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Army Defense Ammunition Center





September 2009

U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety

DSN 956-8919 or commercial (918) 420-8919
Acknowledgement Page
(as Necessary)


General Information 1

Distances, Definitions 1

Internal Distances 2

External Distances 2

Barricades 4

Blast/Fragment Effects Chart 5

Ammunition Holding Area (AHA) 8

AHA Storage, Table of Distances 10

AHA Configurations 11

Earth Filled, Steel Bin Barricades 13

Arms Rooms 15

Various Light Armor Vehicles 15

Forward Area Re-arm/Re-fuel Point (FARP) 17

Combat Aircraft Parking Area (CAPA) 18

Apache (AH-64) Template 20

Kiowa (OH-58) Template 21

Certificate of Risk Acceptance (CoRA) 22

Explosives Safety Assistance 23


The purpose of this guide is to provide Tactical Commanders, in possession of ammunition and explosives (A&E), with information
on how to manage the risks associated with their storage and handling. The general information contained in this guide regarding
typical ammunition situations meet criteria contained in Army Regulation (AR) 385-10, The Army Safety Program, Department of the
Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 385-10, Army Safety Program, DA PAM 385-64, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards and DA
PAM 385-30, Mishap Risk Management. A&E will be referred to as AMMO in the contents of this guide.


Primary protection against effects of blast or over pressure, fragmentation and fire from accidental or enemy initiation is provided by
separation distances. The greater the distance from a detonation, the greater protection the exposed site will be afforded. Protection
from fragments can also be provided by properly constructed and located barricades.

When possible, all AMMO should be stored in its original packaging in a designated AMMO storage area (AHA, BLAHA, BLSA,
ATHP, ASP, etc.). Original packaging provides greater protection from the effects of detonation and may isolate the AMMO from
contributing to the detonation.

Less distance and thus protection, is acceptable risk for related personnel and operations. Related personnel and operations are
directly related or associated with the AMMO storage area mission. In essence, it is when personnel can only accomplish their job
within the AMMO area or their job directly supports the AMMO operation or mission (i.e. AMMO workers and handlers). Examples
of unrelated personnel or operations, requiring a higher degree of protection, are dining facilities, barracks, MWR facilities, AAFES,
and motor pools. It is imperative that the correct relationship is determined and applied to ensure the proper degree of protection for
personnel and assets. We call the application of the rules on separation Quantity Distance (QD).


Measuring Distances

Distances should be measured from the exterior edge of any AMMO storage site or AMMO operating facility to the nearest edge of
any exposure being considered.

Storage Site

Storage sites can include MILVANS, ISO Containers, Open Pads, ARMAG Containers, etc. Operating facilities (in the open or in
structures) can include workshops, reconfiguration (pack/unpack/repack) operations, minor maintenance operations, issue/turn-in
operations, administrative office spaces directly related to the AMMO mission, etc. There are basically two types of AMMO storage

 Areas where AMMO has already been issued to the unit or troops (examples: Ammunition Holding Areas (AHA), Basic Load
Ammunition Holding Areas (BLAHA), Ammunition Transfer and Holding Areas (ATHP), Aviation AHAs, and Artillery
 Areas where AMMO has not been issued to the unit or troops (examples: Theater Storage Areas (TSA), Corps Storage Areas
(CSA) and Ammunition Supply Points (ASP)).

NOTE: AHAs can be a component of ASPs but different storage criteria may apply.

Internal Distances

Internal distances are those required for the separation of operating facilities and storage sites within the confines of an AMMO
storage area. Internal distances are the minimum required by DA Pam 385-64 and Technical Data Packages approved by the
Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB). Internal distances are identified as inter-magazine (IM) and intra-line
(IL). IM and IL distances are adjusted based on the presence or absence of properly designed and constructed barricades (see
barricade section starting on page 4 of this guide). These internal distances are expected to prevent simultaneous, prompt propagation
of an explosives event between adjacent storage or operating locations. Typically, IM distances are applied to AMMO storage
locations such as pads within an ammunition supply point (ASP) or Ammunition Holding Area (AHA). IL distances are applied to
AMMO operations such as AMMO surveillance and AMMO maintenance. Delayed propagation of an explosives event to adjacent
storage location is still possible. It is extremely important that applicable internal distances be established and maintained between
explosives locations. If these distances are not maintained, an explosive event can be expected to propagate rapidly between sites,
resulting in the destruction all ammunition and explosives assets and rending the unit incapable of performing its mission and denying
access to the area until EOD can render safe damaged items. Although prompt propagation is not expected, collateral damage to
ammunition on nearby storage sites and operating facilities may be so severe that the assets may become unserviceable. Providing a
greater distance than the minimum standard will provide greater protection and survivability to the nearby assets. See picture on cover
of FOB Marez. Days earlier, personnel quarters were part of this ASP.

