WEEK 7

TITLE EIGHT: CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

What are the crimes against persons?

1. Parricide (Art. 246)
2. Murder (Art. 248)
3. Homicide (Art. 249)
4. Death caused in a tumultuous affray (Art. 251)
5. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray (Art. 252)
6. Giving assistance to suicide (Art. 253)
7. Discharge of firearms (Art. 254)
8. Infanticide (Art. 255)
9. Intentional abortion (Art. 256)
10. Unintentional abortion (Art. 257)
11. Abortion practiced by a woman herself or by her parents (Art. 258)
12. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortive (Art. 259)
13. Duel (Art. 260)
14. Challenging to a duel (Art. 261)
15. Mutilation (Art. 262)
16. Serious physical injuries (Art. 263)
17. Administering injurious substances or beverages (Art. 264)
18. Less serious physical injuries (Art. 265)
19. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment (Art. 266)
20. Rape (Art. 266-A)

Art. 246 – Parricide — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Elements:
1. That a person is killed
2. That the deceased is killed by the accused
3. That the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse, of the accused.
People v. Jumawan, 116 SCRA 739

FACTS: On the basis of a written statement made by Vicente Recepeda on July 18, 1976,
and an affidavit executed by Trinidad Alcantara on July 19, 1976, a complaint for murder was
filed in the Municipal Court of Sariaya, Quezon, on July 19, 1976, by Station Commander
Sisenando P. Alcantara, Jr. against Francisco Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan
and Presentacion Jumawan for the death of Rodolfo Magnaye.
The lower court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye, Manuel Jumawan,
and Francisco Jumawan guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
as defined and punished under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences each
of them to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to indemnify jointly and severally the
parents of the victim in the amount of Twenty-four Thousand (P24,000.00) Pesos.
It appears from the evidence adduced during the trial that Rodolfo Magnaye was married on
26 January 1974 to Presentacion Jumawan, one of the accused in the above entitled criminal
case. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister
Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and stayed with his mother
Trinidad Alcantara. The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several
attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo Magnaye on a document agreeing to a separation
from his wife so that both he and his wife will be free to marry again but Rodolfo Magnaye
persisted in refusing to sign said document.
On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye even brought Rodolfo
Magnaye and his mother to the Provincial Constabulary Command to ask for the assistance
of Sgt. Mortilla to assist her daughter in securing a separation from Rodolfo Magnaye but they
were told by Sgt. Mortilla that it cannot be legally done.
Issue: Whether or not Presentacion Jumawan- Magnaye should be convicted of Parricide?

Ruling: No, Wife of victim cannot be convicted of parricide if charged only with murder.
However, relationship must be considered aggravating even if not alleged in the
information.— Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her
relationship to the deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be
convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength. Although not alleged in the
information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the
appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of
murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate
the crime.
Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the
deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder
only qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should
be assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion
stands convicted of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and
brotherin-law aggravate the crime.
The penalty for murder with an aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of
necessary votes, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
People v. Tomotorgo, 136 SCRA 238 (c/o Marbibi)

FACTS: Magdalena de los Santos, the wife of Jaime Tomotorgo, had been persistently asking
her husband to sell the conjugal home and that their family transfer to the house of her
husband's in-laws. Tomotorgo would not accede to his wife's request. He did not like to
abandon the house wherein he and his wife were then living. Furthermore, he had no
inclination to leave because he has many plants and improvements on the land which he was
then farming.
On June 23, 1977, at about seven o'clock in the morning, the accused left his home to work
on his farm Upon his return, he found his wife and his three-month old baby already gone.
He finally saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of clothes some 200m
away from their home. He asked and pleaded with his wife that she should return home with
their child but she adamantly refused to do so. When appellant sought to take the child from
his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail hereby causing the latter
to cry. This conduct of his wife aroused the ire of the herein accused. Incensed with wrath
and his anger beyond control, appellant picked lip a piece of wood nearby and started hitting
his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of severe pains on her chest. Realizing
what he had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He
then returned to the place where the child was thrown and he likewise took this infant home.
Soon thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate
her pains. After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident to
the Barangay Captain of their place who brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom the
accused surrendered. He also brought with him the piece of wood he used in beating his wife.
He was charged with parricide and pleaded not guilty. Upon realizing the gravity of his offense,
he changed his plea to guilty. The court found him guilty of parricide but with three mitigating
circumstances – voluntary surrender, plea of guilty and that he acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.
He was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant claims that the court handed him
the wrong punishment. Appellant claims that article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes
the proper applicable penalty when the crime committed is different from what was intended.
If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is higher than the offense which the
accused wanted to commit, the penalty corresponding to the later shall be imposed as the
maximum period. Appellant avers that the penalty for the felony committed by him – parricide
– was higher than that which he intended to commit – physical injuries.

ISSUE: W/N accused is guilty of physical injuries only and not parricide.

HELD: NO. Accused is guilty of parricide. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that the accused is liable for all the
consequences of his felonious acts. Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more
serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act because
under Art. 4 (1) of the same code, he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of
his unlawful act. His lack of intentiosn to commit a grave wrong is at best mitigating.
The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes
graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely misplaced
and irrelevant considering that in this case the victim died very soon after she was assaulted.
The court held that the fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict
physical imjuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more serious crime
committed.

People v. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198 (1996) (c/o Garillo)

FACTS: Trial Court convicted Accused Malabago of parricide for killing his wife Letecia and
imposed the death penalty. Accused’s mother-in-law was tending her sari-sari store, when
her daughter, Letecia, arrived. Later, accused came and he and Letecia began arguing about
money and husband’s jealousy of someone. Letecia cried out "Agay!" and the mother-in-law
saw Letecia's face bloodied with a slash along her right ear. Accused was facing Letecia, he
was then holding a bolo, struck her again, hitting the lower left side of her face, from the lips
to the neck. Letecia died. Accused says he was in another poblacion and he didn’t know who
killed his wife and says that his mother-in-law testified because she was against their
marriage.

ISSUE: Is he guilty of parricide?

Held: Yes, but court modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua, not death. (no treachery,
but there was voluntary surrender. 1 mitigating, no aggravating)

RATIO: Parricide is committed when:

(1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to.
The essential elements like accused’s marriage to Letecia, the cause of death, and accused’s
participation therein were facts established by the prosecution in its evidence in chief:
-[As to their marriage] He did not object to the mother-in-law’s testimony that accused and
Letecia were married. He also testified to that fact. Such was an admission against his penal
interest and there is the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
-[As to the cause of Letecia’s death] There was the death certificate, the mother -in-law’s
testimony and affidavit, and even the accused himself affirmed that his wife died as a result
of the hacking (he just denied to have done the hacking).
-His defense of alibi was not appreciated because the two poblacions were only 4 km apart
and easily accessible by motor vehicles.
People v. Ignacio, 270 SCRA 445 (1997) (c/o Marbibi)

Facts: Rosaria Ignacio, then 44 years of age, lived with her husband, Juan Ignacio, 67 years
old, Residing with them was Rosaria's daughter, Milagros V. Cabanilla, by a previous marriage.
On the night of 09 February 1992, Rosaria and Juan had a heated argument.
Milagros, entreated them to stop but the couple were in no mood to heed her. The following
night (10 February 1992), at dinner, Juan and Rosaria had another quarrel. Milagros peeped
and saw by the gas lamp that both were pulling a piece of lawanit and each tried to take
possession of it. Juan ultimately released the lawanit and turned to go for his bolo when
Rosaria picked up a palo-palo and hit Juan on the nape. Rosaria left the straggling Juan and
surrendered to the police at the municipal building. Rosaria voluntarily disclosed before
Rolando (Son of Juan) and Pat. San Diego that she hit Juan with a wooden club. Juan died
the following day. Testifying in her defense, Rosaria did not deny having inflicted the fatal
wounds on her husband. According to her, between 7 and in the evening of 10 February 1992,
while she was resting on the wooden bed near the kitchen, her husband arrived drunk.

Armed with a bolo, he went around the wooden bed and then faced her. She finally stood up,
pulled his hair, got hold of a palo-palo and hit him once on the head. The assault sent Juan
hovering down the floor. Rosaria went to the municipal hall and surrendered to police officer
San Diego. Rosaria has interposed this appeal praying that she be acquitted on the basis of
self-defense or, in the alternative, that she be held guilty only of homicide rather than of
parricide.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused is guilty of parricide

Held: YES. An accused who interposes self-defense admits the commission of the act
complained of. The burden of proving self-defense would now be on the accused. Unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. By her
own admission, appellant only thought that her husband would strike her. In fact, appellant's
claim of self-defense was belied by her own daughter, Milagros, who declared that even
before the victim could get his bolo, appellant already picked up her palo-palo and hit him.
Accused claim of self-defense cannot be sustained. The bolo which was allegedly in victim's
possession and with which the victim allegedly attempted to hit the accused, was never found
and its whereabouts unknown to the accused. Appellant contends that, if at all, she should
be convicted only of homicide, not parricide, because "there was no clear evidence of
marriage" between her and the victim. Here, appellant not only declared in court that the
victim was her fourth husband but she also swore that they were married before a judge in
Montalban, Rizal. The victim's son testified that his father and appellant were husband and
wife and appellant's daughter, Milagros, held the victim to be her mother's husband.
Appellant's own admission that she was married to the victim was a confirmation of the
semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman so deporting
themselves as husband and wife had verily entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

People v. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493(c/o Tibre)

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa,
appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but
apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their
quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk,
he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she
consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant
and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able
to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the
victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and
defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and
imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the
re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case
for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly
granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial
court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman
syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”,
Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently
submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as
constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with
the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form
of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman,
the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in
an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time
of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual
-- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were
duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in
the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to
self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the
following requisites of self-defense must concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,

sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there
was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack
upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed.
The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however,
taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted
by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately
chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-
spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child,
overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame
her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering
the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance,
the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14
years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has
been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of
the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law
provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered
women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of
any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.xxx"

Art. 247 – Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances — Any legally
married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to
their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living
with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the
benefits of this article.
Requisites:
1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his daughter, the
latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person.
2. That he or she kills any or bother, of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any
serious physical injury in the act of immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that
he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
In what cases is a person who committed parricide not be punished with reclusion perpetua
to death?
1. When parricide is committed through negligence (Art. 365)
2. When it is committed by mistake (Art. 249)
3. When it is committed under exceptional circumstance (Art. 247)

People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735 (c/o Marbibi)

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte,
sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder
with double frustrated murder. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death
sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death
and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-
appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In
compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the
case by way of an appeal.
On July 15, 1984 at around 6:00 PM, accused Francisco Abarca went home and found his
wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh
noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who
was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ranaway. The accused
went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. At around 6:30 p.m. he got an M-16 rifle and
went back to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the
hangout of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mah-jong and fired at him three
times with his rifle. Koh was hit and died instantaneously. Arnold and Lina Amparado who
were occupying the adjacent room were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Arnold
and Lina Amparado were rushed to the hospital and were rendered timely medical assistance
that prevented their deaths.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under
exceptional circumstances can be applied in the instant case dissolving the criminal liability of
the accused for the murder of the deceased.
2. Whether or not the accused is liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by
the Amparados.

Ruling:
1. Yes, Article 247 can be applied in the instant case.
2. No, the accused is not liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.
Article 247 qualifies death to be under exceptional circumstance when the following elements
are present: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in
the act or immediately thereafter.
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse. That he went out to kill one of them immediately thereafter is however vague.
The length of time that passed between the time the accused discovered his wife having
sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot took almost an
hour. It must be understood however that the shooting was the continuation of the pursuit
of the victim by the accused. The killing has been motivated by the same blind impulse and
was the direct by-product of the accused’s rage. Satisfying both provisions, Article 247 can
therefore be applicable in this case. As a result, accused is not criminally liable for the death
of the deceased as he was under exceptional circumstance upon employing the act of killing.
As a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act. However,
that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. Ruling that Article 247 can be
applied in this case, accused was therefore not committing a felony when he killed the
deceased. Having not committing a felony, it therefore follows that the accused is not liable
for the unintended acts which followed, in this case, for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.

Summary of Ruling by SC:

The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder
when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. It cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. For the separate injuries suffered by the
Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its
medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty
(than destierro).
The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four
months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in
confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to
indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization
expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No
special pronouncement as to costs.

People v. Puedan, 388 SCRA 266 (c/o Fabile)

Facts: In the morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his six-year old
grandson, Reymark Anthony Ilar, went to the house of Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet Appellant
Roger Puedan suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five (5) times, first in the abdomen,
with a sharp, pointed knife locally known as plamingco. Appellant contends that he deserves
acquittal, because the killing falls under the exceptional circumstance referred to in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. He claims to have surprised his spouse whom he had caught
in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person. Leah Puedan, the wife of the
accused, admitted having an illicit relationship with the deceased, Florencio Ilar. The illicit
relationship had been going on for two years and was known in their barangay, except her
husband. On February 21, 1995, at about 8:00 o’ clock in the morning, Florencio Ilar came to
their house, and suggested that they have a quick sexual intercourse. While they were having
sex, Roger suddenly appeared and was stunned by what he saw. Roger then struck Florencio
with his bolo and the two men grappled with each other. She then gathered her young child
and ran away from the house.

Issues:
1. WON Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied in appellant’s favor, and
2. WON treachery should not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.

