Cabrera vs Tiano
within which to file the action had not yet elapsed
FACTS: Ciriaco Potestas and Gregoria Blanco, parents of 5 children, Isabelo,
Lourdes, Clemente, Josefina, and Cresencia.
Gregoria died before the 2nd world war, together with Clemente, single.
During their lifetime, the spouses acquired properties,
among which was a parcel of agricultural land, of about 7 hectares. On July 2,
1947, Ciriaco, the surviving husband and 3
children (Isabelo, Lourdes and Cresencia), purportedly sold the above
mentioned parcel to defendant Mariano Tiano, for
P3,500.00. At the time of the sale, Cresencia was a minor, and the other child,
Josefina, did not sign the deed of sale, and did
not know about the transaction.
On June 20, 1957, an action for "Partition and Recovery of Real Estate,
with Damages" was filed by Josefina and Cresencia
against Tiano. In the complaint, it was alleged that they were entitled to a
portion of the land, since Josefina did not sign the
sale and Crescencia was a minor; that defendant Tiano had usurped the
portions belonging to them, to their damage and
prejudice.
As a Special Defense, defendant alleged that he was the absolute owner of the
land by acquisitive prescription of 10 years, from
the date of purchase. Before the trial, parties agreed to the fact that the
plaintiffs commenced this case on June 20, 1957 and
the judicial summons was issued by the Clerk of Court on June 21, 1957, but
defendant received the same on July 2, 1957.
The court a quo rendered the following judgment: “plaintiffs are entitled each
to 1/8 of the property in question and therefore
Judgment is hereby ordered declaring them entitled to partition the property in
question in proportion of 1/8 each of them,
plus damages for both of them in the amount of P1,000.00 and attorney's
fees in the amount of P200.00.”
Defendant moved for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that
prescription had already set in, and his (defendant's)
title, had become irrevocable. The MR was denied on March 5, 1960. The
Commissioner's report, partitioning the property was
submitted on April 11, 1960. Defendant perfected his appeal on May 9, 1960,
and on May 14, 1960, the same was given due
course and elevated to this Court.
Issue: Did prescription already set in, making Tiano’s title irrevocable?
Ruling:
In claiming that prescription had taken place, appellant insists that the period
should be counted from the date the summons
was served on him, which was on July 2, 1957. It was agreed, however, that
the complaint for the recovery of the land in
question was presented on June 20, 1957, and the summons was sent out the
following day. The Civil Code, provides that—
The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court,
when there is a written extra-judicial
demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of
the debt of the debtor. (Art. 1155)
Since the sale of the property took place on July 2, 1947, the 10 year period
on June 20, 1957, when the complaint was presented. The established is that
the commencement of the suit prior to the
expiration of the applicable limitation period, interrupts the running of the
statute, as to all parties to the action. The fact that
summons was only served on defendant on July 2, 1957, which incidentally
and/or coincidentally was the end of the ten 10 year
period, is of no moment, since civil actions are deemed commenced from date
of the filing and docketing of the complaint with
the Clerk of Court, without taking into account the issuance and service of
summons. The contention that the period was not
interrupted, until after defendant received the summons is, therefore, without
legal basis.
Defendant-appellant claims that he had already acquired full ownership of the
property in question because the judicial
summons, which could civilly interrupt his possession was received by him
only on July 2, 1957. Conceding, for the purposes of
argument, that the article cited is applicable, still appellant cannot avail
himself of acquisitive prescription, for the simple
reason that no finding was made by the trial court that his possession from the
time of the sale (July 2, 1947), was with just
title, in good faith, in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted. Good faith and just title must also
be proved. The factual requisite of adverse possession do not appear in the
stipulation of facts and the trial court did not make
findings to this effect. These circumstances could and/or should have been
ventilated, had the appeal been taken to the Court
of Appeals. Defendant, however, having chosen to appeal the decision directly
to this Court, he is deemed to have waived
questions of fact and raised only questions of law. There being no factual
finding by the lower court of the presence of the
requisites of acquisitive prescription this Court has to reject, as did the trial
court, said defense. Moreover, on July 2, 1957,
when the summons was received, the 10 years necessary for acquisitive
prescription had not yet elapsed. In fact, said period
terminated on that very day.
Decision affirmed.
Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a
decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the
Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In
addition, PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc.,
however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although
from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50
million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The
complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent
re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding
docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private
respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?
YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period.
Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the
government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a
more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike
in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.
JOE HODGES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF LEON
P. GELLADA, plaintiff-appellee in Civil Case No. 6512, ROMEO
MEDIODIA, plaintiff-appellant in Civil Case No. 6513, and HEIRS OF
FERNANDO MIRASOL, plaintiff-appellee in Civil Case No.
6516, Respondents.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NO-PAYMENT OF DOCKET
FEE; LEGAL EFFECT. — As early as Lazaro v. Endencia, [57 Phil. 552
(1932)] this Court held that an appeal is not deemed perfected if the appellate
court docket fee is not fully paid. In Lee v. Republic, [10 SCRA 65 (1964)]
this Court ruled that a declaration of intention to be a Filipino citizen
produced no legal effect until the required filing fee is paid. In Malimit v.
Degamo, [12 SCRA 450 (1964)] We held that the date of payment of the
docket fee must be considered the real date of filing of a petition for quo
warranto and not the date it was mailed. In Magaspi v. Ramolete, [115 SCRA
193, 204 (1982)] the well-settled rule was reiterated that a case is deemed
filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filling in court. At the time, therefore, that the three (3) cases subject of the
herein petition were filed, the rule was already clear that the court does not
acquire jurisdiction over a case until after the prescribed docket is paid. In
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 562
(1987), this rule was emphasized when this Court stated "The court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amount sought in the amended pleading." The rule in Manchester was relaxed
in Sun Insurance v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, whereby this Court declared
that the trial court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but
in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Nevertheless, in Sun Insurance, this Court reiterated the rule that it is the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests the trial Court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT DOES NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER
THE SUBJECT MATTER; CASE AT BAR. — In the present petition, it
appears that in the case of Gellada v. Hodges the total amount of the claim for
damages is about P460,000.00, the estimated docket fee due is P770.00 but
what was paid only was P32.00. Despite the order of the trial court on August
31, 1972 and another order ten years later, that is on March 11, 1982,
requiring plaintiff to pay the correct docket fee, Gellada paid the amount of
P168.00 only. Thus his total payment amounts to just P200.00, which is still
much less than the amount of P770.00 due. Similarly, in Mediodia v. Hodges
where the claim is approximately P360,000.00 and the appropriate filing fee
would be about P570.00, the plaintiff paid only P32.00 upon filing the
complaint. After the two aforesaid orders of the trial Court were issued,
Mediodia paid on September 5, 1982 the amount of P168.00 bringing his
payment to a total of P200.00 which is also much less than the amount of
P570.00 due for docket fee. Thus, the entire proceedings undertaken in said
cases are null and void. The plaintiffs in said cases are practicing lawyers who
are expected to know this mandatory requirement in the filing of any
complaint or similar pleading. Their non-payment of the prescribed docket fee
was deliberate and inexcusable.
SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE
LEON, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO MA.
ELAYDA II, FEDERICO ELAYDA and DANILO
ELAYDA, Respondents.
(Civil Procedure – Jurisdiction, Civil action not capable of pecuniary
estimation, Docket Fees)
Facts: Private respondents filed in the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two parcels of land against
petitioners. Private respondents paid the docket fee of a flat rate of P400.00 as
provided in Rule 141, par 7 (b)(1) of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction by the trial court by reason of private respondents’ non-payment
of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners argue that an action for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is a real action
and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be paid by private respondent
should be based either on the assessed value of the property, subject matter of
the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the
last paragraph of par 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in
Rule 141, par 7(b)(1).
The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss but required private
respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of
the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.
The Court of Appeals held that an action for rescission or annulment of
contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket
fees should not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter of
the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded
Issue: WON in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action
for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property,
should be used as basis.
Held: No. The action for annulment or rescission is considered as one which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation.
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of
the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated
in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
Manchester Development vs Court of Appeals
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development
Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter
to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that
City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction
thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This
amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated
in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00
only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their
action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees
hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but
what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said
amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.
HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original
complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the
proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no
complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly
filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in
consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific
performance is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the
allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages
and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already
provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly
constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop
the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court
ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall
be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading
that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted,
or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
CITIZENS’ SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v.
HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, SANTIAGO DACANAY,
and JOSEFINA DACANAY, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ACTION IN PERSONAM;
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS REQUIRED. — We agree with
respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the
Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant,
absent a personal service of summons within the forum. We have explicitly so
ruled in Pantaleon v. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 765, pointing out without such
personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be
violative of due process. In the aforecited case this Court, through Justice
Roberto Concepcion, now Chief Justice, ruled as follows: . . . "It is a well-
settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam,
like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does
not voluntary submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words,
summons by publication cannot — consistently with the due process clause in
the Bill of Rights — confer upon the court jurisdiction over said
defendants.’Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal
judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to
determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service
within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the
constitutional requirement of due process. . . .’Although a state legislature has
more control over the form of service on its own residents than nonresidents,
it has been held that in actions in personam . . . service by publication on
resident defendants who are personally within the state and can be found
therein is not "due process of law," and statute allowing it is unconstitutional.’
(16A C.J.S., pp. 786, 789; Emphasis our)"
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CREDITORS;
REMEDY AGAINST ABSCONDING DEBTORS. — The proper recourse
for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or
personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause
them to be attached under Rule 57, Sec. l(f), in which case, the enactment
converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons
by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective But
because debtors who abscond and conceal themselves are also quite adept at
concealing their properties, the dismissal of the case below by respondent
Judge should be set aside and the case held pending in the court’s archives,
until petitioner as plaintiff succeed in determining the whereabouts of the
defendants’ person or properties and causes valid summons to be served
personally or by publication as the case may be. In this manner, the tolling of
the period of prescription for as long as the debtor remains in hiding would
properly be a matter of court record, and he can not emerge after a sufficient
lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to profit from his own misdeed
and claim prescription of his just debt.
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. ESTEBAN
ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC.,
1.REAL AND PERSONAL ACTI ON; FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
AFTER
OBTAI NI NG A PERSONAL J UDGMENT; WAI VER. — Most of the
provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure are taken from that of California, and I n that
jurisdiction the rule has always been, and still is, that a party who sues and
obtains a personal judgment against a defendant upon a note, waives thereby
his right to foreclose the mortgage securing it.
2.I D.; I D.; I D.; RULE FOUNDED ON STATUTORY PROVI SI ONS. — I
t is true
that this rule is founded on express statutory provisions to that effect. I n this
jurisdiction, section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a
creditor
holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other
collateral security, has to elect between enforcing such security or abandoning
it by presenting his claim before the committee and share in the general
assets of the estate. Under this provision, it has been uniformly held by this
court that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he
waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly.
3.I D.; I D.; I D.; PRI NCI PLE FOLLOWED I N ORDI NARY ACTI ONS.
— There is
indeed no valid reason for not following the same principle of procedure in
ordinary civil actions. With the substitution of the administrator or executor in
place of the deceased, or of the assignee or receiver in place of the insolvent
debtor, the position of the parties plaintiff and' defendant in the litigation is
exactly the same in special or insolvency proceedings as in ordinary civil
actions.
4.I D.; I D.; I D.; RULE AGAI NST SPLI TTI NG A SI NGLE CAUSE OF
ACTI ON. —
Even if section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or section 59 of the
I nsolvency Law were not in the attitude books, there is still the rule against
splitting a single cause of action. This rule, though not contained in duly
statutory provision, has been applied by this court in all appropriate cases. The
rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated
litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of
controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the
costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." (1 C. J ., 1107.) I t comes
from
that old maximum nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa (no man
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shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). And it developed, certainly
not as an original legal right of the defendant, but as an interposition of courts
upon principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship
incident
to repeated and unnecessary litigations. (1 C. J ., 1107.)
5.I D.; I D.; I D.; I D. — For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage,
the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause
of
action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. I n
other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment
of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from
the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they
constitute a single cause of action.
6.I D.; I D.; I D.; I D. — Though the debt and the mortgage constitute
separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to
one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of
action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the
rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a
complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage. I f he does so, the filing of the first complaint will
bar the subsequent complaint.
7.I D.; I D.; I D.; I D. — BY allowing the creditor to file two separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, the court would in effect, be authorizing
him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts
and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor. I n the absence of
express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the
mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose
the mortgage.
8.I D.; I D.; I D.; I D. — A rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a
personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another
action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of
suits so offensive to justice, but also in subjecting the defendant to the
vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the
plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.