External Distances

External distances are those required for the separation of personnel and facilities that are outside the confines of an AMMO storage area and that
are not directly related or associated with the AMMO storage area mission. External distances are the minimum required by DA Pam 385-64.
These external distances are identified as inhabited building distance (IBD) and public traffic route (PTR) distance. On-base roads are often
confused with PTRs. Technically, on-base roads are roads that are located on bases and are not generally traveled by the general public. Both
PTR and on-base roads are generally 60% of IBD. IBD provides excellent protection to personnel and material assets from blast effects and very
good protection from fragments. There is moderate risk of serious injury and possible fatalities from rogue fragments. PTR distances provide less
protection with a higher probability of serious injuries and fatalities. Most material assets at PTR distances can be expected to be serviceable or
easily repairable. See the cover picture of FOB Falcon when IBD and PTR distances were violated.

Realistically, the required distances described are not always possible to obtain in a deployment situation. In the initial deployment, Commanders
must use good risk management to identify and minimize the risk to personnel and mission capability. Once the situation has stabilized, efforts
should be made to comply with QD requirements; consideration should be given to moving personnel and material assets that are at risk from the
ammunition being stored. If QD compliance is still not possible, a DA Form 7632, Certificate of Risk Acceptance (CoRA) must be initiated.
CoRAs are explained in the back of this guide.

Asset Preservation Distance (60% of IBD). At this distance from the potential explosion site (PES) such as a pad within an ASP,
assets at the exposed site (ES) typically a site at which the effects of an explosion is undesirable, are expected to be usable and mission
capability is maintained following an incident however, the possibility of mission capability to be impaired or delayed exists to
varying degrees, based on characteristics of the PES and ES. This separation distance should prevent propagation between PES.

Minimum Separation Distances: At this distance from the PES, mission capability will be severely impaired with a high probability
for substantial loss of assets. This separation distance should prevent prompt propagation; however, delayed propagation between
PES‟ is possible. Minimum separation distances include:

 Inter-Magazine (Barricaded) IM (B): the inter-magazine distance has a properly constructed barricade and is afforded
barricade protection.
 Intra-Line (Barricaded) IL (B): intra-line distance has a properly constructed barricade and is afforded barricade protection.
 Inter-Magazine (Unbarricaded) IM (U): the inter-magazine distance DOES NOT have a properly constructed barricade and IS
NOT afforded barricade protection.
 Intra-Line (Unbarricaded) IL (U): the intra-line distance DOES NOT have a properly constructed barricade and IS NOT
afforded barricade protection.



Properly constructed and located barricades reduces the internal footprint (IM/IL distances) of a AHA or any other AMMO operation
or site. They do not reduce the external footprint. Barricades will stop high velocity low angle fragments but are ineffective in
preventing high lobbed fragments. For this reason, there is no reduction in the external distance (IBD/PTR) footprint based on the
presence of barricades.

Barricades are generally of earth construction. Typically barricades do not use concrete, heavy steel or stones and debris heavier than
10 pounds or larger than 6 inches in diameter in the fill or cover due to the added fragmentation or spalling hazard that they create.
Natural land features can be used as a barricade provided there is no line-of-sight between the ammunition locations and the top of the
natural feature is at least 1 meter thick. HESCO Concertainer barricades have been used to provide the requirements of a properly
constructed barricade. The diagrams below give general details of an earthen barricade. Various sizes of HESCO‟s are illustrated in
Appendix A. Properly designed barricades use a 2:1 ratio (2 meters of run for every 1 meter of rise). A MIL 7 topped by a MIL 4
HESCO works well for this configuration. DO NOT USE LARGE STONES IN BARRICADE FILL.


