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Art. 40.

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Mauel vs Republic (G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005)

FACTS:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting the petitioner of bigamy.

The petitioner married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975 in Makati. On the same year, Gaña was charged
with estafa. The petitioner visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again.

In January 1996, petitioner, then 39 years old met complainant Tina B. Gandalera, 21 years old, in
Dagupan City. Petitioner visited her several times in Baguio City, at one time he brought his parents
whom assured the complainant and her parents that the petitioner is single. On April 22, 1996, they had
a civil marriage in Baguio, settling at Irisan, Baguio. In their marriage contract, petitioner wrote that he
was "single".
After three years of marriage, complainant allege that petitioner was home only twice or thrice a year
and that whenever complainant asks for sustenance, the petitioner would slap her. On January 2001,
the petitioner finally left and did not return. Petitioner allege that the reason he left was that her wife
has a lover evidenced by the "love-bite" he saw on her neck.

The RTC of Baguio ruled against the petitioner, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty from six
years to ten month as minimum and ten years as maximum, and indemnity in the amount of Php
200,000.00 by way of moral damages. After appealing with the Court of Appeals, the sentence was
reduced to two years, four months and one day minimum and ten years maximum.

Issues:1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner's first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was
no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
Php 200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law

Ruling:1. No, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error of law. The Family Code, having a retroactive
effect, amended Article 390 of the Civil Code, wherefore adding the third rule in the requirements for a
subsequent bigamous marriage to be considered valid, which are: (1) the prior spouse have been absent
for four consecutive years, (2) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead, and (3) a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (Armas vs
Calisterio 330 SCRA 201), the third rule of which is designed to harmonize with Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code which defines and penalizes bigamy.

2. No, there is no error of law committed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner is liable for moral
damages in accordance to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. Article 19 contends that a person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duty, act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith; Article 20: every person who, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter the same; and Article 21: any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another, in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage, by his and his
parents' assurance that he is single, were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
complainant. Also, the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution,and against good morals, and the interest and general welfare of society.
Therefore, the award of Php 200,000. 00 cost for moral damages is just and reasonable.

TEVES V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 188775, [August 24, 2011]

DOCTRINE:Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

FACTS:On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma
Jaime-Teves (Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to
the Philippines for vacations. In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted marriage
with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma then went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of
the Certificate of Marriage indicating that her husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10
December 2001 in Bulacan. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of
bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC on June 2006. However,
during the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City, rendered a decision
dated May 2006 (one month before the case for bigamy was decided) declaring the marriage of
petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final by
a Certification of Finality issued on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA contending
that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability had already been
extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, “there is
in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.”
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case
because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity
of marriage was filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had already been legally
dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.

ISSUE:Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the
judicial declaration that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.
HELD:YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed
before the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage
while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of Nullity of
the First marriage AT THE TIME HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

RATIO:The instant case has all the elements of the crimeof bigamy under Art. 346 of the RPC. Thus, the
CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26
November 1992. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001. At
the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted
that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27
June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent
marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact
not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.
His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage is bereft of merit. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.

If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We
note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It
was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as
in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage
precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID


MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (n)

(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.

(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te
complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.

Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -


(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriage based on any of the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and within the
period herein indicated:

(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute
parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the
age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent, guardian or person
having legal charge of the contracting party , at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any
relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the
death of either party; or by the insane spouse during the a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after coming to reason, has not freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue
influence, within five years from the time the force intimidation, or undue influence
disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation, or undue influence
having disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband or wife;

(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such incapability continues and
appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage; and

(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Enrico vs. Heirs G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

FACTS:The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and
Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004,
Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo,
Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later. They
argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was
dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date
of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional
ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its
performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under
one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of
a marriage license. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal
Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought
the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who
can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUES:Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Eulogio and Lolita
RULING:No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. But it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse
under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

IGNACIO J. SALMINGO v. ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA 527 SCRA 1(2007)

