ALAN F.

PAGUIA, Petitioner, (Requirements to Admission to the Bar)

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United
Nations, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors
by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’ role in the
appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’ confirmation of
nominees.1 However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioner’s lack of capacity
to sue and mootness,2 we dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another
day the resolution of the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for
the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of
respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent
Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No.
7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that
respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him
from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging
the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all
DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks
discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question
petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents)
argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to
question respondent Davide’s appointment because petitioner remains without personal and
substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state
or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this
petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by
a contender for the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s mandated
retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees
such as respondent Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit.
We have granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of
"transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.5 Three factors are relevant in our
determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues
raised – the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of
constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these
parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision
on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the
admission that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the
DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career
ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold
interest far more substantial and personal than petitioner’s generalized interest as a citizen in
ensuring enforcement of the law.1avvphi1

The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’
contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which
are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent
Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive
issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s total
expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s
nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is
at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary,8 negating petitioner’s claim of "illegal expenditure
of scarce public funds."9

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s
suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal
protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section
23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. A.C. No. 6166 (payment of fees)
CENIZA,
Complainant, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 2, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a verified complaint[1] dated July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Maria Earl
Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the
law and falsification of public documents.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in regard to the share
of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for
attorneys fees since her mother-in-law would arrive from the United States only in June 2002,
respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo
Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of
the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with
no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint. However, three
months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It was then that
they received a copy of the complaint with Civil Case No. 4198 and a rubber stamped RECEIVED
thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket
number was filed.[2]

Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for intending
to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located in
Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue
that real actions shall be filed in the place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged
that respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss
attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202.[3]

In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the complainant to institute the
administrative complaint for disbarment as she was not a party to the action for partition and
recovery of ownership/possession. As such, her allegations in the administrative complaint were
all hearsay, self-serving and unsubstantiated. Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of
Loss was belied by the March 3, 2003 decision of the trial court, wherein Carlito C. Ceniza affirmed
his statements in the said affidavit when he was called to testify.[4]

On February 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 29, 2004, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment explaining the rubber stamped
RECEIVED on the complaint. According to her, when her staff Jan Kirt Lester Soledad was at
the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court, she called him through cellular phone and directed him to
stop the filing of the complaint as the same lacked certain attachments. However, one copy
thereof was already stamped RECEIVED by the receiving court personnel, who also assigned a
docket number. She kept the copies of the complaint, including the one with the stamp, to be filed
later when the attachments are complete.

Meanwhile, on November 7, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion praying
that the administrative complaint be likewise dismissed in view of the dismissal of the criminal
case due to complainants apparent lack of interest to prosecute.

On January 19, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
found guilty of falsification of public document and be meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three years. The report reads in part, as follows:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action, where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. It involved
no private interest. The complainant or person who called the attention of the court
to the attorneys misconduct is in no sense a party and has generally no interest in
its outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. It affords no redress for private grievance. (Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154)
Prescinding from the aforequoted ruling, it is therefore irrelevant and immaterial if
herein complainant is not a party to the subject civil complaint prepared by the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether on the basis
of the facts borne out by the record, the charge has been proven.

On the payment of the acceptance fee in the amount of P32,000.00, respondents

contention that she acted as guarantor of Carlos Ceniza, complainants husband,
when he borrowed money from a money lender, Domingo Natavio, the amount
representing the acceptance, does not inspire belief. The promissory note dated
May 3, 2002, appended as Annex A of the complaint-affidavit eloquently shows
that consistent with the complainants allegation, she was made to borrow said
amount to be paid as respondents acceptance fee. It bears stress that the date of
the promissory note is the same date when respondents services were engaged
leading to the preparation of the subject civil complaint. Complainants allegation is
further enhanced by the fact that such promissory note was even notarized by the
respondent.

On the alleged filing of the subject civil complaint, it is undisputed that the same
was not filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Davao Del Sur, as
evidenced by a Certification from the said office appended as Annex A of
complainants Manifestation dated October 14, 2005. Thus, the claim of
complainant that respondent falsified or caused it to falsify the stamp marked
received dated May 10, 2002 including the case number 4198, finds factual and
legal bases.

It bears stress that a copy of the subject civil complaint was obtained by
complainant from the respondent herself who tried to impress upon the former that
contrary to her suspicion, the subject civil complaint was already filed in
court.However, inquiry made by the complainant shows otherwise.

Respondents contention that after one copy of the complaint was already stamped
by court personnel in preparation for receiving the same and entering in the courts
docket, she caused it to be withdrawn after realizing that the same lacked certain
attachments, is bereft of merit.

