Didipio v Gozun (Natural resources)

DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006

FACTS:

This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40,
s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining
Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its
nationals.

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that
now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling
99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.

on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of
37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area
is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.

The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract
Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows
CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface owners or
occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.

Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and

indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a community actually
affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of areas affected by the
mining activities of CAMC.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE
THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF
JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

NO.

The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-
owned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface
areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. The
government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor,
through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement
the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various
avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA
provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and
shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and
regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private
properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the
payment of just compensation.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION.

NO.

there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and
regulations that exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in
expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.

Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the authority to decide cases
where surface owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus,
necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of the just
compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board is final and
conclusive. The determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or
the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable
compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. The original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains intact
despite the preliminary determination made by the administrative agency.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA,
ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.

RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining operations. The
following provisions thereof establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over
mining operations and institute reportorial requirements.

The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a
“passive regulator” dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the
government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to
influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding minimum
expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of
the mining enterprise.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY

FOREIGN AND FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING
ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

the use of the word “involving” signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of
assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial
or technical assistance.

Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and deliberate
decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the
expression “agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance” in an
exclusionary and limiting manner.

WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SERVICE CONTRACTS

NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution was not
carried over to the present constitution, sans any categorical statement banning service
contracts in mining activities, does not mean that service contracts as understood in the
1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987 Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time, however,
safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.

the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in

paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new
ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the
other, the government as principal or “owner” of the works. In the new service contracts,
the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial
expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the
government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision
over the entire operation.

OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law. ! to exercise the power of judicial review, the following
must be extant (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; -
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights as Rep.
Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been
entered into. The FTAA holders have already been operating in various provinces of the
country.

(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A question is considered ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. (3) the person challenging must have the “standing" - personal or substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized
grievance.

By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.

! “taking” under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for more
than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as
to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally

appropriated or injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power

The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to
which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use
upon payment of just compensation.On the other hand, police power is the power of the
state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
 Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for
their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an
implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two.

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance
prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which would
result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld valid as this would
promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers.

where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be
injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence
would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a
property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable
taking.

! On different roles and responsibilities:

* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned

corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with
the foreign proponent. (Executive Order No. 279, 1987)

! in re: easements and taking

In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the imposition of burden over a private
property through easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is
required. The Court declared:

And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object
thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to
prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for public use
which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the property
condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the
appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is only adequate remedy
when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an
arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same
is invested.

! in order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be
inconsistent.The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act.
You might also like:
 Cruz v Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation (Civil Procedure)
 Coscolluela v Rico General Insurance (Civil Procedure)
 Dial Corp. v Soriano (Civil Procedure)
 Valencia v CA (Civil Procedure)
Linkwithin

Posted by Victor Morvis

Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest
Labels: case, case digest, denr, didipio, didipio v gozun, didipio vs
gozun, digest, ftaa,gozun, gr 157882, gr no 157882, natural resources, v

No comments:

Post a Comment
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so
that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent
contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object
for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone
company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of
just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone
systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

Share this:

Republic Vs. Tagle Case Digest

Republic Vs. Tagle
299 SCRA 549
G.R. No. 129079

December 2, 1998

Facts: Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land located
in Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite containing an area of 483,331 square meters more or less.

The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC),
negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on the
technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project in the
Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed project was Program III (Construction
Manpower Development) which involved the establishment of a Construction Manpower Development
Center (CMDC). PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, signed a Memorandum of
Agreement which provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes to lease within the period of twenty
(20) years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no less than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC
which likewise agrees to lease within a period of twenty (20) years and/or buy said property site.

The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use
the land in question and to undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and
other related works necessary to attain its objectives. Pursuant thereto, the CMDC took possession of
the property and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary for its operations. A deposit
made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is
equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject matter hereof based on defendant’s 1990 tax
declaration, was made.

In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute
Sale with Benitez, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDC, as vendees, duly represented by then
Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez. Benitez in her own capacity did not sign
the deed of absolute sale.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through the Department of
Trade and Industry, to which CMDC is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant
to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25, 1985.

A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it subsequently.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the
expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.

Held: No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent makes the
required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. The expropriation
of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain
usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the
property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership.

