Walter
Thompson Company and North American
Advertising in Brazil, 1929 – 1939
James P. Woodard
This article and its author have benefited from the insight, advice, and encouragement of
Louis A. Pérez Jr. Thomas E. Skidmore gave the penultimate draft a careful read and made
valuable suggestions for revision. Thanks are also due to John Charles Chasteen, who read
and commented on an earlier work containing much of this material, and to the HAHR’s
anonymous reviewers.
1. For the emergence of the U.S. advertising agency in this context, see T. J. Jackson
Lears, Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America ( New York: Basic
Books, 1994), pt. 2; and Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for
Modernity, 1920 –1940 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985), chaps. 1– 2.
With the opening of the São Paulo office in 1929, Thompson executives
hired former employees of the General Motors advertising department, pro-
fessionals already attuned to North American methods and modalities. The
advertising men also began to cultivate new clients and initiated the first sur-
veys of the Brazilian market, research that not only afforded them greater
insight into local business and the lives of Brazilian consumers but that also
provides historians with the opportunity to examine North American attitudes
toward Brazil during this period. Finally, the new office conducted the work
for which it was founded: the creation and dissemination of advertising for an
array of complementary products, thus promoting a certain vision of moder-
nity that was to be assembled in Brazil.
The JWT experience had, in turn, far-reaching effects on Brazilian soci-
ety. With Thompson’s entry into the Brazilian market, other North American
agencies were forced to follow. These agencies, along with JWT, provided the
training that created a new group in Brazilian society, a group of Brazilian
advertising men who formed part of a larger professional-managerial elite that
looked increasingly to the United States as a model for their own country. The
expansion of JWT and its subsequent competitors also led to an increase in
advertising; this increase stimulated the expansion and professionalization of
Brazilian media, with a consequent growth of dependence on advertising rev-
enue on the part of media outlets. Finally, advertising’s appeals reached the
men and women of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, who received and inter-
preted these appeals in different ways.
2. James A. Farrell, “U.S. Steel’s President on the Export Outlook,” Printer’s Ink,
25 June 1925, 154, 165.
demand for markets which will absorb production and keep factories hum-
ming.”3 Government officials agreed, including Henry H. Morse, chief of the
Specialties Division of the Department of Commerce, who saw exporting as
the “foundation” of future U.S. prosperity.4
The enthusiasm for exporting extended to overseas advertising. Charles
Fischer, the foreign manager of Standard Brands — a JWT-Brazil client from
the 1930s through the 1980s — called for more advertising abroad because “it
costs us approximately fifty percent more to advertise in foreign countries. . . .
But the returns of today is [sic] not our yardstick; it is the returns our money
is building for tomorrow from those new markets [we are] in the process of
making.”5
Advertising was seen as a particularly effective means of countering the
commercial advances of European nations as their economies recovered from
war. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Director Julius Klein
warned that in “Japan, China, South America, and other parts of the world,
British, French, and German interests are now making every possible effort to
undermine American prestige.” North American advertising, however, could
serve to counter these efforts as “the American manufacturers who are making
the most headway against the foreign handicaps are those who are advertising
and merchandising their products on the sound basis of high quality and rea-
sonable price.”6
Businessmen, increasingly concerned with export advertising, agreed. At
the 1926 National Foreign Trade Convention in Charleston, J. W. Sanger of
Frank Seaman, Inc., declared, “In today’s international competition for free
trade, America has the distinct advantage of superior initiative, larger plant
capacity, greater reserves of capital, more open-mindedness, and last but not
least, more faith in and better knowledge of modern advertising. Of these
weapons, the most patent one at our command, is advertising.”7
Seven years earlier, Sanger had traveled to Brazil to study the country’s
advertising conditions for the U.S. Department of Commerce. In Brazil he
saw a lack of advertising on the part of European interests and called for
3. Dana Hubbard, “The Road to Export Sales,” Printer’s Ink, 27 Mar. 1924, 49.
4. “Export Service Step by Step,” Printer’s Ink, 26 July 1923, 74.
5. Charles Fischer, “Let’s Sell Yeast Abroad,” Advertising Abroad, Nov. 1929,
31 (emphasis in original).
6. “Present-Day Handicaps to Foreign Trade,” Printer’s Ink, 21 Jan. 1926, 113 –14,
116.
7. J. W. Sanger, “Three Questions Which Exporters Must Answer,” Printer’s Ink,
6 May 1926, 41.
11. Merle Thorpe, “Advertising’s Present Opportunity,” Printer’s Ink, 5 Dec. 1929, 80.
12. James D. Tew, “Does Advertising Need a Continual Defense?” Printer’s Ink,
14 Mar. 1929, 105.
13. Russell Pierce, Gringo-Gaucho: An Advertising Odyssey (Ashland, OR: Southern
Cross Publishers, 1991), 20, 21.
14. Ricci, “Latin America Today,” 5 – 6 (emphasis in original).
15. S. Pereira Mendes, “That Mysterious Continent to the South,” Printer’s Ink,
11 Mar. 1926, 124.
American Sales Division of the General Motors Export Company was estab-
lished.16 In 1925 the company opened an assembly plant in São Paulo.17 The
following year, General Motors established an advertising department along-
side its assembly operations. Founded with five employees, the department
was initially responsible for the production of pamphlets, car cards, and a
GM-Brazil house organ, as well as the organization of North American-style
car shows and cooperative campaigns with local dealers.18 By the end of 1926,
the department had begun producing and placing advertisements. In 1927 a
specialist from the United States arrived to lead the department and teach
“modern advertising” along North American lines. As automobile sales
increased, the department grew to 34 people in 1928.19 GM was not the only
foreign interest to develop a Brazilian advertising department; other North
American companies also established house agencies, most notably General
Electric. However, GM’s department was widely recognized as the “most pro-
fessional and able of the time,” and its employees would later be sought after
by U.S. advertising agencies entering the Brazilian market.20
While GM’s advertising department was being staffed and trained in São
Paulo, the automobile manufacturer and JWT were extending contacts. In
1927 these contacts were formalized such that Thompson became GM’s
advertising council for all markets outside of the United States and was com-
mitted to opening a local office everywhere that GM had an assembly plant,
including São Paulo.21 In Brazil, ties between the advertising agency and the
16. Arthur Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors through Twenty-Five
Years, 1908 –1933 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, & Company, 1934), 247.