In the first place, respondent miserably failed to mention these lacking attachments
that allegedly caused the withdrawal of the complaint. Secondly, and assuming
arguendo that the withdrawal was due to lacking attachments, how come the same
was not filed in the next office day complete with attachments. And lastly, the
Certification of the Clerk of Court clearly states that Civil Case No. 4188 is not the
case of Mercedes Callejo vda. De Ceniza, et al. vs. Charlotte Ceniza, et al.

xxxx

The fact that the City Prosecutors Office of Digos, upon motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, dismissed a similar complaint filed by herein
complainant will not in anyway affect the above captioned administrative
complaint.
 The pendency of a criminal action against the respondent, from the facts
of which the disciplinary proceeding is predicated, does not pose prejudicial
question to the resolution of the issues in the disbarment case. (Calo vs. Degano,
20 SCRA 447) His conviction is not necessary to hold the lawyer administratively
liable because the two proceedings and their objectives are different and it is not
sound public policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before the court
act on a complaint against a lawyer as it may emasculate the disciplinary power of
the court. (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1) Nor is his acquittal, by this fact alone, a bar
to an administrative complaint against him. (Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350).

The other allegations in the complaint about ignorance of the law are found
to be without basis.

RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent Atty.
Vivian C. Rubia, be found guilty of the charge of falsification of public document
and be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) years.
On May 31, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting the
Investigating Commissioners recommendation with modification, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237

Adm. Case No. 6166
Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.
Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents falsification of public document, Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is
hereby DISBARRED.

However, in its December 11, 2008 Resolution, the Board of Governors reconsidered its May 31,
2007 Resolution by reducing the recommended penalty of disbarment to five years suspension
from the practice of law, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-715

Adm. Case No. 6166
Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.
Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the
 above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with
modification, that Resolution RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237 of the Board of
Governors dated 31 May 2007 recommending the Disbarment of Atty. Vivian G.
Rubia is reduced to Five (5) years Suspension from the practice of law.
On April 20, 2009, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court as provided under Rule 139-
B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court.

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law and for falsification of public document. In disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.[5]

The sole issue in this case is whether or not there is preponderant evidence to warrant the
imposition of administrative sanction against the respondent.
In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that respondent
misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, upon verification
with the RTC Clerk of Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the
complaint with a stamped RECEIVED and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations,
complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately falsified a
public document.

A perusal of the records shows that complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-
Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory
conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test
the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or
falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts
constituting the same.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of
the complaint by respondents staff because she was not present when the same was filed with
the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondents claim that
the case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with RECEIVED and
assigned with a docket number. We find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering
that the stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done
when pleadings are received by the court.

Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not filed and that CIVIL
CASE NO. 4198 pertained to another case, did not diminish the truthfulness of respondents claim,
but even tended to bolster it.Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket number 4198
indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court.

Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioners ruling that respondent
was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no
factual basis to stand on.

However, we find that respondent committed some acts for which she should be disciplined or
administratively sanctioned.

We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondents act of charging an acceptance fee

of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety
lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the
payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the
cause of complainants mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to
render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the
payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of
complainants mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted the case.

Respondents transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client

relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of
Companies, which constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the
case, thereby leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not
sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services.

Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client
regarding the status of their complaint.
 Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyers Oath which imposes upon every member of the
bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon
22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR

GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he
undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its
significance. Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will discharge
his duties diligently and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his
(clients) cause with reasonable dispatch. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave
administrative liability as a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be
sanctioned.[6]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is found GUILTY of
violation of Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning
that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision, and be it duly
recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8242 October 2, 2009

REBECCA J. PALM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm (complainant)
against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for revealing information obtained in the course of an
attorney-client relationship and for representing an interest which conflicted with that of his former
client, Comtech Worldwide Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of computer

software development. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent served as Comtech’s
retained corporate counsel for the amount of ₱6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September
to October 2003, complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate matters,
including potential amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003,
respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during
board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who were outside
the Philippines.

Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant became
uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a
former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing
unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer
agreement with respondent effective November 2003.

In a stockholders’ meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy for Gary
Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members of the Board of
Directors, were present through teleconference. When the meeting was called to order,
respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and
Deanna Palm could not participate in the meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet
been amended to allow teleconferencing.

On 24 March 2004, Comtech’s new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return or account
for the amount of ₱90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements when she was the
Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004, Comtech received Soledad’s reply, signed
by respondent. In July 2004, due to Soledad’s failure to comply with Comtech's written demands,
Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutor’s Office. In
the proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as Soledad’s
counsel.
On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint1 for disbarment against respondent before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

In his Answer,2 respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him on process and
procedure in acquiring property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted him about the legal
requirements of putting up a domestic corporation. In February 2003, Soledad engaged his
services as consultant for Comtech. Respondent alleged that from February to October 2003,
neither Soledad nor Palm consulted him on confidential or privileged matter concerning the
operations of the corporation. Respondent further alleged that he had no access to any record of
Comtech.

Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003, complainant met
with him regarding the procedure in amending the corporate by-laws to allow board members
outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings.

Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him as proxy during
the 10 January 2004 meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison instructed him to observe the
conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted that he objected to the participation of Steven and
Deanna Palm because the corporate by-laws had not yet been properly amended to allow the
participation of board members by teleconferencing.

Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the
case for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became
a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the criminal case was not related to or connected with
the limited procedural queries he handled with Comtech.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated 28 March 2006,3 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of representing interest in conflict with that of Comtech as his former client.

The IBP-CBD ruled that there was no doubt that respondent was Comtech’s retained counsel
from February 2003 to November 2003. The IBP-CBD found that in the course of the meetings
for the intended amendments of Comtech’s corporate by-laws, respondent obtained knowledge
about the intended amendment to allow members of the Board of Directors who were outside the
Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. The IBP-CBD noted that
respondent knew that the corporate by-laws have not yet been amended to allow the
teleconferencing. Hence, when respondent, as representative of Harrison, objected to the
participation of Steven and Deanna Palm through teleconferencing on the ground that the
corporate by-laws did not allow the participation, he made use of a privileged information he
obtained while he was Comtech’s retained counsel.

The IBP-CBD likewise found that in representing Soledad in a case filed by Comtech, respondent
represented an interest in conflict with that of a former client. The IBP-CBD ruled that the fact that
respondent represented Soledad after the termination of his professional relationship with
Comtech was not an excuse.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent
be found guilty of the charges preferred against him and be suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year.4

In Resolution No. XVII-2006-5835 passed on 15 December 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification
by suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.6

In an undated Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors First Division found that
respondent’s motion for reconsideration did not raise any new issue and was just a rehash of his
previous arguments. However, the IBP Board of Governors First Division recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for only one year.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-703 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors First Division. The
IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but reduced his
suspension from two years to one year.

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B7of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of this Court

We cannot sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Violation of the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainant’s consultations, respondent obtained the
information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the
Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. Respondent himself
admitted this in his Answer.

However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a stockholders’
meeting. Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The physical presence of a
stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders’ meeting because a member may vote by proxy
unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws.8 Hence, there was no need
for Steven and Deanna Palm to participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent
their proxies to the meeting.

In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may
have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The
amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by "the board of directors or
trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital
stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock corporation."9 It means the stockholders
are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be delegated to the
board of directors or trustees, there is nothing in the records to show that a delegation was made
in the present case. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made,
copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.10 The
documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.1avvphi1

It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.11 The client must intend the communication to be confidential. 12 Since the
proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and
copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have
been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the
stockholders’ meeting could not be considered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidence
within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Representing Interest in Conflict With the Interest of a Former Client

The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a former client,
in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

We do not agree with the IBP.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,13 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests.
One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.14 The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain
inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him
in any matter in which he previously represented him.15

We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech.
The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its
former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used
against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtech’s
retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his
retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client.16 The intent of the law
is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.17

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 681 September 30, 1982

ELISEO GUEVARA, complainant,

vs.
MAXIMO CALALANG, respondent.

RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In a complaint for malpractice filed by complainant Eliseo Guevara, the respondent Atty. Maximo
Calalang was charged with having acquired by transfer or assignment a parcel of land in violation
of Article 1491 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,

and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

6. Any others specially disqualified by law.

Respondent Maximo Calalang died on August 8, 1978. His death rendered the case moot and
academic. However, the investigation of the charges conducted during the respondent's lifetime
indicates that the charges filed against him have no merit. Consequently, We also dismiss the
complaint to clear the name of the deceased respondent insofar as this case is concerned.

The report and recommendation of the Solicitor General filed on July 29, 1981 states:

After a careful consideration of the above-stated facts, as wen as of the applicable

law, rules and jurisprudence, undersigned are of the opinion that respondent was
not guilty of professional misconduct or unethical practice.

According to respondent, under his agreement with Bernabe Flores, he was to get
for attorney's fees one-half (1/2) of what would be awarded to Flores in Civil Case
No. Q- 2171. Because of the agreement, he actually paid to Flores only one-half
of the total consideration of P18,348.45 mentioned in the deed of assignment,
Exhibit E.

