Dr.

Tina Kinsella, National College of Art and Design, Dublin

Enjoying Liminal Pleasures?

The Jouissance of Becoming-Non-Life-in-Life

in the Photography of Francesca Woodman

Introduction

Francesca Woodman began taking photographs at the age of thirteen, producing around five
hundred works between 1972 and 1980. Her first book, Some Disordered Geographies was
published in early January 1981. On the 19th January 1981 Woodman jumped from her
apartment window on the Lower East Side of New York in 1981. She was twenty two years
old. At the time of her suicide, Woodman’s work had been shown in a number of small group
shows in New York, but it didn’t gain serious recognition until 1986 when she had her first
solo show. The catalogue essay for this exhibition featured essays from renowned theorists
such as Rosalind Krauss and Abigail Solomon-Godeau and, according to Peggy Phelan, both
writers ‘made a conscious decision not to discuss Woodman’s suicide in detail.’1 Since then
responses to Woodman’s oeuvre have largely concentrated on the formal aspects of her work
— placing her images among the repertoire of Surrealist, Minimalist and feminist work of the
20th century — or it has been interpreted through a psychoanalytic lens and discussed in
relation to constructions of femininity, female narcissism, the fetish, and the death drive.
Death, it has regularly been argued, permeates Woodman’s work, leading Phelan to claim
Woodman’s images as testament to her “rehearsal for death” and to suggest that, in the act of
leaping to her death, Woodman ‘asked us to see that her death was with her all along. It had
not just developed ... Woodman’s use of photography [is] ... a way to rehearse her work
death’ that ‘allows us to consider her art as an apprenticeship in dying.’2 This rehearsal for
death, Phelan claims, does not situate the photographic document as the object that ‘outlasts
or conquers death,’ but as that which ‘invites us to see her [Woodman’s] suicide, like art, as a
gift.’3

This paper does not seek to negate the inferences that have been abstracted from Woodman’s
work in relation to the dynamic between death and the image or to contest the claim that
Woodman’s photographs are a gift that allow us to consider her art as an apprenticeship in
dying. Rather, it aims to tentatively explore Woodman’s photographs from the perspective of
artist and psychoanalytic theorist, Bracha L. Ettinger’s, Matrixial theory in an attempt to
examine non-conscious affects that may arise in the modality of embodied art practice. To
consider, in addition, the dynamic between the viewer and the traumatic image: the residual
trauma for/in the viewer who encounters Woodman’s work, with or without the knowledge of
her early death as well as to enquire into the critical framing around Woodman’s work which
has, in some part, concentrated on the purported staging of a scene of femininity aligned with
death. I review two particular hermeneutic strands that have been applied to Woodman’s
work. The first being that of art theorist Phelan who suggests that Woodman’s work
evidences a rehearsal of her own death and who approaches Woodman’s practice via
Sigmund Freud’s analytic of the death drive. The second strand I address is that of Jui-Ch’I
Liu who has similarly approached Woodman’s work from the perspective of psychoanalytic
theory by drawing on Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject and the maternal relationship vis-à-
vis child and mother. Liu contends that Woodman’s work ‘exhibits her longing for
fantasmatic fusion with the womblike environment .... [a] fetishistic yearning for the illusory

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recovery of the pre-Oedipal space.’4 A yearning then for what can, from certain
psychoanalytic perspectives, be considered a form of psychical death. Concentrating on
Freud’s analytic of the death drive — which is concerned with the absence and presence of
the mother — Phelan evokes a particular dynamic at work in Woodman’s work that places
the feminine in assignation with death. Drawing on Kristeva’s notion of the abject, Liu’s
discussion of Woodman’s images evidences a rendezvous between the maternal body and
psychical death or disintegration. I do not aim to offer an alternative reading of Woodman’s
photographic inventory, nor to interrogate the artist’s intentions. Rather, I explore the scene
of encounter between the traumatic image and viewer: the potentially traumatising image that
is already situated within discourses infused with an entanglement between femininity and
death. I do this to raise a question: what happens in us, as viewers, as consumers of such
images?

