The History of Political Science

Author(s): James Farr

Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Nov., 1988), pp. 1175-1195
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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 ofPoliticalScience
TheHistory

ofMinnesota
JamesFarr,University

Politicalscienceis onceagainrediscoveringitspastandretelling itshistory.

In thelastfewyearsseveralworkshavebrought an endto an erawhenourdisci-
pline'shistorical werelimitedtotherather
reflections briefpresidentialaddresses
of theAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,to theevenbrieferliterature re-
viewsthatprefaced journals,andtotheneverbriefcontri-
articlesinprofessional
butionsto thatmoregeneralenterprise of thehistory of politicalthought,from
Platoto Pareto.Indeedfromthelate-1950sto themid-1980s,worksin thehis-
toryof politicalsciencestandoutby theirsheerrarity (amongthem,Somitand
Tanenhaus,1967;and,morenarrowly, Kress,1973,andKarl, 1974). As theau-
thorsofone suchworkpointedoutin 1967,thishadtakenitstoll:"MostAmeri-
canpoliticalscientistsarelargelyunfamiliarwiththeoriginsandearlyevolution
of theirdiscipline. . . . An adequate historyof thefieldhas yetto be written;and
the available literature. . . affordsat best a fragmentary and partial account"
(SomitandTanenhaus,1967,p. 2).
Bycontrast, earlierpoliticalscientistswererather(thoughnotexceptionally)
morehistorical in theirdisciplinaryself-understanding. Forthosewriting in the
latenineteenth andearlytwentieth centuries, thiswas perhapsa consequenceof
theirbeingmorehistoricalin generalaboutthescope and methodsof political
science.This was theview,at any rate,of FrancisLieber,the firstofficially
namedProfessor ofPoliticalSciencein theUnitedStates,a positiongranted him
by ColumbiaCollege in 1857. This was also a messageof FrederickPollock's
1890 Introduction to theHistoryof theScienceofPolitics,as well as of J.R.
Seeley'smotto:"Historywithout PoliticalSciencehas no fruit;
PoliticalScience
withoutHistoryknowsno root" (1896, p. 3). While CharlesMerriamlater
wouldbrooknoneof thishistoricism in thestudyof politics(at least once he
deserted thecomparative-historical methods ofhisteacherWilliamA. Dunning),
hismajesticpronouncements on thedisciplineofpoliticalsciencewerenonethe-
less cast in historical termswhenin 1925 he spokeof NewAspectsofPolitics
emerging from"the recenthistoryof politicalthinking"(1925, ch. 3). In the
sameyear,and witha less recentpastin mind,RobertH. Murrayprefacedhis
HistoryofPoliticalSciencefromPlato to thePresentwiththeobservation that
therewas not"a singlecontroversy ofourdaywithout a pedigreestretching into
thedistant ages" (1925, Preface).The 1930sallowedforpedagogicalreflections
ofa historical kindbyAnnaHaddowon PoliticalScienceinAmericanColleges
and Universities, 1636-1900 (1939).
Eventheopeningsalvosofthebehavioral revolutionintheearly1950swere
firedbycompeting ofthehistory
narratives ofpoliticalscience.In ThePolitical
System,David Easton's(1953) behavioralprogramforgeneralsystemstheory

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1176 JamesFarr

(modeledon themethodological assumptions ofthenaturalsciences)followedon

theheelsof his diagnosisof the"malaise" of politicalscience"since theCivil
War" and his historicalsketchof "the declineof modernpoliticaltheory"
(pp. 38, 233-65). Threeyearslater,BernardCrickrepaidhisvisitto theUnited
Statesby writing a dissertationon thehistoryof Americanpoliticalscience
laterto becomeTheAmericanScienceof Politics:Its Originsand Conditions
(1959). A principalthemeof his was thatthebehavioralist aspirationsto "sci-
ence" wereneither newnorpoliticallyinnocentnormuchworthholding."By
scorning history andphilosophy," Cricknotedin conclusion,"theidea of a sci-
ence of politics"showeditselfto be but "a caricature of Americanliberalde-
mocracy"(p. 227). Scornful,liberal,or not, politicalscience in the 1960s,
1970s,andearly1980srarelyrecalledits(or anyother)history.
Now, almostsuddenly, politicalsciencehas (re)captured theattentions of
historians in andoutof thediscipline.In each of thelastfouryearsat leastone
majorworkhasbeenpublishedon thehistory ofpoliticalscience:in 1983,Stefan
Collini,Donald Winch,and JohnBurrow,ThatNoble Science of Politics:A
Studyin Nineteenth-Century IntellectualHistory;in 1984, David Ricci, The
Tragedyof PoliticalScience: Politics,Scholarship,and Democracy;in 1985,
RaymondSeidelman,withtheassistanceof EdwardJ.Harpham,Disenchanted
Realists:PoliticalScienceand theAmericanCrisis,1884-1984; in 1986, An-
drewC. Janos,Politicsand Paradigms:ChangingTheoriesofChangein Social
Science. Otherworkscontinueto be published(amongthem,Finifter,1983;
Weisberg,1986; AnckarandBerndtson, 1987).
The reasonsorcausesforthisveritable renaissancearenotaltogether clear,
thoughanylistofthemmightincludetheneedofa newgeneration ofscholarsto
understand thecrisesthatcontinueto besetpoliticalscience,therecentrevolu-
tionin historiography at lastbreaking uponpoliticalscience,andtheincreasing
historicalself-awareness of the othersocial sciences.As but one sign of the
latter,considertheemergence orcontinuing ofjournalsliketheHistory
viability
ofSociology,theHistoryofAnthropology, andtheJournaloftheHistoryofthe
BehavioralSciences(thecatholicity ofwhosetitlefailsto concealthehegemony
ofpsychology within).Eveneconomics-as dismalandahistorical as ever-has
theHistoryofPoliticalEconomyto salvethehistorical consciencesofseveralof
its members.Perhapsit is onlya matterof timebeforepoliticalscience,too,
comesto havea journaldedicatedto itshistory.
Forthepresent, we can takestock.It is thepurposeof thisessayto review
andcritically assessthefourabove-mentioned recentworksin thehistory ofpo-
liticalscience.These worksforward differentintents,demarcatedifferent peri-
ods, coverdifferent episodes,andremember different
lessons-so muchso that
theydeserveandbelowwillreceiveseparatetreatment. Despitethedifferences,
however, something ofa composite-anddiscomforting-image ofpoliticalsci-
ence,pastandpresent, emergesfromthem.In conclusionwe maybriefly draw

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1177

outthisimageinordertounderscore ofandneedformorehistories
therelevance
of politicalscience.