9.I D., I D.; I D.; I D. — The creditor's cause of action is not only single but
indivisible, although the agreements of the parties, evidenced by the note and
the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different remedies. (Frost vs. Witter,
132 Cal., 421.) The cause of action should not be confused with the remedy
created for its enforcement. And considering, that one of the two remedies
available to the creditor is as complete as the other, he cannot be allowed to
pursue both in violation of those principles of procedure intended to secure
simple, speedy, and unexpensive administration of justice.
I NDUSTRI AL FI NANCE CORP ORATI ONI NDUSTRI AL FI NANCE case. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the
CORP ORATI ON, petitioner, vs .vs . HON. SE RG I O A HON. SE RG I remedy of
O AF. AP OSTOL, Jud g e o f t he Co ur t o f Fi r s t I ns t anc e o f Ri zal certiorari is not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of law, or
, B r anc hF. AP OSTOL, Jud g e o f t he Co ur t o f Fi r s t I ns t anc e o f where the error
Ri zal , B r anc h is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are
1.CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTIONS; MORTGAGE; REAL those
ESTATE; REMEDY OF already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court. In its
MORTGAGE CREDITOR; ACTION TO RECOVER BARS FURTHER motion for
REMEDY. — In Manila dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC, petitioner raised the ground
Trading and Supply Co. v. Co Kim and So Tek, we declared: "The rule is now that
settled that a another action for forcible entry was pending at the METC between the same
mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an parties
ordinary action to involving the same matter and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the
recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all RTC, the same
the properties issue was elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
of the debtor, including the subject-matter of the mortgage, subject to the Clearly, under
qualification the prevailing circumstance, any motion for reconsideration of the trial court
that if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the would have
remedy he has been a pointless exercise.
waived." The highest Court also directed the RTC of Quezon City to dismiss the
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — By instituting Civil Case No. Q- complaint for
14417 in the Court of damages filed before it by private respondent on the ground of forum
First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) to recover the unpaid balance on the shopping and for
promissory note unduly splitting a single cause of action which run counter to the rule against
from the Padilla spouses and by subsequently obtaining a judgment in its multiplicity of
favor, petitioner suits.
IFC is considered to have abandoned its mortgage lien on the subject property SYLLAB USSYLLAB US
covered by CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133625. The end result is the discharge of 1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI;
the real estate MOTION FOR
mortgage and the Delmendos, having purchased the mortgaged property, RECONSIDERATION MUST BE FILED BEFORE RESORTING
automatically THERETO; EXCEPTIONS. —
step into the shoes of the original mortgagors with every right to have the title While generally a motion for reconsideration first be filed before resorting to
delivered to certiorari in
them free from said encumbrance. order to give the lower court an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it,
this rule
G.R. No. 123555. January 22, 1999.] admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the
P ROG RE SSI VE DE VE LOP ME NT CORP ORATI ON, I NC.P ROG circumstances of the case. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before
RE SSI VE DE VE LOP ME NT CORP ORATI ON, I NC. , petitioner, vsvs availing of
.. the remedy of certiorari is not sine que non when the issue raised is one purely
COURT OF AP P E ALS and WE STI N SE AFOOD MARK E T, I of law, or
NC.COURT OF AP P E ALS and WE STI N SE AFOOD MARK E T, I NC. where the error is patent or the disputed order is void or the questions raised
, on certiorari
respondents. are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the
Angara Abello Concepcion Regala for petitioner lower court.
Tomas Carmelo T. Araneta for private respondent. In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner
SYNOP SI SSYNOP SI S raised the
Private respondent, Westin Seafood Market, Inc., failed to pay its rentals ground that another action for forcible entry was pending at the MeTC
amounting to between the same
P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted breach of their parties involving the same matter and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by
contract; the RTC, the
thus, pursuant to the express authority granted petitioner under the lease same issue was elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of
agreement, Appeals. Clearly,
petitioner repossessed the leased premises. This prompted private respondent under the prevailing circumstance, any motion for reconsideration of the trial
to file a court would
complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with damages before the MTC have been a pointless exercise.
