on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution.
In the
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-
FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal
from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer
by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of
Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido
averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately
from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H.
Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years
old both of whom are in complainants custody. Complainant filed a
case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint
for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of
Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James
Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to
complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and
demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered
to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution
issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion
for temporary child custody.[2]Complainant called up her lawyer but the
latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary
child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the
alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give
it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted
that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001.
Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children
to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was
with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City,
respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He
threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his
companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the
Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen subsequently escorted
her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled
peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in
the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI,
formally served on complainant the appellate courts
resolution/order.[3] In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed
to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition
that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement
was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito
Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received
information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the
children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant
rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they
stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition[4] for the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children
meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and
obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002[5]from the Court of
Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to
surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23,
2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was
dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that
respondent violated his attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and
using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of
law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged
granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was
referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation,
report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in
his disbarment.[6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the
Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be
increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can
be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to
enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted
in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he
honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact
that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As
pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed
Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions:
first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as
Special Proc. Case No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover
custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was
respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have
participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden
cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face
value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be
devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could
easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause,
it must never be at the expense of the truth.[8] Thus, the Code of
professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor
consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of an
opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite
as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive
language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives.
A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or oral
should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be
of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to
another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as
a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of
speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for
such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that
the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for
the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the
offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict
C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of
respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5379. May 9, 2003]
WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR G.
BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and
FRANKLIN Q. SUSA,respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified
Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas,
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly
committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyers
oath.[1]
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-
187627 for Murder, entitled People of the Philippines versus Crisanto
Arana, Jr., pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as
counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging
that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority. As such, he is now under detention.[2] Upon personal
verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where
accused Arana allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he
surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate
of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the
Security Management Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila,
Branch 27, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the
foregoing irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the lack of
notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day
notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which
was referred to in the Motion as Annex 1.
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on
December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued
against their client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with
the trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite
and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to
heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence,
the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on
December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither unethical
conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has
voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As regards the
lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private
prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they
furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with
notice of hearing thereof.Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter
notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.[3]
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he
was no longer in court when his co-respondents filed the Manifestation
with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Pea, Clerk III, received the said
Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000
and the Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the
presiding judge instructed her to receive the Motion subject to the
presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing. Thus,
the inclusion of the Motion in the courts calendar on December 15,
2000 was authorized by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by
respondent Susa in faithful performance of his ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,[4] the instant case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation or decision.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner,
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and recommendation
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their
profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6)
months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q.
Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby recommended dismissed for
lack of merit.[5]
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and
approved by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline in Resolution No.
XV-2002-400, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents commission of
deliberate falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The
complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.[6]
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Commissioner. Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are
guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.[7] He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.[8] He should bear in mind
that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the
court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice
and arriving at correct conclusion.[9] The courts, on the other hand, are
entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them.[10] While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend
his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense
of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of
truth.[11]
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[12]
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and
responsibilities expected from them as members of the
bar.Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if
it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they
craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority and was under
detention.Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the
court and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue
statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we
strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to
deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the accuseds
detention was merely a statement of an ultimate fact which still had to
be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they were
able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI
at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate
them. The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the
custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the
police authorities on the same date tentatively scheduled for the
hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening
event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent
judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have
accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of
persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such
specific affirmative relief from the court.[13]
In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor
or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation.[14]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of
hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled
date.Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents
failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the
three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe
the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.[15]
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner
that respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively
liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court,
considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he
is reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving the
discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound
administration of justice.[16] Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the
judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which
are contrary to the established rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys.
Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty
of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they
are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records
of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.
CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L.
FRANCISCO, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF
OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE;
SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR
GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY
ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. —
The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The
respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the
gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was
consistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly
abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing
a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the
obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings
as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to
delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of
an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust
reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his
misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be
influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all
the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine
bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992,
Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L.
Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo,
the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a
parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years
beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written
demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee
claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years
and the right of pre-emption over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel,
respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different
courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these
proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed
from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and
parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his
client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law.
The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as
follows:
1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint
against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and
reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9,
1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
of failure to state a cause of action, laches and prescription. The
case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.
2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through
Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and affirmative
defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino
Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation on the ground
that the issues before the two courts were separate and different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia
and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-
3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have known
that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing
of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court.
Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer for dismissal
of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-3833 was
clearly a special civil action and not an appeal.
On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order
enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the
unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however,
the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was
dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.
4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and
the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition
assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil
Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was denied.
5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in
favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not
appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed
a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari
and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages
with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This was docketed
as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.
In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-
90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies.
Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an
appeal.
On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an
order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that
case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp.
No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on
September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.
6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in the
unlawful detainer case. On September 27, 1991, Lee, through
Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the
hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by
Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.
7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge
Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This Court denied the petition
on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.
8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the
other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside
and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was
dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed a
motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved
as counsel while this motion was pending.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The
respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the
gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was
consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added
to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their
valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to
the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every
move.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose
of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was
disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions
or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as
he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his
oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched
the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself
unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2,
1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws,
he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an
instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of
judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only
as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other
lawyers who may be influenced by his example.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the
practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges
appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the
respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's
Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for having
uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No.
Q-99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by
complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for
whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the
February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other
cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before against the
same defendants. We had an agreement that if we
withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw
all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even
retired and he is now receiving pension.2 (emphasis
supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge
Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and
thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and
"file the appropriate pleading."3Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla
submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his
averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla
in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with
"misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in]
obstruction of justice,"5 was referred to a commissioner6 for
investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating
commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to
withdraw his lawsuits.7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of
two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted
several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.8 Later he
explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle
the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to
trial"9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He
pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his
"alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case
and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a
report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely
stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility12 and recommending that he be
"suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a
period of three months."13 This was adopted and approved in toto by
the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as
officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to
behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel
compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become
a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS,
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to
withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory
tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath
to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of
which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act
infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge
or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by
his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had
done. From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty.
Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing
wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in
doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing,
spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than
express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted
to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the
falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway
but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending
proposal" to settle the case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its
speciousness,19 cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to
suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts
for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his
favor, though, a presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from
treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of
mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was
"to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going
to trial,"21 perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he
really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation
as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were.
But even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for
speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to
foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary
under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is
not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as
are consistent with truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a
tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt
and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to
settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to
falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x
x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only
suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree
with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from
the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this
administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a
member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in
the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a
penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his
suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's
Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal
officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the
practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a
penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond
the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall
treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the
practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation
on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider
a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we
give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the
investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge
Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to
complainant may also be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.23 And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense,
he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.24
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this
administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely
not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the
practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the
misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice
of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and
copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge
Advocate General's Service.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2152. April 19, 1991.]
TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. ESCOLASTICO R.
VIOLA, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; NOT A
RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
2. ID.; ID.; DUTY OF ATTORNEYS; FIRST DUTY OF LAWYERS IS
NOT TO THEIR CLIENTS BUT TO THE COURTS. — It cannot be
gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential
for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand,
has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could
proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times
that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that
they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in
rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they
advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason,
he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case,
respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were
merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading, he
stated that the very same clients were owners of the same property.
One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters not which
one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a member of the
ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to do no
falsehood before the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent upon
respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in
pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other
than that he had not originated but merely continued the registration
proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and that he
really believed his clients were entitled to apply for registration of
their rights. Respondent’s excuses ring very hollow; we agree with
the Solicitor General and the complainant that those excuses do not
exculpate the Respondent.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYER’S OATH AND CANON 22 OF THE
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, VIOLATED BY
RESPONDENT. — It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola
violated his lawyer’s oath and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which stated that" [t]he conduct of the lawyer
before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by
candor and fairness" (now Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prescribing that" [a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the courts"). He has been deplorably lacking in the
candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the
court. In his apparent zeal to secure the title to the property involved
for his clients, he disregarded his overriding duty to the court and to
the law itself.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated 9 May 1990 1 addressed to this Court,
complainant Teodoro I. Chavez prayed for the disbarment of or other
appropriate penalty upon respondent Escolastico R. Viola, a member
of the Philippine Bar, for gross misconduct or malpractice.
The letter-complaint stated that respondent Viola was engaged by
Felicidad Alvendia, Jesus Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. as their
counsel in connection with Civil Case No. 3330-M 2 filed sometime in
1966 with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Bulacan against
Teodoro Chavez (herein complainant), Lucia dela Cruz, Alpon dela
Cruz and Eugenio dela Cruz. In the complaint, 3 respondent alleged,
on behalf of the Alvendias (plaintiffs therein), that Felicidad Alvendia
and Jesus Alvendia were the holders of Foreshore Lease
Applications Nos. V-1284 and 2807 covering portions of public land
situated in Barrio Baluarte, Municipality of Bulacan, Province of
Bulacan, and that lease contracts 4 had been executed in their favor
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Respondent
prayed in the complaint that his clients (the Alvendias) be declared
"bona fide lessees of the land in controversy . . . ." 5 In an Order
dated 2 October 1969, 6 the CFI dismissed the complaint filed in Civil
Case No. 3330-M for non-appearance of the Alvendias.
On 18 June 1966, Congress passed Republic Act No. 470, which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. The parcel of public domain comprising a portion of the
foreshore fronting the Manila Bay along the Province of Bulacan . . .
is hereby withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for
communal fishing ground purposes which shall hereafter be called
the Bulacan Fishing Reservation." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the foreshore land being occupied by the Alvendias
was part of the communal fishing ground reserved by Republic Act
No. 470.
On 8 November 1977, respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias,
Amended Application for Original Registration of Title 8 in Land
Registration Case ("LRC") No. 3711-M with the then CFI of Bulacan
praying that the land covered by Psu-141243, Amd. 2 9 be registered
in the name of the spouses Alvendias. Respondent alleged in the
Amended Application that the applicant Alvendias were the owners of
the land, they having acquired the same from one Teresita Vistan by
sale sometime in 1929.
It is petitioner’s contention that respondent, in filing the Amended
Application for Original Registration of Title in LRC No. 3711-M
stating that his clients were the owners of the property applied for
despite his full knowledge of the fact that his clients were mere
lessees of the land in controversy as so described in the complaint
respondent had filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M, had willingly aided in
and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false
and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath
of office as a member of the Bar.
In his Answer, 10 respondent alleged that the Application for Original
Registration of Title was originally instituted by one Atty.
Montesclaro, and when said lawyer withdrew his appearance therein,
respondent filed the Amended Application for Original Registration of
Title; that he believed his clients had the right to apply for the
registration of the land; and that assuming his clients did not in fact
have any such right, the court where the Application for Original
Registration of Title was filed had not yet passed upon it; hence, this
complaint for disbarment was filed prematurely.cralawnad
Complainant filed a Reply to the Answer. 11
In a Resolution dated 29 October 1980, the Court resolved to refer
the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On 11 March 1981, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 the
complaint for disbarment. In said Motion, he alleged — for the
second time — that he was not the original lawyer who filed the
application in the land registration case, but a certain Atty.
Montesclaro. Respondent further alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Your respondent, not content with just having conferred with
Atty. Montesclaro when he took over, even went to the extent of
verifying from the Bureau of Lands if the application was proper. The
Legal Department of the Bureau of Lands assured your respondent
that it was. He was informed that judicial application for registration is
one of the methods of acquiring such lands, said lands being
‘alienable and disposable.’ There are, however, other means of
obtaining the said lands, but the applicants (with Atty. Montesclaro)
chose the present action for land registration.
Undersigned wishes to point out that he merely took over from the
original lawyer when said counsel withdrew his appearance. Your
respondent, hence, was in good faith when he took over the land
registration case, subject matter of this present administrative
investigation."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court, in a Resolution dated 8 June 1981, forwarded the Motion
to Dismiss to the Solicitor General.
In a Report 13 dated 28 February 1990, the Solicitor General stated
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his
clients, i.e., the Alvendias, have the right to apply for registration of
the land in question. However, respondent does not deny that he
prepared and signed the Amended Application for Original
Registration of Title in Land Reg. Case No. 3711-M wherein he
alleged that the Alvendias are the owners of the land covered by Psu
141243, Amd. 2. Respondent does not offer any explanation at all as
to why his submission in said application was diametrically opposite
to his allegations in the complaint in the earlier Civil Case No. 3330-
M that the Alvendias were permittees and later the lessees of the
same property.
It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false
statement to the court in the land registration case. As proven by
complaint, respondent has willingly aided and consented in the filing
and prosecution of a groundless, if not false, application for land
registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and member of the
bar. 14
It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements is
the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that
candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect
only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could
proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times
that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that
they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in
rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they
advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason,
he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court. 16
In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading
that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his
later pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of
the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it
matters not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as
a member of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had
sworn to do no falsehood before the courts, did commit one. It was
incumbent upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no
falsehood in pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no
explanation, other than that he had not originated but merely
continued the registration proceedings when he filed the Amended
Application, and that he really believed his clients were entitled to
apply for registration of their rights. Respondent’s excuses ring very
hollow; we agree with the Solicitor General and the complainant that
those excuses do not exculpate the Respondent.chanrobles law
library
It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyer’s oath
and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
stated that" [t]he conduct of the lawyer before the court and with
other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness" (now
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that"
[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts"). He
has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a
member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to
secure the title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded
his overriding duty to the court and to the law itself.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of
committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the
Canons of Professional Ethics (now the Code of Professional
Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from
the practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING
that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result
in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of this Resolution
shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69129 August 31, 1987
ROGELIO B. RAGASAJO, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF FLORENTINO MANUNGAS, represented by its
Administratrix ENGRACIA N. MANUNGAS, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the nullification
of the Resolutions of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated
August 10, 1984 and September 27, 1984, in AC-G.R. No. CV-
0719 * denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 25, 1984, declaring his appeal abandoned, and to
command respondent court to admit petitioner's brief.
The issue that emerges in this petition is whether or not the right to
appeal which had been declared abandoned for failure to file
appellant's brief within the period prescribed by the rules may be
revived by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period.
It appears that petitioner filed a civil suit for Cancellation of
Titles ** against the Intestate Estate of Florentino Manungas
represented by Administratrix Engracia Manungas before the then
Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District. 1 The
complaint alleged among others that private respondent unlawfully
and wrongfully prepared a survey plan of Lot 866 by including 11,132
sq. m. of petitioner and fraudulently secured title in her favor.
Respondent vehemently denied the accusation and alleged
otherwise.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor
of respondent and against herein petitioner, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Upholding the validity of TCT Nos. T-30203, T-
30204, T-30205, T-30206, T-30207 and T-30208
and ordering the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens from TCT No. T- 30203;
2) Nullifying OCT No. P-12853 and ordering the
plaintiff and his privies to vacate and surrender
the possession of the lots covered thereby,
together with all improvements, free from liens
and encumbrances, to Engracia Vda. de
Manungas and the Intestate Estate of Florentino
Manungas who are the true and lawful owners, it
appearing that the said plaintiff was a purchaser
and builder in bad faith;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the
Manungases nominal damages of P15,000, plus
P15,000 moral and P5,000, exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees of P5,000.
Costs against the plaintiff. 2
Petitioner appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
by filing a notice of appeal. On November 16, 1983, petitioner
through counsel, Occena Law Office, received a notice requiring him
to pay a docket fee of P68.00 within fifteen (15) days from notice,
which the petitioner complied with on November 24, 1984, by
remitting Postal Money Order, F-5166765 under Office Receipt No.
2526531E On December 9, 1983, a notice requiring petitioner to file
the appellant's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt was
mailed by the clerk of court of the Intermediate Appellate Court to the
Occena Law Office. 3 On December 29, 1983, petitioner's counsel
received the notice to file brief. 4
On April 24, 1984, without any brief having been filed, and without
any motion for extension of time having been sought by petitioner,
private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to dismiss the appeal. 5
In the Resolution of June 25, 1984, respondent court declared the
appeal abandoned for failure of petitioner to file the required
brief. 6 On July 11, 1984, petitioner's counsel received the notice of
dismissal.
On July 26, 1984, petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion
for reconsideration of the Resolution of June 25, 1984, and for
admission of appellant's brief with one (1) copy of brief attached,
through registered mail, under Registry No. 4954 of Davao City Post
Office and another copy served upon respondents' counsel under
Registry Receipt No. 4953. On the same date, petitioner filed with
respondent court six (6) more copies of the brief through air cargo
under Airway Bill No. 216733 of the Allied Brokerage Corporation,
Davao City. On July 30, 1984, respondent court received petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. 7
On August 10, 1984, respondent court, considering the day of receipt
as the date of filing, issued a resolution 8which reads thus:
Acting upon the motion for reconsideration filed
by counsel for plaintiff-appellant on July 30,
1984, the Court resolved to deny the motion, the
same having been filed late.
On August 25, 1984, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Resolution of August 10, 1984, 9 while private respondent filed a
timely opposition thereto. 10
On September 27, 1984, respondent court denied petitioner's motion
of August 25, 1984.11 On October 12, 1984, the Resolution of June
25, 1984, became final.
Hence, on October 26, 1984, petitioner filed the present
petitioner. ***
A perusal of the petition shows that the petitioner's cause of action is
predicated upon the respondent court's denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of June 25, 1984, declaring
petitioner's appeal abandoned. It is the position of the petitioner that
with the said denial, respondent court unlawfully deprived him of his
right to appeal considering that his motion for reconsideration was
filed in due time. Petitioner maintains further that the respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in considering the day of
receipt, July 30, 1984, as the date of filing, and thus denying his
motion for reconsideration, whereas, he filed his motion on July 26,
1984 through registered mail.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor part of due process but
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law.12 It is the rule in
this jurisdiction that an appeal from the Court of First Instance **** to
the Court of Appeals may be taken by filing with the trial court within
thirty (30) days 13 from notice of order, or judgment a notice of
appeal, an appeal bond and a record on appeal. 14 Upon receipt of
the printed copies of the record on appeal, the clerk shall ascertain
whether or not the transcript or exhibits have been elevated and if
not, shall cause this to be done. 15 Upon receipt of the transcript and
exhibits, the clerk shall notify both parties that all evidence, oral or
documentary is already attached to the record. 16 From the notice of
the Clerk of Court to the effect that all evidence, oral or documentary
is already attached to the record, it is the duty of the appellant to file
the printed brief with the Court of Appeals. 17
The record before Us shows that petitioner failed to comply with
respondent court's order of December 9, 1984, requiring the filing of
appellants' brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, the
notice of which was received by petitioner's counsel on December
29, 1984, as per registry return card, 18 a xerox copy of which was
made part of the record of this case with a corresponding certification
issued by respondent court's clerk of court. 19 Petitioner, instead of
asking of this Court and that of the respondent court for liberality by
stating that his failure to do so was due to excusable oversight,
asserted that in fact no such notice to file brief was received in his
office. This pretension must fall for as above stated said counsel
received said notice to file brief on December 29, 1983 as shown by
the registry return card.
Under Rule 50 of the Rules, one of the grounds by which the Court of
Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss the
appeal is the failure on the part of appellant (or his printer) to serve
and file the required number of copies of his brief within the time
prescribed by these rules.20 Under the said provision, the Court of
Appeals has a discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case. In the
present case, from the date of receipt of notice to file brief on
December 29, 1983, there being no extension of time sought, the
forty-five (45) days lapsed on February 12, 1984. Thus the
Resolution of respondent court of June 25, 1984 declaring the appeal
abandoned is in order.
It is however the position of the petitioner that his motion for
reconsideration should not have been denied as it was filed in due
time.
The petitioner's motion was filed through registered mail on July 26,
1984, which was the last day of the 15-day period of appeal since
petitioner received notice of the order of dismissal on July 11, 1984.
The date of mailing shall be considered as the date of
filing.21 Contrary to the finding of respondent court, the said motion
was filed on time.
In the motion for reconsideration the petitioner failed to show that it
was due to excusable negligence or oversight that the brief was not
filed on time nor did petitioner demonstrate the merit of his appeal.
The respondent court therefore did not err in denying the motion for
reconsideration even if We overlook its error in considering the
motion to have been filed out of time.
The court would like to stress that the attempt of counsel for
petitioner to mislead the court by denying he ever received the notice
to file brief when in fact he did is noted with disapproval by the court.
As an officer of the court he must conduct himself with candor and
sincerity towards the courts. His dedication to the cause of his client
is no excuse. He does more damage to his client and to his standing
as a member of the Philippine Bar in so doing. Let this serve as a
warning.
Nevertheless the court examined the judgment of the lower court
sought to be reviewed, wherein the trial court found, among others,
that contrary to the claim of petitioner that the transfer certificates of
title covering the properties of private respondent had encroached
upon the titled properties of petitioner, it is the certificates of title
covering the properties of petitioner that encroached into the
properties of private respondent by an area of approximately 11,132
square meters. 22 On the assumption that this finding of the lower
court is supported by the evidence, and considering the contention of
petitioner in his appeal brief filed in the Court of Appeals that his
property covered by TCT No. T-12852 has an area of 5,695 square
meters, while his property covered by OCT P- 12853 has an area of
34,118 square meters, or a total of 39,813 square meters for both
properties. 23 then the trial court appears to have committed an error
in cancelling said OCT No. P-12853 of petitioner and awarding
possession and ownership of the entire property to private
respondent. Only the portion of the said property of private
respondent encroached upon by petitioner should be returned to said
respondent and only to this extent should the title of petitioner be
cancelled and nullified.
Unfortunately, since the judgment has now become final, the herein
petition may not be given due course under the circumstances of the
case so that this apparent injustice that appears to have been
committed cannot be corrected in this proceeding. Indeed petitioner
did not even raise this issue in the petition. Nevertheless, at the time
of enforcement of the judgment petitioner may invoke the power of
the lower court to correct the ambiguity in the dispositive part and/or
such clerical error therein so that it may conform to the findings and
conclusion of the Court as embodied in the body of the judgment. 24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 1900 June 13, 2012
RODRIGO A. MOLINA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is the undated Resolution1 of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)finding Atty.
Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical conduct and
recommending that he be reprimanded.
The Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint for disbarment2 filed by Rodrigo
A. Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the Court on May
5, 1978. The complaint alleged, among others, that complainant filed
cases of Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and Breach
of the Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de
Leon) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the
counsel of record for accused de Leon in both cases was Atty.
Magat; that a case for slight physical injuries was filed against him
(Molina) by de Leon as a counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also
the private prosecutor; that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion
to quash the information on Assault upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority on the sole ground of double jeopardy claiming that a
similar case for slight physical injuries was filed in court by a certain
Pat. Molina (Molina); that based on the record, no case of slight
physical injuries was filed by Molina against de Leon; that Atty.
Magat was very much aware of such fact as he was the counsel and
private prosecutor on record of de Leon from the very start of the
case way back on May 24, 1974; that Atty. Magat’s act of filing the
Motion to Quash was a malicious act done in bad faith to mislead the
court, thus, a betrayal of the confidence of the court of which he is an
officer; and that Atty. Magat likewise committed willful disobedience
of the court order when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two
(2) occasions despite the fact that he was suspended from the
practice of law.
In his Answer,3 Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the filing of the
motion to quash was concerned, he was really under the impression
that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2) charges was indeed filed
and that the said motion was opposed by the other party and was
denied by the court. He admitted his appearances in court while
under suspension. He explained that his appearance in the
December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the court that the accused
was sick and to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
the accused. In the January 9, 1978 hearing, he appeared because
the accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony be
finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of the court and
conveyed his repentance and apology and promised that the same
would not happen again.
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation.4 Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records of the
case to the IBP for proper disposition.
In his Report and Recommendation5 dated March 20, 2009, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found merit in the complaint and
recommended that Atty. Magat be reprimanded and fined
₱50,000.00. It stated that:
This Commission finds it hard to believe that respondent would have
mistakenly been under the impression that a case for physical
injuries was filed against his client when there was no such case
filed. Respondent was either negligently reckless or he had
mischievous intentions to deceive the trial court. In any case, he
committed a transgression for which he should be punished.
However, the graver sin of respondent is, and this he admits, that he
appeared as counsel before a trial court on at least two (2) occasions
notwithstanding the fact that he had been suspended by the
Supreme Court from the practice of law. Despite professing his
contrition in his Answer, this Commission is not convinced.
Otherwise, respondent should have had, at the onset of the
proceedings, admitted to his misdeeds and put his fate squarely with
the disciplinary body. Yet, he proceeded to fight the charges against
him.
Moreover, if respondent was indeed moved by altruistic intentions
when he made those appearances before the trial court despite
having been suspended, he could have so informed the Presiding
Judge of his plight and explained why the party he was representing
could not attend. Yet, what he proceeded to do was to enter his
appearance as counsel. Indeed, it is beyond doubt he trifled with the
suspension order handed by the Supreme Court.
If there is one thing going for respondent, it is that the passage of
time with which this case remains pending makes it difficult to impose
a penalty of suspension on him. Under normal circumstances, this
Commission would not have thought twice of suspending
respondent. However, the acts committed by respondent occurred
over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would not be fair to now impose a
suspension on respondent, more so considering that he is, in all
likelihood, in the twilight of his career.
On the other hand, there is still a need to discipline respondent if only
to set an example to other lawyers that suspension orders of the
Supreme Court cannot simply be ignored. Thus, it is the
recommendation of the undersigned that respondent be meted a fine
of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱ 50,000.00) and that he be heavily
reprimanded for his actions, the passage of time notwithstanding.6
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed its
Resolution7 adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.
It, however, deleted the imposition of fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not with respect to
the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that
they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.
Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.8
Atty. Magat’s act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which
provides:
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that
there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the
court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the
basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and
untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a
similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all
he had to do was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed,
a case was filed.
Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court on
two occasions despite having been suspended from the practice of
law by the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an
attorney for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court and/or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney without
authority to do so.1âwphi1 It provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
[Underlining supplied]
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic intentions when
he appeared before the trial court despite having been suspended,
he could have informed the Presiding Judge of his plight and
explained why the party he was representing could not attend. On
the contrary, Atty. Magat kept his silence and proceeded to represent
his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is hereby
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with
a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar offense in
the future would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FIRST DIVISION
PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or A.C. No. 6323
OLIVARES REALTY
CORPORATION,
Complainants, Present:
ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 13, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint[1] for disbarment and suspension[2] against
respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares and/or
Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum
shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina
Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly sued him for violations of the lease
contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in Olivares
Building in Paraaque.[3]
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.[4] The case was dismissed for improper venue.[5]
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action
for breach of contract with damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 274. [6] The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-
0233, was dismissed for failure to prosecute.[7] Al-Rasheed, through
counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to