17. Carl H. A. Dassbach, Global Enterprises and the World Economy: Ford, General
Motors, and IBM, the Emergence of the Transnational Enterprise ( New York: Garland, 1989),
143; and Pound, The Turning Wheel, 248.
18. Ricardo Ramos, História da propaganda no Brasil (São Paulo: Univ. de São Paulo,
1972), 31; and Fernando Reis, “São Paulo e Rio: A longa caminhada,” in História da
propaganda no Brasil, ed. Renato Castelo Branco, Rodolfo Lima Martensen, and Fernando
Reis (São Paulo: T. A. Queiroz, 1990), 306.
19. Reis, “São Paulo e Rio,” 307.
20. Augusto de Angelo, “A longa jornada da institucionalização,” in Castelo Branco,
Martensen, and Reis, História da propaganda no Brasil, 25.
21. On the agreement, see Henry C. Flower, interview by Colin Dawkins, Greenwich,
Conn., 16 Oct. 1979, 102, J. Walter Thompson Archives (hereafter JWTA), Duke Univ.,
Durham, N.C., Colin Dawkins Papers (CDP), Oral Interview Series (OIS), Transcript
Subseries (TSS); unsigned memorandum on General Motors, 25 July 1928, JWTA, James
Webb Young Papers ( JWYP), International Branch Notebooks (IBN), box 1, fol. 6; Robert
T. Colwell, The One World of Sam Meek ( New York: By the author, 1964), 25; L. T. Steele,
“Driving Wedge for the Global Client,” in Advertising: Today, Yesterday, Tomorrow, ed.
automobile company were so close that one advertising man would later
remark that “We moved with General Motors; we were the advertising depart-
ment of General Motors.”22
Printer’s Ink ( New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 208; “J. Walter Thompson Company,”
Fortune, Nov. 1947, 220; and Pierce, Gringo-Gaucho, 37.
22. Henry Flower, interview by Colin Dawkins, Greenwich, Conn., 20 July 1979, 23,
JWTA, CDP, OIS, TSS.
23. U.S. direct investment in Brazil increased from $193,606,000 at the end of 1929
to $240,109,000 at the end of 1940. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries, Trade
Information Bulletin, no. 731 ( Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1931), 18; and idem, American
Direct Investments in Foreign Countries ––1940, Economic Series, no. 20 ( Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1942), 13. On the expansion of U.S. business in Latin America more generally, see
Thomas F. O’Brien’s pioneering The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin
America, 1900 –1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), which covers Chile, Peru,
Mexico, Cuba, Honduras, and Nicaragua; and idem, The Century of U.S. Capitalism in Latin
America (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1999), which, in its later chapters,
includes Brazil in a more general discussion of the entire region.
24. The opening was preceded by an initial investigation of market conditions by
William B. Ricketts of JWT-New York. See Ricketts, “What Does South America Offer
the American Advertiser,” The News Bulletin, July 1928, 31– 44, JWTA.
American diplomat who had served in Rio de Janeiro, was enlisted for his lan-
guage skills. Flower, a banker’s son, had been educated at Harvard and risen
swiftly through the ranks at Thompson. The similarities between the two men
are telling. They were in many ways typical of the newly professionalized
managerial elite of North American advertising executives: they were born to
wealth and privilege, educated at the better schools, and now looked toward
progress abroad, as well as at home.25
São Paulo, which Flower called the “Detroit of South America,” was
selected as the site for the initial unfolding of this progress. This decision was
made primarily because General Motors was based in the city, but was also
influenced by other factors. Flower, like other North American observers, was
impressed that its “people were so much more alive and progressive.” Giving
voice to the dominant racism of the period, he also saw racial admixture in the
rest of the country as an “obstacle to its future development,” but found this to
be less true of the southeastern part of the country, the “real Brazil.”26
The advertising men set up shop in the Edifício Glória on the praça
Ramos de Azevedo and began the process of staffing the new office.27 The
New York organization specified that local employees should have “some busi-
ness experience” and “a point of view in sympathy with American methods and
ideas.”28 As an earlier investigation had suggested, the GM advertising depart-
ment was crucial.29 Its employees, soon to be put out of work by Thompson,
more than fit the description above, some having worked for the automobile
company since 1926. Oscar Fernandes da Silva, a writer for GM’s advertising
department, became JWT’s media chief. Américo Cassoli was brought over
from the advertising department as checker. Another former GM employee,
Henrique Becherini, was retained as a photographer.30 Trained in the program
and practices of North American advertising during their time at General
25. Historian Jackson Lears has written of this group: “They were the sons . . . of the
late-nineteenth-century liberal Protestant elite, and they clung to a secularized version of
their parent’s worldview: a faith in inevitable progress unfolding as if in accordance with
some divine plan.” See Lears, Fables of Abundance, 154.
26. Minutes of Representatives’ Meeting, 20 Aug. 1929, 14 –15, JWTA, Staff Meeting
Minutes (hereafter SMM), box 2, fol. 1.