of Quezon 2. ID.; ID.; FORCIBLE ENTRY OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER; NO
City. This case was still pending before the MTC when private respondent CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
instituted before ARISING THERETO MAY BE FILED SEPARATELY AND
the RTC of Quezon City another action for damages against petitioner, which INDEPENDENTLY OF CLAIM FOR
the latter RESTORATION OF POSSESSION. — Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
moved to dismiss on the ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping to no Court provides that
avail. The any person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
same fate awaited petitioner before the Court of Appeals which dismissed his intimidation, threat,
special civil strategy or stealth, or against whom the possession of any land or building is
action for certiorari and prohibition due to the failure of petitioner to file a unlawfully
motion for withheld, may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
reconsideration of the RTC order. Hence, petitioner found its way to the person or
Supreme Court on persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, together with
petition for review on certiorari. CaEATI damages and
The Supreme Court found merit to the petition. The Court held that while costs. The mandate under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible
generally a entry or
motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall
order to give include not only
the lower court an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it, this rule the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs
admits of arising
exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible
circumstances of the entry or
unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for Court of Quezon City contained no certification of non-forum shopping.
restoration of When petitioner
possession. filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum
3. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. — Res shopping it
adjudicata requires that pointed out the absence of the required certification. The amended complaint,
there must be between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action as well as
the the second and third amended complaints, attempted to rectify the error by
following elements: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the invariably
same stating that there was no other action pending between the parties involving
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the the same
relief being cause of action although there was actually a forcible entry case pending
founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) preceding before the MTC
particulars should of Quezon City. By its admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is
be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, obvious that private
regardless of respondent was indulging in forum shopping. While private respondent
which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under conveniently failed
consideration. to inform the RTC that it had likewise sought damages in the MTC on the
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN basis of the
CASE AT BAR AROSE same forcible entry, the fact remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem
FROM ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION. — It is likewise basic under Sec. was being
3 of Rule 2 of the duplicated in the second case. This is a compelling reason to dismiss the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party may not institute more than second case. IaH
one suit for a
single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are G.R. No. L-46000. March 18, 1985.]
instituted on G LI CE RI O AG USTI N ( Dec eas ed ) as Ad mi ni s t r at o r o f t he I nt
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the es t at eG LI CE RI O AG USTI N ( Dec eas ed ) as Ad mi ni s t r at o r o f t
merits in he I nt es t at e
any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or others. E s t at e o f Sus ana Ag us t i nE s t at e o f Sus ana Ag us t i n , petitioner-
"Cause of action" plaintiff-appellant, vs .vs . LAURE ANO LAURE ANO
is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates B ACALAN and t he P ROVI NCI AL SHE RI FF OF CE B UB ACALAN
a right of and t he P ROVI NCI AL SHE RI FF OF CE B U ,
another. These premises obtaining, there is no question at all that private respondents-defendants-appellees.
respondent's SYLLAB USSYLLAB US
cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is the 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; COUNTERCLAIM; GRANT OF
alleged illegal MORAL DAMAGES
retaking of possession of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, AS COUNTERCLAIM, UPHELD. — A defending party may set up a claim
from which for money or any
all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the restoration of possession and demand other relief which he may have against the opposing party in a counterclaim
for actual (Section 6,
damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand for damages with the Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). And the court may, if warranted, grant
RTC both actual, moral, or
arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by petitioner into exemplary damages as prayed for. The grant of moral damages, in the case at
the leased bar, as a
premises. counterclaim, and not as damages for the unlawful detention of property must
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5. ID.; ID.; MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS; CASE AT BAR RUNS COUNTER However, the amount thereof is another matter.
THERETO. — A 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COUNTERCLAIM BEYOND COURT'S JURISDICTION
comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent MAY ONLY BE
against petitioner PLEADED BY WAY OF DEFENSE. — It is well-settled that a court has no
before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res jurisdiction to hear
adjudicata and determine a set-off or counterclaim in excess of its jurisdiction (Section 5,
present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is Rule 5,
concerned, Revised Rules of Court; Ago v. Buslon, 10 SCRA 202). A counterclaim
but also that the claim for damages — moral and exemplary in addition to beyond the court's
actual and jurisdiction may only be pleaded by way of defense, the purpose of which,
compensatory — constitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs however, is only
counter to to defeat or weaken plaintiff's claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief
the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action (Section 5, Rule 5,
becomes Revised Rules of Court).
