A.C. No.

5365 April 27, 2005

SPOUSES FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of
respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those
checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were
meant to secure had already been paid.

The Case

Before us is a verified Petition1 for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin
and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged respondent with
willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After
he had filed his Comment2 on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several
hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,3 the parties were able to
present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties' respective
formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners' Memorandum,4 the case was considered submitted for
resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated January 30,
2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-
177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts

In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central Post
Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a
mail sorter, P6,000.5

Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc.,
in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five Philippine
National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as
well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future.6

On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus
surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,7 herein quoted as follows:

"August 31, 1999

Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes
Olbes.

(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

 8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 –8/15/99"8

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos.
0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity
-- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.9

On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-
Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that
on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and
requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242
totaling P100,000.10

Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-
Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999,
around two o'clock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that he
exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.11

Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to
Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as shown
by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact business in
Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the heavy
traffic conditions in those places.12

Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and
Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.13

In his Comment,14 respondent denied petitioners' claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any truth
and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their commitment
regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been
covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to "ACCOUNT
CLOSED." Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had already been fully
filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given them the
amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with them
convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.

Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in any
way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly
private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations. He
maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The commissioner said that respondent's version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay
rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:

"In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that:
 2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES
and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately
exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then,
to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

"Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both
LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

"The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony
before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you,
you filed two separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in
Quezon City, is that correct?

A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.

Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15,
1999, is that correct?

A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because it's quite a long time. Yes, Your
Honor, the first two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon
(sic).

COMM. DULAY:

Which are the first two checks?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And
Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with
number 0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?

A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to
10:00.

Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?

A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Q. Is that your house?

A. No, it's not my house?

Q. What is that, is that your law office?

A. That is my retainer client.

Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you
these checks have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a
retainer. That's why I am asking your client…

COMM. DULAY:

The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued
here in Pasig. What building?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.

COMM. DULAY:

What is the materiality of knowing the name of his client's office?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the
truth. The place, Your Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am
asking who is that client?

COMM. DULAY:

Your answer.

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.

Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check
Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct?

A. Yes.
 Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in
the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?

A. That is correct, sir.

"Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the
complainants. As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of
complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place
where the transaction involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact
would seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.

"Furthermore respondent's statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also
obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public
prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondent's version of the transaction.

"Complainants' version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of
a loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed
upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post
Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been
paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous
transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell
due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving
them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the
amounts under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the
background of the previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That
respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the
money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money
for contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondent's version. These circumstances really
cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the
public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing
with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondent's
filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases
against the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing
similar complaints in the IBP for his actions."15

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.

Respondent's Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.16 It is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character.17 "A lawyer
is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and
ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she]
has sworn to be a fearless crusader."18

By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.19 Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in
the legal profession.20
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

xxx xxx xxx

"Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

"Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar.21 Such conduct of
nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private lives. As officers
of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social
responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.22

The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be
upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their
professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.23

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they had
given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for
the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondent's assertion that
they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a
careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.

Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable
conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According to
Franklin Olbes' testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan
had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him,24 he was not able to return
them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by
petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with their
blank checks.25

It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his
malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and
despite respondent's full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been
paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.

And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the
temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have
them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on
them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months26 because of the
Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He
committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the
bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is
equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the exercise
of the privilege.27 Good moral character includes at least common honesty.28 No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness and candor.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places
a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence,
they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are
expected to act in good faith.31

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;32they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.33

Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing
deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention
of one petitioner is loathsome.

In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,34 the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it
appear that he was authorized to sell another's property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious
inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the
SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein
respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and
thereby caused the detention of one of them.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01
and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the
practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondent's personal record. Let
another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

EN BANC

[A. C. No. 2841. July 3, 2002]

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV,
TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

“Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer
is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law
and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he
has sworn to be a fearless crusader.”[1] These were the eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession. But he laments the pathetic and
deplorable fact that, “many a law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in
direct proportion to a litigant’s financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts in the
dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike.”[2] Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as later shown
by his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an apostate to his
exalted position as an officer of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession
to protect its sanctity and nobility.