(Respondent's Memorandum, pp. 3, 4, 9) The other half was set-off with his
attorney's fees.
 The agreement of respondent and Bernabe Flores is a contract for contingent fee.
It has already been held that contingent fee is not prohibited in the Philippines and
is impliedly sanctioned by the Canons of Professional Ethics (Recto vs. Harden,
100 Phil. 427 [1956]. In the absence of a prohibiting statute, a contingent fee
agreement between an attorney and his client, under which the attorney is to have
a portion of the thing in litigation in the event of a successful prosecution or defense
of an action, is generally recognized as valid (14 Am Jur 2d 41, p. 845), if not
attended by fraud, mistake, undue influence, or suppression of facts (7 Am Jur 2d
414, p. 171). The presence of any of the vitiating circumstances has not been
shown in this case. Indeed, the absence of fraud or undue influence is indicated
by the fact that the complainant in this case is not Flores but one of the third-party
claimants to the lot assigned to respondent.

In some jurisdictions, a contract for contingent fee is even deemed to create a

equitable pro tanto equitable assignment, or to transfer an equitable interest in
favor of the attorney in the judgment or the proceeds of settlement, or to give him
a lien on the judgment or its proceeds (7 Am Jur 2d. 218, p. 173).

Even if the assignment of rights in question is considered an outright purchase by the respondent
of the subject lot or of the rights therein, still respondent was not guilty of breach of professional
ethics, misconduct or malpractice by reason of said transaction. It is true that Canon No. 10 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics prohibits the lawyer from purchasing any interest in the subject-
matter of the litigation which he is conducting, and Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code prohibits him from acquiring by purchase or assignment the property and rights which may
be the object of any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession. But in those
cases where these provisions were applied, the rights or properties purchased by the lawyer were
the very subject of the litigation handled by him (Rubias vs. Batiller, 51 SCRA 120 [1973]; Sotto
vs. Samson 5 SCRA 733 [1962]; Go Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 [1940]; In re Ruste, 70
Phil. 243 [1940]; Director of Lands vs. Abagat et al., 53 Phil. 147 [1929]; Hernandez vs.
Villanueva, 70 Phil. 775 [1920], or were properties of the minor in guardianship proceedings in
which the lawyer appeared as counsel for the guardian (Junquera vs. Vaño, 72 Phil. 293 [1941],
or were properties belonging to the estate for which he appeared as counsel (In re Calderon 7
Phil. 427 [1907]). In the case at bar, the lot in which respondent acquired rights by assignment
was not the subject of Civil Case No. 2171 in which he approved (sic) as counsel for Bernabe
Flores and others. The said case was purely one for damages and did not involve the lot in
question. The lot was simply levied upon on execution after judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs. Therefore Article 1491 of the New Civil Code did not apply. Consequently,
respondent had not violated the said provision of law.

We agree.

It was not professional misconduct or unethical practice for the respondent to acquire the rights
and interests of his client to the 439 square meter parcel of land subject of the administrative
charges because the land was not involved in the litigation he was handling. The land was
acquired by Bernabe Flores in an execution sale conducted to satisfy the judgment secured in
the course of Civil Case No. 2171. The case handled by the respondent was for damages.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against the respondent is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Article VI Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1563 May 31, 2001

ROSEMARIE LATORRE, complainant,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO P. ANSALDO, Executive and Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court,
Branch 94, Boac, Marinduque, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

On November 23, 1998, Rosemarie Latorre filed with the Office of the Court Administrator,
Supreme Court a complaint charging respondent Judge Leonardo P. Ansaldo with bias and
partiality, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law relative to his handling Criminal Case
Number 13-971 for murder.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On January 19, 1997, Alberto Bayotas, Cesar Pe, PO3 Arnold Tablatin, Dennis Magcarang and
Benny Sotto killed Edwin Latorre, the husband of complainant Rosemarie Latorre.

On February 11, 1997, the Municipal Trial Court, Buenavista, Marinduque found a prima facie
case for homicide and frustrated homicide against the accused.

Sometime in September or October 1998, accused Cesar Pe, Dennis Magcarang and Benny
Sotto surrendered to the court. They were detained at Marinduque Provincial Jail, Boac,
Marinduque. Alberto Bayotas and Arnaldo Tablatin remain at large.

On October 13, 1998, upon arraignment, accused Cesar Pe, Dennis Magcarang and Benny Sotto
pleaded not guilty.2 They were assisted by counsel, Atty. Julian Vitug, Jr. Neither the private
prosecutor nor complainant Rosemarie Latorre was notified of the arraignment.

The order indicated that by agreement of the parties, the pre-trial conference of the case was set
on November 4, 1998, at about 8:30 a.m.

On September 22, 1998, accused filed a "Motion For An Order Granting Accused Right To Bail
And For Provisional Liberty."3

On November 4, 1998, the private prosecutor moved that the respondent judge discipline the jail
guards in charge of the accused for allowing the accused to sleep in a hotel during nighttime and
for not confining them in jail during day time. Complainant alleged that on November 3, 1998, the
accused stayed at the compound of Camp Col. Maximo Abad, 1,000 meters away from the
provincial jail.

