RULES ON EVIDENCE

In Re Testate of Suntay | 95 PHIL 500

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decree of the CFI of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on
November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China on 4 January 1931 by Jose B. Suntay.

Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, Fookien Province, China, leaving real and personal
properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy and 9 children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz and a child
named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.

Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI Bulacan and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay.
After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.

On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to
have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay.

This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the
insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records
and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931
and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a
petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China may be probated in the Philippines.

RULING: No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in
1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are a deposition or a perpetuation of testimony, and
even if it were so, it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the
validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in
the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties
residing in the Philippines.

In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate
or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this
country.

In an intestate proceeding that had already been instituted in the Philippines, the widow and child of the
testator are not estopped from asking for the probate of a lost will or of a foreign will just because of the
transfer or assignment of their share, right, title and interest in the estate of the deceased. The validity
and legality of such assignments can not be threshed out in the probate proceeding which is concerned
only with the probate of the will.

Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before,
the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved by at
least two credible witnesses. "Credible witnesses" mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to
facts from or upon hearsay.

In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese
law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating
or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is
a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
interested parties must be made.

The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, notice to all interested parties was necessary for the
validity of such proceedings.

Where it appears that the proceedings in the court of a foreign country were held for the purpose of taking
the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and the order of the probate court did not purport to
allow the will, the proceedings cannot be deemed to be for the probate of a will, as it was not done in
accordance with the basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance
of wills. Consequently, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent
court of this country.
The lack of objection to the probate of a lost will does not relieve the proponent thereof or the party
interested in its probate from establishing its due execution and proving clearly and distinctly the
provisions thereof by at least two credible witnesses, as provided for in section 6, Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court.

PCIB vs. Escolin | 56 SCRA 265

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc.
No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.

FACTS: In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was
domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should
her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a
motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be
appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada
manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to
have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same
estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted.
Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the
estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her
will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under
Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be
respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of
her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The
Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law
applicable (and not said law at any other time).

PCIB’s representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the
other parties and the court are being made to rely and act upon. PCIB is “not permitted to contradict
them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.”

Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of the
laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her
will. And since PCIB’s representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute
admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon,
PCIB is “not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or
inconsistent with them.” (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana
vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).

Vallarta vs CA | 150 SCRA 336

FACTS: Rosalinda Cruz, the private offended party, and accused Victoria Vallarta are long time friends and business acquaintances.

On November 20, 1968, Cruz entrusted to Victoria Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry.

In December of the same year, Vallarta decided to buy some items, exchanged one item with another, and issued a post-dated check in
the amount of P5,000 dated January 30, 1969.

Rosalinda Cruz deposited said check with the bank. However, upon presentment, the check was dishonored and Cruz was informed
that Vallarta's account had been closed. Cruz apprised Vallarta of the dishonor and the latter promised to give another check. Later,
Vallarta pleaded for more time. Still later, she started avoiding Cruz.
Hence, this criminal action was instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villarta should be held guilty for non-payment of debt

RULING: Yes. By virtue of Rep. Act No. 4885, "(t)he failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for
lack or insufficiency of funds" is deemed prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

To constitute estafa under this provision the act of post-dating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient
cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud.

Moreover, it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of
innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence
shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence"

It is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-
payment of the debt.

Republic Act 4885 amending Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, establishes a prima facie evidence of
deceit; How deceit established—Republic Act No. 4885, amending Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code,
establishes a prima facie evidence of deceit upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or
insufficiency of funds.

No constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be
overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct—Moreover, it is now
well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of
human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of
innocence" (People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing I COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when certain facts
have been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shif t
the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience"

RA 4885 merely established the prima facie evidence of deceit and eliminated the requirement of notice to
the payee that he had no funds in the bank; With the amendment introduced by RA 4885 it is still criminal
fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code and not
the non-payment of the debt.—ln People v. Sabio (No. L-45490, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 568), this
Court ruled that Rep. Act No. 4885 has not changed the rule established in Art. 315 (2) (d) prior to the
amendment; that Republic Act No. 4885 merely established the prima facie evidence of deceit, and
eliminated the requirement that the drawer inform the payee that he had no funds in the bank or the
funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. Thus, even with the
amendment introduced by Rep. Act No. 4885 it is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check
which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of the debt.