27. “A Thompson no Brasil,” Propaganda, July 1969, 14.
28. “Organization of a Copy Department” (memorandum), JWTA, JWYP, IBN,
box 1, fol. 1.
29. See Memorandum by Gilbert Kinney, 7 June 1928, JWTA, JWYP, IBN, box 1,
fol. 6.
30. “A Thompson no Brasil,” 14 –15.
South America specifically. His discussion of business history and empire may
seem crude, and his insistence on the importance of “American brains” dis-
tasteful, but his conception of the status and intent of U.S. business abroad
provides a clear picture of expansionist thought:
To return for a minute to the question of American Imperialism: We
cannot help but realize that our foreign development is passing through
an exceptionally interesting phase. Originally foreign trade was a ques-
tion of barter; next it was founded on the buying and selling of big
importing and exporting companies; then followed the appointment of
local agents or establishment of branch offices. Now we can witness the
growth and development of still another phase: The importation of
American capital and American brains. The market is “opened” by ship-
ping in products from home; it is further developed by a market invest-
ment in the form of advertising and sales activity and then if tariff barri-
ers are thrown up, preparations are begun at once for its local
manufacture.35
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Minutes of Representatives’ Meeting, 10 Sept. 1929, 5, JWTA, SMM, box 2,
fol. 2.
38. See General Reference Client Lists, JWTA, Client Lists Collection, box 6, fol. 2;
and Minutes of Representatives’ Meeting, 19 Mar. 1930, 1, JWTA, SMM, box 2, fol. 3.
of the south (Porto Alegre, Pelotas, and Rio Grande), while his assistant cov-
ered the north of the country. Up to this point the office had relied on the
1920 census and information provided by Julius Klein’s Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce; with the new information Kennard was convinced that
JWT would be “envied even by the Government.”42 Other investigations
included studies of the concentration of wealth nationwide, of rural and urban
banks, and of population and car ownership. Perhaps the most important
result of the surveys was the acquisition of mailing lists of car registrations,
club memberships, bank customers, and home and property owners. These
lists included almost all potential consumers resident in metropolitan Rio de
Janeiro and São Paulo and a significant sector of the consuming public nation-
wide.43
Media studies were obviously essential for an advertising agency’s new sub-
sidiary. Contacts with São Paulo’s newspapers began in June; by early August,
professional contacts had been made with 80 papers across the country.44 Along
with these contacts, the agency studied the Brazilian media independently,
looking at urban and provincial newspapers and their readers, the geographic
and socioeconomic circulations of these papers, and the state of other media
such as magazines, billboards, car cards, radio, and moving pictures.45
In São Paulo, the advertising men found O Estado de S. Paulo most to their
liking, as it was read “by all the better class people in São Paulo city and the
richer farmers in São Paulo, North Paraná, South Minas and [the] ‘Triangulo
Mineiro.’ ” For the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the advertising men
compiled information on the readership of different publications, cataloging
them by class, age, gender, and lifestyle.46
Investigations were also undertaken at the behest of foreign interests
(mostly North American, but one British) to explore their market potential in
Brazil.47 These investigations are of interest to the historian to the degree to
42. Ibid.
43. JWT, “International Advertising,” 109.
44. The News Letter, 15 Sept. 1929, 3.
45. JWT, “International Advertising,” 110.
46. J. Walter Thompson Company do Brasil, “Investigation Made for Blue Star Line”
(1931), microfilm, reel no. 223, 9 –11, JWTA.
47. See JWT, “International Advertising,” 109 –110, 132; JWT, “Investigation Made
for Blue Star Line”; J. Walter Thompson Company do Brasil, “Investigation of the Face
Cream Market in Brazil,” ( July 1934), microfilm, reel no. 223, JWTA; J. Walter Thompson
Company do Brasil, “Preliminary Report on Royal Baking Powder,” n .d. [1934?],
microfilm, reel no. 223, JWTA; and J. Walter Thompson Company do Brasil,
“Investigation for Lehn and Fink” (May 1931), microfilm, reel no. 223, JWTA.
which they represent the creation of knowledge about areas of Brazilian soci-
ety previously ignored, even, as Kennard pointed out, by the government.
They are striking in their concern with race, class, and gender as benchmarks
of consumption. In these respects, the most important of the surviving investi-
gations is one made for Lehn and Fink, the North American manufacturer of
Lysol disinfectant.
In examining Brazilian society through this investigation, the advertising
men not only came to understand what they saw through their North Ameri-
can experience but also from the point of view of where they were in Brazil;
they interpreted Brazil not only through their own prejudices, liberal world-
view, and the historical experience of the United States but also from the point
of view of members of the paulista bourgeoisie with whom they identified.
The Lehn and Fink investigation confirmed these ties: “social life tends to
establish a fairly close relationship between the foreign families [the immi-
grant elite as well as the expatriate elite to which the advertising men belonged]
and the [elite] nationals. This tendency is naturally more accented in the areas
of greatest population density,” such as São Paulo.48 These ties were more than
merely social, they were also commercial and cultural ties, as the two groups
had a host of interests and attitudes in common.49
When discussing race, the North American advertising men accepted the
myth of “racial democracy,” ruling class (white) Brazil’s image of itself.50
Although they probably would have disagreed privately with the desirability of
racial equality or admixture, the advertising men reported that “whites, blacks,
and mixtures mingle in social life without any restraint,” and that racial inter-
marriage enjoyed “every possible legal encouragement.”51 This acceptance of
the myth of Brazilian racial harmony and equality, the advertising men’s view
of Brazil from São Paulo, and their genuine interest in race in Brazil translated
into printed investigations which equated race and class, dividing the popula-
tion into “whites” (like themselves) and “natives” (the ubiquitous other).52
From the vantage point of São Paulo, the advertising men could discount
48. J. Walter Thompson Company do Brasil, “Investigation for Lehn and Fink,” 4.
49. For a discussion of this affinity, albeit one set outside of this period, see Richard
Tansey, Michael R. Hyman, and George M. Zinkham, “Cultural Themes in Brazilian and
U.S. Auto Ads: A Cross–Cultural Comparison,” Journal of Advertising 19, no. 2 (1990): 34–35.
