RENATO CAYETANO vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission
on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on
Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed
this certiorari and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in

confirming Monsod’s appointment.

HELD:

1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and
other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional
commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to
consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law
provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court
also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers
nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that
because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions
to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in
management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked
with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986,
became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide
Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as
lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by
the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially
within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no
occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA.

People v. Hon. Bonifacio Maceda

January 24, 2000

FACTS:

This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking reconsideration of our
August 13, 1990 decision holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed
no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over
private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that
time, sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should not be detained at the Antique
Provincial Jail. The trial court’s order specifically provided for private respondent’s
detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be
allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.
It was howevere found that the order was not strictly complied with because Javellana was
not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if
he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention.

Held:

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against
him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave
Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation
“to hold and detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the clerk
of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he
ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court
must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.

OCA vs. Ladaga OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M.
LADAGAA.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001

Facts:

Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared
as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal
Case No. 84-885 for ―Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It
is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous
permission of the Court. During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such
counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his
Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling.
Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin -client Narcisa Ladaga.
Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent
being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and
high regard for her. This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member
of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of
settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance
as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in
government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence. He failed to obtain
a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to
which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private
practice? NO
Held:

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private
practice of their profession.
Admission a. Legal ProfessionIn re: Cunanan Resolution Cunanan, et. al 18March1954

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946
to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have
aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the ―Bar
Flunkers’ Act of 1953.‖ Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave
of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few
exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the
bar examinations(1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 194974%, 1950-1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed
by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to
congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after
he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate
bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became
law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit
to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law
profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the
administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. - An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. - The Judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. - The Constitution,
has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission
to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this court. - Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that
what the law seeks to ―cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or
the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by
the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. -Reasons for
Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of
the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972
violated the Constitution.3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and
supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must
elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)4. It
is a class legislation5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the
entire law is void.

HELD:

Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and
therefore void and w/o force and effect.2. The part of ART 1 that
refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and
shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to
1952are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN
Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having
passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was
born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in
the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to
take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the
following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified
accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was
scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance
with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in
which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother
is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he
does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present
jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:

1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within
a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3
years from "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected
Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court
considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING

IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF
THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004

Facts:

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of
the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the
2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not
a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with
the OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him
by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be
settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from
a single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover,
Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral
turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office
clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition
to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact,
the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these
cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under
oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
Issue:

Whether or not the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and
shall subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of
Attorneys

Held:

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership
of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders
from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to
prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as
a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.

Alawi v Alauya
January 31, 2016Thinker Bell

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City,
a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to
be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising
of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was
vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and
the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of
her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members
of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically
synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken
for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held:

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
 As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction

GRANDE v DA SILVA

FACTS:
Emilio Grande is the private offended party (of estafa and BP 22) against a certain
Sergio Natividad, the client of Atty. De Silva
De Silva tendered a check to Grande as settlement of the civil aspect of the case.
The check was returned with the notation that the ACCT CLOSED
Grande filed a suit against De Silva for violation of BP 22 and Estafa (sha naman ang
nakasuhan tuloy hehe)
De Silva refused to comment on notices of complaints sent to her.
IBP recommended that de Silva be suspended for two years.

ISSUE:
WoN de Silva should be suspended?

HELD: YES

1. The nature of the office of an atty requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
character. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may
render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason
whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment.
2. Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-pro, justifies disciplinary action. For a lawyer’s professional and
personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.
Her deliberate refusal to accept the notices served on her stains the nobility of the
profession. How else would a lawyer endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she
disdains to follow even simple directives. Also, Canon 1 says that a lawyer shall uphold the
consti, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the legal processes.

In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS:

This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.
Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but
was sentenced with homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was
sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which
was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was
not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office
averring that his probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10
months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE:

WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING:
The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping
in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he
was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and
have become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of
individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr.
Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the
law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to
the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.

TAPUCAR VS TAPUCAR

EN BANC[ A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998 ]

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR,

RESPONDENT

Facts:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar

sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances.

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty
of six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
from service of respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility

Ruling:

Yes.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand
as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as “moral
character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and
maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the
Bar but also the administration of justice.
GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO
Facts:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental
affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana
P. Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Discipline, charging
them with gross immorality, in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through
her daughter that her husband was having an affair with a woman other than his
wife and already had a child with her; and the same inf ormation was confirmed
when one of her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons mall with the
other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in
tow. After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yielded re
sults telling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been married in Hong Kong.
Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia at their residence, and has since failed to render much needed financial
support. In their defense, they postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they
committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of
a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute a violation of Canon 1,
Rule1.01 and thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being
supposedly committed when they were not lawyers.
Held:
Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where
circumstances show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers,
be they academic or moral. In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their
blatant violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which commands that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Furthermore, The contention of respondent that they were not yet
lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions; good
moral character was already required as a condition precedent to admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and Valencia w
ereshouldered with the expectation that they would set a good example in promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to
cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the
legal profession. Such actions by themselves, without even including the fact of Garrido’s
abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner;
or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two
other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of moral values not
consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their
disbarment is affirmed.

Cruz v. Mijares

FACTS:

Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for Abatement of Nuisance pending in the
sala of respondent judge.

He sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf.

Claim anchored on Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required petitioner to secure written permission from
the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself.

Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.

Petitioner objected, alleging that an MTD is not allowed after the Answer has been filed.

Respondent judge remarked, “Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?”

Petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to inhibit: there was partiality on the part of
respondent judge as can be seen from her contumacious remarks.

Motion denied. MR denied.

Cruz’s appearance was also denied as he failed to submit the document

required by Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.

MR: basis of his appearance was Rule 138, Sec. 34, not Rule 138-A.

138-applicable to any non-lawyer;

138-A–specifically for law students.

MR denied, still invoking Rule 138-A.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUES:
Does the SC have jurisdiction to entertain the petition?

HELD:
YES.
SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, and injunction.

This concurrence does not mean that the petitioner has absolute freedom to choose where
the petition will be filed.

Still has to give due regard to the judicial hierarchy.

Thus, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against RTCs should be filed with the
CA.

Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the SC take cognizance of
petitions directly filed before it.

SC assumes jurisdiction over this petition as it concerns the interpretation of Sec. 34, Rule
138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly with the SC.

What rule applies in the case of petitioner, Rule 138 or 138-A?

Rule 138.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR.QUISUMBING,

Facts:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine
(9) years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San
Joaquin, Iloilo. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and
the prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old
playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the victim. The Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentences him to suffer
 the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty. Appellant contends that he
was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents
and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination and cross-
examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the services of a new
lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually
not a member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed
this fact.
Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily
result in his acquittal of the crime charged.

Issue:
Is the petitioner entitled to a new trial?

Held:
“This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar
in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is
represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will
be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.”
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The
right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the
State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement
is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily.

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and Victoriano
Tenazas vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations and Quintin
Muning

FACTS:
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES
FOR ENTILA AND TENAZAS.
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a notice of attorney's lien
equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
i. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their non-objection to an
award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages
ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered"
equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
a. Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
i. Cipriano 10%
ii. Quintin Muning 10%
iii. Atanacio Pacis 5%

iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the division of attorney's
fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers
Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a ruling, that the person representing the
party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees
a. Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
b. Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member does not entitle the representative to compensation for
such representation.
Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees:
 i. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
than a reasonable compensation for his services.

a. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.
b. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good
moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was 16 years old,
that he was eligible for 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and
name-sake, Juan M. Publico.
ii. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
iii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification
of school records or credentials.
PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground that his witnesses
had turned hostile.
i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
i. Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules
of Court, which require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed
courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice
of law.
11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never
received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of the
Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him.
He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to Manila.
Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary conduct
from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous awards,
resolutions and/'or commendations he received,
i. Court denied the Petition.
ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for lack of
merit.
5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through the
initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and enrolled him
in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his demonstrations
i. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle; that being
merely 16 year old, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still under
the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.

ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought
to be voided in the present petition.

WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the
backpay of some of its members. YES.
It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for
review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition. Their inclusion in the petition as co-
petitioners was belated.

HELD:
ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED 10% OF
BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST MUNING.
1. Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is
not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
2. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications, for the ethics of the profession and
for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
3. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated:
1. Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by
fine or imprisonment or both,
2. Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation
of law
3. If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to
whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside
from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
4. In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the
backpay of some of its members:
1. YES because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the
industrial court on behalf of its members
2. If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an
aggrieved party, under Sec 6, RA 875:
i. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by
any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
3. Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Five J Taxi and Juan Armamento v. NLRC, DomingoMaldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon
G.R. No. 111474. August 22, 1994
Facts:
Maldigan and Sabsalon were hired by the Five J Taxi astaxi driver. Nov. 1987 and
June 1979, respectively.
a. T h e y w o r k e d f o r 4 d a y s w e e k l y o n a 2 4 h o u r
shifting schedule.
b. Aside from the daily “boundary” of P700.00 f or air-
co n d i t i o n e d t a x i o r P 4 5 0 . 0 0 f o r n o n - a i r -
conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P 2 0 . 0 0 f o r c a r
w a s h i n g , a n d t o f u r t h e r m a k e a P 1 5 . 0 0 deposit to answer for
any defiency in their “boundary,” for every actual working day.
Subsequently, in less than 4 months after he was hired, Maldigan failed to
report to work for unknown reasons.
Sabsalon was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and
stabbed him. He was hospitalized and a f t e r h i s d i s c h a r g e , h e w e n t t o h i s
h o m e p r o v i n c e t o recuperate.
While Sabsalon was re-admitted to work by Five J Taxi, he was only required to work
every other day. However, on several instances, he also failed to report for work during his
schedule. Despite repeated requests for him to report to work, he refused.
In 1989, Maldigan requested Five J Taxi for the
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but they told him that nothing
was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent f o r
t h e r e p a i r s o f t h e t a x i h e w a s d r i v i n g . T h i s w a s allegedly the practice
adopted by Five J Taxi to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab
units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated
his services.
Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was
effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
Maldigan and Sabsalon then filed a complaint with the N L R C
for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
Comlaint was dismissed.
a. T h e f i l i n g o f t h e c a s e w a s a m e r e a f t e r t h o u g h t since it took
them two years to file the same. Such delay is unreasonable.
b. It was also discovered that Maldigan was work ing for another
taxi company called “Mine of Gold” and that Sabsalon was driving a
taxi for “Bulaklak Company.” Both of them failed to controvert the
evidence showing this and that they voluntarily left their jobs.
 c. H o w e v e r , o r d e r e d F i v e J T a x i a n d A r m a m e n t o t o p a y
M a l d i g a n a n d S a b s a l o n t h e i r accumulated deposits and car wash
payments.
Is s u e :
W h e t h e r o r N o t M a l d i g a n a n d S a b s a l o n ’ s d e p o s i t s a n d c a r wash payments
should be refunded.

Held:
YES.
1 . N L R C h e l d t h a t t h e P 1 5 . 0 0 d a i l y d e p o s i t s m a d e b y respondents to
defray any shortage in their “boundary” is covered by the general prohibition in LC
114 against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the
Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a “practice” in the taxi industry. Therefore,
t h e d e p o s i t s m a d e w e r e i l l e g a l a n d t h e r e s p o n d e n t s must be refunded.
2. It can be deduced that the LC114 provides the rule on
d e p o s i t s f o r l o s s o r d a m a g e t o t o o l s , m a t e r i a l s o r equipment supplied
by the employer. Clearly the same does not apply to or permit deposits not to
defray any d e f i c i e n c y w h i c h t h e t a x i d r i v e r m a y i n c u r i n t h e remittance
of his “boundary.”
3 . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n M a l d i g a n a n d S a b s a l o n s t o p p e d working for Five
J Taxi, the alleged purpose for which the deposits were required no longer existed. As such,
any b a l a n c e d u e t o p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s a f t e r p r o p e r accounting must be
returned to them with legal interest.

G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA,
JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA,
RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO SACURA,
FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO
CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO
CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE
ORAEZ, JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ,
CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA,
DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO,
GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO
NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with

principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner
was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its
plant employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by
petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under the supervision of Engineers Paulino
Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its completion and petitioner started
terminating the services of private respondents and its other employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-
Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed
that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought payment of their salary
differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-
respondents.

The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio
and Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter
Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner’s liability to private respondents and agreed to
pay their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this
agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner’s right to file its position paper. 1
Private respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their position papers and
were adopting their complaints as their position paper.

Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company to pay the
employees.

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it

was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to
represent and bind petitioner.

NLRC affirmed the decisions of the Labor Arbiters.

RULING:

It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal
address in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and
summons served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer
Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of petitioner.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic corporation or
partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so integrated with the
corporation that they know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with
any legal papers served on them.

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and
supervised the construction project. 9 According to the Solicitor General and private
respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised the
work of the employees thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion
to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the same to the
president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore
validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims
of private respondents is another matter.

The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and
respondent Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .

A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to
present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department
of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . .
10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents
himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or its members, with
written authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid
office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
in cases referred to by the latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited
members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as
parties to the cases was authorized under the first exception to the rule. However, their
appearance on behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent
upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named
co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements
and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized
to appear as representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural
matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner’s liability arose from
Engineer Estacio’s alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to
compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of petitioner.
The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly established by
evidence.

Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have
authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a
special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the
opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client’s claim.

After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims as promised, Labor
Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective position papers.
The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without at least requiring private
respondents to substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their
right to file position papers but petitioner’s waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the
premise that petitioner shall have paid and settled the claims of private respondents at the
scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged on its “promise,” there was a failure to settle
the case amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their
position papers.

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree

upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter
shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the
conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position
papers.

VARGAS vs. IGNES

FACTS:
Apr 16, 2007-
Atty. Michael Ignes was hired by Koronadal Water District (KWD) as private legal counsel for one
year; the Office of Gov’t. Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and Commission on
Audit (COA) consented
Dec. 28, 2006
- Dela Pena (DP) Board filed a case to annul the appointment of two directors who will
allegedly connive with Director Allan Yapchockun who is against the present Board of
Directors (the Dela Pena Board)
Jan. 18, 2007
- DP Board appointed respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. And Atty. Buentipo Mann as
private counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under Atty.
Ignes’s supervision
Feb. 9 and 19-
they filed cases “KWD represented by Gen. Manager Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba vs Efren V
Cabucay” and “KWD vs. Rey J. Vargas”
Feb. 16, 2007
- OGCC approved retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin Cunanan as new legal counsel of
KWD and stated that the retainership contract of Ignes had expired on Jan.14, 2007
March 2, 2007
- OGCC addressed Eleanor P. Gomba’s insistence that the retainership contract of Atty.
Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or OGCC
may terminate the contract anytime without need of judicial action; that OGCC’s grant of
authority to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable circumstances;
and that the termination of Atty. Ignes’s contract was justified by the fact that the Local
Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new Board of
Directors of KWD and that said board had terminated Atty. Ignes’s services and requested
to hire another counsel. Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal
authority, complainants filed a disbarment complaint against the respondents before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline-Investigating Commissioner recommended that
the charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating
Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year,
from April 2006 to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination of his
contract when he filed pleadings-IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
did the IBP Board of Governors err in dismissing the case? Are the respondents liable for
appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so?
HELD/RATIONALE:
Yes, the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case; and YES, the respondents
are administratively liable. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Admin Code of
1987 says that the OGCC shall act as the principal law office of all Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations(GOCCs); Sec. 3 of Memo Circular No. 9: in exceptional cases, the
written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured
before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm.-Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr.
and Mann had no valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case
No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was
engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel.-In the case of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann, their
appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no approval
from the OGCC and COA.-In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD
without authority, after his authority as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA
approved his retainership contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we
assume as true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records
still disprove his claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007

