Aircraft Accident of Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave

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Introduction.
Aviation safety is essential to
passenger’s confidence and
in eliminating the going
concern of organizations
engaging in air travel. The
occurrence of aircraft
accidents due to engine
failures may attribute to
operational failures or in
other elements such as
weather or communication
faults. In the year 2010,
Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave
with two passengers on
board crashed in New South
Wales, Austria. The report by
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) found errors in one of the aircraft engines
leading to a collision with terrain 6km northwest of Bankstown airport in Australia. To
improve the safety and operational of aircraft, it is essential to conduct a failure
analysis to the events leading to the accident. The use of report findings from
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) informs of a comprehensive analysis while
relying on technical information on aircraft safety from peer-reviewed literature.
Literature review.
Findings by Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).
On the morning of 15 June 2010, the aircraft Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave carrying two
passengers’ experience engine difficulties while on the flight (Bureau, 2012). The pilot
attempting to control the engine failure of the right engine made a decision to return to
the airport while cruising at an altitude of more than 7000 feet. Due to lack of
functioning of the right engine, Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave began a steep decent
exceeding the capacity of the left engine to handle operational control of the
aircraft. Australian Transport Safety Bureau details that because of lack of maximum
operational of the left engine led to the failure of the pilot to maintain a level flight of
the Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave (Bureau, 2012). According to Lee, (2006), during the
collapse of engine operational capabilities, initiating protocols for saving lives is the
ultimate goal for crew or passengers. In line with this rationale, the pilot initiated
contact with the control to inform them of the engine failure flight manifests during the
decent details of attempts the pilot. This includes communicating to control of the
uneven distribution of fuel in the cylinders. A spectral analysis of radio transmissions
shows surging of engine activity that is consistent to shifting to one engine used in a
twin-engine aircraft.
Status of the pilot.
During failure analysis of aircraft accidents, checking the integrity of the pilot is
essential while ruling out cases of negligence and professional malpractices (Lee,
2006). As such, pilot details show that the pilot flew 16hrs of flight within the last seven
days to the flight. This is consistent with the finding of the pilot clocking 0.5 hrs with
the Piper PA-31P within the previous 7 days (Bureau, 2012). Assessing the number of
flights taken by the pilot of the specific aircraft translates to demonstrating a level of
understanding of the aircraft by the pilot. Having a total of 70.2 hrs within the previous
30day while o flight, this shows that the pilot met all the prerequisites before attaining
control of the aircraft. With a medical certificate without any restrictions and having the
approval of Airtex Aviation group, the pilot’s experience thus is not in question.
Undergoing training to operate and fly a multi-engine aircraft is an essential
endorsement to the pilots’ efficiency and capabilities (Lee, 2006). Failure analysis at
this point may rely on the integrity of the engine leading to the events of the accident
on 15 June 2010.

The integrity of Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave.

Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & Lee, (2017), assert that aircraft safety includes
assessment of aircraft worthiness and the quality of maintenance. This, however, relies
on the effectiveness of engineers that particular airlines have while relying on the
lifespan of aircraft. Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave logbook statement manifests timely
maintenance and safety checks (Bureau, 2012). The airframe worthiness report by the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau confirms good integrity status while engine
worthiness indicates top quality and maintenance. Lack of evidence showing negligence
in maintenance affirms by the lack of documentation showing preexisting defects before
the accident. According to Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & Lee, (2017), long-term
operation of aircraft in harsh surrounding or instances of maximum pressure affects the
interior of airplanes. In the particular use and assessment of Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave,
having to ferry small groups of passengers and operating in moderate level
environments free of pressures, it is highly unlikely that the accident was because of
long-term use (Ayres, Shirazi, Carvalho, Hall, Speir, Arambula, & Pitfield, 2013). The
last date of maintenance for Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave is 11 June 2010. Issuance of a
maintenance release permit on 28 May 2010 indicates the meeting of all prerequisites
before taking any commercial flights (Bureau, 2012). Changing of the aircraft engine
for maintenance purposes took place on 19 February 2010 that is 4 months before the
accident. Regarding weight and balance of the aircraft, operating on the day of an
accident with a tonnage of 3266 kgs shows conformity to industry regulations and
safety levels.