Dela Rama vs Ledesma | 143 SCRA 1

SALVADOR DE LA RAMA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.RAFAEL LEDESMA, defendant-appellee.
Parol Evidence Rule – Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid instrument.

While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake.

SUMMARY: Petitioner sued his nephew, the respondent, over a money claim. It transpired from the war damages claim to be
received by Inocentes de la Rama Inc. wherein petitioner was a stockholder. Petitioner alleged that he sold his 140 shares to the
respondent with an understanding that the latter would deliver to him his (petitioner’s) proportionate equity in the war damage benefits
upon payment by the US foreign claim settlement commission. However, respondent failed to deliver the said payment. Petitioner
relied on their verbal understanding as evidence for his cause of action, however the trial court, as affirmed by the Court, ruled in
favour of respondent. It held that parol evidence cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

FACTS: Petitioner was a stockholder of Inocentes de la Rama Inc. which suffered damages during the last war. The corporation had
an approved war damage claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission (P106,000.00) and the first payment (P56,000) was
made while De la Rama was still a stockholder. Upon resolution of the majority of its stockholders, it was used for the reconstruction
of the Iris Theater Building.

Petitioner sold his shares to his nephew. On Nov. 18, 1958, prior to the payment of the balance of the war damage claim, De La
Rama sold to Ledesma at par value his 140 shares in the corporation by endorsing his certificates of stock in favor of the latter. This
was done with an alleged understanding that De la Rama reserved to himself his proportionate equity in the war damage benefits due
on his 140 shares. Ledesma promised to deliver to him this equity upon payment by the Foreign Claim Settlement Commission of the
United States of the remaining balance.

The corporation received a final payment of its war damage claim (P46,696.33) on March 20.1965 and the Board of Directors passed a
resolution distributing the final payment received by said corporation among its stockholders as dividend computed at P29.59 per
share.

o When Ledesma received the dividends pertaining to his total shareholding including the 140 shares he had purchased from
De la Rama, the latter demanded from the former the return and delivery to him of his corresponding share, yet he refused.

Thus, he filed a complaint against respondent, asking for moral and exemplary damages, including attorney’s fees.

o In his answer, Ledesma admitted the allegation in the complaint except: (a) the alleged verbal understanding between De la
Rama and himself regarding the unpaid war damage claim; (b) the alleged equity of De la Rama in the said claim as such
equity is with the corporation itself, and not with the stockholders individually; and (c) his liability for damages.
o By way of special defense, he claimed that the indorsement by De La Rama was their exclusive contract and to allow the
latter to prove an alleged simultaneous oral agreement would be contrary to the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of
Frauds. Also, the war damage claim belongs to the corporation, not to the individual stockholders.
o In Reply to the special defense, De La Rama said that the said claim should go to those who actually suffered damages during
the war and that it is not profit of the corporation; that the Statute of Frauds only applies to executory contracts, not to
partially fulfilled ones; and that the instant case is exempted from the Parol Evidence Rule since the writing fails to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties, and this fact is pleaded.
o He also alleged that the Board of Directors should be guided by the spirit and letter of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of
1946 and that the oral agreement of the parties is consistent with the trust and confidence of the parties at the time in view of
their close blood relationship.

The trial court, on the issue on whether De La Rama is allowed to present parol evidence to prove his alleged reservation to the war
damage benefits, ruled in the negative.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged verbal agreement of the parties concerning plaintiff's reservation of his right to the balance of the war
damage claim at the time of the sale of his shares to the defendant, can be proven by parol evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule and
the Statute of Frauds

RULING: No. A. (See doctrine) The exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case, there being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud,
mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of the parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like
the parties would have placed in writing such an important reservation.

