People vs Gacott GR No 116049
Renomeron
13 July 1995
Facts: For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of
respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal
case was annulled by the Supreme Court. The respondent judge was
also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross
ignorance of law. The judgment was made by the Second Division
of the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court
has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge?
Decision: To require the entire court to deliberate upon and
participate in all administrative matter or cases regardless of the
sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially
in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require action by the Court En Banc.
Collantes v.
A.C. No. 3056. AUgust 16, 1991.
FACTS:
Complainant, house counsel for V&G, filed a disbarment complaint
against Atty. Vincent Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regards to the
application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma. Deeds of
Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision.
ISSUE:
WON respondent should be disbarred.
RULING:
Yes. The acts of dishonesty and oppression which respondent
committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to
practice the high and noble calling of the law.
Reyes v. Gaa
A.M. No. 1048. July 14, 1995.
FACTS:
Wellington Reyes, complainant, reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by
respondent Atty. Salvador Gaa, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila,
who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant’s
business rival. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent in an
entrapment operation set up by them.
ISSUE:
WON respondent should be disbarred on the grounds of malpractice
and willful violation of lawyer’s oath.
RULING:
Yes. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct
as a public official, which also constitutes as a violation of his oath
as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment, or other
disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
PENTICOSTES VS. IBAÑEZ
Adm. Case CBD No. 167, 9 March 1999
104 SCAD 236, 304 SCRA 281
FACTS:
Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual was sued for non-
remittance of SSS premiums which complaint was assigned to
Prosecutor Ibañez for preliminary investigation. In the course of the
investigation, Encarnacion gave the amount of P1,804.00 to
respondent as payment of her SSS contribution in arrears.
Respondent did not pay the SSS, hence on Nov. 16, 1990, a
complaint was filed against the respondent for professional
misconduct in allegedly misappropriating the amount. On 23
November 1990, the respondent paid SSS the amount of P1,804.00
on behalf of Encarnacion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct and have violated
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
It is glaringly clear that respondent’s non-remittance for over one
year of the funds coming from Encarnacion is gross violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The belated
payment does not excuse his misconduct. Neither would his defense
that the acts complained of were not done by him in his office as a
prosecutor exculpate him from responsibility. While Encarnacion
may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules
relating to a lawyer’s handling of funds of a client is applicable.
Respondent’s failure to immediately remit the amount gives rise to
the presumption of misappropriation. That is in gross violation of
general morality as well as professional ethics, it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high
sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required
of every member of the Bar.
Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a
lawyer who holds a responsible public office.
The respondent was reprimanded with stern warning.
Felisa De Roy vs Court of
Appeals
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157 SCRA 757 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Application of
Laws – Publication of Laws – Publication of Supreme Court
Decisions in the Official Gazette
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De
Roy collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the
family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death of
Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned
prior hand but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She
appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last
day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s counsel filed
a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled
that pursuant to the case of (August 1985), the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case
should not be applicable because said ruling was never
published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be
published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme

and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty
of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals
IGOY vs. ATTY SORIANO
Facts:
Igoy was a petitioner in a certain case pending in the CA. He later
sought help from a friend to win his case in the event it would lose in
CA. The said friend introduced IGOY from one of the alleged
âJUSTICEâ of the SC which later turned out to be Atty Soriano. The
âJusticeâ offered IGOY to help him when his case reaches SC for a
consideration of 20k. When then they loss the case in CA, the
âJusticeâ prepared a petition for review for a consideration of another
20k. When IGOY found out that the âJusticeâ is not really a Justice,
and when the petition for review was denied, IGOY now filed this
administrative case against ATTY SORIANO.
Held:
ATTY SORIANO is disbarred. Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The foregoing command acquires particular significance given the
prevailing facts of this case considering that respondent is a senior
lawyer of this Court. It bears stressing that government lawyers who
are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service, for public
service is a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct
is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.
