1 Chapter 13 1

2 2
3 Disengagement, De-radicalization 3
4 4
5 and the Arc of Terrorism: 5
6 6
7 Future Directions for Research 7
8 8
9 John Horgan and Max Taylor 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13

y
14 Introduction 14
15 15
The allure of terrorist de-radicalization research has peaked. Whilst interest in the
16
17
18
19
20
21
op
concept has grown quickly over the past five years (e.g. Benard 2005, Boucek
2008, Noricks 2009, Cook 2010, Miller 2010, Morris et al. 2010, Stern 2010,
Ashour 2010) failure to redress widening gaps in our knowledge will undoubtedly
challenge its long-term place in the counterterrorism toolbox. Unless a clearer
strategic development map is forged, its future remains uncertain, and even
16
17
18
19
20
21
fC
22 attempts to promote de-radicalization will sink into the increasingly complex and 22
23 overlapping mire of counter-insurgency, counter-narratives, counter-radicalization, 23
24 and counterterrorism. 24
25 There are many reasons for the current state of affairs. One set of concerns 25
26 relates to the dearth of efforts to explore attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of 26
oo

27 these initiatives (e.g. Horgan and Braddock 2010). Another set of concerns relates 27
28 to the inability to explore how de-radicalization might be conceptualized in terms 28
29 of a framework for behavioral control (and therefore behavior change) as distinct 29
30 from proposing it alongside an ideological framework. Whilst the distinction 30
31 between disengagement and de-radicalization now seems too obvious (despite 31
repeated and opportunistic reminders), conceptual development appears to have
Pr

32 32
33 inexplicably stopped short at that distinction. 33
34 This chapter seeks to redress this by addressing some key issues. The chapter 34
35 will provide a succinct summary assessment of current efforts but is concerned 35
36 primarily with identifying what is necessary for helping put de-radicalization 36
37 efforts onto a more focused footing. In a practical sense, a case will be made for 37
38 greater evaluation of de-radicalization initiatives; from a theoretical perspective, 38
39 we will explore a series of ideas from behavioral psychology and criminology to 39
40 help provide conceptual development to many of the ideas inherent in terrorist 40
41 de-radicalization. Of special urgency we will note the need to understand the 41
42 factors contributing to terrorist recidivism. Indeed, it might be argued that the 42
43 failure to address the issue of recidivism continues to plague efforts to critically 43
44 assess the effectiveness of de-radicalization initiatives, given that discussions of 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 173 7/11/2011 10:33:32 AM

 174 Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge

1 recidivism are absent from all but media accounts of the looming ‘failure’ of 1
2 de-radicalization initiatives. The extent and nature of recidivism must, after all, 2
3 be the critical practical factor when judging the adequacy of de-radicalization 3
4 initiatives. 4
5 In terms of improving both our understanding and capacity to intervene, 5
6 assessing the extent of recidivism may in fact be less important than providing a 6
7 conceptual mechanism for understanding recidivism and thus providing a basis 7
8 from which we might develop strategies to reduce re-engagement in terrorism. 8
9 To do this, in the following we will consider key contributions from industrial/ 9
10 organizational psychology (in the form of ‘job analysis’ of terrorist roles) and 10
11 behavioral psychology (in the form of an experimental paradigm with which to 11
12 explore what, in essence, may be effective de-radicalization). 12
13 13

y
14 14
15 Critical Assumptions 15
16
17
18
19
20
op
Working toward these goals assumes a certain value in supporting the idea of de-
radicalization. Such an assumption should not be taken for granted. It is easy to
dismiss the idea of de-radicalization on at least the following grounds:

1. Not every radical will become involved in terrorism. It might appear obvious
16
17
18
19
20
21
fC
21
22 to state this, but failure to understand its implications is a testament to the 22
23 poorly understood relationship between political or religious radicalization 23
24 and terrorism (radicalization generally thought of as the acquisition of 24
25 certain beliefs, values or attitudes deemed, in hindsight, conducive to 25
26 involvement in terrorism, but not necessarily the commission of an illegal 26
oo

27 act of violence). 27
28 2. A converse point related to this, but rarely acknowledged, is that not every 28
29 terrorist is necessarily ‘radical’ (i.e. holding politically or religiously 29
30 extreme views, as opposed to engaging in violent behavior). Consequently, 30
31 the idea of ‘de-radicalization’ as a prerequisite for risk reduction of 31
Pr

32 terrorism is questionable. 32
33 3. A related point is that implicit in much of the literature on de-radicalization 33
34 is an assumption of a causal relationship between radical political or 34
35 religious views and the dangerous behavior of terrorism. Even if this is the 35
36 case, in causal terms the reciprocal of this has certainly not been proven. 36
37 Indeed, probably the best we can say is that whilst radical views might be a 37
38 necessary condition for the emergence of terrorism, they are not a sufficient 38
39 account in themselves of terrorist behavior. 39
40 4. The most widely known de-radicalization initiatives (particularly 40
41 Singapore, Saudi Arabia, among others) are the ones that appear to have the 41
42 least transparency surrounding their claims of effectiveness, and therefore 42
43 lack an acceptable evidential base. 43
44 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 174 7/11/2011 10:33:32 AM

 Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism 175

1 A core element of a de-radicalization process might be seen as ‘risk reduction’ 1

2 (whether of violence, or acquiescence of ‘radical’ views, etc.) and the promise of 2
3 effective risk reduction strategies to protect against terrorism is too strong not to 3
4 consider carefully (Horgan and Braddock 2010). It is therefore imperative that the 4
5 prospect of meaningful, measurable and evidence-based risk reduction strategies 5
6 be supported conceptually, theoretically and experimentally, before the uncritical 6
7 discourse currently surrounding them unwittingly provides its downfall. As a first 7
8 step toward this, we must resolve the recurring issue of nomenclature. 8
9 9
10 The Problem with ‘De-radicalization’ 10
11 11
12 In the context of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, the term ‘de- 12
13 radicalization’ is now synonymous with a growing list of terms. These range from 13

y
14 policy aspirations to programmatic objectives to outcome expectations (implicit 14
15 or otherwise) and priorities. These goals, objectives, and descriptions frequently 15
16 overlap and are rarely mutually exclusive. They include but are not limited to: 16
17
18
19
20
21
•
•
•
•
op
Rehabilitation (Macleod 2007, Boucek 2008, Ghosh 2009)
Reform (Scott-Clark and Levy 2010)
Counseling (Scott-Clark and Levy 2010)
Re-integration
17
18
19
20
21
fC
22 • Reconciliation 22
23 • Amnesty 23
24 • De-mobilization (Jardine 2010, Ackerman 2011) 24
25 • Disbandment (Ackerman 2011) 25
26 • Disengagement (Horgan 2009, Bjørgo and Horgan 2009) 26
27 • Dialogue (Boucek, Beg and Horgan 2009) 27
oo

28 • Deprogramming 28
29 • Counter-radicalization 29
30 30
31 Each of these terms reflects deeply context-specific, linguistic and culturally bound 31
32 assumptions about, and reactions to, the development and execution of initiatives 32
Pr

33 aimed at ‘doing something about terrorism’. An analysis of developing initiatives 33

34 such as that started by Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) suggests that these terms are 34
35 often used interchangeably, and are rarely mutually exclusive. Sometimes that 35
36 may be deliberate, at other times not so. Sometimes, for reasons that owe more to 36
37 culture, efforts to distinguish these concepts from each other simply do not work. 37
38 Ackerman (2011), for example, describes the practical difficulties of distinguishing 38
39 ‘reconciliation’ from ‘reintegration,’ ‘terms that don’t easily translate into Dari 39
40 and Pashto.’ In truth, it is unlikely that these issues will be resolved in the short- 40
41 term, largely owing to the opportunistic nature and rapid development of many 41
42 of these initiatives. By the time Bjørgo and Horgan’s survey of de-radicalization 42
43 programs had ended in 2009, there were already at least a dozen more programs 43
44 in development. 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 175 7/11/2011 10:33:32 AM

 176 Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge

1 One suggestion for reconciling the terminological confusion has been to 1

2 advocate use of the term ‘risk reduction’ (Horgan and Braddock 2010). A value 2
3 of this is that the term ‘risk reduction’ has wide currency in other areas concerned 3
4 with mitigating the effects of problematic behavior. In this context, however, 4
5 perhaps the most problematic characteristic of ‘de-radicalization’ is that the term 5
6 presumes the need to achieve attitudinal change (as opposed to behavior change) as 6
7 a prerequisite for reduced risk of re-engagement in terrorism. In a report sponsored 7
8 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Horgan and Braddock found that 8
9 whatever name might be suggested, ‘de-radicalization’ was misleading given that 9
10 many of the programs that appeared to fall under that label were not especially 10
11 concerned with changing attitudes and beliefs. The specific advocation of the term 11
12 ‘risk reduction’ comes from a simple argument that attempting to reduce the risk 12
13 of re-engagement in terrorism (recidivism) is the one common feature across all 13

y
14 of these initiatives. Once we go beyond that, the defining characteristics of such 14
15 programs tend to be much more specific to the initiative or setting in question. 15
16
17
18
19
20
op
Use of a broader term such as ‘risk reduction’ also reduces some of the
assumptions that are associated with de-radicalization. As a universal concept,
the term ‘de-radicalization’ gives the impression that there is an overarching
single solution – in this case, most often assumed to be change in beliefs, and we
see change in behavior. Yet, despite several programs demonstrating that to be
an unnecessary (let alone often untestable) step for behavior change, this linear
16
17
18
19
20
21
fC
21
22 approach does not allow for easy engagement with the complexity of the problem 22
23 at hand. Even in the smallest of terror networks, we find a strikingly heterogeneous 23
24 community of offenders, each of whom may have become involved for their own 24
25 unique complement of factors, and only forged with others upon subsequent 25
26 engagement in terrorism. Understanding those unique and often person-specific 26
oo