B. In the case at bar, nowhere in the complaint were the exceptions to the rule alleged or put in issue.

C. Since the alleged reservation is not admissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, the Court does not find it necessary to discuss the
applicability or non-applicability to the present case of the Statute of Frauds.

Parol evidence rule- Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement regarding the balance of a war damage
claim, generally not admissible to vary or contradict the operation of a valid instrument—It is a well accepted principle of
law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat
the operation of a valid instrument. (American Factors [Phil.] Inc. vs. Murphy Tire Corporation, et al. [CA.] 49 O.G. 189.)

While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot incorporate therein additional
contemporaneous conditions not mentioned at all in the writing; Exceptions to parol evidence rule, not present.—While
parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose
of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing,
unless there has been fraud or mistake. (Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384.) Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not
apply in the instant case, there being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of
the parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like the parties would have placed in writing
such an important reservation.

Lechugas vs CA | GR 39972 Aug 6,1986

VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO
LOZA, CARMELITA LOZA, DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA LOZA and ALEJANDRA LOZA,
respondents.

SUMMARY: Lechugas filed an action for forcible entry and damages and an action for recovery and possession of the same property
(disputed land) against the Lozas. Leoncia, the vendor of Lechugas, testified during trial that when the deed of sale was executed
between her and Lechugas, the vendor’s intention was to sell Lot 5522 (located south of the disputed land) because the disputed land
was already sold to the Lozas by her father. Lechugas contends that it was improper to subject the true intent of the deed of sale she
executed with Leoncia to parol evidence. SC held that parol evidence rule does not apply and that Leoncia did not intend to sell the
disputed land to Lechugas.

FACTS:
1. LEONCIA Lansague sold a parcel of land to her cousin, Victoria LECHUGAS. The sale is evidenced by a deed of sale.
LECHUGAS took possession through her tenants Jesus Leoncia, Roberta Losarita, and Simeon Guinta.

2. While Simeon Gunita was plowing a portion of the land, DEFENDANTS (all surnamed LOZA) entered and forced him to
stop working
a. DEFENDANTS told Gunita that he will be allowed to continue plowing if he signed an affidavit recognizing the
DEFENDANTS as his landlords.
b. Gunita reported the incident to LECHUGAS who sought the help of the police. DEFENDANTS did not vacate the
lot despite demands by the police.
c. DEFENDANTS entered another portion of the land and continued to cut bamboo poles growing thereon despite
warnings.
d. Eventually, the whole parcel of land was occupied by the DEFENDANTS.

3. LECHUGAS filed an action for forcible entry and damages with the Justice of the Peace against DEFENDANTS (case
dismissed). The forcible entry case was appealed to the CFI. While the appeal was pending, LECHUGAS filed an action for
recovery and possession of the same property. The two cases were tried jointly.
a. LEONCIA, as witness for the DEFENDANTS in the proceedings in the trial court, testified that the land she sold
to LECHUGAS did not include the disputed land. What she intended to sell was the land situated south of the
disputed land (referred to as “Lot 5522” in the case).

4. The CFI dismissed the two actions and declared DEFENDANTS owners and lawful possessors of the land. LECHUGAS
appealed to the CA (affirmed CFI). A petition for review was filed before the SC.

5. DEFENDANTS claim that the land that LECHUGAS purchased from LEONCIA is different from the disputed land.
a. HUGO Loza, predecessor-in-interest of DEFENDANTS (except as to Jose and Salvador Loza) purchased the land
from Victorina Limor. Immediately after the sale, HUGO took possession of the property. This sale was evidenced
by a “Venta Definitiva”. HUGO purchased from EMETRIO Lansague (LEONCIA’s father) another parcel of land
which adjoins the land he had earlier bought from Victorina Limor. This sale was evidenced by a public instrument.
It would appear that the land sold by EMETRIO covered the disputed land allegedly sold by LEONCIA to
LECHUGAS.
b. DEFENDANTS claim that the land bought by LECHUGAS is the one situated Lot 5522.