Some preliminary observations willhelpus situateourfourworks,provide

a thematic structure forcriticalanalysisof them,and remember some of their
moreimportant predecessors.One evidentconclusionof theseobservations,
whichwe maystateinadvance,is thatverydifferent sortsofcontributions to the
historyof politicalscienceare possibleand inevitablebecause different histo-
rianswillbe partytodifferent judgments aboutthedoingof history, thenatureof
politics,and themethodsof science.Writinga history of politicalscience,in
short,is verymucha partisanactivity.
At its simplest,a historyof politicalscience-like a historyof any sci-
ence-will be a history of theories.The slightest scrutiny,however, revealsthe
complexities thatsuch a historyentails.In thefirstinstance,theoriescovera
widerangeof substantive or methodological topics;theyneverstandalone;and
thereis moreto theirhistory thanmerechronological arrangement. Theoriesare
organizedin andbylargerintellectual complexeswhosetransformations provide
therelevant lifescriptsforthem.Furthermore, thesecomplexesandtheirtrans-
formations are open to different accounts.Paradigms(Kuhn, 1962), research
programs (Lakatos,1978), and/orresearchtraditions (Laudan, 1977)-to take
threeinfluential accounts-haverecently viedforthepartisanship ofvarioushis-
toriansof science,whosechoicesin any case reflectsome deep-seatedphilo-
sophicalcommitments aboutthenatureof science(Agassi, 1963). Furthermore,
withinthesecomplexes-howevertheyareconceived-theoriesarebestunder-
stoodas solutionsor attempted solutionsto problems,andtheseproblemsarein
turnbestunderstood as beinglocatedin yetbroaderproblemsituations thatre-
flecttheirenvironments. Thus, as Karl Popper(1972) once pointedout, "The
history of scienceshouldbe treatednotas a history oftheories,butas a history
ofproblem-situations andtheirmodifications" (p. 177).
By definition, theoriesinpoliticalsciencemustbe scientific, andtheymust
be aboutpolitics.No readerof thisessayneedbe remindedof thecontinuing
agoniesand antipathies generated in politicalscienceoverdecidingwhether po-
liticalscienceis a "science" in anysenseofthetermandjustwhowillgetwhat,
when,and how by determining 'the contentof "the political."Nevertheless,
someineliminably partisan judgments in theseconnections are essentialifonly
todetermine relevantepisodesofthehistory, todistinguish the"scientific"from
the"extra-scientific" activitiesof pastpoliticalscientists, or to distinguish the
history of politicalsciencefromthehistory ofrelatedactivities, including, say,
sociology,economics,or politicalthought moregenerally.Also in thebalance
mayhangthenomination of a founder-orat leastan honorablemention of fig-
uresin a distantpast-if, ofcourse,thehistorian is intothatlineofbusiness.If

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1178 JamesFarr

bypoliticalscience,onemeansonlythemore-or-less empiricalstudyofpractical
politics-as Murray(1925) traditionally did-then Aristotle figures first.If one
meansthehistorically inductivestudyof realpolitik, thenMachiavellideserves
thehonor.If one meansthededuction of thecharacter of themodernstatefrom
thefirst principles ofmotion,thenHobbesplaysthepart.Ifone meanstheNew-
tonianinspiration to "reducepoliticsto a science,"thenHumeandotherfigures
oftheScottishEnlightenment deserveinitialmention (see Farr,1988). Ifbypo-
liticalscience,onemeansan academicdisciplinewitha Schooldevotedto study-
ingthecausalnexusofpolitics-as SomitandTanenhaus(1967) did-then John
W. Burgessfigures as founder; andeverything beforetheSchoolofPoliticalSci-
encefoundedat ColumbiaUniversity in 1880willbe "prehistory."
Of course,the"science"-of theseFounders-theseDead Heads, as one of
mystudents onceputit-may be questioned.Skepticsmaywellthinkthatper-
formance differed frompromise,or that,say,certainnormative commitments
subverted theirscientific quest.Such skeptics,accordingly, woulddatetheori-
ginsofpoliticalscienceinthemorerecentpast,saywithMerriam,Lasswell,the
behavioralrevolution, or theriseof positivepoliticalscience(as Rikersuggests
inFinifter, 1983,p. 47). Some mightevenarguethatas ofyettherehas beenno
"genuine"politicalscienceto speakof. Ironically, thisis an old claimthatscien-
tificreformers inpoliticalsciencehavebeeneagertopressforwellovera century
now.JohnStuartMill did; so too didWilliamB. Munrowhenin 1928 he spoke
of "thebackwardness in whatmaybe calledthepurescienceofpolitics"(1928,
p. 1). Similarsentiments havebeenheardmorerecently, as readerswillremem-
ber.This has at leastone intriguing historiographical consequence.Since there
is no genuinepoliticalscience,therecan be no history ofit. One hopesfora fu-
turepast.
Facingtheprospectofhavingno genuinely scientific pastto remember, the
historian ofpoliticalsciencemightfindconsolation intwoways.He orshemight
be satisfied,andwiselyso, to identify "politicalscience"nominally, thatis, as a
sciencein nameonly.Accordingly, he or shewillprovetobe relatively generous
in tellingthetalesof thosewho,on theirownreckoning and forwhatever rea-
sons, identified theirtheoriesand methodsas contributions to "politicalsci-
ence." The historian hererelaxescontemporary standards of "science" in order
to identify his or hersubjectmatter; and he or she followsthehistoriographical
ruleof thumb:wherever we-hearor readof "politicalscience,"thereis enough
politicalscienceto tellitshistory.
The historian ofpoliticalscience,second,mightfocusnotso muchon po-
liticalscience,butonpoliticalscience.Thiswillentailnotonlysayingwhatsort
of politicspoliticalsciencestudiesbutwhatsortofpoliticspoliticalscienceen-
gagesin. Foron painof writing utterlybloodlesshistory, thehistorian ofpoliti-
cal sciencewillwantto tellthestoriesofpoliticalscientists andoftheactivities
in whichtheywereengaged.Scienceitselfcomprisesa numberof activities, of

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1179

course,butbeyondthemareotheractivities of a morereadilyidentifiable politi-

cal sort.Whiletheseactivitiesmayvary,thereis thehistorically predominant
one of educating democratic citizens.One couldeveninsistthatpoliticalactivi-
tiessuchas thisone, or evenothersof greaterpublicvisibility, represent those
activitiesuponwhichtheveryidentity ofpoliticalsciencehas restedandshould
againrest.
No matter whatchoicesa historian ofpoliticalsciencemakesinorderto tell
hisor herstory,otherhistorians willcomplainandcriticize.Whatever else they
do, historians ofpoliticalsciencedo notmerelyrecordthepast,and whenthey
criticizeone another, itis seldomsimplyovermatters of fact.Ourdiscussionto
thispointhas triedto establishsomeoftheextrafactual themesbywhichwe can
understand theaccomplishments andcriticisms ofdifferent historiansofpolitical
science,andthesethemesarepreciselythoseaboutwhichhistorians revealtheir
mostpartisan judgments. Whether abouttheoriesor scienceorpoliticsorfound-
ersor episodesworthy of remembrance, suchpartisanjudgments maywell and
usuallywilldivideone historian fromanother.So, forexample,ifone historian
failsto makeperfectly clearthepoliticalas opposedto thescientific identity of
politicalscience(as CharlesMerriamarguablydid, if onlyin his 1925 book),
thenhe mightincurthewrathofanother historian ofpoliticalscience-like Ber-
nardCrick(1959). Crickthought thatpoliticalscience,at leastin America,har-
boredsomedefinite politicalbeliefsof a distinctly liberalsortandthatwriting a
history of politicalscienceaccording to scientific criteriasimplyrecapitulated
thoseliberalbeliefs.He arguedquiteplainlythat"theclassification [ofthedevel-
to
opmentofpoliticalscience]according methodology is itselftheexpressionof
some substantive politicalbeliefs, characteristic of American politicalthought"
(1959, p. xv).
Crick'sobservation responded directlytoCharlesMerriam's(1925) influen-
tialperiodizationof "thechieflinesofdevelopment ofthestudyofpoliticalpro-
cesses" (p. 132).
1. The a priorianddeductivemethod,downto 1850.
2. The historical
andcomparativemethod,1850- 1900.
3. The presenttendencytowardobservation, 1900-.
measurement,
survey,
4. The beginnings ofthepsychological of politics.
treatment
Proceedingin reversetemporalorder,we have a bare dawn,25 years,50
years,and22 centuries. (Thismaywellsendup warning flagsforthehistorian of
politicalscience,inadditiontothosepoliticalinsigniathatCrickespiedfluttering
there.Forotherrecentperiodizations,see Easton,1985,andBerndtson in Anc-
karandBerndtson, 1987). Buttheimportant pointhereis thatMerriamintended
to be scientific
and relevantwhenperiodizing thehistory of politicalsciencein
thisway.In doingso, though,he too was beingcriticalofthosewhowouldperi-
odize thehistoryof politicalsciencedifferently,and he was usingthishistory

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i i8o JamesFarr

veryexplicitlytocriticizethosepoliticalscientistswhowereinsufficiently meth-
odologicaland insufficientlypsychological in theirpractice.
History,in sum,can be usedto servecontemporary purposes.In Merriam's
case, itwas usedtounderwrite hisownprogram toprovidepoliticalsciencewith
a methodological foundationin experimental psychology.In Easton'scase itwas
usedto clearthedeckforsystems theory.In Crick'scase it was used to criticize
the politicalassumptions of Americanpoliticalscience. In Somit and Tan-
enhaus'scase itwas usedtohelpthedisciplineassessitsthenpresentstatein the
latterdaysof behavioralism's ascendancy.Indeedit is hardto imaginethathis-
torywill notservethisor thatcontemporary purpose.But heretoo is judgment
andpartisanship andtheopportunity forfuture criticism.

