cripple , or des紅旬, but do目 not actually do 80. To use milit旺y power forcefully
18 to wage w缸; to use 1t peace:臼lly is to threa阻nw旺 Only when diplomacy ha8
failed is w訂 generally waged. Mainly in 吐le hope that w缸 can be avoided 祖C
址rreats usually made. For any given state, war is the exception , not the rule , in its
relations with other countri間, because most of the time a given s扭扭 is at peace,
not war. Consequently, states use 曲目r military power more frequently in the
peaceful th祖血也e forceful mode
When used forcefully, the e在'ects of milit缸y power are e品Y to identify. A
state unleashes its military forces , and it either ac趾ev目 its objectives or fails to.
The adversary is defeated and coerced; or 誼時m祖ns victorious and unbowed; or
the battle is fought to a draw. Used in w缸, force is a blunt instrument, but it can
achieve decisive results if wielded prop目ly. When used pea,臼full弘 st刮目 employ
their military power in more subtle , and therefore in less well-defined ways. Used
peaceful旬, mi1i祖ry power is held at 也e ready, and its exact influence on politica1
outcomes becomes more dif自cult to trace. The w叮叮waging use of m且 1t缸y power
is akin to a powerful flood: it washes away all before it. The pea∞ful use of mil-
U缸y power is ak:i n to a gravi'個tional fiel且 among large object8 in space: it affects
all motion that 個kes place , but it produces its effects imperceptibly. The e旺ects
3
4 Robert J. Art THE FuNGIB且,ITY OF FORCE 5
of f100ds 旺e dramatic and easy to pinpoint; those of gravity seem more mundane or implicit, threats remain an integral feature of statecraft, and it is these threats
and are harder to discern. A f1 00d demonstrates 1ts e旺'ects by its presence; a grav- that produce 血e gravitational effect of military power.τnat in tum imp盯ts to the
1個組onal field , by its absenc.己 Most of the time 由e effect of military power looks other instruments of state叮afi more "punch" than 由ey would oth叮wise have. In
mO時 like gravity 伽 a 宜。od; 也erefl帥,也e usefuln的s of milit的 power 恥uld short, in a permissive rl四1m like anarchy, where itnplicit 址在eats i凶 ere, force bol-
not be equated sitnply Wl由此s physical use. Short of waging war or playing sters diplomacy
chicken in a cris-時,出凹. IDili祖ry power shapes ou阻om目 more by its peacetime Coercion,由erefore, is to a political frarnework what a political framework is
p間S扭扭曲an by its forceful use.τn間, (0 focus only on 也e physical use of mil to a market 也e nec四sary, but not 出e sufficient p自condition for i臼 effective
U缸y power is to miss most of what most states do most of 也e time Wl也出emil fiructioning. An efficient marke! depends upon 血e expectation by its participants
1t旺y power at their disposal that 血e rules goveming their economic interactions will be stable 缸ld fa位It is
Tbe peaceful use of mili個可 power may be less decisive than its wartime use, the political frarnework in which marke臼 exist that provides these rnles. Without
but 由at does not rne曲 the peacetime e旺ects 旺'e insignificant. To 由e contr:肛y such a frarnework , markets firuction poorly. If, for exarnple, seizure of assets is
出e peaceful use of military power explains why it remains central to statecrafi arbitrary aud frequer尬, private investrnent will be discouraged. If a state can alter
Lurking behind the scenes , unstated but explic丘, lies 也e military muscle 由at the prices of goods at will , investrnen包 will be skewed. If no punishment exis阻
gives meaning to 也e posturing of the diplomats. Especially for great powe凹, but for stock-market fraud,也en either fraud will become r:咽lp血t, or would-be b呵呵
for the lesser ones , too , military power undergirds 也e other instruments of state- ers of stock will need to hire their own stock-fraud screene凹. To function well.
crafi. Diplomacy is the striking of compromises by s扭扭 s with differing perspec- 出凹, free markets must be embedded in a politi吋 framework that enforc自由E
tives and clashing interests. There 缸'e many factors 也at go into the fashioning of rnles for stable economic exchanges. As the British historian E. H. C盯了 put lt:
diplomatic agreemen帖, but central to each is fe缸 about the consequences of fail- 呵'he science of economics presupposes a given political order, and cannot be
ure. Fear of failure , combined with the knowledge 血at force c祖 be used if pro自tab1y studied in isolation from politics."
agreement is not reached, help produce agr'田ment. It is the ultimate ability of Similarly, the study of politics cannot b巴 pro且tably studied in isolation from
each s扭扭扭 use its military ins虹ument 也at disciplines 也e diplomats. In由IS coercion. Political s甘uctur,間, domestic or intemational , cannot exist apart from it
fashion 出e 註rr開t to use force plays the sarne role in bargaining among natlOns Wi曲曲 a state,芷削y group cau get its way through the use of force,出en public
that 血e 世rreat to strike plays in labor-management negot1atlO帥. The 吐rreat of order will break down, might will make rig恤, mafiosos will replace govemme剖,
自由er a destructive war or a prolonged strike represents a ca個strophic b自ak 阻dcons祖ntw缸f缸e will ensue untillines 盯e drawn , power balances 缸'e es祖b
down that the p缸ties would prefer to avoid. The fe旺 of breakdown , toge血erwith lished,阻d uneasy peaces ensue. When the coercive power of govemment breaks
出e desire to avoid it, work to p血vent it. Environments where nothing ex站站 to down , force becomes privatized. When force is privately held, it creates gang-
prevent c品品缸'Ophic breakdowns from occu的時,。由自由an the will of the par. sterism; when publicly held, it c阻ates government. It is a state's legitimate
峙, are called permissive realms. In such realrr院 the fear of failure bec叩les an monopo1y on 血e use of force that creates the bedrock ωndition for a stab1e
essential ingredient for succ自 s. domestic political order.