Sps.Agbulos vs. Gutierrez, GR No. 176530, June 16, 2009

FACTS:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza
and Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses
Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents
inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in
Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-
123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded
in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when,
in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a
new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the notation
at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita
Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the
undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without
respondents knowledge and consent;

2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite
the fact that Atty. Magbitangs appellants brief failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding
the contents of an appellants brief; and

3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial
Court), not the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or
the PARAD/RARAD (Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents complaint.

HELD:

The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and
substantive grounds.

A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such
client before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:

SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client
on appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court
shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files
a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.

A reading of respondent Elena Garcias letter to the RTC would show that she did not
actually withdraw Atty. Magbitangs authority to represent respondents in the case. The
letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.

In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client

either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyers first
appearance and validates the action taken by him. Implied ratification may take various
forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits
flowing therefrom. Respondents silence or lack of remonstration when the case was finally
elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.

Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and

diligence. Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him; otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In light of
such mandate, Atty. Magbitangs act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her
clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not commendable.

The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, not the DARAB.

For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship
between the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable elements of
a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3)
that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation
on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint. Respondents complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the
slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. We are
in full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this point:

x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the

principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the
supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-
188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its reconveyance, and not
for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-appellees. Moreover,
the parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the
agrarian reform laws. Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in
this case nor the latters entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian in
nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants brief filed before the CA by the
respondents, suffice it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to
aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the
CA found the appellants brief sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was
able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held that technical and procedural
rules are intended to help secure, not to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a
rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime objective
for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.

Manangan vs. CFI, GR No. 82760, Aug. 30, 1990; Lapena 2009

FACTS: On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed

Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p. 98, Rollo).

On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias
Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court
of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner
with "Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the
Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of Lands had given his imprimatur to the
charge.

On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel Dunuan of
respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).

On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus with Writ of Preliminary Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court
of First Instance, et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to
try the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition
was dismissed on 7 May 1979 for non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).

On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show
up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p.
61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag,
Filemon Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."

On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a bailbond with the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva
Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B, Petition, p. 2).

On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is

this Alias Warrant that is challenged herein.

On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case,
which was denied by respondent Court (see CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).

Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled "Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI
of Nueva Vizcaya." The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands,
dated 27 March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion, impersonation and
abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal from the service; and (2) "require
respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court." In a
Decision, promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the Petition for
"absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding, among others, that "the non-
withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by
mandamus" (hereinafter, the German Decision).

On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioner, ostensibly through counsel, Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal
Case be dismissed on the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971
such that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was
denied.

On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of

conviction, respondent Court reset the promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the
bondsmen to produce the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing
the mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the
warrant of arrest issued by this Court through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979,
shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F, Petition).

On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition
for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for
petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on
the ground that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the
crime . . . was rendered." The pleading alleged "that petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased,
but has come to this Honorable Court through counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on
29 November 1982, Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit inasmuch as "there is
nothing on record to show that such dismissal had been sought before the decision was
rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). (Actually, no judgment has been rendered by
respondent Court).

Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10
February 1983, filed a Manifestation before respondent Court asking for the dismissal and
termination of the Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly died.

On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the
case closed and terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he
posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant
issued by the Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon
the accused as in full force and effect."

For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-
G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A.
Catral, etc." The Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983
denying the closure and termination of the Criminal Case.

On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and the
Catral Order, dismissed the Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino Decision) holding, inter alia,
that "whether or not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave abuse
of discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan
Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may not be litigated anew, no matter what form the
action for that purpose may take."

On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused filed an Omnibus

Motion with Motion for New Trial, which was denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19
November 1984. In the same Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until such
time that the accused is brought to the Court.

On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds
that: "(1) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused; and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted of the offense charged."

ISSUES:

Whether or not He is guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper

conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the
administration of justice.

HELD:

In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also committed
imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition
with this Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc.
Bar-2). In those cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres
Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres Culanag to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt for filing the two false petitions (In re:
Andres Culanag, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this
Court would not discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the Court
promising that he would not commit the same act if he is excused and given another
chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged
him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.

Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres
Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H.
Decena vs. Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct
that petitioner be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental
Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering from some kind of mental alienation.
This mitigates somewhat petitioner's present liability for contempt.

It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still
has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on
hand, without need for more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply
establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued
fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending directly to impede,
obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).

While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon
Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those
statements actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon
Manangan, long since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts
continue to this day.

Lemoine vs. Atty. Balon Jr., AC No. 5829, Oct 28, 2003

FACTS:

Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed an insurance

c l a i m w i t h Metropolitan Insurance.

His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balon’s services as his
counsel

Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being
recovered payable upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.

Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of
Lemoine’s claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and
receive payments.
Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoine’s claim and Balon confirmed his
acceptance of the offer.
December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in
the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon.
When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered
t h a t Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine
suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation.
December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of
the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon.
Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the
check as attorney’s lien pending Lemoine’s payment of his attorney’s fee equivalent to 50%
of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to
make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and
BIR if L e m o i n e w i l l m a k e a n y t r o u b l e t o B a l o n a n d t h a t h e h a s g o o d
n e t w o r k w i t h t h e mentioned agencies.

Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine,
however, he gave no evidence to such turnover .

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

hELD:
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistenc y in the interests of two
or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his dut y to oppose it for the
other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed
by him when he argues for the other client.
the reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his
c l e a r representation of conflicting interests.
first, the investigating commissioner observed that the name “Gamaliel Abaqueta” is not a
common name. once heard, it will surely ring a bell in one’s mind if he came across the
name again.
Second, assuming arguendo that respondents memory was indeed faulty, still it is
incredible that he could not recall that complainant was his client, considering
that Mrs.Charito Baclig, who was complainants attorney-in-fact and the go-between of
complainant and respondent in Special Proceedings, was the same person who brought
Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him.
Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil C ase and Special Proceedings are
the same properties could not have escaped the attention of respondent.
PEOPLE VS. GODOY
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 (December 6, 1995)

FACTS:
Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with
serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both
cases by the Regional Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny Codoy(Appellant)
by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, have
carnal Knowledge with her and kidnap or detained her, for a period of five (5).
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the complainant
(Mia Taha) to the accused and the same was corroborated by the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.

ISSUES:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with illegal detention?

RULING:
No. They were in fact lovers.
This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without
regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof
remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is
then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of
proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be
acquitted.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the
evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1)while rape is a most
detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in
mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended
by the party accused, though innocent;(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably
convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and
that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint
for redress of an actual wrong.
The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no
serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the
prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of
the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime
of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony
of complainant regarding the incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there
would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other
portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which
unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the
actual truth could have been readily exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual
intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present
charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution.
Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which
they themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the
prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young
ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is
observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which
brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be
that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows
everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the
wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape
drama.