her appeal.[8] The subsequent petition for review on certiorari filed in
the Supreme Court was likewise denied. [9]
 On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274[10] where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009.[11] It was dismissed on the
grounds of res judicata and prescription.[12]
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only
performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to protect and prosecute
the interests of his client.[13] He denied that he was forum shopping as
his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping,[14] disclosed the two
previous cases involving the same cause of action which had been
filed and dismissed.[15] Respondent further claims he could not refuse
his clients request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed was the
oppressed party in the transaction.[16]
This Court referred the complaint, together with respondents
comment, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[17]
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found
that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in repeatedly suing Olivares for
the same cause of action and subject matter.[18] It opined that
respondent should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for
lack of interest to prosecute.[19] Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the
merits.[20] The CBD recommended the suspension of respondent for
six months with a warning that any similar infraction in the future would
be dealt with more severely.[21]
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that
respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum shopping. It,
however, modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.[22]
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation
as to the penalty.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither
mere words nor an empty formality. When they take their oath as
lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept
the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. [23] As the first Canon of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states, [a] lawyer shall uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.[24] Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they
took, lawyers should not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same.[25]
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from
filing the second complaint against Olivares. He ought to have known
that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect of
an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this
elementary principle of procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed
the second complaint. Respondent appealed the 1999 case to the
Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were
dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate of
non-forum shopping attached to the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-
Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract. As
if such disclosure was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon
unapologetically reproduced his 1999[26] arguments and assertions in
the 2004[27] complaint. Respondent obviously knew the law and tried
to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully
violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from
the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the
expense of truth and justice.[28] Lawyers have the duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions
constitutes an abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who
file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary
action for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys
to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such
actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.[29]
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is
insufficient and rules instead that CBDs recommendation for a six-
month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate
to the violation committed. However, in view of respondents death on
September 27, 2006,[30] the penalty can no longer be imposed on
him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case
moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4947 February 14, 2005
ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this verified Petition1 filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for
the disbarment of her estranged husband Atty. Justo Paras on
alleged acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment2 to the Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999,3 the Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a Report and
Recommendation dated 13 January 20044 of Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which Report
reads in part, as follows:
"Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of
Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo,
Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a
Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels
of land located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority
to their mother to sell the subject real properties previously registered
in the name of the heirs of Vicente Paras wherein respondent was
one of the signatories therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special
Power of Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real
property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was
with the respondent’s full knowledge since he was residing at the
house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap
family had been in possession of the subject real property up to the
present.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was
called to the fact that a free patent title to the aforesaid property was
issued in respondent’s name and upon verification with the DENR,
Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get
copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to
the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed
by the respondent; over the aforesaid lots previously sold by
Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of
Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property executed by
Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated
April 2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan
authorized officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by
Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated
August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo
with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made
by the respondent without her knowledge and consent and those
acts of deceit, machinations and falsification of documents were
deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the respondent in
violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of
his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility.1ªvvphi1.nét
Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free
patent title over real properties which had been previously sold by his
own mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control and
possession of complainant’s natural family, a fact respondent
allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he had full
knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his
name and unjustly and unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their
legitimate title to the said property in betrayal of the court to pervert
the administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.
xxx xxx xxx
In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously
not the owner of the properties and considering that the properties
were applied for free patent titling during their marital union prior to
its breakage, complainant was likewise a communal owner thereof
and as such was also complaining against herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands
classified as forested zone in Matobato were declared and
reclassified into public agricultural lands, then publicly surveyed and
parcelized by lots identified in the survey map based on actual or
known occupants; then the Bureau of Lands allegedly made a public
announcement that the lands were available for private ownership
thru Free Patent Application available only to native settlers or
natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant
being native or natural born Filipinos muchless Aurora D. Yap who in
1985 was said to be already an American citizen; complainant and
her family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply for free patent over
said questioned properties for the reason that respondent had
already occupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon;
acted as owner thereof; and could easily align his right to the
property which had been identified in the public survey as "Heirs of
Vicente Paras", otherwise the questioned properties allegedly
according to the Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other
qualified natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him
over the communal property of him and the complainant as well as
those purchased by him including the portion whose occupancy of a
public land was purchased by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de
Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps for all of them were not
qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural public land via free
patent; none of them being a natural born Filipino or native settler
and were disqualified from a gratuitous grant of public land from the
government.
Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the
complainant the properties was hatched and executed by the Yaps,
most particularly Atty. Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the law and
prevent the properties from being given by the government to some
other qualified persons. He allegedly applied for issuance of free
patent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and control of the
properties in the concept of a legitimate owner under authority of a
gratuitous grant of the government.
Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her family
much less American citizen Aurora Dy Yap had not made any prior
demand for the return of the questioned properties; nor filed a
complaint under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law; nor filed an
administrative remedy before the DENR for the cancellation and
reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor brought
any action in any civil court for either quieting of title, or cancellation
of free patent title or recovery of ownership or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such civil court determination
on whether or not complainant or her family were qualified to become
grantee of a government gratuitous grant of public agricultural land, if
the Honorable Supreme Court will decide that complainant, her
mother, brothers and sisters were within the ambit of the term natural
born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to
them rightfully belong the ownership of the questioned titled public
agricultural lands; and that he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy
Law consequent to such cession, respondent alleged that he will
gladly deliver and transfer title to them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of
possession of all conjugal/communal properties including the herein
questioned properties for after he left the conjugal home in 1988
possession of all these properties, real and personal were until now
with the complainant and her biological family.1ªvvphi1.nét
Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack
of merit."
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply5 to respondent’s Comment,
therein refuting respondent’s claims that he was used as a "dummy"
since complainant and her siblings had previously acquired Free
Patents in their names. Complainant further alleged that respondent
is morally unfit to continue to be an officer of the court because of his
falsely declaring under oath that he had been occupying the subject
real property since 1985 when in fact he did not and was never in
occupation/possession thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an
Order6 noting the filing of the last pleading and setting the instant
case for hearing. Several hearings7 were conducted wherein
complainant presented all her witnesses together with their
respective affidavits and supporting documents8 , which were all
subjected to cross-examination by the respondent. Likewise,
respondent presented his Counter-Affidavit9 and supporting
documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded
her Report and made a recommendation, as follows:
"From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and
falsehood in having applied for free patent over lands owned by
another over which he had no actual physical possession being
aware of the fact that the same was previously transferred in the
name of Aurora Yap; an act which adversely reflected on his fitness
to practice law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
"It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there
was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
partakes the nature of proper disciplinary action pursuant to Section
1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully
recommends for the suspension of Atty. Justo Paras from the
practice of his law profession for a period of three (3) months from
receipt hereof.
"It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein
respondent Paras is a registered member be furnished a copy of the
Order and notified of the said suspension for proper enforcement."
Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004,10 the IBP
Board of Governors adopted the Report of the Investigating
Commissioner but modified the latter’s recommended penalty by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
The case is now before us for confirmation.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should
be sanctioned. We find, however, that the recommended penalty is
not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession11 as the bar
should always maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well
as of honesty and fair dealing among its members. By and large, a
lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.12 To
this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the legal profession.13
In Marcelo v. Javier14 , we held:
"It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law
during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity
to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any
constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may
be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on
conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from
the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those
charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the
attorney.
"An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor which include the
statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to cover practically
any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. It
is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for
disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined
on grounds other than those specifically provided in the law.
Generally a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or
an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the
business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which
tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the
favorable opinion of the public."
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege
bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.15 One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor.
And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera16 , we ruled:
"Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s
honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required
to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the
opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound
by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according
to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the
courts and their clients. x x x"
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his
lawyer’s oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility
which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the
courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent has
been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member
of the Bar and an officer of the court in his acts of applying for the
issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite his
knowledge that the same had already been sold by his mother to
complainant’s sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the
comment that he filed before this Court when he alleged that the said
properties were public land under the Forestal Zone "when the
mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of
entire occupancy of the Parases"17 . Moreover, respondent
committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over
the said properties when he manifested under oath that he had been
in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the
fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation
of complainant’s family, as evidenced no less by respondent’s own
statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her
family as "natural born citizens", this Court holds that the instant case
is not the proper forum to address such issue. Furthermore, as
correctly held by the Investigating Commissioner, "[i]t is immaterial as
to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility". Likewise, any other action
which the parties may make against each other has no material
bearing in this case. For, it must be remembered that administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,18 held:
"Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like
the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
this proceeding is not – and does not involve – a trial of an action or
a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. xxx"
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably
reveal respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this
Court.
At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our
Decision in A.C. No. 5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled
Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras, respondent was
previously meted with suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months on the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year
from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of
respondent’s prior misdemeanors for which he was penalized with a
six (6) month and one (1) year suspension from the practice of law,
his deplorable behavior in the present case which grossly degrades
the legal profession warrants the imposition of a much graver
penalty.1ªvvphi1.nét
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of
committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and
likewise be entered in the record of respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL
M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2)
a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring
respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions for making certain public statements.
I In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal
Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The
Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases
(originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707)
naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul
M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5
February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending
the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and
his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1
September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to
Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the
"Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that
respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and
authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal
cases for graft and corruption against public officials and
employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which
read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable
Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting
as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with urgent motion for preliminary
elimination injunction, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to
require the respondents to COMMENT
thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, ordering
respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal
Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to
12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is
concerned and from hearing and resolving
the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend
dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November
1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as
respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987
Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304
recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and
corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other
individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the
Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file
such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also
moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
due course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez
to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining
order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and
particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof
and from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate
resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No.
80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days
prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in
G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal
Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23
November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner
Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December
1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The
motion filed by the Solicitor General for
respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days
from the expiration of the original period within
which to file comment on the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order is
GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat
the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the
Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In
pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to
CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP
Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on
Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and
particularly, from filing the criminal information
consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective
immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul
M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No.
12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs.
Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing
the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan
in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No.
80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion
to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion
cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused
the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No.
12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings
in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his
Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which
appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily
Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said
yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him
from investigating graft cases involving Antique
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought
that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of
a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the
order) is that it appears that while rich and
influential persons get favorable actions from the
Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due
course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an
exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens
the people's apprehension over the justice
system in this country, especially because the
people have been thinking that only the small fly
can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the
tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the
court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating
graft cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased
in his investigations because the latter wanted to
help promote the political fortunes of a friend
from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court
stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft
charge against the governor, and from instituting
any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to
prosecute graft cases even if they involve the
high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been
restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order,
Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against
two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino
government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of
the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of
the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural
Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the
Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am
a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate
the thinking of some people that affluent persons
can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief
Executive over the weekend and that while she
symphatizes with local officials who are charged
in court during election time, 'She said that it
might be a disservice to the people and the
voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed
against local officials during election time could
be mere harassment suits, the Constitution
makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of
the character of tile candidate, who should be
subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16
February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on
aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April
1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the
Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by
petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the
criminal informations filed against him in the
Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease
and desist from conducting investigations and
filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or
otherwise exercising the powers and functions of
the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez
the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez,
after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the
following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either
in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a
leading member of the court ... and he was asked
to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on
him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain
from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it
will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a
leading member of the Court and was asked to
dismiss the cases against (two Members of the
Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten
notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some members of this
Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office
(i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for
Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or
repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the
metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on
those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2
May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the
Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The
Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578
(Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez,
etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28,
1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the
petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10)
days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez
has made public statements to the media which
not only deal with matters subjudice but also
appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court
and its individual members and calculated,
directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into
disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate
and degrade the administration of justice, the
Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez
to explain in writing within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others,
in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal,"
the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the
"Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the
"Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1,
1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely
"an offshoot of the position he had taken that the
SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors or
motivated by a desire to stop him 'from
investigating cases against some of their
proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the
Court "interceded for and on behalf of persons
with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or
sought "to pressure him to render decisions
favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to
go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on
him and to refrain from investigating the
Commission on Audit report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because it
will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the
dismissal of cases against two Associate
Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without
rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without
due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits
relative to the purpose of and circumstances
attendant upon the notes written to said public
respondent by three (3) members of the Court
have since been submitted to the Court and now
form part of its official records, the Court further
Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to
ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn
statements and the annexes thereto appended,
and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to
comment thereon within the same period of ten
(10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution
of February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent
Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not
served on him, the Court Resolved to require the
Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said
Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE
the latter to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May
1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging,
among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of
the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of
innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that
'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there
being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be
able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality."
Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the
four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him
inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to
Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per
curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately
executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of
record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to
Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 21 dated
20 May 1988
 3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time
to File Explanation Ex Abundante
Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to
the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988
(with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27
May 1988 from the alleged Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed
to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with
Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted
earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer
with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary
charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that
pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called
"Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on
22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to
discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme
Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline
lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an
inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to
control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers
of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any
manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for
contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not
dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into
play in cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to
discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the
power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee
both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious
conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into
play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35Where the
respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does
not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to
the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of
the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.
Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede
and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish
for contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor
and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case,
respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court
to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias
and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole
Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this
proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent
cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has
become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent
Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well
as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re
Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro
had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid
manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to
the exercise of our authority in the premises, that,
as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the
members of the Court are the 'complainants,
prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if
not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the
proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity
of the legal profession and the property and
honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a
certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and
inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
 separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with
the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals
but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be
any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be
the Court itself, not the individual members
thereof—as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice
be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the
practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So
that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties,
that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of the power because
public policy demands that they, acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases which call
for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to
disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would
prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting
requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that
for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is
to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has
burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not
mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an
exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done
before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation
of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements
attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest
opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not
make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give
rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his
freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here
are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other
agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent
Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out above. Respondent
has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he
acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements
attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme
Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it
rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent
Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against
him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices
cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government
prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating
against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court
Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the
correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution
dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent
Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to
accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases.
This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault
thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling
implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of
administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the
Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the
legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process
to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had
taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is
very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage
upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's
statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were
made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to
act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10
September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is,
more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision.
Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued
a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering
the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal
cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez.
Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987,
upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr.
Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time
requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in
TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this
Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the
Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members
of the Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him
to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends,"
including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court.
This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a
cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three
(3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which
respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions)
win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend
otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation
at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge
appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance
(at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by
respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong
decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude,
resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in
total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to
cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general
public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more
generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was
preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the
Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on
the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and
allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small
offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to
present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as
intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also
suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly
"dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers
'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not
without relation to the other statements made by respondent against
the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint
of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to
render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its
critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges
and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of
respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of
the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent
undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the
attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have
discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had
ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in
support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both
strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary
measures there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to
strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is
appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a
constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require
the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard"
does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to
explain why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements
adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the
full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative
proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent
made, among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit
[themselves] in the contempt and administrative
charges against the respondent, in the light of the
manifest prejudice and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the language of the
resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has
already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial
judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due
process in the contempt citation as well as in the
possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court
as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has
no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the
contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this
Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation
running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been
castigated with such venom by the entire Court in
its decision denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the
impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds
it extremely difficult to believe that the members
of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased
demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined
to disbar [respondent] without due process" and
that a specified Member of the Court "has been
tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the
decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements
earlier made, respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon
the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and
statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this
Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due
process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up
this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one
obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once
more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how
respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest
tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most
solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings
aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around
the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around
respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may
reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as
warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over
members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of
the kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as
constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the
Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for
Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider
a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a
veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President
of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and
implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived.
Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of
Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals
for damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to
hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This
suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty.
del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices
concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty.
del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This
Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who
had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for
Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for
lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your
Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true
copies of the last two Resolutions of the
Supreme Court confirming the decision of the
Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco
M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed
against the Justices supporting the same, civil
and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the
Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent
falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for
him the decisions of the City Court and the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to
obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the
purpose of exposing to the people the corroding
evils extant in our Government, so that they may
well know them and work for their
extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis
supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making the above statements. In his additional
explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in
and outside of the Government. It is this state of
things that convinced me that all human efforts to
 correct and/or reform the said evils will be
fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to
you, I have already decided to retire from a life of
militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the
filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the
practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind
as state of graft, corruption and injustice
allegedly rampant in and outside of the
government as justification for his contemptuous
statements. In other words, he already assumed
by his own contemptuous utterances that
because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the
government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-
36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and
those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a
complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's
logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear
belated to remind them that second only to the
duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty
of all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court).
But We do remind them of said duty to
emphasize to their younger brethren its
paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the
noble mission of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on
its evaluation of the evidence on only one
specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-
36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision because We found no reason for
disturbing the appellate court's finding and
conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of
Appeals and this Court exercised judicial
discretion in a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act
of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled
threats to make both Courts reconsider their
respective stand in the decision and the
resolution that spelled disaster for his client
cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid
tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant
respect for the two highest Court of the land
when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in
deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and
malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and
those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a
reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and
minds that an attorney owes it to himself to
respect the courts of justice and its officers as a
fealty for the stability of our democratic
institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis
supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4)
members of the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur International
Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain
statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked
the applicable law due to the mis-representation
and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last
sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal
ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right
to reject any and all bids") can be used by
vulturous executives to cover up and excuse
losses to the public, a government agency or just
plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of
our upbringing and schooling, even under many
of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that
in effect does precisely that in a most absolute
manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion
for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31
SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion
to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves
from considering, judging and resolving the case
or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to
January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the
brother of the Honorable Associate Justice
Castro is a vice-president of the favored party
who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31,
1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in
effect prejudging and predetermining this case
even before the joining of an issue. As to the
Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of
the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
was given a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President a short
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered in this case. The appointment referred
to was as secretary of the newly-created Board
of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy
discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number
of side comments projecting what is claimed to
be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968
decision. It enumerates "incidents" which,
according to the motion, brought about
respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial
prejudice had been caused it and that there was
'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their
appointing authority and a favored party directly
benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for
MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave
of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was
penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion when in fact he was outside the
borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the
time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled
case—which condition is prohibited by the New
Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we
quote: "Justices; who may take part—... . Only
those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication ... ." This
requirement is especially significant in the
present instance because the member who
penned the decision was the very member who
was absent for approximately four months or
more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and
Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice
in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it
will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption
of Philippine Government officials in the bidding
of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of
deprivation of justice and confiscation of property
and/or to the United States Government, either
its executive or judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's
proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
Government without either compensation or due
process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including
the sugar price premium, amounting to more than
fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of
contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration,
we, indeed, find language that is not to be
expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures
petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks
of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,'
but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph
categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as
'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous
manner. He then charges that the ex parte
preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even
before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a
reckless manner two justices of this Court for
being interested in the decision of this case:
Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
brother is the vice president of the favored party
who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son
was appointed secretary of the newly-created
Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment
in the Philippine Government by the President, a
short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to
state that 'it would seem that the principles thus
established [the moral and ethical guidelines for
inhibition of any judicial authority by the
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to
itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and
further removed conditions have been known to
create favoritism, only to conclude that there
is no reason for a belief that the conditions
obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro would be less likely to engender
favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular
cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the
Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible
to delicadeza, which could make their actuation
suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the
Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were
not free from the appearance of impropriety but
did arouse suspicion that their relationship did
affect their judgment. He points out that courts
must be above suspicion at all times like
Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for
the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be
allowed to happen in our country, 'although the
process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's
accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The
slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion
on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if,
we repeated any other justices who have
received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of
any board-petitioner or their agents or principals,
including the president.' The absurdity of this
posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the
justices of this Court are appointed by the
President and in that sense may be considered
to have each received a favor from the President.
Should these justices inhibit themselves every
time a case involving the Administration crops
up? Such a thought may not certainly be
entertained. The consequence thereof would be
to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We
would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country.
Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not too-well
concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing
gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such
disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a
court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of
faith, counsel's words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just
recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a
style that undermines and degrades the
administration of justice. The stricture in Section
3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of
 justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to
take the case to the World Court and/or the
United States government. It must be