In permissive realms the 出閃過t of breakdown need not be made explicit, but τ'hi曲ng 伽ut the role 伽 coercion plays in dom,叫ic affairs tl間fo叫elps
can be left implicit and still be e在ecuve.τne 由reat to use force (or to strike) n品d us to understand why it plays 祖 even larger role in a permi由ive realm like inter-
not be articulated b目ause all parties understand that it is an integraI part of the national politics. If force is an important element in politics within nation乳白en
situation. Tbe threat cannot be disowned Tbe right to strike 扭曲 inherent fl晶,ture it must be all 也e more so for politics among nations. When in尉ests clash domes
of collective barg血ning; similarly,出e right of every state to resort to force is p缸t tically, mat1ers usual1y do not get out of hand, because all sides kuow 出現 there
缸ld parcel of international politics. 扭曲e ultimate discipline of forceful coercion by the state. When interests clash
In permissive realms , moreover,伽ats often c祖 be more effective if left internationally, reasonableness , persuasion , and logic c盯ry much less weight th祖
imolicit. When one s個te makes an explicit 甘1臨別, 1t r且ses the pressure on 甘le they do domestically, because there is no centra1 government standing in the
S扭扭 against wh的 the 伽叫 h品 been dirιted to follow suit. Threat spawns background to euforce them. Instead, there 血'e separate states , each of which pos
coun恆的rreat 缸站, lll tum,血。由自由闊別,血d so on. Voluntary agr目mentmaybe 扭扭s ltS own coercive pow問晶。ugh in v呵呵 arnounts. International poli
stymied 扭曲is escalatory process because threats stiffen the bargainers 目ld t1cs 間 not gangsterism, but it resembles it in at least one respec t: all states have
harden their po剖tions. Implicit threa妞, on the other hand, have a bet1er chance of the need to be privately armed because there is no legitimate, public coercive
avoiding the escalatory dynamic 甜d can more easily produce agreement, but 扭曲On可于bove them. As Kenneth Waltz aptly put it “In politi臼臼,rce IS sa仙。
only if 由e desire of both parti目的 avoid breakdown is strong. Whether explicit bedxe liltma mU0.Inmtermuonalpoliucs force serves , not only 扭曲e nltima
Robelτ J.A 吋 'THE FUNGIB且.ITY oFFoRCE 7
6
ratio , but indeed as 血e first and cons阻nt one." In domestic politics force has been many different things-such as a good press , top-flight international negotiators ,
sub]ccted to centraIgovemmentd conIZO1 , mInternatIonal poHUCSIt has not smart 1awyers, cutting-edge techno10gy, barg血ning power in intemational orga-
Consequently, statesm anarchy cannot d1spense wuh somethmg that even nizatio凹, and so on. WI開1血 is also integralωntili個ry power. A rich s扭扭 C阻 gen
era但 more mi1itary power 血祖 a poor one. A s扭扭 that is 1arge and rich can, if it
national goverr班lents cannot do without. .
so chooses , generate especial1y 1arge aruoun臼 of military power. The old mer-
canti1ist insight that weal血 generates power (and vice versa) is still val叫,
POWER ASSETS: COMPARISONS AND CONFUSIONS Po1itical sk:ill is a second power 甜甜t 由甜甜甜。,ly fuugib1e. By definition,
sk:illed po1i包cal operators 缸e ones who can operate well in different po1icy
So far , 1 have argued 血at force is integraI to statecmhbecause mternauonal po1
realms because 由ey have mastered the techniques of persuasion and iufluence.
itics i8 anarchic. By itse1f,也at factmakes force furlEIblc to a degec:Exactly how
τ'hey 缸'e equal1y adept at selliug fr自-trade agreemen阻, wars , or foreign aid to
zzzz;12233:2:2平tzzz::立ttJZZZ: their citizens. Po1itical1y sk:i1lfu1 statesmen can ro剖n with ease al口oss different
po1icy realms. Indee d, that is what we common1y mean by a po1itical1y sk:illfu1
questions. Firs吼t, 1 ma拉
ke a rough ∞
c omp缸1祖s叩on 品
as 岫
t o the 臼
fimgl跆
hi趾
lit句y of the main
1eader--<)ne who can 1ead in many different policy 缸'enasτ'hus , wealth and skil1
ms佐
tn are resources 出at are easi1y transferab1e from one po1icy realm to another and 缸e
吐由
e 自臼伽
1耳ngl跆
bi山
d曲1此
仙t句
y 祖〈晶1 吐伽le
叩n 世itique it prohab1y 由e two most 1iquid pow前 assets
Military power is a third fungib1e 品 set. It is not as fungib1e as weal血 or skil1,
Comparing Power Asse扭 but 由at does not make it i1liquid. Military power possesses versati1ity because
Companng 也emstrumen峙。f statecraft accord> ng to their fungib由句 is a dif- force is integra1 to politics, even when s阻t臼缸'e at peace. If force is in阻gral to
ficult task. We do not have a 1旺ge body of empirical studies that systematically m阻mational politics , it must be fungib1e. It c血mot have pervasive e旺ects and yet
ana1yze the comparative fungibi1ity of a state's power 晶sets. The few s仙也eswe be severe1y restricted in its utili句. Its pervasive effec阻, however, can be uni