27 pathways is critical to facilitate interventions aimed at re-socializing those 27

28 detainees back into the community in such a way as to ensure they present a low 28
29 risk of re-engaging in terrorism (or something else deemed problematic). 29
30 30
31 Recidivism 31
Pr

32 32
33 On 7 December 2010, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the United 33
34 States released a summary report on the re-engagement of detainees formerly held 34
35 at Guantanamo Bay (hereafter GTMO), Cuba. By October of that year, almost 600 35
36 detainees had been released from GTMO. The DNI reported that approximately 36
37 13.5 percent of those released were confirmed as having re-engaged in terrorist or 37
38 insurgent activities (compared to the 6 percent reported by a detailed investigation 38
39 published by Bergen et al. 2011). A further 11.5 percent were deemed ‘suspected’ 39
40 of re-engaging in terrorism (also see Bumiller 2009). The transfer of detainees 40
41 from GTMO to other locations was underpinned by a ‘comprehensive interagency 41
42 review of the status of all individuals’ held there. This review was the result of 42
43 Presidential Executive Order 13492. Little is known about the review process other 43
44 than that the assessment was based on ‘intelligence and threat information’. The 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 176 7/11/2011 10:33:32 AM

 Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism 177

1 DNI report presented findings that the first reporting of confirmed or suspected 1
2 re-engagement emerged ‘about 2,5 years between leaving GTMO and the first 2
3 identified reengagement reports’. 3
4 Perhaps of most significance in that report were some of the assumptions 4
5 underpinning the distinctions made by the DNI about detainees. The report 5
6 acknowledged that ‘it is not unusual for former GTMO detainees to communicate 6
7 with persons in terrorist organizations’ but that that does not necessarily imply 7
8 a pathway to re-engagement. The report suggested that reasons vary from ‘the 8
9 mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences)’ to ‘the nefarious (planning 9
10 future terrorist operations)’. Whilst the reporting qualifications for ‘confirmed’ 10
11 re-engagement in terrorism excludes ‘engagement in anti-U.S. statements or 11
12 propaganda,’ it remains unclear if the DNI considers such engagement a risk factor 12
13 for future possible or suspected engagement (also see Bliss 2010). 13

y
14 To achieve effective de-radicalization, understanding recidivism is key. Bjørgo 14
15 and Horgan (2009) described how the challenges to ascertaining meaningful 15
16 disengagement from terrorism should include (but not be limited to): 16
17
18
19
20
21
op
• in the context of participation in some risk reduction program, the ability to
screen out insincere participants through a selection process;
• where applicable to reducing risk, the ability to effectively influence their
values and/or behavior;
17
18
19
20
21
fC
22 • monitoring ex-militants after their release, with sanctions for breaching 22
23 conditions; 23
24 • providing the necessary skills, resources and social networks to enable 24
25 them to reintegrate into society with substantially low risk of recidivism. 25
26 26
27 Issues of amnesty and successful reintegration pose immense social and political 27
oo

28 challenges. Critical to the effective evaluation of de-radicalization initiatives, as 28

29 well as understanding the factors that enhance risk of recidivism, is the third step 29
30 above (i.e. monitoring ex-militants after their release, with sanctions for breaching 30
31 conditions). Regrettably, we know very little about recidivism and terrorism. In 31
32 one of the very few terrorism-focused analyses of recidivism, Pluchinsky (2008) 32
Pr

33 rather unusually suggested that: ‘terrorists with a secular motivation and goal are 33
34 more likely to be reformed in prison than terrorists who are driven by religious 34
35 grievances’ (187). Pluchinsky’s argument is that the latter will be more difficult to 35
36 ‘reform’ because they operate according to ‘God’s word’ (187). The key issue for 36
37 Pluchinsky, i.e. ‘reform,’ is questionable. For the Afghan Peace and Reintegration 37
38 Program, success is judged if the ‘vast bulk of fighters don’t go back to the fight’ 38
39 (Ackerman 2011). Whether they are ‘reformed’ (and presumably ‘de-radicalized’) 39
40 is a different issue. This is not unlike the distinctions criminologists make between 40
41 primary desistance and secondary desistance. Primary desistance is consistent 41
42 with disengagement from terrorism in that the behavior ceases (or is displaced or 42
43 substituted for an offence-free period) (Horgan 2009). 43
44 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 177 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 178 Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge

1 Secondary desistance implies a much more fundamental change where offenders 1

2 label themselves as such, and is consistent with the idea of de-radicalization 2
3 (2009) in that there is an assumption of long-term meaningful change that results 3
4 in a lowered risk of re-engagement in problematic behavior. 4
5 One of the most studied aspects of the desistance process is age, although it 5
6 should be noted that the relationship between age and desistance is more complex 6
7 than simple reduction of high-risk activity upon aging (Gartner and Piliavin 1988). 7
8 Indeed, Shover (1985) has argued that the older offenders get, the more likely they 8
9 are to have improved ability to make more calculated decisions, benefiting from 9
10 the results of prior experiences and arriving at a maturational stage of deciding to 10
11 desist (or, presumably, offend more effectively). 11
12 At present, there is too little research on terrorist recidivism for us to be able to 12
13 adequately assess what risk factors drive and sustain it. Furthermore, the reasons 13

y
14 for recidivism in those who have undergone ‘rehabilitation’ efforts are unclear 14
15 (particularly, what role if any such program participation had on increasing or 15
16
17
18
19
20
to achieve behavioral change.
op
reducing the risk of that re-engagement). One set of reasons might relate to the lack
of meaningful metrics for assessing the effectiveness of the programs themselves,
whilst another set of reasons may relate to a more basic failure to grasp how best

Before we provide a basis for how to achieve and measure true attitudinal
change, we must first place the disengagement and de-radicalization process into
16
17
18
19
20
21
fC
21
22 the larger context of what we can term the ‘Arc of Terrorism’. 22
23 23
24 Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism 24
25 25
26 In one of the most ambitious psychological conceptualizations of the terrorist, 26
oo

27 Taylor (1988) made a fundamental distinction. Factors governing involvement in 27

28 terrorism, he argued, must be distinguished from those affecting the commission 28
29 of terrorist acts. In other words, understanding the reasons why people are attracted 29
30 to involvement in a terrorist group in the first place may have little, if anything, 30
31 to do with why and how people come to engage in specific acts of terrorism. 31
Pr

32 This is a distinction broadly accepted within contemporary criminology, and stems 32

33 from research conducted on the situational determinants of criminal behavior (e.g. 33
34 Cornish and Clarke 1986). 34
35 Extending this analysis further in the context of terrorism, it seems logical 35
36 that answers to either or both of these phases (involvement and engagement) may 36
37 necessarily tell us about how and why an individual is likely to disengage from 37
38 a terrorist movement. Though recent research (e.g. Horgan 2009) suggests that 38
39 the phase of disengagement may be more closely linked to initial involvement 39
40 (e.g. a major factor for psychological disengagement or disillusionment being 40
41 the incongruence between initial ideals shaping the pursuit of involvement and 41
42 subsequent reality of involvement and engagement), we still know very little about 42
43 how and why people leave terrorism behind. Furthermore, we know even less about 43
44 why some individuals return to terrorism even long after they have disengaged. 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 178 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism 179

1 We can develop a simple three-stage model of an initial ‘arc’ of involvement, 1

2 engagement and disengagement (IED) into the following discrete phases: 2
3 3
4 a. Pre-radicalization (a term coined by Silber and Bhatt 2007) 4
5 b. Radicalization 5
6 c. Violent radicalization (or becoming involved in a terrorist movement) 6
7 d. Engaging in terrorist acts 7
8 e. Disengaging (cessation or directional change of behavior) 8
9 f. De-radicalization (cessation or directional change of attitudes deemed 9
10 conducive to – or risk factors for – terrorist behavior) 10
11 11
12 We can add a seventh phase here, that of ‘re-engagement,’ confirmation of which 12
13 constitutes recidivism. 13

y
14 The ‘arc’ metaphor is consistent with the idea of what might be termed a 14
15 terrorist ‘career’. The idea of a terrorist career, to be considered plausible (to 15
16 paraphrase Gottfredson and Hirschi 1986), must: 16
17
18
19
20
21
1. have a beginning and an end;
2. be of a determinable length; op
3. be of a certain tendency or direction (e.g. involve increasing acquisition of
skills, knowledge, increasing commitment, etc.);
17
18
19
20
21
fC
22 4. involve some kind of specialization to advance in predictable ways. 22
23 23
24 The idea of a terrorist career is one that has long been part of terrorism studies, yet 24
25 just like the study of criminal careers by criminologists, there has been considerable 25
26 danger of being doomed to the ‘repetition of pretentious slogans’ (1986: 231). 26
27 Many of the earliest stereotypes of terrorists were founded on high-profile actors, 27
oo

28 including Carlos ‘The Jackal’. Many of the most well studied terrorist groups 28
29 like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, Hamas and the Provisional IRA have 29
30 also provided many examples of those with a long investment in terrorist activity. 30
31 Aside from the simpler idea of there being ‘leaders’ and ‘followers,’ there are 31
32 some who remain involved with a group for a considerable amount of time, whilst 32
Pr

33 others leave early, either voluntarily or otherwise. Given this, the case for selective 33
34 incapacitation of terrorists is most easily made for ‘careerists’. This argument has 34
35 been made repeatedly in discussions of the former leaders of such movements as 35
36 the Real IRA, Sendero Luminoso and the Red Army Faction. Ironically, many 36
37 examples of terrorist careerists are not hidden and it is likely that those who 37
38 survive have done so because they have moved from a higher-risk activity to a 38
39 lesser-risk one. The reasons for disengagement have been explored and listed 39
40 elsewhere (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009, Jacobson 2010). What remains unexplored, 40
41 however, is the process that underpins how someone who becomes involved in a 41
42 terrorist group moves from one kind of activity to another, or from one level of 42
43 engagement to another. 43
44 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 179 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 180 Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge

1 The ‘criminal career’ concept has been subject to some criticism. Gottfredson 1
2 and Hirschi summarized some basic concerns thus: ‘if the criminal career … can 2
3 be identified by a state of mind, by the quality of the acts he commits, by the 3
4 number of acts he commits, or even by a single, private, excusable lapse, the fact 4
5 remains that the term is meant to serve a purpose. It is meant to distinguish some 5
6 kinds of offenders from others’ (1986: 215). In criminology, concerns about the 6
7 distinct classification of offenders have been underpinned by the idea that such 7
8 pursuit might give rise to ‘efforts to seek unique causes and policy prescriptions 8
9 for each type’ (215). 9
10 As far as terrorism is concerned, the acquisition of certain roles and functions 10
11 does not necessarily automatically suggest a ‘career’-type engagement with a 11
12 movement. Becoming a suicide terrorist, for example, represents one very specific 12
13 kind of involvement that has a very definite end in sight. In reality there are many 13

y
14 different roles and functions to be performed, even in the smallest of terror cells. 14
15 Sometimes an individual may be responsible for one highly specific function 15
16
17
18
19
20
op
(e.g. raising funds) whilst at other times, that individual may be responsible for
holding multiple roles simultaneously – multitasking across varied activities as the
specific operation or climate dictates. This process model of terrorist engagement
is discussed at length by Taylor and Horgan (2006): we do know that there are
some terrorists who engage in terrorist activity over a considerable period of time;
there are also those who engage in terrorism over a shorter period of time but who
16
17
18
19
20
21
fC
21
22 may be seen to migrate from one kind of role to another. 22
23 23
24 Attachment to a Role 24
25 25
26 Though the obvious starting point would appear to be in the area of criminal 26
oo

27 careers, on closer inspection there would appear to be significant benefits from 27

28 further exploration of the meaning of involvement to the individual terrorist. To 28
29 paraphrase B.F. Skinner (1957), terrorists act upon the world, and change it, and 29
30 are changed in turn by the consequences of their action. To understand this, we 30
31 must consider: 31
Pr

32 32
33 1. How an individual recruit is attracted to involvement as a function of 33
34 expectations surrounding the attainment of one or more specific roles; 34
35 2. The extent to which that individual has agency in the acquisition and 35
36 retention of that role; 36
37 3. The social and psychological qualities of that role and how those impinge 37
38 upon the individual; 38
39 4. The sense in which those role qualities impinge upon decisions made 39
40 about other members in the group (e.g. whether leaders tend to surround 40
41 themselves with like-minded individuals within their immediate circle, or 41
42 expose themselves to dissenting views, etc.); 42
43 5. Role migration (i.e. moving from one role to another); 43
44 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 180 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism 181

1 We might add to this list a further quality, of the nature of the environment on 1
2 which the terrorist acts. 2
3 The impact of role type on individual psychology has been extensively 3
4 explored. In so far as terrorism is concerned, there is increasing evidence that even 4
5 within a specific terrorist network, not all members are motivated by the same 5
6 kinds of issues, and that involvement in a terrorist network can occur in different 6
7 ways for individuals concerned. Furthermore, the meaning and consequences of 7
8 involvement (e.g. in terms of commitment to the group, allure of the specific role 8
9 and how experiences in that role come to define one’s extent of involvement) 9
10 will likely develop from the time of initial recruitment to disengagement (whether 10
11 voluntary or involuntary). Taylor and Horgan (2006) describe a conceptual 11
12 framework for understanding terrorist behavior that emphasizes role differentiation 12
13 and also multiple occupancy of different roles that will accommodate both role 13

y
14 and experience differentiation. 14
15 One feature of increased involvement in a terrorist group for the individual 15
16 is the realization that roles can carry different levels of currency or value. As 16
17
18
19
20
21
op
was noted earlier, with a variety of roles and functions found within even small
terrorist groups come different psychological qualities and demands. Whilst
certain roles (e.g. martyrdom) may be limited to minimize the risk of security
breaches, leaders can also attach a psychological value to the restriction of such
opportunities. Hassan’s (2001) interviews revealed that by limiting those accepted
17
18
19
20
21
fC
22 for martyrdom operations, Hamas leaders ensured that ‘others are disappointed. 22
23 They must learn patience and wait until Allah calls them’. The limitation performs 23
24 the important function of sustaining the perceived attractiveness of attaining and 24
25 fulfilling such a role. 25
26 The operational distinctions between roles and the implications of those 26
27 distinctions are significant, but a major weakness here is the lack of any kind of 27
oo

28 empirical verification even of the validity or reliability of roles. Nesser (2006) 28