In the matter of the application for Habeas Corpus of Maximino Gamido vs. New Bilibid
Prison, GR No. 146783, July 29, 2002

FACTS:

Before us is the Motion for Relief filed on January 17, 2002 by Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, of
Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, who styles himself as counsel for
petitioner Maximino B. Gamido.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there has been a violation of the rule against forum-shopping;
and
2. Whether or not Espiridion J. Dela Cruz may appear as counsel for petitioner in
this case, considering allegations that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar.
HELD:

It appearing that earlier the petitioner himself filed under date of February 12, 2001,
personally his Motion to Withdraw Petition, and that the Court in its Resolution dated
March 12, 2001, granted the withdrawal of his petition for habeas corpus, the Court
hereby RESOLVES that the instant Motion for Relief, which was filed without authority of
the petitioner and clearly without merit, should be and is hereby DENIED.
Further, considering representations by the self-styled counsel for petitioner that he,
Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, is a lawyer with a law office bearing his name at Suite 416 William
Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, and for this purpose he used the title of attorney and
indicated in his pleadings filed before this Court an IBP number, which turned out to be
spurious, it having been shown and admitted by him that he is not a member of the
Philippine Bar as certified by the Office of the Bar Confidant, after he was made to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for appearing as counsel in this case
without license to practice law, and although he asked the Court for forgiveness for the
wrong he had done, the Court RESOLVED to declare ESPIRIDION J. DELA CRUZ GUILTY
of indirect contempt of this Court. WHEREFORE, he is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000) within thirty days from notice hereof, OR suffer
IMPRISONMENT for a period of one month and one day to be served at the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) detention center, Taft Avenue, Manila, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)

Facts:

The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus
drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the filing of a
complaint for overtime with the CIR. The disputes were eventually settled when the
contending parties reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the
employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of land was eventually
registered in the name of the Union.

The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the property.
Union President Amado Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the
general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm
based on whatever amount would be awarded the Union.

Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim.
When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm,
his appearance carried the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression
that he was the principal lawyer in these cases.

Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were pending
resolution. He always held office in the firm's place at Puyat Building, except in 1966 to
1967 when he transferred to the Lakas ng Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint
at the latter office, Atty. Pineda continued handling the case with the arrangement that he
would report the developments to the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law firm in 1968,
he continued working on these cases and using the Puyat Building office as his address in
the pleadings.

When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his partners (he
was made the most senior partner) that he had a retainer's contract. He stayed with the law
firm until 1974 and still did not divulge the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of the
Union knew of the contract.

The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and
even illegal as well as unethical considering that-

1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of the Union
chosen by about 125 members only. It was not a contract with the general membership.

2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the
45% fee for those who were no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group
who should and were entitled to more benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's
contract was executed in 1967, the Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro
Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the workers would be out of work which would
mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.

3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was executed when
Atty. Espinas was still handling the appeal of Halili Transit in the main case before the
Supreme Court.

4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien with Arbiter
Valenzuela on February 8, 1983, he did not attach the retainer's contract.

5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized.

A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected in view of PD 1529
which requires no less than an order from a court of competent jurisdiction as authority to
sell property in trust.

Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier authority
given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying that the Union be
authorized to sell the lot. The sale was finally consummated, resulting in the execution of
an escrow agreement.

When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union)
learned of the sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president Amado
Lopez, he requested Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look into the
records of the case. The latter, however, told him that the records of the case were missing.
Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the
records.
Issue:

a. Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in contempt.
b. Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred.

Held:

a. YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court;
such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect
or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders,
and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.

In the Slade Perkins case, "the exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold
aspect, namely (1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court
or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the
court which he refuses to perform. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to
punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.

A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for
the benefit of the opposing party therein.

A criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a
judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or
judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.

b. YES. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.—A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corrupt or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his
unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations,
and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of
good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.

In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's
motion for such authority to sell the property make the entire transaction dubious and
irregular.
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an
admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property. He could
not and did not even wait for valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from
the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize.

The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working
and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the
alleged retainer's contract are also very exorbitant and unconscionable.

*Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to
imprisonment and directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.

Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234

FACTS:
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar
represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del
Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay
Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed
the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled
threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices
“knowingly rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the
court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered
del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the
President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the
CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of
the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a
compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually,
the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as
well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the
ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the
judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should
not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even
stating that had he not been “convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be
fruitless” he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As
an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on
the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity
of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law,
in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
Nuñez vs. Ibay, AM No. RTJ-06-1984, June 30, 2009

FACTS:

The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Valeriano F. Nuňez, filed
with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint
involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which respondent
judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked a government
vehicle which he was driving at the parking space reserved for respondent judge.
Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in respondent Judge’s
space, and that he did not that such space was reserved for respondent Judge. However,
respondent judge refused to accept complainant’s apology and, instead, found the latter
guilty of direct contempt of court for using the former’s parking space, sentencing
complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).
Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring complainant to the City Jail in Fort
Bonifacio, where the father was incarcerated for two days. On April 5, 2005, complainant
was released after filing a Motion for Reconsideration and paying the fine of P1,000.00.
In his Comment. Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time of incident, he was
set to dispose a criminal case, and over the weekend, had even conceptualized the matter
on how to administer the proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case.
However, the inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant disturbed his train of
thought as to the intended disposition of his cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

HELD:
Yes, The Supreme Court held that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from
judges and designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to
apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.
By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had already cited six
persons in contempt, including herein complainant. Worse, respondent Judge immediately
detained complainant, thereby preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided
under the law. Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his
integrity, which is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also
to his personal demeanor.
In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary state that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
The court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes gross misconduct.
“Gross” has been defined as flagrant and shameful, while “misconduct” means a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper
or wrong behavior.

Tan vs. Balajadia

Facts:
Respondent Balajadia was charged for contempt by the petititioners, Tan, et al.
Before that, the respondent filed a criminal case against the petitioners with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. In his complaint-affidavit, the respondent asserted
that he is a “practicing lawyer” based in Baguio City. However, certifications issued by
the OBC and the IBP showed that the respondent was admitted to the Bar.
Respondent asserted that the allegation that he was a practicing lawyer is an
honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the
complaint-affidavit patterned after Atty. Aquino’s affidavit. Liza Laconsay, Atty.
Aquino’s secretary, admitted the mistake of copying Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit
and instead of stating that Respondent Balajadia is a businessman, he was erroneously
referred to as a practicing lawyer.

Issue:
Whether not the respondent is liable for direct contempt.

Ruling:
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the mistake in drafting the complaint-
affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record and the allegation was indeed
a result of inadvertence and doesn’t establish intent to make him liable for indirect
contempt.

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered

financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with
Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes.
The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI
praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as
mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration
on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are
represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan.
It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s
former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent

Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.”

HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and
later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the
issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the
meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the
matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court
held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality
of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus,
the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and
bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of
Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the
government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting,
enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or
briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not
significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer,
having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his
retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to
promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in
which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically
applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the
interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his
accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the service.

People vs. Villanueva, GR No. L-19450, May 27, 1965

FACTS:
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in
Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to
prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the
opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according
to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD:
No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration
of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing
it for free for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the
Secretary of Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given credence.

Noriega vs. Sison, GR No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983

FACTS:
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison as a
hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to engage in the
private practice of law; yet Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under
the name “Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in private practice and represent one
Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the same is
with the permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself out to the public
as a practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family
friendship and for free; that he never represented himself deliberately and intentionally as
“Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his appearance, he
always signed the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison”, and in one instance, he even
made the necessary correction when the court staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”;
that due to the “inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were sent
to “Atty. Manuel Sison”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.