dohv己, even 出ough 也ey 師問efully done , focus on only one or two instru- fornt1 y strong, unifornt1 y weak, or variab1e in strength. Which is the case depends
men阻 and 旺e more concerned with looking at asse阻 Wl由in speci直c issue areas on how military power affects the many domains , po1icy arenas, and disp缸ate
由anJIthcompadnEassetsacm時間le areas. As a con叫uen院 we1叫叫帥, issues 也at come Wl出in 由自e1d. At 也e minimum, however, military power is
cient evidence to comp祖'e power assets according to 也eir fimgibility. Through a fungib1e to a degree because its physi開1 use, i個 threatened use , or sirup1y its
little logic , however, we c祖 provide some bal1park 的tima'把S mere preseoce s仙ctu血 expecta1:J.ons 血d iofluen自由e political calcu1ations of
Consider what power assets a s阻te owns. They include: popu1ation-the size , actors.τ'he gravi個組onal e缸ects of mi1itary power me扭曲目前 s influence per-
education 1eve1, and sk:ills of i租 citizemy; geography-the 自由, 10cation,祖dnat vades the other policy rea1ms , even if it is not dominant in most of them. Perva-
ural resource endowment of 也es阻.te; govem甜ce--the effectiveness of 血 po1it siveness implies fungibility
i叫 syst叫 value←伽 norrns a s臨 1iv帥y and stands for, the na個reof 削 t h 血ec描e of nti1itary power, m凹的ver, greater amoun阻 of it in叮曲se its fun
oI。一{, and 也e ex臨nt of i個 appeal to foreigne間; weal也一也e level, sour臼s, and gibi1ity. Up to a reasonab1e poiut, more of it 扭曲前efore better th叩 1自 s.lItismo且
nat帥。fi叫叫lCllve 叫lomy; 1叫e枷卜也e 仰litical sk:ill of 血 l叫ers and desirab1e to be mi1itari1y powerful than nti1itari1y w開k. Mili阻且1y powe品.ù s阻.tes
:LntzzttZZLhti3ftzi:tztZ站立志:
have grea個 clout in world politics 血祖 mi1itati1y weak ones. Mi1itari1y strong
s扭扭S 缸el目 s subjecttb 也e influen阻 ofother s扭扭S 曲曲 mi1itari1y weak ones. Mi1-
1叫叫e 伽 m關 versa楓 geography 叫 E帥rna賦 d伽 l叫 v呵e阻閻a叫 1個ri1y powe晶11 s扭扭sc缸1 better 0缸erpro扭ction to 0由er s旭tes, or more seriously
c∞ont但:ext Wl泊甘1咀in which the other 晶a.ss阻et包s op巳缸rat阻e; values and pop叫ation, high1y v缸i Final1y, mi1i個ri1y powe晶11 s祖祖s are more s自ure 血an mi1i個rily weak on目 To
able, dependiug , resp目tive1y, on 血e content of the values and 00 the education havemo阻 clout, to be 1ess subject to the will of others , to be in a stronger position
and sk:ill of the popu1ace; 叩d mi1it旺y power, somewhere between wealth 祖d to 。在er protection or 由reaten har咽,祖dωbes田間e in a world where others are
skill , on 由e one hand, and geography and govern胡ce, on the other hand, but insecure--these are political advantages 由at can be dip10matically exp10ited, and
closer to 也e forrner 也甜扭曲e 1atter. In rank order, the 吐rree most fungib1e power 也.eyc祖 also s住eng血聞出.e will, reso1ve, and bargaining s阻nceofthe s扭扭曲ath扭
曲目n. Thus, although mili個ry power ranks behind wealth and skill in terms of i個
asse臼 appear to be weal血, politica1 sk:ill , and mili阻ry power.
Economic wealth has the highest 臼ngibility. It 扭曲e easiest to convert into versat迦旬., it can be a close 吐世rd behind 也oSe two, at 1east for those gr四tpowers
伽 mMliq131d assctofaIL nam4money, WMch 凶 turn can be used to buy that choose 個 gene扭扭 1arge 缸noun阻 ofit and 血en to exp10it it
8 Robert J. Art T!IE FuNGm且πYOF FORCE 9
Conllating Sufficiency and Fnngib盟ity Bo1dwin adduces four ex缸nples that purport to demons個扭曲e limited ver
satility of military power. 3 The examples are hypothetic祉, but 配e nonetheless
甘le view argued here-that military power possesses a relatively 姐拉西egr'峙 Ilse臼1 to an o1 yze because they are eqllivo1ent to thought experimen峙. These 缸已
。f fungibility• s not 伽 conventional wi吋om.Ra血er 血ec。一lOnlyac呻門 由eex缸nples
view is that put forward by David B o1dwin, who argu自由at milit缸y power is of
restricted u位lity. Bo1dwin asserts Possession of nuclear weapons is not just irrelev阻t to securing the election
of a U.S. citizen as UN secret缸y-general; it is a hindrance
τ'wO of 血emostimpor回nt weaknesses in 回ditional 血eorizing about intemational politics
.由e owner of a political power resource , such 扭曲eme祖 s to deter atomic
have been 由e tendency to exaggerate 由e effectiveness of mili且可 power resources 祖d 由C
tendency to treat military P?wer as 由e ultimate 血eas凹ing rod to which 0血er forms of attack, is likely to have difficulty converting this resource into another
resource that would, for instan間, a110w 趾s coun仕Y to become the leader of
power should be compared. L.
the Third World
B o1dw血's view ofm姐姐ry power follows from his more genero1 argument that Planes loaded with nllclear weapons may streng由en a state' s ability to deter
Dower assets tend to be situationally speci位c.By 由athemeans “Wbat functions nuclear attacks but may be 1ryelevant to rescumg the Pueblo [a u s.destroyer
as a power 血source in one pol叫-contingency framework may be irrelevant in seized by the North Ko芷eans in early 1968] on short no包ce.
