Direct Democracy and Institutional Realignment in the American States

Author(s): Caroline J. Tolbert

Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall, 2003), pp. 467-489
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 Direct Democracyand
InstitutionalRealignment
in the AmericanStates

CAROLINE J. TOLBERT

Scholars who study institutions recognize that political structures

shape the context in which actors make choices that lead to policy outcomes.1
While much progress has been made in understanding how institutions affect
political actors, preferences, and public policy, we have little understanding of
the process of institutional change.2 How and why do American political insti-
tutions change over time? One window into understanding institutional change
may be the study of procedural public policy, which alters government rules,
structures, and organization. My research attempts to explain the adoption of
procedural policy at the state level that shapes representative institutions of
government, especially state legislatures and election systems. Citizen ballot
initiatives at the state level are proposed as a catalyst for the adoption of proce-
dural policy and in turn institutional change of representative democracy.
While relatively understudied compared to other electoral institutions, this re-
search places the increased use of direct democracy at the state level as a com-
ponent of a larger reform movement in American politics at the end of the
twentieth century.

1See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism:OrganizationalFactors in

Political Life,"AmericanPolitical ScienceReview 78 (Fall 1984):734-749; B. Guy Peters, Institutional
Theoryin Political Science:TheNew Institutionalism(London, New York:Pinter,1999);Sven Steinmo,
Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth,eds., StructuringPolitics:HistoricalInstitutionalismin Com-
parativeAnalysis (CambridgeUK: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1992).
2 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics" in
Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth,eds., StructuringPolitics.

CAROLINE J. TOLBERT is assistantprofessor of political science at Kent State University. She is

coauthorof VirtualInequality:Beyond the Digital Divide and coeditor of Citizensas Legislators:Direct
Democracy in the UnitedStates.She has published numerous articles on direct democracy,digital de-
mocracy, voting, political behavior, and race/ethnicity.
PoliticalScienceQuarterly Volume118 Number3 2003 467
468 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Proceduralpolicies such as legislative term limits, legislativeredistricting

laws, mail ballots,computerizedvoting systems,campaignfinancereform,and
election system change do not fit traditionaldefinitionsof distributive,redis-
tributive,regulatory,or constituentpolicy proposed by Theodore Lowi.3In-
stead, these policies may be commonly referred to as "governancepolicy."4
Defined as proceduralpolicy that is focused explicitlyon politicalreform,gov-
ernance policies are rule changes applied to governmentinstitutions.Gover-
nance policies alter the politicalsystem by changingrules governingelections
and voting,politicalcampaigns,levyingtaxes, or self-governance.Governance
policy is an aspect of publicpolicy that has received less attention than tradi-
tional substantivepolicies, such as health, welfare,education,or other expen-
diturepolicies. But governancepolicy may be even more importantthan sub-
stantive policy in changingthe structureand organizationof representative
government.Do politicalinstitutions-beyond the electoralarrangementsthat
areoften studied-drive the use of governancepolicy?Whyaresome statesmore
likely to change the rules governingpublic sector organizationsthan others?
Whilethere are manyexamples,this analysisexaminesthe adoptionof nine
governancepolicies across the fifty states duringthe period from 1970-1999:
legislativeterm limits;supermajorityrules for tax increases;voter approvalof
tax increases;complete open primary;blanket or nonpartisanprimary;cam-
paign contributionlimits; public financingof political campaigns;mandated
electronicfilingof campaigncontributions;and all-mailvoting ballots.
To understandthese policy adoptions, a two-stage model is proposed in
which rapid social and economic change leads to frustrationwith traditional
representativechannels.This leads to the use of alternativemechanismsfor
policy decisions,such as ballot initiativesand referenda.Use of initiativesby
state electoratesis, in turn,used to changethe structureandoperationof repre-
sentativegovernment.
Like historicalProgressivereforms adopted at the turn of the twentieth
century,contemporarygovernancepolicy modifies institutionalrules that in
the aggregatecan restructurethe U.S. political system. The first section lays
out the model of institutionalrealignmentpresentedin this research.The sec-
ond section presentshistoricaldataon the use of ballotinitiativesby state elec-
torates over the past century,as well as a breakdownof the subjectmatter of
initiativesappearingon state election ballots duringperiodsof frequentuse of
the process.The thirdsection exploresthe social and economiccontext associ-
ated withincreasedusageof directdemocracyover the pastcentury.The fourth
section employsmultivariatestatisticsto examinewhetherstates with frequent
use of direct democracyare more likely to adopt nine contemporarygover-
nance policies.
3 Theodore Lowi, "Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice," Public AdministrationReview 33

(Summer 1972):298-310.
4 Caroline J. Tolbert, "ChangingRules for State Legislatures:Direct Democracy and Governance

