APPELLATE JURSIDICTION OUTLINE 3

SEC. 1, RULE 41. SEE SEC. 1, RULE 9; S1, R16; S5, R7, S1-3, R17, S5, R18

RULE 7 Parts of a Pleading

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall
be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions. (n)

RULE 9 Effect of Failure to Plead

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss
the claim. (2a)

RULE 16 Motion to Dismiss

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim,
a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. (1a)

RULE 17 Dismissal of Actions

Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being
filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. (1a)
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs
motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court. (2a)
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)

RULE 18 Pre-Trial
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless other-wise
ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof

RULE 41 Appeal From The Regional Trial Courts

Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n)

G.R. No. 148026 July 27, 2006

STRONGWORLD CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, LEO CLETO A. GAMOLO, and REYNOLD P. MOLO,petitioners, vs. HON.
N.C. PERELLO in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 276 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, FIRST
PEOPLE'S BANK, BANK OF COMMERCE, ORLANDO O. FRANCISCO, and EDITHA LIZARDA, respondents.

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 49462, dated 24 May 2000 and 2 April 2001, respectively.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Strongworld Construction Corporation (Strongworld) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
construction. Petitioners Leo Cleto A. Gamolo (Gamolo) and Reynold P. Molo (Molo) are members of the Board of Directors of
petitioner Strongworld. On 31 October 1997, petitioners filed a Complaint3 for Sum of Money and Damages with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, presided over by the Hon. N. C. Perello, and docketed as Civil Case No. 97-222, against
private respondents First People's Bank (formerly known as Rural Bank of San Teodoro), Bank of Commerce, Orlando O. Francisco
(Francisco), and Editha Lizarda (Lizarda).
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that: in 1996, Rizal Cement Company, Inc. delivered to petitioner
Strongworld four (4) checks4 as payment for the construction of housing units;5 at the time of the issuance of the aforesaid checks,
petitioner Strongworld maintained a single account with private respondent Bank of Commerce, San Pedro Branch, 6 with private
respondents Francisco, former president of petitioner Strongworld, and its incumbent president, petitioner Gamolo as authorized
signatories; the subject checks were not deposited to the account of petitioner Strongworld; instead, private respondents Francisco
and Lizarda, conspiring and confederating between themselves and with the employees of private respondent First People's Bank,
maliciously and fraudulently diverted the checks to their personal accounts, specifically First People's Bank Savings Account No. 51-
03025-5, without the knowledge and consent of petitioners Gamolo and Molo, and without authority from the Board of Directors of
petitioner Strongworld;7 and that repeated demands against the private respondents were not heeded resulting in the damage and
prejudice of petitioners.
The petitioners prayed for the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff Strongworld, jointly and severally, the amount of P5,085,615.22
constituting the value of plaintiff corporation's checks, and P3,000,000.00, constituting lost profits, interest and other
expenses which resulted by reason of the illegal acts of defendants.
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, a) P3,000,000.00 by way of moral damages divided
as follows: i) plaintiff Gamolo P1,500,000.00, ii) plaintiff Molo P750,000.00, and iii) plaintiff Strongworld P750,000.00;
b) P100,000.00 exemplary damages; and c) P200,000.00 attorney's fees.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.8
On 2 December 1997, private respondent Bank of Commerce filed an Answer with Cross-Claim,9 praying for the dismissal of
the Complaint. Subsequent thereto, private respondent Lizarda filed an Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,10 dated 12
December 1997. On 11 December 1997, private respondent First People's Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on the grounds that
petitioners Gamolo and Molo had no legal capacity to sue, and that the Complaint stated no cause of action. On 9 January 1998,
petitioners filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.12
On 9 January 1998, the court a quo rendered an Order13 dismissing the Complaint. We quote the pertinent portion
hereunder:
From the allegations of the COMPLAINT, it appears that money sought to be recovered belongs to the Corporation
and who allegedly was damaged due to the unauthorized expenditure of this sum. Therefore, Plaintiff Leo Cleto A. Gamolo
and Reynaldo P. Molo, although, admittedly are officers of the corporation appear to have instituted this action for and in
 behalf of the corporation, yet their authority to sue or defend the corporation has not been shown in this COMPLAINT. No
Board Resolution for this purpose has been attached or recited in it. Thus this complaint is not prosecuted by the proper
property in interest.14
On 30 January 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 which was opposed by private respondent First People's
Bank.16
On 30 March 1998, the trial court granted petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, and consequently, ordered the case
reinstated.17 According to the court a quo, the board resolution authorizing petitioner Gamolo to prosecute the case in behalf of
petitioner Strongworld was defective for not having been authenticated by the proper officer. 18However, notwithstanding the defect
in the resolution, the court a quo held that the intention of petitioner Strongworld to authorize Gamolo to prosecute the case against
private respondents is clear.19 On 30 April 1998, private respondent First People's Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 of the 30
March 1998 Order, praying for the dismissal of the Complaint. On 25 May 1998, petitioners belatedly filed an Opposition21 thereto.
In the interim, on 7 May 1998, the court a quo issued an Order,22 recalling its Order of 30 March 1998. The trial court
declared that the case should remain dismissed on the ground that petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 9
January 1998, dismissing the Complaint, was not served on private respondents Bank of Commerce, Francisco and
Lizarda.23 Moreover, the trial court opined that it was in error when it considered petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, as no proof
of service to private respondents was shown therein, and the same lacked a notice of hearing, which defects rendered the aforesaid
Motion for Reconsideration, a mere scrap of paper.24
Subsequently, petitioners apparently filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 7 May 1998 Order, a copy of which cannot be
found on the records. On 29 May 1998, the court a quo rendered an Order,25 denying the motion and finding no reason to reconsider
its Order of 7 May 1998.
On 15 June 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration and for Declaration of Default.26They
sought, inter alia, for clarification of the Order dated 7 May 1998, positing that the dismissal should only pertain to private
respondent First People's Bank. They also prayed that the 7 May 1998 Order be declared as superseded by the Order of 29 May
1998. In the alternative, they prayed that the 7 May 1998 Order be reconsidered and set aside, that the Complaint be reinstated,
and that private respondents First People's Bank and Francisco be declared in default.27
Resolving petitioners' Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued an Order28 in open court, dated 17 July 1998, reiterating
that the case should remain dismissed as petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was defective, and hence, unbinding against the
Order of 7 May 1998. Similarly, the trial court corrected the Order of 29 May 1998 to refer to the Order of 7 May 1998, which