Ruling:
1. No. ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any
legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised his wife and Florencio
in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter. However, all
that appellant established was Florencios promiscuity, which was inconsequential to the
killing.
In this case, the RTC found the prosecution witnesses to be credible and convincing. It
observed that Tulo, Reymark and Erlinda were candid and straightforward in relating their
versions of the stabbing incident. Standing about a meter away, Tulo recounted that appellant
suddenly appeared and stabbed Florencio on the abdomen with a knife.
Furthermore, the physical evidence shows that Florencio lay dead near Tulos -- not appellants
-- house. Also, When found, the body of Florencio was fully clothed in a shirt and a pair of
pants, all its buttons intact. We agree with the RTC that had the victim been caught by surprise
while engaged in the sex act, he would not have had the opportunity to put on his pants,
parry the forthcoming bolo thrusts, and then grapple with appellant.
Further eroding the defense of appellant is the fact that he immediately fled from the crime
scene right after the stabbing incident. As with self-defense, the exceptional circumstance
provided under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code may not prevail in the face of the flight
of appellant from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident.
Flight bespeaks guilt and gives credence to the version of the prosecution in this case.

2. Similarly without merit is appellants contention that treachery did not attend the killing.
For treachery to be present, the means, methods or forms of execution should give the person
attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation. And it must be proven that such means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted without danger to
appellant. In the present case, the RTC correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing.
Appellant came from nowhere and suddenly stabbed the unsuspecting Florencio five (5)
times. He deliberately and consciously adopted his mode of attack by lunging at the victim
with his knife without any warning whatsoever, giving the latter no opportunity to defend
himself.

Art. 248 – Murder — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

Elements of Murder:
1. That a person was killed
2. That the accused killed him
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art.
248
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide

People v. Tomas, Sr., 643 SCRA 530 (c/o Marbibi)

FACTS: Estrella was walking slightly ahead of her mother and Angelita when appellants
Tomas, Sr., Doctor and Gatchalian suddenly came out from the side of the road. Tomas, Sr.
and Doctor are cousins of Estrella. Thereupon, without saying anything, Tomas, Sr. drew a
gun and shot Estrella twice at a distance of about 1.5 meters away. Gatchalian, without a
gun, allegedly supported Tomas, Sr. by standing in a blocking position along the road, while
Doctor positioned himself at the back of Damiana and Angelita and poked a handgun at them,
telling them to lie face down on the ground, though they did not totally drop on the road but
were in a kneeling position.
When Tomas, Sr. fired the first two shots at Estrella, the latter fell down but the former still
followed it with three more shots when she was already prone on the ground. After the five
shots, the three accused fled towards the house of Tomas, Sr. Liezl, who was standing about
four meters away from Estrella, shouted, "Saklulu, tulungan ninyo kami (Help, help us)," then
ran to her house.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nestor Gatchalian was an accomplice.

HELD: YES. We note that the evidence adduced and the records would show that Gatchalian
did not do overt acts for the furtherance of the shooting of Estrella. As mentioned above,
mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of
cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy.
It appears that Gatchalian is a party to the conspiracy as found by the courts a quo. Gatchalian
appeared in the company of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. He also fled together with them. However,
Gatchalian was unarmed and did not say anything or commit any overt act to externally
manifest his cooperation with the shooting of Estrella. On the other hand, Gatchalian never
attempted to stop the shooting, which tends to show that he was aware of the plan and intent
to kill Estrella or, at the very least, that he acquiesced to the shooting of Estrella.
Thus, with his lack of overt acts manifestly contributing to the accomplishment of the common
design to shoot Estrella, there is some doubt if he indeed conspired with Tomas, Sr. and
Doctor. This, however, does not exculpate him from criminal liability absent proof that he
merely tagged along or just happened to meet his employer (Tomas, Sr.) shortly before the
incident or was merely taken along without being told about the other accused-appellants’
plan. The fact that Gatchalian appeared together with the other accused-appellants and fled
with them, while not constitutive of proof beyond reasonable doubt of conspiracy, still proves
a certain degree of participation and cooperation in the execution of the crime. Consequently,
in line with the principle that whatever is favorable to an accused must be accorded him,
Gatchalian is guilty as an accomplice only. As We aptly explained in People v. Ballesta: “Mere
presence at the scene of the incident, knowledge of the plan and acquiescence thereto are
not sufficient grounds to hold a person as a conspirator. x x x Lacking sufficient evidence of
conspiracy and there being doubt as to whether appellant acted as a principal or just a mere
accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and is thus held liable only as an
accomplice.”

People v. Estacio, 593 SCRA 426 (c/o TIbre)

FACTS: At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with Estacio
and Sumipo, arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon City where
the three of them would meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier
told Sumipo that she would settle her debt to the victim and then "deretsong dukot na rin x
x x kay Charlie [the victim]." Sumipo assumed, however, that Maritess was just joking.
Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the
victim complied, Estacio, with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess
transferred to the backseat, sat beside the victim, tied the victim’s hands behind his back,
and placed tape on his mouth. While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their
plan, they replied that they would kill the victim so that he would not take revenge. On
Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a
secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then
brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced.
After which, they called the victim’s mother and demanded money from her. The victim’s
mother having agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money
in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo
later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as they were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing
them to leave and part ways. Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun,
watch, and necklace from the proceeds of which he was given P7,000.

On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23,
1996, Estacio surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victim’s mother that
Estacio had admitted having killed her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the
crime scene.

ISSUE: WON the accused committed complex crime of kidnapping with murder?

RULING: In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants
bound and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts
to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they
arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That appellants’
intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which
Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that
it would not create noise.The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did
not qualify appellants’ prior acts as kidnapping.
Where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the
accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or deprive the
victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder,
hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony
to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. The crime committed was thus
plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken
from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending
himself and to facilitate the killing.

People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742 (c/o Marbibi)

FACTS: On August 14, 1989, at Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Ilagan, Province of
Isabela, a shooting incident, reportedly between two political factions, resulted in the death
of a town mayor, a Sangguniang Bayan member and two others; and the wounding of at least
six other persons after a heated conversation at a funeral wake. The accused, had in their
respective possessions the following firearms, to wit: Veriato Molina - an M-14 armalite rifle;
Ruben Molina - a cal. 38 revolver; Gregorio Gajas, Casimiro Castillo and Jesus Ariola - M16
armalite rifles; and John Doe, Richard Doe, Michael Doe, and Mark Doe - M-16 armalite rifles
and a cal. 30 garand rifle, which were loaded with their corresponding ammunitions, without
the necessary license and/or authority to possess and carry the said firearms and ammunitions
outside their residence issued by the corresponding government authorities, and which they
used in the shooting and killing of Mayor Bonifacio Uy, Municipal Councilor Antonio Manaligod,
Jaime Vargas, and Policarpio Estrada, and the serious wounding of Manuel Mariano, Andres
Figarola, Moises de la Cruz, and Wilma Acierto with intent to kill, treachery, abuse of
superiority and with the aid of armed men and of nocturnity.
The trial court further concluded that the crime committed was multiple murder and frustrated
murder qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and use of armed men. The lower
court also found both accused-appellants guilty of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. Evidence recovered from the crime scene included a Smith and Wesson revolver
(.38 caliber), bearing SN (Serial Number)
C617376, and six spent shells which were found by the NBI to have been fired from the
aforementioned revolver. The Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
certified that said revolver had been issued to Veriato Molina of Amulung, Cagayan; and that
Ruben Molina was likewise a licensed holder of a registered revolver, Orohm Caliber .22, with
SN 232904. Neither appellant, however, had a permit to carry any firearm outside his
residence.
Upon conviction by the trial court, Veriato and his uncle Ruben, filed their Notice of Appeal
on several assignment of errors upon the trial court, two of which are on the Multiple Murder
and Multiple Frustrated Murder Cases and on the Illegal Possession of Firearms Case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases

HELD: In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and (2) the fact that
the accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, did not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess or carry the same outside his residence.
Both elements have been indubitably proven by the prosecution. Witnesses categorically
stated that both appellants held firearms during the incident -- Veriato, an M-14; and Ruben,
a handgun. Recovered from the scene of the crime were a revolver, which was later confirmed
as registered in the name of Appellant Veriato Molina, and spent shells expelled from it as
well as from other high-caliber weapons. Neither of the appellants, though both registered
owners of handguns, was legally authorized to carry such gun outside his residence, according
to a certification issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit. Neither was Appellant
Veriato authorized to possess an M-14 rifle, the weapon he used in killing Bonifacio Uy.
Obviously, the use of an M-14 rifle was unauthorized because this weapon cannot be licensed
in favor of, nor carried by, private individuals. With these pieces of evidence, appellants should
be held liable for violation of Sec. 1 of PD 1866. Under our ruling in People vs. Quijada,
violation of PD 1866 is an offense distinct from murder; appellants should perforce be culpable
for two separate offenses, as ruled by the trial court.
Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers
the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide, and not as a separate offense. Thus, the unauthorized use of a weapon which has
been duly licensed in the name of its owner/possessor may still aggravate the resultant crime.
In the case at bar, although appellants may have been issued their respective licenses to
possess firearms, their carrying of such weapons outside their residences and their
unauthorized use thereof in the killing of Bonifacio Uy may be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in imposing the proper penalty for murder.
All in all, appellants may be held liable only for murder with the special aggravating
circumstance of using unlicensed firearms. Nevertheless, the death penalty cannot be
imposed upon appellants, since the killing occurred in August 1989, when the imposition of
the capital penalty was still proscribed by the Constitution. Appellants Veriato Molina and
Ruben Molina are found guilty of murder for the death of Bonifacio Uy with the special
aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed firearms.

RATIO: While affirming the conviction of accused-appellants for the murder of the late Mayor
Bonifacio Uy, the Court applies in their favor Republic Act No. 8294, which amended PD No.
1866. Under the new law, the use of an unlicensed weapon in the commission of homicide or
murder is considered simply as an aggravating circumstance and no longer a separate offense.
Thus, said law effectively modified the court’s ruling in People vs. Quijada, in which it was
held that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes - one, for
the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and, two, for homicide or murder.

People v. Molina, G.R. No. 129051 July 28, 1999 (c/o Marbibi)

FACTS: Accused-appellant Molina was treated for injuries sustained when he was mauled
without no apparent reason by several assailants, including Domingo, the victim, whom Molina
looked up to as a father. At least 6 hours after the attack, Molina went to the house of
Domingo and thereafter attacked the latter while sleeping, hitting and stabbing him with a
stone and a short knife, resulting in Domingo’s death.

ISSUE: WON the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense is present.

RULING: The mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense was present. Being
mauled by someone whom the accused respected akin to a father understandably engendered
a strong feeling of vengeance on the latter’s part.
As to the manner in which Molina killed the victim, the same was undoubtedly attended by
treachery since the accused attacked Domingo while the latter was asleep and unable to
defend himself. There is alevosiawhere the attack was sudden and unexpected, rendering the
victim defenseless and ensuring the accomplishment of the assailant’s evil purpose without
risk to himself.
It should be emphasized that for dwelling to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance,
there must have been no provocation on the part of the victim. The provocation contemplated
here is one that is sufficient and immediate to the commission of the crime. In other words,
the invasion of the privacy of the offended party’s house must have been the direct and
immediate consequence of the provocation given by the latter as where, for example, the
accused and the victim quarelled in front of the latter’s house and the accused, in a fit of rage
entered the victim’s house and proceeded to stab him. Such is not the situation in the case
at bar because the killing in the victim’s house occurred at least six hours after the accused’s
mauling.
There is, however, the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to offset the
generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling. As the records show, accused-appellant was
treated for injuries he sustained when he was mauled in the afternoon of July 14, 1995 and
the prosecution did not offer any rebuttal evidence to deny the allegation that Domingo was
one of the men who beat up Molina. Indeed, that accused-appellant was mauled for no
apparent reason by someone who looked up to as a father understandably engendered a
strong feeling of vengeance on his part. Sadly, however, he chose to take the law into his
own hands to sate his thirst for revenge.

Art. 249 – Homicide — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

Elements:
1. That a person was killed;
2. That the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;
3. That the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
4. That the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or
by that of parricide or infanticide

Notes:
* Use of Unlicensed firearm is an aggravating circumstance in homicide

* Accidental homicide is a death of a person brought about by a lawful act performed

with proper care and skill, and without homicidal intent.

* Corpus delicti means that a crime was actually perpetrated, and does not refer to the
body of the murdered person

Esqueda v. People, 589 SCRA 489 (c/o Marbibi)

Facts: A petition for review on certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court regarding the
affirmation of the Court of Appeals to the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court Branch
33 of Dumaguete City on Criminal Case Nos. 14612 and 14609 of herein respondents
common-law spouses Gaudencio Quiquinto and Venancia Aliser respectively against petitioner
Edgar Esqueda and one John Doe of 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide.
The private respondents were awaken on of before 11 o’ clock in the evening on March 3,
1999 by the accused petitioner who concealed their identities as members of roving patrol in
their place and asking for a drink from the household. One of the respondents, Gaudencio
Quiquinto opened the door and went outside while his lived-in partner Venancia Aliser
followed him and stayed by the door. They found two men outside, one is positively identified
as the accused petitioner while the other is not identified. The accused petitioner allegedly
stabbed Gaudencio immediately. Aliser tried to ran away but was allegedly stabbed and fell
on the ground and was continually inflicted mortal wounds against the victims.
The defense anchored on alibi and denial. Presented three witnesses, Claudio, Viviana and
Domingo testified before the court that the accused was out sea fishing during the time of
the crime.

Issue: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the latter guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of frustrated homicide and totally disregarding the latter’s defense.

Held: The Honorable Court did not disregard the defense of the accused petitioner in
rendering its decision. The presented alibis and denial by the defense are essentially weak
against the positive identifications made by the respondents.
For an alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he is somewhere else and it is physically
impossible for him to be in the scene for the crime. Physically impossible refers to the distance
between the place where the crime has transpired and the place where it was committed,
also the facility of access between the two places. Using the testimonies of the witnesses as
evidence, the accused petitioner failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to
have gone to the scene of the crime at the time of the incident.
In this case, the defense of alibi failed. The positive identification destroys the defense of alibi
giving to such effect to be weak, given as the identification was made with resound and
credible.