50. For insightful commentary on Brazilian “racial democracy” during this period, see
George Reid Andrews, Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888 –1988 (Madison: Univ. of
Wisconsin Press, 1991), 16, 129 –135.
51. JWT, “Investigation for Lehn and Fink,” 4 – 5.
52. Ibid., 3 – 4.
lows: class A made upwards of 24,000 milreis per year, class B over 12,000, class
C over 5,000, and class D under 5,000.55 Industrialists, owners of big commer-
cial houses, large landholders and coffee planters, and the upper reaches of the
liberal professions made up class A, while class B was made up of more mod-
estly prosperous merchants and farmers, other liberal professionals, and upper-
level civil servants.
The advertising men chose to concentrate on classes A and B as “it is
probable that a more satisfactory net profit can be secured by concentrating on
the small, wealthy section of the population.” These two groups were esti-
mated to number 125,000 families in the Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo mar-
kets. When opened up to include the states of Minas Gerais, Bahia, Rio
Grande do Sul, Pernambuco, Santa Catarina, Paraná, and Espirito Santo, this
number was raised to 193,244 families, 20 percent of the total number of liter-
ate families. The remainder of the country’s population was excluded from the
marketing of modernity.56
Luxury automobile advertisements clearly reflected the projection of dis-
tinct needs and wants — a distinct consumer culture — onto the elite audiences
targeted as class A. Advertisements for LaSalle touted the automobile’s “Dis-
tinction, Luxury, and Mechanical Perfection.” The 1929 Cadillac Phaeton
Sport was sold on the basis of its “Security and Comfort.” The two cars were
“preferred by people who desire comfort, luxury, and security.”57 A 1935 Buick
advertisement invited the reader to come and see the new Buick, the “best-
selling luxury car,” the interior of which “was notably improved to satisfy peo-
ple of demanding tastes for comfort and elegance.” The text was set off against
a picture of society men and women in top hats and gowns standing by their
cars watching a plane fly overhead in the night sk y. Below the text was a list of
private companies and prominent individuals that had recently purchased
Buick automobiles.58 A similar Buick advertisement announced “the continua-
tion, in 1935, of its elegant style, proven superiority, and prestige.”59
Advertisements for travel and tourism shared this preoccupation with
prestige, leisure, luxury, security, and comfort. Campaigns for Blue Star Lines,
like the campaigns for luxury automobiles, were directed at what the advertis-
ing men called the “smart, wealthy and somewhat snobbish set of Brazilian
The “elite,” for whom luxury and comfort are a habit, for whom the
company of people of the same means is indispensable, choose for their
travels a steamship, which provides them with this same ambiente in
which they are accustomed to live. Pleasant hours of rest in a deck-chair!