2
The authorsof ThatNoble Science of Politicsintroducetheirworkwith
somemethodological ofprevious(tactfully
criticisms unnamed)historians ofpo-
liticalscience.Theirfirst
is toohumorous andtooimportant notto quotein full.
No future of politicalsciencewill wanthis or herhistoryto fittheir
historian
lampoon.
Thereis an unfortunately familiar
wayof simplifying thecomplexity of theintellectuallifeof
thepastintoa conveniently unifiedstory,one thatis particularlyfavouredwhensupposedly
tracingthehistory of a modemacademicdiscipline,especially,perhaps,a disciplinedrawn
fromwhatare now regardedas thesocial sciences.In essenceit consistsin writinghistory
backwards.The presenttheoretical consensusof thediscipline,or possiblysome polemical
versionof whatthatconsensusshouldbe, is in effect takenas definitive, and thepastis then
reconstituted as a teleologyleadingup to andfullymanifested in it. Pastauthorsare inducted
intothecanonofthedisciplineas precursors orforebears,andpassedin reviewas thoughbya
generaldistributing medals-and sometimes reprimands-attheendofa successful campaign,
withtheusefulimpliedcorollary thatifmedalscanbe distributed thecampaignmusthavebeen
brought to a satisfactoryconclusionand thedisciplinedulyestablished.The listof canonical
precursors, arrayedinchronological order,eachwearinga labelconveniently summarising his
"contribution," thenbecomesthehistory ofthedisciplinein question.As with"officialhisto-
ries" in recently establishedrepublics,rivalteamsof greatpredecessors maybe assembledin
thisway,ostensibly to proclaimand honoura tradition of surprising antiquity, butin factto
legitimate theclaimsofthecurrent protagonistsin thestruggleforpower. (1983, p. 4)

No readerof ThatNobleScienceofPoliticswill findan "officialhistory"

betweenitscovers.Whathe or she willfindis a first-rate intellectual
historyof
nineteenth-centuryBritishpoliticalsciencethatwill set standards forthehisto-
riographyofthesocialsciencesforsometime.He or shemust,however, be pre-
paredto encounter a "curiouslyalien" subjectmatterand forgoanyhopes of
mappingand defending the "nebulousprovince"thatpoliticalsciencehas be-
come(pp. 3, 365).
Collini,Winch,and Burrowhave chosen"a subjectwhichno longerap-
pearson modernmapsof knowledge"and whichis "onlyindirectly relatedto
whatthetwentiethcentury hascometoknowas thedisciplineofpoliticalscience

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE I 181

(p. 3). Withglancesback at David Hume,AdamSmith,and thoseenlightened

Scotsmenwhofirst popularized theverylanguageofthe"scienceofpolitics"in
theeighteenth century, theauthors offera seriesofselectivestudiesinnineteenth-
century politicalsciencebeginning withthelaterScottishEnlightenment figure,
DugaldStewart andendingwiththeformalintroduction of "politicalscience"to
thesyllabusat Cambridgein theclosingyearsof thecentury. Alongtheway-
andoftenconnected bylittlemorethantheirnominalinvocation oftheterm"po-
liticalscience"-several greater and lesserfigures maketheirappearance,to be
treatedat somelength,amongthemThomasMalthus,David Ricardo,SirJames
Mackintosh, ThomasB. Macaulay,JamesandJohnStuartMill,WalterBagehot,
WilliamStubbs,Sir HenrySumnerMaine, E. A. Freeman,Sir JohnSeeley,
JamesBryce,CliffeLeslie, WilliamCunningham, W. J. Ashley,HenrySidg-
wick,AlfredMarshall, Graham Wallas,and a hostof walk-ons.
Each of theelevenchapters(plusprologueandepilogue)bringsto lightan
important episodeof thisneglectedstretch of intellectual
history. Each chapter
displaysclose textual and contextual analysis. Theories, problems, situations,
andscientists to
come life, even are
ifthey alleged to be "curiously alien." The
authorsletthewordsof thepastanimatethepast,and theyneither"conductan
inquisition" norimposean infallible versionofscienceon thehistory ofpolitical
science,fortheyconfessto being "agnosticon fundamental . . . epistemo-
logical problems"(p. 7). In short,if "politicalscience" was a good enough
boastor aspiration a century ago, itis goodenoughforhistory today.
ThatNoble Science of Politicsborrowsits titlefromThomasBabington
Macaulay'sextravagant encomiumof 1829 to "thatNoble Science of Poli-
tics . . . which,ofall sciences,is themostimportant tothewelfareofnations,-
whichof all sciences,mosttendsto expandand invigorate themind,-which
drawsnutriment andornament fromeverypartofphilosophy andliterature, and
dispenses,in return,nutriment and ornamentto all" (p. 128). Et cetera,et
cetera,et cetera.This is pretty headypraise,outdoneonlyby JohnAdams's
somewhat earliersermonizing about"thedivinescienceofpolitics"deliveredan
ocean away.Now Collini,Winch,and Burroware nottakenin by Macaulay's
visionof thatnoblescience.Theysharenoneof thatfamousWhig'spolitics,
historiography, or penchantforprogress.Whiletheyare generallysympathetic
(in thehistorians' specialsortof way)withMacaulayandtheotherpoliticalsci-
entists theydiscuss,theyneveralloWhimorthemtobe abovecriticism forthisor
thatfoibleof intellection. AndtheyneverletJohnStuartMill rest,despitetheir
denialsofinquisition: "How utter was Mill'sfailureto implement theprogram of
Book VI" of theLogic (p. 151). One couldwellimaginesuchcriticism issuing
in a narrative of subsequent progress,evensuccess,in dealingwithMill's pro-
gramor withtheprogram of others.Butnothing of thesorthappenshere.The
authorsare so partisanabouttheirbeing "anti-Whig"(p. 5) thatnothingre-
motelylike"progress"is espied.Eventhewords"tradition" and "continuity"
and"development" areusedsparingly and suspiciously.