another." If assets 缸e situationo1ly or domain spec過c,也en they are not easily The ability to get other countries to refrain from attacking one's homeland is
缸間由able from one policy re o1m to ano由er. In fact , as B o1dwin aτgues: “Polit not 血e s缸ne as 血e ability to “ win the hearts and mind出 of the people" in a
ical power reso盯ces . . . tend to be mllch less liquid than 缸onomic resources"; faraway land [the reference is to the V阻tnam War]4
and o1though power resourc自 V的 in their d咖e of fimgibility,“no politico1
pow叮間source beFIls to approach the dqree of fmgh1tlty of money" E Se泡mingly persuasive at first glance , the examples are , in fact , highly mis
For B o1dwir豆, two consequences flow from the dom位n-speCl日c nature ot lea也ng A IIttle reEEUon about each wdl show how Baldwm has cozzmIHed the
power resources. First, we cannot rely on a gross ass目 sment ofa s扭扭's overo11 cardinal error of conflatir悟出e insufficiency of an instrument wi自由 low fllngi
power assetsm order to4etCHIme how well H W1ll dommy speciftarea- bili旬, alld, therefore , how he has made military pow目 look more domain spec過c
Instead, we must assess 血e streng由 ofthe rl臼 ourc自由at it wields in 也at spec過c in each example than it re o1ly is
domain. Second , the gener阻'ally low 臼 flungr跆
bi凶
lit句
y of po
叫li誠t1時c祉
a1 powe
叮r res叩
ources Consider first 血e United Nations c品e. Throughout the United Nation's 趾sto旬,
expla
泊ins what Ba 叫Idwin c叫Is 血the “P旺adox of unrea1ized power": the fact 血 tha瓜t a theUni阻d States never SOllght, nor did it ev叮 favor, the election of an American 晶
Strong 蝴 secre阻ry-genero1. If it had, money and bribes would have been of as little use as a
he tells us , is simple 也e state at issue has s甘ong assets m 血e domain where it nucl間主自reat The Soviet Union would have vetoed 丘, Just as 甘1e Uni但dS阻島問
prev剖Is and weak ones whe血 it does not would have vetoed a Soviet national as secret缸y-genero1. Neither sta阻 wOllld have
On the face of 丘, B o1dwin's argllment is reasonable. It mak四 intuitive sense countenanced 血eapp個ntment of a ci世zenfrom 由eo也缸" or from one of its client
to argue, for example,也at armies are better at defeating 缸宜lÍes than they 旺'e at stat臼 τher目son is clear: the Cold War polarized 血e United Nations between East
promot呵 S帥le exchange rat目It o1so makes good sense to take 血eps帥n 血d West, and ll<自由叮 sllperpower was willing to al10w the other to g祖n undue
血叫出em。但 carefully we assess what sp血泊c assets a state can bring to 田缸 on infI uence in 也e institution if 出ey could p肥vent it_ The阻fore, because neither
a specific iss間,自emore 且ne-tllned our feel wi1l be of what the s扭扭 C臨時別扭, sup目power would have ever agreed on a-national from 也e othercamp , bo吐1 sought
uc hI y accompl 凶 on 伽t issue. To de 閒nyt由h叫
at 剋
0a11 仰
P owe:
叮:r 晶
as阻蚓t扭s aredomain 叩恥e郎
c泊 as師姐ry-genera1 fro且也e ranks of the una1ig叫 neutral nations. This 旬出ns
tωoad 岱e且缸r閏
eei臼s 址由1e阻f臼'ore absurd. Eqllo1ly absurd, however, are 由ep聞組ons 也at 011 why Cold War s郎扭扭n的-general came from 由e uno1igned Scandinavian or 11世d
assets 盯e domain specific to 也e s缸ne degr間,血d that a gross inventory of a Worid nations (D ag H個llIlars勾oldfrom Sw叫間;U Th祖t frorn Burma. for exam-
S扭扭's overall power 扭扭扭 is not a reliab語, even if on1y a rough, guide to how ple) , particlÙarly duting the heyday of the Cold War.τms arrangement, moreover,
well the s扭扭曲 likely to do in 祖y given domain. Assets 旺'e not equo1 in 臼ngi se:凹edbohup?中owers'in但rests. At 也ose rare 恤臼 when 也ey both agr,叫出at
bili旬, and fine-tuning does not mean dr宙間tically o1tering assessmellts 血eIImted NatIons could be helpfU1, UN mediatIon wasmade more effect1ve
Wbat does 011 出is mean for the fllngibility of military power? Shon1d we because it had a secretary-gen白了這1 who was neu缸訟, not o1igned.
accept B o1dw妞's view about it? 1 argue 血at we shon1d no t. To see why, let us Finally, even 芷 i fA
岫叮
men
目n
叫
1
look in greater de個il at what else he has to say. ret缸1閏 gene: 叮r阻叫
a I, we should not conclude thatu has nothing to do w1th AmencaI
10 Robert J. A阿 THE FuNGmILITY OF FORCE 11
nrovocahve ac阻; and how to reassure the South Koreans su鉛ciently so 由且也ey sonable statemen臼 There is , however, also a 且fth that should be drawn from 由lS
exarnple: (5) when an outside power arrays itself in a civil w缸 on 也e wrong side
L叫d keep their troopS in So岫 Vietnarn. 的 AAst
叫t缸ron
1旭as前t圳two叫ta叫
s吠ks. not 伽 first , were 伽 prirr間 purpos叫or 伽 sub叫uentAmer of nationalism, not only will force be insufficient to w血, but 帥, too , will ne盯ly
ican milit的日Idup in East A恥 After all , the Uni削 States did not need addi all the other tools of statecraft-money, political skil1, propag扭曲,且d so on. In
包onal forces 血ere to pressure 由e No的1 milit盯ily to release 也e crew. There such cases mili個ry power suffers from the s缸nemsu血ciency as the other in甜u~
ments.τnat makes it no more, but no less , fungible th個 theyare.
