singlemindedly pursuing one suspect and limiting
his investigation to that one possibility, excluding various other probabilities. The killing of a tourist is a blot on the
peace and order situation in the Philippines and must be solved. Still, concentrating on pinning down an alien
companion of the victim and not pursuing the possibilities that other persons could have killed the victim for her
money and valuables does not speak well of our crime detection system. It is not enough to solve a crime. The truth
is more important and justice must be rendered.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming
is acquitted of the charge of murder on grounds of reasonable doubt and his immediate release from custody is
ordered unless he is being held on other legal grounds.

People of the Philippines vs. Hector Maqueda @ Putol, Rene

Salvamante
242 SCRA 565 (1995)
Confessions

G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused,
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World
Bank, and his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country
home not any near the metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and
mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet. Perhaps they thought they were in a veritable
paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and trouble when in the early morning
of 27 August 91, in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was brutally slain and
Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient prima
facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims·former houseboy, as one of the
perpetrators of the That illusion was shattered ghastly crime.

As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y

Severino in the information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries 1 filed
on 19 November 1991 with Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at
La Trinidad, Benguet.

Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of
Richard Malig, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information 2 to implead as
co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation Of the evidence
subsequently submitted established his complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the
motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused Richard Malig be
dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him. 3

The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused
Salvamante and Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4
March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail. 4 He categorically
stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above-
entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."

On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations 5 with only Salvamante
and Maqueda as the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan Municipality of
Tuba, Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the, above-named accused, Conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain and against the will and consent of
the owners thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house
of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM HORACE BARKER and with violence against and
intimidation of the persons therein ransack the place and take and carry away the
following articles, to ,it:

[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]

 all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the said Teresita and William
Horace Barker; that on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery; both accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly strike Teresita Barker and William Horace
Barker with lead pipes on the different Parts of their body, leading to the death of William
Horace Barker and inflicting various physical injuries on the former which required
medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and have likewise
incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary labor for the same period of
time.

Contrary to Law.

Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial
proceeded entered a plea of not guilty on 22 April 1992. 6

In its decision 7 Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial Maqueda guilty beyond
reasonable doucccbt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries
and sentenced him to Suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of William Horace
Barker, court found accused Hector P41,681,00 representing actual expenses,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs."

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps
Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr.,
Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez,
SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in chief and
Fredesminda Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector
Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his
evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness.

The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous
summary thereof, is as follows:

Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker
and Teresita Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as
washer wont, the main doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted.

At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of
the Barkers who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta
Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her
face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of the toilet and switched.
on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well because he
and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta
Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her chores.

Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to
turn her face and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at
Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free
from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante
chased her and pulled her back inside the house.

Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and
upon opening the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants
with 'his right hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the
trial, She pointed to, accused Maqueda as the man she saw then. (She got scared and
immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing his
way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for help.

The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of
the room, leaving behind her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs
and proceeded t, the dining room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a
complete stranger to her. Suddenly the two rushed towards her and beat her up with
lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want and not to hurt her, they continued
to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to accused
Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.

Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the·back of her right
hand. She fell to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage
and hid under the car. After a few seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and
because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they
rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw that the door knob was being
turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering. While
locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker:
"That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and
Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.

At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were
resting in a waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba·, Benguet, which is only
a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them
from a curve. When the two men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller
of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index
finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder

Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were
following would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes
later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben
Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men bearded it, Mike again noticed that
the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right hand
with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he bearded it. In the
Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the shorter
man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.

At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the
room where they had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get
the key to the gate of the garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in
their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet
Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call the police, they returned to the
Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier. They just
stayed near the road.

Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team
from the Baguio City Police Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and
which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the City Health Department, also arrived. The team
conducted an initial investigation only because it found out that the scene of the crime
was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station, which, however, was difficult to get
in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barker inside the
Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its location.' They
went around the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-shirt
(Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead
pipe (Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two
househelps who provided him with descriptions of the assailants. The team then left,
leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod
prepared a report of his initial investigation (Exhibit "KK").

Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several
pieces of jewelry scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed
footprints at the back of the house, particularly at the riprap wall, and observed that the
grass below it was parted as if someone had passed through and created a trail amidst
the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba, Benguet. Upon his request, a security
guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker house to secure the premises.
Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.

At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at the·Barker
house to conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit,
returned to the Barker house.

The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker
house by the Baguio City Police were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service
at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the court.