CONCRETE BARRIERS (i.e. T-Walls, Texas or Jersey Barriers, etc.) DO NOT

PURPOSES. They may be of value for Force Protection, but do not reduce QD


There are basically two general types of AMMO storage in a contingency environment; Ammunition Holding Areas (AHA) and
Ammunition Supply Points (ASP).
AHA storage sites (also known as BLAHA, ATHP, Avn AHA, Arty AHA, etc.) are locations where AMMO that has been issued to
using units can be safely stored. They may consist of one or more storage sites and involves acceptance of risks to personnel, facilities
and equipment that are greater than that normally permitted. An AHA storage site can be an open pad, uploaded vehicle, MILVAN or
ISO container, barricaded cell, etc. The concept of AHA storage may also be used to provide QD separations during mobile
The maximum NEW at any single AHA storage site must not exceed 8,818 lbs [4,000 kg]. An AHA may have multiple cells but none
can exceed 8,818-lb and each must be separated from adjacent sites by the applicable separation distance.
Storage Compatibility Group (SCG) and Hazard Class/Division (HCD) criteria are somewhat relaxed for AHA storage. Except for
SCGs A, K and L, segregation by SCG is not required for AHA storage. AHA mixing rules for HCD require only that the NEW for
all AMMO in HCDs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 shall be added together and considered as HCD 1.1. The NEW for AMMO classified as HCD
1.4 may be disregarded. AMMO classified as HCD/SCG 4.1G and 6.1G may also be stored in an AHA without restriction. Although
the SCG and HCD criteria have been relaxed for AHA storage it is strongly recommended that storage should be in full compliance
with peacetime storage criteria whenever possible.
ASP storage sites (also known as CSA, TSA, MSA, etc.) are logistical storage locations for AMMO that has not been issued to using
units. In a contingency environment, these sites are usually located in austere areas where real estate is often at a premium and where
alternatives to earth-covered magazines (ECM) will likely be necessary.
Alternatives to ECM storage include widely spaced open storage pads and protective construction using earthen berms or barricade
systems such as HESCO Concertainer barricades and steel bin barricades. Use of barricades will allow the sites (called cells or
modules) to be located much closer together. Whether storage is open or barricaded, the storage sites should include environmental
protection for the AMMO such as MILVANs or ISO containers or, as a minimum, some sort of sun shading.
The maximum NEW that can be stored in ASP storage sites is not restricted however, real estate constraints generally will limit the
maximum NEW to 30,000 lbs below which, minimum distances to external exposures (1,250 feet) does not change.
For ASP storage sites, compliance with SCG and HCD mixing rules is mandatory.


Distance „A‟

BLAHA Storage Using Barricades, Internal Distances


Distance „B‟
Heavy Armor

Light Armor
BLAHA Storage Unbarricaded, Internal Distances
Inhabited Building


Distance „D‟ Distance „E‟

BLAHA Storage, External Distances



Net Explosives
Quantity (Net Distances (in meters) Asset
Explosives Weight) Preservation
on MILVAN Pad (1) A(2)(4) B C(3) D(4) E(5) Distance

500 kg (1,102 lbs) 6.3 37.8 N/A 6.3 270 162

1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) 7.9 47.6 N/A 7.9 270 162
1,500 kg (3,307 lbs) 9.1 54.5 N/A 9.1 270 162
2,000 kg (4,409 lbs) 10 60 N/A 10 270 162
2,500 kg (5,512 lbs) 10.8 64.6 N/A 10.8 272 163.2
3,000 kg (6,614 lbs) 11.4 68.7 N/A 11.4 298 178.8
3,500 kg (7,716 lbs) 12 72.3 N/A 12 322 193.2
4,000 kg (8,818 lbs) 12.6 75.6 N/A 12.6 344 206.4


(1) No separation between uploaded MILVANs is required. However, the MILVANs are expected to mass detonate. The net
explosives quantity/net explosives weight (NEQ/NEW) is the total explosives weight of all the MILVANs on a single pad.
NEQ/NEW is computed by combining all AMMO except small arms Ammo. AHA storage cannot exceed 4,000 kg per MILVAN
(2) At this distance explosives are not expected to propagate but the munitions in adjacent pads will be unserviceable.
(3) A detonation at the MILVAN pad is not expected to propagate to the heavy armor. The closer the heavy armor is to the MILVAN
pad the more likely the heavy armor will be damaged beyond serviceability.
(4) At these distances light armor may be damaged beyond serviceability.
(5) The presence of barricades does not reduce required external distances.