Without acting on the motion, respondent judge issued an order4 suspending further proceedings
due to a pending request before the Supreme Court to change the venue of the trial from Boac,
Marinduque to Metro Manila. Thus –
 "When these cases were called for hearing on the petition for bail of accused Cesar Pe,
Dennis Magcarang and Benny Sotto, counsel for the accused Atty. Julian Vitug, Jr.,
together with the private prosecutor Atty. Tiberio U. Prado and the public prosecutor
Edgardo P. Balquiedra appeared.

"Atty. Prado moved for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground that they have a
pending request before the Supreme Court for change of venue together with their
intended move to disqualify Prosecutor Balquiedra from participating in this case and
request for the appointment of a special prosecutor. Over the objection of defense counsel
and assurance of private prosecutor that he will follow-up promptly this action of the higher
court, the Court deemed it wise to suspend the proceedings on both cases until such time
that the Supreme Court has made a definite ruling on the request."5

On November 12, 1998, accused filed a motion for speedy trial as a reconsideration of the order
suspending the proceedings. The court scheduled the motion for hearing on November 17, 1998,
at 9:00 a. m.

On November 16, 1998, complainant filed with the court a motion reiterating her oral motion to
discipline the jail guards.6 Complainant alleged that accused were out every Thursday and
Sunday attending worship services about two (2) to three (3) kilometers away from the jail.
Respondent judge did not act on the motion and declared that the accused were accompanied
by jail guards whenever they were out of jail.

On the same day, November 16, 1998, a day prior to the scheduled hearing, respondent judge
issued an order7reconsidering the suspension of the proceedings and setting the hearing on the
petition for bail on November 18, 1998, at 9:00 a. m. Private prosecutor and complainant resided
in Metro Manila. Luckily, both prosecutor and complainant were in Boac, Marinduque when they
were furnished a copy of the order.

On November 17, 1998, complainant filed with the trial court an "Urgent Motion for Inhibition" 8 of
respondent judge.

On November 18, 1998, respondent judge issued an order recalling his order dated November
16, 1998, and setting the case for hearing on the motion for speedy trial on November 25, 1998.

In the afternoon of November 20, 1998, the wife of counsel of complainant received a telephone
call from the staff of respondent judge stating that the case was set for hearing on November 25,
1998.

Actually, no hearing was conducted until private complainant filed a motion to dismiss 9 the case
with the conformity of the accused and the approval of the public prosecutor.

On December 2, 1998, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice.10

On November 23, 1998, complainant filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme
Court a complaint against respondent judge alleging:

"xxx respondent Judge be administratively disciplined by removing him from the service
with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which respondent
Judge Leonardo P. Ansaldo may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/ or
 reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government including the government-
owned or controlled agencies or corporation."

On July 3, 2000, the Court issue an order11 referring the case to the Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Batangas City for investigation, report and recommendation within thirty (30) days
from notice.

On September 27, 2000, the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Judge
Paterno V. Tac-An, made the following recommendation:

"IN VIEW THEREOF, and considering the advanced age of the respondent Judge (68
years old on the dates in question), it is respectfully recommended that respondent Judge
be fined in a moderate amount to be deducted from his retirement benefits and that he be
considered retired at his 70th birthday in January 2000."12

The Court finds the recommendation well taken.

The Code of Judicial Conduct ordains judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.13Judges must live up to this expectation by diligent effort to keep themselves
abreast of the legal and jurisprudential developments.14 Likewise, judges must preserve the trust
and faith reposed in them by the parties as impartial and objective administrators of justice.

When Judge Ansaldo found that the motion of the complainant to discipline the jail guards was
not supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses on the matter, he should have set the case
for hearing, requiring the jail guards to explain their side.

Respondent judge's act of scheduling the petition for bail for hearing on November 18, 1998, less
than three (3) days from the issuance of the order constitutes plain ignorance of the law. Such
order created a cloud of impropriety on the part of the judge.

Nevertheless, we have to consider the respondent judge's act of resetting the hearing to
November 25, 1998. Obviously, he realized that he committed an error and tried to rectify it. The
doubt as to the impartiality of the judge, however, was attendant in the mind of the parties.

To highlight the doubt, the judge did not fix any bail for the temporary liberty of the accused.

Considering such situation, Judge Ansaldo should have inhibited himself instead of proceeding
with the case.