. . . The comfort of a cabin made for the most refined tastes . . . Good
music . . . Good company . . . Impeccable service . . . The ships of the
Blue Star Line are exclusively for the people of culture and of the social
“elite.” 61
The people with whom you associate — that you find at the country
club, at the Jockey Club, at the Municipal Club, people of culture,
well-traveled, interesting — are without a doubt the ideal companions for
a cruise, whether it be for pleasure, or for business. For a cruise to be as
pleasurable as possible, it is not only important that your fellow travelers
be of the same rank [meio] and have the same tastes and habits. It’s
indispensable that you have the comfort, luxury and the service to which
you are accustomed. Blue Star Line is the line chosen by the “elite” of all
countries for their cruises.62
60. JWT, “Investigation Made for Blue Star Line,” 5 –11, 18.
61. Advertisement in O Estado de S. Paulo, 5 Jan. 1930, 7.
62. Advertisement in O Estado de S. Paulo, 19 Jan. 1930, 9.
tige was still used as an important draw by advertisers, but it was of a different
sort. For example, the 1929 Chevrolet was the “Mirror of your personality,”
and would “Impress your friends” and “fill you with pride.”63 More often,
advertisements for Chevrolet relied on an appeal to emulation of luxury cars
and luxury car owners. A front-page advertisement in O Estado de S. Paulo listed
the improvements of the new model, improvements that gave it “all of the
characteristics of a high-priced car.” A drawing detailed the inside of the car,
the “quintessence of good taste and comfort.”64 Five years later, another front-
page advertisement announced the arrival of the 1936 model, the “only fully
loaded car in the low-price class,” a car “made to provide a new comfort never
before seen in a car of its class.”65
The appeal was not necessarily comfort or luxury, but the idea of luxury as
prestige, now within the reach of the less wealthy for a “moderate down pay-
ment” through the importation of automobile financing. Nowhere was this
more evident than in testimonial advertising, the power of which had been
noticed early by the advertising men.66 Testimonial advertising played on the
perceived emulation of class A consumers by class B audiences. A Chevrolet
advertising campaign that ran in 1934 featured testimonials from famous
liberal professionals, industrialists, and society people along with discreet
reminders of the GM financing plan.67 One such advertisement featured
industrialist Raul Crespi: “Few opinions of the 1934 Chevrolet could be more
valid than those given by Sr. Conde Raul Crespi. A large industrialist of
national renown and a person of importance in the social circles of São Paulo
— as well as a dedicated sportsman — his comments on the acção de joelho of the
new Chevrolets are very significant.”68
Although automobile advertisements directed at class B audiences did
offer them luxury comparable to that enjoyed by their social betters, they did
not sell leisure in the same way as advertisements for the higher end automo-
biles. Neither was there an advertiser comparable to Blue Star Line, in terms
of advertising leisure activity outside of the home. Instead, those members of
class B that could afford it were offered the opportunity to spend more time
within the home. One such advertisement called for the reader to “Enjoy
more of your family’s company, at home, leaving later and getting home
sooner. And put an end to the inconveniences of streetcars and buses! It would
be easy, if you had an affordable car like the new Opel. Owning an Opel is a
pleasure that’s within your grasp these days.”69
Automobile advertisements clearly touched on the issues of thrift and effi-
ciency that dominated so many appeals aimed at middle-sector groups. Prices
figured much more prominently in advertisements for Chevrolets or Opels
than for Cadillacs, LaSalles, or Buicks, where prices were rarely listed. Chev-
rolet dealers offered test-drives so that potential customers could see the auto-
mobile’s “perfect performance and low maintenance costs” for themselves.70
Testimonial advertisements called the readers’ attention to the economy and
savings of the Chevrolet.71
Other advertisements aimed at class B audiences had similar themes, no
doubt influenced by the economic environment of the era. A 1932 Sul America
advertisement offered the fable of the ant and the cricket. The ant was a “pre-
cious symbol of foresight and diligence. He struggles and works, full of confi-
dence in a future of peace, love, joy.” The cricket, on the other hand, was a
“lazy bohemian who sang, played, and danced, careless as a child, without
thinking of the uncertain future.” With the end of the fable, the reader was
urged to think of the future to ensure the success of the ant.72 Not only did the
fable push the product (life insurance), it also assured the well-off reader that
poverty was the result of sloth and carelessness, just as prosperity was the
result of hard work and foresight, a comfortable position for the desired audi-
ence.
Distinctly different appeals were also made to class A and class B female
audiences. In large part, differences in appeals were based on the particular
experiences of the two groups as perceived by the advertising men. For exam-
ple, investigations revealed that class B women did their own housework and
gardening, and were more likely to work outside of the home, whereas class A
women usually did not work, inside or outside of the home. Class A women
were likely to drive, whereas class B women were not. The “wealthier classes”
traveled abroad and “most Brazilian women [of class A] were educated in
France,” while the “poorer classes” (classes B and C) did their own house-
work.73 Advertising directed at class A audiences emphasized recreation and
leisure; women were appealed to as society people and offered products not
offered to class B audiences. Advertisements directed at class B women
appealed to woman as wife and mother, as the purchasing agent of the house-
hold. Luxury was more often than not offered in escapist terms of emulation,
in products that promised to make them as perfect as the North American
starlets featured in the advertisements.
Advertisements directed at the wealthiest of women featured themes
markedly similar to those directed at men of the same position. Class A
women were offered luxury automobiles like the LaSalle. One such advertise-
ment centered on a picture of a woman smiling at the reader from behind the
wheel of an automobile. Above the picture was a line drawing of a woman in a
long dress riding a bicycle and the slogan “Other times, other ways.”74 Auto-
matic transmission was marketed directly at women; the “starterator” was a
“radical solution” to stalling out in traffic. Woman’s commercial liberation as
modernity was touted as a means of selling automobiles as the text of the
advertisement continued on to offer elegance and comfort.75
A distinct model of motherhood, one that included servants and nannies,
predominated in advertising directed at class A women. A 1935 Blue Star Line
advertisement strategically placed next to O Estado de S. Paulo’s society column
brought the ships’ “Beautiful ‘Playroom’ ” to the reader’s attention. The text
read: “Blue Star Line remembered Mother and Father. Completely remod-
eled, its ships now have ample ‘playrooms,’ perfectly ventilated and especially
equipped for children to play in. The little ones stay here under the care of
skillful governesses. And the parents can now dedicate themselves to the ships’
diversions, confident in the protection that the Stars give their children.”76
Class B women were offered a distinctly different model of life in the
advertisements of the period. Advertisements for Refinazil’s Maizena Duryea,
a cornstarch, and for Royal Baking Powder offered their products to “good
housewives” (as boas donas de casa).77 The kitchen was to be modernized — and
were endowed with powers that gave any user new strength and vigor. Kodak
cameras advertised during this period were within the reach of either intended
audience. More important, however, were the messages of certain advertise-
ments directed at anyone who read the newspapers. In the 1920s in the United
States, advertising assumed the role of selling “belief in the business and the
business itself.”85 JWT-Brazil, emerging from the same intellectual milieu,
could not but do the same. But while in the United States this ideological proj-
ect belonged to a domestic professional-managerial block that included impor-
tant sectors of industry, government, and the professions, in Brazil JWT’s
advertising represented a small clique of a few foreign corporations and even
fewer domestic advertisers. In the case of multinational corporations, the
problem was not only to sell the idea of business but also to sell the idea of for-
eign business.