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II82 JamesFarr

Consequently, theauthorshave allegedto offerneithera "comprehensive

survey"nora "continuous narrative" (p. 3). Thereis morethana littleunder-
statement in this,at leastin thatthebookoffers themostcomprehensive survey
to date, and theessaysoverlapin enoughwaysto at least intimate significant
continuities. Therewas a certainsteadinessof thecategoriesand conceptsof
nineteenth-century British politicallifethatalloweditssciencetoenjoya relative
stability,ifnotsomeprogress.Also, as thechaptersubtitles themselves suggest,
theoriesof methoddominateeach chapter,andtheyestablishnarrative continu-
ity.(Indeedreadersarepresumed toknowquitea bitaboutthesubstantive politi-
cal theories ofthepoliticalscientists underdiscussion).In thisstorypoliticalsci-
ence provesto be an intellectual practice,or theaspiration towardone, whose
methodological theoriesandfoundations werecontested in andbetweengenera-
tions.Thus,although neverin "overlyneatpatterns" (p. 280), thehistory ofpo-
liticalscienceis thehistory ofthecompetition betweenthephilosophicmethod,
the historicalmethod,the comparative method,and the methodof reflective
analysis.The categories of induction versusdeduction areoftenheard.Forthose
contemporary politicalscientistsraisedon a dietof scope-and-method texts,the
richvarietiesand subtledefensesof induction anddeductionmakeforfascinat-
ingreading-fora change.
Furthermore-and thistoocouldhavebeenbetterarticulated as a themeof
narrative continuity-the methodological debateshadtheirpoliticalbearings.In
particular, thetravailsofrepresentative democracy werefeltin politicalscience.
Atonepointintheseventh chapter, on "theappealoftheComparative Method,"
theauthorsintimate as muchin generalterms:"Demonstrating or denyingthe
possibility of successfulpopulargovernment had, of course,been one of the
mostimportant practicalspurstothedevelopment ofa scienceofpoliticsfromat
leastthemiddleofthecentury"(p. 237).
The methodofpoliticsandthepoliticsofmethodarehardlydistinguishable
whenturning to particular episodes,as well. Thus,forexample,readersarere-
mindedof "thepoliticalcharacter ofpoliticaleconomy"because"it was, above
all, itscommanding role in thediscussionof publicaffairsthatmadepolitical
economya prizeso clearlyworthfighting for" (ppr 261, 274-75). The com-
parativemethod,to takeanother example,begannotas a meremethodological
exerciseinclassification (muchless "remorseless cataloguing," p. 243) butas an
adjunctto a developmental framework on essentiallyAryan-racialist linesthat
naturally had itsuses in theEmpire.Or, yetagain,considerthemethodological
plea by JamesBrycefor "Facts, Facts, Facts." Americanpoliticalscientists
mightremember thewordsofthisfuture fourth presidentoftheAPSA as an epi-
graphin thePoliticalSystemwhereit becamea convenient targetof Easton's
(1953) assaulton "hyperfactualism" and "crudeempiricism"(pp. 63-78). In
thestoryby Collini,Winch,and Burrow,however,Bryce's"energeticempiri-
cism" is presented notonlyas a methodological positionbutalso as a political

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE II83

one thatwas enlistedto fightignoranceand so-in one of thebestlinesof the

book-"to makeAmericasafefordemocracy's supporters" (p. 240).
In theend,whatdid itcometo andwhatdoes itmeanto us today?Collini,
Winch,and Burroware forthcoming in answering theformerquestion:"It is
tempting toconcludethatforovera century thecategory ofa 'scienceofpolitics'
had been as emptyas a dress-maker's window,readyto be filledby thelatest
waveoffashion"(p. 376). One is also tempted to saythatthedressmaker is still
inbusiness.Buttheauthors do notthemselves saythis;theyonlyremotely hintat
whatsortofpractices theythinkinhabit the"nebulousprovince"ofpoliticalsci-
ence in ourcentury. Indeed,theysayhardlyanything at all aboutcontemporary
politicalscienceor itsconnection withthepast. The "curiouslyalien" subject
matter of ThatNobleScienceof-Politics is allowedto remaincuriousand alien.
is
Whilethere something refreshingly honestaboutthishistoriographical
posture, onewonders if itdoes not sell itself short.In anycase, one wondershow
toencouragecontemporary politicalscientists whotaketheirdisciplineseriously
to readthisimportant book-assuming,as is likely,thattheywill yearnto see
some connections between pastandpresent, andevensomehopesforthefuture.
Well,contemporary political scientists assuredly willnotfinda long-lost catalog
of ready-made problemsor theoriesor datawhichmightbe resumedforthwith.
Theymight,however, findtheirpredecessors considerably less alienthanadver-
tised,notonlyintheirmethodological disputes,manyofwhichcontinue todayin
virtuallythe same terms,but when consideringtheirbroaderattachment to
democratic politics.Thisconnectspastandpresent, andperhapspointsbeyond.
As one historian ofpoliticalsciencehasrecently observed,politicalscience"co-
incidedwiththe growthof representative democracy.The logical conclusion
seemsto be thatthedevelopment of politicalscienceas we understand it is de-
pendenton thefuture of representative democracy"(Berndtsonin Anckarand
Berndtson, 1987,p. 98). If,evenif,thisseemstogivepoliticalsciencea particu-
larlyfragileidentity in thepresent context-which,as we shallsee below,Ricci
and Seidelmanbothintimate-thenperhapsthenineteenth century providesus
withmaterials forreflection notbecauseof itsnoblepretensions, butbecauseof
itsvery"shortcomings" (p. 376). Arewe doomedto repeatthepast?If so, letit
notbe becausewe forgot thoseaspirations nowa century andmoreold, orfailed
to learnfromtheirfailures.
3
Two purposesinformthe verydifferent enterpriseof Politicsand Para-
digms.In tracing thechangein theoriesofchange,AndrewC. Janossetsout(1)
"to writean intellectualhistory,howeversketchy, of theevolutionof modern
politicalscience"and(2) "to takestock,toclarify,
andtocreateorderamongthe
recentcropof competing theories"(p. 4). The first
purposehopesto enlighten
thedisciplineaboutits recent"trialsand tribulations."The secondhopes to

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II84 JamesFarr

benefitpoliticalscientists"in organizing empiricalresearchand in comparing

politicalphenomena inWestern, non-Western, andCommunist societies,within
a single,unifiedintellectual construct"(p. 4). Since thebook ends on a very
"cautious"note-that "insteadof formulating yetanothergeneraltheory,we
seem to be contentwithdiscerningloci of indeterminacy in largercycles of
change"(pp. 153-54)-one cannotbutconcludethatthesecondpurposehas
notbeen fullyrealized,sinceno unifiedintellectual construct in factemerges.
IndeedJanos'spenultimate line hintsat something just shyof despair:"social
scientistscreaterobuststructures in theknowledgethattheymaybe standingin
quicksand"(p. 154).
As ourcenterofgravity sinks,thebookdeservesitsdue. Itis, inthespiritof
thesecondpurpose,a helpfulbibliographical essayforadvancedstudents (of all
ages) interestedin an overviewof (mostlyrecent)theoriesofpoliticalchange.It
shouldproveespeciallyaidworthy forthosestudents who, like Janoshimself,
havea particular theoreticalproblemandwhowantto assessor to introduce that
probleminbroaderintellectual terms.Originally, Janosplannedhisbookas "the
introductionto a largerstudydesignedto comparethepoliticsofEasternEurope
in thepre-Communist andCommunist periods"(p. vii).
The firstpurposeof Politicsand Paradigms-to writean intellectual his-
toryofmodernpoliticalscience-concernsus here.UnlikeCollini,Winch,and
Burrow,Janosdesignsan unabashedly disciplinary
history thatleads up to and
triesto informthepresent.He focusesveryselectively on theoriesofchange,as
opposedto thedisciplineas a wholeor to themethodological idea of "political
science" itself.And, mostimportant, he organizeshis historyarounda much
strongerand morescientific narrativedevice-namely,paradigms,or rather
paradigmshifts, in thesensegivento thisnotionsome25 yearsago byThomas
Kuhn.Whilethislastfeature ofthebookis a presumptive strength,itis infactits
centralweakness.
The antipositivist model of scientificchangethatKuhn sketchedin the
Structure ofScientificRevolutions (publishedin 1962 ironically in thepositivist
EncyclopediaofUnified Science)has prompted so muchdiscussionandso much
criticismthatonescarcelyneedstoglossitatall. Janoshimself makesshortwork
ofitinhisintroduction andconclusionand,intheprocess,failsorchoosesnotto
mention keytermslike"normalscience,""exemplars,""puzzle-solving,""in-
commensurability," or "scientificrevolutions."The relativisticfeatures are not
underscored, especiallyKuhn's own skepticism about any cross-paradigm no-
tionsof theoretical progress.Trimming and simplifying, then, Janos says that
paradigmsare "constructs identifying broadrelationships betweentwoor more
generalcategories,together withsomebasic assumptions concerning thenature
ofa largeruniverse"(p. 1). Theoretically, paradigms organizeresearch, andpsy-
chologicallyand sociologically, theybindresearchers intoa community. It is in
thenatureofthingsthatparadigms discoveranomalies,thoughtheseareshelved

