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1. SJS Vs. Atienza

Pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. The said ordinance, in essence, reclassified portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as
well as its adjoining areas from industrial to commercial areas [reservoir of oils of big oil companies are
located in this area- this is called as the Pandacan terminals] and owners or operators of industries and
other businesses, of the Pandacan terminals are given a period of 6 months from the date of effectivity
of the Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are
Subsequent to the approval of the ordinance, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy
(DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they
agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option and
not total removal of the Pandacan terminals as demanded by Ordinance 8027. Under the MOU, the oil
companies agreed to scale down the oils reservoir and agreed that the joint operations of the OIL
COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities.
The said MOU was adopted by a resolution of the Sanggunian Panglunsod of Manila.
Petitioners filed a mandamus compelling respondent in his capacity as Mayor of Manila to enforce the
said ordinance and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Atienza contended that Ordinance 8027 was superseded by the MOU, hence he cannot enforce it.
Whether or not respondent can be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027.
Whether or not the MOU superseded Ordinance 8027.
Yes, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to 'enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.' One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed
by theSanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do
so. The Court ratiocinated, "these officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question
the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it."
As to the second issue, assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No.
8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full
force and effect only until April 30, 2003.Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders
respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
2. Acebedo Optical Vs. CA G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
1. Police Power as exercised by LGUs, restrictions and qualifications
2. Power of city mayor to grant/cancel/revoke business permits
3. Granting of business permits vs. granting of permit to practice profession
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. Permit was therefor
issued, subject to certain conditions like prohibition of putting up an optical clinic, examining and/or
prescribing reading and similar optical glasses, etc. When it was found that petitioner violated these
conditions, its business permit was cancelled.

 Whether or not the imposition of special conditions by the public respondents were acts ultra
Police Power exercised by LGUs
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The State,
through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as
agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code xxx
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters
affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police
power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if
exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
Power of city mayor to grant business permits
The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided
for by law.
However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal
protection of the law.


1. Jejomar C. Binay vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan

Facts: Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandigan bayan (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay of
Makati for ‘Illegal Use of Public Funds’ (RPC A220) and ‘Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act’ (RA 3019) on September 1994. The informations filed constituted crimes which were
committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.The petitioner filed a motion to quash
alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due
process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the motions.
Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash and further the latter’s
motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused
‘pendente lite’ (benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension. Petition for
certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was
ordered even before he could file his reply to the petitioner’s opposition. SC then, directed
the SB to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB none the less r iterated its previous resolutions and
order after the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect
on May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of
Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and
suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioner’s motion. Hence
this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal
Issue: WoN SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975.
Held: YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the
time of the commission of the offense: 1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
mayors are "local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher.
2. Tirol Vs. COA G.R. No. 133954, Aug. 3, 2000
During petitioner's capacity as the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII, he and some officials of the
Lalawigan National High School in Eastern Samar entered into a contract with Fairchild Marketing and
Construction in the total amount of P80,000.
Upon filing of complaint by the Teachers and Employees Union, COA investigated the transaction and
found that there was malversation of public funds. Instead of a competitive public bidding, the purchase
of certain supplies and equipment was done through a negotiated contract, which resulted in an
overprice of P35,100.
Petitioner's main allegation is that the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV) and check were previously
reviewed by his subordinates before he approved and signed them. Said act, therefore, only constitutes
a ministerial act on his part.
But the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rejected petitioner's defense because had he carefully
scrutinized the documents he would have discovered that the purchases were made without
competitive public bidding. Moreover, the magnitude of the amount involved would prevent a
reasonable mind from accepting the claim that petitioner was merely careless or negligent in the
performance of his functions.
Accordingly, it was recommended that petitioner and co-petitioners be indicted for violation of Sec. 3 (g)
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended for entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government. An information was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan,
charging the petitioner and two others with the aforementioned offense.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's ruling but the Motion was dismissed,
prompting petitioner to file the instant petition, seeking reversal of the Ombudsman's assailed
Resolution and Order.
Petitioner alleged that (1) his participation was limited to signing of the RIV and the check as a matter of
routine; (2) that the RIV did not involve the determination of the price of the supplies and equipment;
(3) that the signing of the check was authority vested in him as the DECS Regional Director; and (4) that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions by public officers should apply in
his favor.
Petitioner cited the cases of Arias v. Sandiganbayan and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan where the Court held
that heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those
who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.
In his comment, the Solicitor General contends that there was a conspiracy of silence and inaction and
because of that petitioner was guilty of negligence. He further asserverates that it is beyond the ambit
of the Court's authority to review the power of the Ombudsman in prosecuting and dismissing a
complaint filed before it.
In his Reply, petitioner states that the petition does not involve a review of the factual finding of the
Ombudsman but rather its conclusion based on undisputed facts.
(1) Whether or not the issue is a question of law, and may therefore, be reviewed by the Supreme Court
(2) Whether or not the defense of good faith and regularity of performance of duty may be raised by the
(3) Whether or not there is conspiracy as would warrant conviction of the accused
From the pleadings, it is clear that the questions raised by the petitioner are questions of fact rather
than of law. What petitioner wants to happen is for the Supreme Court to review the evidence and
determine whether in fact he acted in good faith and that no conspiracy existed among the accused.
The rulings in Arias and Magasuci are inapplicable to petitioner because the petitioners in the said cases
were indicted and submitted themselves to trial before the Sandiganbayan, which convicted them for
the offense charged. In Arias, the Court set aside the judgment against the petitioner becasue there was
no evidence that the Government suffered undue injury. And in Magsuci, the reversal by the Court of
the judgment of conviction was based on a finding that Magsuci acted in good faith and that there has
been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both
Engr. Enriquez and Acia.
In both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence on conspiracy, while in this case, there is only
the claim of peitioner that he acted in good faith and that there was no conspiracy. The Ombudsman
believes otherwise and the Court does not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the said Office.
Moreover, this case is an appeal under Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which has been declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto for
increasing appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent. Also, there is no
right of appeal available since the Section mentions only appeals from all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court also found that the petition was in fact a modified form of forum shopping as shown
in the other case filed.
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DENIED, and the Resolution of 20 March
1997 and Order of 5 March 1998 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are
3. Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 –
Tanodbayan Has Jurisdiction over all Government Owned Firms Regardless of How Organized.F: F.
Quimpo filed a complaint w/ the Tanodbayan (TB) charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager and
analyst of Petrophil, w/ viol. of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB
dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned
corps. organized under a special law. Petrophil is a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it
was acquired by the gov’t to carry out its oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for
certiorari, questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB confessed judgment.
ISSUE: WON PETROPHIL is a government owned or controlled corpo¬ration whose employees fall
within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Prac¬tices Act?
HELD: YES. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally
"created"as a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It
is now funded and owned by the government as in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related
to governmental programs and policies on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent
adjunct to perform essential government related functions.


1. Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, et al. G.R. No.
149927 March 30, 2004
Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been granted
permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, SanMiguel, Bulacan,
succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount
Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range. The petitioner then applied with the
Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license
to exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the
herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioner’s license
stating that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that
there was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The
latter reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to his law, public
interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No.
2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.
Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.” Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a
patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a
punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder. Too,
there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an
ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation84, which
merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents’
license, is clearly not penal in character. Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No.
84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution of 1986. Section 1of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional
Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section6 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Director of Lands v. IAC, ACME Plywood and Veneer Co. Digest
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC) 146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986
1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint
that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners

2. Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court, amended the answer.
In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears. The alleged ownership of the land by the
plaintiff was denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner of the land as he
bought it from the plaintiff’s parents while they were still alive.
3. After trial, the lower court upheld the defendant’s ownership of the land. On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his original answer.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct
RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it already disappeared from the record,
lost its status as a pleading and cease to be a judicial admission. While the said pleading may be utilized
against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally
offered in evidence.


1. G.R. No. L-23139 December 17,1966 MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC. vs. CUSTOMS
FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" consigned to Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. It was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service,
the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre
Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only. Petitioner filed suit in the Court
of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureauof Customs to recover
the value of the undelivered case plus other damages. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that not being persons under the law, they cannot be sued.
ISSUE: WON the defendants can invoke state immunity.
HELD: YES. Now, the fact that a non corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in
nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as
an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit
extended to such government entity. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of
Finance with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function
is governmental, that of assessing and collecting awful revenues from imported articles and allot her
tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a
necessary incident.
2. Professional Video v. Technical and Educational Skills Development Authority [Tesda]G.R. No.
155504, June 26, 2009
FACTS: Professional Video (PROVI) entered a contract with Technical and Educational Skills
Development Authority(TESDA) for the supply of PVC cards to be used as ID of TESDA trainees who
passed TESDA’s National Skills Certification Program – the program that immediately serves
TESDA’s mandated functions of developing and establishing a national system of skills
standardization, testing and certification in the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not TESDA can be sued and held liable for recovery of money and damages on
the entered contract with PROVI.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that TESDA cannot be sued for recovery of sum of money and
damages. TESDA performs a governmental function. TESDA’s funds are still public in nature, and,
thus, cannot be valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and services
rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.


1. Tolentino vs COMELEC41 SCRA 702 Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO

Respondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and the Disbursing
Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana
III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F. Ortega and
Juan V. Borra
The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking
to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing
the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,
submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The
Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the
Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a
convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint
sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said
Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation
thereof, Republic Act 6132.
Issue: Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?
The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same
for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null
and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called
for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely
provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to
ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or
convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and
the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying
therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec,
Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined
from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.