6. LECHUGAS claims that it was improper to subject the true intent of the deed of sale she executed with LEONCIA to parol
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parol evidence rule applies – NO

RULING: Parol evidence rule does not apply –the rule is not applicable where the controversy is between oneof the parties to the
document and third persons.

Parol evidence rule does not apply and cannot be invoked by party-litigants against the other, where at least one of them is (1) not a
party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and (2) does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a
right originating in the instrument or the relation that it establishes. Strangers to a contract are not bound by its terms.

While the deed of sale was executed between LECHUGAS and LEONCIA, the litigation was between LECHUGAS and
DEFENDANTS. Thus, LEONCIA is a stranger to the litigation and is not bound by the rule.

Zulueta vs CA | 253 SCRA 699

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took certain possessions
and documents belonging to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit Cecilia filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC of Manila which rendered a decision declaring him as “the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress.”

The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives
were enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in
question.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that a
previous ruling of a different nature involving the same documents were admissible as evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissible as evidence.

HELD: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any
proceeding.

Evidence; Illegally Obtained Evidence; Constitutional Law;Privacy of Communication and

Correspondence; Privacy of communication and correspondence is inviolable. The only exception in the Constitution is
if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires, otherwise, as prescribed by law .”—
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
“the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.—The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged.—The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

Guerrero vs St. Claire's Realty | GR. 58164

JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA GUERRERO, MAGDALENA GUERRERO ESPIRITU, assisted by
her husband CANDIDO ESPIRITU, GREGORIO GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO, et al.,
petitioners, vs. ST. CLARE’S REALTY CO., LTD., GUILLERMO T. GUERRERO, CECILIA
GUERRERO, assisted by ANGELO CARDEÑO, PERLINDA GUERRERO, etc. et al.,
respondents.
FACTS: The disputed lot was formerly owned by Andres Guerrero, father of the petitioners. Andres physically possessed and
cultivated the land through a tenancy agreement. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted the land to
his sister, Cristina Guerrero, who was to enjoy the owner’s share in the produce of the land. After the death of Andres in 1943,
Cristina continued as trustee of the deceased.

Petitioners alleged that the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then,
at about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed
of Sale of Land” dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt Cristina. They further alleged that notwithstanding the opposition of
the heirs of Cristina, Manuel was successful in his application of the registration of the land in his favor.

Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later
sold the disputed lot to a St.Clare’s Realty, a partnership constituted by them.

According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained and that the subsequent deeds of sale were
likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the defendants allegedly knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero.

During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the petitioners. She testified that the money used
for the illness of her mother was obtained from Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for the loans obtained. This was objected to
by the counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the trial court allowed the witness to
continue, but upon a written motion to disqualify on the same basis, the trial court declared Laura and Jose Cervantes disqualified
from testifying in the case.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a “Motion for the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case to another Branch.” This was denied.
Petitioners then failed to appear at the set schedule for trial, and the trial court judge issued an order stating that petitioners “are
deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally offer their evidence in court” as a consequence of their non-
appearance.

Petitioners filed a “Manifestation” that they did not waive their rights to present further evidence, to cross-examine defendants’
witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence. They added that they reserved such right upon the decision of the CA in a petition for
certiorari which they were preparing to file.

Despite this, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants Guerreros, even ordering the petitioners to pay damages in
the amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in the case and their testimonies
excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”?
Whether the exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was correctly sustained by the CA?

RULING: Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither is they assignors of the parties nor persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the petitioners aimed to establish that it was not
Cristina who owned the disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to Manuel, and that Cristina merely mortgaged the property to
Manuel.

The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the
executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual
capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Thus, the dead man’s rule is clearly inapplicable.

Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other witnesses testified and it was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been
formally offered, or that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is affected by calling the
witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions.

