That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M.

,
TOPIC: Rule 113 - B. Warrantless Arrests (Sec.5)
in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Republic of the Philippines Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without
SUPREME COURT being authorized by law, did then and there have in his possession the
Manila following:
THIRD DIVISION
1 = One (1) lighter
January 25, 2016
2 = One (1) rolled tissue paper
G.R. No. 205472
3 = One (1) aluminum tin foil
1
AMADO I. SARAUM, Petitioner,
vs. which are instruments and/or equipments (sic) fit or intended for
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body.
DECISION
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
PERALTA, J.:
In his arraignment, Saraum, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of not guilty to the offense charged.5 Trial ensued. Meantime, Saraum
Court (Rules) seeks to reverse the Decision2dated September 8, 2011 was released on bail.6
and Resolution3 elated December 19, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CEB CR No. 01199, which affirmed the PO3 Jeffrey Larrobis and PO1 Romeo Jumalon testified for the
judgment of conviction against petitioner Amado I. prosecution while the defense presented no witness other than Saraum.
Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737. According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call was
received by PO3 Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio
Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-bust team was then
II (Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of Republic formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel Sta.
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of Ana, PO1 Roy Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Aniñon against a certain
2002. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana was designated as the poseur-buyer
accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the back-up of PO2
Sta. Ana, and the rest of the team as the perimeter security. PO1
Aniñon coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) regarding the operation. After preparing all the necessary
documents, such as the pre-operation report and submitting the same
to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject area.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards
his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a curtain as
partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who
were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a
"shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum’s possession a
lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3
Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua
wrapper, and made initial markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for
Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as "AIS-08-
17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case was
filed, the subject items were turned over to the property custodian of
the Office of City Prosecutor.
By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged
offense. He testified that on the date and time in question, he was
passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-
law when he was held by men with firearms. They were already with
"Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that
he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He
learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court.
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165
and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay a fine of Php20,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The drug paraphernalias (sic) are ordered forfeited in favor of the
government.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the CA sustained the judgment of conviction; hence, this
petition. We deny.
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable
error, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts, such findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive
and binding.9 Besides, a review of the records reveals that the CA did
not err in affirming his conviction.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of
any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession
is not authorized by law.10 In this case, the prosecution has
convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug
paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and
lighter, all of which were offered and admitted in evidence.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance
does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.11 In arrest in flagrante
delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense
in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.12
Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum’s statement that he was
not committing a crime at the time of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis
described in detail how they were able to apprehend him, who was then
holding a disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled
tissue paper in his left hand,13 while they were in the course of arresting
somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in
eluding arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were
incidentally caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not
proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at the
vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized
items that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses." On the contrary,
the prosecution witnesses have adequately explained the respective
uses of the items to prove that they were indeed drug
paraphernalia.14 There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory
examination and finding as to the presence or absence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said
items since possession itself is the punishable act.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the
shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia
they found.1âwphi1 In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were
plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them.
Considering that Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia
that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore,
admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the
judgment of conviction.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have
waived any objection thereto when he did not raise the issue before
entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move
for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment.
Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed
waived."15 In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection to
the admission of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest
and search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the
prosecution.16
In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia presented in court as the ones actually seized from the
accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure
under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied
with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article
II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9165;17 and (b) there was an unbroken link (not perfect link) in the
chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items.18
Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the
apprehending team must immediately conduct a physical inventory of
the seized items and photograph them, non-compliance therewith is
not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team.19 While nowhere in the
prosecution evidence show the "justifiable ground" which may excuse
the police operatives involved in the buy-bust operation from making
the physical inventory and taking a photograph of the drug
paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized, such omission shall not render
Saraum's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him as
inadmissible in evidence. Said "justifiable ground" will remain
unknown in the light of the apparent failure of Saraum to specifically
challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and
preservation of the subject drug paraphernalia before the trial court. He
cannot be allowed too late in the day to question the police officers'
alleged non-compliance with Section 21 for the first time on appeal.20
The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who
handled the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the
authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia
from the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court.21 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No. 9165,
defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody
of seized items should be established, thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it
was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.23
While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and
unbroken, in reality, it is almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain.24 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21(1),
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused
person's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible.25
x x x Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a
law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule,
the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight
that will be accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule
that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or
seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said
section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or
probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by
the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in
each case.26
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items.27 In this case, the prosecution
was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised because it
established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items
from the time they were first discovered until they were brought to the
court for examination. Even though the prosecution failed to submit in
evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug
paraphernalia, this will not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items
seized from him inadmissible. There is substantial compliance by the
police as to the required procedure on the custody and control of the
confiscated items. The succession of events established by evidence
and the overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals
all show that the evidence seized were the same evidence subsequently
identified and testified to in open court.