HELD:
No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by evidence. The
allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the Sison. There is no evidence
that Sison has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath
as a lawyer, willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully
appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to do so. His isolated
appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private practice of law, more so since Sison
did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance because Sison and Sacquing were
close family friends. Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close
family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment against
him.

LIM SANTIAGO VS SAGUCIO

EN BANC[ A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006 ]

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew
the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened
Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove
that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February
1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of
April 1996.

Issue:

whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor

Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:

1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (“Code”). However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act
No. 6713 (“RA 6713”).

Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties.” A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition
“not [to] represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations.
The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest
exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or
when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x
conduct.” Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to “engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
[his] official functions.”

2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and
he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is
without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
“practice of law.”
Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

16AUG
Ponente: CORONA, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon
located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for
them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to
conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case.
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.
RATIO:
[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer
and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully
at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the
written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.

PENTECOSTES VS MARASIGAN

SECOND DIVISION[ A.M. No. P-07-2337 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2060-P), August
03, 2007 ]
ROLLY PENTECOSTES, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, CLERK OF COURT VI, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint

filed by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by
members of the PNP of M’lang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a
criminal case for carnapping, was lodged at RTC.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M’lang, North Cotabato turned over the
motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court
issued an Order for its release to Pentecostes.
 Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him. Respondent,
however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the
complaint.

Issue:

On the topic of good moral character

Ruling:

,Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. – The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers, files,
exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court,
and the seals and furniture belonging to his office.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan,
respondent was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and
to keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its
safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But
whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and
approval of the trial court.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking
officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice. Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits
and public property committed to their charge.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more

particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

Father Ranhilio C. Aquino et al vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua A.C. No.5095, November 28, 2007

FACTS:

Father Aquino as the Academic head of Philippine Judicial Academy, filed a complaint
against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. He
alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents wherein both documents had “Doc. No.
1213, Page No. 243. Book III, Series of 1998” and both are dated on December 10, 1998. It
was shown by the Clerk of Court of RTC – Tuguegarao that none of these entries appear in
the National Register of Atty. Pascua. In his comment, Atty. Pascua admitted having
notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his
Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary. Complainant maintains that
Atty. Pascua’s omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Pascua violated the Notarial Practice Rule

HELD:
Yes, under the notarial law, “the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological
order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the
person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of the notary to
make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the
manner requested by law is a ground for revocation of his commission.”

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff.
Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his
notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his
part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.

Furthermore, the claim of Atty. Pascua of simple inadvertence is untenable. The photocopy
of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998
is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints
allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively,
under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilo and the other complainants are correct in
maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned
affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as
a member of the Bar.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional
or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who
were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.

Atty. Pascua is declared guilty of misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law for
3 months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely. His notarial commission is revoked.

Administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC No.013, August 22, 2007

FACTS: Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and
criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant
Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office
11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the service per Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on
November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases (Criminal
Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before
the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by
Judge Qutain in his PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)
Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified
copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases. On even date, letters were sent to the
NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of documents relative to the administrative
complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10,
1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to
explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Judge is guilty of grave misconduct.

HELD:

We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those
who are in the service of the Judiciary. We have often stressed that the conduct required of
court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be
beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them
be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.

Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave

misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.

However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain
addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation
effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao
City. Acting on said letter, the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable resignation of Judge
Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the
administrative case.

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without
prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The
jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is
not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent
acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency
of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent
or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. Indeed, if innocent, the respondent
official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he
has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure
and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.

Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty Ismael F. Mejia, Adm Case No.2984, August 31, 2007

FACTS:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for
reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-
one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years.

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the
practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying
the petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No.
2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was
filed against the petition.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a
great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.
2. whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicants
reentry as a counselor at law.

HELD:

The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take
into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent
to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement.

In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen years
had already elapsed since Mejias name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age
of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to
him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he
wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due
to his disbarment.

After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his
religious and social writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it El
Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind.

The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was
punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take
the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is
already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during
which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a
petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since
his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are
imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened
with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are
the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

GSIS vs. Hon. Vicente A. Pacquing, AM No. RTJ-04-1831,February 2, 2007

FACTS:

In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed P4,250,000 from

petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel
mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, petitioner
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction where it
emerged as the highest bidder.
 In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
La Union, Branch 26 to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge
Antonio Fineza, declared the foreclosure void and directed petitioner to restore to Bengson
the foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with
modification the trial courts decision and remanded the case for reception of evidence on
the costs of suit and determination of the replacement value of the properties should
petitioner fail to return them. The CA decision became final and executory on February 10,
1988.

When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new presiding judge of
Branch 26, respondent Judge Vicente A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the
equivalent value of the foreclosed properties. Thereafter, Bengson moved that it be
permitted to present evidence on the costs of suit. On April 6, 1995, the trial court directed
petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. This order became final on April 24,
1995.

Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a quo stating that its
counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, went on AWOL and never informed it of respondent judges
order. This motion, treated as petition for relief from judgment by respondent judge, was
dismissed on January 16, 1997.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Judge acted administratively liable for ignorance of the law.

HELD:

For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained
of must be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not
only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud,
malice or dishonesty. That certainly does not appear to be the case here as petitioners
complaint was spawned merely by the honest divergence of opinion between petitioner and
respondent judge as to the legal issues and applicable laws involved. Petitioner also
proffered no evidence that respondent judges acts were imbued with malice or bad faith.

In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor partial
against petitioner when he issued the alias writ of execution. Petitioners assertion that
respondent judge precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported by the records. On the
contrary, the records indicate that the writ was issued more than three years from the
finality of the order directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. Its
issuance was not all tainted with undue haste. In the exercise of his judicial discretion,
respondent judge believed that the issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a matter
of right following the finality of said order. The rule is that once a judgment becomes final,
the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a
courts ministerial duty.

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in issuing the alias writ,
his act would still not merit administrative sanction absent malice or bad faith. Bad faith
does not simply connote poor or flawed judgment; it imports a dishonest purpose, moral
obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.
 Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand, petitioner should have
demonstrated that respondent judges decisions and orders came from extrajudicial sources
or from some bases other than what he had learned from his study of the case. Decisions
formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although they appear erroneous, are not
necessarily partial as long as they are culled from the arguments and evidence of the
parties. The party who alleges partiality must prove it with clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner failed in that aspect

The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the
actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient
remedy exists. The actions against judges should not be considered as complementary or
suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of by a party in a
case.

Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Baez, the Court finds no basis to
hold him liable for executing the assailed writ at that time. Undeniably, the most difficult
phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Charged with this task, he must act
with considerable dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise, a judgment, if not executed at
once, would just be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. In executing the
writ, Atty. Baez merely carried out a ministerial duty. He had no discretion to implement
the writ or not.

Velez vs De Vera
496 SCRA 345 [ÀC No. 6697 July 25, 2006]

Facts:

An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de
Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son
to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the
release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement
of the case which he then deposited to his personal account; The Hearing referee in the said
administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law
for three years; Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was
accepted by the Supreme Court of California. Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the
foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client’s funds as the latter’s father
(the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing
officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis
testified under oath that he “expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.
Petitioner claims that such information was concealed by the respondent. Such and other
circumstances which the IBP board deems that respondent is not fit to be a member of the
board, hence his removal was sought.