sustained the dismissal of the case.29 The court a quo reasoned, thus:
Even as the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION by the Plaintiff was not assailed by the other Defendant, but due to
lack of notification, this Motion should not have been received by the Court at all, therefore [it] is a mere scrap of paper
which requires no ruling.
1. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper, it represents no question which
merits the attention of the Court. (Goldloop Properties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 498).
2. Rule 15, Sec. 4. Hearing of motion- Except for motions which the Court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
3. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing unless the Court for good
cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
4. Sec. 5, Notice of hearing – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify
the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
5. Sec. 6, Proof of service necessary – No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the Court without
proof of service thereof.
6. Any motion that does not contain proof of service of notice to the other party is not entitled to judicial
cognizance. (Cui vs. Madayag, 245 SCRA 1).30
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 7 May
1998 and 17 July 1998. The Petition likewise sought to annul the Order of the RTC dated 9 January 1998, dismissing the Complaint,
which was later revived by the Order of 7 May 1998.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari for utilizing the wrong recourse of certiorari, instead of an
ordinary appeal. The appellate court said that the Complaint was finally dismissed on 17 July 1998. Thus, citing Denso (Phils.), Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,31 it held that the dismissal of the Complaint is a final order which disposed of the action, and the
remedy of a party aggrieved of a final order or judgment is appeal under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, and not a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 thereof.32
In dismissing the Petition, the Court of Appeals, in part, declared:
As earlier said, however Our Supreme Court has held that if a party essays a course by the wrong procedure, the
only recourse of action open is to dismiss the case (Murillo vs. Rodolfo Consul, UDK 9748, 182 SCRA XI (sic)). The remedy
of appeal being available to the petitioners, it cannot resort to Certiorari (Felizardo vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 220).
It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the last (sic) remedy of appeal
(Dela Paz v. Panis, 245 SCRA 242) and we find no special nor compelling reasons why we should make out this case as an
exception.33
Petitioners moved for Reconsideration34 thereon, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed Order
promulgated on 2 April 2001.
Assignment of Errors
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition for Review, submitting that the Court of Appeals erred, viz:
I.
IN RULING THAT APPEAL IS THE PROPER REMEDY AND PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THE
PRESENT CASE;
II.
IN NOT FINDING THAT APPEAL IS NOT THE REMEDY WITH RESPECT TO PETITIONER'S (sic) MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION;
III.
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT REINSTATING THE COMPLAINTS (sic)
AND IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN: 1) DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE
 GROUND THAT A BOARD RESOLUTION WAS NOT RECITED IN OR ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT; 2) IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT EVEN AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS WHO DID NOT FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS AND WHO DID NOT RAISE THE
SAME GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT; 3) IN REINSTATING ITS JANUARY
9, 1998 ORDER AND IN NOT RECALLING THE JANUARY 9, 1998.35
Issue
For our resolution is whether the appellate court was in error when it dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari on the
ground that appeal was the appropriate remedy under Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and not a Petition
for Certiorari, under Rule 65 thereof.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, attention must be called to Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable:
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an
appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
From the foregoing, it is evident that under Section 1(h), Rule 41, no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an
action without prejudice. In such a case, the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states that the remedy available to the aggrieved
party is to file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Jurisprudence has similarly underscored that with the advent of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an order of
dismissal without prejudice is no longer appealable, as expressly provided by Section 1(h), Rule 41 thereof. In Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. Philippine Infrastructures, Inc.,36 this Court had the opportunity to resolve whether an order
dismissing a petition without prejudice should be appealed by way of ordinary appeal, petition for review on certiorari or a petition
for certiorari. The Court said that, indeed, prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an order dismissing an action may be
appealed by ordinary appeal.37 Verily, Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure recites the instances when
appeal may not be taken, specifically, in case of an order dismissing an action without prejudice, in which case, the remedy available
to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.
Thus, the question is: was the Order of the RTC, dated 7 May 1998, reviving the 9 January 1998 Order, which dismissed the
Complaint, an order dismissing an action without prejudice?
We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without prejudice. The former disallows and bars the refiling of
the complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal without prejudice.38 Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal
with prejudice is subject to the right of appeal.39
To resolve the issue before us, it is critical to examine the Order of dismissal rendered by the court a quo. It can be recalled
that on 9 January 1998, the trial court issued an Order dismissing petitioners' Complaint, on the ground that petitioners Gamolo and
Molo had not shown their authority to sue for and in behalf of petitioner Strongworld. Subsequently, on petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered its 9 January 1998 Order of dismissal. Hence, on 30 March 1998, the RTC ordered the case
reinstated. However, on 7 May 1998, upon Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent First People's Bank, the court a
quo recalled the Order of 30 March 1998. The recall by the court a quo of the Order dated 30 March 1998 reinstated the Order dated
9 January 1998, which dismissed the Complaint. Finally, on 17 July 1998, the court a quo, upon petitioners' Motion for Clarification,
enunciated that the Order of 7 May 1998, dismissing the case, is sustained.
As can be gleaned therefrom, the trial court's order of dismissal of 9 January 1998, was founded on the ground that the
action was not instituted by the proper party in interest.40 The trial court held that petitioners Gamolo and Molo, although admittedly
officers of petitioner Strongworld, appear to have instituted the action for and in behalf of petitioner Strongworld, yet, their authority
to sue or defend the corporation had not been shown in the Complaint.41No board resolution for the purpose had been attached or
recited in the Complaint.42
Jurisprudence states that if the suit is not brought in the name of, or against, the real party in interest, a Motion to Dismiss
may be filed on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action.43 Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure allows the filing of a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action. Thus, in Aguila, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,44 we pronounced:
A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or who is entitled to the avails of
the suit. This ruling is now embodied in Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Any decision
rendered against a person who is not a real party in interest in the case cannot be executed. Hence, a complaint filed
against such a person should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.45
Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for which a Motion to Dismiss may
be filed, viz.:
SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
 (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
Section 5 of the same Rule, recites the effect of a dismissal under Sections 1(f),46 (h),47 and (i),48 thereof, thus:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. – Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on
paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim.
Briefly stated, dismissals that are based on the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (3) that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of
the statute of frauds, bar the refiling of the same action or claim. Logically, the nature of the dismissal founded on any of the
preceding grounds is "with prejudice" because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim. Ergo, dismissals based
on the rest of the grounds enumerated are without prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the same action.
Verily, the dismissal of petitioners' Complaint by the court a quo was not based on any of the grounds specified in Section 5,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; rather, it was grounded on what was encapsulated in Section 1(g), Rule 16 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. As the trial court ratiocinated in its 9 January 1998 Order, the Complaint is not prosecuted
by the proper party in interest.49 Considering the heretofore discussion, we can say that the order of dismissal was based on the
ground that the Complaint states no cause of action. For this reason, the dismissal of petitioners' Complaint cannot be said to be a
dismissal with prejudice which bars the refiling of the same action.
As has been earlier quoted, Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that no appeal
may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. The same section provides that in such an instant where the
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
The appellate court erred, thus, when it pronounced in its Decision of 24 May 2000 that petitioners' remedy is appeal under
Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is available in cases when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the case at bar, appeal of the 7 May 1998 Order, reviving the Order of 9 January 1998,
which dismissed petitioners' Complaint, and as reiterated in the 17 July 1998 Order is not a remedy available to petitioners as
aggrieved parties.
In sum, the appellate court erred when it ruled that petitioners' Petition for Certiorari filed before it was not the proper
remedy. The dismissal of the Complaint being without prejudice, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 49462,
dated 24 May 2000 and 2 April 2001 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
which is directed to hear and decide petitioners' Petition for Certiorari with utmost dispatch. No costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194880 June 20, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, both represented by the
PRIVATIZATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioners,
vs. SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which ordered the
dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation (NPC) are registered co-owners of several
parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs).1 The main subject matter of the instant Petition is one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area
of approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned
by petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC. 2 Petitioners are being represented in
this case by the Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with the administration and disposal of
government assets.3Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by
virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December 1977,4 petitioners leased the four parcels of land,
including the subject property, to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning 01
January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.5 Under the Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI
the right to sublease any portion of the four parcels of land.6
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property to respondent Sunvar through several
sublease agreements (the sublease agreements).7 Although these agreements commenced on different dates, all of them contained
common provisions on the terms of the sublease and were altogether set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of
TRCFI’s main lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:8
The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and [variable] months commencing on [variable],
renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVAR’s exclusive option.9
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed "to return or surrender the subleased
land, without any delay whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any renewal or extension
thereof."10
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful improvements, consisting of several commercial
buildings, and leased out the spaces therein.11 It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the subject property as parking
areas for customers and guests.12
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its stead, the Philippine Development
Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming the functions previously performed by TRCFI. 13
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements,
respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the
sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25 years.14 On even date,
it also wrote to the Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC. The letters
expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the subject property under the new rental rate and renewal period. 15
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease had already been sent to petitioners, but
that it had yet to receive a response.16 It further explained that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease could not
yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental payments be accepted.17 Respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter
and requested PDAF to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with respect to the said lease arrangement over the
subject property.18
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire, petitioner NPC – through Atty. Rainer B.
Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel – notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the contract of lease.19 In turn,
PDAF notified respondent of NPC’s decision.20
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified
PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the lease contract.21 The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten
the corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latter’s assets to the former for the purpose of selling them to raise funds.22 On 25 June
2002, PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republic’s decision not to renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum
of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.23
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease agreements with respondent Sunvar, all
expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject property and the three other parcels of land.
Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar
continued to occupy the property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30) days.24 The latter
duly received the Notice from the OSG through registered mail,25 but failed to vacate and remained on the property.26
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days.27When the
period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine the fair rental value of the subject