remembered that respondent MacArthur at that
time was still trying to overturn the decision of
this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were in ejected. More
specifically, the motion announced that McArthur
'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of
the Philippine government officials in the bidding
of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would
invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring
the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars
annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the
blind of this Court to decide the case' in its favor.
A notice of appeal to the World Court has even
been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross
inconsistency between the appeal and the move
to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a
decision presupposes that a party has already
abandoned any move to reconsider that decision.
And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the
World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect
a change of the decision of this Court. Such act
has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can
never be protected where infraction of ethics
meets with complacency rather than punishment.
The people should not be given cause to break
faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of
honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a
court of justice should not yield to the assaults of
disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think,
is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31
SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest
against what he asserted was "a great injustice committed against
his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that
"justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen
vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that
"the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court'
and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the
press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the
"Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented
petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice
of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without
any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.'
Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to
pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the
case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice,
Almacen said in this petition, 'where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to
our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself
of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court 'will
become responsible to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA
at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him. His explanation,
which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in
paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two
more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court
has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our
beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us
reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not
one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no
human defect or ailment in the above statement.
We only described the impersonal state of Things
and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and
confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our
lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be regained
tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-
imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as
to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to
have faith and confidence in the members of the
Court but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be condemned by
the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572;
emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected.
The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law
holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran
was dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in his
Motion for Reconsideration:
 The petitioner respectfully prays for a
reconsideration of the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the
ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14
of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated
by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the
further ground that it is likewise a violation of the
most important right in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable
violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always
be upheld and protected by all means, because
the rule of law creates and preserves peace and
order and gives satisfaction and contentment to
all concerned. But when the laws and the rules
are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to
armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We
do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again
and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme
Court and in those of the City Hall of
Manila. Educated people should keep their
temper under control at all times! But justice
should be done to all concerned to perpetuate
the very life of Democracy on the face of the
earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the
dignity of the Court and required counsel to show cause why
administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later
explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of
Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of
such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these
explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for
reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing
of two employees is but a covert threat upon the
members of the Court. ... That such threats and
disrespectful language contained in a pleading
filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt
has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza,
52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil.
151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas
L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57
Phil. 86). What makes the present case more
deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of
the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the
judges who try his cases with that courtesy all
have a right to expect. As an officer of the court,
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and
not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in
defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will
be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting
to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety
and respect which the dignity of the courts
require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re
Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812;
emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking
the Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news
item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing.
Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the
publication of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in
Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic
Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in
the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local
daily, who now has to suffer 30 days
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the
source of a news published in his paper, I regret
to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is
once more putting in evidence the incompetency
or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members. In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these
last years, I believe that the only remedy to put
an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I
announce that one of the first measures, which I
will introduce in the coming congressional
sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, the Supreme Court of today
constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so
that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court
of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark
of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and
glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-
598; emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his
avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and in
requiring him to show cause why he should not
be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice
Feria, said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been
for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it
has been deciding in favor of one party knowing
that the law and justice is on the part of the
adverse party and not on the one in whose favor
the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the
people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to
lower and degrade the administration of justice
by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of
their rights when these are trampled upon, and if
the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the law into their
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer
of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is
in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according
to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such
 guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis
supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion
before the Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph
(in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it
of record that the resolution of this court, denying
our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely
erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the
rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We
wish to exhaust all the means within our power in
order that this error may be corrected by the very
court which has committed it, because we should
not want that some citizen, particularly some
voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas,
resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he
has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the
herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the
prestige of this honorable court and of each and
every member thereof in the eyes of the public.
But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely
that erroneous decisions like these, which the
affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice. (61
Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be
declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it
was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made
above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court,
an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the
court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no
less than having proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused
its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because
the acts of outraging and mocking from which the
words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are
derived, means exactly the same as all these,
according to the Dictionary of the Spanish
Language published by the Spanish Academy
(Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed.,
pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said
motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many
years a member of the Philippine bar, was
neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court
in a special way to the essential points relied
upon in his argument and to emphasize the force
thereof, the many reasons stated in his said
motion were sufficient and the phrases in
question were superfluous. In order to appeal to
reason and justice, it is highly improper and
amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can
ever sanction them by reason of their natural
tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise
of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in
judicial matters, in the consideration of questions
submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it
is insinuated therein, after the author shows the
course which the voters of Tiaong should follow
in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort
to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what
he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his
client has been the victim; and because he states
in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the
court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices
against it in order to make it odious in the public
eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred
to in his motion to promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism a movement with
seditious and revolutionary tendencies the
activities of which, as is of public knowledge,
occurred in this country a few days ago. This
cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, because he presumes that the court is
so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not
resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven,
with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this
court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity
and authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it had conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of
justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither
creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent
which, in many cases, is the source of disorder,
thus undermining the foundation upon which
rests that bulwark called judicial power to which
those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed
exhaust our case law on this matter. In the following cases, among
others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively
disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from
those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382
(1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67
(1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA
441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211
(1956);
 7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per
curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29
April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt
Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil.
312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above
which the Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as
warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is
compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent
Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's
statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately
rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated
Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed
their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent
here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact
outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated
by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the
then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the
centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of
respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as
an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the
related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair
criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of
free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this
Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech
and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself
can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly
system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of
viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an
independent judiciary, nor an independent
judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy
over the other; both are indispensable to a free
society. The freedom of the press in itself
presupposes an independent judiciary through
which that freedom may, if necessary be
vindicated. And one of the potent means for
assuring judges their independence is a free
press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the
following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of
speech and press. This constitutional right must
be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard
for charges under the Libel Law which come
dangerously close to its violation. We shall
continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the
citizens must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of
the press and of the citizens should not be
confused with liberty ill its true sense. As
important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the
citizens is the maintenance of the independence
of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot
be had if persons are privileged to scorn a
resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be
permitted by subterranean means to diffuse
inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings
to the embarassment of the parties and the
courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the
capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional
misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every
man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a
lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than
that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a
lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court
as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a
private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to
criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court
may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of
criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice
Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect
to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful
subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even
those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent
has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that
criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the
Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will
not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of
his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point
out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations
and exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury
to the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court
denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of
27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its
Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage
sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a
finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority
of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned,
this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988
Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof
and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by
the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for
which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and
undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of
injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress.
What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial
institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in
particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a
given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like
those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and
countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in
the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured;
but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is
critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt
is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members
of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the
remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be
available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an
exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not
only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an
institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an
adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M.
Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders
from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the
Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
EN BANC
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC.,
LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the
President. The warring personalities are important enough but more
transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties'
dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue
involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a
democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the
crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was
elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the
petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a
plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His
sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day,
October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate
Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech
entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220
million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November
1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended
for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate
President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then
headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice
(then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on
Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo
Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On
the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera
and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11,
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf
of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking
petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral
authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the
resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17,
former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the
petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former
President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on
October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for
petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to
his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers,
members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned.
They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister
Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington
Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from
the Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate
President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together
with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition,
Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous
session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more
than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the
Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of
Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as
Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took
their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On
December 7, the impeachment trial started.14 The battle royale was
fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession.
Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader
Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto
Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib
Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and
Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private
prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and
now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel
were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General
and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of
Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul
Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun.
The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course
enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the
constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic
point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa
Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified
that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed
the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million
investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned
in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more
bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty.
Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance
took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned
BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing
charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16,
when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was
met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the
metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA
Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the
petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker
Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the
public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for
petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on
Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the
people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students
and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show
their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA
Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and
more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary
Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President
where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing
crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado
and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services
went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents
Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering
demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your
Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces,
we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their
posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in
various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner
announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of
the highly controversial second envelope.26There was no turning
back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first
round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive
Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst.
Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the
Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner.
Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary
Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there
was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada
protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor
injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke
out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He
issued the following press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that
will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil
society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace,
the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for
the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
 MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed
the following letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I
am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30
a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate
President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at
9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On
the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines before the
Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to
the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court,
dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an
administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to
confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of
the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at
noon of January 20, 2001.1âwphi1.nêt
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any
justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as
ambassadors and special envoys.34 Recognition of respondent
Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On
January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang, led by
the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco,
more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of
respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the
respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US
recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new
Speaker of the House of Representatives.37The House then passed
Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved
Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support
for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's
goals under the Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste
Management Act.40 A few days later, she also signed into law the
Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The next day, February 7, the
Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of
Senator Guingona, Jr.43Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan
Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing
as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of
respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators
Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House
of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in
Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice
President two (2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that
the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the
record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court
on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of
whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's
public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to
38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the
ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of
the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of
petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of
Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating
increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all
social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in
the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are:
(1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on
October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption,
bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct
for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed
by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000
for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong,
et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal
use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD
46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto
B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and
corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the
respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the
petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P.
Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew
Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty.
Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order
directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of
his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5,
petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further
proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757
and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his
office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if
legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6,
filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment
"confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and
to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos.
146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the
respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period
expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered
the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the
filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of
February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-
hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and
Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on
motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag.
They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have
"compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their
weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves.
Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to
file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous
replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for
copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on
respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the
President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice
issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are
officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt
to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public
the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending
decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately
enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or
deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his
office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of
the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the
respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the
cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days
after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action
will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases
at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable
controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption
that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from
criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar
pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the
cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They
stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through
people power; that she has already taken her oath as the
14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of
the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign
governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute
the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here
and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its
exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the
courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests
on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential
considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional
law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr.
Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the
case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's
presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political
questions', not of 'political cases'."
with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer
perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree,
the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has
focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against
the exercise of its jurisdiction.60With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this
intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so
called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of
Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the
extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C.
Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since
the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of
respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more
cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are
inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of
former President Aquino was the result of a successful
revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less
than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of
the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the
legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by
people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered
contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not
revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA
Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she
categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the
powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987
Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA
People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people
power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA
I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government
that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review,
but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a
political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief
discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievance which are
the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by
Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898
revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the
clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos
and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus
non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the
revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that
Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his
ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or
other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of
human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the
right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or
collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the
United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900
issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried
over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the
Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935
Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now
safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of
assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put
by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of
assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for
advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to
provide for participation in decision-making by all members of
society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and
hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious
balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In
this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a
framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a
society can take place without destroying the
society."70In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was
echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of
the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of
the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion
and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and
by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v.
Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it should be
clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign
people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should
listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who
are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political
questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably
section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803
case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that
"it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in
vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered
this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal
question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of
the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he
resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant
when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8,
Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the
unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President
and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case
of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice President shall have been elected and
qualified.
 x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or
should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when
respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear,
it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace
in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned
has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and
after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the
petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the
exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged
misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate
against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of
succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of
115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began
deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social
Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected
with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic
advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call
for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo
when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused
to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of
outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine
was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their
number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly
spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative
window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is
provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of
Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January
19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the
crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee
to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled
Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence
and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes)
(Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30
p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal
for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up
the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes
joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of
the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of
support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent
Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a
president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator
Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit
or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened
intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m.,
Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a
graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by
saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough
funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner
expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and
dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At
10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie
(Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the
palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to
the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already
concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the
palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President
Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan
tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful
and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the
request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this
stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power
immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful
Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the
transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the
guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the
agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the
petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was
not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of
this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the
petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara
Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of
negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well
as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will
leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any
more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape,
the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has
resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko
na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According
to the Angara Diary, the following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms.
Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I
am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It
reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within
the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice
President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the
Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition
process for the assumption of the new administration shall
commence, and persons designated by the Vice President
to various positions and offices of the government shall
start their orientation activities in coordination with the
incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police shall function under the Vice President as
national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of
Staff, shall guarantee the security of the President and his
family as approved by the national military and police
authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second
envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of
the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with
the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the
Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their
respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24
January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are
guaranteed security and safety of their person and property
throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President
Estrada and his families are guarantee freedom from
persecution or retaliation from government and the private
sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as
approved by the national military and police authorities –
Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate
sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening
of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof
that the subject savings account does not belong to
President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20
January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition
Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an
appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as
part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and
PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful
implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a
public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
"Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the
petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round
of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures
to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was
premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It
was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General
Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United
Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent
Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates
the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is
a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful
transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points
with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today,
20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24
January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume
the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new
administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to
various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of
Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the
President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes
as approved by the national military and police authority –
Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall
function under the Vice President as national military and
police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the
second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of
which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings
account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the
form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore
attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene
Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting
the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that
the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang
agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the
agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic
na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir
(yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that
there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision
on resignation since this matter is already moot and
academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first
provision and faxes the documents, which have been
signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel
and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to
General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is
important that the provisions on security, at least, should
be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has
ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to
Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the
Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people
inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential
Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who
have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the
first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to
protect the Palace, since the police and military have
already withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack
as many of the Estrada family's personal possessions as
they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president
needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along
with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong
and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality
of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace,
the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for
the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved
people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to
re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now
in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a
temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to
Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again,
we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I
am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice
President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The
pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss,
may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation.
Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these
circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as
strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to
by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was
not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press
release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his
press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he
was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the
time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious
letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was
prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later
act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it
commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the
presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a
whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court
cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall
be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign,
he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies
on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or
retire pending an investigation, criminals or administrative,
or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide
any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill
No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the
Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as
it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo
Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the
period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that
no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or
corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed
to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments,
the following provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be
allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal
or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for
any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office
shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an
offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who
questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and
insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No.
293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13
under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision
mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of
the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any
debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a
public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against
him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is
to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a
public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a
pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent
his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery
under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be
compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his
constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he
really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns
or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not
cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings
against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid
prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be
rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner
resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-
1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed,
the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the
sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically,
the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman
lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot
therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases
whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any
insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an
administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars
him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an
impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not
be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the
process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges
voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and
private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings
were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment
case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act
as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely
temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the
presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the
inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner
sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has
no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to
determine whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article
VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that
he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting
President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of
the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the
Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-
eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need
of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
 President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above
letter claiming inability to the Senate President
and Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took
her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of
Representatives passed on January 24, 2001
House Resolution No. 175;96
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its
support to the assumption into office by Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of
the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to
express its support for her administration as a partner in
the attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of
Representatives on January 24, 2001.