were alre吶枷ut 100,000 Americ扭住oops in East A叫 A milit叮 buildu札
kowever, would be a useful s1Enalfor deterrence of hrther provocations and All fo叮 of Baldwin's ex個nples demonstrate an important fact about military
rea叫祖ce ofi扭曲 Un州or if) North Ko帥'8 archives are 叩開ed 坤,明 can power: used alone, it c制服ot achieve many things. Surely,址的 lS an lmpo吐缸1t
not blow whetber deterrence of furtheEProvocauon wozkex1, because we do not point to remember, but is it one 出at is peculiar to military power alone or that
proves 出at it has little fungihility? Surely not. lndeed, no single ins佐ument of
know what additioual plans 也e No地 had. What we do know is that the reas
surance funcuon of the buildup d14work South Korea keptus divlsmnsm statecraft is ever sufficient to attain any signi且cant foreigu~policy objective-a
fact 1 shall term “個sk 姐sufficiency_"τ'here 缸'e two reasons for 血is. Fir;泣, a states-
如此叮ZhitZ;:uttZPJZZZl:TZZZZZ manmust 祖.t1clpate 血e counteractions that will be undertaken by the states he is
trying to inftuence. They will attempt to counter his stratagems wi自由OSe oftheir
su血, 1t1s wrong to draw dle conclusiondIat the Pueblo casc shows 也at force has
little fungibili旬, even though military postnring appe旺s not to have gotten 血c own; they will use different types of ins甘uments to 0旺'set the on臼 he is using;
aud they will attempt to compensate for their weakness in one area with their
crew 阻Jeased S臨時也扭曲other. A welJ~prepared influence attempt therefore requires a multi~
Baldwin'sanalexample1s equaly problemauc if 由βpoint is to show 出現
ms缸umental approach to deal wi曲曲e likel y counters to it. Second,血y rmpor~
$12231112且立法JZa氏平;其 ELtrz;tzz;;tzz 阻nt policy itself has m抽y facets. A multifaceted policy by necessity requir,的
m祖y instrumen恆的 implement it. For both reasons , all 前叫y important matters
m a dISIant lmd Presumably, however, the pointof 出e exarnple is to argue 血at
the latter task is not merely different from 也efo閻王缸, but also more 也值cult. 1f require a statesman to muster several, if not all , the ins甘uments at 趾s disposal ,
由is is the asscdmtHIs unexceptIonable compelling 曲。由er government 個 even though he may rely more heavily on some 曲曲 on others. In sum, in state
cra血 no tool c阻 stand alone
change its behavior h品 always been an i的時間ntly more di前cu]t task 曲曲 deter~
ring a EEven govenment fkom attacking oncIhomeland.Not only1sm阻四個te For military power, then, as for the other ins仕umen臼 of statecraft, fungibility
叩門ellence mo叫iffìcult 也an inte:帥te ddCHence, putiMmMCCO呻ell凹臼 should not be equated with suffìciency,祖d insu且 ciency should not be equated
1S IILICdl他cu]t than interstate compel1e眠. The ability of 叫扭曲 p帥叫。 with low fungibility. A given instrument can car可I a s扭扭 p缸t of the way to a
force the adversaries in a civil w旺 to lay down their arms and negotiate an end to gìven goal , even though it cannot c缸ry the state all the way there. At one and the
曲目r dispute is a notoriously diffìcult 個此, as 由e Chinese civil war in 由e 1940s S 缸ne tI me, an illStrument of statecraft c阻 usefully con甘ibute to attaining many
THE FuNG江BILITY OF FORCE 15
Robert J. Art
14
A spill-over effect can be understood 自由er as a prerequisite or a by-product
$1131:lzt::zsr;;ZZZL:1:;:12:23:芷江;;二 Asap扭扭:quisi妞, the resu1t produced by the act of force checking force creates
something 血at is deliberate and viewed as essential in order to reach a given out
2謊話:嗚嗚嗚iE站站甜瓜 valued in that other domain. Two examp1es will illustrate how the spill-over
effect works and how it manifests itse1f 自由er as a prerequisite or a by-product
by itse旺" to achieve 血yof 出em. Examples: Banking and Cold War Interdependence
The first examp1e has to do with banks; the second, with r,目 ent history. The
HOW FORCE ACHlEVES FUNGffiILITY banking examp1e demonstrates the ro1e force plays in solvency; the historical
ex缸nple , the role 伽t U.S. military power played in cr凹ting tod旬 '8 economic
If mihtary power1s a vcrsatile insmIment of statecm血, then exactly how does it interdependence
achieve its fungibi1ity? What are 也e paths through which it can influence even阻 First,也eb血 king ex缸nple. Begin with 也is qu自tion: why do we deposit 0盯
money in a bank? The answer is: we put our money in a bank because we think
服咐
we c扭扭ke it out whenever we want. We beIieve 由e money is there when we
W阻t it. In short, we believe the bank to be solvent
Solvency is usually thought of solely in economic terms: a bank is solvent
because it has enough assets to meet its finan口al liabilities if they are called.7 Sol-
vency, however, is a function , not simply of finances , but of physicaI safety. A
bank's solvency depends on the fact both that its a隨時臼 exceed i個 liabiliti臼 (i臼
balance sheet 扭扭曲e black) and that its assets 缸'e physically s四ure (not easily
:23:1;22芷江::品?♂立cZIZLC:;LZtzztt stolen). Physical security is therefore as important to a b缸盒 's solvency 晶晶Iiq
uidi旬, even though we generally take the former for granted when we re自由 in a
each pa血 works 祖d i1lustra但 bo也 with examp1es. stable domestic order. If the banks within a s扭扭 could be robbed at wiII, then its
citizens would not put their money in them. A state makes banks physically
SpiJl-Over Effec恆 sec田'e by using 由 milit盯y power to deter and defend against would-be robbers
阻d to compel them to give back the funds if a robbery 個kes place (品 sur世時也ey
are caught and the fnnds r,也overed). Through its use of its legitimate monopoly
on the use of force , a state seeks to neu仕'aIize the threat of forcible seiznre. If血e
s扭扭 succ間,ds in estabIishing the physical s目urity of 血 banks , it produces one
of the two prerequisi但s required for a bank's solvency.