29 developed a categorization of the 7 July 2005 bombers to suggest that the al- 29
30 Qaeda members fit along a typology of ‘Entrepreneur,’ ‘Protégé,’ ‘Misfit,’ and 30
31 ‘Drifter.’ Though potentially interesting, such typologies tend to be expressed in 31
32 very general terms and lack empirical validation across and between different 32
Pr

33 terrorist organizations. Certainly, the principle behind such categorization may be 33

34 helpful for law enforcement agencies in the initial stages of investigating terrorism 34
35 cases and may hold implications for the penetration of developing networks. But 35
36 it does little to progress our understanding and adds little to our knowledge of 36
37 the psychological qualities of involvement and engagement in terrorism. General 37
38 typologies also deflect attention away from a more discriminating analysis of 38
39 individual roles themselves. As a consequence, not only is there a poor analytic 39
40 understanding of what it means to be ‘involved’ in terrorism, but from a policy 40
41 perspective, decisions made either to sentence or release terrorist offenders tend 41
42 to be largely ad hoc and not based on empirical findings. Although there is an 42
43 increasing distinction made in the terrorism studies literature between those who 43
44 are radicalized as opposed to those who can be considered ‘violent radicals’, there 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 181 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 182 Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge

1 is little beyond that. In particular, there is no mechanism for understanding why 1

2 different role qualities become evident to and engage people in different ways. 2
3 Of critical importance to understanding the relationship between individuals 3
4 and their movement into terrorism, a useful step would be to develop a typology 4
5 of involvement. To do this, a descriptive analysis of roles and functions held 5
6 by members of terrorist groups would need to be conducted. Creating such a 6
7 continuum might enable the construction of a simple grading system that would be 7
8 of value in characterizing involvement. In addition, it would allow us to properly 8
9 distinguish involvement from engagement, and also offers a more discriminating 9
10 way of understanding and indicating risk and dangerousness of the individual 10
11 concerned. Critical to such an analysis is a focus on overt behavior; expressing 11
12 the process in this way suggests a need for a ‘functional analysis’ as argued for 12
13 by Taylor (2010). However, given the clandestine quality of terrorist behavior, it 13

y
14 has to be noted that in some circumstances behavior may be difficult to identify or 14
15 verify objectively. 15
16
17
18
19
20
op
If we pursue this analysis, many individuals may fall within one category of
role, but from time to time the boundaries between roles can be somewhat blurred.
Of relevance here is the area of job analysis, within which there is a large and robust
research literature dealing with the analysis of jobs and roles in organizations (e.g.
Guion 1998, Harvey 1991). For example, one of the best established taxonomies
for functional roles in organizations is one that classifies jobs in terms of those
16
17
18
19
20
21
fC
21
22 that deal primarily with knowledge, human resources and physical resources (e.g. 22
23 Fine and Cronshaw 1999). Thus, following this one scheme for classifying the 23
24 nature of an individual’s involvement in terrorist groups is in terms of the extent 24
25 to which he or she is involved in the acquisition and management of information 25
26 (e.g. intelligence-gathering, learning bomb-making techniques), the acquisition 26
oo

27 and management of human resources (recruiting, training new members) and/ 27

28 or the acquisition and management of physical resources (e.g. financing, bomb- 28
29 making). In addition to the qualitative ‘knowledge–people–things’ taxonomy, 29
30 standard methods of job, task and role analysis can also be applied to allow us to 30
31 scale levels of involvement in each of these roles. For example, an individual who 31
Pr

32 helps transfer funds that are subsequently used by a terrorist group might have 32
33 a different level of closeness to the core function of a group than another who 33
34 directly manages payments to individual group members. 34
35 Critical to this kind of analysis is a focus on overt behavior, as the principal 35
36 task in the development of a typology is to systematically identify behavior 36
37 categories and descriptors relating to a potential outcome. A fundamental challenge 37
38 in understanding terrorism is, therefore, knowing what involvement in terrorist 38
39 behavior entails, and separating that description from assumptions about ‘intent.’ 39
40 Closely related to this is that there is also a sense in which occupying a role 40
41 can be understood in terms of thematic or narrative qualities. The role of video 41
42 material in promoting a type of ‘prestige’ around the role of martyrdom illustrates 42
43 this. A further example is the online video clip, known as ‘Juba the Baghdad 43
44 Sniper,’ in which a series of rapid shootings of U.S. troops in Iraq, allegedly 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 182 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism 183