In Gutang vs. Court of Appeals,15 we said that in the final reckoning, there is really no hard and
fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case shall be treated differently and
decided based on its peculiar circumstances. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter
of conscience and sound discretion based on valid reasons on the part of the judge. 16 It is a
subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any
manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an
acknowledgment of the fact that judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition
as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
In this case, respondent judge failed to take into account the loss of trust on the part of the
complainant as to his impartiality.

Judges must at all times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of parties litigants in the court's
impartiality, and that the slightest doubt in the actions of a judge, whether well grounded or not,
will leave the judge no better alternative than to rescue himself as the ideal mode to preserve the
image of the judiciary.17 By inhibiting himself, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for
probity and objectivity is preserved. More importantly, the ideal of impartial administration of
justice is lived up to.18

In Orola vs. Alovera,19 we reiterated that when a judge exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or
unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but
to inhibit himself voluntarily. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but
when circumstances appear that will induce doubt on his honest actuation and probity in favor of
either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The
better course for the judge is to disqualify himself.20

WHEREFORE, Judge LEONARDO P. ANSALDO, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,

Marinduque, Branch 94, Boac, is declared guilty of simple ignorance of the law and FINED in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. SCC-98-4 March 22, 2011

ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CASAN ALI L. LIMBONA, Shari'a Circuit Court, Lanao del Sur, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is the present administrative matter against Judge Casan Ali Limbona, Tenth
Shari’a Circuit Court (10th SCC), Tamparan, Lanao del Sur. This matter is the subject of the
Memorandum/Report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated August 7, 2000.1

The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, culled from the OCA report and the case record, are summarized below.

(1) The OCA received on July 31, 1998 a letter dated July 13, 1998 addressed to then
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo,2 signed by Datu Ashary M. Alauya (Alauya),
Clerk of Court, 10th SSC, Marawi City.

Alauya reported that numerous verbal complaints had been received against Judge Casan
Ali Limbona (Judge Limbona) for: (a) not reporting to his station at the SCC in Tamparan,
Lanao del Sur; (b) having filed a certificate of candidacy as a party-list candidate of the
Development Foundation of the Philippines (DFP) while serving in the Judiciary and while
receiving his salary as a judge; and (c) obtaining from the post office, without sufficient
authority, checks representing benefits for court employees.

(2) A request from a "concerned citizen"3 that the court in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur, be
moved to Cotobato City where Judge Limbona resided since the judge had been reporting
to Tamparan only once a year since 1994.

Upon the OCA’s inquiry,4 the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) confirmed that based
on their records, a certain Casan Ali L. Limbona filed his certificate as a party-list candidate
of the DFP in the May 11, 1998 elections.5

The OCA confirmed, too, that Judge Limbona failed to submit any notice or information about his
candidacy; for this reason, the Judge continued to draw his salary as a judge. The OCA forthwith
advised the Finance Services Office to discontinue the payment of Judge Limbona’s salary.

On January 27, 1999, the Court resolved to: (1) treat Alauya’s letter as an administrative complaint
against Judge Limbona; (2) direct Judge Limbona to comment; (3) explain why he did not inform
the OCA that he ran for public office in the May 1998 elections; and (4) immediately refund the
salaries/allowances he received from March to November 1998.6

In a letter dated December 28, 1998 addressed to the OCA, Judge Limbona denied that he
consented to be a nominee of DFP in the May 1998 elections. To prove his point, he submitted
the affidavit7 of Datu Solaiman A. Malambut, DFP’s National President, admitting sole
responsibility for his "honest mistake" and "malicious negligence and act of desperation" in
including the name of Judge Limbona among the party’s list of nominees.

While Judge Limbona professed awareness of the rule that appointed government officials are
considered resigned on the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, he was not aware
of any legal opinion or ruling applicable to his case.

Alauya, on the other hand, denied authorship of the letter against Judge Limbona and requested
that his name be stricken from the records as complainant in the case.8

In his comment dated April 26, 1998,9 Judge Limbona branded as "purely malicious and
unfounded" the allegations that he and his staff were not reporting at the 10th SCC in Tamparan,
Lanao del Sur. In support of his claim, the judge submitted the joint affidavit10 of several members
of his staff certifying that the public had been transacting business daily with their office at the
Memorial Building in Tamparan. Members of his staff also vouched for Judge Limbona’s
leadership, intelligence, diligence and contributions to the welfare of the community. The judge
also submitted a certification dated April 8, 199911 from the municipal mayor of Tamparan, Datu
Topa-an D. Disomimba, attesting that the establishment of the 10th SCC in Tamparan has
contributed to the maintenance of peace and order in the area, and that Judge Limbona’s
leadership has been excellent.

Judge Limbona reiterated his denial that he filed a certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1998
elections. He explained that he had no knowledge of his supposed candidacy until he learned
about it from the OCA and this Court. Because he was never a candidate, he continued performing
his duties as a judge.

