NOTE: These are only suggested answers.
You contempt power and exercise it beyond legal
may have a different take on the question or a
different presentation of the underlying premises.
The most important consideration here is you
should be able to justify your answers and to offer
plausible arguments and legal bases for your
responses.
1. No, the argument of Beauty is not
meritorious.
The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Lower
House (§17, Art. VI). To be considered a
member of the Lower House, a Congressman-
elect must have been validly proclaimed, has
taken oath and has assumed office (Reyes v.
Comelec). Her assumption of office coincides
with the beginning of her term at noon on the
30th day of June next following the election
(§4, Art. VI).
In this case, the actions of the COMELEC in
the disqualification case – from the decision to
the declaration that the decision had become
final – were done prior to noon of June 30,
2013, the beginning of the 2013-2016 term.
During this period, it was the COMELEC and
not the HRET that had jurisdiction over the
case.
Thus, the argument of Beauty is not
meritorious.
2. The claim is only partially correct.
The Senate is a continuing body. It does not
cease to exist upon the periodic dissolution of
Congress (Arnault v. Nazareno). The Senate as
an institution is not dissolved as an entity with
each national election or change in the
composition of its members. (Neri v. Senate
Committee). However, even if it is a
continuing body, the Senate may not abuse its
bounds, especially the limitations found in the
Bill of Rights.
In this case, the Senate argued that as a
continuing body, it can detain Strongwill
indefinitely. There is no dispute on the first
part of the argument (Senate as continuing
body). However, the second part (indefinite
detention) is not correct as this amounts to
deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. In other words, the Senate, although a
continuing body, would be violating the Bill of
Rights, especially the due process clause, if it
detains Strongwill indefinitely.
Thus, the claim of the Senate is only partially
correct.
3. No, Rosebud is not disqualified to run by
reason of citizenship.
No person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he/she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Meanwhile, a woman that
marries a foreigner, whose national law
automatically deems her as its own citizen,
does not thereby lose her natural-born Filipino
citizenship. Her being considered a citizen of
the country of her husband is by operation of
law and not because of her renunciation of her
Filipino citizenship.
In this case, there is no indication that
Rosebud renounced her Filipino citizenship.
From the point of view of Philippine law, she
is still considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Therefore, she is not disqualified to run by
reason of citizenship.
4. No, the Preamble neither confers rights nor
imposes duties. It merely indicates the
authorship of the Constitution, enumerates the
aims and aspirations of its framers and the
people that ratify it, and serves as an aid in
constitutional construction.
Thus, the Preamble of the Constitution is not a
source of a positive right that may be invoked
as constitutional basis of the position of the
religious groups.
5. Bayad Muna may still run as a party-list
group in the 2016 elections.
No member of the House of Representatives
shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. In the context of the party-list system,
the word “member” refers to the nominee of
the party-list group that sits as its
representative in the House, not to the group
itself. Thus, although the party-list
representative sitting as member of the House
may not serve for more than three consecutive
terms, the party-list group itself may
continually join the party-list elections.
In this case, Bayad Muna participated and won
a party-list seat in the election of 2007, 2010
and 2013 elections. In order to be able to join
the 2016 elections, its nominees must not have
served for three consecutive terms.
Thus, subject to the foregoing condition,
Bayad Muna may still run as a party-list group
in the 2016 elections.
6. No, the Senate may not validly modify the
SET rule.
The Electoral Tribunals of each House of
Congress shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members
(§17, Art. VI). This power, including the
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure,
is exclusive and may not be shared or
exercised by the concerned House (Angara v.
Electoral Commission).
In this case, the Senate majority modified a
rule of the SET, not a rule of the Senate itself.
Therefore, the Senate may not validly modify
the SET rule.
7. No, the contention of AA is not correct.
The Constitution provides that the state shall
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law (§26, Art. II). This provision is not self-
executing; it requires an implementing
legislation.
In this case, AA contends that BB’s candidacy
violates the constitutional policy against
political dynasties. AA fails to consider,
however, that as of now there is yet no law
defining political dynasties.
Ergo, the contention of AA is not correct.
8. I will tell YY that he cannot anymore run
as Senator in the 2016 elections.
The Constitution provides that no Senator shall
serve for more than two consecutive terms. A
senatorial term lasts for six years beginning at
noon on the 30th day of June next following
the election (§4, Art. VI) and ends at the start
of the immediately succeeding term.
In this case, YY served as Senator for two
consecutive terms – the 2004-2010 and 2010-
2016 terms. Although his tenure during the
2004-2010 term was only for a few months
before the 2010 elections, he is deemed to
have served that term as his first senatorial
term. If he runs and wins again in 2016, this
will already be his third consecutive term.
Hence, I will tell YY that he cannot anymore
run as Senator in the 2016 elections.
9. Chan Sing’s submission is not correct.
During a belligerent occupation, there is no
such thing as suspended allegiance.
Sovereignty remains vested with the de jure
government even if the occupant has
established a de facto government. Corollarily,
the people continue to owe their allegiance to
the rightful government (Laurel v. Misa).
In this case, Chan Sing, a Filipino, argued that
he did not commit treason because his
allegiance to the rightful Philippine
government was suspended during the
occupation. This argument had been rejected
by the Supreme Court in Laurel v. Misa.
Ergo, Chan Sing’s submission is not correct.
10. No, Congressman XX may not validly
move for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of parliamentary immunity.
The Constitution provides that no member of
Congress shall be questioned or be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof (§11,
Art. VI). However, each House may punish its
members for disorderly behavior [§16(3), Art.
VI]. In other words, the privilege of speech
and debate – which is the parliamentary
immunity invoked by Congressman XX – may
only be invoked “in any other place,” but not
in the concerned Chamber itself, which has
disciplinary power over its members.
In this case, the allies of the President filed a
complaint against Congressman XX before the
Ethics Committee of the House, not in any
other place.
Hence, Congressman XX may not validly
move for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of parliamentary immunity.
11. No, this does not violate the constitutional
requirement that revenue bills must originate
exclusively from the House of
Representatives.
The Constitution provides that the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments to the
bills that are supposed to originate exclusively
in the Lower House (§24, Art. VI). It is not the
law but the revenue bill that is required to
“originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives. The phrase “originate
exclusively” merely means that the initiative
for filing the specified bills must come from
the Lower House. But a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in
the Senate (or in the conference committee)
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole
(Tolentino v. Secretary).
In this case, the version of the Upper House
has significant variance from the version of the
Lower House and the final version signed into
law by the President. However, although the
problem is silent on which House the initiative
for filing the bill originated, it can be
presumed from the tenor of the problem that it
came from the Lower House.
Thus, as long as the initiative for filing the bill
originated in the Lower House, there is no
violation of the requirement that revenue bills
must originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives.
12. No, the NLIA may not validly invoke the
immunity of the state from suit.
For incorporated government entities, their
respective charters must be examined to
determine whether state immunity from suits
applies in a case filed against them. If the
charter provides that the entity may sue or be
sued, state immunity is waived and the entity
may be sued.
In this case, the charter of NLIA authorized it
to “exercise all the powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Code.” Among the
powers of a corporation in the Corporation
Code is to sue and be sued. In effect, therefore,
the charter of NLIA allows it to sue and be
sued.
Consequently, the NLIA may not validly
invoke the immunity of the State from suit.
13. Yes, the grant of authority to impose the
alternative penalty (of imprisonment) in the
discretion of the court is an undue delegation
of legislative power.
There are two tests to determine whether there
is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz.:
(1) the completeness test; and (2) the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves Congress so that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
to prevent the delegation from running riot.
These requirements do not apply it the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency.
During the last reading, no amendment shall
be allowed, and the votes shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.