1 by one single sniper, have given rise to a series of Internet forums lauding the 1
2 sniper for his actions. We can also extend this by reference to the product of a 2
3 raid undertaken by U.S. troops on an al-Qaeda safe house in the Iraqi town of 3
4 Sinjar in October 2007. In this safe house the troops found a wealth of data on 4
5 the biographies of insurgents. Of relevance to this argument, of those who joined, 5
6 most requested for their assignment to be a fighter, combatant or martyr. However, 6
7 others requested to be doctors, journalists and other media roles (Horgan, Gill and 7
8 Taylor forthcoming). 8
9 Interviews of former terrorists illustrate the sense in which role qualities 9
10 do matter to potential recruits (Horgan 2009). Conceptualizing involvement in 10
11 terrorism like this, and identifying the subsequent practical implications of such 11
12 analysis, emphasizes that involvement is a process dependent on behavioral 12
13 qualities. It is important to stress, however, that the development of a typology 13

y
14 should not necessarily imply a linear progression from role to role. The process 14
15 and features of particular roles are not well understood, and the case can be made 15
16 that the profiling of roles as opposed to individuals may reveal much more about 16
17
18
19
20
21
op
the meaning of activity to the individual concerned (2009). And to return to the
central theme of this chapter, this is at the heart of informing a risk assessment.
Examining roles using this kind of analysis offers us a structure for making more
systematic discrimination between terrorist offenders. Such discrimination takes
as its focus the roles, functions and behaviors associated with individuals rather
17
18
19
20
21
fC
22 than any presumed internal states. This offers a way of judging the significance 22
23 of involvement at the individual level and therefore offers a means of providing a 23
24 basis on which judgments about sentencing, management and possible release of 24
25 terrorist offenders can be informed. 25
26 26
27 Effective De-radicalization? 27
oo

28 28
29 To recap on key assertions thus far: 29
30 30
31 1. De-radicalization is a misleading term to encompass what are context- 31
32 specific and culturally determined efforts to reduce the risk of involvement 32
Pr

33 or re-engagement in terrorism. Hence ‘risk reduction’ is a more appropriate 33

34 and accurate description of this process. 34
35 2. Recidivism is a key factor in ascertaining the effectiveness or otherwise 35
36 of risk reduction programs – though our knowledge of the factors driving 36
37 terrorist recidivism is almost non-existent. 37
38 3. To begin the process of understanding terrorist recidivism, it is worthwhile 38
39 examining more closely the qualities of involvement in terrorism. One way 39
40 to do this is to examine the qualities of the specific roles and functions 40
41 available to terrorist recruits. 41
42 4. Understanding the process of role acquisition, engagement and migration 42
43 between different kinds of roles may offer the first steps in developing a 43
44 typology of terrorism involvement that in turn may offer us the ability to 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 183 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 184 Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge

1 discriminate between different kinds of ‘involved’ individuals – this may 1

2 be a key element in developing person- and role-specific risk factors for 2
3 recidivism. 3
4 5. The core strategy to achieve these ends is a focus on behavior. 4
5 5
6 Finally, we will consider a question that has escaped much direct attention in 6
7 recent years. That is, although we may be promoting the idea of de-radicalization, 7
8 is it actually possible? And perhaps more accurately, is it possible in a meaningful, 8
9 verifiable way that does not require substitution with some ideological 9
10 ‘retraining’? Developments in behavioral psychology may provide some insights 10
11 into an alternative way of addressing this and, in particular, may provide useful 11
12 starting points for establishing an empirical and experimental basis to efforts to 12
13 achieve de-radicalization without reference to ideology or vague and essentially 13

y
14 immeasurable assumptions. 14
15 The main concern of behavioral psychology is the identification of what it is 15
16
17
18
19
20
op
that determines behavior (because that tells us what we need to do to change or
control that behavior – either to ensure, for example, its continuation (e.g. increase
in frequency, duration, or intensity, etc.), or perhaps a reduction in behavior, or
even a complete elimination in the frequency of responding (its ‘extinction’)).
A particularly effective contemporary way of conceptualizing this process
has been developed in clinical practice, and is referred to as Applied Behavior
16
17
18
19
20
21
fC
21
22 Analysis (ABA). ABA approaches use the principles of the experimental analysis 22
23 of behavior to change and improve problematic behavior. It uses the three-term 23
24 contingency of analysis of antecedents of behavior, the behavior itself, and its 24
25 consequences to develop strategies to effect behavior change. Such behavior 25
26 change programs therefore focus on functional relationships between the behavior 26
oo

27 and its consequences for the individual. Interventions are therefore specific, 27
28 contextualized and empirically based. Analyses of this kind extend not simply to 28
29 overt behavior, however, but also to more complex forms of cognitive function 29
30 illustrated by approaches such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) 30
31 (see, for example, Hayes and Batten 2000 for a primer of ACT therapies) and 31
Pr

32 Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP) (Kohlenberg and Tsai 1991). A useful 32

33 support for the development of systematic problem and intervention formulation 33
34 can be found in Sturmey (2008), which also provides a summary of the strategies 34
35 described above. 35
36 Dixon et al. (2003) have explored these ideas further and described a 36
37 conceptualization of terrorist behavior from what they call a relational frame 37
38 theory (RFT) perspective. RFT emerged from efforts to understand the 38
39 relationship between language and cognition, and represents the empirical base on 39
40 which radical behaviorist approaches to therapy such as ACT and FAP are based. 40
41 Though a major preoccupation has been with understanding the development of 41
42 clinical disorders, there have also been considerations of how knowledge of these 42
43 issues might be applied to understanding the development of discrimination and 43
44 prejudice (e.g. Roche et al. 2002). The significance of this for our consideration of 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 184 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism 185