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE II85

whenever possible.Butovertimetheseanomaliesmountandlead to crisis."In

theend,thedisciplinemaysimplycollapse"(p. 2), oritmayissueina newpara-
digmthat,strictly speaking,is incompatible withtheformer one. Janosmentions
thehistory of physicsas thearchetypal exampleof all this.He goes on to ac-
knowledge, as he must,that"Kuhn'scriticsmaywellbe justified in questioning
the universalrelevanceof the model. Still," he continues,"the sequenceof
eventshe suggestsandtheconceptofa paradigmshiftseemto be eminently ap-
plicableto theexperience ofthesocialsciences,andwithinthem,to theexperi-
enceof politicalinquiry"(p. 3).
Thisis a surprisingly sanguinejudgment.Kuhn'sownmisgivings aboutthe
social sciencesbeing"pre-paradigmatic"-their interminably warringschools
of thought, theirinability to shareexemplarsor a commonsetof puzzles-are
citedbutnotheededbyJanos.Instead,readersare assuredthat"overtheyears,
however, theparadigmconceptgainedquickandwidespreadacceptanceamong
students of social scienceandthehumanities" (p. 157, n. 6). This is at bestan
overstatement; at worst,simplyfalse. And thebasis forthejudgmentis never
madeclear.Indeedin comparison withtherichandnearlyexhaustive citationof
worksabouttheoriesofpoliticalchange,JanosonlycitestheStructure ofScien-
tificRevolutions itselfand threeessaysin an editedvolume(Gutting,1980) to
support hishistoriographical claims.Butalmosteveryother(unmentioned) essay
inthatveryvolume-nottomention numerous others(forbeginnings inpolitical
science alone, see Landau, 1972; Moon, 1975; Ball, 1976; and Bernstein,
1978)-reject or qualitatively transform Kuhn'sideas, especiallyforthesocial
sciences.M. D. Kingsaysthat"sociologistscannot. . . expecttofindinKuhn's
worka ready-made theoryof scientific change"(Gutting,1980, p. 115); Mark
Blaugoffers thesummary judgment that"theterm'paradigm'oughtto be ban-
ishedfromeconomicliterature" (p. 137); andtheeditorhimself declaresthat"it
on
wouldalmostsurelybe a good idea to declarea moratorium applications of
Kuhnto themethodology andhistory ofthesocialsciences"(p. 18).
Eveniftheidea of a paradigmwerein principleirreproachable, one might
stillquestionsomeof theparticular historiographical judgments in Politics and
Paradigms.Consider,forstarters, theidentity ofthe first
"classical" paradigm.
It turnson theconceptof innovation andespeciallythehumanattempt to master
thematerialenvironment, whether suchmastery is furtherexplained termsof
in
individual self-interest orintermsofoverall social equilibrium. Thisparadigmis
foundedin the 1760s by AdamSmith, and its principalprotagonists thereafter
includeall thesociologicalmasters of the nineteenth century: Karl Marx, Au-
gusteComte,HerbertSpencer, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. The neo-
classicalvariantof theparadigm-developedto extenditsimplications to non-
Westernsocieties-foundchampions in Thorstein Veblen, V. I. Lenin,Talcott
Parsons, and a host ofrelativelyrecent scholars, including Walt Rostow, Seymour
Martin Lipset, Samuel Huntington, Karl Deutsch, Lucien Pye,Barrington Moore,

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II86 JamesFarr

and ReinhardBendix(to whomthebook is dedicated).Then,sometimein the

midto late1960s,the"classicalparadigm"couldno longerexplainnewanoma-
lousdevelopments-inLatinAmerica,inAfrica,inEasternEurope.A newpara-
digmemerged,we aretold,one whichtooka moreglobalpurchaseon political
changeandemphasizedculturalandpostindustrial, as wellas material,factors.
PerryAnderson, ThedaSkocpol,Daniel Bell, MorrisJanowitz, ImmanuelWal-
lerstein,AndreGunderFrank,ZbigniewBrzezinski,SewerynBialer,Kenneth
Jowett, andJurgen Habermas-to begina muchlongerlist-came to and con-
tinueto articulatethisnewparadigm.
One couldbe forgiven forthinking thatthesevarioustheorists facedsuch
significantlydifferentproblemsin such radicallydifferent situations
thatthey
do notformtwocoherent wholes-,muchless paradigms in Kuhn'ssense.Janos's
two "paradigms"appearto be heuristic devices-holdingtanks,really-fora
sweepingdiversity of theoriesthatoverlapin variouswaysandthat,without ty-
pologicalviolation,couldbe sortedintoverydifferent setsandintoa fargreater
number of themthantwo.
On thematterof datesand changesin general,Janosis right:something
happenedin thelate 1960s whichinfluenced a wide rangeof (liberal,conser-
vative,and Marxist)thinkers. Andhe does hintat an important explanationfor
changesin theoriesof change(even if theydo notcomprisea paradigm).He
suggests, that"thedominant
rightly, positionofneo-liberal socialscienceandof
thetheoryof modernization [associatedwiththeso-calledclassicalparadigm]
came to an abruptend in thelate 1960s undertheimpactof developments that
shattered thecomplacentworldof establishedsocial science,"especially"the
riseof radicalsentiment duringtheVietnamera" (p. 70). Politicalsciencein-
deedoftenchangesitstheories becauseofnewpoliticaldevelopments externalto
itstheoriesand theacademyitself.Janoscould and perhapsshouldhave made
evenmoreofthisanditsbearingon thehistory ofmodernpoliticalscience,espe-
ciallygivenhis knowledgeable to thepoliticalleaningsof different
sensitivity
theoriesand theorists of politicalchange.But one thingmeritsfinalnotice:if
true,notKuhnian.Kuhn'ssketchof scientific change-in generaland, espe-
cially,in theparticular case studieshe provides-dependsupondevelopments
internal to thescientificcommunity. In theend, then,we shouldlook beyond
paradigmsfora narrative-andespeciallyfora politicalnarrative-totellthe
history ofpoliticalscience.
4
IfKuhndoes notprovidean appropriate narrative
framework forthehistory
ofpoliticalscience,he nonetheless partin one ofitsepisodes.
playsa significant
Indeedso suggestive was he in the1960sthathe seemedcapableof performing
anytask,atleastinthehandsofhismanytaskmasters.
virtually Whenhe was not
beingused to condemnPoliticalTheoryand praisePoliticalScience, he was

