Project:
Falcon Pneumatic 3 Way Spool valves, *S****0 w/o manual override
Customer:
Westlock Controls
Saddle Brook, New Jersey
USA
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Management summary
This report summarizes the results of the functional safety assessment according to IEC 61508
carried out on the:
Falcon Pneumatic 3 Way Spool valves, *S****0 w/o manual override
The functional safety assessment performed by exida consisted of the following activities:
- exida assessed the development process used by Westlock Controls by an on-site audit
and creation of a detailed safety case against the requirements of IEC 61508. As RGS
Electro-Pneumatics Ltd is the original designer of the solenoid valves and is involved in any
modification activities, the development process used by RGS was also reviewed via a
separate assessment.
- exida performed a detailed Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) of the
devices to document the hardware architecture and failure behavior.
The functional safety assessment was performed to the requirements of IEC 61508, SIL 3. A full
IEC 61508 Safety Case was prepared, using the exida SafetyCaseDB tool, and used as the
primary audit tool. Hardware process requirements and all associated documentation were
reviewed. Also the user documentation including the Falcon Pneumatic 3 Way Spool valves,
*S****0 w/o manual override safety manual was reviewed.
The results of the Functional Safety Assessment can be summarized by the following statements:
The Falcon Pneumatic 3 Way Spool valves, *S****0 w/o manual override meet the
requirements of SIL 2, single use (HFT = 0) and SIL 3 for redundant use (HFT > 0).
1
Type A component: “Non-Complex” component with well-defined failure modes, for details see 7.4.3.1.2
of IEC 61508-2.
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4 IEC 61508 Functional Safety Assessment
The IEC 61508 Functional Safety Assessment was performed based on the information received
from Westlock Controls and RGS Electro-Pneumatics Ltd and is documented in [R4].
4.1 Methodology
The full functional safety assessment includes an assessment of all fault avoidance and fault
control measures during hardware and software development (if applicable) and demonstrates full
compliance with IEC 61508 to the end-user. The assessment considers all requirements of IEC
61508. Any requirements that have been deemed not applicable have been marked as such in the
full Safety Case report, e.g. software development requirements for a product with no software.
As part of the IEC 61508 functional safety assessment the following aspects have been reviewed:
• Development process, including:
o Functional Safety Management, including training and competence recording, FSM
planning, and configuration management
o Specification process, techniques and documentation
o Design process, techniques and documentation, including tools used
o Validation activities, including development test procedures, test plans and reports,
production test procedures and documentation
o Verification activities and documentation
o Modification process and documentation
o Installation, operation, and maintenance requirements, including user documentation
• Product design
o Hardware architecture and failure behavior, documented in a FMEDA
o Hardware Proven-in-use study, as documented in [D23]
The review of the development procedures is described in section 5.1. The review of the product
design is described in section 5.2.
5.1.5 Verification
Since RGS is the original developer of the Falcon Pneumatic 3 Way Spool valves, *S****0 w/o
manual override and involved in any modification activities, this lifecycle phase applies to RGS. The
compliance to the requirements for this lifecycle phase are covered in the RGS IEC 61508
assessment report.
The development and verification activities are defined in the Design and Development File [D25].
For each phase the objectives are stated, required input and output documents and review
activities. QA forms are used to facility the verification activities at the concept, feasibility and
capability stages, see [D29], [D30], and [D31] respectively. All verification activities are
documented. Given the solenoids only perform a single safety function, this meets SIL 3.
For RGS the compliance to the requirements for this lifecycle phase are covered in the RGS IEC
61508 assessment report. Modifications are done per the QA Document/Engineering Change Note
Form [D32]. The D/ECN form subsequently becomes part of the Design and Development File. The
D/ECN system allows the user to identify if the change affects functional safety. Affected
documents and/or drawings are also listed. If design changes are identified as a result of an
D/ECN, they are usually treated as a derived product and therefore the same general procedure is
used for both new development and modifications. All design change requests are reviewed to
determine if there is any negative impact on product safety. This review is done by both the
assigned engineer and the appropriate engineering manager (others may be included in the review
as necessary). This meets SIL 3.
Westlock Controls has a field return process in place as described in [D1]. Field returns are
evaluated by Quality Assurance. Returns that require modification to the Falcon Pneumatic 3 Way
Spool valves, *S****0 w/o manual override are communicated to RGS. If it is determined that a non-
conformity affects functional safety, Westlock Controls will notify its customers per [D6]. For RGS a
similar process is in place.
2
Note that the SU category includes failures that do not cause a spurious trip
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Table 2 Failure rates Technis report – field data and returns data
When comparing this to the FMEDA predicted results it can be concluded that the field experienced
failure rates do not indicate any systematic problems with the Falcon Pneumatic 3 Way Spool
valves, *S****0 w/o manual override.
For redundant use, common cause failure between the solenoid valves has to be considered. The
Safety Manual includes estimation of the common cause factor β.
The analysis shows that the design of the Falcon Pneumatic 3 Way Spool valves, *S****0 w/o
manual override meets the hardware requirements of IEC 61508, SIL 2 when used as a single
final element (HFT = 0) and IEC 61508, SIL 3 for redundant use (HFT > 0).
Type A (sub)system “Non-Complex” (sub)system (using discrete elements); for details see
7.4.3.1.2 of IEC 61508-2
Type B (sub)system “Complex” (sub)system (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for
details see 7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2
7.2 Releases
This report supersedes Report No. WES 05/08-32 R001 and all of its versions and revisions
Version: V1
Revision: R0
Version History: V1, R1 Released to Westlock Controls
V1, R0: Draft; October 8, 2009
Authors: Rachel Amkreutz - Iwan van Beurden - William M. Goble - Steven Close
Review: V1, R1: William Goble (exida); October 12, 2009
Release status: Released