imperative. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO CONTRADICT COURT'S
6. ID.; ID.; SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION; PURPOSE IS TO JURISDICTION CONSTITUTES
PROTECT WAIVER. — An appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the
DEFENDANT FROM UNNECESSARY VEXATION. — A claim cannot be Court of Appeals
divided in such a way for decision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision is
that a part of the amount of damages may be recovered in one case and the rendered therein,
rest, in should be considered as having voluntarily waives so much of his claim as
another. In Bachrach v. Icarangal we explained that the rule was aimed at would exceed
preventing the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule
repeated litigations between the same parties in regard to the same subject of would encourage
the the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the
controversy and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo Court of
debet bis Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its
vexari pro una et eadem cause. jurisdiction
7. ID.; ID.; FORUM SHOPPING COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. — — should the decision be unfavorable. Thus, by presenting his claim voluntarily
The records before the
ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private respondent with the City Court of Cebu, the defendant-appellee submitted the same to the
Regional Trial jurisdiction of the
court. He became bound thereby. The amount of P10,000.00 being the Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded judgment in favor of the
jurisdictional defendant-appellee in
amount assigned the City Court of Cebu, whose jurisdiction the defendant- excess of its appellate jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the
appellee has maximum allowable
invoked, he is thereby deemed to have waived the excess of his claim beyond award of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such being
P10,000.00. the case, an
It is as though the defendant-appellee had set up a counterclaim in the amount action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the plaintiff-appellant
of before the
P10,000.00 only. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper remedy. The nullity of
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; A COUNTERCLAIM NOT PRESENTED IN LOWER such portion of
COURT CANNOT BE the decision in question, however, is not such as to affect the conclusions
ENTERTAINED ON APPEAL. — A counter-claim not presented in the reached by the
inferior court cannot court in the main case for ejectment. As held in Vda. de Pamintuan v. Tiglao
be entertained in the Court of First Instance on appeal (Francisco, The (53 Phil. 1)
Revised Rules of where the amount set up by the defendant was not proper as a defense and it
Court in the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 26, citing the cases of Bernardo v. exceeded
Genato, 11 Phil. 603 the inferior court's jurisdiction, it cannot be entertained therein, but the court's
and Yu Lay v. Galmes, 40 Phil. 651). As explained in Yu Lay v. Galmes — jurisdiction
"Upon an appeal to over the main action will remain unaffected. Consequently, the decision over
a court of first instance from the judgment of a justice of the peace, it is not the main
possible, action, in the case at bar, must stand, best remembering that a counterclaim,
without changing the purpose of the appeal, to alter the nature of the question by its very
raised by nature, is a cause of action separate and independent from the plaintiff's claim
the complaint and the answer in the original action. There can be no doubt, against the defendant.
therefore, of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com G.R. No. 83545. August 11, 1989.]
scope of the doctrine laid down in the several decisions of the Court. ADELFO MACEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
Consequently, We CEMENT CENTER, INC., respondents.
hold that, upon an appeal to the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff as well as Charles S. Anastacio for petitioner.
the F.M. Carpio & Associates for private respondent.
defendant cannot file any pleading or allegation which raises a question SYLLABUS
essentially distinct 1. REMEDI AL LAW; J URI SDI CTI ON; METROPOLI TAN TRI AL
from that raised and decided in the justice of the peace court." This rule was COURTS; SECTI ON
reiterated in 33 B.P. BLG. 129; COUNTERCLAI M I N THE MUNI CI PAL OR CI TY
cases from Ng Cho Cio v. Ng Diong (1 SCRA 275) to Development Bank of COURT BEYOND
the Philippines J URI SDI CTI ONAL LI MI T MAYBE PLEADED ONLY BY WAY OF
v. Court of Appeals (116 SCRA 636). Thus, the defendant-appellee's DEFENSE. — The
counterclaim beyond jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in a civil action for sum of money
P10,000.00, the jurisdictional amount of the City Court of Cebu, should be is
treated as limited to a demand that "does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of
having been deemed waived. It is as though it has never been brought before interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind." (Sec. 33,
trial court. It subpart.
may not be entertained on appeal. 1, B.P. Blg. 129.) A counterclaim limit may be pleaded only by way of
5. ID.; JURISDICTION; AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT ON APPEAL defense to
CANNOT EXCEED THE waken the plaintiff's claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief. (Agustin vs.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF ORIGIN. — The amount of judgment, Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340).