In order to explore this question, I draw on Ettinger’s theorisation of matrixial trans-

subjectivity and her insights into the potential knowledges that arise in art practice and in the
viewer’s encounter with the artwork. Ettinger offers a radical supplement to the analytic of
the subject proposed by Freud and Jacques Lacan by suggesting that subjectivisation
processes commence in the emergence into life during the late intrauterine encounter between
becoming-subject/infant and becoming-mother. During this encounter/emergence/event, she
argues, there is a subtle entanglement between unconscious death drives and sub-Symbolic,
non-conscious (yet affective and subjectivising) matrixial life drives. Due to the
psychoanalytic foreclosure on the pre-birth scene, Ettinger argues, we have no conceptual
apparatus to understand the affective apprehension of this emergence into life, which she
theorises as “non-life,” becoming-life” and “not-yet life.” During the emergence into life in
the late intrauterine encounter there are two becoming subjects (becoming-subject/infant and
becoming-mother) who are both partialised subjects and partialised objects to/for each other.
Due to this affective co-becoming, the subject may have an affective apprehension of its own
“objectality” in life. The experience of such objectality, Ettinger suggests, may be
experienced by the subject as a desire for death because we have no conceptual apparatus to
understand the objectality we affectively encounter in the emergence into life. Ettinger’s
intervention in psychoanalytic theorisations of the subject and the death drive do not deny
psychical unconscious phantasy that align with the maternal body with death, rather she
claims that such phantasies are concordant with, what she terms, identity on the phallic level
of subjectivity where the subject is concerned with policing and shoring up psychical and
corporeal boundaries: those psychical and somatic contours of identity whose unity, presence
and integrity are threatened by the intrusion of that which is other than the celibate, singular
self.

Drawing on key concepts developed by Ettinger, such as “matrixial desire,” “maternal Eros,”
and “matrixial Thanatos” which she articulates as life drives, I place Woodman’s
photographs in conversation with Ettinger’s theorisation of matrixial subjectivity to suggest
that Woodman’s work, and the viewer’s encounter with her images, can be approached
through this matrixial prism. Thinking through matrixiality, we can begin to consider the
possibility that Woodman’s traumatic images may not only pay testament to her own death
drive and not only evidence a phantasmatic desire to return to an illusory pre-Oedipal
symbiotic fusion with the maternal body. Considering matrixial life drives as a sub-Symbolic,
non-conscious yet affective, pulsations or modulations within one’s own subjectivity allows
us to permit the possibility that viewing her images does not necessarily enliven our own
death drive when we encounter her work as viewing subjects. We can ruminate on the
potentiality for working-through objectality and non-life in life: the nuanced interweaving of

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Dr. Tina Kinsella, National College of Art and Design, Dublin

the phallic death drive and matrixial life drives in our post-Oedipal subjectivity. To consider
this matrixial approach to the encounter with the traumatic image, we return to Freud’s 1920
essay, Beyond the Pleasure Principle in which he began to elucidate his conceptualisation of
the death drive (Thanatos). For Freud, the life drive (Eros) is considered to be a preservative,
procreative, constructive and productive instinct innate to all human beings. Eros conflicts
with the death drive as Thanatos opposes the conservative nature of Eros as the death drive
evidences a desire to ‘achieve a state never previously attained.’ a drive to return to an ‘old
state, a primordial state from which’ the organism ‘once departed.’5 Freud writes:

If we may reasonably suppose, on the basis of all our experience without

exception, that every living thing dies — reverts to the organic — for
intrinsic reasons, then we can only say that the goal of all life is death, or to
express it retrospectively: the inanimate existed before the animate.6

We have already noted that Phelan argues that a preoccupation with death permeates
Woodman’s understanding of photography.7 In order to situate this reading, Phelan draws our
attention to Freud’s detailing of the fort/da game in his analytic of the death drive. Freud had
observed his young grandson Ernst throwing a spool of thread across the curtained cot of his
mother’s bed, then retrieving the spool whilst saying “fort/da” (gone/here). This repetitive
staging of the scene enacted through the compulsively repetitious discarding and retrieval of
the cotton spool is understood by Freud as an attempt, on young Ernst’s behalf, to alleviate
the anxiety he felt in response to the enigma of his mother’s alternating presence and absence.
Thus Phelan observes that this ‘psychic struggle between the compelling drive for stillness
and the vital necessity of animation that Freud believed was fundamental to all life’ — this
tensile dynamic between Eros (the life drive) and Thanatos (the death drive) — is evident in
Woodman’s work, which stages and re-stages the play between absence and presence through
the body in Woodman’s work.8