0.6m=2‟ 1m=3‟ 1.5m=5‟ 2.1m=7‟ 2.2m=7.25‟ 2.4m=8‟
3m=10‟ 3.2m=10.5‟ 6.1m=20‟ 8.5m=28‟ 9.8m=32‟ 14.6m=48‟



Barricading Schemes for Explosives Safety With Additional Barricading for Force Protection

NEW ≤ 8,800 lbs NEW ≤ 5,000 lbs

IBD - 1,250’ IBD - 886’
PTRD - 750’ PTRD - 591’
ILD(U) - 372’ ILD(U) - 308’
ILD(B) - 186’ ILD(B) - 153’


For Ammunition Supply Points (ASP) applications, these barricades, also known as ARMCO, Inc. revetments, are earth-filled steel bins used
to separate AMMO. They are designed to limit the maximum creditable event (MCE), for QD siting purposes, of AMMO properly positioned
in separate cells by preventing prompt detonation transfer to adjacent cells.

When properly sited, these cells prevent prompt propagation; however, all assets in the series of cells are at risk of loss. Although a revetment
is effective in limiting the blast, there is a significant probability that the contents of many of the cells will be damaged or destroyed by the
initial and subsequent fire and explosion events. The extent of such losses increases with the amount of explosives present.

Type A revetments, which must be a minimum of 7 feet [2.1 m] thick, can be used to limit a MCE in a series of cells to the largest quantity in a
single cell, provided the quantity in the single cell does not exceed 30,000 pounds NEW [NEQ] [13,608 kg].

Type B revetments, which must be a minimum of 5.25 feet [1.6 m] thick, can be similarly used to limit the MCE, provided no cell contains
more than 5,000 pounds NEW [2,268 kg NEQ].

For ARMCO, Inc. revetments to be used effectively, the following conditions must be met:

 AMMO shall be positioned no closer than 10 feet [3.1 m] from cell walls, no closer than 3 feet [0.9 m] from the end of the wing walls,
and no higher than 2 feet [0.6 m] below the top of cell walls.

 AMMO shall be distributed over the available area within the cell, rather than being concentrated in a small area.

 AMMO stored in a cell in quantities near the maximum NEW limit shall not be configured into a single row of pallets, stacks, or

 The storage of AMMO in flammable outer-pack configurations shall be minimized.

 The types of AMMO to be stored in these type areas shall be verified with QASAS or Explosives Safety personnel to ensure
compliance with standards.

(Example using 7 foot Steel Bins)


Compliance with QD and compatibility criteria is not required for mission essential or operationally necessary quantities of
ammunition and explosives in HD 1.4 or 6.1 (excluding toxic chemical munitions). In addition, up to 100 pounds NEW HD 1.3 and
up to 50 pounds NEW HD 1.2.2 may be stored in this manner. However, a risk assessment shall be prepared and the risk assessment
will be submitted with the license for consideration by the approval official. Documentation of the risk assessment will be maintained
in the designated safety office. Documentation of the risk assessment will be part of the license and maintained with all copies of the


Vehicles that are designed to resist small arms ammunition fire and fragmentation from artillery shell detonations are considered light
armor. These vehicles are not designed to contain explosions within the vehicle, but are designed to protect contents and passengers
from outside blasts/fragmentation. This design will prevent propagation via high speed low angle fragmentation propagation between
vehicles, but will not prevent the vehicle from coming apart in the event of an explosion. For this reason, external distances are not
reduced beyond the distances contained in the table on page 16. See cover picture of Doha when proper standoff distances are not

 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) with Frag-5 or comparable kits.
 Armor Security Vehicle (ASV).
 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) including Buffalo and RG-31.
 Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle (JERRV) AKA Cougar.
 M113 Series Vehicles
 Striker Vehicle Family

Separation distances are based on AMMO being stored in the crew compartment with door and other opening closed while parked in
an authorized location. If AMMO is stored in compartments external to the crew compartment, the AMMO is not afforded “Light
Armor” protection and is considered “Non-Armor.” An example is a JERRV is approximately 7 meters long by 3 meters wide, if
there are 5 JERRVs parked together, side by side, with 50 kg NEQ of HD 1.1 AMMO stored „under armor‟ in each, your internal
footprint would be approximately 3 meters between vehicles, making your parking area footprint 7 meters by 27 meters (5 vehicles
times 3m and 4 spaces between them 3m each). The external distance would be 277 meters by 297 meters (add 270m to each figure).
See table below for internal separation. Separation distance is measured from the outside edge of the vehicle, not from the edge
of the uploaded munitions.