Colinares v. People, 662 SCRA 266 (c/o Sarzona)

FACTS: The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel)
with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur.
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that on the evening of June 25, 2000, he and
Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took
a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and
struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell
unconscious as Jesus fled. Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home
when he saw Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with
something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit
him. Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to
be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought
Rufino to the hospital.
A Medico-Legal Certificate showed that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the
forehead, along the hairline area and the injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino
chose to go home after initial treatment.
Arnel claimed self-defense and testified that the victim, along with Jesus and Ananias were
all quite drunk when he met them on his way home. Rufino tried to stab him but missed and
so he picked up a stone and in order to defend himself, he struck Rufino on the head with it.
When Ananias, saw this, Ananias charged towards him and tried to stab him with a gaff but
he was also able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias too with the same stone. He then fled
and hid in his sister’s house. On September, 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrended at the Tigaon
Municipal Police Station. Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a
pre-wedding party on the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his
way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking
conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the
penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for
lost income in the absence of evidence to support it. Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court
on petition for review.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a
stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated
homicide.
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case
to the trial court.

HELD: In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires

(1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2)
that the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient
provocation. The three witnesses Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias testified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract
from their core story. The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted,
not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People, SC ruled that when the accused intended to
kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the
victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or
frustrated homicide. If the victims wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder
or attempted homicide. Taken in its entirety, there is a death of medical evidence on record
to support the prosecutions claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical
intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The Court finds Arnel guilty only of the
lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on
him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would
be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC
People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (c/o Marbibi)

FACTS: Timoteo Penesa and Rosario Aguillon lived as husband and wife, in the barrio of
Marupit, municipality of Camalingan, Province of Camarines Sur. Their daughter and five
children of Rosario by her late husband lived with them. Due to continuous wrangles between
Timoteo and Rosario's children by her late husband, both agreed to part. In pursuance of the
agreement and after dividing the palay, lumber and firewood between Timoteo and the
children of Rosario by her late husband, Timoteo left the house on 30 August 1942. Early in
the morning of the following day, Timoteo returned to the house and asked Rosario to live
with him in another place. The request was refused. Santiago Cerrado, a cousin of Rosario,
came to the house and, upon seeing Timoteo, asked the latter why he was there after they
had agreed to live apart. Angered by this remark, Timoteo unsheathed his bolo and assaulted
Santiago. Crescencio Doro, the eldest son of Rosario, who tried to prevent another blow upon
Santiago and had made a remark similar to that of Santiago before the latter came to the
house, was also assaulted by Timoteo. At this juncture, Rosario went down through the
stairway, preceded by Santiago. Crescencio and Timoteo grappled for the possession of the
bolo and both fell to the floor. A brother of Rosario appeared upon the scene and snatched
the bolo and a dagger from the hands of Timoteo. As a result of the assault upon Santiago
Cerrado, two wounds were inflicted upon him. They were not serious. Upon Crescensio Doro,
wounds were inflicted, which on the day of the trial was still bandaged because it was not yet
healed. There was one wound on him, which was serious and, if the hemorrhage was not
stopped, it would have resulted in his death.
Upon this evidence the trial court found Timoteo Penesa guilty of frustrated homicide. From
this judgment he has appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of frustrated homicide

HELD: No. The trial court found the appellant guilty of frustrated homicide. This is an error.
When he went to the house of Rosario early in the morning of 31 August, it was not with the
intention to kill anybody, for he went there to entreat Rosario Aguillon to live with him in
another house. Neither could the remarks uttered by Crescencio Doro and Santiago Cerrado
have aroused his temper to such an extent as to engender the desire and intent to kill them.
The finding of the trial court is based on the kind of weapons carried by the appellant when
he went to the house and on the parts of the victims' bodies at which the weapons were
aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. The bolo with the appellant inflicted the wounds
upon Santiago Cerrado and Crescencio Doro was one ordinarily used by farm laborers. The
dagger was carried for self-defense. The wounds inflicted upon the offended parties by the
appellant were caused indiscriminately and not deliberately. Appellant's purpose in going to
the house, and not the kind of weapons he carried, nor the parts of the victims' bodies on
which the wounds were inflicted indiscriminately, is indicative and determinative of his intent.
The crime committed by the appellant against Santiago Cerrado, in the absence of proof as
to the period of the offended party's incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance,
is slight physical injuries, as provided for in Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code; and against
Crescencio Doro is serious physical injuries, for the evidence shows that the wound inflicted
on the 31st of August upon Crescencio Doro was not yet cured on the day of the trial held on
9 October 1942, or that the wound did not heal within 30 days. Pursuant to Article 263,
Paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation, taken into consideration in his favor by the trial
court (Article 13, Paragraph 6, Revised Penal Code), the penalty to be imposed upon him is
six months and 1 day of prision correccional for the wounds inflicted upon Crescencio Doro;
and 15 days of arresto menor for the wounds inflicted upon Santiago Cerrado.

RATIO: In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the
victim. If there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for physical injuries.
Intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts of the victim’s
body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. However, the bolo
which the accused carried with him is one ordinarily used by farm laborers and the accused
was such a farm laborer.

People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72, C.A. No. 227, February 1, 1946 (c/o Isanan)

FACTS: This is a case of Dr. Leon Castillo and Mrs. Nena Tanalega Raymundo for the crime
of “FRUSTRATED MURDER BY POISONING THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE” that was
later changed to “FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE.”
On February 18, 1941, Mr. Silvino Belarmino presented a prescription to the Escudero Drug
Store and asked Dr. Castillo if they could prepare said medicine after having failed to secure
the same in other drug stores in the locality. The complainant requested to prepare him 1/3
of the formula and the former has written “1/3 f.” The following are the prescribe medicine:
Spartein Sulphate, Phenobarbital, and Carrbromal. With some doubt as to the figure appearing
after the word “carbromal”, Belarmino requested a new written prescription and returned at
about 2 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day. The pharmacist Saturnino Cortes was in the
house and Dr. Castillo sent for defendant-appellant Nena Tanalega Raymundo, who was
employed in the drug store as pharmacy clerk.
When the medicine was already prepared, the complainant took one of the capsules with a
glass of water at around 5 o’clock of the same day, he felt dizzy and had difficulty in
breathing,, he could hardly stand as his knees became shaky, and for that reason, he
immediately consulted with physicians, namely, Dr. Felisa Celestino and Dr. Ricardo Reyes.
The latter advised him to go home and rest and explained that the remaining capsules
contains strychnine sulphate a substance sufficient enough to kill a person.

ISSUE:
1. WON defendant-appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crim
frustrated murder through reckless imprudence
2. WON the defendant-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violating the
provisions of section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code
HELD: -- NO. The said judgement is untenable, on the ground that the offense of frustrated
homicide requires the concurrence of the essential requisites of intent to kill, which in
incompatible with the charge of reckless imprudence; although a charge for physical injuries,
serious or less serious, through reckless imprudence, is legally proper under the law; as in
that case the act sought to be punished is the material damage or injury done.
Human health, is the most precious thing, and human life is most sacred. When a person gets
sick or feels sick, he goes to, or sends for, a physician for consultation and treatment, so that
he may secure the proper remedy for his malady.
Defendant and appellant cannot complain that she has been found guilty of a criminal offense,
without due process of law. She had ample opportunity to defend herself against the charges
filed against her.

2. YES. Defendant and appellant Nena Raymundo is found guilty of preparing one’s
medicine for another, under a false name, in violation of the provisions of section 751 of the
Revised Administrative Code; Which states that :
SEC. 751 – Responsibility for quality of drugs – Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the
quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it
shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any
prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name. xxx

People v. Avecilla, 351 SCRA 635 (c/o Bardaje)

Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime if Qualified Illegel Possession of
Firearms on June 21, 1994 by the RTC of Manila,Branch 38 sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The records and the evidence show that the elements of the offense of QIPF defined in 2nd
Paragraph of section 1 PD no. 1866 are present in this case. However, the law on illegal
possession of firearms has been amended by R.A 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1994. The
amended law says that the crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is
committed only where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of
murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat. Otherwise the
violation of unlicensed firearm would be treated either 1) as an essential ingredient in the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat or 2) as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide.

Issue: 1) WON the accused can be acquitted in the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearms.
2.) WON the accused can be convicted in the crime of homicide.

Held:
1) YES. Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to the accused-appellant in this
case, the same may be retroactively applied. This new law applies even to violations that
occurred prior to its effectivity as it may given retroactive effect under art 22 or RPC. R.A
8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the case at bench was committed on
May 5, 1991. As a general rule, penal laws will generally have prospective application except
where the new law will be advantageous to the accused. In this case R.A 8294 will spare
accussed-appellant from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
Accordingly, said law should be given retroactive application.
2) NO. The accused-appellant cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with the use of
the unlicensed firearm as aggravating, inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the
information but merely mentioned as the result of the use of unlicensed firearm. Accused was
not arraigned for homicide or murder. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any these crimes
without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, not to mention his right to due process.

Celino v. CA, 526 SCRA 195 (c/o Gulle)

Facts:
Two separate Information were filed against the petitioner, Angel Celino: one for violation of
the Comelec gun ban; the other, for Illegal Possession of Firearm under R.A. 8294. After
pleading not guilty to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the latter contending that he
“cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if he was also charged of having
committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts
x x x.”

Issue: Whether the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily
bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm because of the provision of the law that
"Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested."

Ruling: Ruling against the petitioner, the High Court explained that he can be convicted of
illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
The word “committed” taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional
presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction
resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.
Citing the case of People v. Valdez (1999), the Supreme Court ruled that “all pending cases
involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other
crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.”

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any
information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession
of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat. Conversely, when the other offense involved
is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession
of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

People v. Buensuceso, 132 SCRA 143 (c/o Cabigas)

FACTS: April 21, 1967 between 5-6pm, witness Apolonio Salvador saw Patrolman Rodolfo
Aguilar & Pariseo Tayag conversing as they were walking side by side, each resting his hand
on the shoulder of the other, going towards the municipal building. Pat. Aguilar was trying to
take the fan knife of Tayag, but could not take it because Tayag prevented him from taking
it. He didn’t want to the give knife because he was not making any trouble. Aguilar told Tayag
to go to the office of the chief of police. Tayag agreed Inside, a heated argument took place
between Pat. Aguilar & Tayag when the latter still refused to give his fan knife. Pat. Fidel de
la Cruz came too, but when Tayag was about to leave the office, Chief of Police Adriano
Canlas arrived & asked what was going on. Aguilar said that the two of them (Aguilar &Canlas)
had been cursed by Tayag. But Tayag denied cursing the 2 & informed the chief that Aguilar
was forcing him to give up his knife.
Tayag hurriedly left the office but he was followed by Pat. Aguilar, Mallari & De la Cruz. Since
Mallari & Aguilar were holding guns, the latter fired his upward. Hearing the shot, Tayag
turned about, retreated backwards until he reached the fence of the plaza, but when Tayag
was near the wooden fence about a knee high, Aguilar shot him above the knee. So, Tayag
ran towards his house but was followed by de la Cruz without a gun. However, Mallari &
Aguilar went to the waiting shed to intercept Tayag & took opposite sides of the road. Then
there were several successive gun shots, more or less nine in number. After the commotion,
Tayag was seen lying prostrate near the back of a jeep parked about 60 meters away from
the municipal building. De la Cruz took the knife from Tayag & gave it to Pat. Jose Buensuceso,
Pat. Izon & Pat. Joson were there too.
Finding out that some police officers were involved, Sgt. Romualdo-Espiritu proceeded to the
municipal building and investigated on the crime. The 4 police officers were charged of
Murder, under Art 248 of the RPC.

ISSUE: Was the conviction of Izon & Joson as co-principals in the crime of Murder correct?
Was the court correct in holding that although there was no conspiracy between the 4 police
officers, they are guilty of Murder under Art. 248 of RPC? Though he claimed to have acted
independently, was there treachery on the part of Aguilar when he killed Tayag?