In view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance of due


process, as in other judicial determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of
innocence in favor of the lawyer.
Ignacio J. Salmingo (Salmingo), City Administrator of Silay, filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica) and a petition for setting aside of the decision holding Liza Jane’s (Jane)
marriage as annulled. Salmingo alleged that in prosecuting an annulment case, Atty. Rubica deliberately
concealed Liza Jane’s address so that she could not be served with summons, thus enabling him to
present evidence ex parte, and that Atty. Rubica also caused the publication of summons only in a
newspaper of local circulation. Salmingo also contends that Atty Rubica did not serve a copy of his
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor; and
that he did not cause the registration of the decree of nullity in the Civil Registry. Salmingo contends
that the conduct of Atty. Rubica did not comply with the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) investigating commissioner recommended that Atty. Rubica
be suspended for three months for gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors resolved
to dismiss the case for lack of sufficient evidence. Salmingo, meanwhile, re-appealed the decision to
the Supreme Court through a letter he sent to the Chief Justice. He avers that in prosecuting the
annulment case, Atty. Rubica deliberately concealed Liza Jane’s address so that she could not be served
with summons, thus enabling him to present evidence ex parte.
ISSUES :Whether or not Atty Rubica’s alleged non-compliance with the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is tantamount to gross
misconduct which warrants his disbarment
HELD:The Court upholds the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
It is settled that in view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance of due
process, as in other JUDICIAL determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of innocence in
favor of the lawyer. Consequently, the burden of proof is on the complainant to overcome such
presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence.
To prove that Atty. Rubica knew Liza Jane’s true whereabouts all along, complainant alleged that Atty.
Rubica had been sending allowances to Liza Jane and their children at her residence. Atty. Rubica
countered, however, that he had been sending allowances by depositing the same in a bank in Bacolod
City through an automated teller machine (ATM) account, which deposit could be withdrawn at
any ATM machine within the Philippines. This complainant failed to controvert.
On Atty. Rubica’s alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which took effect on March 15, 2003 xxx
that the petitioner should serve copies of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and that of
the Public Prosecutor; that service of summons by publication on a respondent whose whereabouts are
unknown be in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and that the prevailing party cause
the registration and publication of the decree took effect only May 15, 2003, after respondent filed the
declaration of nullity case on January 9, 2003.
At the time respondent filed his petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage, what applied was the
Rules of Court under which he was not required to file his petition in six copies and to serve copies on
the Office of the Solicitor General and that of the City or Provincial Prosecutor. Neither was he required
to cause the registration and publication of the decree of nullity.
Atty. Rubica did comply with the procedure in the Rules of Court on service by publication on a
respondent whose whereabouts are unknown, which procedure requires only ―publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order,‖ as
opposed to ―a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court may
order‖ required by the above-quoted Section 6 (1) of the Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void
Marriages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages.
The requirement that the trial court order the prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists in
case the defendant in the declaration of nullity case files no answer is addressed to the said court, not
to the parties to the case nor to their counsel, absent any showing of respondent’s involvement in the
lapse in the prescribed procedure, he cannot be faulted therefor.

Valdes vs. RTC 260 SCRA 221

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.
*Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage , shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.( As
amended by E.O. No.227, dated July 17, 1987)
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed
a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

HELD:The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
*prima facie- based on the first impression; accepted as correct until proved otherwise
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Domingo vs Court of Appeals


FACTS:Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia,
for support and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some
of her properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and
separation of property.

ISSUE:Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however,
one is required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.
Vincent Mercado vs Consuelo Tan
Judicial Declaration of Nullity Before Remarriage
In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado married a
second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.
In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).
In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now sought the
dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first marriage was declared
void ab initio, there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his “second” marriage with Tan was
actually his first marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is correct.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first marriage was
still subsisting and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an action to declare his first
marriage void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be
obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that declaration a person who
marries a second time shall be guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former
marriage.
HELD:A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute
as “void.”

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan
filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second
marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

Republic vs. CA and Molina G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in
1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a
father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986,
the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and
their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the
time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
-burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
-root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
-such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
-essential marital obligations such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying
with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
-such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
-decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
-court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon
in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking
chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of
Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine
prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their
marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does
not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part
and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the
result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological
incapacity.
HELD:The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

MARCOS V. MARCOS

FactsPlaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children.
Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was
however reversed by CA.

IssuesWhether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician


is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

HeldPsychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be


established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such
declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was
during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only
to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic
v. CA and Molina.
REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FACTS:On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years
old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and
Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino
started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a
few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in
drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned
that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-
date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was
served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for
presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law as her only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in
writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file
said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor
conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the
investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino
void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground
that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest
whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the
evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a
married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

ISSUE:Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on
the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?

HELD:Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-
mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires
that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since
no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the
crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not
given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely
rendered.
David Dedel vs Court of Appeals & Sharon Corpuz-Dedel
In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. They’ve had four children since then. David then found
out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had
extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with
whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon is psychologically
incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had
no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting
to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to the most
serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing the essential marital
obligations. Sharon’s sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of
psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude
the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in
law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be
appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage.

Buenaventura VS. CA G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005

Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and
violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general
rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA,
to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No
fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution.
PARAS V. PARAS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.G.R. No. 170022,
January 9, 2013

FACTS:Respondent Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. To support his family, Cesar
went to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar learned that Lolita had been having an
illicit affair with Alvin Perez (Alvin). Subsequently, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her
children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. Thereafter, Cesar filed
with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas
psychological incapacity.

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home. He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after
he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.

RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The
Office of the Solicitor General then filed the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.