Issue:

Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a

foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign
jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction
committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

Held:
No. We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who
was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.)
and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction.
However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment
was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as
he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the
Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a

foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and
suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the
foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes,
until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the
giving of due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must
prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing
officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise
unethical under Philippine law.

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent

Facts:

The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the ground of gross

immorality. It was alleged that sometime in December 2004, complainant seek for legal
advice from petitioner regarding her collectibles from a travel company. Respondent sent
Demand Letter and sometime in February 2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss
the possibility of filing complaint against the travel company because the latter failed to
settle the accounts. That after that said meeting, the respondent "held her arm and kissed
her on the cheek while embracing her very tightly."

The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint and while on their way
home after the said meeting, the respondent suddenly stopped the car and things went out
of hand. Thus she decided to refer the case to another lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral which would
warrant the disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

Held:

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of morality, not only
upon admission to the Bar but all throught out their legal career as lawyers belong to an
exclusive and honored fraternity. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the
legal profession and should adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest standard of morality.
The respondent admitted to the act of kissing the complainant on the lips as evidenced as
well of his asking for apology from complainant in his text message. Regardless of the fact
that the respondent admitted that he kissed the complainant but the Court held that this
was not accompanied by malice because the respondent immediately asked for forgiveness
after sensing the annoyance of the respondent after texting him. Thus the Court held that
this is not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible which will warrant disbarment or
suspension. But the Court reprimanded respondent to be more prudent and cautious.

In re: Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonardo De Vera, AC No.6052, December 11, 2003

FACTS:

The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set on April 26, 2003,
a month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election
was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:

SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the
national convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region,
the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003,
reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP
Rizal Chapter, sent a letter dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider
its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering
to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors
at least one month prior to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being
politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging
in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will
render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for
governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to
wit:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within
two days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of
the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such
petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of
Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The
decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be
final and conclusive.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in
its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.
 On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the
afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP
Board seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or
third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being
elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
ISSUE:

(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the
determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues,
namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper
remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is
not premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor
of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;
HELD:

Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent
De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of
the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP,
including the election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935
Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:

SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
 The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly
worded provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution through all the years have been the
sources of this Courts authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term Bar
refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the
Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which
was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. Not long after,
Republic Act No. 6397 was enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per
curiam Resolution of this Court captioned In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the
Philippines, we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-
A, of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under
the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP
independence from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 of the IBP By-Laws
vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu
propio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section
15, the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national.
Section 44 empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the members of
the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the
irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter
No. 491 entitled In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections.
The results of the investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities,
with the principal candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the
IBP By-Laws. The Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special
elections, as well as explicitly disqualified from running threat the IBP members who were
found involved in the irregularities in the elections, in order to impress upon the
participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it
and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-
political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering.
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed
direct election by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP
President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of
the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from
among themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the
automatic succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon the expiration of
their common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the
Regional Governors shall be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates
and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different chapters in
the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP
and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action
against him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to
disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests
or post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within
two days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of
the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such
petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of
Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The
decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be
final and conclusive.
 Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the
elections is the election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to
just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of
nominees for the position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former
Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:

SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a

candidate must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided
by the Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in
attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by
raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall
thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had in accordance with
Section 40.

The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of
the Board of Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members
of the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other year. The election was a
two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not
less than two nor more than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The
names of all the nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written on
the board within the full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the
lists were distributed to all the Delegates. Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his
alternate voted for only one nominee for Governor for each Region. The nominee from every
Region receiving the highest number of votes was declared and certified elected by the
Chairman.
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this
Court deemed it best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional
Governors. The Court localized the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and
elected by the delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through
the following provisions, to wit:

SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions
as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one
Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different chapters in the
region.

SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region,
the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for
the pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation
process operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar
which is non-political and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of
the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth
and progress of the Philippine society.
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on
disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant
petition has no firm ground to stand on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the
IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not
qualified to be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He
argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended,
only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be
nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition,
petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section,
only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the
grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only
IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and
elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is
pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP
By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners,
Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the
petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the
petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP
Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to
be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated
for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the
House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De
Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is
not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paranaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is
the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent
De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

Section 19. Registration. -

....

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall
be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case
shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic
that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is
located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member
of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription
in registering ones preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one
chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section,
transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions
set forth therein, thus:

SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is
terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he
transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter,
provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any
Chapter election.
 The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made
not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the
lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to
Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M.
Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM
Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing
them of respondent De Veras transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in
their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was made effective
sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the
elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as
mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter
Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other
year. Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed.
This makes respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done more than three months
ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not
morally fit to occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements
provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who
wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good
standing of the IBP; 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not
disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-
Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs; (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a
regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season
or cycle; and (4) he is not in the government service.
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of
moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of
Delegates. Indeed, based on each members standard of morality, he is free to nominate and
elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law.
For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court,
or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged
sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of
the plunder law, is apparently referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re:
Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by
Atty. Leonard De Vera. In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect
contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in
the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De Veras
statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers

Plunder Law

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition
filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed
vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court
insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said
Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the
prosecution of Estrada.

We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices-
considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-
will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either
unconstitutional or vague, the group said.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

Xxx

People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard De
Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign
movement.

He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II.

Xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II if
the rumor turned out to be true.

People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty
must prevail.

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made
said statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy
public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute. He explained that he was merely
exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were
aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law.
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for
which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections, the
Court defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. The determination of whether an act involves
moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending
the violation of the statute.
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public
interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent
De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he
voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to
invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he
was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by
the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license
to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it
impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the
absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the
burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Veras moral fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the
delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his
candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be
emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under our Rules of Court.

Soriano v. Dizon

A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.

Per Curiam

FACTS:

While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car driven
by herein respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to
make a turn. An altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that the respondent
fired and shot complainant hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the respondent
so the latter pushed him out and sped off.

ISSUE:

WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

RULING:

Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.

AGUIRRE VS RANA

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled
mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
 Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal

government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate.
As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses

respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the
latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use
of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

CRUZ VS MINA

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES,
RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
 The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner
to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:

whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant

Ruling:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where
the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear
in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.

In re: Atty. MarcialEdillion, AM 1928, August 3, 1978

FACTS:
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1
(In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws

ISSUE:
1. whether or not a lawyer can compel to be a member of the Integrated Bar.
2. Whether or not a lawyer is mandated to pay the monthly fees.
3. Whether or not the practice of law is a property right.

HELD:

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and in cohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers.

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State.

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges
— from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable
fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause
to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr. BM 1370, May 9, 2005

FACTS:
 This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of
IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-
2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of
the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the
USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot
be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since
the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service,
and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment stating inter alia: that
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues
to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP;
that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on
the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar
Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment
of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help
in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing
the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed
is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner
could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so
that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay
dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members,
which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP
members from payment of the annual dues.
ISSUE:

whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003

HELD:

We rule in the negative.

An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar - which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses
of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is,
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble
objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of
a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as
an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The
doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting
from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which

no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for
as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the
type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound
to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles
the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length,
as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.
 As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.
Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749

23JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues. He was also cited in the
complaint as not paying his professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his
pleadings filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity when he included his “IBP-Rizal
259060” where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was
dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he
was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving
estafa but was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and
plea for a more temperate application of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has
paid his IBP dues.