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Resolution No. 17697 which states: Secretary General"

"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:
INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice
President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the
of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him; Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
members of both Houses voting separately;
was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January
2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T.
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the
Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the
international community had extended their recognition to
Republic of the Philippines;
Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public
servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
who has served the Filipino people with dedicated
Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and
responsibility and patriotism;
reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity
and development;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses
sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the
government in various capacities, among others, as
government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of
Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
Justice, Senator of the Philippines – qualities which merit
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people,
his nomination to the position of Vice President of the
the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a
Republic: Now, therefore, be it
stable, continuing government and therefore must remove
all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of
Representatives, That the House of Representatives
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to
Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political
wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation
and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various Adopted,
segments of the whole nation;
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital Speaker
for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of
Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to This Resolution was adopted by the House of
the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Representatives on February 7, 2001.
Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in
nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Now, therefore, be it Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming
inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed
the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the
nation an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome
awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose
and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the
forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the
new government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's
challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate
Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice
President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the
Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public
servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage;
who has served the Filipino people with dedicated
responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses
sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served the
government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit his
nomination to the position of Vice President of the
Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm
the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7,
2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise
passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE
IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate
recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officioand
has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment
Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and
Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment
Court including the "second envelope" be transferred to the
Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and
preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate.
Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon
written approval of the Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished
copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7,
2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No.
84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on
the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the
Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed
into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet,
without any recognition from any sector of government, and without
any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his
inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the
claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the
Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court
cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language
in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."
Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to
discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by
this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on
leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and
the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed
against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited
because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit,
whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history
executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of
executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In
the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner
W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.
J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the
Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for
allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of
prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does
not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the
acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of
his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained.
Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the
guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly
abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly
free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does
not mean, either that a person injured by the executive
authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n
remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it
means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges
if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not
be personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will,
when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion
justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General
illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status
quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured to every
person, however humble or of whatever country, when his
personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary
can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in
damages which result from the performance of his official
duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine
Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the
chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation
to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the
contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore
had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of
judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that
of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he
acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority
that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is
held here is that he will be protected from personal liability
for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but
also when he is without authority, provided he actually
used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty,
in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In
other words, in determining the question of his authority. If
he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the
question of his authority was one over which two men,
reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ;
but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so
plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-
General but as a private individual, and as such must
answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief
Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz"xxx. Action upon
important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the
chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered
for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the
office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a
way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific
provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial
law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the
1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the
amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII
stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure.
Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done
by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during
his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the
incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled,
"Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege
As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned
counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao
Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional
amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his
disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans
one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity
concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not
only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and
other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it
would cover even acts of the President outside the scope
of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so
as to include not only the President but also other persons,
be they government officials or private individuals, who
acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at
that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute
immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of
this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973
Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now
Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after
incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the
principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the
immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no
wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was
ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the
1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the
executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following
explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's
omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the
President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at
the very least, of the original provision on immunity from
suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee
members not agree to a restoration of at least the first
sentence that the President shall be immune from suit
during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him
that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time
facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now
facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider
it understood in present jurisprudence that during his
tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The
only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to
make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any
more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this
history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the
reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led
to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment
Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can
be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against
his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for
it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who
has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be
the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed
against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment
proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgement of
conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or
by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to
remove one from office, then his resignation would render
the case moot and academic. However, as the provision
says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the
ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that
'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment
process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he
lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition
sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that
he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the
case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are
inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by
petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is
an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule
is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will
reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when
it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In
the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a
sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and
documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers.
Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges
of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were
committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in
Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign.
President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground,
among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process
and that he should first be impeached and removed from office
before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The
claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that
"when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal
justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme
Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil
damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court
had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for
money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to
unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch
the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great
themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public
trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that
"public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the
Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is
to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or
inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we
sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity
from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be
stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against
him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits
that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set
file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought
on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach
the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury.
Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the
right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American
approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about
the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to
a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve
this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong
likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised
in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile
criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in
the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the
doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied
the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is
true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at
bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.
To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right
to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press
has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive
public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not
by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of
the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from
pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system
brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables
and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit
who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed
the jury system whose members are overly protected from
publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-
court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice
on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity
that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In
Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of
actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a
actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a
result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change
even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has
the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of
Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on
their right to due process while undergoing preliminary
investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early
invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty
while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of
sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For
sure, few cases can match the high volume and high
velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and
fiction about the case continues unabated even today.
Commentators still bombard the public with views not too
many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the
principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents,
their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in
this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their
threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot
be completely closed to the press and public. In the
seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it
was
xxx
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the
criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this
Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal
trials both here and in England had long been
presumptively open, thus giving assurance that
the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned and discouraging perjury, the
misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant
community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized when a shocking crime occurs a
community reaction of outrage and public protest
often follows, and thereafter the open processes
of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility and emotion. To work
effectively, it is important that society's criminal
process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt
v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75
S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing
people to observe such process. From this
unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it
must be concluded that a presumption of
openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal
trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf.,
e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed
2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
 b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly,
expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment,
share a common core purpose of assuring
freedom of communication on matters relating to
the functioning of government. In guaranteeing
freedom such as those of speech and press, the
First Amendment can be read as protecting the
right of everyone to attend trials so as give
meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
Amendment right to receive information and
ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to
the public at the time the First Amendment was
adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also
relevant, having been regarded not only as an
independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which the draftsmen
deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public
place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be
present, and where their presence historically
has been thought to enhance the integrity and
quality of what takes place.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no
provision which be its terms guarantees to the
public the right to attend criminal trials, various
fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed,
have been recognized as indispensable to the
enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to
attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment: without the freedom to
attend such trials, which people have exercised
for centuries, important aspects of freedom of
speech and of the press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and
prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial.
Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that
to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records
that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners
cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the
sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ
Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in
criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no
indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence
properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its summary nature
and the generosity with which they accommodated the
discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the
ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough
evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his
burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to
render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the
petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special
panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No
allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the
minds of the members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against
him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings
and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will
be unfavorable to the petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent
Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the
respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of
slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and
pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also
been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has
already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated
that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by
this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner
is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to
his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity
in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we
adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that
the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled
cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words,
investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot
machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file
the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the
findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still
has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the
petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a
new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call
from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the
gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the
sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of
the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair
investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most
fundamental of all freedoms."135To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor
is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to
insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a
circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what
Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in
a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated
by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the
power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is
not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy
has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has
respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is
wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they
may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let
us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada
challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de
jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152072 January 31, 2006
ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Petitioners,
vs.
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI,
PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R.
DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES,
JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Respondents.
x----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 152104 January 31, 2006
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI,
PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R.
DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES,
JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H. PEDROSA,
ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us are two petitions for review on certiorari1 which were
consolidated per Resolution2 of this Court dated 27 November 2002.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor, seek the reversal and annulment of the
Decision3 and Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 25 June
2001 and 06 February 2002, respectively. The petitioners in G.R. No.
152104, the Zuzuarreguis, on the other hand, pray that the said
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals be modified. Said
Decision and Resolution reversed and set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 98, Quezon City, dated 03
January 1994.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National
Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the
Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152104, for parcels of land
belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal, with a total land
area of 1,790,570.36 square meters, more or less. This case was
lodged before the RTC, Branch 141, Municipality of
Makati,5 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 26804 entitled, "National
Housing Authority v. Pilar Ibañez Vda. De Zuzuarregui, et al."
On 25 May 1983, said case was ordered archived6 by Branch 141.
About a month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the
Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas
and Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in Civil Case No. 26804.
This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement dated 22 April 1983, which is
partly reproduced hereunder:
April 22, 1983
Mr. Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.
Mrs. Pacita Javier (as heir to the late Jose de Zuzuarregui)
Mr. Antonio de Zuzuarregui ( as heir to the late Pilar Y. vda.
De Zuzuarregui)
Dear Sir and Madam:
This is to confirm in writing our verbal negotiations for us to
represent you in the expropriation proceedings filed by the
National Housing Authority against your goodselves before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now the Regional Trial
Court) and docketed as Civil Case No. 26804. Our
representation shall also include the areas taken over by the
Ministry of Public Works and Highways which now formed
part of the Marcos Highway at Antipolo, Rizal.
The areas affected are the following:
xxxx
We shall endeavor to secure the just compensation with the
National Housing Authority and other governmental agencies
at a price of ELEVEN PESOS (P11.00) or more per square
meter. Any lower amount shall not entitle us to any attorney’s
fees. At such price of P11.00 per square meter or more our
contingent fee[s] is THIRTY PERCENT (30%) of the just
compensation.
The other terms and conditions of our proposal are:
xxxx
5. You are willing to accept NHA 5-year bonds as part
payment up to 75% of the total compensation. In the event of
your desire to discount the bonds, we shall assist to have
them discounted at 75% of its face value.
6. Our lawyer’s fees shall be in the proportion of the
cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation. Likewise our fees
are subject to 10% withholding tax.
xxxx
Should the above proposal be acceptable to your
goodselves, kindly signify your formal acceptance as (sic)
the space hereunder provided.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
SANTIAGO N. PASTOR ROMEO G. ROXAS
Lawyer Lawyer
CONFORME:
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI,
PACITA JAVIER
JR.
In my behalf and
as heir to the late Pilar Y. vda. as heir to the late Jose De
De Zuzuarregui Zuzuarregui7
A Motion to Set Case for Hearing,8 dated 14 February 1984, was filed
by Attys. Roxas and Pastor in Civil Case No. 26804, praying that the
case be revived and be set for hearing by the court at the earliest
date available in its calendar.
The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. On 29 October
1984, a Partial Decision was rendered by Branch 141 in Civil Case
No. 26804 fixing the just compensation to be paid to the
Zuzuarreguis at P30.00 per square meter.
The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated 23 November
1984 praying that the Partial Decision be reconsidered and set aside,
and a new one rendered lowering the amount of just compensation in
accordance with applicable laws. Pending resolution thereof, a Joint
Special Power of Attorney was executed by Antonio De Zuzuarregui,
Jr., Enrique De Zuzuarregui and Pacita Javier, in favor of Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, viz:
 JOINT SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE
PRESENTS:
That We, ANTONIO DE
ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE
ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA JAVIER,
all of legal age, …, do hereby appoint,
name and constitute ATTYS. ROMEO
G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO PASTOR,
to be our true and lawful attorneys to act
in our names and on our behalves to do
and execute all or any of the following
acts and deeds subject to our approval:
xxxx
(2) To represent us in the
negotiations for a compromise
with the National Housing
Authority for our properties
subject of the above case;
(3) To negotiate for and in our
behalves for the settlement of
the just compensation of our
properties payable in cash or
in bonds;
(4) To sign and prepare all
papers relative to the
preparation of a Compromise
Agreement or any papers and
communications which shall
eventually bear our
signatures; and
(5) That this Special Power of
Attorney is enforce (sic) as
long as ATTYS. ROMEO G.
ROXAS AND SANTIAGO
PASTOR are our lawyers in
Civil Case No. 26804 before
the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Branch CXLI.
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING
unto our said attorneys full power and
authority whatsoever requisite or
necessary or proper to be done in or
about the premises, as fully to all intents
and purposes as we might or could
lawfully do if personally present, and
hereby ratifying and confirming all that
our said attorneys shall do or cause to
be done under and by virtue of these
presents.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have
hereunto set our hands this 26th day of
August, 1985, in Makati, M. M.,
Philippines.
(Sgd.)
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI,
JR.1avvph!l.ne+
(Sgd.)
ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI
(Sgd.)
PACITA JAVIER10
On 22 November 1985, a Special Power of Attorney was executed
by Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes in favor of Attys. Romeo G.
Roxas, Santiago Pastor and Basilio H. Toquero, quoted as follows:
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE
PRESENTS:
That I, BEATRIZ ZUZUARREGUI VDA.
DE REYES, Filipino, of legal age,
widow, and a resident of E. Rodriguez
Ave., Quezon City, Philippines do
hereby appoint, name and constitute
ATTYS. ROMEO G. ROXAS,
SANTIAGO PASTOR and BASILIO H.
TOQUERO, to be my true and lawful
attorneys … :
1. To represent me in the
negotiation for a Compromise
with the National Housing
Authority for my properties
subject to my approval in
CIVIL CASE No. 26804,
entitled "National Housing
Authority vs. Pilar Ibañez de
Zuzuarregui, et al., before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati,
Branch CXLI;
2. To negotiate for and in my
behalf for the settlement of the
just compensation of my
properties payable in cash or
in bond, subject to my
approval;
3. To sign and prepare all
papers relative to the
preparation of a Compromise
Agreement or any papers and
communications which shall
eventually bear my signature;
4. To accept for and in my
behalf payments for my
properties after the
Compromise Agreement is
duly approved by the Court,
the actual receipts of which