The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of defendants’ evidence and without regard to the proofs that petitioner has
presented. Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was incorrect.

Evidence; Witnesses; The “dead-man’s rule” does not apply to a witness who is not a party or assignor
of a party or person in whose behalf a case is being prosecuted.—Upon the facts and under the law, this
Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were
made in error. The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present
case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor “persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.”
They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina
Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel
Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel
Guerrero.
Same; Same; The “dead man’s rule” does not apply where the case is not a claim or demand against the estate of
a deceased person, but a case where defendant is being sued for allegedly claiming ownership of plaintiffs lot without
basis.—Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero.
The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They
are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a
part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule.
Same; Same; It is error to require a formal offer of testimonial evidence as a condition for its
admission in evidence.—The next question that requires attention is whether or not the exclusion of
plaintiffs’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was correctly sustained by the
respondent Court of appeals. Prior to the issuance of the court’s order of June 14, 1974, by which the
plaintiffs were “deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally offer their evidence”, the
following had testified as witnesses of the plaintiffs, namely: Alfredo Zamora, Roman Mataverde, Moises
Javillonar, Dominador Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong, Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes and Jose
Cervantes. It was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that
without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling the
witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions. (Moran,
Comments on the Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 ed., p. 122.)

Lichauco vs Atlantic Gulf | 84 PHIL 330

Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS, deceasied, MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO,

administrator and appellee, vs. ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA,
claimant and appellant.

DOCTRINE: Inasmuch as the Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.

FACTS: Richard Fitzsimmons, the president of Atlantic Gulf, a foreign corporation registered and licensed to do business in the
philippines, held 1,000 shares of stock of which 545 had not been fully paid for but were covered by promissory notes in favor of
Atlantic Gulf.

In 1941, P64,500.00 was credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the said stocks out of bonuses and dividends to
which he was entitled from the company. Under an agreement with Atlantic, should he die leaving the shares unpaid, Atlantic, at his
option, may either acquire said shares by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the
corresponding shares equivalent to the amount paid thereon.

Fitzsimmons died and a proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted.
Atlantic then filed a claim against the estate and offered to reacquire the shares sold to Fitzsimmons upon return to the estate of the
P64,500 paid thereon.

The administrator, Marcial Lichauco, however, denied the alleged indebtedness. During trial, Atlantic presented the testimonies of the
chief accountant and assistant accountant, and of the president and vice-president-treasurer of the corporation.

The trial court however refused to admit said testimonies on the ground of incompetency under the Dead Man’s State, as the witnesses
were not only stockholders and members of the Board of Directors, but officers as well.

ISSUE: Are the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an administrator disqualified from testifying under the
Dead Man’s Statute?

RULING: No. To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would
be equivalent to materially amending the statute by judicial legislation.

The Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of a corporations, therefore, are
not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate
of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such person.

EVIDENCE; SURVIVING-PARTIES RULE; WITNESSES; CORPORATION AS A PARTY; OFPICERS

AND/OR STOCKHOLDERS ARE NOT DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY.—Inasmuch as section 26 (c) of
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, the officers and/or
stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which is a
party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person.

ID. ; SELF-SERVING DECLARATION AND DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST, COMPARED AND

DiSTiNGUiSHED.—A self-servfeig declaration is a statement favorable to the interest of the declarant. It
is not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted. "The vital objection to the admission of this
kind of evidence is its hearsay character. Furthermore such declarations are untrustworthy; to permit
their introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and perjuries." (20 Am. Jur., Evidence, sec.
558, pages 470, 471.) On the other hand, a declaration against the interest of the person making it is
admissible in evidence, notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and the
declarant has died, become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a witness. "The true test in
reference to the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem motam, as is the case
with reference to some classes of hearsay evidence, but whether the declaration was uttered under
circumstances justifying the conclusion that there was no probable motive to falsify." (Id., section 556, pp.
467, 468.)