Donton vs. Dr. Tansingco, AC No. 6057, June 27, 2006

FACTS:

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document against Duane O. Stier
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized
the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized
by me under the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located
at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby

disqualified to own real property in his name – agreed that the property be
transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several

documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,

recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which
Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his
name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in
violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the
disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio
A. Alentajan, because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal
case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent violates the canon 1 and rule 1.02 of the code.

HELD:

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in
a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from
owning real property. Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware
of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name.
But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, including the
Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the
property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided
Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by
preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code
when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign
ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.

In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, “pirated” a
client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty.
Linsangan’s allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card which appears as
follows:
FRONT

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

BACK

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the
printing of such calling cards.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of
Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.

HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty.
Linsangan’s clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he
actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to
his law office. Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word
that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.
Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance
legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the
lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake
in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his
interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided
fidelity to the client’s cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states “w/ financial assistance“, was clearly used to
entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans
to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal
and direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with severity.
At any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the
Supreme Court for one year.

Atty. Vitriolo et al vsAttyDasig, AC No. 4984, April 01, 2003

FACTS:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an
official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross
misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public
office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In
their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants
allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts
that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation
as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C.
Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches,
Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending
before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded
from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth
anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms.
Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the
application for correction of name.
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by
filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.
ISSUE:

whether or not the respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services,

CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position,
at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED

HELD:

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie
B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her
favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence
remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by
this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find
that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect
her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it
was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for
the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any
violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money
or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of
pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the
oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988,
was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers
including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus,
they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their
conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests
pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule
6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good
moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than
her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon
1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts
of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that
respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from membership in the
Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but
outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this
decision.

Jonar Santiago vs. Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004

Facts:

Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, was allegedly notarized several documents on different

dates and failed to: a) make the proper notation regarding the Community Tax Certificate
(CTC) of the complainant; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial
register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in
the documents he had notarized.

On the other hand, Atty. Rafanan admitted having administered the oath but
believed that non-notation of the Resident Certificates as well as not entering the details of
the notarized documents in the notarial register was allowed. Notation of Resident
Certificates are applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not
mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government
offices. He further asserted that this was a popular practice among notaries public in
Nueva Ecija, some of whom were older practitioners.

Issues:

What is the rule on registry of notarial documents?

Held:

The court ruled in the negative. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations
 and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption
from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such
certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter
therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and
to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded. Failure
to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries
public.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the
degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries
public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements.

It is intolerable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly
because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an
acceptable justification for breaking the law.

Disbarment, however, cannot be granted considering the nature of the infraction

and the absence of deceit on the part of Atty. Rafanan. A fine of P3, 000 is imposed with a
warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Khan Jr. vs Atty. Simbillo AC No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS:
An advertisement in Philippine Daily Inquirer came out which reads: “ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE SPECIALIST 532-4333/521-2667.”
SC ordered its staff to call the number and ask some information.
Espeleta called the number and the wife of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo answered who said that his
husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and guarantees a court decree within
4-6 month. The services of Atty. Simbillo is for P48,000. half of which is payable at the
filing of the case and the balance after the decision has been rendered.
Similar advertisement also appeared in The Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin.
Khan, Assist. Court Administrator, filed a case against Simbillo for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Rule 2.03 and 3.01.
Simbillo admitted that he caused the advertisement but he argued that solicitation and
advertisement is not prohibited per se and that it is about time to change our views about
the prohibition on advertising and solicitation. He also said that the interest of the public
is not served by the prohibition and suggested that the ban be lifted.
IBP recommended that Simbillo be suspended for 1 year and that repetition of similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
While the case was being investigated upon by the court, Simbillo again advertised his legal
services, for 2 times, in the Buy & Sell Free Ads Magazine.

ISSUE:
W/N Simbillo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:
YES!
Rule 2.03 provides a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business while Rule 3.01 states that a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in
which the duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. The gaining of
livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
Aside from advertising himself as an “Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” his assurance of his
clients that an annulment may be obtained in 4-6 months from the filing of the case
encourages people, who might other have 2nd thought, to dissolve their marriage.
Solicitation of legal business is not proscribed. However, solicitation must be compatible with
the dignity of the legal profession. The use of simple signs stating the name/s of the
lawyers, the office and residence address and the fields of expertise, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
The use of calling cards is now acceptable.

BR Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs CA GR No. L-41862, February7, 1992

FACTS:
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages against the Director of Public
Works and BR Sebastian Enterprises. Trial court found B.R. Sebastian liable for damages
but absolved other defendants. B.R. Sebastian, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas,
Alberto and Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Eulogio B. Reyes died and was substituted by
his heirs. On February 1974, B.R Sebastian, thru its counsel of record, received notice to
file Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof; however, it failed to comply. Court
of Appeals issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should
not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief within the reglementary period. On
September 1974, Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. On September 1974, petitioner,
this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior
partner in the law firm. Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial
court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant’s Brief
but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm. Court
denied the motion for reconsideration. No action was taken by petitioner from within the
period to file a petition for review, the same became final and executory, and the records of
the case were remanded. Trial court issued a writ of execution. But on November 1975,
petitioner filed with Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was subsequently denied. Petitioner filed prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to Court of
Appeals denial of petitioner’s motion. SC required them to comment and soon after, some
amendments were made. Ultimately, the petition was denied. But on May 1976, petitioner
filed a motion for its reconsideration claiming that since it was deprived of the right to
appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course. Supreme Court
reconsidered and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective
Memoranda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant’s Brief

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that no fraud is involved in the present case. What was
present was simple negligence on the part of petitioner’s counsel, which is neither
excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to
warrant a favorable action on its plea. Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an
appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to
dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good
and sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court
to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which
would call for, prompt and justify its exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and must not be
upheld. The “confusion” in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin
Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas’ death, the
responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until
withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court.
The law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have
withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner
could contract the services of a new lawyer. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel
binds the client. Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make
inquiries from counsel regarding its case.

Petition DISMISSED.

Diana Ramos vs. Atty. Jose R. Imbang, AC No. 6788, August23, 2007

FACTS:

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty.
Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt
for P5,000 only.

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told
her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the
hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each
appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally
inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna.
She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and
that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.

HELD:

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as
they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public
servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For
this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
 xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their
official function.

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to
devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on
July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted
money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he
accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly
violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was
created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3),
Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free
legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and
other quasi-judicial cases.

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the
prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of
the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services.
Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting
attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he
fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have
done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against
the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the
complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These acts
constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required
of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected
not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence
of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of
public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his
brethren in private practice.

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of
the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust
for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a
judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose
(such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless, respondent should
return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not
allowed to accept them.

Huyssen vs. Gutierrez

A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006

(Legal Ethics)

FACTS

Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation officer, received

US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen. Accused of falsely representing that it was needed
in complainant’s application for visa and failing to return the same, respondent denied
misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who
assisted complainant and children in their application for visa. He failed however to
substantiate such denial.

Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not immediately be returned to the
complainant, and promised her several times that he would repay her out of his personal
funds. He even issued personal post-dated checks on this, but which later bounced.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and
merits the penalty of disbarment?

RULING

Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled that denial,
which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by a strong evidence
of non-culpability. The evidence, respondent’s letters to the complainant, shows that he
made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation. If this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts
therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his
personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really
officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to
the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use.

Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions
than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned
in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his
position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said
office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."

Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's acts are
more despicable, for not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he
had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover
up his misdeeds.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a
special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally.

A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and
the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for, among
other acts, gross misconduct in office.