payments shall be signed by
me.
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING
unto my said attorneys full power and
authority whatsoever requisite,
necessary or proper … to be done
under and by virtue of these presents.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have
hereunto set my hand this 22nd day of
November 1985, in the City of Manila,
Philippines.
(Sgd.)
BEATRIZ ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE
REYES11
On 10 December 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and
between Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De
Zuzuarregui, on the one hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago Pastor, on the other. The said Letter-Agreement reads:
December 10, 1985
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas
Atty. Santiago Pastor
Makati Executive Center
Salcedo Village, Makati
Dear Atty. Roxas & Atty. Pastor:
This will confirm an amendment to our agreement regarding your
attorney’s fees as our lawyers and counsels for the Zuzuarregui’s
properties expropriated by National Housing Authority covering ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE (179) HECTARES, more or less,
covered by TCT Nos. 138340, 85633 and 85634 and filed as Civil
Case No. 26804.
We hereby confirm and agree that we are willing to accept as final
and complete settlement for our 179 hectares expropriated by NHA a
price of SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter, or for a
total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P30.4 Million), all payable in NHA Bonds.
We also agree and confirm that for and in consideration of your
services as our lawyers and counsels in the said expropriation case,
we commit and bind ourselves to pay to you, your heirs or assignees-
in-interest, as your contingent attorney’s fees any and all amount in
excess of the SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter
payable in NHA bonds as mentioned above.
This Letter Agreement serves also as your authority to collect directly
from NHA the amount pertaining to you as your contingent attorney’s
fees.
This Letter Agreement hereby amends and supersedes our previous
agreement regarding your attorney’s fees as our lawyers and
counsels in the above-mentioned expropriation case.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
In my behalf as heir to the late Pilar I. vda. de Zuzuarregui
(Sgd.)PACITA JAVIER
As heir to the late Jose De Zuzuarregui
(Sgd.)
ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI
CONFORME:
(Sgd.)ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS
(Sgd.)ATTY. SANTIAGO PASTOR12
Resolution No. 117413 dated 16 December 1985 was issued by the
NHA stating that the Zuzuarregui property would be acquired at a
cost of P19.50 per square meter; that the Zuzuarreguis would be
paid in NHA Bonds, subject to the availability of funds; and that the
yield on the bonds to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis shall be based on
the Central Bank rate at the time of payment.
As a result of the aforesaid NHA Resolution, a Compromise
Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA in
Civil Case No. 26804. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated
among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui
properties would be at P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA
Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC, Branch
141, Makati, approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the
parties.
On 27 December 1985, the NHA Legal Department, through Atty.
Jose B. H. Pedrosa, released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of
the Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer
Bonds as "partial payment for several parcels of land with a total area
of 1,790,570.36 square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal."14 On even
date, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas delivered NHA Bonds to Antonio De
Zuzuarregui in the amount of P15,000,000.00.15 On 04 February
1986, the amount of P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was again
released by the NHA to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis.16 On 14 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued a
receipt17 for receiving the amount of P30,070,000.00. This receipt
included the P15,000,000.00 given to them last 27 December 1985.
Again on 17 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis, through Beatriz
Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes, issued another receipt for the amount
of P450,000.00 in NHA bonds.18 The total amount in NHA bonds
released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis
amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show
that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas
amounted to P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square
meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price
of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA
was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is,
undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter19 was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new
counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding
that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to
bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under
pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter dated 21 September
1987 explaining their side of the story. They stated therein, among
other things, that the amount that they got seems huge from the
surface, but it just actually passed their hands, as it did not really go
to them.20
On 29 September 1987, a letter21 was sent by the Zuzuarreguis
through Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., to Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor, informing the latter that their services as
counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the expropriation
proceedings filed by the NHA, docketed as Civil Case No. 26804,
was being formally terminated.
Apparently unsatisfied with the explanation of Attys. Roxas and
Pastor, the Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money and
Damages on 14 November 1989 before the RTC, Quezon City,
Branch 98, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-4013, against the NHA,
Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas and Atty. Santiago N.
Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds
be turned over to them.
After due hearing, a Decision22 in Civil Case No. Q-89-4013 was
rendered on 03 January 1994, dismissing the Complaint. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration[s], judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the dismissal of the complaint against all
the defendants; and, further ordering plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily,
to:
1. Pay each of the defendants Romeo G. Roxas, Santiago
Pastor and Jose B. H. Perdosa, the amount of
P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively,
as moral damages;
2. Pay each of the defendants Roxas, Pastor and Pedrosa,
the amount of P50,000.00, P50,000.00, and P25,000.00,
respectively as exemplary damages;
3. Pay attorney’s fees to defendants Roxas and Pastor in
the amount of P20,000.00; and
4. Pay the costs of this suit.
A Notice of Appeal23 dated 10 February 1994 was filed by the
Zuzuarreguis. Subsequently, on 26 April 1995, the Zuzuarreguis filed
their appeal brief with the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 45732.
A Decision24 was eventually promulgated by the Fifteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals on 25 June 2001, reversing and setting aside
the ruling of Branch 98, viz:
Therefore, We find that the amount of P4,476,426.275 is, in the
opinion of this Court, commensurate to the services rendered by
defendants-appellees. This amount has been arrived at by giving to
defendants-appellees P2.50 per square meter of the 1,790,570.51
square meter expropriated properties of herein plaintiffs-appellants.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision dated
January 3, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 98, Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-4013 entitled
"Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. versus National Housing Authority, et
al." for "Sum of Money and Damages," is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Defendants-Appellees Roxas and Pastor are hereby
ordered to return to plaintiffs-appellants the amount of
P12,596,696.425, the balance from the P17,073,122.70, received as
yield from NHA bonds after deducting the reasonable attorney’s fees
in the amount of P4,476,426.275.25
Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion for Reconsideration26 on 25
July 2001. The Zuzuarreguis also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration27 on 30 July 2001, not having been satisfied with the
award, while the NHA and Pedrosa filed their Motions for
Reconsideration28 on 03 August 2001.
In a Resolution dated 06 February 2002, the Court of Appeals denied
for lack of merit all the Motions for Reconsideration.
On 05 March 2002, Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari29 assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
docketed as G.R. No. 152072. Likewise, on 21 March 2002, the
Zuzuarreguis filed their own Petition for Review on
Certiorari30 assailing the same Decision, docketed as G.R. No.
152104.1avvph!l.ne+
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, assign as
errors the following:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE LETTER-
AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 1985 CANNOT BE
ALLOWED TO STAND AS THE LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES;
and
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS, HEREIN PETITIONERS, CONCEALED TO THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, HEREIN RESPONDENTS, THE YIELD
OF THE NHA BONDS31
The Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152101, on the other hand,
assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING TO
PETITIONERS THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF ONLY
P12,596,696.425 AND NOT P17,073,122.70 MAKING A
DIFFERENCE OF P4,476,426.28
II
THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR INTEREST
FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT UNTIL
FULLY PAID
III
THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE HELD LIABE FOR MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
IV
THE RESPONDENTS NHA AND JOSE B.H. PEDROSA ARE
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH RESPONDENTS
ROXAS AND PASTOR32
ISSUE FOR RESOLUTION
Drawn from the above assignment of errors, it is patent that the
principal issue that must be addressed by this Court is:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LETTER-AGREEMENT DATED 10
DECEMBER 1985, EXECUTED BY THE ZUZUARREGUIS, AND
ATTYS. ROXAS AND PASTOR, FIXING THE EXACT AMOUNT
THAT MUST GO TO THE FORMER, SHOULD STAND AS LAW
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
THE COURT’S RULING
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, contend in
the main that the Zuzuarreguis are only entitled to the amount
of P17.00 per square meter for the 1,790,570.36 square meters
expropriated by the government. This was, according to them,
embodied in the Letter-Agreement dated 10 December 1985,
wherein the Zuzuarreguis agreed to accept the price of P17.00 per
square meter. Besides, Attys. Roxas and Pastor contend that the
price of P17.00 was even way above the P11.00 that the
Zuzuarreguis were willing to accept for their properties under the
Letter of Engagement executed by the parties earlier on 22 April
1983. Computed at P17.00 per square meter, they stress that the
amount that should go to the Zuzuarreguis for their 1,790,570.36
square meters property should be P30,439,696.10, and that in fact
the Zuzuarreguis have received P30,520,000.00. The Letter-
Agreement dated 10 December 1985 should thus stand as law
between the parties. Since this Letter-Agreement, which was "as
plain and simple as can be such that there is no need for any further
construction," already fixed the amount that would go to the
Zuzuarreguis (P17.00 per square meter), then it should be so.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor further assert that the receipts issued by the
Zuzuarreguis dated 14 February 1986 and 17 February 1986
indicated that the amounts received by the latter were in "full and
final payment" for the subject properties.
The NHA, for its part, insists that there was no conspiracy between
Attys. Roxas and Pastor on the one hand, and the NHA and Atty.
Pedrosa on the other, on the application of yields from NHA
bonds.33 The Zuzuarreguis, according to the NHA, "miserably failed
to substantiate and establish conspiracy" between them.
The Zuzuarreguis, for their part, though they were triumphant in the
Court of Appeals, insist that the amounts awarded them were not
enough. According to them, the P12,596,696.425 awarded by the
Court of Appeals was not correct. They should have been awarded
the amount of P17,073,122.70. Quoting the Zuzuarreguis:
Respondents Roxas and Pastor retained for themselves the amount
of P3,980,000.00 which represented the agreed attorney’s fees of
Roxas and Pastor at P2.50 per square meter. The amount
of P20,000,000.00 representing the yield of all the bearer bonds was,
in the words of the Court of Appeals, "deliberately hidden" by
respondents Roxas and Pastor from petitioners. By mathematical
computation, the P20,000,000.00 yield should be proportionately
divided at the ratio of P17.00 (petitioners’) and P2.50 (share of
respondents Roxas and Pastor). Following this ratio of division, of the
P20,000,000.00 yield, P17,073,122.70 should pertain to petitioners
and the balance of P2,926,877.30 to respondents Roxas and Pastor.
Add this amount to the total of P3,980,000.00 at the agreed rate of
P2.50 per square meter, the total attorney’s fees of respondents
Roxas and Pastor should be P6,906,877.30, not bad, again in the
words of the Court of Appeals, for handling "a simple expropriation
case which ended up in a compromise agreement." It was, therefore,
in error to still deduct the amount of P4,476,426.28 from petitioners
share in the yield in the amount of P17,073,122.70 leaving then only
P12,596,696.42.
What was done, however, is that the product of 1,790,570.36 sq m.
(area of the expropriated land of petitioners) and P2.50 which is
4,476,426.28 was again deducted from the P17,073,122.70 which is
the corresponding share of the petitioners out of the total yield
of P20,000,000.00. If this were a criminal case, petitioners were
being sentenced twice for the same offense.34
The Zuzuarreguis further insist that legal interest on the amount
of P17,073,122.70 be imposed from the date of the filing of the
complaint, including moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees.
We sustain the Court of Appeals, but with modification in the
computation.
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby
one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to
render some service.35 Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present.36
Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, there are three essential
requisites which must concur in order to give rise to a binding
contract: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the
obligation which is established.37
All these requisites were present in the execution of the Letter-
Agreement.
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract.38 The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement,
fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them (the
Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for
the purpose of confirming all the matters which they had agreed upon
previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody
was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its
existence, due execution and contents were admitted by the
Zuzuarreguis themselves.39
The second requisite is the object certain. The objects in this case
are twofold. One is the money that will go to the Zuzuarreguis
(P17.00 per square meter), and two, the money that will go to Attys.
Roxas and Pastor (any and all amount in excess of P17.00 per
square meter). There was certainty as to the amount that will go to
the Zuzuarreguis, and there was likewise certainty as to what amount
will go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The cause is the legal service that was provided by Attys. Roxas and
Pastor. In general, cause is the why of the contract or the essential
reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the
contract.40
It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties.41 Obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith. Unless the
stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, the same are binding as between the
parties.42
In Licudan v. Court of Appeals,43 we did not allow the Contract for
Professional Services between the counsel and his client to stand as
the law between them as the stipulation for the lawyer’s
compensation was unconscionable and unreasonable. We said:
Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30,
1979 was apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan
for himself and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-
Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested
in open court that they gave their free and willing consent to the said
contract, we cannot allow the said contract to stand as the law
between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the
presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the
parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties
is not absolute but admits an exception – that the stipulations therein
are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or
public order.44
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to
receive contingent fees45 for their professional services. It is a
deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by
law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, viz:
13. Contingent Fees. –
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk
and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,46 viz:
CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered
or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result
of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the
same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness,47such that under Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and
reasonable fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable
fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s
fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable.48 Thus, Section
24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court partly states:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x
x. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of
justice, decency or reasonableness.49 It becomes axiomatic
therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the,
unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties
is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.50
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount
which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation
paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the
Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the
P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in
the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement,
the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the
circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order. This is in
accordance with our ruling in the earlier case of Tanhueco v. De
Dumo51, where we reduced the amount of attorney’s fees from sixty
percent (60%) to fifteen percent (15%), for being excessive and
unreasonable.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and
Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the
yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in
the P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA
must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.1avvph!l.ne+
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This
amount must therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the
one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division
must be pro rata. The amount of P17.00 that should go to the
Zuzuarreguis represents 87.18% of the P19.50 per square meter just
compensation, The P2.50 per square meter that was to go to Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, represents 12.82%.
The Zuzuarreguis are entitled to the yield equal to 87.18% of the
P19,583,878.00, while Attys. Roxas and Pastor are entitled to
12.82% of said amount. The amount corresponding to 87.17% of
P19,583,878.00 is P17,073,224.84. This is the yield that the
Zuzuarreguis are entitled to. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other
hand, are entitled to P2,510,653.16.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not
shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be earning or
actually earned attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75
(P4,476,425.59 + P2,510,653.16).
The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys.
Roxas and Pastor to the Zuzuarreguis. They can take this out from
the yield in the amount of P19,583,878.00 which they have
appropriated for themselves.
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the
same for there was no direct showing of bad faith on the part of
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are
not per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary that it be reduced
when excessive and unconscionable, which we have already done.
We likewise cannot hold the NHA and Atty. Pedrosa jointly and
severally liable to the Zuzuarreguis for there is no evidence to show
conspiracy between them.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 25 June 2001
and 06 February 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED but with the
MODIFICATION that Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor
are hereby ordered to return to the Zuzuarreguis the amount of
P17,073,224.84. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
EN BANC
GENARO SANTIAGO III, A.M. No. CA-09-47-J
Complainant, [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-
121-CA-J]
Present:
Promulgated:
February 13, 2009
- versus -
JUSTICE JUAN Q.
ENRIQUEZ, JR.
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Ist Indorsement[1] dated January 3, 2008, the Court
Administrator referred to this Courts Clerk of Court for appropriate
action the verified Complaint dated December 27, 2007, [2] with
enclosures, of Genaro Santiago III (complainant) against Court of
Appeals Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (respondent), for gross
ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and gross incompetence in
connection with his rendering of alleged unjust judgment in CA-GR CV
No. 84167, Genaro C. Santiago III versus Republic of the
Philippines, which was promulgated on December 3, 2007.[3]
The antecedent facts of the case follow:
Complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Quezon City a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original
Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona
Santiago and Blas Fajardo.
By Decision of September 2, 2004, Branch 220 of the Quezon City
RTC granted the petition.[4] The Republic of the Philippines through
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed the decision to the Court
of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-GR CV No. 84167.
The case was raffled to Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison (Justice
Gonzales-Sison) of the appellate courts Thirteenth Division of which
respondent was Chairperson.Completing the composition of the
Division (of three) was Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso (Justice Veloso).
On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her
Report,[5] which was used as basis for the Divisions consultation and
deliberation.[6] By letter of July 18, 2007 addressed to Justices
Gonzales-Sison and Veloso, respondent expressed his dissent from
the Report.[7] Justice Veloso, who originally concurred in the Report,
requested Justice Gonzales-Sison, by letter of July 19, 2007, to take a
second look at respondents Dissenting Opinion,[8] as the reasons
[Justice Enriquez] gave are strong enough to be ignored by plain
technicality.[9]
In view of his dissent, respondent requested on August 23, 2007 the
Raffle Committee of the Court of Appeals to designate two associate
justices to complete the composition of a Special Division of
five.[10] The Raffle Committee, by Special Order dated August 24,
2007, designated Justices Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz) and Lucas
P. Bersamin (Justice Bersamin) as additional members of
the Special Division.[11]
Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with
respondents Dissenting Opinion.[12] Justice Bersamin expressed his
concurrence with the Report of Justice GonzalesSison, [13] while
Justice Cruz expressed his concurrence with respondents Dissenting
Opinion.[14]
Respondents Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority opinion of
the Special Division and the Report-opinion of Justice Gonzales-Sison
with which Justice Bersamin concurred became the Dissenting
Opinion.
The Decision of the Special Division reversed and set
aside the September 2, 2004 Decision of the Quezon City
RTC. Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
received by the appellate court on December 20,
2007.[15] On December 27, 2008, complainant filed the present
complaint.
On January 9, 2008, complainant filed a Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition [of respondent] pursuant to
Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137[16] on the ground that he
(complainant) had filed this administrative complaint against
respondent. The appellate court denied the motion by Resolution
of April 20, 2008.[17]
In the present Complaint, complainant alleges, inter
alia, that:
xxxx
. . . despite the overwhelming evidence
of complainant, all corroborated by several
government agencies like the original duplicate
certificate of OCT No. 56, certified copy of Decree
No. 1275, PC Crime Laboratory report, Bureau of
Lands record, tracing cloth of survey plan, blue
print plan, certified technical description all
approved by the Bureau of Lands, among others
and adduced and offered in evidence during
trial, Associate Justice Enriquez deliberately
twisted the law and existing jurisprudence to grant
the appeal, to the extreme prejudice of
complainant. For this reason, this administrative
charge of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
LAW/GROSS INCOMPETENCE is now being
filed against respondent Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr. No one is above the
law.[18] (Emphasis and italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
In compliance with this Courts Resolution of January 22,
2008,[19] respondent filed his Comment,[20] branding the complaint as
a mere nuisance, a dirty tactic in order to harass him for the purpose
of making him inhibit from handling the case the decision on which was
pending consideration. He denies any irregularities attendant to his
arrival at the Decision which, he maintains, has factual and legal basis
and is not contrary to law and jurisprudence.
At any rate, respondent contends that the administrative
complaint was filed prematurely considering that complainants motion
for reconsideration of the Decision was pending, and that assuming
that the Decision was indeed unjust and contrary to law, then Justices
Cruz and Veloso, who concurred in his ponencia,should also be
charged.
Finally, and at all events, respondent contends that the
administrative complaint is not the proper forum for the determination
of whether the Decision is erroneous or contrary to law and
jurisprudence.
In compliance with the directive of the Court,[21] complainant
filed a Reply dated 20, 2008 to respondents Comment[22] in which he
contends that the cases cited by respondent to support the Decision
are not applicable.
The complaint is bereft of merit.
That cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable,
and the appreciation of evidence and facts is erroneous, do not
necessarily warrant the filing of an administrative complaint against a
judge, unless the Decision is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty
or with deliberate intent to cause injustice.[23]
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not
to file an administrative complaint against the
judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order
to the higher court for review and correction. An
administrative complaint is not an appropriate
remedy where judicial recourse is still available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal,
or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed
order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or
dishonesty
The Court has to be shown acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of the
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
 branded the stigma of being biased and partial.
Thus, unless he is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice, not
every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liableThe
failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate
the evidence presented does not necessarily
render a judge administratively liable.[24] (Italics in
the original; underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that respondents citation of cases in
support of the Decision and his appreciation of the facts and evidence
were erroneous, since there is no showing that the Decision,
reconsideration of which was still pending at the time the present
complaint was filed, is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or was
rendered with deliberate intent to cause injustice, the complaint must
be dismissed.
The principle of judicial immunity insulates judges, and
even Justices of superior courts, from being held to account criminally,
civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good
faith.[25] To hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice could be infallible in his judgment.[26]
. . . A judicial officer cannot be called to
account in a civil action for acts done by him in the
exercise of his judicial function, however
erroneous. In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v.
Johnson, it is a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. This concept of judicial
immunity rests upon consideration of public
policy, its purpose being to preserve the
integrity and independence of the
judiciary. This principle is of universal application
and applies to all grades of judicial officers from
the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest
officer who sits as a court.[27] (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears particular stress in the present case that the filing of
charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is
inappropriate. The Decision was not rendered by respondent in his
individual capacity. It was a product of the consultations and
deliberations by the Special Division of five. Consider the following
pronouncement in Bautista v. Abdulwahid:[28]
It is also imperative to state that the
Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was not rendered
by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual
capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate
court whose members reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have
held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is unjust cannot
prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges
against a single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate. [29] (Underscoring
supplied)
In fine, while this Court will not shirk from its responsibility to
discipline members of the bench if they err, it too will not hesitate to
shield them if they are charged with unmeritorious charges that only
serve to disrupt, rather than promote, the orderly administration of
justice.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7828 August 11, 2008
JUDGE ALDEN V. CERVANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUDE JOSUE L. SABIO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional
retirement on November 23, 2005. Some of the cases lodged in his
sala were ejectment cases filed by Extra-Ordinary Development
Corporation (EDC) against the clients of Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio
(respondent). It appears that respondent had filed motions for
inhibition of complainant "on the basis of the fact that EDC gave him
a house and lot putting into serious doubt his impartiality,
independence and integrity." The motions were denied.
After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-
Complaint dated April 6, 2006,1 sought the investigation of
complainant for bribery.
In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated March 6, 2006 of Edwin P. Cardeño,2 a utility worker
in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating that, inter alia, orders and decisions
of complainant were not generated from the typewriter of the court
but from a computer which the court did not have, it having acquired
one only on May 2, 2005; that there had been many times that a
certain Alex of EDC would go to the court bearing certain papers for
the signature of complainant; that he came to learn that a
consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or decision
released by complainant in favor of EDC; and that he also came to
know that attempts at postponing the hearings of the complaints filed
by EDC were thwarted by complainant as he wanted to expedite the
disposition thereof.
By Resolution of August 30, 2006,3 this Court, after noting the July
20, 2006 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) relative to respondent’s complaint against complainant,
approved the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss the complaint
for lack of merit, "the complaint being unsubstantiated and motivated
by plain unfounded suspicion, and for having been filed after the
effectivity of his optional retirement" (underscoring supplied).
Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-
complaint4 of complainant against respondent, for disbarment.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
From the Report and Recommendation5 of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Randall C. Tabayoyong, it is gathered that despite
the January 12, 2007 Order for respondent to file an answer to the
complaint, he failed to do so, prompting the Commissioner to declare
him in default.
It is further gathered that after the conduct by the Investigating
Commissioner of a mandatory conference on May 25, 2007, the
parties were ordered to file their respective position papers. In
compliance with the Order, complainant submitted his verified
position paper.6 Respondent did not.
Defined as issues before the IBP were:
(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against
the complainant before the Office of the Court
Administrator in Admin Matter OCA IPI No. 06-1842-MTJ
was malicious, false and untruthful.
(2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondent’s
complaint against herein complainant false and untruthful, it noting
that respondent’s complaint was dismissed by this Court due to
insufficiency of evidence which, to the IBP, merely shows a "failure
on the part of respondent to prove his allegations" against
complainant.
Noting, however, this Court’s August 30, 2006 Resolution finding
respondent’s complaint "unsubstantiated and motivated by plain,
unfounded" suspicion, the Investigating Commissioner concluded
that respondent "knowingly instituted not only a groundless suit
against herein complainant, but also a suit based simply on his bare
suspicion and speculation." (underscoring supplied)
On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless
bribery charge against complainant, respondent violated the
proscription of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
"wittingly or willingly promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit"
including baseless administrative complaints against judges and
other court officers and employees.
The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that
while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the
allegations in respondent’s affidavit-complaint against
herein complainant were false, the evidence nonetheless
show[s] that respondent had knowingly and maliciously
instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his unfounded
suspicions against complainant;7 (Underscoring supplied)
and that he violated Canons 10,8 11,9 & 1210 and Rule 11.0411 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility under his oath of office.
He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount
of P5,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of
Resolution,12 informs that on November 22, 2007, it adopted the
following Resolution adopting and approving with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondent’s violation of Canons 10, 11 and
12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
responsibility for filing a groundless suit against
complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is
hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern Warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. (Emphasis in the original)
The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well
taken.
Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a
lawyer is to be disciplined, the evidence against him should be
substantial, competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on
mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on the basis of
hearsay.13
No doubt, it is this Court’s duty to investigate the truth behind
charges against judges and lawyers. But it is also its duty to shield
them from unfounded suits which are intended to, among other
things, harass them.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in
the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar questioned act will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
JOHN SIY LIM, A.C. No. 5653
Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
ATTY. CARMELITO A. Promulgated:
MONTANO,
Respondent. February 27, 2006
x-------------------------------------------------
-x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross
misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928
entitled Spouses Tomas See Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v.
John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.[1]
It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant
in Civil Case No. C-14542 for reformation of contract, quieting of title,
with damages, then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan City, Branch 131.[2] The subject of the dispute was a 650-
square meter conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street,
7th Avenue, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant
(complainant herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties
executed on July 15, 1987 was an absolute and unconditional
conveyance of subject property by the plaintiff in favor of such
defendant. On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court
reversed itself and declared that the sale was in fact an equitable
mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the
reinstatement of the previous title on the subject property.
The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31,
1995, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order
dated November 16, 1992, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the original
Decision of the trial court, dated December 2,
1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the
 modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to
pay defendant-appellant the sum of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month as
reasonable rental for the use and occupation of
Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the
premises shall have been vacated and
possession thereof peacefully turned over to
defendant-appellant.
The counterclaim for attorneys fees of
defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no
clear showing that the action taken by plaintiff-
appellee was done in bad faith. There should be
no penalty on the right to litigate.[3]
The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and
the petition was docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000,
the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA and denied the petition.[4] Entry
of judgment was made of record on October 3, 2000.[5]
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of
Appearance[6] as counsel of Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in
the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 in Civil Case No. C-14542.
On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a Motion to Comply
to [sic] Decision without Writ,[7] worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to
the decision of the court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the
decision on the present case had already
become final and executory.
2. In order to avoid undue
inconvenience on the part of herein defendant,
plaintiff shall voluntarily settle the money
judgment as stated in the decision sought to be
enforced.
3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight
Hundred Ten Thousand (P810,000.00) Pesos,
equivalent to 162 months of rent as per decision
and the same to be covered
by supersedeas bond issued by a reliable
insurance company to answer for said obligation.
4. Every month starting February 15,
2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the
amount of P5,000.00 as monthly rent.[8]
On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses
Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint[9] for nullity of TCT and other
documents, reconveyance, maintenance of physical possession
before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121
thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).
Meantime, on February 19, 2002,
Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 126[10] issued an Order[11] in Civil
Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion for Execution with
Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party (complainant herein),
and denying for lack of merit, the Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision
without Writ filed by respondent counsel.
This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint
for disbarment against respondent. In his Complaint-
Affidavit[12] dated March 20, 2002, complainant alleged that
respondent filed the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice,
pointing out that it involves the same parties, the same causes of
action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542. Thus,
the complainant prayed that the respondent be disbarred and/or
suspended from the practice of law for his gross misconduct, on the
following allegation:
6. Evidently, I have been subjected to
harassment by the antics of the respondent in
filing a recycled case docketed as Civil Case No.
C-19928 on January 07, 2002. Respondent is
guilty in abetting the conduct of his
clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his
lawyers oath not to promote or sue groundless,
false or unlawful suits among others. Instead of
counseling his clients to abide and obey the
decision of our Supreme Court, the final arbiter
of all controversies and disputes, he is showing
disrespect to a final and executory decision of
our court.[13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent denied the allegations
against him. While he admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as
counsel for the plaintiff therein, he claimed that it was not filed with
malicious intent. Moreover, while the new case involved the same
party, it was for a different cause of action and relief, and, as such, the
principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the
complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or
reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for
annulment of title. He accepted the case based on his professional
appreciation that his client had a good case.
In his Reply,[15] the complainant stressed that the
respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was
nothing but a revival of the old complaint; and the lame excuse of the
respondent that the present case is an action in rem while the other
case is an action in personam did not merit consideration.
On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the
matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[16]
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner Salvador L. Pea. Only
the counsel for the respondent appeared at the mandatory conference
held on September 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual issues
in the case, Commissioner Pea terminated the mandatory conference
and ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position
Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case submitted for resolution.
The case was re-assigned to
Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report and
Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the respondent guilty of
misconduct. It was recommended that respondent be meted a two
months suspension from the practice of law.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements
of res judicata are present in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case
No. C-19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-14542,
upholding the validity of the absolute deed of sale, had attained finality;
(b) the court which rendered the decision had the required jurisdiction;
and (c) the disposition of the case was a judgment on the merits.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said
Report and Recommendation with the modification that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum
shopping. By his own admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-
14542 was already final and executory when he filed the second case
(Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he was not the original
counsel of his clients and that when he filed the subsequent case for
nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom
he believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for
reformation and quieting of title, deserves scant consideration. As a
responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the effect of
such final and executory decision on his clients rights, instead of
encouraging them to file another case involving the same property and
asserting the same rights.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion
in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he
institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to
the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim
substantially the same reliefs.[17] Forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another.[18] Thus, the following
requisites should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions, (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicatain the action under consideration.
x x x[19]
The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not
identical will not prevent the application of the principle of res judicata.
Mere substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests
between a party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case,
even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case, is
sufficient.[20] Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall
not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.[21] This
was what respondent resorted to in order to give some semblance of
merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He should have realized
that
the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[22] effectively
determined with finality the rights and obligations of the parties under
the questioned deed of sale.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at
the expense of truth and the administration of justice.[23] The filing of
multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his
duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to
maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are
consistent with truth and honor. [24]
The filing of another action concerning the same subject
matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a
lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations,
respondent also violated Rule 12.02[25] and Rule 12.04[26] of the Code,
as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or malice.[27]
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to
assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which
tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyers duty. Indeed, the Court has time and again
warned not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court
dockets.[28]
While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for
his actions, we also note that the power to disbar should be exercised
with great caution, to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should
never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired.[29]
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a
lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately
executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date
of receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5474 August 28, 2003
REDENTOR S. JARDIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DEOGRACIAS VILLAR, JR. Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in
professionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication. Far
from measuring up to the standards of a lawyer's conduct set in
the Code of Professional Responsibility which are also the hallmarks
of professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case virtually
abandoned his client's cause.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Redentor S.
Jardin against respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr., who was his
counsel in a case, for the latter's failure to formally offer the
documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the dismissal of the
case.
The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
21480 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. A building
contractor, he engaged the services of the respondent to represent
him in the case which is for the collection of the sum of One Hundred
Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Four and 80/100 Pesos
(P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid contract price for the
repair of the house of the defendants in the case.1 The case went its
course, but later despite several extensions of time given by the trial
court, the respondent failed to file his formal offer of
exhibits.2 Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court issued
an Order the full text of which reads as follows:
When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty. Rodrigo
C. Reyes, counsel for the defendants manifested that up to this date,
Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not formally offer (sic) the
documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in writing as Order (sic) by the
Court.
Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was given
an extension period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer
the documentary exhibits in writing copy furnished Atty. Reyes,
counsel for the defendants who was given a period of Five (5) days
within which to comment and/or oppose the admissibility of the said
exhibits and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the
presentation of evidence for the defendant on March 30, 2001.
On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing records
show that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not complied
yet with the formal offer of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff and
again, in the interest of justice, the Court give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr.
another period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer the
documentary exhibits in writing and set the continuation of the
hearing of this case for today for the presentation of evidence for the
defendant.
Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for the
plaintiff have (sic) not complied with the submission of documentary
exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack of interest on the part of the counsel
for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case, upon motion of Atty.
Reyes the oral testimonial evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
hereby ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further
motion of ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further
motion of Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for
lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to further prosecute this
case.
Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing of
this case for the presentation of evidence on the counter claim on the
part of the defendant on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.3
The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainant to file
a verified Affidavit-Complaint4 dated July 4, 2001 for the disbarment
of the respondent with this Court, wherein he also alleged the
developments which transpired after the dismissal of the
case, viz: that he already terminated the services of the respondent
as his counsel; that the respondent failed to return the originals of the
documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the respondent
finally handed over the documents only as an aftermath of a heated
argument he had with the complainant's wife.
In a Resolution5 dated September 10, 2001, this Court required the
respondent to comment on the complaint against him. However, the
respondent failed to file his comment despite two (2) extensions of
time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved to dispense with the
filing of the respondent's comment and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.6
Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required by the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.7Hence, the averments
made, as well as the evidence submitted by the complainant, are
undisputed.
Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, found the respondent liable for
negligence and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, with the warning that a similar
conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. The salient
portions of the Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2003 of
the Investigating Commissioner are as follows:
Complainant's contention that respondent Villar failed to file plaintiff's
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence is substantiated by the
Orders dated 26 February 2001, 30 March 2001 and 7 May 2001
(Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001
(Annex 10 of complainant's Affidavit) reads:
....
It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure of
respondent Villar to file the Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits
which led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21480 to the prejudice of
respondent's client, herein complainant. Respondent Villar has failed
to offer any explanation for his failure to file the Formal Offer of
Exhibits within the several extensions of time given him by the trial
court to do so. There is no doubt that it was part of respondent's
obligation to complainant as the latter's counsel of record in Civil
Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits,
and respondent's dereliction of this duty has prejudiced the interests
of respondent's client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was
respondent's obligation to take all measures to protect the interests
of his client in accordance with Canon (sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility but it was respondent's negligence or
omission which has caused damage to such interests.8
In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved said Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.
At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondent's disregard
of the resolution of this Court directing him to file his comment on the
complaint. He exhibited a similar attitude in failing to file his answer
when required by the Commission on Bar Discipline. The repeated
cavalier conduct belies impudence and lack of respect for the
authority of this Court.
The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languid in the
performance of his duties as counsel for the complainant. He was
given by the trial court several extensions of time: first, an extension
of ten (10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March 8, 2001,
and; second, another extension of ten (10) days from March 30,
2001, when the case was called for hearing and the court noted that
no such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. It must
also be emphasized that there was an interim period of twenty two
(22) days between March 8, 2001 and March 30, 2001, and another
interval of twenty-seven (27) days from April 9, 2001 until May 7,
2001 when the Order dismissing the case was issued. Effectively,
therefore, respondent had three (3) months and nine (9) days within
which to file the formal offer of exhibits.9 The respondent did not
bother to give an explanation even in mitigation or extenuation of his
inaction.
Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competence and
diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
....
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
....
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
....
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH
ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
It is indeed dismaying to note the respondent's patent violation of his
duty as a lawyer. He committed a serious transgression when he
failed to exert his utmost learning and ability and to give entire
devotion to his client's cause. His client had relied on him to file the
formal offer of exhibits among other things. But he failed him.
Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failure constitutes
inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court to take action on
the respondent's mortal infraction, which caused undeserved and
needless prejudice to his client's interest, adversely affected the
confidence of the community in the legal profession and eroded the
public's trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, the respondent is
sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity to the courts and
his clients.10 This means that in relation to his duty to his clients he
should put his maximum skills and full commitment to bear in
representation of their causes.
We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat,11 to wit:
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his
profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135,
September 22, 1999:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client
but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.12
This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high
standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession,
the courts and the public.13 Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his
full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.14 Certainly, a
member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the
profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyer's lethargy from the
perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.
The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months. We find the
recommended penalty commensurate with the offense
committed.1âwphi1
In Aromin v. Boncavil,15 this Court suspended a lawyer for six (6)
months for his failure to file a written offer of evidence despite the
trial court's directive.
The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with
failure to file brief, which as this Court held in Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon16 constitutes inexcusable negligence. In
the Saquilabon case, the respondent lawyer was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months. The Court likewise
imposed the same penalty upon the respondents in the cases of In
Re: Atty. David Briones,17 Spouses Galen v. Paguinigan,18 Spouses
Rabanal v. Rabanal19 for their failure to file the briefs of their
respective clients.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Deogracias
Villar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective upon finality hereof, with the WARNING that the repetition of
a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of
respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXx
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 123698 August 5, 1998
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE
SEELIN, respondents.
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation has come to this Court assailing the execution of the
judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope
springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in this
second petition for review are but mere reiterations of previously
settled issues which have already attained finality. We now write finis
to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years,
for as we ruled in Gomez vs. PresidingJudge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis
City: 1
. . . litigations must end and terminate sometime
and somewhere, it being essential to the effective
administration of justice that once a judgment
has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits
of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard
themselves against any scheme to bring about
that result, for constituted as they are to put an
end to controversies, they should frown upon any
attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound
practice demand that at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final
and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by
law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses
Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central
Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for
quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said corporation,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, 2 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No.
205942 null and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without
pronouncement as to costs.
The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually
upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991.
Said dismissal became final on March 5, 1992. 4
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private
respondents moved for execution which was granted by the lower
court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion for an Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The
motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the
jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit
between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true
and registered owner of the lot having bought the same from Central
Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion.
Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court
holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the
successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule
39, Section 48 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On
September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and
find no compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the
property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297,
petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of
Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have
to be included or impleaded by name in order to
be bound by the judgment because the action or
suit may be continued for or against the original
party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee 5
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of
Appeals on February 18, 1993. 6
On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 109076, was denied in a
resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7 Upon finality of said resolution,
this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21, 1993. 8
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance
of a second writ of execution before the trial court which was granted
in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's
motion was initially granted 9 on August 29, 1994 by the trial court
thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private
respondents, the said order was reconsidered on December 19,
1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge
Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second
time, filed a petition for certiorari 11 with respondent Court of Appeals
(docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the
judgment cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to
Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case
never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property
to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances
which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the
execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of
the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of
religion and worship; and that private respondents' title is being
questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered
judgment 12 dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that
the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become
final and executory. It ruled, thus:
This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that
the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No.
9297 had long become final and executory. The
respondent court's writs of execution and
possession could have been implemented a long
time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers
of petitioner Eternal Gardens. . . . Petitioner
Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the
execution of a final judgment by raising issues
which actually have been ruled upon by this
Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP
No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a
mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics
so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will
not benefit at all from a final judgment in their
favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously,
frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment
of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec.
3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein
private respondents, the instant petition has
already become moot and academic as the
property in question was already turned over by
the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs
of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus,
hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to
rest. (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30,
1996. 13
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in
essence the same line of arguments espoused in their petition before
the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the
issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved
and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the
controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one
hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender and/or deliver
possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were
never parties to the case between private respondents and Central
Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the
property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297,
petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of
Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have
to be included or impleaded by name in order to
be bound by the judgment because the action or
suit may be continued for or against the original
party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee. 14
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is, therefore,
no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioner's contention that a determination of the issue of
possession should first be resolved before the issuance of a writ of
possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is
the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in
Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the
property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not
have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession
of the subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances
transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297
which will reader the execution of the said judgment unjust and
illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against private respondents for nullification of 22 titles
which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that
the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why
execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the
subject property should be permanently stayed or at least held in
abeyance until after the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed
by the Republic against private respondents will not justify the
suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-
9297. This is so because the petitioner's title which originated from
Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the
judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in
the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner,
the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and
make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the
present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the
judgment.
Finally, petitioner's fear that the grave lots will be disturbed,
desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the judgment
proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the
trial court with regard to the execution of the judgment reveals that
the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken into account
by the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions as to how
their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13,
1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not
completely without recourse or remedy because
they can still go after the original party-defendant
or transferor of the property in question which is
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation
pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible
for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in
possession of the subject property, due to
defendant-petitioners' arguments that the same
have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then
it should be incumbent for the defendant-
petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiff-
respondents for payment in cash of the property
subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or
desecration since they benefited from the sale of
the burial lots. 15
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was
given, to wit:
The court directs and orders the defendant to
give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by
the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a
small portion of the fence so that they can have
access to the property. But as to the demolition
of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by
the defendant with the former owner so that cash
payment or cash settlement be made. 16
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order
dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation on the writ of
execution, as follows:
Moreover, considering the manifestation that
large areas within the Eternal Gardens have
been sold to so many persons who now have
buried their beloved ones in the grave lots
adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the
interest of justice and equity, that the
enforcement of the writ of possession and break
open order should be applied only to the gate of
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern
side nearest to the parcel of land in question
where the factory of the defendant is located, in
order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting
souls over the graves the parcels of land within
the said memorial park. 17
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to
the status of the burial lot owners has been properly addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic
in view of the fact that the questioned AliasWrit of Possession dated
December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December
27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by
the "Sheriffs Return," 18 dated March 31, 1995, with the attached
"Turn Over Premises" 19 indicating therein that private respondents
took possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a
final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the private
respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution,
interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the
time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already
been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents,
the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their
clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not
forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They
should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes. 20 In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna,
et. al., 21 we ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers have a
responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge
this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add
to the workload of the judiciary, especially this
Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and the law should
advise them when a case such as this, should
not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5469 August 10, 2004
RICARDO A. FORONDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARNOLD V. GUERRERO, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant disbarment case arose when Ricardo A. Foronda, acting
as attorney-in-fact for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz and Concepcion D.
Alcaraz, filed a verified Letter-Complaint1 dated June 29, 2001 with
the Office of the Bar Confidant charging Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero with
abusing "procedural rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice by
filing appeals, complaints and petitions to frustrate and delay the
execution of a judgment."
The Antecedents
The complainant alleged that his principals, Ramona and
Concepcion Alcaraz, filed Civil Case No. Q-44134 entitled
"Concepcion Alcaraz, et al. v. Romeo Coronel, et al." for specific
performance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 83. The case involved a parcel of land which
the defendants therein sold to the Alcarazes, and, thereafter, while
the case was pending, to Catalina Balais-Mabanag. Assisted by her
husband Eleuterio Mabanag, and with the respondent as their
lawyer, Catalina intervened in the case.
On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered a Decision2 in favor of the
plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is
hereby rendered ordering defendant to execute in favor of
plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of
land embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City, together with all the improvements
existing thereon, free from all liens and encumbrances and
once accomplished, to immediately deliver said document
of sale to plaintiffs, and upon receipt thereof, the plaintiffs
are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance of the
purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby
cancelled and declared to be without any force and effect.
Defendants and intervenor, and all other persons claiming
under them, are hereby ordered to vacate the subject
property and deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ claim for damages and attorney’s fees, as well as
the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors, are
hereby dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.3
The Mabanag Spouses, through the respondent as their counsel,
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 23000. In its Decision4 promulgated on December 16, 1991,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
Unsatisfied with the judgment of the appellate court, the respondent
elevated the matter to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 103577. The
petition for review was dismissed, and the judgment appealed from
was, likewise, affirmed in toto in the Court’s Decision5 dated October
7, 1996.6 The Court found that the questioned sale of the parcel of
land between therein petitioners and Mabanag on February 18, 1985
was correctly upheld by both courts below.
Thereafter, according to the complainant, the respondent, acting for
and in behalf of his clients, the Mabanag Spouses, filed several
cases7 questioning the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 103577. The
complainant contended that the multiple pleadings and actions
pursued by the respondent indicate that he violated his oath as an
officer of the court and breached the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers. The complainant thereafter prayed that
the instant complaint be referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action.8
The Respondent’s Defense
The respondent, for his part, filed a Motion to Cite Complainant and
Counsel in Contempt Without Prejudice to Disciplinary Action Against
Counsel,9 alleging that in an attempt to cause disrepute, dishonor
and to cast aspersion on him, the complainant’s counsel virtually
"published and made known publicly" the instant administrative case
against him by filing a Manifestation in Civil Case No. Q-01-43396
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80. According
to the respondent, this grossly violated the confidentiality in
administrative proceedings.10
In his Comment,11 the respondent did not deny that the decision in
Civil Case No. Q-44134 was already final and executory, as it had
already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in their respective decisions. The respondent put forth the
following arguments to justify the dismissal of the instant complaint:
A. THE SUBSEQUENT CASES FILED INVOLVED
LEGITIMATE AND VALID RESORT TO JUDICIAL
PROCESSES AND REMEDIES; HENCE, THERE IS NO
BASIS FOR THE CHARGE THAT THE RESPONDENT
COUNSEL HAS ABUSED PROCEDURAL PROCESSES
TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
B. THE COMPLAINT MUST AND SHOULD BE
DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING
AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
C. THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE IS PREMATURE
CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTERS RAISED THEREIN
ARE STILL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN PENDING
CASES; HENCE, ITS OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL IS
APPROPRIATELY CALLED FOR AND WARRANTED.12
The respondent was vehement in denying that he abused legal
processes and remedies, as the issues raised in the subsequent
actions he filed were valid and meritorious, the resolution of which
were indispensable for the orderly administration of justice. Thus:
It is basic that a counsel may resort to all legal reliefs and
remedies available and to invoke all pertinent provisions of
the law and rules, to protect the interest of a client in order
that justice may be done and duly administered. In fact, it is
not only the right of a counsel to do so but rather, it is his
bounden and sacred obligation as an officer of the court
and as an advocate who is tasked to protect the interest of
a client within the bounds of law.
…
Thus, in Civil Case No. Q-91-31268, with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, which is the first complaint,
what was challenged therein is the eligibility of Ramona
Patricia Alcaraz, to own urban commercial lands, within the
ambit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, considering that she is
not a Filipino citizen or at least, she does not appear nor
was she alleged to be so. Evidently, therefore, this is not
intended to forestall the execution of the judgment which
must be executed, pursuant to the rules that is, in
accordance with the dispositive portion thereof. Otherwise
stated, the execution, if it must be undertaken, must be
made in accordance with and consistently (sic) the
dispositive portion thereof. It is well settled that
execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in
the dispositive portion of the decision. …
As shown in the earlier narrations, the foregoing case is
presently on appeal with the Honorable Court of Appeals
and is still pending thereat, up to the present.
With regards to the petition for certiorari filed with the
Honorable Court of Appeals, docketed thereat as CA-G.R.
SP No. 4770 (sic), whereby a decision was already
rendered and such decision is already final and executory,
the issues therein disposed as raised, pertinently pertained
to the questioned and assailed Orders of the trial court
which granted the writ of execution, upon motion of parties
who are purportedly the principals of the complainant and
his counsel. After the denial of the said petition and the
finality of the judgment of such denial, partial execution
ensued and was not of course, even attempted to be
forestalled by the herein respondent counsel and his
clients.
However, the execution being undertaken later on was
shown to have been exceeded when, despite the fact that
there is no showing that the parties who were supposed to
execute a deed of absolute sale pursuant to the dispositive
portion of the subject decision being sought to be
implemented, had refused or at least failed, after demand,
to so execute and perform the foregoing acts, the trial court
ordered its branch clerk of court to perform the said acts. In
fact, it was pointed out that it does not even appear that the
other parties whose acts are sought, were already served
with the writ of execution; hence, the trial court’s act was
without basis and/or premature. Nevertheless, the trial
court’s branch clerk of court notwithstanding, proceeded as
in fact, executed the deed of absolute sale in favor of the
Alcarazes. This act of the trial court, with due respect,
unduly created chaos and confusion, which are antithetical
to its function for an orderly administration of justice and
the fair approximation thereof.
The matter was, thereafter, complicated further, when
despite the fact that the citizenships of the Alcarazes were
not indicated in the deed of absolute sale which appears to
have been presented with the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, the said Register of Deeds cancelled the title of the
client of the herein respondent counsel and issued a new
title over the subject property in favor of the Alcarazes and
in order to validate and to give a semblance of legality or
color to the validity of the issuance of the said title, by
making it appear that the Alcarazes are Filipino citizens,
ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INDICATION OF THEIR
CITIZENSHIP IN THE SUBJECT DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE, nevertheless, indicated in the new title that the
Alcarazes are Filipinos.
Thus, the herein respondent counsel, in behalf of his client
and to protect their interest, this time, was constrained to
institute a petition with the Honorable Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55576,whereby they assailed
the jurisdiction of the trial judge in decreeing the foregoing
execution of acts not included in the disposition portion of
the decision being sought to be executed and to perform
acts within the exclusive competence and direction of the
Register of Deeds pursuant to Providential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Board Registration Decree.
This case is still pending with the Honorable Court of
Appeals up to the present; hence, it is misleading for the
complainant to even insinuate that a decision thereon is
already final, which, of course, as shown in the earlier
discussions, are farthest from the truth.
While all of the foregoing issues were still pending as they
are still pending up to the present, the complainant and
counsel, purportedly sold and transferred the subject
property, using the title being assailed and questioned in
CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, to a third person, one Emelita
Mariano, with the purported deed of absolute sale being
notarized by the same counsel of the herein complainant,
Atty. Oscar R. Ferrer, who is representing the Alcarazes in
the abovesaid cases; hence, he cannot feign ignorance of
the pendency of the said cases and the issues involved
therein which cast questions on the said title and, thus,
rendered the purported transfer or sale fatally defective.
True to his duty to his client and as an officer of the court
and in order to maintain the integrity, dignity and
orderliness in the administration of justice, herein
respondent counsel, filed in behalf of his client, the
Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-01-43396, on February 15,
2001, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for
the annulment of the title issued in favor of the third person,
Emelita L. Mariano, for the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale to her and Damages with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
When no temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction were issued by the trial court, herein
respondent counsel, in behalf of his client, availed of the
legally available remedy of a special civil action of
certiorari, assailing on jurisdictional/grave abuse of
discretion grounds, the refusal and/or failure of the trial
court to issue the prayed for preliminary injunctive reliefs,
among others. Thus, respondent, as counsel for his client,
filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals, on July 24,
2001, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, which is
still pending resolution of the said Honorable Court up to
the present.13
The respondent also alleged that the complainant’s failure to disclose
the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-01-43396 in the certification
against non-forum shopping in the case at bar was in gross violation
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of
this, the respondent reasoned, the complaint should be dismissed.
Finally, the respondent averred that the instant administrative case is
premature, considering that there are still issues to be resolved in the
pending cases. As such, no cause of action could accrue against
him. The respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed for
"utter and palpable lack of merit."
In his Compliance and Comment,14 the complainant asserted that
there was no malice nor inaccuracy resorted to in the filing of the
complaint against the respondent. The complainant averred that he
was constrained to file the instant complaint out of exasperation, if
not desperation, upon the instruction of his principals, so as to stop
the respondent from continuing with his "dilatory and obstructionist
strategies" to deprive them of their rights already confirmed by the
courts, from the RTC to the Supreme Court. Thus:
… In order to stall the execution of the favorable decision
obtained by my principals Concepcion Alcaraz and her
daughter Ramona Patricia Alcaraz as early as March 1,
1989, in Civil Case No. Q-44134, respondent acting in
behalf of his clients, went to this Court three (3) times in
said case and several times also to the Court of Appeals
on appeals, petitions for certiorari, etc.
 … Although respondent admits the fact that the subject
decision of the court a quo is already final and executory,
he insists that "the issues in the other cases are indeed
different." He argues in his comment that the issue in his
petition (Annex "2" to Comment) pertained to the issuance
of a writ of execution to implement the abovesaid final and
executory decision." This is plain hair-splitting aimed to
muddle the issues and ultimately mislead the Honorable
Court.15
The Recommendation of the Integrated Bar Of The Philippines
(IBP)
Commission On Bar Discipline
On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XVI-2003-237, finding that the foregoing recommendation of the
Commissioner was fully supported by the records, as well as the
applicable laws. The Board found that the respondent violated Rule
12.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended
his suspension for one (1) year.
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, the Court would like to stress that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own.16 As we held in the
leading case of In re Almacen:17
… Neither purely civil not purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are]
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration
of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. ….18
As such, the instant complaint cannot be dismissed as prayed for by
the respondent.
We agree that the respondent is administratively liable.
The respondent, by his own admission, filed multifarious petitions,
motions and actions concerning the sale of the property in question,
after the Court already ruled in G.R. No. 103577 that the said sale
was correctly upheld by both the trial and appellate courts. He,
thereafter, filed two other initiatory pleadings before the RTC of
Quezon City, namely, Civil Case No. Q-97-31268 and Civil Case No.
Q-01-43396. The same matter subject of the original complaint was
elevated to the Court of Appeals no less than four (4) times: CA-G.R.
CV No. 65124, CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, CA-G.R. CV No. 75911, and
CA-G.R. SP No. 55576. And from there, the matter was again
brought before this Court twice: G.R. No. 135820 and G.R. No.
153142.19
We concur with the following observations made by IBP
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala in her Report and
Recommendation dated October 3, 2003:
The issue being raised by the respondent on behalf of his
clients in all the complaints, appeals, petitions and motions
he has filed is the question of non-eligibility of Ramona
Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines and the nullity
of the sale between Alcaraz and the Coronels. These
issues have already been passed upon and upheld by both
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In the case
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, the First Division of
the Court of Appeals "observed that Mabanag’s counsel,
(respondent herein) has questioned the non-eligibility of
Ramona Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines for
the nth time although as early as 30 July 1998, the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710 had already affirmed
the lower court’s ruling that the petitioner is not the proper
party to question the eligibility of Alcaraz to own property in
the Philippines. The petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135820 upheld the right of
Ramona Alcaraz as one of the vendees in the deed of sale.
The Supreme Court passed judgment on her capacity to
buy the property. The issue was recycled in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55576, Entry of Judgment was already issued by the
Supreme Court on 2 January 1997. However, petitioner
has succeeded for more than five (5) years now to hold
at bay the full implementation of the judgment in
point." Likewise, in dismissing the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of his client before RTC QC Branch
83 docketed as Case No. Q-97-31268 entitled Mabanag
vs. Patricia Ramona Alcaraz, et. al. to declare Patricia
Alcaraz ineligible to acquire real property, the court
observed that for failure of the plaintiffs to get a
favorable decision of the earlier case, they tried to
prevent the execution by disqualifying herein
defendant. (Emphasis ours).
In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP [No.] 65783, a
pertinent portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads
"While lawyers owe (sic) entire devotion to the interest of
their client’s right, they should not forget that they are
officers of the court bound to exert every effort to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice – they
should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede
the execution of a judgment or misuse the court processes
(Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 293 SCRA 622)."20
It has, thus, been clearly established that in filing such numerous
petitions in behalf of his client, the respondent thereby engaged in
forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in
another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a
favorable decision. An important factor in determining the existence
of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
same reliefs.21
Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it
should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has
the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution
of a judgment or by misusing court processes.22 Such filing of
multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court’s processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to add, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his
duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to
maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are
consistent with truth and honor.23
We note that while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should
not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.5 The Court
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient of Appeals presented the facts of this case as follows:
administration of justice.24
"Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, a lawyer of the LAPIL (IBP) Negros Oriental,
In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same who was also an [e]lection [r]egistrar of the COMELEC, filed the
subject matter, the respondent violated Canon 12 of the Code of complaint in 1975;
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and Atty. Lituanas was able to present evidence on the following dates:
efficient administration of justice. He also violated Rule 12.0225 and
Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no
July 10, 1981
man for money or malice."
First plaintiffs' witness Atilano Ramirez, 73 years old, was presented;
We find that the IBP’s recommended penalty of one year’s
suspension from the practice of law is not commensurate to the
respondent’s transgression. He shall thus be meted a two-year July 16, 1981
suspension from the practice of law, effective immediately.
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to
forum shopping, respondent Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero is hereby August 24, 1982
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years.
The respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be included in the
respondent’s files which are with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and November 20, 1984
circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
SO ORDERED.
February 28, 1984
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Direct Examination of 2ndPlaintiffs' witness Ignacio Tomias. Cross-
THIRD DIVISION examination was waived.