The analysis of Woodman’s work offered by Liu similarly concentrates on the dynamic
between Woodman’s work and the absent maternal body. Detailing Woodman’s desire as a
‘daughter’s active desire to return to the maternal body’ and subvert ‘the paternal symbolic
order,’9 Liu acknowledges Kristeva’s notion of the abject as an avowal of the death drive,
with Woodman’s daughter’s desire for return to, and reunion with, ‘the maternal body that
cannot be captured, except in death.’10 Thus both Phelan and Liu highlight the assignation
between death, absence and the psychically foreclosed maternal body. For Liu, this is staging
of the play between absence and presence is evidenced in Woodman’s theme of an elusive
self, absorbed in a nostalgic place that is theatrically enacted and performatively iterated in
neglected domestic interiors. Interiors in which Woodman often appears blurred; crouching
like a phantom in a foetal position or disappearing ‘behind the detached mantel of an old
fireplace’ where the artist is ‘struggling to hide herself by merging into the dark womb’ that
the fireplace symbolically invites 11 Liu draws an analogy between Children’s Games (1942),
a painting by the Surrealist painter Dorothea Tanning, and The Yellow Wallpaper, a short
story/novella by the American writer, Charlotte Perkins Gilman (first published in 1892). In
this brief tale, Perkins Gilman details a bourgeois woman’s confinement in a room decorated
with yellow wallpaper, charting what is often understood as her descent into madness. This
novella ends with the heroine stripping the paper from the walls, an act replicated in the
Tanning painting. This act is interpreted by Liu as ‘an implicit mise-en-scène of an
intrauterine metaphor’ with the narrow passage-like room in Tanning’s painting being ‘a
metaphorical place of birth.’12 For Liu, the painting depicts the violence of ‘separation from

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the mother’ as well as being suggestive of ‘mother-daughter bonding ’that resonates with the
‘daughter’s fantasy of having being born.’13

In Woodman’s domestic images Liu sees an ‘unsettling disturbance of physical and

psychological boundaries, a fear of absorption of her ego within the ominous, abandoned
setting.14’ The abandoned home in Woodman’s work signifies the absent maternal body, yet
her images demonstrate the presence of a daughter’s desire to return to this absent maternal
body that is transmitted through an ‘active longing and a positive struggle to merge with the
wall.’15 Thus Liu understands Woodman’s work as fear of absorption into a threatening
feminine world as well as a desperate to desire to fuse with that world. A tension being
played out between psychical and corporeal unity and fusion with the maternal, feminine
space, evoking Woodman’s daughterly desire to return to the pre-Oedipal space. Liu aligns
this space with Kristeva’s notion of the semiotic chora, from which the child has experienced
both the ‘jouissance of the fluid and heterogenous semiotic motility through contact with the
maternal body’16 and the pre-Oedipal repression of this ‘semiotic relation’ that must take
place ‘in order to acquire the symbolic order of language.’17 Thus Woodman’s body, staging
the interplay between these conflicting desires, is re-staging the play of absence and presence
of the maternal body by dissolving her own corporeal boundaries within the photographic
frame and by refusing her body to the spectator as spectacle. This dissolution and refusal is
an enactment, according to Liu, of Kristeva’s abject which is disrespectful of borders,
positions, rules and the Law. Being in-between, ambiguous and composite, the abject disturbs
identity, system and order by signalling the maternal body that the subject struggles to
psychically rid itself of. At once desirable, yet terrifying, nourishing, yet murderous,
fascinating, yet repulsive, the maternal body evoked in Kristeva’s analytic of the indexes that
otherness which must be abjected in order to establish clear psychical and somatic boundaries
between self and other.

In both Liu and Phelan’s analysis, the pre-Oedipal space and the maternal body as source
threaten identity; singularly signalling fusion, symbiosis, absorption, dissolution: the loss of
boundaries and collapse of borders. This is most marked in Phelan’s critique, evidenced when
she invites us to consider Woodman’s work as a rehearsal for death: an erasure of the self that
is performatively worked-through by Woodman in a series of compulsively, repetitively
staged series of self-effacements. To appreciate what Ettinger’s account of matrixial trans-
subjectivity offers, as a supplement to our conceptualisations of the maternal body we can
consider Freud’s analytic of the Oedipus complex and the incest taboo. For Freud, desire and
incest are countenanced only in terms of sexual-genital desire for sexual union with the
mother.18 Ettinger challenges Freud’s contention that sexual incest is the universal taboo of
civilisation. She argues:

... In the matrixial sphere all mothers are incestuous in a nonphallic,

nongenital, and non-Oedipal sense, inasmuch as intrauterine relations
between future mother and future subject are by definition incestuous.19