property and petitioners’ lost income – a loss arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the
expiration of the main lease contract and sublease agreements.28 Using the market comparison approach, the PMO determined that
the fair rental value of the subject property was ₱ 10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a total of ₱
630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.29
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay damages for
the illegal use and lost income owing to them:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all persons, natural and juridical,
claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same, with the useful improvements
therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative; and
2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs damages in the amount of
SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (₱ 630,123,700.00)
for the illegal and unauthorized use and occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31, 2009, and
the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (₱ 10,364,000.00) per month from April 1,
2008 until the subject property, together with its improvements, are completely vacated and peacefully surrendered to the
plaintiffs or to their authorized representative.30
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not
constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them.31 In the alternative, it also argued that
petitioners’ cause of action was more properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC,
considering that the petitioners’ supposed dispossession of the subject property by respondent had already lasted for more than one
year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed respondent Sunvar to file an
answer to petitioners’ Complaint.32 The lower court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration33 filed by respondent.34 Respondent
later on filed its Answer35 to the Complaint.36
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for
Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. 37
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the
Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the
MeTC.38 Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary circumstances called for an exception to the general
rule on summary proceedings.39 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 which was subsequently denied by the RTC.41 Hence,
the hearing on the certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.42
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the
Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. 43 The RTC reasoned that
the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the
sublease agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of
an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.44
I
Petitioners’ Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural issues that merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court is an
improper mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition
instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari
petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that the resort by petitioners to the present
Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules.
 As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC dismissing an action without
prejudice,45 but the aggrieved party may file a certiorari petition under Rule 65.46 Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the
parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. 47 This latter situation was
one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan,48 the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary
appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first
mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of
appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to
the Supreme Court only on questions of law."49 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on
the matter.50 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.51
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari
petition filed against the interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct
application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took cognizance
and granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly
a question of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition
has been properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was erroneous for the RTC to have taken
cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for
unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the
court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.52 The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary
verbiage.53 The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading.
Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition.54 Yet, the
RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition,55 but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino56 and Go v. Court of Appeals57 to justify a certiorari review by the RTC
owing to "extraordinary circumstances" is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the
filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure – conditions that are not availing in the
case of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique
an ejectment case against Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his property. When Magdato,
an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary
tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of
Magdato was filed three days after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of his
Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayog’s land. When his house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a
Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant in the agricultural property, and that
he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC,
however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would
otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:
We disagree with the RTC’s holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding
petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial
Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition
for relief from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg.
129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless some form of relief is made available to
MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or negligence on his part will only be
perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an
exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September
1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor of
MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx 58 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a procedural void in the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in the subject
ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific
performance involving the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the suspension order
to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a
summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the
MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari against an
interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the MTCC’s erroneous
suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this
wise:
 Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for "it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else
to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case." It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal.
Thus, it has been held that "the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result
in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial
court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress."
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for certiorari,
because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers petitions for certiorari
prohibited pleadings:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught "between Scylla and Charybdis" in the procedural void
observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a
remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is ‘to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules.’ (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)"
Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent
unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the MTCC order
delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari,
in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and
negate the rationale of the said Rules.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these two cases are not comparable with
respondents’ situation, and our rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As this Court explained in
Bayog, the general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the MeTC.
Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory
order, which is generally not the subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in
Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived
of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that would justify respondent’s resort to a
certiorari Petition before the RTC. When confronted with the MeTC’s adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case,
the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer.
Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment proceeding was not only
prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on account of respondent’s having already taken advantage of a speedy
and available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances that would constrain this Court to apply
the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of these two judicial precedents to
litigants in summary proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition
against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar
prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of the lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of
summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition – whether the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly
an action for unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the
controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year after the unlawful withholding of
possession will determine whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period should be
counted from respondent Sunvar’s receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed
within the one-year period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged from the
expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then petitioners’ proper remedy should have been an accion
publiciana to be filed with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the
ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right
to hold possession may – by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation – bring an
action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages
and costs.60 Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the person
found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of
buildings.61
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,62 the Court recently defined the nature and scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as
follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is
summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought up within
one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
 2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination of the
7latter’s right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s
enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the Complaint for ejectment.63
"On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the
proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one
year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will
be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana."64
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for an action for unlawful detainer.
Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on
with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the
subject property. Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03 February
2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the
fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year period should be counted from
the final demand made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the
expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for
determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. "Such one year period should be counted from the date of
plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession
become unlawful."66
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of the last demand. 67 In Leonin v. Court
of Appeals,68 the Court, speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the unlawful detainer
Complaint – filed on 25 February 1997 – from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand
letter dated 03 July 1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter property located at K-J Street, East
Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy Apartment C without paying any rentals.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion publiciana because their possession is not de facto, they
having been authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one year had elapsed from respondent’s demand
given on "July 3, 1995" when the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent
alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered owner of the property and that petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to
vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned
from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on
February 25, 1997 was well within the one year reglementary period.69(Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 January 2003), respondent Sunvar no
longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any
separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners –
petitioners herein. Thus, respondent Sunvar’s possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03 February 2009.
Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent is "necessarily bound
by an implied promise" that it "will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them."70 Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently,
petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant
case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008, which could have possibly
tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their right of action
against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate
almost a year later gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance.
Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest
demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand do
not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be
reckoned from the date of the original demand.71 If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original
demand, the one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.72 However, respondent failed
to raise in any of the proceedings below this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is now too
late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to
Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to resolving
questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject property since the expiration of its sublease on
31 December 2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the
present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Court’s attention that almost a
decade has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondent’s possession of the subject property, contrary to
the aim of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant Petition and the
remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this
matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a prime property of the government located in the country’s business
district and the various opportunities for petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.
 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic
and National Power Corporation, which are represented here by the Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01
December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case
No. 98708.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132624 March 13, 2000