Ali vs Atty. Bubong, AC No. 4018, March 8, 2005

FACTS:

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents
dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned said
administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and
jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents in that petition
violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his
authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
 In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the
part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned order. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us,
seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that
respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an
attorney and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession.
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his
issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law
and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the
documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the
documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to
issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad
Abdullah and the latters co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said
case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor
who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further
claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely
on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainants allegation, therefore, that he
influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
ISSUE:

whether or not respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was
in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative

HELD:

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6
thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official,
he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his
oath a member of the legal profession.
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, we ordered the
disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because
of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph.
This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted
place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities
of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, this Court found sufficient
basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had
explained in that case
[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than
her brethren in private practice.

In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer.
By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his
knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives,
respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a
civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he
used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use
of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of
his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for
the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of
this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same. As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v.
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of

the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administrative of justice.

Olazo vs. Justice Tinga, AM No. 10-5-7-SC, December 07, 2010

FACTS:
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was
previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for
disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986, and
Proclamation No. 172, issued on October 16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to
study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands
declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of
Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as
the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondents district
includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of
their profession during their incumbency.

HELD:
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of
their profession during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can
engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the
private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. The last paragraph of
Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the
government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No.
6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before
the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and
prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term
intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power
to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or
employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised
power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously
interfered with the sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a
member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish
that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service
rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single
document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described private practice of law as
one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice
of law, the available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation
was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be
presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider
any uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful

conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation
that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer
for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the
respondent violated paragraph 4(1) of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales
application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a
qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a
sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the
affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004, when the
DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point,
bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of
the President, the Court of Appeals and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated
October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for
review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible
error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or

suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers. The
respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the burden
shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the
first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the
respondent for the complainants failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
power.

Que vs. Atty. Revilla Jr. AC No. 7054,December 4, 2009

FACTS:

In a complaint for disbarment, Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla,
Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of
committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of
title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of
judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before
the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final
judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and RTC in the unlawful
detainer case rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in
this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC
and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the
 complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful
detainer case;

(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases

in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of
justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant
and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful
detainer case;

(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the
courts by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and
impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood
in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for
annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the
presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss
filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the
respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also
deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above
falsehood.

(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and
defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico
(Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents clients.

(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in

court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of
whom are already deceased;

(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for
annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without
being authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52)

litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.

ISSUE:

whether or not the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and
professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.

HELD:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves
to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed,
and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and
to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that
the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the
law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has
disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not
even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save
him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
 Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical
infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court;
for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by
reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience
and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the
interest of justice.

People vs. Hon Maceda, GR No. 89591-96, January 24, 2000

FACTS:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our

August 13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient
reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique
Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention
at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed
liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was
not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if
he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July
30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No.
4262, the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.

ISSUE:

(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty.
Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262?

(2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and

(3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty.
Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a
fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?

HELD:

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court
resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando
Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking
the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent
Javellana in the provincial jail.

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an
urgent motion seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or
resolved the motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against
him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave
Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation
"to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk
of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he
ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court
must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist.
Thus, the trial courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of
court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San
Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent

Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status
as a detention prisoner. The trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to
be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition
to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well,
except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself. Spped

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This
is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more
than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate
dispatch and to avoid further delay.

Zeta vs. Malinao, AM No. P-220, December 20, 1978

FACTS:

Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First
Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in

the municipal court of this town for parties like attorney when he is not an
attorney. Reliable information also says he has been appearing in the
municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not
authorized to do so we believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he
collects fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys but does not pay
anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for a good
government. These facts can be checked with records of those municipal
courts.

2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First

Instance he would instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or
coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this town involving
himself and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a
court employee and has influence over the judges. Those persons being
ignorant would believe him and so would commit crimes. This act of Mr.
Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his supposed
influences to urge persons to commit crimes.

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully

filing his time record in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the
municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time record as present. He
 receives salary for those absent days. This can be checked with time record he
has submitted and if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it by
submitting application for leave but this should not be allowed as he has
already committed crime.

4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have

reliable information it is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in
private practice any profession or business without permission from the
Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission
because he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that
were so, he violated that Executive Order and Civil Service Law and we are
urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil Service to
investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the corresponding
penalty as dismissal because we believe he deserve it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Department of Justice had jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD:

We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the
Investigator to be amply supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting
of public records and the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared.
It is clear to Us that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal
courts without prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and
regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear therein that he was
present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as
counsel, without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice
of law. We, therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.

The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous
as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of
one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing
as counsel in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he
falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in
question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above
circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
considerations other than pure love of justice.

In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave,
hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge
Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition
that he desist from appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of
the bar are allowed to practice.

Tan and Pagayokan vs. Balajadia, GR No. 169517, March 14,2006

FACTS:

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with
the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave
coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking
fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent
asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-
207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City." However, certifications issued by the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that
respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that
respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary
of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a
complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one
for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and another for the
parking incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking incident
correctly alleged that he is "a businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez
Building, Session Road, Baguio City." However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00
o’clock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to
him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of
Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a
"practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez
Building, Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred to the person of Atty.
Aquino and his law office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit admitting the mistake in the
preparation of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the
complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the
same allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that
he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.

In their Reply, petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect
contempt for having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he
cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquino’s secretary.

ISSUE:

Whether OR not respondent is liable for indirect contempt

HELD:

we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and
acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine
or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section
3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are
punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct
the orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-
settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless
the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never
intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part
of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances
that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the
documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the
allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of
inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was
the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for
indirect contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice
of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his
client; appearing before court hearings as an attorney; manifesting before the court that he
will practice law despite being previously denied admission to the bar; or deliberately
attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with
full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney
or that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect
contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s deliberate intent to
misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is hereby
warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

Lijauco vs. Atty. Terrado AC No. 6317, August 31, 2006

FACTS:

On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint was filed by complainant Luzviminda

C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice
and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorney’s fees.

According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January
2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank,
Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed
house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and
registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan,
Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.

Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing
for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the
Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he
received from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit
with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner
submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provide:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except:

a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the
persons specified in the agreement; or

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer;

or

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if
the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.

In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made
the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by
convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the
exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act
done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.

In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the
Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings
account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:

1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too
high;

2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the compromise

agreement.

By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as

commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring
complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and misleading
assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property
respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law

HELD:

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5)
violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court;
and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.

In Santos v. Lazaro and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a
client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The
failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also
to the legal profession, the courts and society.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once he agrees
to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this
duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much
cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients’ interests. It is
not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must
also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel
agrees to take the cudgels for his client’s cause.

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is
warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by
way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.

Plus Builders Inc. vs. Revilla, Jr. 578 SCRA 431

Facts:
The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a decision in favor of Plus Builders,
Inc.and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al, who were the clients of
respondent, Atty. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere tenants
and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the way
up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining Plus Builders Inc.’s rights over the
land.
Respondent was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court
processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of
several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet
title despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in
the unauthorized practice of law – holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the
law firm. Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of and that the
courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB
Decision.

Issue:
WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Held:
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.

A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every
honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense
provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to succeed.

In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that
the respondent’s acts complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided
desire to protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. Taking the
cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should
not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the
cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth
and justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a
case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. However, the
Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing
the appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s
length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondent’s
advanced age, among other things, which have varying significance in the Court’s
determination of the imposable penalty. Therefore, a suspension of six (6) months from the
practice of law is sufficient in this case.