Certainly, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation are generally accorded full faith and credit in view
of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
and especially so in the absence of ill-motive that could be attributed
to them.28 The defense failed to show any odious intent on the part of
the police officers to impute such a serious crime that would put in
jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent person. Saraum’s mere
denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification
and declarations of the police officers. The defense of denial, frame-
up or extortion, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts
with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.30 As evidence that is both negative and self-
serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby
positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.31 To
merit consideration, it has to be substantiated by strong, clear and
convincing evidence, which Saraum failed to do for presenting no
corroborative evidence.32
Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight
and influence have been overlooked or the significance of which has
been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusion of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and
observing their deportment and manner of testifying.33 The rule finds
an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained
by the CA as in this case.34 In this case, the quantum of evidence
necessary to prove Saraum's guilt beyond reasonable doubt had been
sufficiently met since the prosecution stood on its own strength and did
not rely on the weakness of the defense. 'The prosecution was able to
overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision elated September 8, 2011 and Resolution dated December 19,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01199, which
sustained the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision 2 dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution 3dated February
19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813,
which affirmed in toto the Judgment 4dated July 28, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in
Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin
Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging
Comerciante of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess
any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control
Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing
0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with
a total of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LA W. 6
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of
July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the
NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag) were aboard
a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at
Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed
of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a
distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as
Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla 7 (Dasilla) - standing and
showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them
handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may
contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante
and Dasilla At a distance of around five (5) meters, P03 Calag
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and
Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later
confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. 8
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to
evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However,
due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the
RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present
his evidence.9
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a
certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when
suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney
along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There,
the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them
and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed
to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station
to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 10
The RTC Ruling
In. a Judgment 11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years, and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00.12
The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest
on Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing
shabu. In this relation, the R TC opined that there was probable cause
to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that P03 Calag saw, in
plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he
decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found
that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag was impelled by any
malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed
his duty when he arrested Comerciante.13
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed
Comerciante's conviction. It held that P03 Calag had probable cause to
effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was
committing a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the
latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA,
this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that those sachets
might be shabu, and thus, P03 Calag had every reason to inquire on the
matter right then and there.15
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration 16 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution 17 dated February 19, 2013. Hence,
this petition. 18
The Issue before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section
11, Article II of RA 9165.
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did
not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence
gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic
sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily
resulting in his acquittal. 19
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of
respondent People of the Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's
warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk"
rule, especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of illegal drugs. 20
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III 21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the
absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general
rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3 (2), Article III 22 of the Constitution provides an
exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures
are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding. 23
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid
proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. 24 In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can
be made - the process cannot be reversed. 25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, as follows:
SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
( c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. 26
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements
must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 27 On the other
hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the
arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it.28
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a),
the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section (b), he knows
for a fact that a crime has just been committed. 29
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that
there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on
Comerciante. P03 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when
he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing
plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided
to effect an arrest. P03 Calag's testimony on direct examination is
revelatory:
Pros. Silao:
Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly
tell the court where were you?
A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am.
xxxx
Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling?
A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am.
Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan?
A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.
Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or
what unusual incident that happened if any? less?

A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.
to someone.
Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was
xxxx the reaction of these two male persons?

Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two A: They were surprised, ma'am.
male persons you already identified?
xxxx
A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.
Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced
Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in yourself as police officer?
that particular act?
A: They were surprised.
A: They were quite facing me then.
Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you
0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing say that they were surprised?
this Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City?
A: They were stunned.
A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.
Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?
Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?
A: I arrested them, ma' am. I invited them.
A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.
Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short,
Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, napakasimple Lang ng tanong ko sa yo eh. Did you say anything?
what did you do?
Court:
A: We stopped ma'am.
Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listens.
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness:
Wala po.
Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?
Court: You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question,
ano sinabi mo sa kanila?