SUPREME COURT: YES TO ALL. THE COURT FOUND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BACKED UP BY
THE CREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS.
All 4 of the police officers were seen by the witness Salvador to have been present at the
crime scene at armed with .38 calibre service revolvers. The autopsy showed that Tayag died
as a result of 4 gunshot wounds inflicted by .38 cal. Revolvers. Specifically that the slug found
from the knee of Tayag was from the Revolver of Buensuceco. The on-the-spot inspection by
Sgt. Espiritu right after the incident, he found that the service pistol of Aguilar had been fired
& had 3 empty shells & 3 live ammunitions left, and that of Buensuceso’s had been fired as
well & had 4 empty shells & 2 live ammunitions left. The Ballistic examination proved that the
empty shells of ammunition were from the guns of BUENSUCESO & AGUILAR. The Chemistry
Reports on the paraffin tests of IZON and JOSON showed positive results, therefore,
confirming Salvador’s declaration that they were in the vicinity of the crime at the time it
happened. AGUILAR's plea of self-defense is evidently unmeritorious. AGUILAR followed the
victim right after the latter hurriedly left the office of the Chief of Police. If, as contended, the
victim had thrust his knife at AGUILAR inside the Municipal Building malting the former the
unlawful aggressor, to be sure, the incident would have happened there and then and not
some 60 meters away from the building. There is ample evidence establishing that AGUILAR,
BUENSUCESO, IZON, and JOSON had fired their guns at the victim hitting him on different
parts of his body. Although it has not been established as to which wound was inflicted by
each accused the Court held that where the victim died as a result of wounds received from
several persons acting independently of each other, but it has not been shown which wound
was inflicted by each assailant, all of the assailants are liable for the death of the victim. The
crime was qualified by TREACHERY hence it’s MURDER. Because:

a. The victim was already retreating backwards until he reached the fence of the town plaza
when AGUILAR fired his revolver at the former hitting him above the right knee.
b. Despite the fact that he was already hit & wounded, & possibly immobilized, he was still
subjected to successive shots as shown by the wounds that he had received, even at his back.

c. Evidently the means employed by the police tended directly & specially to insure the
execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim
might have made. Also, Tayag s killing was aggravated by abuse of superior strength as
shown by the number of assailants, which was however, absorbed by treachery.
No other circumstances modify the commission of the crime. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

People v. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439

Samson and Pugay were charged with the crime of murder. Samson and Pugay, committed
the crime with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation and superior strength.
FACTS: On May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.
Sometime after midnight, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic
book. Later, Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived at the scene seemingly
drunk. The group saw Bayani Miranda and started making fun of him by tickling him with a
piece of wood. · Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on Miranda.
Gabion asked Pugay to stop during the process of pouring the gasoline. · Then Samson set
Miranda on fire.
ISSUE: WON Pugay and Samson are guilty of the crime murder.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: There was no evidence found that Pugay and Samson planned to kill Miranda. Their
meeting was accidental and the accused were merely making fun of the deceased-victim.
Criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson are counted as individual acts and they are held
liable only for the acts they committed individually. Pugay should have known that what he
was pouring on Miranda was gasoline because of its smell. He failed to exercise diligence
necessary to avoid the consequences of his actions and exposed Miranda to danger and injury.
Pugay is guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Samson just wanted to set Miranda’s
clothes on fire but this doesn’t relieve him of criminal liability (Art. 4). Samson is guilty of
homicide credited with ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong. Gabion testified that accused were stunned when they noticed Miranda burning.
People vs. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 (1993) (c/o Calignawan)

Facts: Jaime Ramirez and Teodoro Basay were accused of killing four (4) people and burned
their house after. Both accused signed a Joint waiver, but was disregarded by the court
because when they signed a joint waiver, they were not represented by a counsel. Basay was
Acquitted, however, Jaime Ramirez was sentenced with life imprisonment because the court
admitted in evidence the so-called extra-judicial confession of Jaime Ramirez as part of the
res gestate the alleged statement of Bombie Toting (victim) to the police constabulary SGt.
Tabanao.
Jaime Ramirez is a farmer, he only finished Grade II and that he doesn’t know how to read.
He, however, understands the Cebuano dialect. The referred sworn statement in English was
taken on March 7, 1986 and subscribed and sworn to only on March 14, 1986 before Judge
Teopisto Calumpang.

ISSUE: W/N the constitutional right of the accused to counsel and to remain silent during
custodial investigation were violated.

RULING: The SC declared in People v Nicandro that one’s right to be informed of the right to
remain silent and to counsel contemplates the “Transmission of meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle”.
Thus it is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under investigation
the provisions of Section 20, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also
explain the effects of such provision in practical terms.
The right “to be informed” carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results inthe
subjects understanding of what is conveyed.

Art. 250 – Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide — The courts, in view
of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of parricide,
murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a penalty lower by one
degree than that which should be imposed under the provision of Article 50.
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one degree the penalty
which under Article 51 should be imposed for an attempt to commit any of such crimes.
Art. 251 – Death caused in a tumultuous affray — When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the
course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified,
such person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all
those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.

Elements:
1. That there be several persons
2. That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally

3. That these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner
4. That someone was killed in the course of the affray
5. That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased
6. That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence
can be identified.

Note:
• Tumultuous affray exists when at least four persons took part
• Several means more than two but not very many
• Tumultuous means that the disturbance is caused by more than three persons who are
armed or provided with means of violence

Who are liable for death in a tumultuous affray?

1. The person or persons who inflicted the serious physical injuries are liable (Art. 251
par 1)
If it is not known who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, all the persons
who used violence upon the person of the victim are liable, but with lesser liability (Art. 251
par 2)

People v. Unlagada, 389 SCRA 224 (c/o Fabile)

Facts: On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel left his house
together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Rizal St.,
Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or around 11:00
o'clock that evening, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their
personal necessities outside the dance hall.
According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters from Danilo who was relieving himself
when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the
side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost
simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him
with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was
petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by his
assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given any medical assistance.
The defense presented a different picture of the story. Guglielmo Laurel testified that on the
evening of 27 January 1989 he was at the dance hall when he met accused Anecito Unlagada.
From his vantage point of about forty (40) meters away, Guglielmo observed that a rumble
erupted. From a distance, he saw a man, whom he later recognized as Danilo Laurel, fall to
the ground. He however belied having seen the accused Anecito Unlagada anywhere near the
scene of the crime. By his account, the melee broke up only when a policeman fired a warning
shot in the air and the protagonists scampered away.
Accused Anecito Unlagada testifying in his defense, recounted that at around 10:00 o'clock in
evening of 27 January 1989 while he was inside the dance hall, an altercation ensued near
the gate between the gatekeeper and a group of four (4) individuals who, despite their
disruptive behavior, were eventually allowed to get through the gate. At around 11:00 o'clock,
a gunshot suddenly rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble had taken
place and that somebody was killed. But he came to learn the victim's identity only the
following morning when he and a certain Lorenzo Patos were brought by a police officer to
the Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal Building, he heard somebody asking
who "Lapad" was and an alleged eyewitness, who later turned out to be Edwin Selda, pointed
to him as the man referred to by that name. Anecito Unlagada and Lorenzo Patos were put
in jail and a complaint was filed against them before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran.
Meanwhile the case against Lorenzo was dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to face the charge
of murder.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in convicting him of murder qualified by treachery and
not "death in a tumultuous affray

RULING: No, the lower court is correct. "Death in a tumultuous affray" is defined in Art. 251
of The Revised Penal Code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally,
quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of
the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased,
but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person
or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage
in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded
and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. [5] The quarrel in the instant case is between
a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author
of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a
"tumultuous affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a
melee or free-for-all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups
attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of
one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully
unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin
Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at all to
accused-appellant; the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by
surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.
Art. 252. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. — When in a tumultuous
affray as referred to in the preceding article, only serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the participants thereof and the person responsible thereof cannot be identified, all those who
appear to have used violence upon the person of the offended party shall suffer the penalty
next lower in degree than that provided for the physical injuries so inflicted.
When the physical injuries inflicted are of a less serious nature and the person responsible
therefor cannot be identified, all those who appear to have used any violence upon the person
of the offended party shall be punished by arresto mayor from five to fifteen days.

Elements:
1. That there is a tumultuous affray as referred to in the preceding article
2. That a participant or some participants thereof suffer serious physical injuries or
physical injuries of a less serious nature only
3. That the person responsible therefor cannot be identified
4. That all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the offended party
are known.

Art. 253. Giving assistance to suicide. — Any person who shall assist another to commit
suicide shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor; if such person leads his assistance to another
to the extent of doing the killing himself, he shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.
However, if the suicide is not consummated, the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods, shall be imposed.

Acts punishable:
1. By assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is consummated or not
2. By lending his assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent of doing the killing
himself

Notes: (Assistance to suicide is different from mercy-killing)

• Euthanasia – commonly known as mercy-killing is the practice of painlessly putting to

death a person suffering from some incurable disease

o It is not lending assistance to suicide. In euthanasia, the person killed does not want to die.

Discharge of Firearms (Art. 254) — Any person who shall shoot at another with any
firearm shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
unless the facts of the case are such that the act can be held to constitute frustrated or
attempted parricide, murder, homicide or any other crime for which a higher penalty is
prescribed by any of the articles of this Code.
Elements:
1. That the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person
2. That the offender has no intention to kill that person
Dado v. People, 392 SCRA 46

Infanticide (Art. 255) — The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder
in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days
of age.

If the crime penalized in this article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose
of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by the maternal
grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be prision mayor.

Elements:
1. That a child was killed
2. That the deceased child was less than three days (72 hours) of age
3. That the accused killed the said child

Art. 256. Intentional abortion. — Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion
shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of the
pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the consent
of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman
shall have consented.

Ways of committing intentional abortion:

1. By using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman
2. By acting, but without using violence, without the consent of the woman. (By
administering drugs or beverages upon such pregnant woman without her consent)
3. By acting (by administering drugs of beverages), with the consent of the pregnant
woman

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman
2. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the accused
otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman
3. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her or any other act
of the accused, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom
4. That the abortion is intended

Art. 257 – Unintentional abortion — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by
violence, but unintentionally.

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted
4. That as a result of the violence, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been
expelled therefrom

People v. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401, G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988
FACTS: On 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the CFI of
Camarines Norte,with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion. It was alleged
that on the 3rd day of December, 1974, the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on
his wife, MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing
upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act
committed on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at the time 8 months pregnant,
the accused caused the death of the unborn child,committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and
INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I,
of the Revised Penal Code.
At the trial court, Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania testified that,he was called
upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania
that was exhumed from its grave in which the cause of death was cardiac arrest.
Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a
certification thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the
deceased Marciano Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the
basis of the information relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial,
without mentioning the cause of death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was
indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem examination on 11 December
1974.
The lower court allowed the son of the accused, Pedro Salufrania, The lower court stated
that, by reason of interest and relationship, before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify
against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, after careful examination by the prosecuting
officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine
whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions
of facts and of relating them truly and, also, whether he was compelled and/or threatened by
anybody to testify against his father-accused. He stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania
and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December
1974, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the
floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his
mother and that she died right on the spot where she fell. His brother, Eduardo Abuyo and
had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter has threatened
to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his mother's
death.The brother in law and sister of the deceased victim,Narciso Abuyo also declared that
after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of his deceased sisterrefused to go
home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that when asked why, his nephew Alex Salufraña
told him that the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and headache,
rather, she was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately
after learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention
of the police authorities.
The CFI found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Marciano Abuyo in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For
unselfish, valuable and exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C.
Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is hereby recommended for him subject to the
availability of fund. Since the accused was sentenced to death, this becomes an automatic
review before the Supreme Court.
The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the
accused Filomeno Salufrania.Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno
Sulfrania whio tried to help him administer a native treatment around 6am in the morning of
December 4, 1974, but she died around 7am. Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was
fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of Filomeno Salufrania Marciana Abuyo was already
dead so he just helped Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house
of the latter's brother-in—law.Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident she
arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning Marciana still
in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that Marciana was suffering from
an old stomach ailment. The accused admitted that he was that lawful husband of the
deceased Marciana Abuyo; that he sent r Juanito Bragais but the latter was not able to cure
his wife, that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's death,
and that during the lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her burial, his
son Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was
not able to talk to his son until during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife, aside
from the members of his family, Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce
were also present.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania
before he was allowed to testify. He also questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an
expert witness, and alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro
Salufrania do not tally. But this contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that
appellant did not even bother to discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence
against him. This is tantamount to an admission that he could not adequately support his
version of Marciana Abuyo's death.Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed
his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this
contention, appellant is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide
with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows: 1. That there is a pregnant woman. 2.
That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3. That the
violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in
the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in its ruling of complex crime with parricide and
intentional abortion?
HELD: According to the Supreme Court, “Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the
truth and detect falsehoods in the testimony of witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, in view of its advantage in
observing first hand their demeanor in giving their testimony. Such rule applies in the present
case. The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion
because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then
strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently
established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of
the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused
Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that
caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein
accused upon his victim. It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was
seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily
exerted upon her by her husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana
Abuyo died together with the foetus in her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code states that the accused should be punished with the penalty corresponding to the
more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its maximum period which is death.
However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished the death penalty, appellant
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. “ In the present case, the
Supreme Court modified, the judgment appealed from was AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded
to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with the recent
decisions of the Court. With costs.

Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents. — The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman
who shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other person should do so.
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them, and they
act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the offenders
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion
2. That the abortion is intended
3. That the abortion is cause by:
a. The pregnant woman herself
b. Any other person, with her consent; or
c. Any of her parents, with her consent for the purpose of concealing her
dishonour.

Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives.

— The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively,
upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill,
shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any
abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered ana abortion
2. That the abortion is intended
3. That the offender, who must be a physician or midwife, causes or assists in cause the
abortion
4. That said physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific knowledge or
skill

Elements as to the pharmacists:

1. That the offender is a pharmacist
2. That there is no proper prescription from a physician
3. That the offender dispenses any abortive

Art. 260. Responsibility of participants in a duel. — The penalty of reclusion temporal

shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill his adversary in a duel.
If he shall inflict upon the latter physical injuries only, he shall suffer the penalty provided
therefor, according to their nature.
In any other case, the combatants shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor, although no
physical injuries have been inflicted.
The seconds shall in all events be punished as accomplices.

Acts punished:
1. By killing one’s adversary in a duel
2. By inflicting upon such adversary physical injuries
3. By making a combat although no physical injuries have been inflicted

Who are liable:

1. The person who killed or inflicted physical injuries upon his adversary, or both
combatants in any other case, as principals
2. The seconds, as accomplices

Art. 261. Challenging to a duel. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person who shall challenge another, or incite another to
give or accept a challenge to a duel, or shall scoff at or decry another publicly for having
refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel.

Acts punished:
1. By challenging another to a duel
2. By inciting another to give or accept a challenge to a duel
3. By scoffing at or decrying another publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to
fight a duel

Persons responsible:
1. The challenger; and
2. The instigators

Chapter 2 – Physical Injuries

What are the crimes of physical injuries?

1. Mutilation (Art. 262)

2. Serious physical injuries (Art. 263)
3. Administering injurious substance or beverages (Art. 264)
4. Less serious physical injuries (Art. 265)
5. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment (Art. 266)

Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either
totally or partially, or some essential organ of reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.