In su血, in a weIl-ordered state , public force suppresses private force. The
effect of 血1S suppression is to crea阻 a generalized stability that sets 血e context
within which all societal interactions take place. This e缸'ect spills over into
numerous 。也erdomains 祖dproduces m血y manifestatio間, one of which is con
fidence about the physical s目nrity of banks.τms confidence can be viewed as a
by-product of the public suppression of private for,間, as a prereqU1s1te 阻 banking
solvency, or, more sensibly, as both
A good historical example of the spiIl-over effect of military power 扭曲e
economic interdependence produced among the free world's 自 onomies during
……撫…r…
τ'HE FUNG血ILITY OF FORCE 17
叫山川附心向耐心如此甘沉耐心問… Robert J. Art
出拉拉拉PWM帥
出叫阿拉
向阿拉站神州叮
~叫山山川師
zw…品品叫帥扭扭側v
16
KMM 酷的吋伽風心
gb 啊M
岡
m 州凹的。咐巾血巾Z
mrmdAmkwd
扭」
m
u
MZ立“?話 m叫
叫地叫做側叫:喇啪叫叫帥叫m副
臼凹 PMsern 叫伽 m
叫峙的叫阿叫阿叫 would have the political will to rebuild themselves economically. The initial pur.
血 b 由
旺 FEr曲,也ymd 臼 a 盯
WS叫 MV別
叫 e 肝咀缸,扭扭
pose of NATO is the key to its (and to the United States-Japan defense treaty)
long司lasting function: the 叮目tion of a politically stable island amidst a turbu
,Mmd也許
Second, America's provision of security to its allies in Europe and in 也eF盯
East dampened their respective concems about German and Japanese military
W 的。的問蝴蚵m
限制阿拉山耐心的心叭叭的加…拉
rearmament. The United States 's pr目ence protected 血 allies not only from the
dk
Soviets , but also from the Germans and the J apanese. Because German 祖廿
枷明珈酷腳 mmH
Japanese military power was contained in alliances 出at the United States domi-
自
nated, and espec凶ly because American 仕oops were visibly p阻sent and li阻r祉Iy
d 仕叫
mmp
C
m
within each nati凹, Germany's 臼ld Japan's neighbo凹, while 也ey did not forget
恥AmM
m 仙
the horrors they suffered at the hands of these two during the Second World W:缸,
叩吋開
帥即回師叫…別叫吋
間e
一喘
g
nevertheless , were not p缸alyzed from cooperating wi由自em. The success of 由e
旺MK
z品
M師叫帥州州叫伊拉叫阿拉
胸
恥叫帥叫巾w
European Common Market owes as much to the presence of Americ祖 military
u一
a
H
心
poweron 血e continent of Europe as it does to the vision of men like Monne t. The
t叫
帥
nHLM
和ω
句 mmn 狗的前扭扭 WV
b
S缸ne can be said for the Far East. America's military presence has helped “ oil the
v
mmK叫
凶
坤加 mmd 加組凹的,m 問時
…叫
肝N
d
c
h
泣喇叭油枷叫:此對d性
-e
伽圳叭叭叭τ甘
由 JUU
叫M
啪"叫做研叫山叩附加叫
h 叫仕刪訕訕副研帥,i中
ities in relative economic grow也阻d about vulnerabilities inherent in interde-
s由曲目FM
M
pendence , bo由 of which are heightened in an open economic order. Freer trade
你~
耐W叭
…一
耐心
benefits all nations , but not equally. The most efficient benefit 由e most; 祖d 配O
U
間h
M
Fb
加t州
e
加 A自m
d
denci間,叫1 the greater 由e more states sp個alize economically. Unequal g缸ns
即由',目由恥,“
叩
M叭
V"
W
♂M
m
圳
from trade and 住ade dependencies all too often historically have had adverse
o
相…………
p
咐,叫川
u個腳闊別帥,d開M的
politi叫 and mili阻ry effi叫s. Through its provision of military protection to its
h
u
m
m叭
凹的 tAe
w
記U
t
p叫
and enabled the Germans and the Japanese to bring their neighbors (America's
h個帥
zt
江山間E山
allies) into 由err 血 onomic orbits without those neighbors feating 伽tGerman or
山
'
bd
出叫州州拉此相
個
ne
ap1
e酬
mm
間
叮叫帥一
個
rity issue dealt with,也e economic predomin祖ce of the Germans and J apanese
J
啦,祉 Imp 叫出 bh
叫叫
出
耐心叫如巾仰岫叫
,
IP
帥u
吶
“h
l'3---pfdLLVd
田
倒m
批
, su
helped develop 也e determination and the good will necessary to Qvercome the
d
W叫
d 位于的服昀叫
間
EU
閉Z
MhMm
F的
A枷
M
U時叫
圳咐吋叮扭加w
凹位 nruk
m加
間闊
Emm
品m 閻明m
mn
m咽。叫叫帥
間枷
t
叫v耐
tt
alliance in a common cause bred must have had these spiIl-over effec祖. Finally,
咖
山d
-
耐郎
也e need to preserve a united front against 曲e common enemy put lirnits on how
缸
血向
w
d閃伽
叭b
M
f盯由e allies , and the United States , would permit their economic disputes to go
油
山叫
帥坤
芯
叫也
伯w拉
本刊
hu
The need to maintain a united political-mili祖ry front bounded the inevitable eco
t
叫臨
伽
THE FuNom lLITY OF FORCE 19
Robe吋 J.Art
18
nected, domains c祖not be wholly delinked from one another. If they c祖 not be
economic natio閏lism. Poli'注t 帥 delinked,也en we should not view them in isolation from one 阻。由 er.τ'herefore ,
Japanesemi盟lita缸ryr'品盯E齡c叩n血ce. 也edamp目ling of concems about relati ve g且nsand 個y explanation of an outcome in a given domain 出at is based only on what goes
dependmues, and the sense Of SOManty-aIIOf these were a1dcd by 血e Ameri on m 由單位om祖n will always be iocomplete, if not doworight wrong. In sum ,