(Distances in meters)

NEQ (NEW)(1) (4) Spacing (2) Spacing (2) Asset(5)

per Light between from Non External Preservation
Armor Vehicle Vehicles Armor Vehicles Distance Distance

2 kg (4.4 lbs) 1 6 270 162

3 kg (6.6 lbs) 1.2 6.8 270 162
4 kg (8.8 lbs) 1.3 7.6 270 162
5 kg (11 lbs) 1.4 8.2 270 162
10 kg (22 lbs) 1.8 10.2 270 162
20 kg (44 lbs) 2.2 13 270 162
30 kg (66.1 lbs) 2.5 14.8 270 162
40 kg (88.2 lbs) 2.7 16.3 270 162
50 kg (110.2 lbs) 3 17.6 270 162


(1) The net explosives quantity/net explosives weight (NEQ/NEW) is the total explosives weight of all AMMO on a vehicle.
NEQ/NEW includes all energetic materials combined, treated as HD 1.1 (exclude HD 1.4 materials [small arms]).
(2) At this distance explosives are not expected to propagate. At these distances light armor or non-armor may be damaged beyond
(3) The presence of barricades does not reduce required external distances.
(4) Design of vehicle should provide equal barricading.
(5) Asset preservation distance to unarmored exposed sites.

The template below depicts a fixed FARP at an OCONUS installation. The concept of the operation is that the Ready Ammunition Storage Areas (RASA) resupply
the helicopters and the aviation Ammunition Holding Area (AHA) supplies the RASAs. The RASAs should be located midway between helicopter landing sites.
This maximizes the distance between RASAs. Internal distance is dependent on the amount of ammunition in the RASAs. Internal distance is also required from the
RASAs to the AHA. Additional AHA sites could be added but each AHA must be separated from other AHAs by a minimum of 77 meters. In the footprint below,
the RASAs are 10 meters long and 2 meters wide and the AHA is 30 meters wide and 10 meters long. These are variable and can be adjusted to suit operational
needs. In this example, each RASA has 200 kgs and requires 31 meters to adjacent RASAs. 16 meters was added as the distance from the far right RASA to the
helicopter to the right.

RASA Internal Distance

NEQ Required
200 kg 31 meters
(441 lbs)
Internal Distance Internal Distance
300 kg
33 meters
Internal Distance (661 lbs)
400 kg

350 m
36 meters
Note A - 350 m is required (882 lbs)
to inhabited buildings such 500 kg
as headquarters, post 39 meters
(1,102 lbs)
exchange, living quarters,
motor pool, or installation 600 kg 41 meters
critical assets. Ammunition Holding Area 350 m (Note A) (1,323 lbs)
Note B - 77 m is required to 819 m
another Ammunition 4,000 kgs NEQ 77 m (Note B)
Holding Area.

350 m
350 m

Ready Ammunition Storage Area (RASA)

755 m
119 m

55 m
350 m 350 m

Note - Per DA Pam 385-64, paragraph 14-15 reads “Armament pads will contain the minimum amount to conduct efficient

350 m
operations. In no case will the amount of munitions exceed the amount of munitions required to arm the maximum number
of helicopters that can be refueled at one time.” Note: This example‟s internal footprint does not include AHA
distances and assumes 500 kgs at the RASAs.
Commanders should carefully weigh the risks of “Efficient Operations” when those operations adversely affect
internal and external QD standards.
Locate fuel downhill of ammunition!
Special consideration must be given to plans where contingency operations employ the use of AMMO. Commanders must consider the risks
when approving these plans. The proper use of such features as barricades or earth-filled, steel-bin-type barricades (ARMCO revetment or
equivalent) can decrease the magnitude of a potential event and increase the explosives capacity of limited areas.