Two kinds of mutilation:

1. By intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some
essential organ for reproduction
2. By intentionally making other mutilation, that is, by lopping or clipping of any part of
the body of the offended party, other that the essential organ for reproduction, to deprive
him of that part of the body

Elements:
1. That there be a castration, that is mutilation of organs necessary for generation, such
as the penis or ovarium
2. That the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the
offended party of some essential organ for reproduction

Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the
injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of
speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or
a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for
the work in which he was therefore habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed,
or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have
been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged
for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for
labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article
246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case
covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case covered
by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; and the
case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict
physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.

How committed:
1. By wounding
2. By beating; or
3. By assaulting (Art. 263); or
4. By administering injurious substance
What are serious physical injuries?

1. When the injured person becomes insane, imbecile, impotent or blind in consequence
of the physical injuries inflicted
2. When the injured person
a. Loses the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or loses an eye, a
hand,
a foot, an arm, or a leg, or
b. Loses the use of any such member, or
c. Becomes incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore habitually
engaged, in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted
3. When the person injured
a. Becomes deformed, or
b. Loses any other member of his body, or
c. Loses the uses thereof, or
d. Becomes ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in whice he was
habitually engaged for more than 90 days, in consequence of the physical
injuries
inflicted
4. When the injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days
(but must not be more than 90 days), as a result of the physical injuries inflicted.

Physical injuries distinguished from attempted or frustrated homicide

1. In both crimes, the offender inflicts physical injuries. Attempted homicide may be
committed, even if no physical injuries are inflicted
2. While in the crime of physical injuries, the offender has no intent to kill the offended
party, in attempted or frustrated homicide, the offended has an intent to kill the offended
party
Deformity requirement:
1. Physical ugliness
2. Permanent and definite abnormality, and
3. Conspicuous and visible

Art. 264. Administering injurious substances or beverages. — The penalties

established by the next preceding article shall be applicable in the respective case to any
person who, without intent to kill, shall inflict upon another any serious, physical injury, by
knowingly administering to him any injurious substance or beverages or by taking advantage
of his weakness of mind or credulity.
Elements:
1. That the offender inflicted upon another any serious physical injury
2. That it was done by knowingly administering to him any injurious substances or
beverages or by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credibility
3. That he had no intent to kill

Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall inflict upon another
physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same
period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor.
Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with the manifest intent to
kill or offend the injured person, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense in
addition to the penalty of arresto mayor, a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender's parents, ascendants, guardians,
curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, provided that, in the case of persons in
authority, the deed does not constitute the crime of assault upon such person.

Matters to be noted:
1. That the offended party is incapacitated for labor for ten days or more (but not more
than 30 days), or needs medical attendance for the same period of time
2. That the physical injuries must not be those described in the preceding articles

Qualified less serious physical injuries

1. A fine not exceeding P500, in addition to arresto mayor, shall be imposed for less
serious physical injuries when
a. There is a manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person; or
b. There are circumstances adding ignominy to the offense
2. A higher penalty is imposed when the victim is either:
a. The offender’s parents, ascendants, guardians, curators, or teachers; or
b. Persons of rank or persons in authority, provided the crime is not direct assault

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the offender has
caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual
work nor require medical assistance.
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when the
offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.

Three kinds of slight physical injuries:

1. Physical injuries which incapacitated the offended party for labor from one to nine
days, or required medical attendance during the same period
2. Physical injuries which did not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual
work pr which did not required medical attendance.
3. Ill-treatment for another by deed without causing any injury

Hazing - is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a

fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other
similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or
injury (RA 8049 Sec 1)

RA 8049 - AN ACT REGULATING HAZING AND OTHER FORMS OF INITIATION

RITES IN FRATERNITIES, SORORITIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR

Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to
do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's
Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing
and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and
psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police as approved ny the Secretary of National Defense and the
National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered
as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or
organization shall be allowed without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of
organization seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation. The written notice shall
indicate the period of the initiation activities which shall not exceed three (3) days, shall
include the names of those to be subjected to such activities, and shall further contain an
undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites.
Sec. 3. The head of the school or organization or their representatives must assign at least
two (2) representatives of the school or organization, as the case may be, to be present
during the initiation. It is the duty of such representative to see to it that no physical harm of
any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.
Sec. 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical
injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or
organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals. The person or persons who participated in the hazing shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or
mutilation results there from.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile,
impotent or blind.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and one
day to 17 years and 4 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost the
use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an
arm or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member shall have become incapacitated
for the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and one day to 14
years and 8 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become deformed or
shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have
been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually
engaged for a period of more than ninety (90) days.
5. The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years and one day to 12 years)
if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more
than thirty (30) days.
6. The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and one day to 10 years) if
in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of ten
(10) days or more, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same
period.
7. The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years and one day to 8 years) if
in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged from one (1) to nine
(9) days, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period.
8. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and one
day to 6 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim sustained physical injuries which
do not prevent him from engaging in his habitual activity or work nor require medical
attendance.
The responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training
organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the
persons charged under this provision even before their conviction. The maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed in any of the following instances:
(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or
deceit on the person of the recruit who refuses to join;
(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon
learning
that hazing will be committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;
(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented
from reporting the unlawful act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school
authorities, or to the police authorities, through force, violence, threat or
intimidation;
(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or
(e) when the victim is below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the hazing.

The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as an accomplice, when he
has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent
the same from occurring. If the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or members
of the fraternity, group, or organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals when
they have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to
prevent the same from occurring.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have
actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring
shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.
The officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who
actually planned the hazing although not present when the acts constituting the hazing were
committed shall be liable as principals. A fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present when
the acts constituting the hazing were committed and failed to take action to prevent the same
from occurring shall be liable as principal.
The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein
as principal unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.
Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance
that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
This section shall apply to the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment in the manner provided
herein.

R.A. No. 8353 - AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE,
RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."
Section 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified
as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known
as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the
same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:

Chapter Three: Rape

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall become reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law
enforcement or penal institution;
3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is
personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission
of the crime;
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
(HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually
transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;
7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-
military units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency
or penal institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the
commission of the crime;
8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation or disability;
9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime; and
10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua.
"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten aggravating/
qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.

"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.

"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife
as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab
initio.
"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the
act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated
as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the
prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A."

People v. Alfredo, 638 SCRA 749

FACTS: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23 February
2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon
(appellant), charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older brother.
All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed
in several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant,
their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them.
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further considered the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and
appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to
attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 9346 which ended the imposition of death penalty. The proximate concern as to
the appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape which under the penal law
should be two degrees lower than that of consummated rape, should be computed from death
or reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: What is the properly penalty for the crimes convicted?

HELD: The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can
no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu
of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly,
the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if
the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate.
Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that the penalty to be
imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals
in an attempt to commit a felony.
The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is the
prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under
eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death
penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. Following the
scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal,
which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted
rape.
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape,
with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty
within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not
been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication. However,
the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty.
Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the
penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it
follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so
followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by
reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under
the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also
reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony.
Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death
by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and
consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies,
and for accessories and accomplices. In the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty
for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be
reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.

People v. Rellota, 626 SCRA 422 (c/o Marbibi)

Doctrine: Minor inconsistencies on the testimony of a victim of rape won’t affect her credibility,
acts of lasciviousness vis a vis attempted rape.
Facts: AAA a minor (12 years old) filed a case of 2 counts of rape and a case for attempted
rape against Rellota. she claimed that she was forcibly raped twice by Rellota on two different
occasions, on both instances Rellota inserted his penis to her private part. the third incident
was halted by AAA’s resistance, she was able to escape, thereafter she told what had
happened to her sister, both of them went to the police. she relayed the 2 previous instances
of rape and the recently halted incident. subsequently the cases were filed against Rellota.
Rellota alleged as his defense that the testimony of AAA was flawed by several inconsistencies.

Issue: are the inconsistencies pointed by Rellota sufficient to cause his acquittal?

Ruling:
The court ruled that no, the said inconsistencies pointed out by Rellota were minor ones which
do not affect the credibility of AAA nor erase the fact that the latter was raped.
The inconsistencies are trivial and forgivable, since a victim of rape cannot possibly give an
exacting detail for each of the previous incidents, since these may just be but mere fragments
of a prolonged and continuing nightmare, a calvary she might even be struggling to forget
For his defense, appellant merely denied having raped AAA. However, denial, when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes negative self-serving evidence
which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who
testified on affirmative matters.
In the present case, the records are devoid of any clear and convincing evidence that would
substantiate appellant's denial. In the same manner, appellant's claim that the filing of the
criminal charges against him was instigated by AAA's aunt because he failed to lend the latter
money is uncorroborated by any evidence. Thus, when there is no evidence to show any
improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify falsely against the accused or to
falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony
is worthy of full faith and credence. He was convicted of two counts of rape in this case.
However the court just downgraded the third incident in this case as only act of lasciviousness
and not attempted rape, the court stated that Rellota’s act of removing the towel wrapped in
the body of AAA, laying her on the sofa and kissing and touching her private parts does not
exactly demonstrate the intent of appellant to have carnal knowledge of AAA on that particular
date; thus, dismissing the mere opinion and speculation of AAA, based on her testimony, that
appellant wanted to rape her. Even so, the said acts should not be left unpunished as the
elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness

People v. Apattad, 655 SCRA 335 (c/o Baltazar)

FACTS: Accused was charged in four (4) separate informations of raping his 10 year-old
daughter, AAA in Cagayan. AAA testified that sometime in 2001, while she was sleeping with
her sisters, the accused pulled and positioned her just below the feet of her siblings, and right
then and there, succeeded in molesting her. AAA was just seven (7) years old then. It was
repeated in 2003 where the accused also threatened to kill her if she reports the incident to
her mother. When AAA finally told her mother on June 13, 2003 that she was being abused
by her own father, her mother whipped her for not telling her about it immediately.
Thereafter, they went to the DSWD office in Peñablanca, Cagayan, where AAA was
interviewed by DSWD personnel. Afterwards, they proceeded to the police station where AAA
executed a sworn statement narrating what happened. Dr. Simangan subsequently conducted
a physical examination on AAA and discovered that the latter had a healed hymen laceration
at 4 and 7 o’clock positions, and that her vagina admitted the tip of the fifth finger easily. She
stated that the laceration could have been caused by a blunt object.
The accused denied the accusation of rape hurled against him and claimed that his wife was
the one who initiated the criminal complaint against him because she thinks that he has a
mistress.
The trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered its decision
finding the accused guilty of three (3) counts of rape and imposed the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA for each case. Apattad was further ordered to pay AAA the amount of P150,000.00
Pesos as civil indemnity.
Accused is acquitted in one of the criminal cases for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA
affirmed the judgment of conviction by the trial court with the modification that the civil
indemnity awarded should be P75,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition, moral damages
and exemplary damages in the amounts of P75,000.00 and Php25,000.00 respectively, for
each count of rape were awarded.

ISSUE with regard to DAMAGES: WON the C.A. GRAVELY ERRED IN MODIFYING THE
DAMAGES IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

HELD: NO. As modified, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA for each count of rape, PhP
75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary
damages.

RATIO: In rape cases, when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim, the imposable penalty is death.
However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now
prohibited. In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.
Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose
reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of damages is “the
penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the
public penalty actually imposed on the offender.”
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of
death were it not for RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be
PhP 75,000 racionating that “this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.”
Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted without
need of pleading or proving them. In rape cases, it is recognized that the victim’s injury is
concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages. Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount
of PhP 30,000, despite the lack of any aggravating circumstances, to deter others from
committing similar acts or for correction for the public good.

MAIN ISSUE: WON THE C.A. GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APATTAD GUILTY DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD: S.C. sustained accused-appellant’s conviction. The appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

RATIO: Accused-appellant’s defenses of alibi and denial cannot prosper. Alibis and denials
are inherently weak defenses. This is understandably so because said defenses can be easily
fabricated by an accused in order to escape criminal liability. An alibi is evidence negative in
nature and self-serving, and, thus, cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. In the present case, AAA
positively identified accused-appellant in her testimony as the very perpetrator of the crime
of rape committed against her. As correctly observed by the trial court, a distance of three
(3) kilometers does not make it physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene
of the crime at the time it was committed. Calimag himself admitted during cross-examination
that the house of accused-appellant may be reached by jeepney in an hour. Significantly,
even if accused-appellant indeed stayed in Calimag’s house on the dates that he committed
rape, it was still not physically impossible for accused-appellant to go home and commit the
said crime at the time it was said to have been committed.
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the S.C. is satisfied that the
prosecution’s evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
AAA was below twelve (12) years old when the crime was committed. A copy of AAA’s
birth certificate to prove her age was duly presented in evidence by the prosecution, indicating
that she was indeed born on October 14, 1994. When AAA was called to the witness stand,
she gave a detailed narration of how she was sexually molested by her father, which narration
is difficult, if not improbable, for a 10-year-old girl to concoct.
Pertinently, “it is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight
and credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.” The medical examination conducted
and the medical certificate issued is veritable corroborative evidence, which strongly bolster
AAA’s testimony.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated August 28, 2009
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03173 finding accused-appellant Juanito Apattad guilty of rape is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA
for each count of rape, PhP75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP75,000 as moral damages, and
PhP30,000 as exemplary damages.
People v. Padua, 645 SCRA 744

FACTS:
State version:
XXX, together with her younger brothers YYY and ZZZ were watching television at the house
of their neighbor. When the program ended, the siblings decided to go home. YYY and ZZZ
left the place first and waited for their older sister, XXX who then took another route home.
YYY was about to call his sister when he saw the three accused approach XXX and snatch
her. The place is well-lit. YYY was able to see appellant Dullavin cover XXX’s mouth to prevent
her from making any sound. YYY also saw Christopher and Alejandro Padua hold XXX’s hands.
They saw XXX being dragged towards the house of Alejandro Padua. XXX was struggling to
free herself. During that time, YYY was only ten years old and ZZZ was much younger than
him. The two boys ran home but they did not relate what they saw to their parents since they
feared that if they told their parents what they saw, the same fate might befall them also.
The next time YYY saw his sister XXX was inside the morgue of the Veronica Funeral Homes.
He noticed that the body of his sister was still wearing the same clothes she had on the night
she was abducted. The body of XXX was examined by Dr. Rolando Victoria, medico-legal
officer of the NBI. He gave the cause of death as traumatic injuries resulting from fracture
blood vessels in the intracania, sub-dual and sub-arachnoidal portions of the skull.
Defense version:
Alejandro Padua testified that on the date the crime was committed, he was at his house
taking care of his three-year old grandchild whose mother was then confined in the hospital.
He was 73 years old at that time, had a failing eyesight and was also suffering from
rheumatism and hypertension, hence he could no longer work or go out at night. He started
losing his sexual urge when he was 72 years old as his knees became weak and his eyes
blurred. Christopher Padua, grandson of Alejandro, declared that he was at his parents’
house and stayed there the whole day.
They celebrated his sister’s birthday Michael Dullavin, brother-in-law of Christopher, testified
that he was at the house of his parents as he was then repairing his passenger jeep. Together
with his wife Cristina, the two of them went to the house of his parents-in-law where he saw
his co-appellant Christopher.