can military pr剖開回 in Europe and the Far East issue linkages lim扭曲e expl祖 atory power of a dom剖且』目的 cted 祖alysis
B缸E血ning linkages in particular make s個te assets more fungible 也an they
might otherwise be , Linkage politics is a fact of intemational politicallife. We
Linkage Politics
should not expect otl主 erw帥. Statesmen 臨 out to make the best deals they can
τ'he second way force exerts influ聞自 on other domains of policy 時也rough by compensating for weakness in one 缸臼 with strength io others. Powe由1 states
)認啦!臨部括:
can better engage in these compensa切可 linkag的 than can weak ones. They 旺e
s虹ongerînmo間缸目s than 也ey are weak; consequently,出eycanmo阻 easily uti-
1ize their leverage in the strong 缸eas to make up for 也eir deficit in 由e weak: ones
Gr臼t powers 缸e also better able to shift as扭扭扭long issue 缸C晶 in order to
build positions of b缸莒anung s間ngth when necessary. They can , for exarople ,
more easily generate rr吐lit缸y power when they need to in order to link it to non-
誰注:25注:13323諾諾諾::fziij
mili祖ry 個sks.τ'herefore, because powerrul states can link issues ffiore easily 由組
can weaker ones , can compensate for deficiencies better, can generate rnore
resources and do so more quickly when needed , and can shift 扭扭扭缸。und wi血
oil 時血剖ns priced in dollars,甘E funcdonaI t1e between exchanEemtesmd enc培y greater ease, how powe:品J1 a state is overall remains 祖 essential detenninant to
cannot be delinked. Moreov缸, as the oil-dollar example illustrat肘, functional how successful it is internationally,盯'espective of how weak it may be at 祖y
t:rzz罰。1:;;5:21立12平:;TZZ::叫:;;:戶 gIven moment on 祖ysp血泊c issue in 朋Y particul旺 domain.In s山n, linkage pol-
itics enhances the advantages of being powerful and boosts the fungibility of
:::括:譯詩lfiyi是2諾z
詰
謊:3
記i泣2
設滸詔:古?詰
:2i苦扭扭苦詰訴1f詰持
j持2khh:f
是江芯
t泣泣泣::
泣泣:
Exartψles: Defici肘" Petrodollars, and Oil Prices
Three . . . brief examples show the r血ge of state goals 由at c祖 be served
by constructing such linkag得&
In咀叫
s叫t缸e臼a吋A 由e two 阻
1 ss叫u目 become linked because a st叫
a叫t剖血祖 has made a ∞
c onne前c The first involves the relation between Ameri間 's 1缸ge and continuing bal-
恤1 wie缸:re none beft
臼or血ee泊訕S闢 U曰叩蝴叫
1曲a祉
叫lly, but 叫甚
n' 祖ce-of-payments deficits and 自 global alliance system. Tbroughout most of the
?詰;立
7:t叮立J;::立;tτ:3JfZZJplzzc;2:;2;:早已ZZZZt
They 戶ake compensa扭 for weako的s
a link io order to issueτ'heir on a given
Cold War era,也e United States ran 田mual large balance-of-payments deficits
Historically, no nation has been able to buy more abroad than it sells abroad
(import more 白血 it exports) in as huge a volnme and for as long a period as h品
zr;;2stzzrztz立;凡EZJrzrzt止;zz 出e United Sta但:s. There we阻 m祖y 血 asons why it was able to , r,個ging from 由e
liquidity that de且cit dollars provided, which enabled world 甘ade 個 grow, to gen-
由自ate世ng to do somethmg undesirable in the strong 訂ea, or by promising to do eral con且 dencein 血e American economy, which caused foreigners to invest 自己E
HHiS鵲起抓性;
dollar holdings in the United States. Part of the reason 出at foreigners continued
to take America's continuing ftow of dollars , however, was an implicit, if not
explic尬,甘adeo旺 in 阻tom for their acceptance of American I. O.U.'s (deficit dol-
lars) ,出e United St刮目 provided the 1呵自t holders of them (即 Germans, the
1元;也泣如芷江?口口說:1 師工:立即:2 Jap曲目吭祖吐出e Saudis) mili個ry protection against 也eir enemies. Am erica's
mili個rys個ng血 compensate吐 for its lack of fiscal discipline
A second ex缸nple involves the r,自ycling of petrodoll缸s. After the oil price
耳刮IZiZf且也叫fici祉, issue 1帥皂的 have a crucial ∞叫uence for hikes of the 1970s, the OPEC produce凹, especi叫ly its Persian Gulf members ,
bo曲曲e 四alys祖祖d 出e exercise of s扭扭 power . . . [B ]ecause issues 缸'e con
τ'HEF'uNOffi II..πYOF FORCE 21
Robe阿 J.Art
20
a joint Saudi-American naval task force to ♂lard against Iranian attacks on oil
:2:rZZJJ;;:1:z:cztzr矗立了Jiit;有2位立e tank前sintheG叫f. In 間tum,也e Saudis' inc:扭曲 ed their oil production from 9.7
miIlion barrels per day (m岫 to 10.3 , which was 血e high的t level it could sus-
如:認錯的;3端
t詛咒 and kept it there for the next ten months. Saudi 缸tions had a considerable
effect on oil pric間,
As in the other cases , in this instan間, American mili個可, power alone was not