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William C. Ogan which
has since been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over
the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting
that the proceedings have been pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the
principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C.
Occeña caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation
through his various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly sue
any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any man’s cause for money or malice.

Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late
William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas
Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband,
Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer.

The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of America), and
real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the
estate should have been simple and speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1,
1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of
Atty. Occeña.

Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, filed
a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the
project except certain portions. The executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused by
the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed several motions praying that the estate’s remaining
P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United States be
distributed among all the heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña, vehemently opposed
the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her husband’s
attorney’s fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed among the
heirs because the stock certificates were not in her possession. The dispute between the executrix, on
the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly on the
P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.
Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, interposed numerous appeals from the
orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release
of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the same,
thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in
remanding the case to the probate court, had this to say:

“It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences with the view to
closing the estate which has been pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are
reminded that the prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit the executor or
administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It always results in the diminution of the
share of each of the heirs because the estate is burdened with the expenses of the administration
proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorney’s fee and the longer the proceedings the bigger the
attorney’s fee.”[3]

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña’s claim for
attorney’s fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix’s refusal, through her husband, to
account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which, according to her, were not in her
possession. The other heirs could not accept that explanation because as executrix, she was charged
with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment why the
securities were not in her possession. She filed her comment, through her husband, that some
Philippine and American securities were not in her possession. To determine which securities were in
her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within 30
days the latest inventory of all the securities of the estate. However, she failed to comply with the
order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978, “directing her to take possession of
all certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date
inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value.” Again, she did not comply with the
order.

Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occeña,
appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence,
adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, to elevate
interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her
to “refrain from instituting any action or proceeding without first informing the court.” The executrix
and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals and one with
this Court.

On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to
go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the estate
and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the court ordered the
executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be
liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of her report on or before September 30,
1979. The executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition and
certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981 for
lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:

“Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the court which is
and would be for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs completely agreed with what
the trial court did. xxx

“Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
orders he should be complimented in finding ways and means of promptly and expeditiously
determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately distributed among the heirs.”

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to obey the orders
of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed her to
report to the court which securities were and were not in her possession and to give the reason
therefor.

On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña were held in contempt of court and fined
P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the executrix to release
$1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to explain their failure to comply with
the order, but they did not submit any explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the
proceedings for four (4) years.

On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to distribute
immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the Batangas-Laguna
Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor Service Co.; to report her compliance within
10 days from notice; and within the same period, to file a written report to the court stating (a) what
other certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are in her possession; and (b) which certificates of
stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty.
Occeña, did not comply with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she
should not be punished for contempt of court. After several postponements at her instance and that of
her husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared, thus
delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in the
performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No. 14456 for
damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on
October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint
against Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in that
without prior notice and hearing, he punished the executrix for indirect contempt of court and
censured her for non-compliance with the probate court’s order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit,
Atty. Occeña’s complaint was dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a Resolution
dated November 19, 1984.

On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against
Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court
dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Occeña to substantiate his charges during the
investigation.

Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative complaint, Atty.
Occeña and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case No. 14957 for damages against the
former. The couple alleged that they suffered damages upon reading the judge’s comment filed with
the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, the
comment being an absolutely privileged communication.

By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to be groundless,
Atty. Occeña further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain
upon Judge Ruiz.

More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occeña has inflicted greater
harm to the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.

From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with this Court
and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occeña, questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court.
But most, if not all, were without merit.

Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same probate
proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occeña with groundless administrative charges and suits, both
criminal and civil. These cases, while pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occeña in securing
restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds for the judge’s inhibition.

Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that the CFI may
suspend an attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the
same probate court Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña with gross misconduct,
violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an
answer, he submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty.
Occeña was then directed to file his answer within 15 days from notice which was extended to another
15 days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.
Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning and afternoon.
Upon Atty. Occeña’s motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from November 3, 1982 within
which to file his answer. However, he did not comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.

Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a temporary restraining
order in G. R. No. 62453, “Samuel Occeña vs. District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol” for
prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty. Occeña’s petition for lack of
merit. The hearing of the administrative case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not
appear.

The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear. Upon his telegraphic request, the
hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion
for Referral to the Solicitor General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied.
The hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occeña, the
hearing was postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus, in its order of
August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his right to present
evidence.[4]

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty. Occeña has
“abused, misused and overused the judicial system,”[5] Judge Ruiz rendered a decision suspending[6]
him from the practice of law for three (3) years. The decision[7] unfolded a long list of his
administrative offenses, thus:

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court;

gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occeña, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed with the
Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the
probate court directing the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to determine the assets
of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and the order ordering the same
executrix to report to the probate court the securities belonging to the estate. Atty. Occeña’s refusal to
obey the said orders and elevating the same to the higher courts unnecessarily delayed the probate
proceedings.

II
Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless

suits and gave aid or consent to the same; delayed

persons for money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two actions for
damages which were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent also filed
with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge of the probate court with knowingly
rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint was likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative complaint which was again dismissed for
failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal charge
which were found to be groundless and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed the settlement of
the estate proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time, effort and money to defend
himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.

In fact, respondent’s propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil and criminal
suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the case. As a measure of
self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare and file pleadings or comments thereby using
time which could have been devoted to expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court.
Most, if not all of these petitions, were determined to be groundless and without merit.

III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyer’s oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of Rule 140,
Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled “Charges Against Judges of First Instance,” which reads as
follows:

“Sec. 6. Confidential - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential.”
During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. “Z”) filed by
respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he violated the private and confidential nature
thereof three (3) times, to wit:

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari,
entitled “Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604”,
questioning an interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. “V”) to which he attached as
Annex “AW” a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the
same is completely immaterial to the issue raised in said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled “Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon.
Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162” (No. 4, Exh. “V”), impugning an interlocutory order of
the probate court, he attached as Annex “C” thereof a true and complete copy of the said
administrative complaint although not relevant to the question therein raised; and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the Tanodbayan (Exh.
“Y”), he also attached as Annex “A” thereof a true and complete copy of said administrative complaint
against Judge Ruiz even if said administrative complaint is not germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1,
Exh. “Y”).

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the court, put
to naught one of the principal purposes thereof which is to protect the personal and professional
reputation of judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients,
litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs. Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March
23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI, page 260). Respondent committed gross
misconduct in office and has not conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion.

IV

Did falsehood and consented to the

doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. “W”), respondent alleged
in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. “W-1”) that his wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña was held in
contempt and censured, “without any hearing,” for not obeying the probate court’s order of October
16, 1979 (Exh. “N”).
However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that in the order
of February 26, 1980, the probate court directed said executrix to explain within 5 days from notice
why she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. “O”). In the order of April 8, 1980, the contempt
charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 o’clock in the morning (Exh. “P”) but was reset to
October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the restraining order of the Court of Appeals (Exh. “Q”). This was
again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the denial by the Supreme Court of the respondent’s
petition for review impugning the Court of Appeals’ decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981,
page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. “R”), copies of the order setting the hearing of the contempt charge on said
date (April 20, 1981) were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on March 24, 1981. On
the date of the hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The following day (April 21,
1981), the court received executrix’s motion for postponement of the hearing, which was denied for
lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. “R”) was rendered holding the executrix in
contempt and penalized with censure.

In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged under oath in
his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. “Y”) that
“without prior notice and without any hearing,” Judge Ruiz adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña
guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. “Y-2”; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. “Y-
3”).

Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15, 1979 (Exh. “C”),
directing said executrix to remit immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson
with which to meet whatever necessary expenses that she might incur in inquiring into the status of
the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-
executrix committed falsehood when they stated in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was issued “without hearing” and thus a violation of procedural
due process. The Court of Appeals, in its decision which has become final (Exh. “E”), confirmed this
falsehood when it held that the petitioner-executrix “was not deprived of her right to be heard when
the respondent judge issued the two orders in question” (Page 6, Exh. “E”).