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE II87

beingused to condemnPoliticalScienceand praisePoliticalTheory.In David

Ricci's(1984) tellingofthiscontradictory episode,Kuhnplayeda part-along-
sidetheCounterculture, theCaucusfora NewPoliticalScience,theshift topolicy
studies,and mainstream politicalscientists who "co-opted"him-in thedisci-
pline'sdevelopment during that"decadeofdisillusionment" whentheuniversities
explodedin student demonstrations, liberalismlostmostof its vitality, behav-
ioralismsighedthelastgasp of "Popperism,"and thecrisisof democracybe-
camea crisisinthediscipline.
Ifthisseemsa sweepingstorylinethatis inequal partssociologyofknowl-
edge, methodology, democratic theory, and drama,thenit is a plotby design.
The TragedyofPoliticalSciencetellsa dramaticstoryof "Americanpolitical
scienceas an academicdiscipline"(p. 3), sociologically formed andtransformed
as a profession withinthemodernuniversity, methodologically fixatedon the
"Templeof Science" (p. 54), politicallyand theoretically dedicatedto under-
standing andtransmitting thevaluesof democracy. Buttroublebroodsoverthis
storybecausethediscipline'spursuitof scienceconflictswithits devotionto
democratic politics.Timeandagain,politicalscientists discoverthingsthatdeny
keytenetsof democratic theory, particularly therationality andinformedness of
ordinary citizens.Commitment tovalue-free inquiry andtherefinement ofscien-
tifictechniques also proscribethescope of studyintoindispensable democratic
values,suchas patriotism and mutualrespect.The organizational pressuresof
themodernuniversity perpetuate theconflict betweenscienceand democracy,
particularlybycounseling safescienceattheexpenseofpublishing worksofrisk
andrelevanceto democracy. Indeedso persistent is theconflict betweenthedis-
cipline'stwo"good ends" ("the acceptanceof scientific techniquesand attach-
mentto democratic ideals," p. 24) thatin itRicci findshis narrative device.He
analogizesthepredicament of politicalscienceto a literary tragedy,reminiscent
of Oedipus,Antigone, or BillyBudd. "As a tragicprotagonist, thediscipline's
is
collectiveshortcoming located in a stubborn insistence on studying politics
even thoughinquiryin thatmodecannotinsurethehealthof a
scientifically,
democratic society"(p. 25).
The wholehistory of politicalscienceis a stage,then,and each of itsepi-
sodesplaystotragedy. Kuhnepisodeis onlyone, or rather
The partofone, and
in
itbeginsthestory mediares. After a general introductory chapter, Ricci be-
ginshis history proper with some generalsociological observations about "the
locus of highereducation" in the late nineteenth century when the universities
replacedcollegesand whenthelearneddisciplinescreatedprofessional associa-
tionsconsistent with middle-class culture. In chapter 3 we witnessthe birthof
politicalscience as an academic discipline at theturn of the century, though the
of its
"contradictions" development up to 1930 reflect the intellectualand politi-
cal commitments toliberalism whichpredisciplinary politicalsciencehadforged
as earlyas 1825. Fromthebeginning, then,therewas a tragictelos.

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I i88 JamesFarr

BecauseAmericawas so overwhelmingly devotedtotheprinciples

andpracticesofdemocratic
theendforpoliticalsciencewas virtually
liberalism, laiddowninadvance,andanydiscoveries
thedisciplinemightmakewouldeitherengendersupportforthatend or-and herewas the
danger-detractfromexistingsupportby revealingtheexistenceof bad citizenshipand en-
couragingmoreofthesame. (p. 70)

Chapters4 through 6 ("The New Viewof ScienceandPolitics,""The Be-

havioralPersuasion,"and "The Decade of Disillusionment") makeup thehis-
toricalcenterpiece ofthebook.Theyspanandperiodize"themidcentury liberal
matrix"from1930 to about1975. The subsequent twochaptersare moreana-
lytical,especiallytheeighthon themethodological debatesovernomothetic laws
whichattended community powerstudiesandcriticaltheory. In discussing"the
loss of wisdom" (pp. 236ff.),the seventhchapteranticipatesthe essentially
moralreflections ofthelastchapter, whichsharesthebook'stitle,butwhichalso
asks "can something be done?" Each chapterkeepsup an energetic pace just
shortof breathtaking. Debatesovermethodology anddemocratic theorysustain
thetragicnarrative set in theuniversity. Scoresof politicalscientists makeap-
pearances,mostofthemrather brief-fromFrancisLieberandJohnW. Burgess
to WoodrowWilsonand CharlesMerriamto RobertDahl and WilliamRiker.
Ironically-ifonlybecause theywerenotacademicpoliticalscientists-John
DeweyandKarlPopperreceivethemostsustainedattention of all. So influential
does Ricci findtheirreflections on scienceand democracy thathe evenhas two
ideologiesemergefromthem,namely,DeweyismandPopperism.
Theoverallframework forRicci'sthoughtful andambitious history ofAmeri-
can politicalscienceseemsabsolutely therightone: theconnection ofAmerican
politicalsciencewithAmericanpolitics,whichin thenatureof thebeastmeans
liberalism andrepresentative democracy. Moreover, thehistory helpsservecon-
temporary moralandpoliticalreflections on thediscipline'sloss ofandhopesfor
recovering wisdomanddemocratic service.In passinginreviewso manyevents,
theories, andtheorists, TheTragedyofPoliticalScienceamassesa bibliographic
treasure. The footnotes alonewillassistpracticing historiansofAmericanpoliti-
cal science,especiallythosewho will wantto chase downthisor thattheorist,
thisor thatdisciplinary crisis.
Doubtless,some skepticswilljoin thischase. Some might,forexample,
challengethetreatment ofPopper,orrather Popperism. Whilenota politicalsci-
entist,Popperdoes seemtofitthestoryquitewell.He was influential inthepost-
WorldWarII period,especiallyforhisbookswhichespouseda liberalandscien-
tific"open society."(Poppercalledthesebookshis "warwork.") However,his
methodological influence on politicalscience,especiallybehavioral politicalsci-
ence,is muchless clear,andRicci'sdiscussion and footnotes do not establishit.
Whenbehavioralist tenetsand theirphilosophical bona fides were articulated
of
(and often, course,they were leftsomewhat vague),theyfrequently empha-
sized positivisticnotionsof verification, operationalization, and psychological

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE I I89

hypotheses abouthumanbehavior.ButPopperintended hisdoctrine of falsifica-

tionto refute notsupplement verification;
operationalization emphasizedtheim-
portanceofredefining concepts,a taskthatPopperthought was relatively minor
forthegrowthof knowledge;and themethodof situational analysiswas for-
wardedto displaceifnotreplacepsychology. No wonderhe boastedof "killing
positivism" (1976, p. 88). If,as Ricciclaims,"Popperism"can be further cred-
itedwithproviding an accumulationist or "building-block" conceptionof the
growth of science(p. 141), a "straight-line" viewof knowledge(p. 142), and a
call forpiecemealresearch(as opposedto piecemealsocial engineering), then
Popperwas no Popperist. Giventhis,Popperism seemsto fitthestoryrathertoo
well,as if it wererequiredto. Suspicionsalongthisscoreare notallayedwith
transitionsofthiskind:"And so,forourstoryto continuesmoothly, itwas nec-
essarythata large-scaleshiftto Popperismtake place. It did, conveniently,
in whatcame to be called 'the end of ideology'movement"(p. 126; empha-
sis added).
The veryidea of tragedyalso seemsmorethana triflestrained.Whileit
makesfora rhetorically chargedtitleand promisesa dramaticnarrative device,
thereis no realfallof thecollectiveprotagonist (politicalscience)froma great
height.Andthougheach generation cries"crisis,"politicalsciencehas notsuf-
fereda prolonged agonyofhistorical muchless self-destruction,
self-revelation,
characteristic of an Oedipusor an Antigone.Less grandly, it is notclear that
politicalscience mustfail tragicallyto achievescienceand servedemocracy.
Ricci himselfhintsat thisand nevermoreso thanwhenhe asks in conclusion,
"Can something be done?" He is notwildlyoptimistic aboutthedisciplineas a
whole,sincethereis "nothingor verylittle"it can do (eventhoughhe adds,
rathersurprisingly, that"thereis greatvirtuein theoverallshapeof thedisci-
pline,"p. 308). But as individualpoliticalscientists who teachin universities
and colleges,we can be morehistorical(p. 311); we can encouragereflection
intotheadmittedly intangible "realmof morals"(p. 304); and we can "search
outwisdomvia reneweddedicationto continuing a greatconversation embodied
in greatbooks,newandold" (p. 315).
Ricci is wise notto makeoverlymuchof theseproposals.But we might
noticeone finalthingaboutthem.Although theyaretendered as contributions to
something otherthanthe"TempleofScience,"theydo reviveandremember the
meaningof "science" in theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries in thoseintel-
lectualpractices explicitlycalled"moralscience"and"politicalscience"(ofthe
sortCollini,Winch,and Burrowdiscussed).One stepback mighthelpus take
twostepsforward. But thissuggestsnotonlythatwe mightyetlearnfromthe
past,butthatin doingso we aredoingnothing less and nothing morethanwhat
politicalsciencehas alwaysdone,namely,engagingin thatdisciplinary ritualof
reconceptualizing "science" (and perhaps"democracy,"too). In this time-
honoredwaywe continueto hopeto avoidtragedy, notsuffer it.