This concern is reflected in JWT’s earliest advertisements. Within a week
of the São Paulo office placing General Motors advertisements, an advertise-
ment based around an exaggerated rendering of the domestic assembly system
was featured in O Estado de S. Paulo. “Only those products that Brazil does not
produce are imported from the United States,” the advertisement proclaimed,
before pointing out domestic assembly’s “innumerable advantages” to the
Brazilian consumer.86
As advertising campaigns proceeded, they became increasingly concerned
with appealing to the local pride of paulistas and portraying GM as a valuable
agent of modernization and commerce. One early advertisement proclaimed
“For the progress of São Paulo” next to the city crest and above a photograph
of a fleet of Chevrolet trucks used by the city’s paving service. The text extolled
the “meaningful badge of the Prefeitura of a city whose progress is one of
Brazil’s greatest glories,” linking GM with that progress through the paving ser-
vices’ use of Chevrolet trucks.87 A week later, another advertisement sold the
importance of the trucks in bringing produce from the interior into the markets
of the city with a caption that read: “For the provisioning of São Paulo.”88 Dur-
ing the 1932 Constitutionalist rebellion, JWT ran advertisements for Nestlé’s
Leite Moça with the slogan “Send a can as a gift to the soldiers.”89
85. “Advertising Promotes Economic Peace,” Printer’s Ink, 31 Dec. 1925, 143.
86. O Estado de S. Paulo, 7 Aug. 1929, 2.
87. O Estado de S. Paulo, 19 Jan. 1930, 5.
88. O Estado de S. Paulo, 21 Feb. 1930, 5.
89. O Estado de S. Paulo, 5 Aug. 1932, 5. See also Nestlé’s newspaper advertisement
(18 Aug. 1932), microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA. An advertisement from this campaign is
reprinted in Maria Helena Capelato, O movimento de 1932: A causa paulista (São Paulo: Ed.
Brasiliense, 1981), 81.
The use of local and national linkages and the fashioning of unique
appeals to be directed at different sectors of the population characterized
much of the advertising of the period. The dominant theme of the period’s
advertising, however, clear in many of the examples cited above, was an ideal-
ized vision of efficiency to be attained through the triumph of medicine, sci-
ence, and technology over nature. The advertising men strove to link their
appeals and the advertisers’ products to an often semimystified science. These
advertisements were not only selling consumer products, they were also selling
a secular doctrine of mass efficiency, both as modernizing concept and way of
life. In the pursuit of modernity along North American lines, efficient and
rational progress was to be extended into the workplace, the home, and even
the body.
Once again, automobile and auto-related advertisements epitomize this
dominant theme in the advertising of the 1930s. Two advertisements, one for
the Buick-Marquette and the other for Atlantic Motor Oil, illustrate this ten-
dency: the automobile’s efficiency was “proven” by laborious testing and the
gasoline was so efficient that it burned to the last molecule.90 In advertise-
ments for commercial vehicles the doctrine of efficiency was even more marked;
newspaper advertisements for GMC and Chevrolet trucks constantly featured
the words economia, econômico, and economisar, not only to sell the products’ low
cost but also to appeal to efficiency and reason. The Chevrolet truck was
touted as the symbolo da economia for both its “minimal cost” and its “maximum
mechanical perfection.”91 Economia also became synonymous with financial and
fuel efficiency. Advertisements for GMC trucks promised the customer that
the truck would save (lhe economisará) enough to make up for the cost.92
Another Chevrolet advertisement combined the ideal of economia/efficiency
with the triumph of science and technology over nature: the text claimed that
the truck had the “Power to haul a full load on rough terrain, speed and, there-
fore savings/efficiency of time [economia de tempo], easy handling, minimal
expense, and the most recent improvements.” The truck’s ability to haul on all
terrain represented a victory over the vagaries of nature; speed and low cost
represented economia; and the most recent improvements represented the pin-
nacle of the modern.93
90. Buick advertisement (late 1929) and Atlantic advertisement (13 Feb. 1931),
microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA.
91. Chevrolet advertisement (1 Nov. 1930), microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA.
92. GMC advertisement (mid-1930), microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA.
93. Chevrolet advertisement (20 Mar. 1930), microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA.
94. O Estado de S. Paulo, 16 Jan. 1931, 5; and Refinazil newspaper advertisements ( Jan.
and Mar. 1931), microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA.
95. Royal Baking Powder advertisement (n.d.), microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA.
96. O Estado de S. Paulo, 18 Aug. 1932, 3.
97. Maizena advertisement (Aug. 1932), microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA.
98. Fleischmann advertisement (Mar. 1934), microfilm, reel no. 41, JWTA.
By the end of the decade, the advertising men had produced and placed thou-
sands of advertisements. The staff of the São Paulo office had grown to 25,
while the Rio de Janeiro suboffice, opened in 1931, now had 10 employees.99
Many others had worked at JWT and taken their training to the newly opened
local branches of other U.S. advertising agencies or gone on to found their
own agencies. The JWT client pool had grown to include other multinational
corporations and, to a lesser extent, national advertisers, lessening Thompson’s
dependence on General Motors and providing the company with a Brazilian
veneer. Looking back from 1935, the parent company in New York could
make the following claims: “The São Paulo office is equipped to carry out full
agency functions. In this respect and as regards experience and resources, the
office is better situated than any other agency in Brazil. In spite of continuous
economic instability and repeated political upheavals in Brazil, the Company
has made excellent progress in winning the confidence of local advertisers on
the basis of actual results obtained.”100
During this period, JWT’s advertisements were seen by at least 90,000
people per day during the week and 105,000 per day on Sundays in O Estado de
S. Paulo alone.101 In addition to Portuguese-language advertising in scores of
newspapers, the São Paulo office set advertisements in German and Italian,
while Japanese-Brazilian publishers set advertisements in their mother tongue.
The newspapers of the Anglo-American expatriate communities of Rio de
Janeiro and São Paulo also ran Thompson advertisements.102
The significance of JWT’s success was not lost on contemporary
observers. Thompson’s role in the expansion of advertising in Brazil, and the
degree to which this expansion formed part of a larger cultural and economic
advance on the part of North American interests, was made clear by the U.S.