In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138[8] and Section 9, Rule 139[9] of the Revised
Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of facts.[10]

On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña’s motion, restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing
his decision of November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989, this
Court issued an Order[11] requiring “the parties to move in the premises, by informing the Court about
the status of the decision or order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law, Judge
Ruiz particularly indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within ten (10) days from notice.”
On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Court’s action on his
decision suspending Atty. Occeña.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case be referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and recommendation. This Court denied the
motion and instead referred the case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for
evaluation, report and recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended “that the
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated
November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law for a period of three
years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña be DISBARRED from the practice of law
for grave violation of his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll
of attorneys.”

We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the same
being supported by the facts on record.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[12] His guilt, however, cannot be
presumed.[13] It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation
thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by
himself and counsel.[14] All these requirements have been complied with in the case at hand.

In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative case
against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the full
measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte
as Atty. Occeña deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against him.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office,
(4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the
lawyer’s oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty. Occeña commit
deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond
these transgressions, he violated the lawyer’s oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following
duties, thus:

“I, __________________,of __________________,do

(place of birth)
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.”

As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special
Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he
successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt
and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For
respondent’s part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly
declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay “can only benefit the executor or administrator” and “the
longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorney’s fees.” But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty.
Occeña has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of
justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused
beyond measure his privilege to practice law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of
arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an
instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of his
client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.[15]

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those
who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.[16] A lawyer must at all times conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach.[17] He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to
administrative sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeña’s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a single
moment.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession.[18]
Atty. Occeña has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest,
unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and
good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice of his profession,[19] because it
cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.[20] Thus, for his serious administrative
offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña deserves the ultimate penalty, that of
expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered
into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a
judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993
Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc
Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to
take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath
of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated
his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did
not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will
to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of
unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An
attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight
and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For
these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings
are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants
by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed
to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the
rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what
protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good
moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit
upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those
who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom,
shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance
so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession
of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace
instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission
to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is
broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court
cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts
which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and
may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would
signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon
Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared
to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take
the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the
bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence
that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications
from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have
actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of
conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up
for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a
different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation,
of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to
the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

Footnotes

1 There is some indication that clerical error attended the grant of permission to take the 1993
Bar Examinations. The En Banc Resolution of this Court dated 24 August 1993 entitled "Re:
Applications to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations," stated on page 2 thereof:

"The Court further Resolved to ALLOW the following candidates with dismissed charges or
complaints, to take the 1993 Bar Examinations:

xxx xxx xxx

3349. Al C. Argosino

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
In fact, applicant Argosino had been convicted and sentenced and then paroled.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-
1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad,
Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused,
tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her
account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid
upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check
which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the
check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case,
which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.

When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the
reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that
she pay the face value of the check.[1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he
instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September
22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.[2]

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of
respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath.[3]

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound,
Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten
(10) days from notice.[4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation Moved.[5] The
Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del
Pilar Street, Pasig City.[6]

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with
the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.[7]

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found

respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.

We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of
settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will
have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into
withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed
account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to
deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.[8] Such
an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138,
Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character.
Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the
maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her
unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the
highest standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession,
whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be
disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not
speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be
kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12]

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her
betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal
profession.[13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings
to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable
her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very
core of her profession.

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because
obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would
respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple
directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could
not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not
even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a
lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by
faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[14] We can not
tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this
Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.

HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,

RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.

Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically
directed against the following observation therein made:

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a
series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole
purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and
executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and
their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice.

Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".

The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while
submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects
adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation
and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the
protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause
delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent.

After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez'
position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by
the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but
calculated to delay an execution long overdue.

Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal
property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-
R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation
with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing
the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of
the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.

In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels,
sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil
case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or
ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene
following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth
Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said
court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper
forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first
instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963
the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the
execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to
have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the
writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on
September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407
an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the
conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt,
the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid
urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing,
prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:

When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel
for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing.
In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his
urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for
resolution.

Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez,
now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch
which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and
their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the
preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by
injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very
day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was
already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic
civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which
denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963,
which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied
"Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace
the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the
Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the
counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the
promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said
motion for reconsideration.

The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the
avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular
counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that
the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected
to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed
their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had
been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3
Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice
was practically waylaid.

The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as
the "proper remedy" when we said that.

In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are
unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall
of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in
which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the
subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the
course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532
and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of
thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .

And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having
been instituted for delay.

The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be
considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the
suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to
prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally
advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they
accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper
remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and
55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement
of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled
doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or
interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However,
the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not
amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses
desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs.
Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to
recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she
advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon
her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they
instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the
same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964,
with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.

The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to
be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged
and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the
patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the
law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is
his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client;
its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of
each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are
assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel"
may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels
on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final
judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned
decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas,
upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First
Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about
August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims
that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr.
Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala
although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in
the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law
firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent
motion is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month
the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is
hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and
severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,

vs.

GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr.
on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a
widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He
was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia
was subsisting or undissolved.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a
civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C
and C-1)

The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one
year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet,
Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and
surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located
at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their
housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors
staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were
confirmed by their testimonies.

Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family
(25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves
Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five
photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.

Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married
Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the
purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-
Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid
witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could
not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she
allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his professional
obligations.

The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment
against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of
additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof.
She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated
from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral
conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married
woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959;
Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman
who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,

vs.

ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno,
a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all
the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein
do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules
of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent,
as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified.
He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958,
disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned
Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with
immorality. The complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were
engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way
the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that
they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first
floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the
rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of
doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant
acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book
as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the
room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and
respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to
molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and
respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured
complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon
respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her
and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of
complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual
intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel
and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958,
respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had
better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling
that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with
his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant
gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of
marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which
shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that
on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however,
admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November,
1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice
law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor
Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo,
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register
as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and
Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a
letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in
November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry
her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met
in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which
was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital.
This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's
Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter
testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by
the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November
3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed
to discredit complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and
complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were
sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp.
12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
(Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old
Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the
Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present
evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which
he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of
Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re
Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583;
Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly
immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act
and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates
unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all
times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the
law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 145 December 28, 1956

JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner,

vs.

ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres
and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner.

Anacleto F. Aspiras, in his own behalf.

BENGZON, J.:

On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F.
Aspiras, alleging substantially that:
1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing as single, courted her and eventually
won her affection; 2. on December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she came to Manila so they
could get married, and she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and after
December 31, 1952 upon being assured of marriage she allowed him to live with her as her husband; 4.
on January 3, 1953, a marriage license was applied for, with the son of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras,
as one of the applicants; 5. upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said Cesar Aspiras,
although she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the marriage, she and respondent continued
cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at the indication of respondent,
who was a married man and who used his knowledge and education to abuse and destroy her.

On April 9, 1953 the petitioner filed a motion to "withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging the contents of her
complaint did not "represent her true sentiments", the respondent acted in good faith, and her
marriage to respondent's son, Cesar Aspiras, was "without any fraud or deceit whatsoever".

Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal
profession 1, this Court denied the motion to dismiss, and required the respondent to answer.

On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer, asserting that petitioner had really married his son
Cesar Aspiras, and denying having had any amorous or sexual relations with her. He also said she
knew all the time he was a married man.

On May 13, 9153, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General reported that in view of the motion to withdraw filed by
the petitioner, he found no other alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the case.

Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint was dismissed on November 5, 1953.