The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at
Naguilian Road, Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje,
Municipal·Health Officer of Tuba, Benguet. H, found in it twenty-seven injuries, which
could have been caused by a blunt instrument, determined the cause of death as
hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits "P," "O," and "R").

The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center where she was treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr.
Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She
was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations
primarily an the left side of the occipital area, bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the
arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She regained
consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries
were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries
had been left unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to
bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.

On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to
the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her
to identify the persons who had assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out
to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the
members of the team that it was improper for them to conduct it without first consulting
him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness. Moreover, her
eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double
vision.

On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then
discharged from the hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost
during the robbery. She requested Glen Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry
taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit
"V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio cassette recorder (Exhibit
"W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The aggregate value
of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these missing
items (Exhibit "X.).

Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was
revealed that she sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could cause
blindness. she then sought treatment at the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York
(Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful operation. She likewise received
treatment at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").

On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF,
ordered Glen Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in
determining the, whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez
was able to obtain information from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he
saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in September 1991; however, they
already left the place.

On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza, and three others went back to
Guinyangan to find out whether Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being
informed by Barangay Captain Requeron that the two had not, Enriquez requested
Requeron to notify him immediately once Salvamante or "Putol" returned to
Guinyangan,

On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol,"
who is none other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan.
Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with
another policeman, Proceeded to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned
over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial
Jai l.b

Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the.
headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon.
Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get
Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his
rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
(Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on
27 August 1991.

On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail
(Exhibit "GG-6"). He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State
witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the
accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such
statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in
entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor
Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was
the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").

In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and
obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda
toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to
Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to
the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante
revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he
initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of
the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a
lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to
attack her with the lead pipe provided·him by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker,
he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs.
the Barkers were already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a
few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of
jewelry.

Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the
house, walked toward the road where they Saw two persons from whom they asked
directions, and when a passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two
Persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted
somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and walked until they reached the
Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for Manila. 8

Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. Hi, testimony is
summarized by the trial court in this wise:
 Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that O"
August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot
1, Block 21 Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was
employed as a caretaker Since July 5, 1991 and he worked continuously there up to
August 27, 1991, It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. A,
caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the employees in the factory and whenever his
employer was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all
Sleep inside the factory.

On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that
day. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the
new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron.

On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it

was his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at work
after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he
saw accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused Salvamante as they were childhood
playmates, having gone to the same elementary school. He had no chance to talk to him
that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each other. He again saw accused
Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante) house.
Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He agreed
to go as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos,
Calauag, Quezon. When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda
to accompany him /Salvamante) in selling a cassette recorder which he said came from
Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's
mother told him about it. They were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's
aunt. They had their meal and then went to visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that
occasion, he never saw accused Salvamante again. After his Christmas vacation, he
went back to work a the polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers
Roselyn Merca, who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she
was hard up in her work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Rosely home to
Guinyangan, Quezon. He was supposed to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he
was not able to as he was arrested by members of the CAGFU at the house of Roselyn
Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail,
then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the
police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He
was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he
could also become a state witness: He told them that he could attest to the fact that he
accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder.

On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet
where he has remained under detention up to the present. 9

The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda

Castience and SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory
where Maqueda worked, ·testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991
and thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno
declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was
investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay
(Exhibit "LL"). 10

Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution
witnesses Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus
disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the
confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It
stated thus:

Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution pinpointing
accused Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction based on the confession
and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial evidence?

In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantial evidence, the
following requisites must be present:
1) there must be more than One circumstance;

2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and

3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt (People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA
678). There must be an unbroken chain of circumstances which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the
author of the crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA
569).

The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the accused
are:

1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any
objection shows that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well and
easily grip a lead pipe and strike a cement post with such force that it produced a
resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude that accused Maqueda could
have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.

2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the
company of accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only prosecution
witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. As they had to ask for directions
from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were strangers to the place

3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they from
the same town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established that he
Salvamante are close friends to the point that they went out together during the
Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied Salvamante in selling the black
radio cassette recorder.

4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement that he is willing and
volunteering to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused in appearing
that he is the least guilty along This in effect, supports his extrajudicial confession trade
to the police at Although he claims that he did not his signature would lean his as he was
just told that release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse which cannot Had he not
understood what the motion meant, he could have easily asked his sister and brother-in-
law what it meant seeing that their signatures up already affixed on the motion.