Goni vs CA | GR.27434
GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P.
VILLANUEVA, MARINA P. VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P.
VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P.
VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees.
FACTS OF THE CASE: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals. The three (3) haciendas known as San
Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria were originally owned by the Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
[TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said
haciendas. As he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell
Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as
guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA.

Villanueva further contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum
of P13,807.00.
Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the
purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter
amount was debited from private respondent’s account. The difference was supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but
as no receipt evidencing such payment was presented.

On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields
Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva. Meanwhile, Fields
nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente.

On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted, among the properties included in the inventory
submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages. He sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his
favor on October 24, 1949.

the trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a formal deed of
sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed lower Court.

ISSUE: May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes a claim
or demand upon his estate, in violation of Rule 130, sec. 20 par. (a) ?

RULING: YES. The object and purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a) (commonly known as the SURVIVORSHIP
DISQUALIFICATION RULE or DEAD MAN STATUTE) is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to
the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party
defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the
deceased.

The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them,
remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased,
not only because they succeeded to the decedent’s right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so
placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the
deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.

HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent
Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representatives of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s lifetime." It must further be observed that
petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual
capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields
nos. 13 and 14. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring
before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate of representatives of the
estate/deceased person.

Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or
incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify.
But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The
inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20 (a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to
either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips, does not actually exist in the
case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goni could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while
admitting the existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni testified that the same was subsequently novated into a
verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

Evidence; The privilege to invoke the Dead Man’s Statute is waived by the defendant where (a) he cross-examines the plaintiff;
and (b) he files a counterclaim against the plaintiff.—Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners
crossexamined private respondent Vicente. “A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or
when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s lifetime.” It must further be
observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it
was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and
surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of
fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or
representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Same; The Survivorship Disqualification Rule cannot be invoke where defendant testifies as to
communications made or contracts entered into with the agent of the decedent while latter was alive.—
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person
in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party
must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The
contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado)
of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract
and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with
respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the
other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar,
for the reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to
sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that
the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

People vs Carlos | 47 PHIL 626

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. FAUSTO V.
CARLOS, defendant and appellant.
 1.

SUMMARY: Dr. Sityar performed a surgical operation on the wife of Carlos because the latter was suffering from appendicitis. The
former demanded payment to Carlos but the latter protested such payment. Dr. Sityar was stabbed by Carlos after an argument
between the two. Carlos claimed self-defense. CFI ruled out self-defense and found that Carlos is guilty of murder. This is based on a
finding of evident premeditation when the court admitted in evidence a letter written by the wife of Carlos addressed to him two days
after the death of Dr. Sityar stating that Carlos might have resorted to physical violence. SC found that Carlos is guilty only of simple
homicide. The letter is inadmissible because the defense was not given the opportunity to assent to its contents during trial.

DOCTRINE: Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally
or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the
communication, if competent, becomes admissible. The illegality of the search and seizure must be directly litigated and established
by a motion made before trial for the return of the things seized in order that the communication be excluded in evidence. However, in
case of letters, the spouses must be given opportunity in the witness stand to assent to its contents.

FACTS: 1. Dr. Pablo Sityar performed a surgical operation for appendicitis and other ailments on Fausto Carlos’s wife. After the
operation, Carlos and his wife visited Dr. Sityar several times for the purpose of dressing the wounds.

2. During one of the visits to Dr. Sityar, the latter asked Carlos to buy some medicine. Carlos states that during his absence, Doctor
Sityar outraged the wife.

3. Carlos, while confined in PGH due to a stomach trouble, received a letter from Dr. Sityar asking the former to settle their account
for services rendered to the wife.

4. May 26, 1924: Carlos went to the clinic of Dr. Sityar and found the latter alone. Without any quarrel, Carlos attacked Dr. Sityar
with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. Dr. Sityar made an effort to escape but Carlos pursued him and inflicted another wound upon
him. He died within a few minutes. Carlos escaped but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of
the following day.