CIVIL LAW: Psychological Incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. In interpreting this provision, the Court have repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence
(i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of
the errant spouse. In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations
of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.
KALAW V. FERNANDEZ
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS: In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going
out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD: YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this
case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in
this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid,
such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of
nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less
specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach
the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next
one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field
of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent
and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be
considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally
examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a
certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert
opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence
on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish
causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional


temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The
position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn
from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had
accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for
by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties


The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should
be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have
known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them
to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term
effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on
her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not
only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of
her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental
development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20

Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with him on
his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his hometown in San
Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In January
1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, she left.
He cut short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.

He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote several letters to
the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he inquired from his
friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA, contending
that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had failed to show that
there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING: No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the Article
41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years;
however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one
spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's whereabouts
too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any information
about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he
took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his captain. He refused to
identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about the returned letters,
he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London, he did not even dare to solicit help of
authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to
regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age
or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable. (85a)

Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the
time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)
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MACABURRO VS. MACABURRO
In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career as a lawyer. However
in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with Esparza was subsisting. In June
2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against Macarrubo. Teves alleged that Macarrubo made
her believe that his marriage with Esparza was void; that Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but
later on left her and then Macarrubo subsequently married another woman named Josephine
Constantino whom he subsequently abandoned. Teves presented as evidence documents proving
Macarubbo’s marriages as well as photos of him and his wife as a family. Macarrubo was initially
declared in default for failing to appear multiple times but was subsequently given the opportunity to
defend himself. In his defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to marry Teves in order to
save her face because at that time she was already pregnant; that Teves sent some strangers to pick
Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He presented a judicial declaration of the nullity of his marriage with
Teves; that the marriage was void for being a sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case
serves as res judicata on the disbarment case because Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He
also avers that his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due to similar
circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in supporting Teves
and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is void, recommended a penalty of
three months suspension from the practice of law for grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is subsisting shall
be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently declared void.
HELD: Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is still
undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the second marriage is
void, he is then liable for concubinage for living with another woman while his first marriage is
subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his defense that both second and third marriages
are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One incident of a “shotgun
marriage” is believable, but two such in succession would tax one’s credulity. Macarrubo’s actions show
a blatant disregard to the institution of marriage and family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a
public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage,
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. Macarrubo violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui generis cases. A
disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an
administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course. In this case, the annulment of Macarrubo’s second marriage will not work to remove such
second marriage as a ground for disbarment.
JIMENEZ VS REPUBLIC
Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that Remedios is
impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already existing at the time of
the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was
found that there was no collusion between the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of
Remedios in the case. Remedios was ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to determine if
her genitals are indeed too small for copulation. Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was
heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The marriage was later annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.
HELD: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of
his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature
coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor
of potency. The lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat April 25, 1941

Facts: Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged
in September, and got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth
to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he
agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue: Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that
Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Held: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a
sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law
student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach )
when they got married.

Decision: SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant

Aquino vs. Delizo 109 Phil 21

FACTS:Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita
Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she
was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave
birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to
prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a
petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as
would annul a marriage.

HELD:The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was
allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is
hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat. It
is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height
above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set
aside.
Anaya vs. Palaroan 36 SCRA 97

FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for
annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting
Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to
her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of
his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in
obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD: The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of
those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the
last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground for
an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not
warrant an annulment of marriage.

VILLANUEVA VS. CA

In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November
1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced
him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that
Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him.
Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he
married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on
the other hand denied Orly’s allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her
after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards
her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its
face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the
pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of
the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove
that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by
the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security
guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done
against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be
raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part
of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings
merit to Lilia’s contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage
LEGAL SEPARATION

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
year.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)

Ong vs Ong G.R. No. 153206


Articles 56 & 57Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong vs Lucita OngG.R. No. 153206
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a
complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.
Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to
physical violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the
concrete wall.and been violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt
buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several
different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which she did.
Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim.
Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also
testified about her injuries.
The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which the CA affirmed
William then filed this petition for review on certiorari
-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted physical harm on
her or their children.
-He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is to deprive
him of his control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita.
-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception to the general rule
that questions of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr.
ElinZano since their testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and since Lucita
abandoned the family home she has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore
should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties
have given ground for legal separation
ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation
HELD:
The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were
brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from
pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and
the companionship of her husband and children
The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great respect.
Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as biased and
unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward
testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause
for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated in the said provision
PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation

EFFECTS ONCE PETITION IS GRANTED


A. MARRIAGE BOND
B. PROPERTY RELATIONS
C. STATUS OF CHILDREN
D. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
E. INHERITANCE
F. DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
G. INSURANCE POLICY
ERIC JONATHAN YU v. CAROLINE YU

Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute
community of property before the Pasig Regional Trial Court. The petition contains a prayer for the
award of sole custody of his daughter Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the Court of Appeals (CA)
on his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The CA dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus for becoming moot and academic.
Caroline Tanchay-Yu, on the other hand, filed before the RTC Pasay a petition for habeas corpus, with a
prayer for the award of the sole custody to her of Bianca.
Both the Pasig RTC and the Pasay RTC asserted their jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the RTC Pasay or
before the RTC Pasig
HELD: Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC, regardless
of which party would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay
RTC since the former has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because there is identity in the facts
and evidence essential to the resolution of the identical issue raised in both actions – whether it would
serve the best interest of Bianca to be in the custody of Eric rather than Caroline or vice versa.
Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig
RTC is Caroline‘s alleged psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations as
provided in Article 36 of the Family Code, the evidence to support this cause of action necessarily
involves evidence of Caroline‘s fitness to take custody of Bianca. Thus, the elements of litis pendentia, to
wit: a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and c) the identity in
the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other, are present.
By Eric‘s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he
automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After
the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for Eric to
replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody
issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.
Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by mere motion of either
party, it could only mean that the filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to consider the
issue of custody of a minor.
The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Family Code
is when “such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings,” which is not the case
here.
The elements of litis pendentia having been established, the more appropriate
action criterion guides this Court in deciding which of the two pending actions to abate.
The petition filed by Eric for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the
more appropriate action to determine the issue of who between the parties should have custody over
Bianca in view of the express provision of the second paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code. This
must be so in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.

CIVIL REGISTER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048 March 22, 2001
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to
Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital AdrenalHyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male
characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical
certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate
is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her
body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both
male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed
before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of
the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a
male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007 [Change of name or sex]
FACTS:Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have his first
name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his petition. CA,
however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court decision,
holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration.

ISSUE:Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the intervention of
sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with
Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as
clerical or typographical errors are involved

Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this petition filed by
Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major changes in statutes
that underscore the public policy in relation to women.

Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang
Case Doctrines: ● The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child
contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
● Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or
civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
● That the continued use of a middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from one's registered complete name.
Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang
who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was born
in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle
name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to
Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be
discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot
just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children
have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could
then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.

Issues: Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

Held: Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an
illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in
a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his
middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate
child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification,
and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws. G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155).

TEOFISTA BABIERA VS PRESENTACION CATOTALG.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000


FACTS:Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the
birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and
contained false entries, to wit:

 That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariñosa;
 Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
 Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
 Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child;
 It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years of age; her
last child birth was when Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to order the
City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the
estate.

Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her certificate of
birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion on the grounds that:

the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of Hermogena and
Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family
Code;

and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the Family Code.

The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art.
171;
2. Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute of limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral testimony of Presentacion.
RULING:Petition is not meritorious.
1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to instances which
the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the
undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to Teofista. The
present action does not impugn Teofista's filiation to Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place. The reason why Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the former's
successional rights.
2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista's Birth Certificate, it does not
impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was allegedly declared
void ab initio.

3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negates
the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.

First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the mother's signature was different from
other signatures. Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of Hermogena's
pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age. Third, the disposition of Hermogena
which states that she did not give brith to Teofista and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.

Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043


Case Doctrines: ● A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding; it cannot
be decided through a summary proceeding
● The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same
nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.
● A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. All the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties were afforded the opportunity to contest the
petition.
Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition forchange of
name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that:
Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on
July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of
the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born and
up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial,
physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father
and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might
eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso,
the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name
will be for the benefit of the minor.
Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due
course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent
moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The
OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the
motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment
of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision
ordering the change of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial
court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable
parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s
change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.
2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?
Held: 1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the
procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the
evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176
of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while
his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he
was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended
petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the
reunification of mother and son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial
proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be
decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule
108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors.
The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by
granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required
to reflect the change in name.
3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of
general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy
thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact
that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does
it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its
judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the
arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to
present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the
proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.
4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through
publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the
whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to
the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG,
were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition , February 2, 2007).

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO I. KHO et al.526 SCRA 177 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth certificate. Kho
petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino”; (2) delete “John”
from his name; and (3) delete the word “married” opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last
correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy
Nona, and Heddy Moira.
The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048, which
allows first name and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer
approved of the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground that the
correction not merely clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals found in
favor of Kho.
ISSUE:Whether or not Kho‘s request for change in the details of their birth certificaterequires an
adversarial proceeding
HELD:It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlito‘s
mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the “married” status of Carlito‘s parents in his
and his siblings‘ respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and
Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather,
the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito‘s mother as reflected in his birth certificate is
a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of
the parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito‘s and his siblings‘ parents were “married” alters
their filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” with significant implications on their successional and
other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as “An Act Authorizing the
City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical Error In An
Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order,”
has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial
corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing
of a petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the
civil register is satisfied.

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