Trial Court:
Convicted all the accused and sentenced to death Christopher and Michael Dullavin. As
for Alejandro, the penalty is reclusion perpetua due to his old age.

Court of Appeals:
Approved the decision of the trial court but modified the sentence as to ChristopherPadua
because at the time of the commission of the crime he was still 17 years old. His sentence
was commuted to reclusion perpetua.
DISPOSITION:
All the accused are found guilty by the Supreme Court. All were charged with reclusion per
petua (fromdeath) due to the suspension of the death sentence at the time the decision was
promulgated.

DISCUSSIONS:
1st CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
They are asking the Supreme Court on whether or not the Court of Appeals and the Trial
Court erred when it convicted them of the crime based solely on circumstantial evidence. The
insufficiency of direct evidence against them must be in their favor because the quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt was not met.

COURT RULING: The appeal must fail.

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely
on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to
the community. Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction provided the following requisites therein are met. All the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent.
Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. In the case at bar
the court took note of the fact that circumstances are sufficient.

2nd CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Appellants also contend that the prosecution’s principal witnesses, YYY and ZZZ, are not
credible as they did not actually witness the commission of the crime.

COURT RULING: It is not persuasive.

We have carefully gone over the testimonies of YYY and ZZZ and we agree with the trial
court’s finding that despite rigorous cross-examination by no less than three defense counsels,
their testimonies remained unshaken. The brothers were consistent and unwavering in their
declaration that they saw appellants drag their sister XXX on the night of August 21, 1995.
The trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of YYY and ZZZ, having had
the direct opportunity to observe their demeanors and manner of testifying while on the
witness’ box. Well-entrenched is the rule that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the trial
court’s findings are accorded finality and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless the court
has overlooked certain facts of weight and substance, which if considered, would alter the
result of the case. We find nothing on record that would compel us to deviate from such rule
or to overturn the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of both YYY and ZZZ.
 (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

3rd CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Appellants argue that the failure of YYY and ZZZ to come to the rescue of their sister and to
inform their parents of the incident are contrary to human experience.
COURT RULING: It is not.
YYY and ZZZ are children. As such, they cannot be expected to deliberate and act as adults
do. While an adult would normally come to the rescue of a child in distress, a minor cannot
be expected to do the same. Children, under ordinary circumstances, would first think of their
own safety, and not of rescuing another child in trouble. As explained by the brothers, they
did not dare help their sister, or even tell their parents about the abduction, since they feared
that appellants, who are definitely stronger than they are, would take them away like they
did their sister. This fear was heightened by the fact that appellants were neighbors who lived
thereby.

4th CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Appellants then resort to pointing inconsistencies/inadequacies in the testimonies of
YYY and ZZZ, such as the title of the movie they watched on television in the house of Aling
Fely; the exact time they arrived at the house of Aling Fely; and whether ZZZ shouted at the
appellants upon seeing their sister XXX being dragged by them.
COURT RULING:
To the mind of the Court, the inconsistencies/deficiencies alluded to are tootrivial
to merit consideration, referring as they do to minor and irrelevant matters.
What is important is that YYY and ZZZ saw the three appellants perform the acts preparatory
to their commission of the crime. The Court is thus consistent in ruling that minor
incongruences even serve to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses as
they dispel the testimonies as rehearsed. Too, ample margin of error and understanding must
be accorded to young witnesses like YYY, 10 years old, and ZZZ, 7 years old, who, much more
than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the experience of testifying
before a court. At bottom, all that appellants could proffer by way of defense are denial and
alibi, which, unfortunately for them, are inherently weak and cannot prevail over the positive
and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. A denial, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative, self-serving and merits no weight in law. On the other hand,
for alibi to prosper, the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The accused must not only
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also convincingly
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time
of the
incident. A thorough examination of the evidence would show that appellants failed to meet
the requirements ofalibi. All three of them claim that they were in their respective houses
when the crime happened. However, considering that their houses are located at Ilaya Street,
Alabang, Muntinlupa, and the victim XXX was abducted in the same neighborhood, it is,
therefore, not physically impossible for them to be present thereat when XXX was abducted,
subsequently raped and killed. What is clear from the evidence is
that Alejandro, Chrsitopher and Michael were all within the vicinity of Alabang, Muntinlupa o
n the night of August 21, 1995. Also, appellants’ presence in San Pedro, Laguna where the
lifeless body of the victim was found, cannot be ruled out considering that the distance
between Alabang, Muntinlupa and San Pedro, Laguna can be negotiated in 30 minutes by
land transportation. In short, appellants failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the physical impossibility of their presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of
its commission.

People v. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577

FACTS:
• On 27 January 1995, an information for rape was filed against accused-appellant
Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez (hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused thru force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have
sexual intercourse with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl,
against the will and consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
• Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital,
testified that on 3 January 1995, she conducted a complete physical examination on LIZETTE
and took wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through scraping. The urinalysis report
includes a positive finding for "sperm cells." Dr. Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm
cells in the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on the
person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means
reddening of the tissue around the vaginal opening.
• On the other hand, PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the
morning of 3 January 1995, he was in his house preparing coffee for Carlito. After Carlito left,
several men arrived and boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and the latter’s
friend then brought him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTE’s father boxed him. He was
thereafter brought to the Pilar Municipal Jail.

ISSUES:

1. Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was
allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she testified.
YES
2. Whether or not there was sufficient Evidence of LIZETTE’s Minority to substantiate the
propriety of the Imposition of the Death Penalty. NO

RULING:
1. As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public
policy, presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the witness in the absence of
proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the
competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency.
Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are disqualified
to be witnesses. Among those disqualified are "[c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as
to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and
relating them truthfully."
No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The
intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a witness. It is
settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating
truthfully the facts for which he is examined.
In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a) at
the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could receive correct impressions
thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly to the
court at the time he is offered as a witness. The examination should show that the child has
some understanding of the punishment which may result from false swearing. The requisite
appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it is wrong
to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is
equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing. A child can be disqualified
only if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts
respecting which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the ground
of her age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental immaturity. From the
above-quoted testimony, it can be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation,
recollection, and communication34 and that she could discern the consequence of telling a
lie. We, therefore, sustain the trial court in admitting her testimony and according it great
weight.
We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify
two years after the alleged rape "when the interplay of frail memory combines with the
imagination of earlier years." It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was committed
and the identity of the person responsible therefor.

In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of young or
tender age is credible and deserves full credit, especially where no motive is attributed to the
victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl of such age as
LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private parts;
and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she
was in fact raped.

2. The following are guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal
certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE’s
exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying
circumstance of "below seven (7) years old" is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of
objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from
discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE’s tender age for purposes of
questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7
years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot
be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTE’s
mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for
purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age.
Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no.
3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age
is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be
reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.

People v. Abello, 582 SCRA 378

Facts: Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) was convicted of one count of rape by
sexual assault and two counts of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law committed against
his step daughter, AAA. The following information for rape was filed against the appellant:
(note there are three Informations filed, one for rape and two for sexual assault).

1. “That on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being a stepfather (sic) of
victim AAA,4 with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously putting his penis inside the mouth of said AAA,
against her will and without her consent”

The victim was a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she was just 7 months.
On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in Navotas
with her sisterinlaw and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello mashed her
breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m, Abello again mashed the breast of AAA under
the same situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to
recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside. Then on July 8, 1998, at around
2:00 a.m, Abello placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The victim on the same date
reported the incident to her sisterinlaw and mother.
The RTC found Abello guilty under all three Informations. The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction
on appeal and increased the penalties imposed. Abello now appeals his conviction for rape on
the ground that the mode of commission provided for in the information is different from that
proven during the trial. He also questions his conviction for sexual abuse since AAA does not
fall under those protected by RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law).
Issue:
1. WoN the appellant shall be acquitted due to the difference between the modes of
commission provided for in the Information for rape and that proven at the trial.
2. WoN appellant is guilty of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law. If he’s not, if he
can be liable for an offense other than that stated in the information.
3. WoN the alternative circumstance of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship should be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
4. WoN aggravating circumstances not mentioned in the Information can be considered
to increase the penalty.

Held:
1. NO, variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the
accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was
committed in a different manner than what was alleged. The Information
alleges “force and intimidation” as the mode of commission. However, AAA testified
during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to find
Abello’s male organ inside her mouth. This variance is not fatal to Abello’s conviction
for rape by sexual assault. A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is
binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was
committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In the present case, Abello
did not object to the presentation of evidence showing that the crime charged was
 committed in a different manner than what was stated in the Information. Thus, the
variance is not a bar to Abello’s conviction of the crime charged in the Information.

2. NO, appellant cannot be held guilty under the Child Abuse Law but he can
be held for Acts of Lasciviousness. AAA cannot be considered a child under Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which states that “Children” refers to person below 18 years of
age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition. AAA was neither below 18 nor was she fully unable to
take care of herself. Though Abello cannot be held liable under RA 7610, he is still
liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The character of the crime
is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed
is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint
or information. In the present case, although the two Informations wrongly designated
R.A. No. 7610 as the law violated; the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts
punishable under Article 336 of the RPC whose elements are:
a. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;
b. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and
c. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
i. By using force or intimidation; or
ii. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or
iii. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

3. NO, the relationship should not be considered as an aggravating

circumstance. Though the three Informations all alleged the stepfatherstepdaughter
relationship between AAA and Abello, this modifying circumstance, was not duly proven
in the present case. The prosecution failed to present the marriage contract between
Abello and AAA’s mother. If the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was
only via an admission by Abello of his marriage to AAA’s mother. This admission is
inconclusive. The court is strict on considering relationship as an aggravating
circumstance because it increases the imposable penalty, and hence must be proven
by competent evidence.

4. NO, the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and knowledge of disability

cannot be considered. Although not alleged in the information, the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling was proven during the trial. Additionally, Article 266B
(penalties for rape) of the RPC recognizes “knowledge by the offender of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the crime” as a qualifying circumstance. This knowledge by
Abello of AAA’s polio was also proven during the trial but not alleged in the Information.
Though these aggravating and qualifying circumstances of dwelling and Abello’s
knowledge of AAA’s physical disability were not considered in imposing the penalty,
they may be appreciated in awarding exemplary damages.
Therefore, appellant is found guilty of rape by sexual assault and acts of lasciviousness.

1) For the crime of rape, he is sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of six years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as
maximum. He is ordered to pay P30,000.00 as civil liability; P30,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
2) For each count of acts of lasciviousness, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months
of prision correccional, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA the amounts
of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P2,000.00 as
exemplary damages, in each case.

People v. Garcia, 617 SCRA 318

SUBJECTS: Statutory Rape, Acts of Lasciviousness
FACTS:
AAA, the victim, is an orphan who is under the care of BBB, her aunt. The accused is AAA’s
cousin within the third civil degree by consanguinity. The accused was charged for three (3)
counts of statutory rape which took place on three successive dates or 30 April, 1 May and 2
May of 2001. It was only when AAA would often feel sick and walked oddly did BBB notice.
Upon BBB’s prodding, AAA disclosed the incidents to the former. During trial, the
accused denied having committed rape but alleged it was BBB who instigated AAA to falsely
accuse him of rape. The RTC convicted the accused for Statutory Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness but acquitted him on the third charge.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the accused is liable for Statutory Rape
2. Whether or not the accused is liable for Acts of Lasciviousness, despite the information
charging him for Statutory Rape.

HELD:
1. Yes, statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve
years (12) of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Thus,
to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries
the burden of proving: (1) the age of the complainant; (2) the identity of the accused;
and (3) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
2. Yes, the touching of a female’s sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape,
not even an attempted one, but one of acts of lasciviousness. Without proof that there
was an attempt to introduce the male organ into the labia majora of the
victim’s genitalia, rape cannot be concluded. What was firmly established was that the
accused kissed AAA’s cheeks and touched her vagina on May 1, 2001, which by any
standards, are lewd acts, which are morally inappropriate, indecent, and lustful for
 Juanito to perform such acts on a young girl whilst taking advantage of her vulnerability
given her minority.

People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105 (c/o Marbibi)

FACTS: On March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student
at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her
home from a party. She knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent visitor
of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading for her release,
he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the 1st floor was locked
from the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his left arm wrapped around
her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs.
When they reached the second floor, he commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to
look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the
wall. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to take off
her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down
on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina.
Still poked with a knife, she did as told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis
entered her. He then laid down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a
small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the
floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and
climbed the partition, she ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a
window.

Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding house
and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and
knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the
door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and
wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house
where they heard and saw somebody running away but failed to apprehend him due to
darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically
examined with the following findings:

• Patient came in a state of shock

• Circumscribed hematoma at interior neck
• Linear abrasions below left breast
• Multiple pinpoint marks at the back, abrasion at both knees

• No visible abrasions or marks at the perennial area or over the vulva; erythematous
areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact; no laceration, fresh and old;
examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.

The accused was charged with the crime of frustrated rape before the RTC, Branch II,
Borongan, Eastern Samar and sentenced to an imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day, Prision
Mayor, as minimum to 12 years Prision Mayor, maximum; and to indemnify the victim the
amount of P4000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.

ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.

RULING: NO. The decision of the RTC is modified. The accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the
victim in the amount of P30,000. Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the
attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.

• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:

o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will
Attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency
which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of
the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to
perform
If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and
voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it cannot be an attempt.
In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole
basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the
genital organ of the victim.

People v. Jalosjos, 369 SCRA 179 (c/o Capalar/Marbibi)

Facts: The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself
narrated the shameful details of the dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled
for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the
complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of
lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused was then Congressman Romeo
Jalosjos who, inspite of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory
rape, was still re-elected to his congressional office. On December 16, 1996, two (2)
informations for the crime of statutory rape and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness, were
filed against accused-appellant
The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of
Simplicio Delantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and
accepting boarders at his house. He, however, was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of one of their boarders. They went tothe Pasay
City Police where she executed a sworn statement against Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was
thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which
eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against accused-appellant He was also convicted
on six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.

Issue/s
1. WON the trial court grievously erred in convicting the accused-appellant based on the
testimony of the private complainant, considering the attendant indicia of the inconsistencies
and untruths
2. WON the trial court grievously erred in disregarding the significance of the conflicting
statements given by the private complainant
3. WON the trial court grievously erred in disregarding the significance of private
complainant’s failure to identify the accused-appellant
4. WON the trial court grievously erred in ruling that private complainant was a minor less
than twelve years of age when the claimed incidents allegedly took place
5. WON the trial court grievously erred in finding that rape was committed against the
private complainant

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC Makati with modification of
penalty.

1. The contention is without merit. Falsus in unofalsus inomnibus is not an absolute rule
of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence. Trier of facts are not bound to
believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and
reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances
to be the truth. Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony,
but may credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief.
2. A reading of the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in
fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape and lascivious conduct committed on her by
accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple and natural words customary of children of
her age.
3. Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn
positively and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such identification
during the trial cannot be diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred
to accused-appellant as her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom
she was introduced and on the name she saw and read in accused-appellant's office.
4. It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by the
presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the
birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said
birth certificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April
11, 1997. Even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample
proof of the complainant's age in the records. Rosilyn's Baptismal Certificate can likewise
serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban, we ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu
thereof.
5. True, in People v. Campuhan, we explained that the phrase, "the mere touching of the
external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge. The inevitable contact between accused-appellant's penis, and
at the very least, the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain
inside her vagina when the "idiniin" part of accused-appellant's sex ritual was performed.
6. At the time of commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape
was penalized under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit: When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or
intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3.
When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented

People v. Olaybar, 412 SCRA 490 (c/o Saporas)

FACTS: Appellant Jaime Olaybar y Odtuhan, was charged with two counts of rape, the first
for statutory rape under the first paragraph of Article 266-A and the second for rape by means
of sexual assault under the second paragraph of the article when the accused, by means of
force and intimidation had carnal knowledge of the complainant Rose Ann Into Y Avenido, a
minor, eight (8) years of age, against her will and consent and committed acts of sexual
assault against the latters will, by means of force and intimidation. Olaybar entered a plea of
not guilty to both charges and that the complaint was filed against him only because victim’s
family disliked the idea of people parking their vehicles in the vicinity.
The Trial Court was convinced of the strength of the evidence submitted by the prosecution
and the utter weakness of the case for the defense, thereby convicting the appellant Olaybar
of the crimes for which he was indicted and sentencing him of the penalty of death.
With the imposition of the penalty of death, the records were elevated to the Supreme Court
for review.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction of the accused.
2. Whether or not the imposition of Supreme Penalty of Death is correct despite the
absence of any qualifying circumstance in the information.

HELD
1. Yes. Like the trial court, which has had an opportunity to observe closely the witnesses
in giving their testimony before it, this Court, in its own assessment, also finds the child-victim
to be credible; her testimony is sufficiently clear, quite categorical and definitely
straightforward. The testimony of the victim was corroborated by the medical findings
showing a clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma on the minor’s genitals and she
has acquired sexually transmitted disease that can be done by sexual act.
Mere denial by the accused without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome
the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the
crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. It is not enough, in order
that alibi might prosper, to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the
commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him
to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene. In this case, appellant himself has
admitted being just around the neighborhood at the time.

2. No. The trial court has decreed the penalty of death on account of circumstance
numbered 6 of Article 266-A, i.e., that when the offender knows that he is afflicted with
Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV), Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or
any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim,
the imposition of the extreme penalty of death would be warranted. While it is established
that the victim indeed, has contracted a sexually transmitted-disease, no evidence has been
adduced to show the accused’s awareness of his own affliction with such disease. In fact, that
aggravating circumstance is not even alleged in the two Informations.
Therefore, sentenced was lowered down, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua for rape by
sexual intercourse and penalty of imprisonment from four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum penalty, to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum penalty, for rape by sexual assault.
Appellant is likewise ordered to pay Rose Ann Into y Avenido civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos and moral damages of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for the offense
of statutory rape by sexual intercourse and another civil indemnity of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos for the crime
of rape by sexual assault.

RATIO: Republic Act No. 8385, otherwise also known as the Anti-Rape Act of 1997, has
incorporated a new chapter in the Revised Penal Code. In a new provision, designated Article
266-A, the crime of rape is committed either by sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape
by sexual intercourse, pursuant to the first paragraph of the article, is committed by a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances; viz:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

The last of the enumeration, item (d) above, constitutes what is so often referred to as
statutory rape. Rape by sexual assault, mentioned in the second paragraph of the same
article, is committed by any person who, under any of the aforestated circumstances, inserts
his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice of another person.

People v. Oga, 431 SCRA 354

Summary: Jose Oga was convicted with simple rape by the lower courts; but acquitted by
the Supreme Court after carefully examining the testimony of Irene (accuser), and
somehow giving credence to his “sweetheart theory”
Facts:
1. Aug 9, 1998 – in a construction site in Navotas, Metro Manila – Ignacio and his
wife sleeping inside a makeshift house, Irene (their 14-yr-old daughter) still outside. They
thought she was selling cigarettes at the fish pier.
2. Aug 10, 1998 – 2:00 am – the couple was awakened by the loud banging of
corrugated GI sheet, which originated from Oga’s (Ignacio’s co-construction worker)
barracks which was about 3 meters away. They hurried to Oga’s place and ws surprised to
see Oga naked and in the motion of pumping his seeds into the sexual organ of their
daughter Irene. The mom pushed the appellant and pulled Irene. Ignacio shouted for
assistance of the guards.
3. At around 10:20 am, Irene was examined by Dr. Aurea Villena and she found fresh
hymenal laceration but no sigh of extragenital physical injuries on her body.
4. An Information was filed against Oga.

Irene’s story:
1. Aug 9, 1998 – 10:00 pm – Oga (24-yr-old construction worker) summoned her to
his barracks. She thought he summoned her for an errand (to buy cigarettes or liquor
perhaps).
2. Inside Oga’s barracks, he pulled her and laid her on the papag, took off her pants
and panty, as well as his clothes. Irene resisted but he was strong and drunk. He pinned her
down with his body- his right hand on her hands above her shoulders, his left hand
separated her legs, then the coitus happened.
3. It was around 2:00 am when she was able to kick the GI that enclosed Oga’s
barracks. That prompted her parents to check appellant’s barracks

Oga’s story (the “sweetheart theory”):

1. May 10, 1998 – after one week of courtship, Irene reciprocated his love.
2. Aug 10, 1998 – 10:30 pm – he was asleep; Irene came inside his barracks,
awakened him with her embraces. He ordered her to go out, but she went on. Irene
stripped and laid down with him. They had sex and slept.
3. 3:30 am the next day, Irene’s mom barged in and shouted to Ignacio “ Ignacio,
nandito ang iyong anak” and then Ignacio arrived.
4. The parents insisted that they be married.
 5. Ignacio made him sign something. Oga signed not knowing that he would be
charged with rape. (he could not read, he only knew how to sign)

* RTC of Malabon City rejected the “sweetheart theory’ – Oga was convicted,
penalty – reclusion perpetua, indemnity – Php 50,000, moral damages – Php 50, 000, plus
cost of suit

Issue/s Held/Ratio
Should Oga NO
be convicted
with rape? It was alleged that the crime of rape was committed with force and
intimidation under Art 335 (1), RPC.

* Force may be physical and actual or psychological.

After scrutinizing Irene’s testimony, SC found that no

force/ intimidation was employed:
 Mouth not covered
 Hands were free most of the time
 No weapon (gun, knife, etc.)

Dr. Villena’s findings:

 No extragenital injuries

Other evidence:
 Not a piece of Irene’s apparel was torn or
damage

* Intimidation and coercion must be viewed in the light of the victim’s

perception and judgment at the time of the rape. Factors: age, size,
and strength of the parties, and their relationship

Irene: 58 ½ cms ; 99 lbs; 14 y/o

Oga: 24 y/o, construction worker
 No other physical stat was
mentioned

Irene’s overall deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension

and the reasonable standard of human conduct when faced with a
similar situation.

 It was 10:00 pm, but she readily acceded when Oga

summoned her allegedly for an errand, considering
that Oga is not related to them – a mere co-worker of
her father
 When she was pulled and laid down on the bed, why
did she not scream?
 It took her so long to kick the GI (from 10 pm to 2
am)
 It was simply incredible – a rapist does not have that much luxury of
time.

When her father saw them, they were both naked – this increased the
suspicion that it was consensual sex.

Decision:

Oga was acquitted. His guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Notes:

In reviewing rape cases, the Court has established the following principles as guides:

(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;

(2) by reason of the intrinsic nature of rape, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and

(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

People v. Buates, 408 SCRA 278 (c/o Lupos)

Facts: The appellant, Nazario Buates y Bitara, was charged with two counts of the crime of
rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in two separate
informations which, save for the date, time and age of the victim when the crimes were
alleged to have been committed,[2] are identically worded: Upon being arraigned, herein
appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty to both charges. Based
on the evidence adduced herein accused with the use of threat and intimidation raped his
niece twice on different occasions. Dr. Moran testified for the prosecution that upon his
medical examination of Jennifer, she already had lacerations in her genetalia for sometime
and that the same may have been due to sexual intercourse. The accused denied such
allegations and imputed ill-motives on jennifer in filing such charges.
Appellant principally assails the credibility of Jennifer, claiming that her actuations after the
alleged commission of each act of rape were not typical of a rape victim. Specifically, appellant
points out that Jennifer continued to take a bath alone and fetch water from the river near
where the appellant allegedly raped her on July 28, 1990.She also took the same path on her
way to school where the second sexual assault allegedly took place on August 14, 1993.
Moreover, Jennifer remained respectful of the appellant.

Issues: WON the court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible
testimony of Jennifer Buates.
Ruling: No, the court did not err in convicting the accused of the two counts of rape. In the
review of rape cases, we are almost invariably guided by the following principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.[19] Therefore, the credibility of the private complainant is crucial
to the outcome of these cases for it is well-settled that conviction or acquittal depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the victims testimony.
Generally, the Court accords due deference to the trial courts views on the issue of credibility.
It is in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses considering its opportunity to
observe their demeanor as well as their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
We do not find any cogent reason to overturn the conclusion of the trial court. Private
complainants testimony gave an honest, candid and categorical account of the sexual assaults
perpetrated by the appellant against her. Even on cross-examination, the private complainant
was consistent in her recollection of the details of her defloration. She never wavered in
pointing to appellant as her rapist on both occasions. A rape victim who testifies in an honest
and straightforward manner and remains consistent is a credible witness

People v. Dela Torre, 419 SCRA 18

Facts:

Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with his common-law wife Melinda
Torre, namely: M1, M2 and M3. Melinda left her family when M1 was about seven (7) years
old bringing with her M3. The victim lived with her father and brother M2 in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales.
In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, teacher of M1, noticed sudden changes in her behavior
and when confronted, the latter admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. Her
head teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred the
case to the DSWD who took her under its custody.
M1 testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following dates:
September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November
12, 1996 and December 23, 1996.
A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta. Cruz,
Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the
3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 nine o’clock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract infection.
Issues:

(a) Whether appellee should be penalized with reclusion perpetua in each of the four
indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A.
No. 7659?
(b) Whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.

Held:

The RTC ruled that "it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of
lasciviousness against M1 on 30 September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and had carnal
knowledge [of] M1 on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12 November 1996 and 23
December 1996." Further, the trial court added that the moral ascendancy of appellee over
the victim was equivalent to intimidation. It did not give any probative value to his
uncorroborated and unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi.
However, the court refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained
that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses.
The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty
of death on the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the
accused, and that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took place. As a
consequence, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section
11 of RA 7659.
Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal
from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This
provision is substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.
In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in People v.
Leones, it unmistakably declared that "[w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of last
resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look
into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution
seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of
the accused against double jeopardy."
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several
avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal,
from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it
prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of
securing a greater penalty.
"While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On the
other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review
of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be
violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal,
contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence on double jeopardy."