FIDEL M. BAÑARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAÑARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL
BESARINO, petitioners, ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES, ANDREA
SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA ESTORES, EDMUNDO DOROYA,
TERESITA GUION, DANNY ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES AND PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo, Rizal, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
71 dated August 26, 1997. 1
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners Fidel M. Bañares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Bañares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused
in sixteen criminal cases for estafa2 filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch II.
After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,3 they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned
cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation
proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal. 4 Petitioners averred that since they lived in the
same barangay as private respondents, and the amount involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00),
the said cases were required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 19915 and Section 18 of
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure6 to be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the
barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court.7
The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 19958 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss on the ground that
they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added
that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said
ground as basis for dismissing the cases.9
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules of
Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. 10
On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners
without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. 11
More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private respondents through counsel, filed a motion to revive the
abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already
been complied with. 12 Attached to the motion was a Certification, dated February 13, 1996 from the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal 13 stating that the parties appeared before said body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private
respondents against petitioners but they failed to reach an amicable settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners filed a comment and
opposition to motion to revive claiming that the Order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases
had long become final and executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to
revive 14 .
On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order 15 granting private respondents' motion to revive. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration 16 of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the municipal trial court. 17
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition
assailing the Order, dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They claimed that the said Order, dated November 13, 1995
dismissing the criminal cases against them had long become final and executory considering that the prosecution did not file any
motion for reconsideration of said Order. 18 In response thereto, private respondents filed their Comment, 19 arguing that the motion
to revive the said cases was in accordance with law, particularly Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. 20
After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their respective contentions 21 , the regional trial court rendered
the assailed decision denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition, stating as follows:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents' comment thereto, the Court regrets that it
cannot agree with the petitioner (sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without prejudice at
the instance of the petitioners for failure of the private respondent to comply with the mandatory requirement of PD 1508.
Since the dismissal of said cases was without prejudice, the Court honestly believes that the questioned order has not
attained finality at all.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 22
The regional trial court, likewise, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration 23 of the aforementioned decision for lack of
merit. 24
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners raise the following questions of law:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within
the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion after the
order of dismissal had become final and executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without
prejudice still have jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of dismissal has become final and executory. 25
Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the
reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed within the reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal
or to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only be revived by
the filing of a new complaint or information. 26 Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality, the
court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the authority to act on any motion of the parties
with respect to said case. 27
On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure such
as the criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule regarding finality of decisions and orders under the Revised
Rules of Court. They insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned may be revived summarily by the filing of a
motion to revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case. 28
Petitioners' contentions are meritorious.
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the
court. 29 As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be adjudicated upon. 30
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order 31 if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, 32 we stated, thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any less final.
Such Order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter.
It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's decision or order disposing of
the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same. 33
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of
the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. 34 A final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the
modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same. 35
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court's power
to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
This was explained in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 36 where we ruled thus:
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the dismissal,
effectively operated to remove the case from the Court's docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the
case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of
another complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law.
xxx xxx xxx
[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action does not attain finality until after fifteen (15) days
therefrom, and consequently within that time the action still remains within the control of the Court, the plaintiff may move
and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive his action before that period lapses. But after dismissal has become final
after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period, the only way by which the action may be resuscitated or "revived" is
by the institution of a subsequent action through the filing of another complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by law.
This is so because upon attainment of finality of the dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses
jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer make a disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such
dismissal. 37 (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to private respondents' claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as well. In Jaca
vs. Blanco, 38 the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement
thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense. 39
Thus, the regional trial court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled that the
order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had
not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
Equally erroneous is private respondents' contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules
of Court 40 do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section
18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same
to conciliation at the barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code. The
said provision states:
Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1508 41 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice,
and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal
cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. 42
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents' view. Section 18 merely states that when a
case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the
Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as
required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even
after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to
cases covered by the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. — The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to
the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith. 43
A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary Procedure and Rule 40,
Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, 44 and Rule 36, Section 2 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
leads to no other conclusion than that the rules regarding finality of judgments also apply to cases covered by the rules on summary
procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment
or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains
finality. 46 Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence 47 applies in
interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said doctrine
applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
 The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. 48
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure especially since the
objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously. 49 To construe Section 18 thereof as
allowing the revival of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would prevent the
courts from settling justiciable controversies with finality, 50 thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal trial court that the non-
referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code of 1991 51 may be raised in a motion to
dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.1âwphi1
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law 52 is not
jurisdictional in nature 53 and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. 54The Court notes that
although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit
the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said
ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on the ground that the
same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said
order may no longer be revoked at present considering that the same had already become final and executory, and as earlier stated,
may no longer be annulled 55 by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court. 56
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II dated
August 26, 1997 and its Order dated January 29, 1998 in SCA Case No. 96-4092 are hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
0829, 94-0830, 94-0831, 94-0832, 94-0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-0839, 94-0841, 94-0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854
and 94-0058 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo are ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice, pursuant to Sec. 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181962 January 16, 2012