5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that
fateful morning and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa as to what
he actually did can be considered as another circumstance to already bloster the
increasing circumstances against the accused.
 6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best a weak
defense and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19,
1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given credence, it must not only appear that the
accused interposing the same was at some other place but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People
vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247). This defense easily
crumbles down as Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crime scene.

The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession produce the
needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the
crime. 11

The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of

Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.

Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that
we acquit him because the trial court committed this lone error:

. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 12

Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which
are anchored on his alibi that at the time the crime Was committed he was not in
Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, ad the failure of the star witnesses for
the Prosecution to identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the
hospital, Pointed to Richard Malig as the companion of Rene Salvamante, and that
when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a description of Salvamante's
companion that fitted Richard Malig.

We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is

unconvincing.

The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker
and the househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the
trial court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie
Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not able to positively identify Magueda, The trial
court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus delicti,
as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his attention and
arguments on these.

From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial
confession — the Sinumpaang Salaysay — and an extrajudicial admission — the,
verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the
Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only
an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the former and the latter as
clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as
follows:
 Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually

applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he is charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as
follows:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his

guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts,
to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and
is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14

And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is
not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was
taken without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an
information had already benefited in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to
a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore,
taken during custodial investigation. Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
providing as follows:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.

is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a
custodial investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court
elucidated on the rights of a person under custodial investigation and the rights of an
accused after a case is filed in court. The trial court went on to state:

At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no
longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a
witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet,
despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still
confessed when he did not have to do so. 17
The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not
be tested under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the
voluntariness of its execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the
burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang
Salaysay was admissible against him.

As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa,
the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their
conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was
objected to as hearsay. It said:

In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the
tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay (People
vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). 18

While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a
person under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal
complaint or information had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping
view that after such filing an accused "no longer Has] the right to remain silent and to
counsel but he [has] the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then there would be a hiatus
in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his constitutional rights
to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not
only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said
accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution,

The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to
the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a
person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." The direct and primary
source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973
Constitution which reads:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .

The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-
incrimination reading:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the
second paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 constitution was an
acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the united States Supreme Court in
Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is
not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long
recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its ruling:
 Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly
stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on
his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to a questioned. 20

It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the
aforementioned Section 20, the word custodial, which was used in Miranda with
reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, 21
this Court aptly observed:

The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by
having it inserted between the words "under" and "investigation," as in fact the sentence
opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the
entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.

Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of
Miranda by making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of
a person and in custody. 22 Accordingly, as so formulated, the second paragraph of
Section 20 changed the rule adopted in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the accused
only begin upon arraignment, Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this Court
laid down this rule in Morales vs, Enrile: 24

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be
arrested of the reason for the arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The
underscored phrase simply means that a case had been filed against him in a court of
either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court had issued the corresponding
warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section 20 are
available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the
commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article
III of the present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel
must be competent and independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party
cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the
rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel.
25
Thus, Section 12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
People vs. Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically declared:

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person
shall be-held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it
has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of
procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de officio for him if he so desires and he is
poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a
person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed
because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the
theory of the trial court, then police authorities and other law enforcement agencies
would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons
after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the
accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain
silent and to counsel.

Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter
arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing
judge, 27 and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would
be improper for any public officer Or law enforcement agency to investigate him in
connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless,
he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.

The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's
arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of
his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the
absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible
pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which reads:

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray

Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary
rules under the Bill of Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor
Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be
utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private
person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government,
declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away
by government and that government has the duty to protect; 28 or restriction on the
power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but
in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that
governmental power is not unlimited. 29 They are the fundamental safeguards against
aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down
the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the
Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. 31

Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are

admissible in evidence against the former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. In Aballe vs; People, 32 this Court held that the declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him
and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession,
is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood
it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives
its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.

To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein
he explicitly .stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above
entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."

In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his
willingness to be a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the
crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile
because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even if we disregard his
extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly
ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The
following circumstances were duly proved in this case:

(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after
the crime in question was committed there;

(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie
Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime;

(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;

(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the
place sometime in September 1991;

(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and

(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least
guilty."

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and

(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial

evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We do
not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are
present in this case.

This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must
fail. The trial court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the
defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is
not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through the unrebutted
testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was
positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27
August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer
away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his
companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed.
Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working
in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony
that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.

WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed
decision Of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91-
CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.

SO ORDERED,

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Harry Parker vs. James Randolph et al.