People v. Bautista, 430 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 140278, June 3, 2004 (c/o Tan)
FACTS: Appellant Sonny Bautista and his wife Analisa had a close relationship with the mother
(Crispina Amparo) of the victim (Mischel Amparo,15 y.o.) and had lived at the house of the
latter as a newly-wed couple.
On March 8, 1996, appellant pleaded Mischel to skip her classes to go with him and his wife
to a supposed field trip in Cavite. Mischel agreed as she has complete trust on the appellant
as a family friend. Appellant told Mischel that they would fetch his wife in Sta. Mesa before
going to Cavite. The appellant invited Mischel to see a movie just to pass time and the victim
went along without any idea he might just be deceiving her. While watching the movie,
appellant told Mischel about the problems he and his wife were experiencing and mentioned
that his sister once taken off her clothes in front of him. He then remarked that Mischel should
do the same.
After the movie, appellant told Mischel that they will go to her ‘Ate Ana’, so the two boarded
a taxi and went to Town and Country Motel. Appellant told Mischel that they will wait for
appellant’s wife there. Upon arriving at a room in the motel, appellant took a bath and told
Mischel that she should take a bath as well but the latter refused. Appellant threatened Mischel
that he would leave her but the latter still declined, hence, he held her hand and pushed her
to the bathroom, forcing her to take a bath. After taking a bath, appellant suddenly carried
her to the bed and started kissing her. Appellant took his off his towel and was completely
naked. Mischel resisted and slapped the appellant but the latter punched her thighs which
made her weak. He then undressed her and forced her legs apart to proceed having carnal
knowledge but he failed when Mischel still resisted. He kicked the victim and forced her to
change position (pinatuwad) and then plunged his penis into her vagina; he was successful
this time, making Mischel weaker as she bled and felt pain and fear. He then tied her hands
and legs after 15 minutes of abuse and threatened her that he will kill her and her family but
Mischel pleaded and told him she would not tell anyone about the incident, thus he untied
her.
When Mischel arrived home crying, she blurted out to her mother that she was raped by the
appellant. The two went to the barangay hall and with the help of QC Police, appellant was
apprehended in his house in Sta. Ana. The medico-legal report exhibited a kiss mark on the
neck of the victim, contusions on her left thigh, and a laceration on the victim’s hymen that
was caused by a full-erect penis.
The RTC of Manila found appellant guilty of the crime rape under Art. 335 of the RPC.
Appellant appealed but did not deny having carnal knowledge with the victim. He raised the
sweetheart defense and claimed that the victim consented to the act, hence no rape was
committed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape.
2. W/N the court erred in not giving weight and credence to the evidence for the defense.

HELD: 1. NO. Appellant argued that the testimony of the victim revealed that she had
reasonable time and opportunity to escape if she had wanted to but chose not to do so and
that it is highly inconceivable for the victim, a 15-year-old, third-year high school student, not
to have sensed danger. She herself testified that 1) in the movie house, he had suggested
that she should take her clothes off in front of him, as his sister had done; and 2) the taxi
took them to a motel instead of Cavite, where they were supposed to meet his wife. Appellant
added that she also had the chance to flee while he was taking a bath, but she just sat on a
chair. And, supposedly, during the thirty long minutes he was at the counter paying their bill,
she failed to call for help or to break away from him.
The Court ruled that nothing in the records indicates that the prosecution evidence was
wanting; or that the victim had any ill motive to fabricate a false accusation; or that the trial
judge mistakenly believed her testimony. It is much more likely that she came out in the open
for no other reason than to obtain justice.
It must be remembered that at the time of the incident, when appellant and his wife were
renting a room in the house of the family of the victim, the girl considered him as a close
family friend, a kinakapatid, and a virtual family member who gave them food. Finding no
reason to disbelieve him, the victim went with him to meet his wife for the purported field
trip, only to realize too late what his real intentions were. Moreover, it must be stressed that
the human mind works unpredictably, and no standard form of behavior can be expected of
people under stressful situations.
The medical findings corroborated the declarations of the victim that appellant had boxed her
thighs a number of times when she resisted his advances. Aside from the contusions found
on her left thigh, a complete hymenal laceration, a physical evidence of forcible defloration
was exhibited. The fact that she promptly reported her ravishment to her parents and the
authorities supports the finding that she had indeed been defiled by appellant. Such conduct
further bolstered her credibility.
2. NO. His sweetheart defense must be rejected for lack of corroboration. As an
affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing evidence by some documentary
and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. In this case,
the only thing he proffered to prove that he and the victim were lovers was his self-serving
statement, which she and her mother categorically denied. Even if he and the victim were
really sweethearts, such a fact would not necessarily establish consent. It has been
consistently ruled that "a love affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually
violated against her will." The fact that a woman voluntarily goes out on a date with her lover
does not give him unbridled license to have sex with her against her will.

People v. Lorena, 639 SCRA 139

FACTS:
 "AAA" is one of the six children born to "BBB" and "CCC." After "CCC" died, "BBB" cohabited
with appellant. Appellant and "BBB" have two (2) children.
 In 2002, "AAA", then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with
her family and appellant in Quezon Province.
 Sometime in December 2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the bedroom
inside their house. Once inside, appellant took off "AAA's" shorts and panty and spread her
legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girl's
vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a bolo
on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she
reported the incident to anyone. At that time, "AAA's" maternal grandmother was in the house
but was unaware that "AAA" was being ravished.
 Unable to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But "AAA's"
mother did not believe her. "AAA" ran away from home and went to her maternal uncle's
house. There, she disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother's siblings. Her uncle
appeared to be angered by appellant's wrong doing. But nonetheless her uncle allowed
appellant to bring her home when appellant fetched her.
 For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and went to the house of her aunt.
Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
 On March 19, 2003, "AAA" was brought to Doña Marta Memorial District Hospital in
Atimonan, Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr. Imperial
issued a Medico-Legal Report. The negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report
means that the victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually
manifests during puberty. The easy insertion of one finger into her vagina means that the
child was no longer a virgin and that it would be difficult to insert even the tip of the little
finger into the private part of a virgin as she would have suffered pain. On the absence of
spermatozoa on the victim's genitals, Dr. Imperial explained that a sperm has a life span of
three (3) days. The lapse of almost four months from the time of the rape would naturally
yield negative results for spermatozoa.
 On April 7, 2003, "AAA" and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for Women
at Gumaca, Quezon. "AAA" was admitted to the said center and still continued to reside
therein at the time of her testimony.
 Appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated "AAA" as his own daughter. He
also claimed that "AAA's" aunt fabricated the charge because appellant called her a thief.

 RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape o Credence to the
testimony of "AAA" especially considering that the same is corroborated by the medical
findings. o Qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship to be present.

 CA: affirmed qualified rape but with modifications as to the damages. o Disregarded
appellant's contention that he could not have raped "AAA" in the presence of "AAA's"
grandmother as "lust is no respecter of time and place." o Prosecution satisfactorily
established "AAA's" minority as well as the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant
being the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother.
 Appellant argues: o If he indeed raped "AAA" in the manner that she narrated, it would be
improbable for "AAA's" maternal grandmother not to have noticed the same. o It was illogical
for "AAA's" uncle to allow "AAA" to return home after learning about the alleged rape incident.
o The examining physician was unsure as to what actually caused "AAA's" hymenal
lacerations.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape. (2) Whether or not the trial court qualifying the charge of rape.

HELD: (1) NO.

o Appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court and the credibility it lent to the
testimony of the victim. As a general rule, however, this Court accords great respect to the
factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA.
o It would not be amiss to point out that "AAA" was only 13 years of age when she testified
in court.  Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when
a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a
horrible story
o We are not persuaded by appellant's argument that if he indeed raped "AAA" inside their
house, then "AAA's" maternal grandmother would have noticed the same. It is settled
jurisprudence that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate. Thus, the
presence of "AAA's" grandmother would not negate the commission of the rape; neither would
it prove appellant's innocence.
o An examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the
victim and on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature,
extent and location of the wounds. In any case, a medical examination is not even
indispensable in prosecuting a rape charge. In fact, an accused's conviction for rape may be
anchored solely on the testimony of the victim. At best, the medical examination would only
serve as corroborative evidence. Dr. Imperial found, among others, that "AAA" suffered
hymenal lacerations. This refers to the location and nature of the wounds suffered by the
victim. Dr. Imperial could not be expected to establish the cause of such lacerations with
particularity because he has no personal knowledge of how these hymenal lacerations were
inflicted on "AAA."
(2) YES.
o Qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the crime itself.
In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship. As such, appellant should only be convicted of the
crime of simple rape.
o The prosecution failed to prove the minority of "AAA"  In its Formal Offer of Evidence, the
prosecution mentioned "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth. Also attached to the Folder of Exhibits
marked as Exhibit "B" is "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth showing that "AAA" was born on
October 31, 1991. However, upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said Certificate of Live
Birth was never presented or offered during the trial of the case. During the March 28, 2006
hearing, the prosecution manifested before the RTC that it will be presenting "AAA's"
Certificate of Live Birth at the next setting. In its Order dated June 27, 2006, the trial court
reset the hearing of the case to allow the prosecution to present evidence with respect to
"AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth. However, up until the prosecution rested its case, nobody
was G.R. No. 191362 People v. Cial y Lorena October 9, 2013 presented to testify on "AAA's"
Certificate of Live Birth. Records show that the prosecution presented only "AAA" and Dr.
Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial never testified on "AAA's" age. On the other hand,
"AAA" even testified on the witness stand that she does not know her age.
o Prosecution likewise miserably failed to establish "AAA's" relationship with the appellant. 
Although the Information alleged that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAA's"
mother, "AAA"' referred to appellant as her step-father.  Even the RTC interchangeably
referred to appellant as the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother as well as the step-
father of "AAA". Moreover, the RTC failed to cite any basis for its reference to appellant as
such. In fact, the RTC Decision is bereft of any discussion as to how it reached its conclusion
that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother or that "AAA" is his step-
daughter.  The terms "common-law husband" and "step-father" have different legal
connotations. For appellant to be a step-father to "AAA," he must be legally married to "AAA's"
mother.

People v. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11,2012 (c/o Garillo)

FACTS: The accused in this case is Edmundo Villaflores who was also known as “Batman” in
their neighborhood and was known to be a drug-addict. The victim is a four-year old girl
named Marita. On July 2, 1999, Marita was last seen by her mother Julia to be playing at the
rear of their residence, when her mother noticed that she was missing, she called her husband
who rushed home to find their daughter. At 6:00AM of July 3, 1999, they found Marita’s
lifeless body covered with blue and yellow sack five houses away from their home. The result
of the postmortem examination showed that the child was raped and the cause of death is
asphyxia by strangulation. Upon police investigation, two (2) witnesses who were Aldrin
Bautista and Jovy Stadium pointedVillaflores as the culprit. Both witnesses narrated that at
about 10:00AM on July 2, 1999, they saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. At noon, the
three used shabu for a while, but the witnesses did not see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores’
house. It was only on 3:00PM that they heard cries of a child. At about 7:00PM both witnesses
saw Batman carrying a yellow sack which appears heavy, the same sack that he saw when
they are still inside the house of Batman. The wife of the accused also gave a supporting
testimony that on the night of July 2, 1999 she saw his husband place some sacks under their
house and then went closer and saw a protruding elbow inside the sack, when she confronted
his husband who was on drugs, Villaflores said it was nothing. Based from these
circumstances, the RTC convicted Villaflores of a rape with homicide holding that the
circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction. The accused appealed
and argued that both RTC and CA erred in convicting him of a composite crime of Rape with
homicide through circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE: Can the accused be convicted of a composite crime of rape with homicide through
circumstantial evidence?

HELD: YES. In order to convict Villaflores for the composite crime of rape with homicide, the
State must thusprove the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had
carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge without the
consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape. Under the RPC as
amended, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female
under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that
age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Marita’s Certificate of
Live Birth disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four
years and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such,
carnal knowledge of herby Villaflores would constitute statutory rape. The crime becomes a
composite crime of rape with homicide when it was made on the occasion of the rape, which
refers to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the commission itself of
the attempted or consummated rape, for as long as the killing is lined to rape. Although the
best evidence to prove rape is the testimony of the victim herself, the rule held that the Rules
of Court allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as
the identity of the culprit when the rape victim is herself killed; provided however, that such
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction.

Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall become reclusion perpetua to death.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
"2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law
enforcement or penal institution;
"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
"4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is
personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the
crime;
"5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
"6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
(HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible
disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;
"7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-military
units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal
institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of
the crime;
"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation or disability;
"9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime; and
"10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua.
"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten aggravating/
qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.

People v. Macapanas, 620 SCRA 54

FACTS:
A student of Eastern Samar State Agricultural College was grabbed by appellant, armed with
a bladed weapon locally known as sundang. Appellant poked the sundang on her side and
pulled her towards an uninhabited house with the knife.
Inside, appellant grabbed her skirt and forcibly removed the buttons to open her skirt.
Appellant then pushed her to the floor where he removed her panty. He mounted her and
succeeded in having intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, appellant allowed AAA to
put on her. With appellant behind her, AAA walked back towards the waiting shed.
When AAA saw plenty of people on the road, she shouted for help. Appellant then stabbed
her at the back and fled. AAA was brought to the Southern Samar General Hospital where
she was confined for 9 days.
ISSUE:
Whether appellant’s guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, must be
alleged in the Information and duly proved during the trial.
In the case at bar, appellant used a sharp-pointed bolo locally known as sundang in
consummating the salacious act. This circumstance was alleged in the Information and duly
proved during trial. Being in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, "use of a deadly weapon"
increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty. This so-called qualified form of
rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.

RA 8353: Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife
as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab
initio.
RA 8353: Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance
against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party
is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as
evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A.