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II90 JamesFarr

5
Theprospects ofthishopecomingtogoodaccountmaywelldependupona
futurebeyondliberalism. Thiswouldbe an enchanted newworldforAmerican
politicalscientists,
a professionof realistsheretoforedisenchanted withtheir
veryownprograms forliberalreform.Giventhepast,thefuture can onlylook
bright.Considerthenotaltogether optimistic closingparagraphofDisenchanted
Realists,thelastofourfourrecenthistories ofpoliticalscience.
Historically,politicalscienceprofessionalism
has onlyobscuredfundamental conflictsand
choicesin Americanpubliclife,forit has treatedcitizensas objectsof studyor clientsof a
benignpoliticalpaternalism. The democratic
delusionsof Americanpoliticalsciencehaveal-
waysexcludedandfeareda future beyondliberalism.Untilpoliticalscientists
realizethattheir
democratic politicscannotbe realizedthrougha barrenprofessionalism, intellectuallifewill
remaincleavedfromthegenuineif heretofore subterraneandemocratic dreamsof American
citizens.Politicalsciencehistory
has confirmed
thisseparation,evenas ithas triedtobridgeit.
Modempoliticalsciencemustbridgeit,ifdelusionsaretobe transformed intonewdemocratic
realities. (p. 241)

No inductive fallacyis committed here,toputitmildly.The future ofpoliti-

cal sciencemustbe different, sinceitspast-or at leaston RaymondSeidelman
andEdwardHarpham'stellingof a good partof itspast-reveals a "tradition"
markedbygenerational cyclesofoptimism withtheprospects ofrealisticpoliti-
cal reform turning sourin thefaceof therealitiesof statepoliticsand popular
indifference. The intractabilityof these"raw slabs of reality"(p. 85) seemsto
havefinallydone in thistradition-this"thirdtradition," a century less vener-
ablethantheothertwotraditions, theinstitutionalistandtheradicaldemocratic-
thatit intendedto replace. Untilthe "eclipse of unity,"roughlycontempo-
raneouswiththepostbehavioral era, politicalscientistswho werepartof this
thirdtradition "blendedscholarship andpoliticaladvocacy,a scienceof politics
witha science'for'politics"(p. 3). In particular, theysoughtto "mold a new
Statewithwhatthey[saw] as nativeAmericanformsofdemocratic legitimacy"
(p. 8). But disenchantment and disillusionment overcomeeach generation from
1884to 1984,untilwe can nowspeakof theveritable, ifnotquiteapocalyptic,
"end of thethirdtradition" (ch. 7). Whatever itsscientific
aspirations,contem-
porarypoliticalscienceis at presentlargelyapolitical,at least in thatwe now
witness"theincreasing insulation of politicalsciencefromtherealitiesof poli-
tics,powerandprotest in twentieth century America"(p. xix).
SeidelmanandHarphamspreadthisstoryoutoversevenchapters, thecen-
tralfiveof whicharehistorical. Each ofthesefivechapters presentsthetheories
andactivities oftwoleadingpoliticalscientists inthethirdtradition.LesterWard
andWoodrowWilsonrepresent theimpulsestowarda scienceofpoliticalreform
in thelate nineteenth century. Arthur Bentleyand CharlesBeardbringout the
muckraking tendencies of Progressive politicalscientists.
CharlesMerriamand

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE II9I

his finestpupilHaroldLasswell end up disillusionedwiththe reformist New

Deal. V. 0. Key and David Trumanforgethetransition fromreformism to be-
havioralism. TheodoreLowi andWalterDean Burnham presideovertheeclipse
of unityof thethirdtradition and bringus to itsend. Each of thesethinkers is
treated at somelength,in themannerof Collini,Winch,andBurrow.Theirpo-
liticaltheoriesdominatethe analysis,at the expenseof theirmethodological
ones, whenthesetwocan be separated.Of course,oftentheycannotbe sepa-
rated.As in thecase of CharlesBeard,"questionsof scientific methodwereof
directpoliticalrelevance"(p. 83). Indeed,third-tradition thinkersheld a "cul-
turaldefinitionofthescientific ideal. Notonlya methodofstudy,socialscience
[was] moreimportant as a peculiarlyAmericandisposition to politicalthought
and practice"(p. 8). So it is thisstoryof politicalscience as a "peculiarly
Americandisposition"thatis toldin Disenchanted Realists.Whileeach of the
tenpoliticalscientistsreceivesrespectful treatment,thereis no romancewhat-
soever.Their"impossiblecontradictions and tensions"(p. 3) are kepteverin
view,and in theend,theyare chastisedforhaving"fortoo longthought about
anddefinedandlookedforreform in all thewrongplaces" (p. 229).
Not sinceBernardCrick'sAmericanScienceofPoliticshas thehistoryof
politicalsciencebeenso criticalin intent or execution."If we haveerred,"the
authorsacknowledgeat theoutset,"we hope it is on the side of provocation
rather thanpedantry"(p. xix). Surely,thishopehas beenfulfilled. Readerswill
notfindpedantryin thesepages; the book is lively,intelligent, and thought-
provoking throughout.Alternatively,manyreaderswillfeelthestingofprovoca-
tion,no matter whether theyconsiderthemselves "acritical"behavioralistswho
accept"thegivennessofAmericandemocracy"(pp. 16, 185); neoconservatives
who would reverseWoodrowWilson and breathePrussianair back intothe
Americanstate;left-leaning rebelsof the stripeonce or stillin that"curious
modeofprofessionalized dissent"knownas theCaucusfora New PoliticalSci-
ence; or liberalreformers of thenearlyextinctor "phantom"variety(p. 200),
likeTheodoreLowi (whowritesa generousifunrepentant foreword tothebook).
Provocations aside, DisenchantedRealistsmakessome historiographical
choicesandpartisan judgments thatarenotabovequestionor criticism, particu-
larlythoseattendant to theveryidea ofa "thirdtradition." The book,on painof
"sanity,"does not claim to offera "complete"historyof politicalscience
(p. xix); indeedit forswears anything otherthan"a selectedinterpretation of
those[politicalscientists]who builtthedisciplineas a scienceof democracy""
thestudyofsomeliberalreformers
(p. 2). Yet,frequently, amongpoliticalscien-
tistsgives way, and understandably so, to more sweepingstatements about
Americanpoliticalscienceas such. (And how manypoliticalscientists would
disavowtheirsas a scienceofdemocracy?) Furthermore,thestrategy ofdissect-
ingpairsofheaviesforeachgeneration has evidentmerits.Butitseemsto imply
greater conformity ofself-conception thananygenerational studycouldprobably