However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that she
had asked for dismissal before the office of the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable settlement
with the respondent; but that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and
wife, from April to November, 1953 at No. 383 Int. 5 Tajeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and that as a result she
was on the family way. She also charged the respondent with having ordered his son, Cesar, to live
with them for purpose of "camouflaging their living together".

On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the above petition to re-open and referred the papers to the
Solicitor General for re-investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor
General filed in accordance with the Rules a complaint against the respondent, praying for his
disbarment, on the ground that he seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to cover up
his illicit relations, he made his son, Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on January 14,
1953; and, what it worse, after the marriage, the respondent continued having sexual relations with the
spouse of his own son.

On May 6, 1955, this Court ordered the respondent to reply to the official charges of the Government
prosecutor.

He replied in due time repeating the same denials he had previously made in this Court. Then he asked
for, and was granted, a chance to introduce evidence in addition to the proofs submitted to, and
forwarded by, the Solicitor General. Yet he failed to produce any.

At the oral argument he did not appear to defend himself, but asked for permission to file a
memorandum--which he afterwards presented. Therein he maintains that the complaint's allegation
were not supported by the evidence, that the petitioner is in pari delicto and deserves no remedy, and
that the alleged misconduct is not sufficient ground for disbarment.

In regard to the first point, the oral and documentary evidence at hand establish beyond reasonable
doubt the following facts:

In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age, single, was a teacher residing with her widowed
mother in Sawang Barrio School, Romblon, Romblon. Sometime in August, of that year she met the
respondent. Atty. Anacleto P. Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who represented
himself as single, although he was already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with whom he had
seven children.

A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and by correspondence until he finally conquered her
trusting heart. He visited her at her house and must have charmed even the mother, because without
much ado she approved of him. The climax came when on a certain night of November, 1952, he was
invited to stay and spend the night at her house, due to a typhoon which was raging. About 3 or 4 a.m.,
while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept into Josefina's room and after glibly promising marriage,
succeeded in seducing her. From that time on, and without the benefit of marriage she gave him the
privileges of a husband. Thereafter yielding to his invitation, Josefina came to Manila in December,
1952, for the purpose of marrying him, despite her mother's desire to have the marriage celebrated the
following month of April, so as to enable he to continue teaching until the end of the school term. She
stayed with her sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City.

Accompanied by the respondent, she went on January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where for the
first time, she met his son Cesar, who was introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her
bridegroom-to-be. She says respondent again told her to follow his "instructions", and left the two of
them (with Atty. Espino) at the City Hall. He then departed for Cebu. She filled up the application for
marriage (Exhibit 7,8 Respondent) and wrote the name of Cesar as her husband-to-be.

In connection with the above "instructions", it is probable that before filing the application Josefina
discovered or was told that respondent was a married man. But she was persuaded by respondent to
enter into a sham marriage with his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully claim to be Mrs.
Josefina Aspiras and save her face before the relatives and acquaintances who had known her amorous
relations with Attorney Aspiras.

Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josefina and Cesar were married 2 at the Manila City Hall before
Judge Aragon, with the respondent and Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar's Aunt) as witnesses. After the
ceremony, the two contracting parties separated, never to live together as husband and wife. However,
the respondent continued up to November, 1953 his adulterous relations with Josefina, as a result of
which she gave birth to a baby boy on January 24, 1954.

Josefina's sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be single and promised marriage, is
confirmed by his love letters, portions of which say:lawphil.net

. . . You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world . . . I will bring you along with me
before the altar of matrimony . (Exhibit A-6, September 22, 1952.)

Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the
first, middle and the last in my life. In short, you will be the only woman to me as I used to say to you.
(Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.)

And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife, with herein
respondent is borne out by his letters to Josefina's mother dated February 9, 1953 and March 6, 1953
— Exhibits A-19 and A-21.

Obviously the courtship and seduction by respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity became
worse when he made use of his minor son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of marriage and/or to cover
up his illicit relations, as the Solicitor General alleged. He corrupted his own descendant by turning
him into an accomplice of his marital infidelities.