G.R. No. 133625 September 6, 2000 August 21, 1985

REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE Plaintiff Pedro Quilat-Quilat was presented on direct examination.
EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO EDRIAL, ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN
EDRIAL, and SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA, petitioners,
"On December 16, 1986, the Citizen Legal Assistance Office (CLAO)
vs.
entered its appearance as new [private respondents'] counsel after
PEDRO QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT, ISIDRA
Atty. Gerardo Lituanas has filed his withdrawal. The subsequent
QUILAT-QUILAT, and ESTANISLAO QUILAT-
events are as follows:
QUILAT, respondents.

February 23, 1987

DECISION

The case was set for hearing on April 21, 1987.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

April 21, 1987

Parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and
caused repeated delays cannot ask for the reopening of the trial for
the purpose of presenting additional evidence. After squandering
several opportunities given them to ventilate their claims, they can no
longer complain of alleged violation of their right to due process.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the October
17, 1997 Decision1 and the March 19, 1998 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA)3 in CA-GR SP No. 42660. The CA affirmed the Order
of the trial court, which had denied their Motion to Reopen the Case
and to allow them to complete the presentation of their evidence. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:4
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED."
The Resolution denied reconsideration of the challenged Decision.
The Facts
The hearing was reset due to the projected amendment of the
complainant to implead Primitiva Torrecampo.
June 19, 1987
The third amended complaint was admitted.
September 9, 1987
Hearing was postponed at the instance of the defendants [herein
petitioners].
October 22, 1987
The hearing was suspended for the reason that the Court would
require the [private respondents] to submit a certification from the
Bureau of Forest Development that the land involved in this case
[was] not a part of the public forest.

Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed
Quilat-Quilat -- filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land against
Petitioners Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind,
Mary Jean -- all surnamed Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch
December 17, 1987
The hearing was postponed at the request of [private respondents']
counsel for the reason that she [would] be attending [a] conference in
Cebu City.
March 18, 1988
The hearing was aborted due to the fact that the Bureau of Forest
Development report ha[d] not yet been finished.
July 5, 1988
The hearing [was] reset upon agreement of both counsel.
September 15, 1988
The hearing [was] reset upon the Court's instance.
December 8, 1988
No hearing was held as the certification from the Bureau of Forest
Development [was] being awaited.
March 16, 1989
The said certification [was] still being awaited.
May 25, 1989
The testimony of [Private Respondent] Pedro Quilat-Quilat [was]
suspended after a question was [propounded] that would require him
to use reading eyeglasses which he did not have at the moment.
December 14, 1989
Hearing [was] reset due to the illness of [private respondents']
counsel.
September 20, 1990
Atty. Eleccion, [petitioners'] counsel did not appear despite due
notice. At this time, the [private respondents] rested their case.
October 15, 1990
Atty. Eleccion [private respondents'] counsel did not appear. Hearing
[was] reset to October 16, 1990.
October 16, 1990
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to December 10,
11 and 12.
December 10, 1990
Atty. Eleccion asked for postponement. Hearing [was] reset to
December 11, 1990.
December 11, 1990
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. The case [was] submitted for decision
as of th[at] day.
August 21, 1992
The transcript of stenographic notes which was taken down by
stenographer Alexander Yberley, was missing. He was ordered to
produce the transcript.
October 30, 1992
Witness Atilano Ramirez was recalled for cross-examination since
stenographer Yberley manifested that the record was burned.
Despite due notice, nobody appeared for the [petitioners]. So as of
this day, the cross-examination of Atilano Ramirez was considered
waived and the case was finally submitted for decision.
December 11, 1992
Court granted the prayer of Atty. Sedillo and the case [was] set for
hearing on March 22, 29 and April 5 1993.
March 22, 1993
Atty. Sedillo did not present evidence but instead moved for a
resetting of the hearing to April 12, 1993. He [was] advised by the
Court to be prepared on the next scheduled hearing.
June 4, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to July 2, 1993.
July 2, 1993
Flaviano Umbac was presented as first [petitioners'] witness. Hearing
[was] scheduled [for] August 27, 1993.
August 27, 1993
[Petitioners] moved for a resetting to October 7, 1993.
October 7, 1993
Atty. Bongaciso was presented as second witness for the
[petitioners]. His testimony [was] terminated and hearing [was] reset
to December 13, 1993.
December 13, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to February 14, 1994.
February 14, 1994
Hearing [was] reset at the instance of Atty. Sedillo who want[ed] to
recall his witness Atty. Bonganciso. Hearing [was] reset to March 23,
1994.
March 24, 1994
Hearing [was] postponed to May 6, 1994 to find avenue for
settlement.
May 6, 1994
Due to the conflict of schedule by Atty. Sedillo and due to the
absence of recalled 2nd [petitioners'] witness Bongaciso, hearing
[was] reset to June 17, 1994.
June 17, 1994
Atty. Sedillo asked for postponement. He [would] attend a Kiwanis
Training Conference. Hearing [was] reset to July 4, 1994.
July 4, 1994
Atty. Sedillo was present but Atty. Rosalinda Ybanez [was] available
at 10:00 a.m. so the case [was] reset to August 15, 1994.
August 15, 1994
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to October 3, 1994.
October 3, 1994
The hearing [was] reset to November 17, 1994 due to non-availability
of [petitioners'] witness Atty. Roque Bonganciso who [was] on recall.
November 17, 1994
There [was] talk about [a] proposed settlement, hearing [was] held in
abeyance.
January 6, 1995
Since no settlement [was] realized a [private respondents'] motion to
set [the] case for hearing was filed and the case was reset to
[February] 27, 1995.
February 27, 1995
Earlier, [petitioners'] counsel, Atty. Sedillo filed a motion for
postponement as he [would be] appearing in a case in Manila. Atty.
Ybanez manifested that on February 26, 1995 Atty. Sedillo was in
Dumaguete and further that this case ha[d] been delayed by the
failure of the [petitioners] to complete the presentation of their
evidence. The Court then ordered the case submitted for decision for
the THIRD TIME.
March 16, 1995
The Court issued an order reconsidering the February 27, 1995 order
upon motion of Atty. Sedillo and set the case for the [petitioners] for
June 16, 1995 with a STERN WARNING TO THE [PETITIONERS].
June 16, 1995
The hearing set for [this day] was cancelled as the Judge [was] on
leave and reset to September 8, 1995.
September 8, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to
November 16, 1995.
November 16, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Neither did his client. The
hearing [was] reset to February 13, 1996.
February 9, 1996
The [petitioners'] counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.
February 12, 1996
The Court issued an order granting the withdrawal of the [petitioners']
counsel. The [petitioners were] directed to immediately engage the
services of a new counsel. This notice was received personally by
the wife of [Petitioner] Mauro Edrial, Jr.
February 13, 1996
The Court issued an order setting the case [for] April 26, 1996. This
order was received by the wife of the [Petitioner] Mauro Edrial, Jr.
April 26, 1996
There was no appearance from the [petitioners]. Hence, the case
was submitted for decision for the FOURTH TIME.
July 8, 1996
Atty. Sedillo filed a motion to reopen the case and in effect reentered
his appearance.
August 20, 1996
Private respondents thru counsel filed opposition to the motion of the
[petitioners].
September 6, 1996
The Hon. Judge issued an order denying the motion to reopen
hereby affirming the April 26, 1996 order submitting the case for
decision.
September 11, 1996
[Petitioners] filed a motion for reconsideration.
October 2, 1996
Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
October 23, 1996
Private respondents received a copy of the Petition for Certiorari."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in issuing the
questioned Orders, the trial judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In giving petitioners more
than ample time to complete their presentation of evidence and in
granting their Motions for Postponement, the judge was
accommodating them more than they actually deserved.
Hence, this Petition.7
Issues
Petitioners submit that the CA erred in affirming the twin Orders of
the Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 39. They contend that a reversal
thereof would have allowed them to complete their presentation of
evidence. Hence, by affirming those Orders, the CA allegedly
violated their right to due process.8
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is without merit.
Main Issue
Due Process and Reopening of Trial
Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file
in his law firm were incorrect; hence, the notices and other forms of
communication he had sent to them were not received. He allegedly
discovered this fact only after he had filed his withdrawal as their
counsel. He also argues that the denial of the Motion to Reopen Trial
was "plainly capricious and oppressive" because private respondents
were equally guilty of delay and procrastination. Finally, he maintains
that allowing petitioners to present their remaining evidence would be
"in the interest of substantial due process and humane justice."
Respondents disagree, reasoning that the trial court thrice
reconsidered its Order to submit the case for decision; that is,
petitioners were given several opportunities to present their
evidence, but they squandered them. Petitioners, they further point
out, were intentionally seeking to delay the resolution of the case
because they were in physical possession of the land in dispute.
Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA
ruled that petitioners were given "more than enough time" to
complete their presentation of evidence. Respondents rested their
case as early as September 1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own
request, was allowed to start presenting evidence only on April 12,
1993. From that day until April 26, 1996 or for a period of three years,
counsel presented only two witnesses. The trial judge was in fact
liberal in granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But enough
was enough; when they attempted to delay the trial some more, the
trial judge finally and correctly refused to go along.
True, respondents also asked for continuances, but petitioners were
ultimately to blame for the inexcusable delay. The case was
submitted for decision three times -- on December 11, 1990, October
30, 1992, and February 27, 1995 - but petitioners and/or their
counsel did not appear in court each time. After having failed to take
advantage of opportunities to ventilate their claims below, parties
may no longer be accorded the same chances, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, as in this
case.9
The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking
extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the
period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation
or manifestation of their failure.10 The same principle applies more
forcefully to motions for continuance. Postponement is not a matter
of right, but of sound judicial discretion. Actions thereon will not be
disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of a clear or manifest
abuse of discretion, resulting in a denial of substantial justice.11 We
concur with the CA that there is no such denial in this case.1âwphi1
It is highly suspicious how the counsel for petitioners continued to
represent his clients effectively for several years despite allegedly
having lost their correct addresses. It was definitely his duty to know
the correct ones. Indeed, it was too late for him to do so after he had
withdrawn as their counsel. According to him, after April 16, 1996, he
sent an office employee to verify the whereabouts of Mauro Edrial Jr.
The inquiry yielded the information that Mauro actually resided in San
Jose, Negros Oriental, and that Susan Edrial Valenzuela resided in
Gomez St., Dumaguete City.12 He should have undertaken the
search before withdrawing as counsel. Further, notice might not have
been received by petitioners themselves, but that did not excuse
counsel's failure to appear during trials.
Counsel for petitioners further avers that he had difficulty in
presenting Atty. Roque Bonganciso because of the latter's prior
commitments which conflicted with the scheduled trial dates. The last
witness was Mauro Edrial Jr., but counsel had the wrong address on
file. He should just have adjusted the order of presentation of
witnesses and called Edrial Jr. later. Such move could have
prevented the postponement. Besides, finding an available date in
his calendar would not have taken Atty. Bonganciso three years.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
shall not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for their failure to do so (Rule 12.03).13 Moreover, they
should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04).
For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's
reminder to petitioners' counsel of his duty to his client and to the
court:
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its ends-the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but
should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that
impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with
the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice."14
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
G.R. No. L-35252 October 21, 1932
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.
Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila absolving the defendant from the complaint,
without a special finding as to costs.
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
The trial court erred:
1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to
appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the balance of the
judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in
favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No.
26328 of the Court o First Instance of Manila.
2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in
certificate of title No. 11274 situated at Ronquillo Street,
Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the
appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of
condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao.
3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is
the condonation of the balance of the judgment rendered in
said civil case No. 26328.
4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter
has actually given such promise to condone, could bind the
appellant corporation.
5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon
appellee Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said judgment
from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una senal
inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the
balance of the said judgment.
6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano
Santos for the sum of P8,600, the said judgment in civil
case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even
discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the
highest bidder for the said property.
7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as
shown by Exhibits D and D-1, reflects only the desire of the
said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the
appellant bank.
8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not
sentencing him to pay the amount claimed in the complaint
with costs.
On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and
against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924,
plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The
court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of
the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in
case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in
transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at
public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied
to the payment of the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the
sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public
auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300
and P1,000 respectively.
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy
Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank
sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was
subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of
the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words,
the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it
when it resold the two parcels of land.
The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the
balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from
August 1, 1930.
In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense
that he waived his right to redeem the land described in transfer
certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an understanding
between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him
the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court
absolved the defendant from the complaint.
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement
on the part of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the
judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated
testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on
direct examination was as follows:
P. En este documento aparece que usted, por
consideracion de valor recibido del Banco Nacional
demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho
de recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en
publica subasta el catorce de octubre de mil novecientos
veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; ¿quiere usted
explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion
de valor? — R. Si, señor. Esto desde mil novecientos
veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo bien,
me haba dicho el señor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo
no podia pagar esos intereses mensuales. Entonces me
dijo Pecson, "¿como puede usted recibir alquileres y no
paga usted intereses?"
P. ¿Quien es ese señor Pecson? — R. Era encargado de
este asunto.
P. ¿Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? — R. Era
encargado de estas transacciones. Cuando tenia
necesidad siempre llamaba yo al señor Pecson. Entonces
hable al señor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas
veces los alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado.
Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la
pregunta.
Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el
testigo su contestacion.
JUZGADO. Que la termine.
TESTIGO. Me dijo el señor Pecson que es cosa mala para
mi "¿por que usted cobra alquileres y no paga los
intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para
cubrir sus deudas.
P. El señor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya
todos sus bienes," ¿a que bienes se referia el ? — R. Al
terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco.
P. ¿Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el
que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1? — R. Paco,
primeramente, los dos ambos.
P. Pero este Exhibit 1, ¿a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de
Ronquillo? — R. Parece que Paco.
P. ¿No recuerda usted muy bien? — R. No recuerdo.
P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el señor Pecson mejor que
dejara todos sus bienes, ¿le dijo a usted a favor de quien
iba usted a dejar sus bienes? — R. Al Banco Nacional.
P. ¿Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el señor
Pecson con respecto al saldo deudor que usted todavia
era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? — R. No
recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.
P. ¿Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria
todavia o se le condonaria?
Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.
JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.
P. ¿Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez
otorgado este Exhibit 1?
SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos
openemos.
Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los
terrenos.
JUZGADO. Puede contestar.
Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no
pague intereses deje usted esos terrenos de Ronquillo y
terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas.
Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este
Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije que queria yo comprar.
P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil
novecientos veintecinco este documento Exhibit 1, ¿recibio
usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? — R. Nada,
absolutamente.
When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the
time of the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the
defendant answered that he did not know; asked when Pecson had
spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not
remember.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant
renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo,
Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying
it.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his
deposition, if he was not residing in Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to
observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a
witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts
prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is
necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active
management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19
of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to
merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of
an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the
case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends
of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf
of his client.
Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain.
There is no mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part
of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in Calle Ronquillo. If
Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is
reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to
waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the
defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon some
evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the
defendant waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo,
because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing to pay
therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the
full amount of the sale.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding
between Pecson and the defendant as the latter claims, it is not
shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such agreement for
the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by
the board of directors could bind the bank by such an agreement.
There is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted the
benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement.
The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold
it at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the
defendant with the full amount of the resale was a sufficient
consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to
redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed,
and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum
from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
G.R. No. 127495 December 22, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NOLITO BORAS Y DOE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
For allegedly raping a six year-old girl, Nolito Boras was convicted of
statutory rape by the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Hence, this appeal
questioning his conviction.
On December 13, 1991, while Melanie Medalla’s parents were
sleeping in their house at Barangay Bahay, Libmanan, Camarines
Sur, she remained downstairs playing alone. At around 9 o’clock in
the morning of that day, Nolito Boras, herein accused-appellant, went
to her and invited her to go with him. Since she is familiar with the
accused-appellant as neighbor, she was cajoled to go with him.
When they arrived at a guava tree near the coconut plantation, which
is about 15 meters from her house, accused-appellant told her
"magkitoan"1 which means "we will have sex." Obeying the instruction
of accused-appellant, she removed her panty. Thereafter, she was
placed "on top and in-between accused-appellant’s legs"2 who then
inserted his penis into her vagina. While accused-appellant was
satisfying his salacious desire, Cirilo Guirela, the victim’s uncle
arrived. When she saw her uncle Cirilo, she ran away. Thereafter,
Cirilo told Jesus Amenia, brother-in-law of accused-appellant, that
the latter raped his niece. Jesus Amenia got angry with the accused-
appellant then proceeded home with the latter.
On December 14, 1991, Cirilo reported the matter to the Barangay
Captain3 and was advised to report the incident to the police authority
of Libmanan, Camarines Sur.4 The police advised the examination of
the victim at the Libmanan District Hospital.
On December 15, 1991, Dr. Cynthia S. Algery of Libmanan District
Hospital examined the six-year-old victim. The examination revealed
hymenal laceration at 3 o’clock caused by any organ which is
inserted into the vagina, like a penis, and hypremia of the introitus
(redness found at the entrance of the vagina).5 While being
examined, the doctor asked the victim what happened and the victim
described the person who raped her.6
On February 12, 1992, an information for the crime of rape was filed
against Nolito Boras y Doe alleging-
"That on or about the 13th day of December 1991, at about 9:00
o’clock in the morning, at Brgy. Bahay, Municipality of Libmanan,
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design,
with violence and force, intimidation and with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with Melanie Medalla, a six (6) years old
(sic), against her will and the offended party suffered damages.
"ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."7
Upon arraignment on May 18, 1992, the accused, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, on December 22, 1992, counsel for the accused–
appellant manifested in court that he noticed something strange with
the accused-appellant and asked that the latter be examined by a
psychiatrist to determine his mental fitness. The trial court advised
the counsel to file a formal motion for the examination of the
accused. Thereafter trial ensued.
On June 16, 1993, the defense presented accused-appellant. When
asked about his personal circumstances, he answered that his name
is Diosdado Macapagal;8 that he does not know the name of his
father and his mother; that he does not know whether he has a
brother and sister; that he does not know Tinagis Penal Farm where
he is presently confined; that he does not know how he was able to
come to court and who escorted him. On such note, the trial court
issued an Order setting forth the foregoing declarations, with further
pronouncement that accused-appellant in all appearances seems to
be normal but is feigning insanity. Thus, the Provincial Warden of
Tinagis Penal Farm was directed to bring accused-appellant to Don
Susano Rodriguez Mental Hospital at Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur for
necessary physical and mental examination and observation in order
to determine whether he is insane or not, and whether he has the
necessary faculties to undergo trial. The Chief of Susano Rodriguez
Mental Hospital was directed to admit and conduct the necessary
examination and submit a written report to the trial court on the
mental condition of the accused within 15 days after the last
examination/treatment. Pending the submission of the report, the
hearing was suspended. After the issuance of the
aforementioned Order, accused-appellant rendered two songs, one
after another, after the trial court requested him.9
On May 2, 1995, the Bicol Regional Hospital - Department of
Psychiatry submitted its report on the mental status of Nolito Boras
remarking that accused-appellant was "coherent and relevant" and
that he was "free of psychotic signs and symptoms." The remarks
further stated that accused-appellant knows the case filed against
him and that his anxiety or apprehension was due to fears of being
incarcerated in jail.10
After trial, judgment was rendered convicting accused-appellant, thus
- alone suffices to establish accused-appellant’s guilt.17 In rape, mere
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds and so holds
that the accused Nolito Boras is found guilty of the offense of
statutory rape of Melanie Medalla, a six (6) year old girl at the time of
the rape and, therefore, sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay Melanie Medalla the
amount of P50,000.00 for indemnity. No pronouncement as to cost.
"SO ORDERED."11
Accused-appellant now appeals questioning his conviction for rape,
assigning as error the admission of Exhibit "B", which is a photocopy
of the certificate of livebirth of the victim.
Initially, to avoid criminal liability, accused-appellant feigned insanity.
To bolster such imagined dementia, accused-appellant offered his
father’s testimony declaring that accused-appellant was afflicted with
a mental defect since childhood. As observed by the trial court,
accused-appellant is normal. In this regard, the trial court’s
observation of the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, as a rule,
will not be interfered with, considering that the behavior, gesture,
inflection of voice and manner of responding to questions
propounded to witnesses are best available to the trial court. It is not
appropriate to calibrate anew such observations on the basis alone
of the cold transcript of stenographic notes unless such findings are
clearly shown to be arbitrary. In fact, the trial court was not remiss in
its duty in determining the mental capacity of accused-appellant
when it ordered accused-appellant’s confinement in a hospital for
medical and psychiatric evaluation which examination revealed that
accused-appellant is "sane and coherent." The foregoing steps
clearly demonstrate that the judge had sufficiently and effectively
satisfied the two components of "insanity test" that will effectively
guarantee accused-appellant’s right to a fair trial, which are: (1)
whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide counsel with
information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense and (2)
whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his
relation to it.12
Accused-appellant was convicted under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code13 which provides that rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age, thus-
"Article 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
"x x x x x x x x x"
In statutory rape, there are two elements that must be established
prior to conviction of this crime, namely: (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) that the woman is below
twelve years of age.14
As to the first element, accused-appellant denied having sexual
contact with the victim and challenges the latter’s credibility. After a
thorough review of the records of this case, we find the victim’s
testimony credible. From the victim’s narration, it was clear that there
was sexual intercourse. The victim even demonstrated in court how
she was raped by the accused-appellant in squatting position by
holding her hips.15 She narrated that she felt pain and when she was
crying, accused-appellant stopped thrusting his organ. She declared
that she was not able to shout because during the sexual contact,
accused-appellant was covering her mouth.16 Her credible testimony
touching by the male’s organ, or instrument of sex, of the labia of the
pudendum of the female’s private part is sufficient to consummate
rape.18 But when the victim is below 12 years old, sexual contact of
the male’s sex organ with the woman’s private part consummates
rape and it is not required to prove force, intimidation, or
consent.19 The victim’s declarations were corroborated by the
testimony of her uncle who witnessed the bestial act. Such
testimonies were further supported by the medical findings of Dr.
Algery who examined the victim two days after the incident. The
medical report shows that there was penetration by the male organ
into her genitalia.
The victim even testified to other occasions of rape committed
against her by accused-appellant prior to December 13,
1991.20 However, accused-appellant cannot be convicted for the
alleged rapes committed other than the one charged in the
information. A rule to the contrary will violate accused-appellant’s
constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.21 Such other alleged rapes committed which
are not alleged in the information may be taken only as proof of
specific intent or knowledge, plan, system or scheme.22
Anent the second element as to the age of the victim when the crime
was committed, accused-appellant questions the admission of the
photocopy of the birth certificate of the child invoking Section 3, Rule
130. Accused-appellant argues that the failure of the prosecution to
prove the circumstances that will warrant the admission in evidence
of the said photocopy, renders the same inadmissible and he cannot
be convicted of statutory rape since the age of the victim was not
proven with reasonable certainty. It is clear from the records that
complainant Melanie Medalla was born on October 23,
1985.23 Besides, under Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after
the offer is made. In the case at bar, the photocopy of the birth
certificate was formally offered in evidence and marked as Exhibit
"B". It was offered to prove (a) the fact of birth of the victim, and (b)
the fact that the victim was below twelve years old when she was
ravished on December 13, 1991. The defense objected to the
purpose for which Exhibit "B" was being offered,24 but did not object
to the presentation of the photocopied birth certificate which is merely
treated as a secondary evidence. Having failed to raise a valid and
timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence
the same became a primary evidence,25 and the same is deemed
admitted and the other party is bound thereby. Even so, if the
evidence objected to was not received, it would not have varied the
conclusion arrived at by the court as to the correct age of the victim
considering that the victim and her mother testified as to her
age.26 The testimony of the mother as to the age of her child is
admissible in evidence for who else would be in the best position to
know when she delivered the child. Besides, the court could very well
assess whether or not the victim is below twelve years old by simply
looking at her physique and built.
It must be stressed that in dealing with rape cases of children,
especially those below twelve years of age, due care must be
observed by the trial court in handling the victim. In fact, more often
than not, the grueling experience in the trial court in the course of
direct and cross-examination is more traumatic than the fact of rape
itself. On such occasions, mishandling of victims lead to
psychological imbalances which, if not properly treated by medical
experts will lead to an abnormal behavioral response against the idea
of sex itself and disturbed interaction with the opposite sex or of the
same sex. The frightful experience of rape committed to children who
are bereft of "mundane wiles"27necessitates the highest degree of
tact, patience and diplomacy. No woman, especially a child of tender
years would exactly remember step-by-step the sexual intercourse in
the hands of the maniacal beast. It is enough that the child was able
to explain in her own way that there was sexual intercourse. By
subjecting her into explaining whether she was forced or intimidated
is excessive. For proof of force and intimidation is unnecessary in
statutory rape. Considering that there is a medical report
substantiating the allegations made by the victim, the manner of
examination of the victim must be tempered. Especially in this case,
since the child is only six years old who remains uncorrupted. In
rape, mere touching of male’s organ to the pudendum of female’s
organ is enough to consummate the crime. Whether the organ was
fully erect or not, to a child of six years of age, slight penetration
consummates rape. Thus, asking questions like-

"Q: Did you have any opportunity at that time when you were raped
to hold the penis of Nolito Boras?

"A: No, Sir.

"Q: At the time, when you were raped by Nolito Boras, was his penis
hard or soft?

"A: Hard, sir"28

and

"Q: Did you see your Uncle Cerilo Guirela after the accused Nolito
Boras stop pushing and pulling his penis to your vagina or while he
was still in the process of pushing and pulling his penis to your
vagina?

"A: Nolito Boras was not yet finished pushing and pulling his penis to
my vagina."29 are unnecessary, uncalled for and excessive
queries.1âwphi1 Imputation of rape against a neighbor cannot be
concocted with ease for malicious reasons by parents of a six-year-
old child because it would cause more harm than good. Aside from
the traumatic experience of rape, the victim’s story of defloration
must withstand not only the examination in court but also the medical
examination of the victim’s private parts by a licensed physician.

Lastly, at the time of the commission of rape on December 13, 1991,

the victim was only six (6) years old. Statutory rape committed in
1991 is punishable by reclusion perpetua. The present law provides
that when the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven
(7) years of age, death penalty shall be imposed. Considering that
the retroactive application30 of the law will be unfavorable to accused-
appellant, the latter is fortunate enough to be meted only the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Had it been committed after the enactment of
the new law, this Court will not hesitate to impose the penalty of
death. The award of P50,000.00 representing civil indemnity is
proper. In addition thereto, accused-appellant shall pay
P50,000.0031 representing moral damages without necessity of proof
other than the fact of rape plus P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, abuse of
confidence should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
The victim trusted accused-appellant in going with him upon the
latter’s invitation on account of her familiarity with him as their
neighbor.

WHEREFORE, the trial court’s judgment convicting accused-

appellant of statutory rape is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages IN ADDITION to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by
the trial court.

SO ORDERED.