Trade Commissioner in Rio de Janeiro:
Brazil affords a fertile field for intelligent advertising, and it may be said
that American products sold in Brazil have benefited to the greatest
extent from this almost indispensable aid to merchandising. The present
era in advertising in Brazil had its inception a decade ago, coincidental
with the expansion of imports of American specialties and the subsequent
ucts to the attention of Brazilian readers. Proper light was not only “the light
of your eyes,” it was also a means for attracting (female) shoppers into a store
or exacting the maximum efficiency from (male) workers. Just as General
Motors promised a car “for every purse and purpose,” GE made refrigerators
“for every need and home.” Other Ayer-advertised consumer products included
hot water heaters, electric clocks, sewing machines, electric stoves, light bulbs,
radios, and lamps.109
McCann-Erickson also entered the Brazilian market during this period,
opening an office in 1935 to serve Standard Oil. It became the first North Amer-
ican agency to be headed by a Brazilian, Armando de Moraes Sarmento, who
had worked for Ayer and founded his own company before joining McCann.110
Perhaps the most obvious result of the growth of JWT and these other
companies was the slow but significant increase in advertising space and
sophistication. Photography became an increasingly important element of
print advertising.111 As Thompson and other North American agencies began
to place more and more advertisements of better quality, unrelated companies
began to advertise and established advertisers improved the appearance of
existing campaigns. On 21 March 1931, an advertisement for the new Buick
covered the entire front page of O Estado de S. Paulo. Similar cover advertise-
ments for the new Chevrolets ran the following month.112 A full-page cover
advertisement by a national advertiser appeared three months later.113 With
the premiere of King Kong in 1933, cinema announcements moved from the
back of newspapers to the front, where an advertisement heralded “The great-
est film of the century!”114
As advertisements proliferated, with a commensurate rise in advertising
revenue during a period of economic depression, newspapers could not but
have become more dependent upon advertisers. O Estado de S. Paulo began
advertising for advertisers: “As everyone’s paper, in the home and office, it is
for this reason the ideal newspaper for advertising. . . . Try placing your adver-
tising in this newspaper and see the results.”115 At the time, advertising made
During the same period, the amount of radio advertising increased dramati-
cally as well. In 1931 only one North American automobile company was
advertising on the radio. By 1937 Brazilian radio was being used to advertise
several North American automobile lines, as well as North American refriger-
ators, petroleum products, and even radio sets themselves.122 The spread of
radio meant the dissemination of North American broadcast advertising not
only to the elite audiences targeted by advertisers but also into regions and
homes overlooked as potential markets. Indeed, as one researcher pointed out
while reflecting on JWT’s growth from the 1930s through the 1950s, the
spread of advertising stimulated the expansion of all media: “In countries like
Brazil, which in those years did not possess a press, radio, or television of
national scale, the advertising network laid the foundations for the integration
of the market.”123
By the end of this period, the North American trade commissioner could
claim that due to the influence of North American advertising agencies the
Brazilian consumer “has been educated to expect attractive and original adver-
tising, and his buying habits are influenced accordingly.”124 Later Brazilian cri-
tiques would also focus on the consumer and claim that North American
advertising had fundamentally reshaped the population’s mentality.125 The his-
torian must be more circumspect in looking at the reception of advertising.
First of all, despite the impressive growth of radio, the bulk of the advertising
produced during this period was in print, which automatically limited its
appeals to the literate, only 35 percent of the population of São Paulo state in
1937, according to one estimate.126 Second, to fall back upon a model of pas-
sive acceptance of North American consumer values by Brazilian audiences is
to stamp a wide sector of the population as hapless receptors of North Ameri-
can commercial designs, allowing for no dissent within consumer culture. At
the same time, however, one cannot overlook the fact that the idea behind
advertising and related forms of merchandising, that of hoisting new wants
122. U.S. Department of Commerce, Broadcast Advertising in Latin America, 10; and
U.S. Department of Commerce, Advertising in Brazil, 29 – 30.
123. Armand Mattelart, Advertising International: The Privatization of Public Space, trans.
Michael Chanan ( New York: Routledge, 1991), 4.
124. U.S. Department of Commerce, Advertising in Brazil, 1.
125. See, for example, Claudio de Arauju Lima, Imperialismo e angústia: Ensaio sôbre as
bases de uma sócio-psiquiatria da classe média brasileira na era imperialista (Rio de Janeiro:
Civilização Brasileira, 1960).
126. U.S. Department of Commerce, Advertising in Brazil, 5.
127. See William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New
American Culture ( New York: Vintage, 1993); and Lears, Fables of Abundance, pt. 2.
128. Propaganda, Apr. 1944, quoted in Reis, “São Paulo e Rio,” 309.
129. Martensen, “O ensino da propaganda no Brasil,” O Estado de S. Paulo, 20 Dec.
1975, Suplemento Centenário, 4.
130. Ramos, História da propaganda, 40; and Angelo, “A longa jornada,” 26, 29.
131. Ibid., 26.
132. Ibid., 26 – 29; and Ramos, História da propaganda, 40.
The Brazilian advertising men also began publishing their own periodi-
cals. In 1932 Propaganda was founded in Rio de Janeiro as a four-page tabloid.
Although it did not last, the marketing of the tabloid offers insight into how
this professional-managerial elite was beginning to think about itself and
the modernity brought from abroad. The founder, Ivo Arruda, published
Propaganda under the pseudonym Pete Nelson, later explaining that “At that
time, [the perception was] that there were not any Brazilian ‘experts’ and I
thought that no one would believe the proclamations made by any paper, if
that paper was not headed by a foreigner. From this came the birth of this Pete
Nelson, who put on airs of a North American.”133 The nascent managerial
elite, heirs to a North American cultural project, demanded U.S. prestige.