442 US 62 (1979)
Confessions

442 U.S. 62 May 29, 1979

PARKER
vs.
RANDOLPH

Respondents were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of murder committed during
the commission of a robbery. None of the respondents took the witness stand, and their oral
confessions, found by the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, were admitted into
evidence through police officers' testimony. Respondent Pickens' written confession was also
admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 . The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be
used only against the defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a
codefendant's guilt. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding
that admission of respondents' confessions did not violate the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 , which held that a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial, of the confession of a codefendant
who did not take the stand. Respondents subsequently obtained writs of habeas corpus in a
Federal District Court, which held that respondents' rights under Bruton had been violated and
that introduction of respondent Pickens' written confession had violated his rights under Miranda.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:

The judgment is affirmed as to respondent Pickens and reversed as to the other respondents. Pp.
69-77; 77-81.

575 F.2d 1178, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III,
concluding that since the grant of certiorari was limited to the Bruton issue, the Court had no
occasion to pass on the merits of the ruling that respondent Pickens' rights under Miranda had
been violated.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE
WHITE, concluded, in Part II, that admission of respondents' confessions with proper limiting jury
instructions did [442 U.S. 62, 63] not infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

(a) In Bruton, introduction at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant's confession had a

"devastating" effect on the nonconfessing defendant's case. Introduction of such incriminating
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, have the same "devastating"
consequences to a defendant who has himself confessed. The constitutional right of cross-
examination protected by Bruton has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to
the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence.

(b) Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized in Bruton to render
the incriminating statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," require application of the
Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by
heaping blame onto himself.

(c) The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial
statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant.
And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only
against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant's
confrontation right.

(d) When the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, as here, the possible
prejudice resulting from the jury's failure to follow the trial court's instructions is not so
"devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant as to require departure from the general rule
allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would not find the rule of Bruton to be inapplicable simply because
interlocking confessions are involved. Rather, even where the confessions of nontestifying
codefendants overlap to some degree, he would follow the analysis indicated by Bruton and then
determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On the facts of this case,
he concludes that any error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), this Court reversed the robbery conviction of a
defendant who had been implicated in the crime by his codefendant's extrajudicial confession.
Because the codefendant had not taken the stand at the joint trial and thus could not be cross-
examined, the Court held that admission of the codefendant's confession had deprived the
defendant of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The issue before
us in this case is whether Bruton requires reversal of a defendant's conviction when the defendant
himself has confessed and his confession "interlocks" with and supports the confession of his
codefendant. We hold that it does not.

Respondents were convicted of murder committed during the commission of a robbery and were
sentenced to life imprisonment. The cast of characters playing out the scenes that led up to the
fatal shooting could have come from the pen of Bret Harte. The story began in June 1970,
when [442 U.S. 62, 65] one William Douglas, a professional gambler from Las Vegas, Nev., arrived
in Memphis, Tenn., calling himself Ray Blaylock and carrying a gun and a deck of cards. It ended
on the evening of July 6, 1970, when Douglas was shot and killed in a Memphis apartment.

Testimony at the trial in the Tennessee state court showed that one Woppy Gaddy, who was
promised a cut of Douglas' take, arranged a game of chance between Douglas and Robert Wood,
a sometime Memphis gambler. Unwilling to trust the outcome of the contest entirely to luck or
skill, Douglas marked the cards, and by game's end Robert Wood and his money had been
separated. A second encounter between the two men yielded similar results, and Wood grew
suspicious of Douglas' good fortune. In order to determine whether and how Douglas was
cheating, Wood brought to the third game an acquaintance named Tommy Thomas, who had a
reputation of being a "pretty good poker player." Unknown to Wood, however, Thomas' father
and Douglas had been close friends; Thomas, predictably, threw in his lot with Douglas,
purposefully lost some $1,000, and reported to Wood that the game was clean. Wood nonetheless
left the third game convinced that he was being cheated and intent on recouping his now
considerable losses. He explained the situation to his brother, Joe E. Wood, and the two men
decided to relieve Douglas of his ill-gotten gains by staging a robbery of the upcoming fourth game.