But he says, the marriage was a true marriage, the contracting parties being actually in love with each
other. Granted. Then his moral deliquency becomes all the more unpardonable: the cohabited with the
wife of his own son after the marriage which he himself arranged and witnessed.
It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant was also at fault — in pari delicto, respondent
suggests -- because this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of
unworthy members, to protect the public and courts 3. So much so that even if she should presently
ask for dismissal, the matter may not dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action. Anyway, pari delicto is not always a complete defense 4

Supposing that respondent's conduct is not one of those mentioned in the Rules for which an attorney
may be disbarred 5, still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers may be removed from office on grounds other
than those enumerated by the statutes. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567.) And we recently applied that
principle in Balinon vs. De Leon, 50 Off. Gaz., 583.

In the United States wherefrom our system of legal ethics derives, "the continued possession . . . of a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . .
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a
ground for disbarment. (5 Am. Jur. 417.)

As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,

One of the requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or she
shall be good moral character, in so far as it relates to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney at law. This is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to admission to the bar,
and the loss of such qualification requires his suspension. The respondent is a member of the bar of
this court. The charges preferred against him challenge his moral integrity. Just as it was the duty of
this court to refuse him admission in the first instance upon a showing that he lacked the necessary
qualification, so is its duty now to remove him upon like proof." (Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55 A. L. R.
1361.)

Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar, as some cases hold 6 and on
this we do not decide. But respondent's moral deliquency having been aggravated by a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage, and by corrupting of his minor son or destruction of the
latter's honor, the undersigned all agree he is unfit to continue exercising the privileges and
responsibilities of members of the bar. 7

Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,

vs.

ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre
charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct,"
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant,
while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded
five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one
place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or
residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the
respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's
Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law
until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant

case. 3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift
Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he
subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968;
that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and
that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good
faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina
Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and
insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate
and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to
Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of
extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult
breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan
Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by
reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred;
by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set
the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy
appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating
Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions
to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally
offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986,
notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear,
the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986.
The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present
evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their
respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not
file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation"
to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was
single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her,
this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was
married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her
first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured
favorable advice from her mother and

ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite
her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July
7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his
parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later
that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she
then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was
subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159
(Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to
exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against
respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was
considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically
separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7,
1986, pp. 28-29). 7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre
contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over
the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan.
When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was
subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity
of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.

Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that
his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores
the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by
which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla
being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other),
she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a
lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of
this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8
Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage
to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to
Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other
circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null
and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and
respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported
by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his
law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to
uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a
member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed
by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery
of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil
Code). 11

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying
another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to
demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy
of a member of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant
Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre
after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the
safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment
of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will
correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent
Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

vs.

ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her
verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal
knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she
would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became
pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer
denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the
complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman of the
Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in the
latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6,
1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila,
otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for
Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador
Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino,
Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);

7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157,
tsn, July 18, 1975);

8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would sacrifice
her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine) that
respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;

11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her
boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17,
1975);

12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask was
placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);

13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been
performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced as
Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).

Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal
examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of
abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:

1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children; respondent never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);

2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24,
1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male
companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel
together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the
complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's
approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the
school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the
defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant.

Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that
respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon
the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would
never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the
College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him.

It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in
Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she
would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to
"K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he presented
Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with them every
time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned
during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at
Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador
Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to
14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp.
43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been
substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and
uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.

On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine
whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p.
69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar
be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously
submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that
respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is
guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme
Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense
imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on
respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained
of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual
intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While
this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really
felt unjustly traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a
fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439
[1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:

When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by
Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which
he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA
439 [1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent
should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since
a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his
recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a
lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period
and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to
marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's
marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for
sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral
ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As
chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to
believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem
it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich
man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere
suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he
is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of
good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The
ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality
(Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v.
Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct,
as follows:

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional
probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral
conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior
to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S.
959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of
intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the
ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she
would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.