The non-phallic, non-genital and non-Oedipal matrixial incest that Ettinger elucidates occurs
during the affective emergence into life where there is a cross-inscription of the Oedipal,
phallic death drive and non-conscious, matrixial, phantasmatic affects between becoming-
mother (who is also a post-Oedipal adult) traversing phantasy on the phallic level of
subjectivity and the pre-Oedipal subject/infant who is being subjectivised by both the phallic
death drive as well as the becoming-mother’s matrixial life drives. This cross-inscription of
unconscious and non-conscious phantasy and affect signals, according to Ettinger, that a

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Dr. Tina Kinsella, National College of Art and Design, Dublin

transgression of somatic and psychical borders has already occurred in the emergence into
life. A necessary, non-genital and non-sexual incest has already taken place in the late
intrauterine encounter between two becoming-subjects who are also becoming-objects for
each other. This incest is prior to the Oedipal prohibition. and it signals that in ‘fact my
boundaries have already always been transgressed, and on certain levels they are only a
fiction.’20 Ettinger suggests that ‘this prebirth, nonprohibited incest’ was silenced and
excluded from psychoanalytic thought because of the ‘highly psychotic potentiality … for
male subjects.’.21 This exclusion ‘is vital for the phallic subject because it stands for the split
from the death drive,’ but the result of this prohibition on pre-birth incest is that the maternal
body is aligned with death, the deathly and the death inducing22 as the psychoanalytic
‘foreclosure on procreation’ results in a conflation between the feminine, ‘death’ and the
‘horrible.’. Thus the:23

... idea of death is closely connected to the feminine in western culture and
is very strongly embedded inside Freudian psychoanalysis in general and
Lacanian theory in particular ... [Where] the feminine is closely associated
with fusion, undifferentiation, autism, and psychosis.24

Ettinger argues that the intrauterine incest that occurs between becoming mother (non-I) and
becoming subject/infant (I) is not ‘excluded from the Symbolic … but rather marginalized as
unthought or crazy, and foreclosed’ and:25

... aspects of this matrixial twilight zone that did not get elaborated in
psychoanalysis were subjugated to the phallic order, by which they were
regulated as a question of bringing children into the heterosexual
framework, where objects-women are exchanged in the “Name of the
Father” and the womb stands for fusion symbiosis and undifferentiation,
which can emerge in culture only as psychosis.26

This leads Ettinger to make a crucial distinction between what she calls phallic Freudian
Eros, and matrixial maternal Eros which is a compassionate Eros of hospitality towards the
emerging life. In the journey into life, the phantasy of the becoming-mother is capacious, as
both compassionate and hospitable maternal Eros and phallic Eros are co-present, as are
matrixial Thanatos and phallic Thanatos. Maternal Eros and matrixial Thanatos are non-
aggressive life drive. Compassionate Eros reveals a ‘non-aggressive thanatos’ and this non-
aggressive Thanatos is ‘not death, but the non-life as the not yet emerged, the not yet
becoming alive.’27 Transiting the non-life state, Ettinger argues, the becoming-subject/infant
is imbued with a matrixial desire which signals an affective capacity in the subject to ‘love
the anonymous elements’28 and to ‘share traces of pain and join in psychic sorrow’ in life .29
Hence Ettinger offers a means by which we can re-think the very formation of ourselves as
subjects who are not only ordered in accordance with the destructive death drive but who are
formed within an affective, compassionate and hospitable co-emergent partnership where
otherness (the partial otherness of the co-emergent partner/becoming-mother) is not rejected
or abjected. The primary vulnerability which is constitutive of life is, on this primordial level,
underwritten by an affective, compassionate and hospitable economy which can be
reactivated and accessed in life .

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Dr. Tina Kinsella, National College of Art and Design, Dublin

Jouissance, as elaborated by Lacan, is aligned to the death drive which is concerned with
split, separation and castration and conflicted with desire. Whereas Ettinger argues that there
is access to feminine/matrixial desire which is matrixially wound ‘around a feminine
jouissance’ by way of a ‘Female swerve and rapport in a Real connected to the womb.’30
This ‘different jouissance,’ a bodily jouissance ‘between trauma and phantasy’ and it
engraves a ‘subknowledge between phantasy and desire, in an enlarged subjectivity’ as it:
indexes an:31

... incestuous in/out-side relation (rapport) between subject-to-be and

archaic-m/Other-to-be, by its connection to female corporeal invisible
specificity (which is the place where this incest takes place), is the source in
the Real for a matrixial stratum […] the I equals subject plus jouissance.32