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1192 JamesFarr

withstand. Evenso, theparticular choicesofthe10 politicalscientists, as repre-

sentatives of politicalscience,are instinctively quitegood ones, and no one, I
suspect,wouldchallengethem,eveniftheywouldliketo see otherfigures cov-
eredas well,or as substitutes.
Butotherfigures couldmaterially affectthestory.In his foreword, forex-
ample,Lowi protests theneglectin Disenchanted Realistsof "an important in-
tellectualRight,sometimescalled neo-conservatism" (p. xvii). Samuel Hunt-
ingtondoes appearin thelastchapter, whereSeidelmanandHarphamallowthat
"neo-conservatives have effectively mixed academicresearchwithinfluence
overan enlightened corporate and governmental elite" (p. 237). Whatever else
one maywantto sayaboutthis(andone sensesthattheauthors haveplentymore
to say aboutit), it does notsustain"our subject,"namely,"theincreasing in-
sulationof politicalsciencefromtherealitiesof politics,powerand protestin
twentieth century America"(p. xix). In short,thedemiseofthethirdtradition or
theexhaustion of liberalreform in politicalscienceis notthedemiseofpolitical
advocacyortheexhaustion ofpoliticalreform as such.Neoconservative political
scientists,or others,havesimplyassumedthemantleonce wornbyliberals.
Or takea verydifferent sortof example.Wouldthestorynotbe materially
influenced if RobertDahl wereheadlinedin thepenultimate chapter?At one
pointtheauthorsstatethat"whatever hiscontribution tothediscipline,Dahl did
littleduringthebehavioralerato movethethirdtradition beyondthelogicfound
in theworkof Key and Truman"(p. 159). Perhapsso "duringthebehavioral
era." Butwhatof Dahl's concernwithworkers'democracy expressedall along,
or his evenmoreexplicitdemocratic socialistleaningsearlierand later?Did he
thenmovethethirdtradition beyondits logic? Did he movebeyondthethird
tradition? Does thistellus something different aboutthehistoryof American
politicalsciencein themidtwentieth century?
Thisraisesa moregeneralquestionaboutthe10 politicalscientists, as rep-
resentatives of the"thirdtradition," leavingaside politicalscienceas a whole.
The pairof behavioralists-Keyand Truman-seemto be at odds oversome-
thingas fundamental as whetherto trustcitizensor elites,not onlybetween
themselvesbut each withhis formerself: Key turning coat to trustcitizens;
Truman,elites.Bentley'sstriking antistatism and Beard'santicapitalism seem
hardlysupportive ordefinitive oftheliberalthirdtradition, andmoreoftheradi-
cal secondtradition whichtracesits paternity back to ThomasPaine. And the
"strangepopulismof thefounder of Americansociology,"LesterWard,is not
onlydrastically out of character withWoodrowWilson,buthe is occasionally
describedby theauthorsas a "radicaldemocrat,"whichis theverydescription
givento thesecondtradition (p. 38). Atthispoint,thequestiondoes notseemto
be merelya typological Intowhich"tradition"
one: do these10, orother,politi-
cal scientistsfit?
Rather, itseems to be whether the third traditionreallyexistsor
everexisted.WhileDisenchanted Realistsdoes notfallvictimto themostevi-

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 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1193

dentmythsassociatedwiththeidea of a tradition (see Skinner,1969; Gunnell,

1979), it does notsucceedin establishing theboundaries or datesor champions
associatedwiththethreeso-called; traditions,especiallythethird.
If it wereto turnoutthatthebeginning and theend of theso-calledthird
tradition werebutliterary eventsof a book, nothing muchwouldhangon it as
regardsthehistory of politicalscienceor the-powerof DisenchantedRealists.
Liberalreform helpedframemuchofthepoliticalidentity of Americanpolitical
science,and thedisillusionment, whichits perceivedand real failureshelped
bringon, is partof thehistory of politicalsciencesincethelatenineteenth cen-
tury,"traditions" notwithstanding. Ifliberalism,likecapitalism,provesmorere-
silientin thefaceofthefuture thansomehavesuggested andothershavefeared,
it will requirea shotof optimismpresently absentfrompoliticalscience.As
Seidelmanand Harphamrightly note-and in facthelpto bringabout-we do
needmore"self-examination within thepoliticalsciencediscipline"(p. xix),the
rekindling of whichcan finditsair,ifnotitsheat,in thehistory ofpoliticalsci-
ence itself.
6
Inattention to thehistoryof politicalsciencehas clearlycome to an end.
Thanksin goodpartto theauthorsoftheworksdiscussedhere,politicalscience
in BritainandAmericain thenineteenth andtwentieth centuries has once again
becomean objectworthy of serioushistoriographical andcriticalattention. Stu-
dentsof politicalsciencewill doubtlessfindthingsto criticizein theseworks,
andI havetriedto suggestsomeof thosethings,in particular thenarrative de-
vicesoffered byparadigms, tragedy, andtraditions. Buttheinevitable criticisms
aside,students ofpoliticalscienceareluckyto findsuchdiversity in thesehisto-
rians:in criticslikeSeidelmanand Harpham;in a reflective moraltheorist like
Ricci; in a chronicler of significant theorieslike Janos;in intellectual histo-
riographers likeCollini,Winch,andBurrow.Anddespitetheirverymanydiffer-
ences,something of a compositeimageof politicalscience,past and present,
emergesfromtheircollectiveefforts.
Politicalscienceappearsfromtheverybeginning, howeverwe datethat,to
be a diverseand pluralistic enterprise,eventhoughit cannotbe said to display
genuinetheoretical progress. It sustainscrisisaftercrisisinitstheoriesandmeth-
ods, anditis fullyinvolvedwiththepoliticalcrisesoftheworldaroundit,espe-
ciallythoseattendant to liberalism and democracy. Politicallyand scientifically,
politicalscienceharborsan alienpast,a tragicor disenchanted present,and an
unknown future.Otherrecenthistorians of politicalsciencehavedrawnsimilar
conclusions. David Easton(1985) has observedthat"therearenowso manyap-
proachesto politicalresearchthatpoliticalscienceseemsto have lost its pur-
pose" (p. 143). JohnGunnelltoo has noteda "dispersion"of politicalscience
and drawnan equallyanomicconclusion."Archaeologicalanalysistendsto

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1194 JamesFarr

produceskepticism, sinceit demonstrates theinevitabilityof mortalityand the

demiseof thepresent.Diggingintothepastof Americanpoliticalscienceis no
exception"(in Finifter, 1983,pp. 5, 38).
Thisis nota comforting imageofpoliticalscience,andforthatreasonsome
politicalscientists
willresistit or seekto reinterpret
it or eventryto changeit.
Butto do thisis to engagein thesamegeneralenterprise. Thatis, writing a his-
toryof politicalscience,albeita differentone, willproveto be themostappro-
priateresponsefromthosewhowishto see something else prevailoverthisdis-
comforting imageofourdiscipline.The diggingwillcontinue.In themeantime
we shouldall agree thatthe varioushistorians of politicalsciencediscussed
abovehaveraisedandtriedto answersomebroaderquestionsthatarewellworth
raisingandtrying to answer:How haveotherswritten andhowshouldwe write
aboutthehistory ofpoliticalscience?What,ifanything, mightwe learnfromthe
politicalscienceofthenineteenth century orearlier?Whatis therelation,ifany,
betweenpoliticalscience'sless-remote past,itspresentstate,anditsfuture pros-
pects?Whatis or shouldbe scientific aboutpoliticalscience?Whatis or should
be politicalaboutpoliticalscience?The identity of politicalsciencedepends
upontheanswerswe giveto thesequestions,and sinceouranswersineluctably
willinvolvejudgments aboutthehistory ofourdiscipline,we can see in conclu-
sionhowouridentity dependsuponhowwe understand ourhistory.

Manuscriptsubmitted21 July1987
Final manuscript
received4 April1988

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