suffici目前 to cause Saudi actions to lower oil prices , but it was essential because
during 也is turbulent period Saudi decisions on how much oil they would pump
were not 由tennined solely by economic factors. True , the Saudis , ag祖nst the
:zzjZZ午12132比如此;早就;1OG::11::i::;: desi記s of the price hawks , which included the Iranians , had been pumping mo血
。il since 1978 in orderto lower oil pricesτ'he Saudis had also violated their long-
姑且在SEiE甜苦苦控制
tenn strategy in March 1979 , however, when they decided to cut oil production
by 1 mbd, primarily to appe晶 e Iran , a move 由at triggered a rapid increase in oil
prices. This pumping de口創on followed a political decision to move 也plomati
cally away from the United States. Only a few months later, however, the confiict
括:詔曰:扭扭抑制;;
within 出e Saudi ruling farnily between an American- versus an Ar ab-oriented
甜甜egy was resolved in a compromise 也at led to a political reconciliation with
由e United States; and this political decision was followed by another to increase
oil production by 1 mbd, s個rting 1 J叫y 1979. Befo扭曲e Iran-Iraq war,也en,
them in the Uni阻d States Bodldecis1ons were of cons1derable economz bene Saudi pumping decisions were affected by political calculations about their
fitto 也eumte4States PEking sauadollars m zulls gave the Amcncmgovd secunt弘 in which the s缸ateglc conn目tion with the Americans played a promi-
emment ‘access to a huge pool of fore1EIICapual' ,;pncmg oum dollars meant nent role. If this was 佐ue in peacetime , surely it was so in wartime , too. The mil
晶晶出e United States “ could pnnt money to buy oil "』Eli個ry power hought it缸y protection announced by 血e Americans on September 30 , 1980 was a n自
ess 缸y condition for the Saudi increase in oil production that followed in
問3叫龍)
October. Again , military power had bought 祖 economic bene飢
In sum, these . . . exarnples- . . . America's ability to run deficits , p帥。 dol
lar 血cycling, and moderate oil prices-all illustrate just how pervasive hargain-
ing 虹nkages are in international politics and spec泊cally how military power c血
be linked politically to produce them. In all . . . cases , military power was not suf-
ficien t. Without 址, however, the United States could not have produced the favor-
able economic outCOIDI回 it had achieved
::;;::1:1:;dZU記本fZZEJ;2ZZSJZfzliz;2:;2 NOTES
::如喘揣在啦!:ifi
1. Exactly where 血is point is , is difficult to de品 ne. One could argue 由 at more rnili-
t缸y power is reasonable up until 血e point where other s扭扭s begin to worry 祖d tak:e coun
teractions. One could 缸gue that more amounts of 0扭扭 sive power will worry 0曲目前刮目
more quickly 曲曲 mo阻缸nounts of defensive power. One could futhermo血 argue 曲目由e
g括:民法諱::是135iZEZZEE是注
point where reasonable becomes unreasonable is more dependent on 也e perceived inten-
tions of the s扭扭 than on its rnili且可 capability. These a血 all “甜甜 onable" points. In 吐血
chapter, 1 cannot settle 由e deba阻 between “ aggressive" and “ defensive" reali拙, norc阻
1 show how to distinguish between offense-and-defense dorninant worlds. More military
:3ZfZZCTZi;:1:;zrcthaiZJZi7位Jtzuz power will buy a state more options 正。由er states 自由叮 do not counter 曲e powerful state,
。r 缸e unable to kl目'PUp Wl由血 pa晶。f anning. Offensive rnilitary power is more 由reat-
22 Robert J , Art
品結如ii嗚嗚
ters 祖別時出_e states of Westem Europe could have on 血回r political relations. He 缸gued
thatcoope:且.tion on economic matters would sp凶 overmto 出eir political relations, induce
greater cooperation 血ere, and lead ultimately to the political integration of Westem
Europe. See Emst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and lntemational Orga
nization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), 48
7. Solvency is to be distinguished from liqui也可 Ab阻k can be solvent but not liquid
Liqu曲ty refers to 血,e ability of a b紅lk to meet all its liabilities upon demand. Most bariks
are not able to do so , however, if all 由e demands are called at the s血ne time. 訓le reason IS Uncertain砂 Reduction
由atn過ny assets of 制ly given b缸盎叮'e tied up in inves恤因此S 由at cannot be called back on
short notice, but take time to convert into cash. The function of a central b位tk: is to solve
也e liqui也ty problem of a nation's banking syst,前n by providing 血e liqui也tym 血e short
阿拉拉ZZZI:zzttflyP時r offensive doc恤的間也C 血句
tenn in order to prevent runs ∞ ao血企
23