Thus for Ettinger, matrixial bodily jouissance signals that the body ‘is not a springboard for
the satisfaction of the drives … the body penetrates from a different place, by different
considerations, and indicates the appeal of the I’s body-psyche to the m/Other, for
closeness.’33 Closeness, rapport, inside/outside relations, connection, are signposted by the
modulations and sub-Symbolic pulsations of the matrixial stratum, not fusion, symbiosis,
collapse, disintegration and annihilation. The partial, trans-subjective, non-life state that the
becoming-subject experiences leaves traces of susceptibility in the subject. In this way the
subject, Ettinger argues, can experience this non-life state in life which can be ‘revealed to
the subject as a shock when not negated, refused or repressed.’34 In other words, non-life and
trans-subjectivity are not furry, fluffy, feel-good capacities to affectively connect with others.
This trans-subjective capacity can be traumatic to the subject when it is experienced because
not only is this capacity for connection not socially recognised, it is not validated or valued.
Hence when the matrixial stratum is aroused and then rejected it can be re-traumatising for
the subject as, on a certain level, the subject affectively apprehends its own objectality which
is then refused.

If we look at this untitled photograph by Woodman, we see a body actually moving through a
hole in a gravestone. This is a body in movement, it is not inert or inanimate but it is naked
and somewhat vulnerable. The identity of the subject who is photographed is not
recognisable; there is an element of anonymity, or perhaps uncognisedness is a better way of
putting it, that Ettinger connects with the matrixial trans-subjective stratum. We find a similar
motif in this photograph where the photographed subject is, once more, unidentifiable but is
not moving through a gravestone but rather through a gap, between darkness and light in a
somewhat liminal state. Can we say that there is a drive and desire to connect with objects as
anonymous (but not only terrifying) elements? I suggest this, not in order to impose such an
interpretation on Woodman or her work, but rather to raise this as an object of enquiry for
ourselves as viewing subjects, reviewing a scene of encounter with Woodman’s body and
with anonymous elements and objects. Lacan identified the mirror phase with the onset of
narcissism. Woodman’s photographs are often read through the prism of narcissism, and I am
not denying that there is no narcissistic content in them. But if we look, for example, at this
photograph we see a figure half-hidden or emerging from behind a wall, a blank space that
we cannot see. The figure’s gaze is averted from the mirror and seems to be directed at the
hand that is reflected in the mirror which is placed on the floor. Phelan notes that hands haunt

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Woodman’s frames, ‘her work hungers for tactility; as skin ‘sometimes brushes against
objects’ and soaks in things that stain.’35 There is a sense of this common human
vulnerability in the permanently exposed body, a body which is usually hers, that reminds us
of the immemorable bodily vulnerability that we all share.

Can we, as I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, very tentatively suggest the possibility
that we, as subjects, are not only concerned with shoring up our somatic and psychical
boundaries and policing the contours of our sovereign identities? Admit the possibility that
there is a jouissance in transgressing beyond one’s borders — beyond the socio-Symbolic
Law that insists on the cut between discrete subjectivities — to a beyond-as-before,
immemorial, yet affecting, space/place/time of encounter? An “event-encounter” (Ettinger)
that appeals to a certain stratum of our subjectivity on which we are subjects who have never
been cleft from bodily jouissance as our corporeal and psychical borders have always,
already been transgressed? And with this in mind, is it possible that we look at images that
evidence, or are purported to evidence, a signifying assignation between the maternal,
femininity and death? Is it possible that we, as viewing subjects, are not only condemned to
be consumers and spectators who re-inscribe this scene with such cultural markings and
inscriptions? If we all emerge, regardless of sex or gender, from such maternal origins,
unremembered as they may be or, as Ettinger suggests, immemorial yet affecting, then what
happens to us as viewers when we re-inscribe such cultural markings? What happens to the
maternal subjectivity, in each and every one of us, in the staging, re-staging and re-inscription
of this traumatic encounter? Can we accept our emergence into life, as non-life, as traumatic,
but also as, potentially, re-traumatising when any discourse of this emergence is culturally
foreclosed, or idealised as a phantasmatic return to a primal unity, or One? When our very
emergence into life is condemned to be aligned on the side of death? Can we consider the
possibility that there may be some kind of relief in the relaxation of one’s sovereign
boundaries, of being a becoming partialised-subject, partialised-object? Can we countenance
a jouissance of non-life in life, the conceptual possibility of an enjoyment, of sort, in liminal
pleasures? An enjoyment in liminality?