For aircraft other than Army aircraft and for asset preservation, asset preservation distance is required (i.e. HD 1.1 material, use 60% of IBD,
for HD 1.2, 1.3, or 1.4 apply standard PTR distance). Asset preservation distances may not provide protection from fragments. To protect
against low-angle, high-energy fragments, aircraft should be properly barricaded (see barricade section on page 4).

Loaded aircraft to loaded aircraft. Measure the shortest distance between explosives on one aircraft to explosives on the adjacent aircraft.

Initial efforts to compute spacing between uploaded aircraft used the figure of 30.5 meters/100 feet as the minimum „rotor‟ distance between
two uploaded aircraft. The end of the wing pylon is approximately 2.4 meters/8 feet from the rotor hub on an Apache attack helicopter. So,
when two aircraft are adjacent using a rotor spacing of 30.5 meters/100 feet the AMMO on one aircraft would be approximately 25.6 meters/84
feet (100- (2 X 8)=84) from the AMMO on the adjacent aircraft. Aircraft publications now specify a minimum rotor separation of 24.4
meters/80 feet for Apache and Kiowa Warrior aircraft. If a rotor separation of 24.4 meters/80 feet is used then the AMMO located under the
wing pylons could be as close as 19.5 meters/64 feet.

Barricades could be used to increase the allowable explosives limits. However, concrete traffic barricades (T-walls, Texas and Jersey barriers)
have not been evaluated for explosives safety purposes and would not be considered a barricade. HESCO baskets or Steel Bin Barricades
(soil/sand/dirt filled) are considered as adequate barricades but could be a source of foreign object debris (FOD) on airfields.

The following tabulated data gives the allowable explosives limits given different rotor distances:

Rotor Distance 24.4 m/80 ft 30.5 m/100 ft 48.8 m/160 ft 61 m/200 ft

Wing pylon to Wing 19.5 m/64 ft 25.6 m/84 ft 43.9 m/144 ft 56.1 m/184 ft
pylon distance

Allowable NEW at 8.6 kgs/19 lbs 19.5 kgs/43 lbs 98 kgs/216 lbs 204.6 kgs/451
Asset Preservation lbs
Allowable NEW at 89.4 kgs/197 lbs 201.8 kgs/445 1,017.4 kgs/ 2,122.8 kgs/
Minimum Distance lbs 2,243 lbs 4,680 lbs

These are the explosives weights of munitions used on the Apache attack helicopter:

 30mm , M799, HEI 0.05 kgs/0.1 lbs NEW per round, normal upload is 1,200 rounds (Typically NEW for this AMMO can be
 2.75” Rocket, 5.4 kgs/12 lbs NEW per rocket (maximum), some rockets have smaller NEW‟s
 Hellfire missile, 15.9 kgs/35 lbs NEW per missile

Asset Preservation Distance Minimum Separation Distance

Rotor Distance 30.5 m/100 ft, NEQ/NEW 19.5 kgs/43 lbs Rotor Distance 30.5 m/100 ft, NEQ/NEW 201.8 kgs/445 lbs
Load 1 - 1 Hellfire missile Load 1 – 3 each Hellfire missiles, 28 each 2.75” rockets
Load 2 – 3 each, 2.75” rockets Load 2 – 12 each Hellfire missiles
Load 3 – 37 each 2.75” rockets
Rotor Distance 54.9 m/180 ft, NEQ/NEW 144.7 kgs/319 lbs Rotor Distance 54.9 m/180 ft, NEQ/NEW 1,503.2 kgs/3,314 lbs
Load 1 – 3 each Hellfire missiles, 17 each 2.75” rockets Any combination of AMMO an Apache can carry.
Load 2 –9 each Hellfire missiles
Load 3 – 26 each 2.75” rockets

action may propagate throughout the uploaded aircraft parking area which could seriously reduce or destroy mission capability.