Refueling of the aircraft took place according to schedule at 0720 before taking off.
Without any irregularities in refueling procedure, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau
(ATSB) found no cause of any preflight influence on the aircraft (Bureau, 2012).
Meteorological information.
In Australia, the issuance of aerodrome forecast (TAF) by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM)
shows no deviances from normal thus indicating no influences by aerodynamics on the
airplane’s capabilities. According to the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM), visibility during
ascent was clear to a distance of 10 km with a few clouds past 3500 ft (Bureau, 2012).
With a temperature of 4°C, the atmospheric pressure at normal conditions facilitated
favorable conditions for ascent and stable flight. Weather observations at the time
indicate temperatures ranging from 4 °C to 6 °C with a visibility of 8km from
Bankstown Airport (Bureau, 2012). The Airport automatic terminal information service
at the Bankstown airport indicates communication between the pilot and the control.
Before the right engine failure, communication through the Airport automatic terminal
information service sent Bravo confirmations indicating a lack of weather inhibitions on
communication capabilities and quality.
Wreckage and scene data.

Left engine

The location of the wreckage at 6.3 km from the Bankstown airport conforms to the
flight path traced by Piper PA-31P-350 Mojave. At a bearing of 299 °(M), this indicates
a route following a path that is consistent with information detailing the path of the
aircraft towards the Bankstown airport. With the right wing hitting a utility pole at 10m
above the ground, this shows that the aircraft made contact with the ground with the
fuselage on the lower side. Witness statements at the site of the crash indicate the right
wing ignited leading to a fire that destroyed essential evidence from the scene. The
resulting fire from the impact destroyed the fuselage including the jet engine propellers.
Without any fire triggers outside the primary source of the right wing, investigators at
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) (Bureau, 2012). Agree with finality that
the right wing fuselage caused the fire. A closer examination of the engines shows a
lack of internal mechanical malfunctions, thus ruling out instances of faultiness by the
aircraft. Without evidence of piston combustion, chamber melting or pre-ignition of the
engines or any equipment in the plane, investigators rule out deficiencies in the aircraft
structural integrity (Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & Lee, 2017).
Medical and pathological information.
With injuries sustained by the pilot and the passenger on board showing conformity
with the accident, medical investigators confirm full capabilities of the pilot to operate
the aircraft. Toxicological examination point towards a lack of foreign substances that
may have caused the pilot to experience incapacitation during the flight. The existence
of fire at the crash site conforms to the existence of fuel since the aircraft failed to
utilize available capacity during the short-lived flight (Lee, 2006). Contact with the
power line pole provided circumstances leading investigators to conclude that the
accident was not survivable by the two aircraft passengers.

Summary of safety factors.

Evidence points towards operational failure by the right engine when the aircraft
climbed to an altitude of 9000 ft. Sustaining a power problem by the right engine
precipitated operational shortcomings leading to shutting down. The immediate
consequence of the shutdown according to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau
(ATSB) is inoperative flight. However, investigators pint that the pilot attempted to
return to the Bankstown airport with a normal flight curve. The normal arrival profile by
the pilot failed to establish a reliable checkup on the capability of the left engine to fully
operate and control the aircraft to safe landing. Thus, this indicates that the behavior of
the aircraft and the pilot manifests a lack of optimal operational capabilities. With the
collision with the power line utility pole, the situation changed from survivable to less
manageable leading to fatality of the passengers.

Conclusion.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) with the advice of Civil Aviation Safety
Authority provides manually relating to multi-engine aircraft to pilots and airlines.
Failures encountered during the climb and descent would inform on future rationale and
procedure of handling cases of engine failure. Provision of guidance material by the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau would advise on the handling of aircraft during
emergency operations while improving the management of multi-engine aircraft. During
training, provision of quality flight simulations would facilitate quality decision making
during the various stages of flight. Safety precautions are essential for passengers’
safety while increasing the competitive advantage of airlines with updated safety
manuals.
References
Ayres, M., Shirazi, H., Carvalho, R., Hall, J., Speir, R., Arambula, E., … & Pitfield, D.
(2013). Modelling the location and consequences of aircraft accidents. Safety
science, 51(1), 178-186.
Bureau, A. T. S. (2012). Australian Rail Safety Occurrence Data: 1 July 2002 to 30 June
2012 (ATSB Transport Safety Report RR-2012-010). Canberra, Australia: ATSB.
Lee, W. K. (2006). Risk assessment modeling in aviation safety management. Journal of Air
Transport Management, 12(5), 267-273.
Maurino, D. E., Reason, J., Johnston, N., & Lee, R. B. (2017). Beyond aviation human factors:
Safety in high technology systems