therefore, obtained 2. CI VI L LAW; CONTRACTS; LEASE; NO MERE LESSEE CAN CLAI
by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the M TO BE A
court in which POSSESSOR I N GOOD FAI TH. — Maceda was not a possessor in good
the action began. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the faith, i.e.,
defendant's one who possesses in concept of an owner, hence, he had no right to retain
counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, possession of the leased premises pending reimbursement of his
likewise, acquired improvements
no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise. Appellate thereon. No more lessee can claim to be a possessor in good faith. (Art. 546,
jurisdiction being not Civil
only a continuation of the exercise of the same judicial power which has been Code; Eusebio vs. I AC, 144 SCRA 154; Laureano vs. Adil, 72 SCRA 148.)
executed in 3. I D.; I D.; I D.; MERE PROMI SE NOT RECORDED ON TI TLE DOES
the court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original and NOT
appellate courts ENCUMBER PROPERTY; CASE AT BAR. — Since the undertaking of the
are capable of participating in the exercise of the same judicial power (See 2 Victorias to
Am. Jur. 850; reimburse Maceda for the P40,000 worth of improvements which he
Stacey Cheese Company v. R.E. Pipkin, Appt. 155 NC 394, 71 S.E. 442, 37 introduced
LRA 606) It is the on their property was not recorded on their title, that promise not encumber
essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the the
proceedings in a property nor bind the purchaser thereof or the successor-in-interest of the
cause already instituted, and does not create that cause (See 2 Am. Jur 850 Victorias (Mun. of Victorias vs. Ca, 149 SCRA 32).
citing Marbury 4. I D.; I D.; I D.; B.P. BLG. 877; GROUNDS FOR J UDI CI AL EJ
v. Madison, 1 Cranch US, 137, 2 L. ed. 60). ECTMENT. — While
6. ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF PROCEEDINGS WHERE COURT EXCEED ITS it is true under B.P. Blg. 877 a lessee may not be ejected on account of the
JURISDICTION; sale or mortgage of the leased premises, the new owner's need of the premises
CASE AT BAR. — It is, of course, a well-settled rule that when court for the construction of dwellings for its employees, coupled with the lessee's
transcends the limits failure to pay the rentals since December 1981, are, to our mind, a legitimate
prescribed for it by law and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its ground for the judicial ejectment of the lessee.
adjudications
will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or otherwise (Planas G.R. No. L-53564. February 27, 1987.]
v. Collector JUAN BAYANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
of Internal Revenue, 3 SCRA 395; Paredes v. Moya, 61 SCRA 526). The BENIGNO BIONG, respondents.
Court of First Rodrigo Matutina for petitioner.
Luceniano E. Lancin for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDI AL LAW; CI VI L PROCEDURE; SUMMARY J UDGMENT;
PROPER
WHERE NO SERI OUS CONTROVERSY EXI STS; CASE AT BAR. — I n
its decision, the
Court of Appeals quoted the following excerpt from Singleton vs. Philippine
Trust
Co. on the nature and functions of the summary judgment: "Summary
judgment
is one of the methods sanctioned in the present Rules of Court for a prompt
disposition of civil actions wherein there exists no serious controversy. The
procedure may be availed of not only by claimants, but also by defending
parties
who may be the object of unfounded claims. A motion for summary judgment
assumes that scrutinizing of the facts will disclose that the issues presented by
the pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently unsubstantial as
not
to be genuine issues, or that there is no genuine issue to any material facts or
where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and affidavits." We hold that there was no genuine or triable issue
of
fact raised by the parties, in view particularly of the affirmative defense of res
judicata invoked by the private respondent. That defense is sustained
2. I D.; I D.; RES JUDICATA; ELEMENTS. — A long line of decisions has
consistently held that for res judicata to apply: a) the former judgment must be
final; b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and d)
there must be between the first case and second case identity of parties,
identity
of subject matter and identity of cause of action.
3. I D.; I D.; I D.; I D.; CASE AT BAR. — The decision in Civil Case No.
1892
became final and executory on February 2, 1978. There is no dispute that the
trial court which rendered that decision had jurisdiction over the subject-
matter
and the parties to the proceeding. The case was tried on the merits. The parties
to Civil Case No. 1892 and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are the same
petitioner and private respondent now before us. The petitioner would draw a
distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892 and the income
from that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589. But that is in our view
splitting hairs to split a cause of action. The subject matter is essentially the
same in both cases as the income is only a consequence or accessory of the
disputed property. Clearly, then, Civil Case No. 2589 is barred by the previous
judgment in Civil Case No. 1892. This being so, it should follow that the trial
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in deciding the latter case by
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summary judgment.