CEFERINO S. CABREZA, JR., BJD HOLDINGS CORP., represented by ATTY. MANUEL DULAY, Petitioners,
vs. AMPARO ROBLES CABREZA, Respondents.
Before us is a Petition seeking to annul the Court of Appeals’ Decision that reversed a lower court’s dismissal of a Complaint
for declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale of a conjugal dwelling on the ground of litis pendentia.
On 3 January 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig Branch 70 (RTC Br. 70) in JDRC Case No. 3705 declared void ab
initio the marriage between Ceferino Cabreza, Jr. (Ceferino) and Amparo Cabreza (Amparo) and ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership in
accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code.1 When this Decision became final, Ceferino moved that their only conjugal
property, the conjugal home, be sold and the proceeds distributed as mandated by law. RTC Br. 70 granted his Motion in a 26 May
2003 Order which became final when the Supreme Court (SC) dismissed, on technicalities,2Amparo’s Petition questioning the said
Order.
Ceferino thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to approve the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale); (2) to authorize
petitioner-movant to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of Amparo; and (3) to order the occupants of the premises to vacate
the property. Despite notice to Amparo, only Ceferino and his counsel appeared during the scheduled hearing on the Motion. The
Omnibus Motion of Ceferino was granted by RTC Br. 70 on 2 October 2003. 3Hence, for himself and on behalf of Amparo, he executed
the Deed of Sale in favor of BJD Holdings Corporation. He then filed a Motion for Writ of Possession and to Divide the Purchase Price,
which RTC Pasig Branch 70 granted in its 12 May 2004 Order.
In response to RTC Br. 70’s issuance of a Writ of Possession, followed by a 30 June 2004 Notice to Vacate, Amparo filed a
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate, arguing that (1) the parties had another conjugal lot apart
from the conjugal dwelling; and (2) under Article 129 of the Family Code,4 the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her as the
spouse, with whom four of the five Cabreza children were staying. RTC Br. 70 denied her Motion and the Court of Appeals (CA)
upheld the denial, prompting her to file with the SC a Petition for Review of this CA Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 171260.
On 11 September 2009, the SC in G.R. No. 171260 denied Amparo’s Petition5 on the ground that granting it would
modify the already final 26 May 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 authorizing the sale of the family home. As the facts upon which Amparo
based her argument against RTC Br. 70’s issuances (Order of Possession, Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate) were already
operative when she questioned the 26 May 2003 Order, she should have raised her argument then. It would be unfair to allow her to
raise the said argument now in the guise of questioning the subsequent implementing Orders of RTC Br. 70. Meanwhile, her
allegation that there is another conjugal property other than the subject property is a question of fact not proper for a Rule 45
petition. Also, the factual finding of both RTC Br. 70 and the CA that there was only one conjugal property was conclusive upon the
parties. The SC Decision in G.R. No. 171260 became final and executory on 5 January 2010.
On 26 January 2005 or during the pendency of the CA Petition, which culminated in G.R. No. 171260, Amparo filed with
the Pasig RTC, Branch 67 (RTC Br. 67) a Complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 70269) to annul the Deed of Absolute
Sale for being void due to lack of her consent thereto.6 RTC Br. 67 dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, on the basis of litis
pendentia and forum shopping.7
Amparo appealed to the CA, which reversed the Resolution of RTC Br. 67. Holding that there was no litis pendentiaand
therefore no forum shopping, the appellate court directed that the case be remanded for trial on the merits. 8
Ceferino moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. When his Motion was denied, he filed the present Petition for
Review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 181962, arguing that the CA erred in reversing RTC Br. 67’s dismissal of the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale filed by Amparo during the pendency of her Petition for Certiorari to
nullify the Writ of Possession on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
We find merit in the Petition.
The following requisites must be present for the proper invocation of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissing an action:
1. Identity of parties or representation in both cases;
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts and the same
basis; and
Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.9
Regarding the first requisite, there is no dispute that the two cases have substantially the same parties.
 Anent the second requisite, the CA correctly noted that to determine whether there is identity of the rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for grounded on the same facts and bases, the following tests may be utilized: (1) whether the same evidence would
support and sustain both the first and the second causes of action; or (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to
substantiate the complaint in the other.10
However, we do not agree with the CA’s conclusion that there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in the
two cases following the application of these tests. Instead, we find that there is substantial identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for between the two cases.
The CA held that using the first test, the evidence in the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale would be
the Deed of Sale itself; while in the case impugning the Writ of Possession, it would be the trial court’s Order applying Article 129 of
the Family Code.
We disagree. The CA failed to consider that RTC Br. 70 issued an Order dated 2 October 2003, which granted authority to
Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on Amparo’s behalf. This same Order also contained, in its dispositive portion, a directive that
"(a)fter the sale of the subject property shall have been consummated, all the occupants thereof shall vacate and clear the same to
enable the buyer to take complete possession and control of the property." Thus, using the first test, the same evidence – the 2
October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 – would defeat both Amparo’s Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale and her