Also on April 26, 1999, Judge Limbona filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the Court’s January
27, 1999 Resolution maintaining his lack of knowledge of the filing of his candidacy. On May 10,
1999, Judge Limbona filed another motion for reconsideration13 of the same Resolution,
submitting fresh arguments as follows:

(1) his alleged certificate of candidacy and acceptance bore discrepancies in the
signature, thumbprints and community tax certificate numbers;

(2) the Court’s order withholding the release of his salaries without giving him the
opportunity to be heard violated his right to due process; and

(3) the resolution of the Court ordering him to refund the salaries he received from March
26, 1998 to November 30, 1998 likewise deprived him of due process as it meant he had
already been adjudged guilty of the charges.

In a Memorandum/Report dated October 18, 1999,14 the OCA apprised the Court of
developments in the case. The OCA noted that the charges against Judge Limbona that needed
to be addressed were: (1) Judge Limbona’s alleged filing of a certificate of candidacy as a party-
list representative in the May 1998 elections, in violation of the rule on partisan political activity,
and (2) Judge Limbona’s neglect of his duties as a judge.

On the first charge, the OCA disbelieved Judge Limbona’s assertion that he did not consent to
the inclusion of his name in the certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC and that his
inclusion was purely due to the carelessness of the person who prepared the certificate. The OCA
nevertheless took the view that a positive identification of the judge’s participation in the filing of
the certificate of candidacy was needed to fully resolve the matter.

The OCA, however, found that the second charge of non-performance or neglect of duty (due to
absenteeism) stood unsubstantiated and was, in fact, negated by the joint affidavit 15 of the staff
members of the 10th SCC in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur and the certification16 of the municipal
mayor vouching for the judge’s leadership, diligence and contribution to the maintenance of peace
and order in the community.

The OCA recommended that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be asked to determine
the authenticity of Judge Limbona’s signatures on the certificate of candidacy as DFP
representative in the May 1998 congressional elections, and that Judge Limbona be suspended
as a judge until the matter is finally resolved.

The Court (Third Division) approved the OCA recommendation.17

On July 7, 2000, the NBI, through Deputy Director Sancho K. Chan, Jr., submitted to the OCA its
report on the matter18 with the following findings:

FINDINGS: Comparative examination of the specimens received under the stereocopic

microscope, hand lens and with the aid of photographic enlargement reveals significant
similarities in habit handwriting characteristics existing between the questioned and the standard
sample signatures of Casan Ali Limbona, to wit:

- structural pattern of letter elements -

- Directions of strokes –

- Manner of execution –

- Other identifying details –

CONCLUSION: The questioned and the standard sample signatures Casan Ali L. Limbona WERE
WRITTEN by one and the same person.""

The NBI findings and conclusion that Judge Limbona himself signed the certificate of candidacy
validated the OCA’s initial doubts on Judge Limbona’s avowals of innocence about his
participation in the May 1998 elections and his claim that the signatures appearing on the
certificate of candidacy were forged.

The OCA Recommendation and Related Incidents

The OCA recommended that Judge Limbona be found guilty of dishonesty and be dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of retirement and other privileges, if any, and be barred from re-
employment in the public service, and that he be made to refund all salaries/allowances he
received from March 26, 1998 to November 30, 1998 without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate case in court.
In a related development, the Court (Second Division) issued a Resolution dated June 16, 2003
in A.M. No. SCC-03-08, entitled Emelyn A. Limbona v. Judge Casan Ali Limbona, forwarding to
the Third Division for consideration under the present case, the charge that the respondent judge
continued to perform his functions and to receive his salaries as judge after he had filed a
certificate of candidacy in the May 1998 elections.

The Court’s Ruling

We find the OCA’s recommendation to be well-founded. Judge Limbona committed grave

offenses which rendered him unfit to continue as a member of the Judiciary. When he was
appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as
a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving up his judicial post, Judge
Limbona violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that "no officer or employee in
the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign."19

The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbona’s signatures on the certificate of
candidacy unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the certificate of candidacy for the May
1998 elections, thus negating his claim that his signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate
of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate
for an elective post.1avvphi1

For his continued performance of his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post,
Judge Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct in office. While we cannot interfere with Judge
Limbona’s political aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his political goals while still on the
bench. We cannot likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary. We find relevant the OCA’s
observation on this point:

"x x x Judge Limbona’s concealment of his direct participation in the 1998 elections while
remaining in the judiciary’s payroll and his vain attempt to mislead the Court by his claim of
forgery, are patent acts of dishonesty rendering him unfit to remain in the judiciary."