A more successful magazine by the same name was published beginning in
1937 by an editorial team that included Thompson, GM, and Ayer alumni.
In 1940 Publicidade was founded in Rio de Janeiro. Renamed PN in 1947, it
would become the most successful trade publication of the immediate postwar
era.134
Alongside the founding of trade associations and specialized publications,
some of the new professionals left the North American subsidiaries and
opened their own businesses, eager to capitalize on their expertise and spread
the ideals they had embraced under North American tutelage. One such
advertising man entitled a short reminiscence of this period, “The Foreign
Agencies Brought Modernity, the National Ones Learned Quickly.”135 In 1930
Francisco Teixeira Orlandi and Aldo Xavier da Silva, both formerly of the GM
advertising department, founded the Emprêsa Nacional de Propaganda, which
Orlandi proudly called the “first Brazilian agency to employ American meth-
ods.” The company failed due to a lack of capital, however, and the two men
went to work for Ayer.136
Columbia University-educated Cícero Leuenroth was more successful. In
1933, he founded his own agency, taking the name “Standard” because of the
prestige of a North American name among advertisers and publishers.137 In
the 1960s, Standard would emerge as one of the national advertising agencies
that would begin to displace the North American agencies that had trained
their founders.
Another such agency was Inter-Americana, founded in Rio de Janeiro in
1929 as Armando D’Almeida Publicidade. Founder Armando D’Almeida had
worked for the General Electric advertising department before founding his
own agency, which provided local representation for Foreign Advertising and
Service Bureau, a small New York export agency. Described by one author as
an “unconditional admirer of matters and institutions North American, to
which he was always connected,” D’Almeida, along with JWT, did propaganda
work for the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs during
World War Two.138 A 1940 article subtitled “Advertising and National Devel-
opment” outlined the philosophy of the agency, renamed Inter-Americana in
1938: advertising was to “create needs, awaken desires, understand, deepen,
exploit, and consolidate markets” in order to “create new habits” and “stimu-
late the demand for comfort and civilization,” thereby contributing to Brazil-
ian development.139
While Inter-Americana and Standard were the most visible and successful
of the agencies founded during this period, a number of other Brazilian agen-
cies were founded in the 1930s. By the end of the decade, there were an esti-
mated 56 agencies operating in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo,
according to the leading trade publication.140
In learning their trade and organizing themselves along North American
lines, the emerging professional-managerial elite also absorbed the values and
ideology brought to Brazil by agencies like Thompson. While the existing
documentation precludes exhaustive discussion of this process during this
period, ample impressionistic evidence for the transmission of the North Amer-
ican cultural program exists (some of it clear in the above). The career of adver-
tising man Renato Castelo Branco serves as an additional brief illustration of
this more general process. Like many of his colleagues, Castelo Branco started
out as an author before joining Ayer as a copywriter in 1935. He would go on
to work for McCann-Erickson, then for JWT, eventually becoming the first
Brazilian to head the subsidiary. He was also a founder of the Brazilian Adver-
tising Association, the São Paulo Advertising Association, and the São Paulo
Museum of Art’s School of Advertising (founded in 1951), as well as a member
of the American Chamber of Commerce of Brazil’s Advisory Committee on
Public Relations.141 Throughout his professional career, Castelo Branco
retained a belief in advertising as an “educational force — an activating force.”
In this regard, he emerged as a national intellectual heir to the liberal modern-
ization project envisioned by the North American advertising men who
brought the profession to Brazil in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In 1975,
reflecting on his 40-year career and the development of the profession in
Brazil, he would write:
groups, new problems present themselves, the first and most obvious of which
is that the advertisements were never intended for the paulistano or carioca
working classes, much less the rural poor. In the case of the latter, moreover, it
is unlikely that they were exposed to advertising during this period, and even
more unlikely that they were able to interpret it — at least in the intended
manner — due to mass illiteracy. It is much more likely that working-class
Brazilians in the São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro metropolitan areas were
exposed to North American advertising. But to assume that a worker’s viewing
of an advertisement on a newsreel at the cinema translated into direct internal-
ization of the advertiser’s values is facile; it posits a view of mass communica-
tion in which the dissemination of values by modern media is more powerful
than any other form of socialization. A case might be made for this argument
in the television age, but in the 1930s it is clear that advertising’s inadvertent
appeals to the Brazilian urban poor, who had grown to adulthood before the
expansion of North American advertising, were ineffective. Radio jingles and
newspaper copy might have elicited comment and even wonder, but they almost
certainly did not involve immediate acceptance of a vision of the good life along
U.S. lines as promoted by the advertisements of agencies like Thompson.
Conclusion
From the 1930s, an important period in the expansion of corporate and con-
sumer culture in Brazil, advertising continued to grow in volume, importance,
and reception. In the postwar era, advertising’s practitioners would build on
the work of this decade as U.S. investment, uninhibited by depression or war,
grew beyond the levels imagined by earlier enthusiasts like Henry Flower and
Julius Klein. The JWT experience was reproduced in a number of other sec-
tors — public relations, publishing, the sales and marketing departments of
countless U.S. firms — as North American corporations continued to intro-
duce new methods and technology and explore new markets. The liberal
developmentalism of the 1920s and 1930s changed in style and sophistication,
if not in substance, as it was reinterpreted and adopted by a new generation of
North Americans ( Walt Whitman Rostow was perhaps the most visible) and
Brazilians (Renato Castelo Branco, for example). Developments like these
built on the growth of the late 1920s and the 1930s, when U.S. business first
reached preeminence in Brazil, aided by advertising agencies like Thompson,
who brought to Brazil the pictures and words of the interwar advertising
boom and trained a generation of Brazilian professionals.