Petition impugning the Writ of Possession. Notably, Amparo failed to timely question RTC Br. 70’s Order dated 2 October 2003.
The CA also held that, using the second test, the defenses raised in one case will not necessarily be used in the other. It
reasoned that although the grant of the Petition impugning the Writ of Possession would result in the nullification of the Deed of Sale,
the denial of the Petition would not bar a ruling on the Complaint for nullification of the Deed of Sale, which was based on Amparo’s
lack of consent thereto.
Again, we do not agree. Amparo seeks to prevent the sale and thereby maintain ownership of the conjugal dwelling, both in
her Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession and in her Complaint for declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale. In both cases, she
theorized that (1) since the 3 January 2001 Decision of RTC Br. 70 merely directed the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code, its subsequent Orders directing the sale of the conjugal dwelling
improperly modified its own final Decision; and (2) because she was the spouse with whom a majority of the common children chose
to remain, the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her in accordance with the mandate of Article 129 (9) of the Family Code.
Accordingly, using the second test, the same defense (i.e., the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70) will defeat both the
Complaint to nullify the Deed of Sale and the Petition to impugn the Writ of Possession. In fact, the subsequent Writ of Possession
issued by RTC Br. 70 was the logical consequence of, and merely gave effect to, the Deed of Sale which it had previously approved.
Basically, the two cases belatedly impugn the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 implementing its 23 May 2003 Order, which had
long become final, following the earlier failed attempts of Amparo to impugn the latter Order.
As to the last requisite, a final judgment on the merits by a court that has jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject
matter in the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession would have barred subsequent judgment on the Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of the Deed of Sale based on the principle of res judicata.11
At the time Amparo filed her Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale with RTC Br. 67, her Petition impugning
the Writ of Possession was already pending with the CA. Thus, from the point of view of RTC Br. 67, the CA’s final judgment on the
merits of the case before it would have barred a subsequent judgment on the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of
Sale.
When the CA eventually upheld the propriety of the Writ of Possession, it necessarily upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale,
which the Writ of Possession sought to implement. On the other hand, had the CA declared null and void the Writ of Possession
based on the grounds cited by Amparo, the Complaint to annul the Deed of Sale would have been barred. This is because upholding
her position would necessarily include a ruling that the RTC Br. 70 Order directing the sale itself of the conjugal dwelling was
improper. Such impropriety would then extend to subsequent orders merely implementing the sale of the conjugal dwelling,
including RTC Br. 70’s grant of authority to Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on behalf of Amparo.
In fine, the CA erred in reversing the dismissal by RTC Br. 67 of the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale on
the ground of the pendency of the Petition impugning the Writ of Possession before another Division of the CA.
Having ruled that litis pendentia was properly invoked below, Amparo was necessarily also guilty of forum-shopping, as
correctly ruled by RTC Br. 67. As we held in Buan v. Lopez,12 "forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other."
Nevertheless, we take time to stress a point to avoid doctrinal confusion on litis pendentia and res judicata in this case.
Despite our pronouncement on the propriety of the dismissal of the Complaint for nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
on the ground of litis pendencia by RTC Br. 67, and the finality of the dismissal of G.R. No. 171260, we clarify that res
judicata cannot be said to apply herein, simply because we dismissed Amparo’s Petition in G.R. No. 171260. While the dismissal of
G.R. No. 171260 is now final, having been rendered by this Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties
thereto, it was not a judgment "on the merits" of the case.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties
based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections";13 or when the judgment is rendered "after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point."14 In American jurisdiction, it is recognized that "(i)nstances in which dismissals are not considered to be on the
merits for purposes of the application of the doctrine of res judicatainclude … dismissal based on court’s procedural inability to
consider a case."15 1âwphi1
A reading of our Decision in G.R. No. 171260 shows that the Petition was dismissed upon a procedural inability to consider
the case, based on the principle of finality of judgments. The Court’s reason for denying Amparo’s G.R. No. 171260 Petition seeking
to nullify the Writ of Possession was that the said writ was merely a subsequent Order implementing that which was issued on 26
May 2003 by RTC Br. 70 authorizing the sale of the family home. Meanwhile, the latter Order can no longer be modified, as it has
long become final.
We also take time to stress that the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale cannot prosper, because, like
the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession, it effectively seeks the modification of an already final Order of RTC Br. 70. In view of
this Court’s consistent ruling that Amparo cannot be allowed to impugn the already final Order of RTC Br. 70 directing the sale of the
conjugal dwelling, we deny the prayer for preliminary injunction to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Notice to Vacate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 25 October 2007 and Resolution dated
27 February 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86511 are REVERSED. The 5 May 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 67, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70269, which dismissed the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale on the
ground of the litis pendencia and forum shopping, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.