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?
Witness: Wala po.
xxxx
Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin
Comerciante did you recover the plastic sachet?
A: From his hand ma'am.
Q: Left or right hand?
Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo Kung
Hindi mo matandaan, no problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot
recall? 30
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible
that P03 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be
able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance
of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed
of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be
properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of
P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way
be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his
companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as
put by P03 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable suspicion
bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest
persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on
illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient
to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante
was indeed shabu. 32
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set
forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed
it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed
to show that P03 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that
the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed
first, which does not obtain in this case. 33
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a
valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante untenable. In
People v. Cogaed, 34 the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively
explain "stop and frisk" searches:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement.1a\^/phi1 That is, law enforcers should
be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses.
However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the
police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly
based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police
officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on
facts that they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in
a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police
officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
xxxx
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an
opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In
Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the
"stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does
not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has
to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk"
exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that
police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.
There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "umeasonable searches
and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance
or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. [35]] (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing
around with a companion and handing over something to the latter do
not constitute criminal acts.1âwphi1 These circumstances are not
enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which
would constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop
and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search
made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop
and frisk" search made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu
purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated
shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante
must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal
liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision
dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin
Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release,
unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which
sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1
of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially
testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning,
he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban
Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle
without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for
violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers
to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited
the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that
while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was
uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was
alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket
of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three
(3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors
and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked
the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he
noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the
table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of
which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a
plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial
ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic
chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner
testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003.
It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been
lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets
later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-
up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The
dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL
LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen
(13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction
in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a
Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to
file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its
Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT
BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because
there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a
lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation
ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming
there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested,
the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and
apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use
of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of
Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused
himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he
was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in
his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the
apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the
latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused,
being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he
could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending
officers. x x x.8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the
particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the
entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.10 It is effected
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It
is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest
of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement
and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director
shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours
from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in
the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.
Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date
of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation
of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations
Manual12 provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles
during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles
While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply
in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the
following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or
any of the vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There
was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him
of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may
be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial
court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to
the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
"almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not
fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal
arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of
the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly
curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any,
of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime
either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having
stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the
Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine
announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in
those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop
exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free
exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be
warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a
person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only
a few minutes. A motorist’s expectations, when he sees a policeman’s
light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short
period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation,
but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his
way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is
quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning
will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek.
See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not
such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To
be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer
and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding
whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation
substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical
traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a
so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a
formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of
detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The
similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to
hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not
"in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will
not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed
to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463
U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment
that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled
to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis
supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein
was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the
traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that
he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can
treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional
equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be
considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being
made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which
was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of
Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be
stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In
this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was
deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and
while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the
arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons
shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against
them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers only after
petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must
also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure
that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing,
to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the
custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s
will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether
particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated
as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of
felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he
was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his
ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a
second time—after the police officers allegedly discovered the
drugs—as he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed:
(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and
frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15 None
of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a
lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly,
the evidence was not immediately apparent.16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search
is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3
Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and
intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely
"told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public
or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search
or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the
defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state
of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that
was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three
in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While
the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or
unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons.20
In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police
officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a
citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize
the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held
that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer
does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct
minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car
or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the
"search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect
in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence
for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for
the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search
in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both
legitimate and weighty,’" x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing
a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a
custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
"danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which
follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the
police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger
to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest."
Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively
brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . .
than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439
(1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where
there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the
police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case
of a routine traffic stop.1âwphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra,
at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer
safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself
justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full
fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges,
officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a
vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers,
Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any
passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry
patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate
control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983);
and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment,
including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New
York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search
incident to arrest—the need to discover and preserve evidence. Once
Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No
further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on
the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may
have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to
search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening
the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming
the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal
Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately released from detention, unless his
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
continued The Facts and the Case
On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay
City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon
Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in
Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail,
the court tried her in absentia. 3

The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February

11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric
Republic of the Philippines Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol
SUPREME COURT car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David
Manila Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of
house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
THIRD DIVISION
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers
G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013 approached the house from where the men came and peeked through
the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused
GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,
Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him
vs.
was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room.