In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power,
petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and
ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the property
fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the
subject property.
Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Lagcao vs. Labra

Facts: On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of
Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the
Province of Cebu executed on June 17, 1994 a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of
petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name of
petitioners and Crispina Lagcao.3
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment
proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu
City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal,
the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of
demolition.1avvphi1
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin
Garcia wrote two letters4 to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the
ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters.
Issue: Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of substantive due process
Ruling: Yes, Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the
petitioners’ right to due process.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable
judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this
ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of
demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext
that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of
looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted
Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners’ lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure
and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly
indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
City of Manila v Chinese Community 40 PHIL 349 (1919)
“expropriation of Chinese cemetery”

Facts: The City of Manila wants to expropriate a land owned by the Chinese community as
cemetery for the purpose of extending

Rizal Avenue
for public use. The respondents contend that the land already acquires a quasi-public character
and many dead bodies are already buried there. They stress that there is no necessity of taking
the land for public purpose since such is under Torrens title and the expropriation will disturb the
resting place of the dead. The plaintiff contends that under the Charter of City of Manila, they may
condemn private lands for public purpose, such being an exclusive function of the legislature and
the only function of the court is to assess the value of the land expropriated.

Issue: Whether or not the court can inquire into the necessity of expropriation.

Held: The court ruled that the power of judicial review on expropriation is not limited to the inquiry
of the existence of law that grants a municipal corporation to expropriate private lands for public
purpose. The court has the responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and (2) that the right or authority is being exercised in
accordance with the law. There are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the
City of Manila: (1) the land must be private; and, (2) the purpose must be public. The taking of
land in the exercise of power of eminent domain of the state is not a judicial question but the court
is bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature. The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must
be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and
not follow, the taking of the land. The court ruled that the cemetery is a public property and it
found no great necessity to allow the expropriation of the land by the City of Manila thus thereby
affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Sumulong v Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)

“expropriation – requisites for expropriation met but denied petitioners with due process of
hearing”

Facts: Petitioner files motion for reconsideration on the lower court decision allowing
expropriation of their parcel of land in favor to the National Housing Authority without due
process of law. They assail the constitutionality of PD 1224 (Policy on Expropriation of Private
Property for Socialized Housing Upon Payment of Just Compensation) allowing the taking of
properties regardless of size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated, social
housing being the purpose of condemnation is not really for public purpose, and violation of
procedural due process as immediate taking of possession of property without due process of
hearing.

Issue: Whether or not due process of law was observed in the expropriation process.

Held: The court ruled that the purpose of expropriation for socialized housing project is a valid
justification for public purpose since housing is a basic need. The size of the area to be
expropriated is not subject to question as long as it satisfied the public purpose of expropriation.
However, the court held that the petitioners were denied of due process of law for being
deprived of the conduct of hearing and notice upon its order for the immediate possession and
taking of the land by NHA.

In order to justify expropriation the following requisites must be satisfied:

1. public use/purpose
2. just compensation

Although the court issued the immediate possession of the land with just compensation to the
petitioners and meeting the requisite for public use, the petitioners were denied with the due
process of expropriation proceeding which is a basic and fundamental right of the petitioner.

EPZA v Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

“appointment of commissioners to determine just compensation in expropriation”

Facts: A land reserve was provided for the Export Processing Zone which some portion of the
land is privately owned by the respondents. Petitioner offered to purchase the land but both parties
did not come to an agreement in terms of the assessed value of the property. Petitioner files an
expropriation case which the court decided in favor of them and issued a writ of possession for
the immediate possession of land subject to just compensation. Respondents however are not
amenable to the amount and thus the court appointed commissioners to determine the
appropriate property value. Petitioner now questions the appointment of commissioners to
determine the value of property while invoking PD No. 1533 that indicates the determination of
just compensation is based on the declared value indicated by the land owner and the assessor
whichever is lower and there is no need to appoint commissioners for the purpose of assessing
the property value.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in appointing commissioners to the case at bar

Held: The court ruled that PD No. 1533 only serves as a guiding principle providing some
considerations in the determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. It does not
substitute the discretion vested upon the court to exercise in determining the fair and just
compensation in expropriating property. The appointment of commissioners is one way the court
may determine the fair and just compensation in dispute for judicial evaluation.

National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson 206 SCRA 520 (1992)

“expropriation case – amt. for just compensation in dispute – judge held in abeyance the write of
possession order due to petitioner while increasing outright provisional value of land without
hearing.”

Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by
respondent judge in violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The
petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels
of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common good
with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation
process. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby
prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing
paramount public interest for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the
provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The
petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of
the assessed value of said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National
Bank. Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed
value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00.
Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in
the motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24
hours from receipt of order while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending
compliance to said order which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge
ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner
assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not
the petitioner was deprived of due process of law.