1 radicalization processes is not to place those processes within a clinical context, 1

2 but to draw on and use the rich empirical and verifiable data from these clinical 2
3 approaches to changing problematic behavior within our approaches to managing 3
4 and changing the behavior of terrorists, and in so doing effectively reduce the risk 4
5 of reoffending behavior rather than attempt ideological change. 5
6 These ideas seem to carry little currency within the terrorism studies 6
7 community, and indeed, a general point might be made that the area is significantly 7
8 lacking in experimentally based analyses of this kind. But such analyses would 8
9 be very familiar to workers managing other forms of problematic behavior. Sex 9
10 Offender Treatment programs (SOTPs), for example, might be thought to have 10
11 a lot in common with programs to manage terrorist behavior – both kinds of 11
12 offenders appear to be strongly motivated, both are socially very troublesome, 12
13 and both cause extensive victimization of innocent people. SOTPs tend to draw on 13

y
14 Cognitive Behavior Therapies (of which ACT and FAP are examples) and focus 14
15 on relapse prevention (the maintenance of behavioral changes by anticipating 15
16 and coping with the problem of relapse). This must be a fruitful area for future 16
17
18
19
20
21
op
exploration, offering the opportunity to develop empirically verifiable behavior
change strategies as well as enabling systematic outcome assessment. In the
particular context of de-radicalization related to Islamic terrorism, verifiability
must also embrace cultural contexts, an area little explored or understood.
Mullins (2010) has attempted to engage with these areas in his review of the
17
18
19
20
21
fC
22 lessons from criminology in the rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists. Although 22
23 providing a useful overview, Mullins fails to address lessons learned from SOTP 23
24 programs, and in general the review seems distant from the actual experience of 24
25 intervention with offenders showing problematic behaviors. A more significant 25
26 problem, however, in both Mullins and the area in general is an implicit and 26
27 uncritical acceptance of the significance of ideological change as a critical factor 27
oo

28 in behavior change (as opposed to what we have earlier referred to as ‘secondary 28

29 desistance’). Ideology may well have a role as an element in the strategy for 29
30 behavior change (as in, for example, the role of ‘deconstruction’ of Islamic 30
31 arguments employed by organizations such as the STREET Project in Brixton, 31
32 London), but as we have argued in this chapter, the relationship between ideology, 32
Pr

33 radical views and terrorist behavior is complex, unclear and in practical terms 33
34 probably of limited significance. 34
35 35
36 36
37 Conclusion 37
38 38
39 This chapter has sought to add some focus to the debate around efforts at de- 39
40 radicalization. It has focused on the concepts of risk reduction and recidivism as 40
41 critical elements in moving the debate forward. It has argued that recognizing the 41
42 ‘arc’ of terrorist involvement, engagement and disengagement gives a basis for a 42
43 more systematic tailoring of initiatives to identify elements of offender behavior 43
44 to be addressed through change programs, recognizing the value of the concept 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 185 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM

 186 Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge

1 of the ‘terrorist career’ as a central process factor. This chapter has also argued 1
2 for a clearer focus on behavior change, rather than a focus on ideological change. 2
3 Drawing on experience from other areas, such as SOTPs, strategies worthy of 3
4 further exploration have been suggested which focus on changing offender 4
5 behavior and addressing issues such as relapse prevention, a critical element in 5
6 reducing recidivism. 6
7 Implicit in the position taken in this chapter is a questioning of the utility 7
8 of focusing on ideology as the critical factor in producing changes in terrorist 8
9 offender behavior in de-radicalization programs. It has been noted that the factors 9
10 governing involvement in terrorism must be distinguished from those affecting 10
11 the commission of terrorist acts, and this implies behavior rather than ideology as 11
12 the point to focus on to achieve change. Evidence suggests that engagement with 12
13 ideologies supporting terrorism is clearly not the same as engaging in terrorist 13

y
14 violence, and as in other areas concerned with the management of problematic 14
15 behavior, initiatives drawing on empirically verified strategies that offer 15
16
17
18
19
20
op
opportunities for evaluation (by specifying behavior change as an objective) seem
to be the best avenues to develop for effective interventions.
There is, however, a broader underlying issue here. Terrorism is all too often
still assumed to be driven and guided by ideology – an assumption that is never
questioned. This may be the case in the totality of societal responses to terrorism,
but the logic of this chapter suggests there may be utility in questioning this
16
17
18
19
20
21
fC
21
22 assumption with respect to terrorist behavior and the factors that might control 22
23 that behavior. Put generally, a case might be made for separating out the factors 23
24 related to the commission of particular terrorist acts from the ideological and 24
25 political context in which those acts occur. If this is the case, by confusing these 25
26 distinctions, de-radicalization initiatives are unlikely to be effective. 26
oo

27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
Pr

32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
36 36
37 37
38 38
39 39
40 40
41 41
42 42
43 43
44 44

978-1-4094-2568-7_Coolsaet.indb 186 7/11/2011 10:33:33 AM