1
Peggy Phelan, 2002.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Jui-Ch’I Liu, 2004.
5
Sigmund Freud, 2006.
6
Ibid.
7
Phelan, 2002.
8
Ibid.
9
Liu, 2004.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ettinger argues that this is because, for Freud, the ‘penis is considered the central support for the child’s
narcissism.’ She observes, ‘what child we may ask — male or female?’ and asks us to consider the enigma of
the sphinx who poses the question ‘“where do babies come from?” to the male subject, Oedipus. This questions,
Ettinger contends, ‘is central for the sexual development of the male child. It is maybe the first question for

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Dr. Tina Kinsella, National College of Art and Design, Dublin

boys, says Freud but “certainly not” for girls. The womb is dismissed since “it was only logical that the child
should grant women the painful prerogative of giving birth to children” that is, since the “neutral” child does not
have a womb but would not give up on such an important issue, the “child’s solution is denial and displacement:
if babies are born through the anus, then a man can give birth just as well as a woman.’ All quotes from Bracha
L. Ettinger, 2001. In text citations are from Sigmund Freud’s ‘The Sexual Theories of Children’ (1908) in The
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol.9, Standard Edition, pp. 219-220.
19
Ettinger, 2006.
20
Ettinger, 2011.
21
Ettinger, 2006.
22
Ettinger, 2000.
23
Ettinger, 2006.
24
Ettinger, 2000.
25
Ettinger, 2006.
26
Ibid.
27
Ettinger, 2005.
28
Ettinger, 2011, p. 17.
29
Ettinger, 2011, p. 18
30
Ettinger, 1998.
31
Ettinger, 2006.
32
Ettinger, 2006.
33
Ettinger, 2007.
34
Ettinger, 2011.
35
Phelan, 2002.

Works Cited

Ettinger, B. L., 1998, ‘Supplementary Jouissance’ in The Almanac of Psychoanalysis no. 1.

Tel Aviv: GIEP, pp. 162-175.

Ettinger, B. L., 2000, ‘Art as the Transport-Station of Trauma’ in Artworking 1985-1999.

Ghent-Amsterdam: Ludion & Brussels: BOZAR-Palais des Beaux-Arts, pp. 91-115.

Ettinger, B. L., 2001, ‘The Red Cow Affect’ in Aguair, S. & Howe, M., (ed.) He Said, She
Says. London: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press/Associated University Press, pp. 57-88.

Ettinger, B. L., 2005, ‘Copoiesis’ in Ephemera 5.(X). [online]. Available at

www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/5-X/5-Xettinger.pdf. Accessed 23 March 2012.

Ettinger, B. L., 2006, From Proto-Ethical Compassion to Responsibility: Besidedness and the
Three Primal Mother-Phantasies of Not-enoughness, Devouring and Abandonment in
Athena, 2, pp. 100-135.

Ettinger, B. L., 2006, ‘Matrixial Trans-Subjectivity’ in Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 23 (2-
3), pp. 218-222.

Ettinger, 2006, ‘The Heimlich’ in Massumi, B., (ed.) The Matrixial Borderspace.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 157-162.

Ettinger, B. L., 2006, ‘Transcryptum: Memory Tracing In/For/With the Other’ in Massumi,
B., (ed.), The Matrixial Borderspace. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 163-
172.

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Dr. Tina Kinsella, National College of Art and Design, Dublin

Ettinger, 2007, ‘Diotima and the Matrixial Transference: Psychoanalytical Encounter-Event

as Pregnancy in Beauty’ in van der Merwe, C. N., & Viljoed, H., (ed.) Across the Threshold:
Explorations of Liminality in Literature. New York: Peter Lang and Potchefstroom, pp. 105-
132.

Ettinger, 2011, ‘Uncanny Awe, Uncanny Compassion and Matrixial Transjectivity beyond
Uncanny Anxiety’ in FLS Psychoanalysis in French and Francophone Literature and Film,
Vol. XXXVIII. Amsterdam and New York: Editions Rodopi B.V., pp. 1-31.

Freud, S., 2006, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ in The Penguin Freud Reader. London:
Penguin, pp. 130-195.

Liu, J., 2004, ‘Woodman’s Self Images: Transforming Bodies in the Space of Femininity’ in
Woman’s Art Journal 2004, Spring-Summer, 25, pp. 26-31.

Phelan, P., 2002, ‘Francesca Woodman’s Photography: Death and the Image One More
Time’ in Signs, Vol 27, No. 4 (Summer 2002), pp. 979-1004.