This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce
DECISION
themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4

ABAD, J.:
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a
wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner,
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent
wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white
search prompted by the police officers' chance sighting through an ajar
crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of
door of the accused engaged in pot session.
aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought
Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine
National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing.5
A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug
paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu."6
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and
time in question, he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was
roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three armed
police officers forced themselves into the house. One of them shoved
him and said, "D’yan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and
someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police
later brought accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and
there informed them of the charges against them. They were shown a
box that the police said had been recovered from his house.7
On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused
Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to
a prison term ranging from six months and one day to two years and
four months, and to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00 each and the costs of the
suit.
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the police caught accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of
using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession. Since
no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the
court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and rejected the
self-serving claim of Antiquera.
The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiquera’s claim of illegal
arrest, given PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan’s credible testimony that,
prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at
their living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The police
officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a warrant
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision10 on
September 21, 2007 affirming in full the decision of the trial court. The
accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it.11 The accused
is now before this Court seeking acquittal.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused
Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw
him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.
Ruling of the Court
The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that
it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw
accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act
of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers
the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the
crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested
positive for shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into
the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the
accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing
on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution
added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular,
he is already considered to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.12
peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that
warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:
THE COURT:
Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion
towards the open door, how was the door open? Was it totally open, or
was it partially open?

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides A – It was partially open Your Honor.
that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the
Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house
arresting officer.14
if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in door?
flagrante delicto.
A – We pushed the door, Your Honor.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two
xxxx
unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City.
Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural
Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push
thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing
its door and peeped inside it, as a police officer?
men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle.
Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the
A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…
officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry
for help from it.
Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search
warrant before you can search the interior of the house?
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going
on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they
A – Yes, Your Honor.
Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant
before searching the interior of the house?
A – Yes, Your Honor.
Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you
tried to investigate the house, considering your admission that you
suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?
A – Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your
Honor.
Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide
open to peep through its opening because you did not know what
was happening inside?
A – Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting
officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without
warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest
was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible,
having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the
confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.17
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity
of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver
of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.18
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
Decision dated September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated November
16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937
and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of
which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 The Court further ORDERS the
cancellation and release of the bail bond he posted for his provisional
liberty.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-
Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May
31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201.
Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated
August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted
the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale
and illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of
Section 15 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which
was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams,
51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of
TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-EIGHT
(247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended,5 which was said to be committed in this manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any
regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17
grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams,
[0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four point zero three grams
of white crystalline substance contained in twelve (12) transparent
plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of
Manila, Branch 23. Upon motion7 of the appellant, however, said case
was allowed to be consolidated with Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in
the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On arraignment, the appellant pleaded
not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was
held on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated without the parties
entering into any stipulation of facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies
of the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean
Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer (PO) 2
Christian Trambulo.13Thereafter, the defense presented in court the
testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan,14 (2)
Angelina Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecution’s Case
The prosecution’s version of the events was primarily drawn from the
testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a
confidential informant went to their office and reported that a certain
Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don
supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don
promised him a good commission if he (the informant) would present
a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to
Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding
officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a
team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a
team on the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo, PO1
Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp.
Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was
able to set up a meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to be held at
around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindy’s Restaurant located in
Welcome Rotonda. She was only supposed to meet alias Don that night
but she decided to bring the team along for security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to
the meeting place with the informant. The members of her team
positioned themselves strategically inside the restaurant. The
informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of
shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI
and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein
she would buy 250 grams of shabu for ₱250,000.00. They also agreed
to meet the following day at Cindy’s Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00
p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went
back to Cindy’s Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her
outside the establishment when she arrived. He asked for the money
and she replied that she had the money with her. She brought five
genuine ₱500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of
play money to make it appear that she had ₱250,000.00 with her. After
she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a
more secure place. They agreed for the sale to take place at around
1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Don’s apartment at
765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western
Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination.
Afterwards, the team held their final briefing before they proceeded to
the target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp.
Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would signify that the deal had been
consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The
team then travelled to the address given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3,
1998, the two vehicles they used were parked along the corner of the
street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the apartment
of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m.,
alias Don came out of the apartment with a male companion. Alias
Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she
wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown
envelope he was carrying and she checked the contents thereof. Inside
she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which contained
white crystalline substance. After checking the contents of the
envelope, she assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She then gave
the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to signal the
rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself
as a narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo
was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of
the shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to
possess or sell shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put
her initials "JSF" on the genuine ₱500.00 bills below the name of
Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two suspects, the buy-bust
team brought them to the police station. The suspects’ rights were read
to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the
appellant Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought
out his NBI ID while he was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also
learned that the name of the appellant’s companion was Reynaldo
Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp.
Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the
appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was present the
entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon receiving the buy-
bust money placed inside a green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the
contents thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked the
drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime Laboratory. She was
accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1 Agravante. She handed
over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to
P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic chemist on duty. The police officers
previously weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the
crime laboratory weighed the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her
team waited for the results of the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized
during the buy-bust operation were actually contained in a self-sealing
plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the brown
envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her initials "JSF"
therein and signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the
envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she
did not bother to check out what they were for or who made them.
When she interrogated the appellant about the brown envelope, she
found out that the same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime
Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory
Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She identified in court the six
plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which sachets she also
initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the appellant
was arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the two
suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the
appellant. The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a
white envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the
envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp.
Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp.
Fajardo’s. PO2 Trambulo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998,
a confidential informant reported to them about the illegal drug
activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo
to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting
with alias Don at Cindy’s Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon
City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias
Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of the team that she
convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and the latter
demanded a second meeting to see the money. After the initial
meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about what
happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo
was furnished with five genuine ₱500.00 bills together with the boodle
play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills
below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the
office. When they arrived at Cindy’s Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias
Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the boodle money to
alias Don and after some time, they parted ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later
told the team that alias Don decided that the drug deal would take place
in front of alias Don’s rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc,
Manila. After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize
themselves with the area. They then proceeded to the WPD station to
coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo conducted a
final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the immediate
back-up arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for
P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the
deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal the same to the other members of
the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m.
on April 3, 1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards
the direction of alias Don’s apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned
himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from the
apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the street
perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with
another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to P/Insp.
Fajardo as if asking for something but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that
she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a
big brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then
handed to alias Don a green plastic bag containing the buy-bust money
and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw this, he
immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects.
He was able to recover the buy-bust money from alias Don’s male
companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12
pieces of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. The same were placed
inside a white envelope that was tucked inside alias Don’s waist. PO2
Trambulo marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and
the date. The police officers then informed the suspects of their rights
and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp.
Fajardo, the latter retained possession thereof. The envelope contained
six pieces of plastic bags of white crystalline substance. When they got
back to their office, the team reported the progress of their operation
to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the
required documentations were prepared. Among such documents was
the Request for Laboratory Examination of the drug specimens seized.
PO2 Trambulo said that he was the one who brought the said request
to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the drug specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results
of her examination of the drug specimens seized in this case. She
explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the drug
specimens but the latter was already assigned to another office. The
results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in
Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied
the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and
retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in their
logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and
examined the white crystalline substance from each of the plastic
sachets. She examined first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-
3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequito’s examination revealed
that the white crystalline substances were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined the contents of
12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained
crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to
"B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic sachets also
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp. Dequito’s
findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and
documentary evidence: (1) photocopies of the five original ₱500.00
bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for
Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial
Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen
submitted for examination tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated September 2, 1998
(Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-9832 dated April
3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7)
Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit Q);
(9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC); (10) Physical
Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of
Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical
Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald
Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo Siscar
(Exhibit JJ).
The Defense’s Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecution’s version of events.
The appellant’s brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise
summary of the defense’s counter-statement of facts. According to the
defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a
Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His
duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry
cases as well as requests from different police agencies to have their
specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day and night
duties, and during regular office hours and in the absence of the
laboratory technician, he would weigh the specimens. As subpoena
clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial courts. When there is
no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or bring the drug
specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial
Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00 o’clock p.m. Thereafter, he took a
jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he took
a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 o’clock that evening, where he
saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential
informant of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 o’clock in the morning, Donald’s household
help, Anatolia Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time,
was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard a knock on the door.
Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter two (2) men entered,
poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The
door to Donald’s room was kicked down and they entered his room.
Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun
at him. He saw that there were six (6) policemen searching his room,
picking up what they could get. One of them opened a cabinet and got
drug specimens in [Donald’s] possession in relation to his work as a
laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2) cases and marked as DD-
93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4
Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope
marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998.
Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a
VHS player, and his wallet containing ₱2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donald’s neighbor, witnessed the policemen
entering the apartment and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from
the apartment terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition
Form41 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel
Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust
money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald
Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting
Deputy Director Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5);
and (6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 1996-1998
(Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes
charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s evidence
given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The trial court
held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show
that the police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive to
charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him. Also,
the trial court noted that the volume of the shabu involved in this case
was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and
illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact
helped to dispel the possibility that the drug specimens seized were
merely planted by the police officers. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that
the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the illegal drug
peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the latter’s bare
denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely
framed up by the police, the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper
authorities, or asked help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan
from the NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox copy of the
Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit
dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo
A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to
testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy
Director in order to corroborate and strengthen his testimony that he
was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said shabu to be
presented or turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should have
filed the proper charges against those police officers who were
responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the
same. Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of
[Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by Acting
Deputy Director) presented by the accused in Court could not be given
weight and credence considering that the said persons were not
presented in Court to identify the said documents and that the
prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the same, thus, it has
no probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD
VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of ₱5,000,000.00;
and 2. In Crim. Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 16,
Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by
Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS
and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND (₱4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are
hereby forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said
shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the
finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the
appellant. The appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently
proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-
bust operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant
failed to adduce any evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on
the part of the police officers to falsely charge the appellant, the Court
of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties on the part of the police officers had not been
controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED. The August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75,
finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of
prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his
conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search
and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his supposed
authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him.51 He argues that
the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest
at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the
police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest
against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that
the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As
the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant
posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant further insists that he was able to prove that he was
authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he
was an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was
tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to
this case, we resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the
validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to
move for the quashing of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality
of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary
submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact
of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of
selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust
operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule
11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made
without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of
the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless
seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We
held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however,
is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long
been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search
of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the
invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or
prohibited drugs, the following elements should be satisfactorily
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of
illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused peddled
illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of drugs
are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo
established that a buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in
the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo,
the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who
sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown
envelope for the price of ₱250,000.00. She likewise identified the six
plastic bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon
after the same were seized from the appellant. When subjected to
laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder contained in the
plastic bags tested positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardo’s
testimony on the events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-
bust operation was detailed and straightforward. She was also
consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the
opposing counsel’s cross-examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the
drug specimens seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further
testified as to the recovery from the appellant of another 12 pieces of
plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo
stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the appellant.
This search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic sachets, the
contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony of
P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own
account dovetailed the former’s narration of events. Both police
officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that
were confiscated from the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given
to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so
when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the
contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less
satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses as to why they would falsely incriminate him. The appellant
himself even testified that, not only did he not have any
misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his
arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60 In the absence of evidence
of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken
by the appellant to criminally or administratively charge the police
officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling and possessing
illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a daunting task for the
appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of the
NBI, the appellant could have easily sought the help of his immediate
supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his
predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were
mere photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he was
authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the original
documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at
all presented in court did nothing to help the appellant’s case. To the
mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant failed to
persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting
officers that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and
possessing a considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the night of
the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the
trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it
gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s
assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the
RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of
the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this
Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the
prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes
charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16,
Article III, in relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation
and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute
any regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should
a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of
Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription,
subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by
the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity. (Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of
regulated drugs, the appellant was found to have sold to the poseur-
buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amount is
more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the
imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating
circumstances, the death penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that
when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall
be applied.1âwphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances attended the appellant’s violation of
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the
Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court’s imposition of
reclusion perpetua. The ₱5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on
the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended.
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal
Case No. 98-164175, the Court of Appeals properly invoked our ruling
in People v. Tira64 in determining the proper imposable penalty.
Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the
imposable penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less than 200
grams, in this case, shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the offense, the
imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY
IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams
prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams
prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams
reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams
reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the
possession of the appellant amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable
penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant
should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as
maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls
within the range of the proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case No.
98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only
if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that
the appellant was a regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry
Division. Such fact, however, cannot be taken into consideration to
increase the penalties in this case to the maximum, in accordance with
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.66 Such a special
aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under special
conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum
period,67 was not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus, the
same was properly disregarded by the lower courts.
All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the
appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.