In this case, §32 of R.A. 4670 is incomplete
because it gives the judiciary absolute
discretion to determine the duration of the
penalty of imprisonment. In other words, the
Congress vested in the judiciary the power to
determine what the law is, i.e., the duration of
the applicable imprisonment.
Thus, the grant of authority to impose the
alternative penalty (of imprisonment) in the
discretion of the court is an undue delegation
of legislative power.
14. No, I will not dismiss the counterclaim.
State immunity from suits may be waived
either expressly or impliedly. There is implied
waiver for instance when the state commences
litigation and prays for the grant of an
affirmative relief from the court.
In this case, the Republic of Indonesia filed an
action for specific performance (i.e., to
perform the balance of its obligations under
the contract) and for damages. It is asking the
court for affirmative reliefs; thus, it impliedly
waived its sovereign immunity from suits.
The bill will then be presented to the
President. If he approves the bill, he shall sign
it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return it with
his objections to the House where it originated.
The House shall enter the objections in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. If
2/3 of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House where
it shall also be reconsidered. If approved by
2/3 of all the Members of that House, the bill
shall become a law.
The President shall communicate his veto to
the House where the bill originated within 30
days after the date of receipt thereof,
otherwise, it shall become (lapse into) a law as
if he had signed it.
Generally, laws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Publication is a condition sine qua non to the
effectivity of laws.

Accordingly, if I were the trial judge, I will not

dismiss the counterclaim.

15. No bill shall become a law unless (1) it has

passed 3 readings on separate days, and (2)
printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to the members of the House
concerned 3 days before its passage.