Held: The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent
domain proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take
possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be
held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge failed
to observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its
effort to deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent
judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both
parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order
and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders.

There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:

1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.

2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners whose findings are deemed to be
final.

Read Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court

RULE 67
EXPROPRIATION
Section 1. The complaint.

The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified

complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated,
and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any
part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate
interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be
expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied
by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so
that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real
owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint.

Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government

depositary.

Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice
to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the
court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the
Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained
and the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper
officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved
and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the
parties.
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections.

If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his

property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to
that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he
claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he
shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the
complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall
serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall
specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an
interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all
his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer
or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in
the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not
later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the
issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared
or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be
paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award.
Sec. 4. Order of expropriation.
If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as
required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon
the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking
of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed
by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to
dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems
just and equitable.
Sec. 5. Ascertainment of compensation.

Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not
more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought
to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the
first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the
time within which their report shall be submitted to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment
of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days
from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the
commissioners shall have received copies of the objections.
Sec. 6. Proceedings by commissioners.

Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall
take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as
commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in
the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners
who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the
commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due
notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be
expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either
party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess
the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner
from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its
franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the
consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or
the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.

Sec. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon.

The court may order the commissioners to report when any particular portion of
the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render judgment
upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their
work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and
may from time to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make
a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such
proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their
report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except
as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within
sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their
appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon
the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on
all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within
which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire.

Sec. 8. Action upon commissioners’ report.

Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding
section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the
interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement
of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and
render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit
the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside
the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part
and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as
shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his
right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property
so taken.

Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims.

If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting

claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the
person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment
shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or
the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for
the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.

Sec. 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment.

Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the
judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the possession of the
property, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the
costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the property
expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in the
judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof
under the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel
absent themselves from the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered,
the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have
the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person
ultimately adjudged entitled thereto.

Sec. 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal.

The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the defendant and
appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not be delayed by an
appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court determines that
plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering
the Regional Trial MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No. 135962)

Facts:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open
its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same
day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue
would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO
and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition
of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the
appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and
cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance.

MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government
endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of
police powers, it follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first.

Hence this petition.

Issue:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and
police powers?

Ruling:
According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and
administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.

LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact
ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the
LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant of the possession
of the property, and to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and
may recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff.

Sec. 12. Costs, by whom paid.

The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the
proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims,
shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the
property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal
shall be paid by the owner.

Sec. 13. Recording judgment, and its effect.

The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an

adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated,
and the nature of the public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When
real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be recorded
in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and
its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so
described for such public use or purpose.
Sec. 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings.

The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person judicially declared

to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform
on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the expropriation
for public use or purpose of property belonging to such minor or person
judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or person judicially
declared to be incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were of age or
competent.
Email This

 HOME

a law student

LABELS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGEST

FRIDAY, APRIL 25, 2014

Amigable v Cuenca [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No.

L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]

Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her
Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of
any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor
General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first
at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery
of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to
be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue
the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when
the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no
annotation in favour of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and
plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the
government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to
recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been
used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due
compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

You may also like:

PHILIPPINE PORESS

Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772

directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half
page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space
shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to
enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of

newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power)
of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises
during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held

that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to
“taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation
required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that
the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking
of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not
without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench,
there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private
property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

AGAN VS PIATCO

G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003 En Banc [Non-legislative power of Congress; Police Power;
Delegation of emergency powers]

FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the
DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).

DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the
implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which
approved the project.

On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an
invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC’s unsolicited proposal, in
accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.

On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,
Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security
Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the
PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated
into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.

AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.

On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement for the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession
Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said
terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in
accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The
Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing
from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
development facility to MIAA.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA
Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and
ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other
services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that
they would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition
for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the
various agreements.

During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not “honor (PIATCO)
contracts which the Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.

RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional
provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay
“reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.”

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency, and in the
exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with
public interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the
temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary takeover by the government
extends only to the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such
the government is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business
as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner
affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the
said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its
police power and not of its power of eminent domain.

Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the
times necessitate the government to “temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.” It is the welfare and interest of the
public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take
over a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its
police power. Police power is the “most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.” Its exercise
therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the
government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the
government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the
operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.