Cordova v. Labayen,
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033, October 10, 1995
CANON NUMBER: CANON 4
FACTS:
A judgment was rendered against the complainants Cordova ordering
their ejectment and payment of rentals until they have vacated the
subject lots. Pursuant to such judgment, a writ of execution was issued
by the court. However, Atty. Sabio with complainants Cordova, Fled an
administrative complaint against respondents seeking their disbarment,
dismissal and disqualiFcation from o±ce, claiming that having Fled a
supersedeas bond, the writ of execution should not have been issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the administrative complaint Fled by Atty. Sabio is
violative of Canon 1, Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. The court is convinced that the issuance of the writ of execution
was done in the valid and judicious exercise of the functions and duties
of respondent judges. There is no evidence to prove the charge Fled
by Atty. Sabio. Such Fling of totatlly baseless and unfounded charges
against judges and court personnel in a vain attempt to escape the dire
consequences of their own negligence or in an eFort to transgress the
lawful orders of the court is reprehensible. As an o±cer of the court, a
lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the
administration of justice. The present administrative charge seeks to
cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judges, the judicial personnel
and the court which they represent, in ²agrant abdication of the
bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be punished for
instigating the ³ling of an administrative complaint by his clients, in the
guise of upholding their rights but actually to frustrate the enforcement
of lawful court orders and consequently obstruct the desirable norms
and course of justice. Wherefore, Atty. Sabio is suspended from
practice of law for six months
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs . ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG,
respondent
.
A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005
FACTS:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali
Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while
olding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It appears
that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative
case earlier filed by complainant against respondent, which was
initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad
Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It
appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of
respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of
respondent, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against
him.
The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then SoJ
Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal
exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents, but held guilty
of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT and
manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-
accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR issued
AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary
Drilon. Respondent questioned said AO before this Court through a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that the
Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to
remove him from office and insisted that respondents violated the
laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit,
then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil
Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the
administrative complaint against him (herein respondent), but was
dismissed for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned order.
Respondent MR was denied with finality. On the disbarment
proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that
respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the
duties of an attorney and that he poses a serious threat to the
integrity of the legal profession. Respondent maintains that there
was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the
name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and
jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as
the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land
registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the
applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus,nothing in the
documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence,
he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal
of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law and
explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who
required him to produce the various land titles involved in said
dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment
suit. On 23 February 1996,Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
denied the order relative to the transfer of venue of this case and
penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of
Marawi City. The finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of
respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by
evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering
the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification,
which pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice
of law from a five-year suspension to a two-year suspension to be
proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that time,
the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.
ISSUE:
WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct
committed while he was in the employ of the government.
RULING:
We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of
Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer
simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by
the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.
Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions
he committed as a government official, he may, however,be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of
his oath a member of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established
by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this
Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage
of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing
his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit
of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness
not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain
his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the people’s
confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on
the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his
knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the
withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants
daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot
possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature
cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.
As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac
v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos: A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve
no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998
FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned
Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots'
Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing,
boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed
himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor
Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of
the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor
from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for
docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-
half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When
the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the
crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2)
shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion
ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the
anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern.
Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel
was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the
anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern"
code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage,
solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the
port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is
caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel
and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time
being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders
must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He
becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as
to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the
like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where
pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective
control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain
systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the
vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains
command and control of the navigation even in localities where
pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely
to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a
enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is
exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable
The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the
acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the
depart, and thus protect life8 and property from the dangers of owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the
navigation. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to
Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care persons or property by reason of her negligent management or
and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill navigation.
and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over
which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than
that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of
skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and
care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot
must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed
to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required
of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have MISAMIN VS SAN JUAN
made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.
Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared
(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. as counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in the
Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. The master is still
in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as
perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police.
was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit
leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He
maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The
owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of contends that his appearance as counsel while
a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a holding a government position is not among the
compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the
therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute
the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid,
suspension or removal of attorneys.
and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no
exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his Issue: Whether or not the administrative case
negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence against the defendant should prosper
of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But
the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled
that the matter is to be decided in an administrative
proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the
Solicitor General. Nonetheless, the court held that
while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would
not be inappropriate for respondent member of the
bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety.
Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of
a public office being a public trust, he did make use,
not so much of whatever legal knowledge he
possessed, but the influence that laymen could
assume was inherent in the office held not only to
frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor
be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and
call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a
matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent,
in his future actuations as a member of the bar
should refrain from laying himself open to such
doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for
the position occupied by him but also for membership
in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an
honorable profession who does not even take care
that his honor remains unsullied.