5. Carlos admits that he killed Dr. Sityar but maintains that he did so in self-defense. (CFI ruled out self-defense for being contrary to
the evidence of the prosecution)

6. The CFI found Carlos guilty of murder due to presence of evident premeditation. This was sustained by taking into consideration a
letter written to Carlos by his wife and seized by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. The letter shows that the
wife feared that Carlos contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.

7. The defense argues that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. Also, the letter was
obtained through a search for which no warrant appears to have been issued. The defense argues that documents obtained by illegal
searches are not admissible in evidence in a criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the letter is admissible in evidence – NO

RULING: CFI decision is MODIFIED. Carlos is guilty of simple homicide.

RATIO:
1. SEE DOCTRINE.

2. The letter must be excluded. The letter was written by the wife and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been
admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand. The letter was therefore not offered for the purpose.
Also, if the defendant had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is
not the case. The fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is
therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to
be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no
difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged.

3. The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband
and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which
both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by
his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.

4.With the letter excluded in evidence, there is no sufficient evidence that the crime was premeditated.

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EVIDENCE; HUSBAND AND WIFE; PRIVILEGED

COMMUNICATION.—Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the other comes
into the hands of a third party, without collusion or voluntary disclosure on the part of either of
the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise
competent, becomes admissible in evidence.

1. 2.ID.; ID.; DOCUMENTS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCHES.—The rule laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in the cases of Boyd and Boyd vs. United States (116 U. S., 616)
 and Silverthorne Lumber Co. and Silverthorne vs. United States (251 U. S., 385) in regard to
evidence obtained by illegal searches, discussed.

1. 3.ID. ; ID. ; LETTERS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.—A letter written by a wife to her
husband is incompetent as evidence in a criminal case against the latter where there is no
indication of assent on his part to the statements contained in the letter. The letter may,
however, be admissible to impeach the testimony

US vs Antipolo | 37 PHIL 726

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.DALMACIO ANTIPOLO, defendant and
appellant.
FACTS:

1. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas, charged with the murder of one
Fortunato Dinal.
2. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he was appealed.
3. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man
whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain
alleged dying declarations.
4. Upon asking question to the witness, the fiscal objected.

“I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified that she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that
being so I believe that she is not competent to testify under the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be
with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified
from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party.”

5. Defense: The disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one
of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and
the accused; that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is
no longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage.
6. Objection was sustained.
7. To this objection counsel took exception and made an offer to prove by the excluded witness the facts which he expected to
establish by her testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LC erred in excluding the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta?

HELD: Yes. The widow of the deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to testify on behalf of the defense or
the prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the deceased concerning the cause of his death.

RATIO:

A. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:

Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a
competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties.

B. This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect
accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to
whom such confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other
spouse.

C. Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in
which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is
made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring
into the cause of his death.

D. On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by
reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the trial of
the one who killed him.

E. The declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any
competent witness who heard the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other fact known to
her. . . . It can not be contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made to her;
on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the
prosecution of the defendant.
 HOMICIDE; DYING DECLARATIONS; WITNESSES; HUSBAND AND WIFE.—The widow of
the deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to testify on behalf of the defense or
the prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the deceased concerning the cause of his death.

National Devt Co vs Workmen's Compensation Comm | 19 SCRA 861

People vs Amajul | GR. 14626-27
People vs Serrano | 105 PHIL 531
People vs Nierra | 96 SCRA 1
People vs Victor | 181 SCRA 818
People vs Pajera | 30 SCRA 693
US vs Dela Cruz | 12 PHIL 87
People vs Alegre | 94 SCRA 109
US vs Tolosa | 5 PHIL 616
People vs Ola | 152 SCRA 1
People vs Cusi | 14 SCRA 944
People vs Saliling | 69 SCRA 427
Ong vs CA | 100 SCRA 641
People vs Mansueto | 336 SCRA 715
People vs Florendo | 68 PHIL 619