In light of the gravity of Judge Limbona’s infractions, we find OCA’s recommended penalty of
dismissal to be appropriate. Under the Rules of Court, dishonesty and gross misconduct are
punishable by dismissal.20 We also approve the OCA recommendation that Judge Limbona be
made to refund the salaries/allowances he received from March 26, 1998 to November 30, 1998.
With this ruling, we likewise resolve the charge against Judge Limbona — referred to us by the
Court’s Second Division in its June 16, 2003 Resolution in A.M. No. SCC-03-08 — that the
respondent judge continued to perform judicial functions and to receive his salaries as judge after
he had filed a certificate of candidacy in the May 1998 elections.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Casan Ali L. Limbona is declared GUILTY OF

GROSS MISCONDUCT and DISHONESTY and is declared DISMISSED from the service
effective March 26, 1998, the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, with FORFEITURE
of all accrued retirement benefits and other monetary entitlements, if any. He is BARRED from
re-employment in the government, including government-owned and controlled corporation.
Judge Limbona is DIRECTED TO REFUND the salaries, allowances and other benefits he
received from March 26, 1998 to November 30, 1998, within 10 days from the finality of this
Decision.
This Decision is without prejudice to appropriate criminal and civil cases that may be filed against
Judge Limbona for the acts he committed. Let a copy of this Decision be served on the
Ombudsman for whatever action it may deem appropriate.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662. November 26, 2001]

VICTOR TUZON, complainant, vs. JUDGE LORETO CLORIBEL-

PURUGGANAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:

The case under consideration is an administrative complaint[1] against Judge Loreto Cloribel-
Purugganan, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3, for illegal practice of law,
gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, evident bias and partiality, knowingly rendering
unjust judgment, and willful violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
On June 25, 1998, Victor G. Tuzon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3,
presided over by respondent Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan in Civil Case No. 4269.[2] The
order denied Tuzons motion to allow cross-examination of his witness and directed that the case
be submitted for resolution.
On July 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution directing private respondent
Raymundo E. Catral to file the comment thereon and to show cause why the prayer for injunctive
relief should not be granted both within ten (10) days from notice hereof.[3]
On July 22, 1998, respondent judge filed the comment for Raymundo Catral and herself, and
affixed her name and signature on the comment.[4]
On August 2, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. [5]
On February 14, 2000, Tuzon filed with the Supreme Court an administrative complaint
against respondent judge deploring the act of filing a comment in the civil case as illegal private
practice of law.[6] Tuzon also averred that respondent judge antedated her decision in Civil Case
No. 4265, making it appear that the decision was promulgated on June 23, 1999, when in fact it
was issued later.
On March 23, 2000, respondent judge filed with the Supreme Court a comment on the
administrative complaint of Victor G. Tuzon.[7] She admitted authoring the comment filed with the
Court of Appeals in the civil case involving complainant. She stated that she did so because Atty.
Isidro Reyes, counsel for the private respondent Raymundo E. Catral in that civil case, was sick
and unable to perform his work. Respondent judge denied antedating any decision and alleged
that complainant failed to present any evidence to support such accusation.
On January 24, 2001, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada submitted to the
Court a recommendation that respondent judge be imposed a fine for filing an answer in behalf
of the respondent Catral and defending her questioned order.[8]
The Court has reminded judges of the lower courts that a judge whose order is challenged in
an appellate court need not file any answer, or take an active part in the proceedings unless
expressly directed by order of the Court.[9]
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent judge filed a comment on behalf of the
respondent Raymundo E. Catral in the case on review with the Court of Appeals. Respondent
judge signed the pleading herself and submitted it to the court notwithstanding that it was her
decision that was the subject of the petition in the said court.
In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision in the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading
therein. If either party elevates the case to a higher court, the public respondents shall be included
therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall not appear
or participate in the proceedings therein.[10]

Respondent argues that she filed a comment on behalf of one of the parties to the case
because the counsel was suffering from an illness at the time. However, a judge must maintain a
detached attitude from the case and shall not waste his time by taking an active part in a
proceeding that relates to official actuations in a case.[11] He is merely a nominal party and has
no personal interest or personality therein.
Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a comment with the court on behalf of one of
the parties, engaged in the private practice of law. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but includes preparation of pleadings or
papers in anticipation of litigation.[12]
Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct,[13] judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law.[14] This is
based on public policy because the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretion and privileges of a judge.[15]
Regarding the other charges of complainant, we find no proof that respondent antedated her
decision in Civil Case 4269. Further, no adequate evidence supports complainants charges of
gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, evident bias and partiality, and knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment. Thus, these charges should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan guilty
of illegal practice of law, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Revised Rules
of Court. The Court hereby metes out on her the penalty of suspension from office for a period of
three (3) months, without pay, and to pay a fine of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with a
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
This Resolution is effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.