At this juncture respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton entered the picture. To carry out
the staged robbery, Joe Wood enlisted respondent Hamilton, who was one of his employees, and
the latter in turn associated respondents Randolph and Pickens. Douglas and Robert Wood sat
down to the fourth and final contest on the evening of July 6, 1970. Joe Wood and Thomas were
present in the room as spectators. [442 U.S. 62, 66] During the course of the game, Douglas
armed himself with a .38-caliber pistol and an automatic shotgun; in response to this unexpected
development Joe Wood pulled a derringer pistol on Douglas and Thomas, gave the gun to Robert
Wood, and left to tell respondents to move in on the game. Before respondents arrived, however,
Douglas reached for his pistol and was shot and killed by Robert Wood. Moments later,
respondents and Joe Wood broke down the apartment door, Robert Wood gathered up the cash
left on the table, and the gang of five fled into the night. Respondents were subsequently
apprehended by the police and confessed to their involvement in the crime.

Respondents and the Wood brothers were jointly tried and convicted of murder during the
commission of a robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. 39-2402 (1975). Each defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Robert Wood took the stand at trial, admitting that he had killed Douglas, but
claiming that the shooting was in self-defense. Thomas described Douglas' method of cheating at
cards and admitted his complicity in the fraud on Robert Wood. He also testified in substance that
he was present in the room when Joe Wood produced the derringer and when Robert Wood shot
and killed Douglas.

None of the respondents took the stand. Thomas could not positively identify any of them, and
although Robert Wood named Hamilton as one of the three men involved in the staged robbery,
he did not clearly identify Randolph and Pickens as the other two. The State's case against
respondents thus rested primarily on their oral confessions, found by [442 U.S. 62, 67] the trial
court to have been freely and voluntarily given, which were admitted into evidence through the
testimony of several officers of the Memphis Police Department. A written confession signed by
Pickens was also admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in violation
of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The trial court instructed the jury that
each confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it and could not be considered
as evidence of a codefendant's guilt.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed respondents' convictions, holding that they
could not be guilty of felony murder since Douglas had been shot before they arrived on the scene
and, alternatively, that admission of their confessions at the joint trial violated this Court's decision
in Bruton. The Tennessee Supreme Court in turn reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals and
reinstated the convictions. Because "each and every defendant either through words or actions
demonstrated his knowledge that `killing may be necessary,'" App. 237, the court held that
respondents' agreement to participate in the robbery rendered them liable under the Tennessee
felony-murder statute for Douglas' death. The Tennessee Supreme Court also disagreed with the
Court of Criminal Appeals that Bruton had been violated, emphasizing that the confession at issue
in Bruton had inculpated a nonconfessing defendant in a joint trial at which neither defendant
took the stand. Here, in contrast, the "interlocking inculpatory confessions" of respondents
Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton, "clearly demonstrated the involvement of each, as to crucial
facts such as time, location, felonious activity, and [442 U.S. 62, 68] awareness of the overall plan
or scheme." App. 245. Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded: "The fact that jointly
tried codefendants have confessed precludes a violation of the Bruton rule where the confessions
are similar in material aspects." Ibid., quoting State v. Elliott, 524 S. W. 2d 473, 477-478 (Tenn.
1975).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee thereafter granted
respondents' applications for writs of habeas corpus, ruling that their rights under Bruton had
been violated and that introduction of respondent Pickens' uncounseled written confession had
violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed, holding that admission of the confessions violated the rule announced in Bruton and
that the error was not harmless since the evidence against each respondent, even considering his
confession, was "not so overwhelming as to compel the jury verdict of guilty . . . ." 575 F.2d 1178,
1182 (1978). The Court of Appeals frankly acknowledged that its decision conflicts with decisions
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding the Bruton rule inapplicable "[w]here the
jury has heard not only a codefendant's confession but the defendant's own [interlocking]
confession . . . ." United States ex rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296, 300 (1968), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970). Accord, United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 48-50,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975); United States ex rel. Duff v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009, 1010 (1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). We granted certiorari in this case to resolve that conflict. 439
U.S. 978 (1978). [442 U.S. 62, 69]

II

In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), a nontestifying codefendant's confession, which
incriminated a defendant who had not confessed, was admitted at a joint trial over defendant's
hearsay objection. Concluding that "it was reasonably possible for the jury to follow" the trial
court's instruction to consider the confession only against the declarant, this Court held that
admission of the confession did not constitute reversible error. Little more than a decade later,
however, Delli Paoli was expressly overruled in Bruton v. United States. In that case, defendants
Bruton and Evans were convicted of armed postal robbery after a joint trial. Although Evans did
not take the stand, a postal inspector was allowed to testify that Evans had orally confessed to
having committed the robbery with Bruton. The trial judge instructed the jury that Evans'
confession was competent evidence against Evans, but was inadmissible hearsay against [442 U.S.
62, 70] Bruton and therefore could not be considered in determining Bruton's guilt.