270 m
270 Spacing
m m

270 m
Internal spacing is dependent on the ammunition
uploaded on the helicopters. The chart on the right
gives the required distance wing pylon to wing pylon
for different ammunition loads. To compute the 826 m
internal footprint multiply the internal distance by seven
(there are 7 internal spaces between 8 helicopters) and
add 48 meters ((the width of an Apache (at the wing

pylons) is approximately 6 meters)). Example an
Apache uploaded with 16 Hellfire missiles requires 34
meters internal spacing between helicopters. 34 meters

558 m

18 m
times 7 equals 238 meters. 238 meters + 48 meters = 270
m m
286 meters, so in this case, the internal footprint is 286 Internal 270
meters by 18 meters. The external footprint is 826 Footprint m
meters by 558 meters (270 meters x 2 plus internal

If there are proper barricades between the helicopters
(see section on barricades at the front of the pamphlet) External
the distance can be reduced to rotor distance (30.5 m Footprint
rotor hub to rotor hub*) for all mission loads.

External distance is 270 meters to inhabited structures

such as headquarters, post exchange, motor pool, or
other non-associated structure. Sleeping/berthing,
TMCs and installation boundaries must be provided a
minimum of 381 meters for IBD.

270 m

30.5 m

270 m
A separation of 21 meters is required between helicopters for
explosives safety purposes, however this is less than the 754 m
required 30.5 meters between rotor hubs. Using the standard
rotor distance provides adequate explosives safety distances for
all Kiowa Warrior loads.

214 m

10 m
Internal Footprint
A separation of 270 meters is required to inhabited buildings
such as headquarters, post exchange, motor pools or any
installation critical asset. Sleeping/berthing, TMCs and
installation boundaries must be provided a minimum of 381
meters for IBD.
External Footprint

Every effort should be made to comply with explosives safety requirements. If the minimum explosives safety quantity distances,
either internal or external cannot be obtained then the situation calls for a Certificate of Risk Acceptance (CoRA). The CoRA took the
place of a waiver or exemption. A CoRA can also be used for other explosives safety deficiencies such as lack of lightning protection
for ammunition storage or risk to mission capability (i.e. less than asset preservation distance). Information on explosives safety
CoRAs is contained in DA Pam 385-30.

Commonly Asked Questions Regarding CoRAs:

1. Who should prepare an explosives safety CoRA?

Basically, anyone can prepare a CoRA for a Commander. The Originating Unit is responsible for initiating the CoRA, generally,
the Safety Officer or Quality Assurance Specialist Ammunition Surveillance (QASAS) prepares or assists in the preparation of the
CoRA form. But ultimately, the responsibility falls to whomever the Commander appoints to the task.

2. What Information is required?

a. A good scale map that shows the location of the ammunition or uploaded vehicles and the entire area of external footprint.
Information on all structures within the external footprint is required. If the footprint extends off the installation or base then
information is needed if any local national structures are within the external footprint.

b. Information on the number of people that are routinely within that external footprint and the value of structures within that
external footprint. If this information is not easily available make best estimates.

3. Who can approve an explosives safety CoRA?

The level of approval for an explosives safety CoRA depends on two factors, the level of risk and the duration of that risk. Low and
medium risk explosives safety CoRAs can be approved by the installation or Garrison Commander. However, risks lasting for greater
than a year will typically be accepted at the General Officer level. Usually, the level of command that has the resources to implement
“the fix” will be approving authority. If that General Officer does not control the assets necessary to fix the deficiency, then the
CoRA would need to be approved at the higher level that does control the assets (see Table 4-2, DA PAM 385-30 for specific approval

4. If an explosives safety CoRA includes hazards to other service personnel or local nationals, does the CoRA need to
coordinated with those hazarded?

Yes, in both cases. In the case of other U.S. services (Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps) we need to inform their command if Army
explosives storage or operations puts their personnel or assets at risk. If the other Service‟s explosives storage puts Army troop assets
at risk they need to coordinate their risk acceptance document with us. In the case of local nationals, seek the advice of legal counsel.

NOTE: Risk has to be accepted by all services affected by commanders at equivalent grades or positions.


Explosives safety assistance can be obtained from Command Safety personnel or Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition
Surveillance) (QASAS) personnel, usually located at the ammunition supply point or with the supporting logistics cell. If additional
assistance is needed, contact the MACOM Safety Office and request assistance from the U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives
Safety. Additional explosives safety information can be found on the “Explosives Safety Ammunition Toolbox” link on the U.S.
Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety web site which is a directorate of the Defense Ammunition Center (DAC) web site,