This Court reversed Bruton's conviction, noting that despite the trial court's admittedly clear
limiting instruction, "the introduction of Evans' confession added substantial, perhaps even
critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination." 391 U.S., at
127 -128. Bruton was therefore held to have been denied his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation. The Bruton court reasoned that although in many cases the jury can and will follow
the trial judge's instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence, "there are some contexts in which
the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of
failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot
be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial
statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are
deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating to
the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do
take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized
motivation to shift blame onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably
compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by
cross-examination. It was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was
directed." Id., at 135-136 (citations and footnotes omitted).
One year after Bruton was decided, this Court rejected the notion that erroneous admission at a
joint trial of evidence such as that introduced in Bruton automatically requires reversal of an
otherwise valid conviction. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). In some cases, the
properly [442 U.S. 62, 71] admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial
effect of the codefendant's admission so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that introduction of the admission at trial was harmless error. [442 U.S. 62, 72]

Petitioner urges us to follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and to
hold that the Bruton rule does not apply in the context of interlocking confessions. Alternatively,
he contends that if introduction of interlocking confessions at a joint trial does violate Bruton, the
error is all but automatically to be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with
petitioner that admission at the joint trial of respondents' interlocking confessions did not infringe
respondents' right of confrontation secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, but prefer to cast the issue in a slightly broader form than that posed
by petitioner.

Bruton recognized that admission at a joint trial of the incriminating extrajudicial statements of a
nontestifying codefendant can have "devastating" consequences to a nonconfessing defendant,
adding "substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case." 391 U.S., at 128 .
Such statements go to the jury untested by cross-examination and, indeed, perhaps unanswered
altogether unless the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and takes the stand. The
prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession upon an incriminated defendant who has, insofar
as the jury is concerned, maintained his innocence from the beginning is simply too great in such
cases to be cured by a limiting instruction. The same cannot be said, however, when the
defendant's own confession - "probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be
admitted against him," id., at 139 (WHITE, J., dissenting) - is properly introduced at trial. The
defendant is "the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past
conduct," id., at 140 [442 U.S. 62, 73] (WHITE, J., dissenting), and one can scarcely imagine
evidence more damaging to his defense than his own admission of guilt. Thus, the incriminating
statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, be of the "devastating" character referred to in
Bruton when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected by Bruton
- the "constitutional right of cross-examination," id., at 137 - has far less practical value to a
defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his
innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross-examination would likely
yield small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before the jury
unchallenged. Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized by the
Bruton Court to render the incriminating statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," id., at
136, require application of the Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his
codefendant's statements by heaping blame onto himself.

The right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment is a safeguard to ensure the fairness
and accuracy of criminal trials, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970), and its reach cannot
be divorced from the system of trial by jury contemplated by the Constitution. A crucial
assumption underlying that system is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial
judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even more
pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly
instructed. The Confrontation Clause has never been held to bar the admission into evidence of
every relevant extrajudicial statement made by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some
way incriminates the defendant. See, e. g., id., at 80; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 -
244 (1895). And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial
statement only against its source has been found sufficient to [442 U.S. 62, 74] avoid offending
the confrontation right of the implicated defendant in numerous decisions of this Court.

When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen not to take the stand and the
implicated defendant has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions cannot be
accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Under
such circumstances, the "practical and human limitations of the jury system," Bruton v. United
States, supra, at 135, override the theoretically sound premise that a jury will follow the trial
court's instructions. But when the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, we
believe that the constitutional scales tip the other way. The possible prejudice resulting from the
failure of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital" to the
confessing defendant to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of evidence
with limiting [442 U.S. 62, 75] instructions. We therefore hold that admission of interlocking
confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the requirements of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 8 Accordingly, the judgment [442 U.S.
62, 76] of the Court of Appeals as to respondents Hamilton and Randolph is reversed.

III

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's granting of habeas corpus relief to respondent
Pickens on the additional [442 U.S. 62, 77] ground that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), had been violated. Although petitioner sought review of this ruling, our grant of
certiorari was limited to the Bruton issue. We thus have no occasion to pass on the merits of the
Court of Appeals' Miranda ruling. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to
respondent Pickens is affirmed.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.