Policies"in ShaunBowler, Todd Donovan, and CarolineJ. Tolbert, eds., Citizensas Legislators:Direct
Democracy in the UnitedStates (Columbus:Ohio State University Press, 1998).
 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT I 469

DIRECT DEMOCRACY AS A CATALYST

FOR INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT

Majorperiods of political reform occur infrequentlyin Americanpolitics, as

politicalinstitutions- federalism,separationof power,fragmentedpower,plu-
ralism-were designed to resist efforts at change and protect the status quo.
Researchershave long recognizedcyclicalpatternsin partisanrealignmentsas
a way that the political system adaptsto change over time."This research,in
contrast,proposesinstitutionalrealignmentas a mechanismfor change.Rather
than arisingfrom partisanshifts, change in Americanpolitics may arise from
the dealignmentof representativeinstitutionsof governmentwith new socio-
economicconditions.The argumentdevelopedhere is thatuse of directdemoc-
racy at the state level may functionas an adaptivemechanism,realigningpo-
litical institutionswith changingsocial and economic conditions.Rather than
incrementalchange,policies adoptedvia ballot initiativesand referendaoften
result in dramaticchange.At the turn of the twentieth and twenty-firstcentu-
ries, there is increasinginterest in changingthe rules governingdemocratic
institutions.
Growingpublic frustrationand distrustof elected officialsmay be symp-
toms of a political system that is out of sync with rapidlychangingeconomic
and social (demographic)conditions.6In the wake of the 2000presidentialelec-
tions, numerousgovernancepolicies have been proposed to update the U.S.
election system for the twenty-firstcentury- computerizedvoting systems,
proportional allocation of electoral college votes, instant run-off elections,
same day voter registration,even dismantlingthe electoralcollege. These poli-
cies havebeen proposedbecausereformof politicalinstitutionsnecessarilylags
behind changesin the economy and social structure.7
At the turn of the twentieth century,reform of governmentinstitutions
laggedbehind the changesbroughton the by the IndustrialRevolutionand by
historicwaves of white ethnicimmigrationfrom easternand southernEurope.
This lag in reform of political institutionsled to unprecedenteddistrust of
5 James Sundquist,Dynamics of the Party System (Washington,DC: Brookings Institution,1983);
Arthur M. Schlesinger,Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,1958); Walter
Dean Burnham,CriticalElectionsand theMainspringsof AmericanPolitics (New York:Norton, 1970);
Samuel Huntington,American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUni-
versity Press, 1981).
6 Scholarsargue that both the very early and late decades of the twentieth century are transforma-
tional periods in American history.See LawrenceDodd, "Congress,the Presidency,and the American
Experience:A TransformationalPerspective"in James A. Thurber,ed., Divided Democracy:Cooper-
ation and Conflict Between the President and Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1991);LawrenceDodd, "TransformationalPolitics"in LawrenceDodd and CalvinJillson,eds.,
The Dynamics of American Politics:Approaches and Interpretations(Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1993);LawrenceDodd, "The New American Politics:Reflections on the Early 1990s"in Bryan Jones,
ed., The New American Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995).
7 Caroline J. Tolbert, "RethinkingLowi's Constituent Policy: Governance Policy and Direct De-

mocracy,"Environmentand Planning C: Governmentand Policy 20 (Winter 2001): 75-93.

470 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

elected officials and widespread concerns about government corruption culmi-

nating first in the PopulistMovement (1880-1890s) and later the Progressive
Movement(1890-1917).Both grassrootsmovementsoriginatedat the state and
local levels. The Progressiveera was a majorperiodof systemicreformof local,
state, and federal governmentinstitutions,culminatingin the creationof a na-
tional administrativestate.8Progressivereformsserved to create hierarchical
bureaucraticorganizationsto prevent political corruptionand restore public
trustin government.By changingpoliticalinstitutions,Progressivereformsre-
shaped American democracyboth substantivelyand procedurallyand were
criticalin adaptinggovernmentinstitutionsfor a new industrialeconomy.
Based on the convergenceof six contextualfactors,this researchsuggests
that we may be on the brinkof anothermajorreformera in Americanpolitics.
First,parallelingthe turnof the twentiethcenturybefore the rise of the admin-
istrative state and consistent with broader trends of devolution in the 1980s
and 1990s, state legislationoften precedes federal policy. Now, at the turn of
the twenty-firstcentury,Congressis reactionaryin the area of politicalreform
and other substantivepolicy, while state and local governments are policy
innovators.
Second, the turn of the twenty-firstcenturyis a transformationalperiod in
Americaneconomic history,an era of rapidlychanginginformationtechnolo-
gies, the Internet, e-commerce,global economy, and economic dislocations.9
This change parallelsthe economic transformationsand upheavalsoccurring
during the Progressiveera when the economy shifted from a rural, agrarian
organizationto an industrial,urbanone.
Third,both the turn of the twentieth and twenty-firstcenturiesare distin-
guishedby historicratesof immigration,the formerfrom easternand southern
Europe and the latter from Asia and Mexico. Contemporaryimmigrationhas
led to rapid demographicchange in the racial and ethnic compositionof the
Americanstates.'0In some states, growingracialdiversityhas fostered a white
backlash against legislation designed to benefit racial and ethnic minorities,
such as affirmativeaction, bilingual education, and welfare for immigrants.
Duringthe turnof the twentiethcentury,ethnic diversityin the cities similarly
fostered a white backlashand widespreadconcernsabout governmentcorrup-
tion and the partymachines.
Fourth,again parallelingthe rise of Populist and Progressivemovements,
a distinguishingfeature of politics at the turn of the twenty-firstcentury is a
pervasivesense of publicdistrust,frustration,and alienationwith government
8 Stephen Skowronek, Building the New American State:The Expansion of National Adaptive Ca-

pacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982).

9B. Guy Peters, The Futureof Governing:Four EmergingModels (Lawrence, KS: Kansas Univer-
sity Press, 1996);David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, ReinventingGovernment:How the Entrepreneurial
Spiritis Transformingthe Public Sector (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992).
,oEileen McDonagh, "Race, Classand Gender in the ProgressiveEra"in Sidney Milkis and Jerome
Mileur,eds., Progressivismand theNew Democracy(Boston, Universityof MassachusettsPress, 1999).
 DIRECTDEMOCRACY
AND INSTITUTIONAL
REALIGNMENT I 471

that is perceivedas corruptand unresponsive.1Americanpoliticsis character-

ized by a persistentdistrustof elected officialsand, in some states, by a turn
awayfrom representativegovernmentin favor of participatorydemocracyfor
importantpolicy decisions.12
Fifth, duringthe turn of the twentieth centuryand the contemporarype-
riod, there has been an explosive use of direct democracyin the American
states to decide policy issues that are often focusedon governance.As political
institutionsonce againlag behind economic and social change,reforminggov-
ernmentfor the technologicalage has become a centralfocus of contemporary
Americanpolitics-from Vice PresidentAl Gore's NationalPerformanceRe-
view and David Osborne and Ted Gaebler'sReinventingGovernment(1992)
to calls for internetvoting.As the nationwatchedthe events of the 2000presi-
dential elections unfold, it became clear that majorinnovationof voting tech-
nology is overdue in America.13
Sixth,duringboth the historicaland the contemporaryperiod,reformwas
focused on the adoption of governancepolicies. Progressivereformerspro-
moted a slate of governancepolicies,includingthe directelection of U.S. sena-
tors, direct primaries,home rule for municipalities,secret ballots, Australian
ballots,nonpartisanlocal elections,at-largeelections,merithiringsystems,pro-
fessional city managers,women'ssuffrage,direct democracy(initiative,refer-
enda, and recall), and many other proceduralpolicies that characterizere-
formedcities and states.14ManyProgressiveera reformswere firstadoptedvia
ballotinitiativesor legislativereferendaor by state legislaturesunderthe threat
of citizen petition drives.'5These reforms were also initiated by local gov-
ernmentsand adoptedby local referenda.State and local provisionsfor direct
democracy served as a catalyst for reform, allowing groups outside of the
legislatureto shape the political agenda in order to restructurepublic sector
organizations.
The dualcharacterof Progressiveera reformsis presentedin the literature.
Some proceduralpolicies strengtheneddemocracyby expandingsuffrageto
women,creatingthe meritsystemto limitpoliticalcorruption,andrestoringpub-

" Stephen Craig, "The Angry Voter: Politics and Popular Discontent in the 1990s" in Stephen
Craig,ed., Broken Contract?ChangingRelationshipBetweenAmericansand TheirGovernment(Boul-
der, CO: Westview Press, 1996);Jack Citrin,"Who'sthe Boss? Direct Democracy and PopularControl
of Government"in Stephen Craig,ed., Broken Contract?
12 Alan Rosenthal, The Decline of Representative Democracy:Process, Participationand Power in
State Legislatures(Washington,DC: CongressionalQuarterlyPress, 1997).
13 David
Osborne and Ted Gaebler, ReinventingGovernment:How the EntrepreneurialSpirit Is
Transformingthe Public Sector (New York: Dutton, 1992).
14 Clarence Stone, Robert Whelan, and WilliamMurin, UrbanPolicy and Politics in a Bureaucratic

Age, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,1986);Robert Lineberryand EdmundFowler, "Re-

formism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review 61 (Fall 1967):
701-716.
15See Elizabeth Gerber, The Populist Paradox:InterestGroup Influenceand the Promise Direct
of
Legislation (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1999) for an extension of this argument.
472 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

lic trustin government.16 Otherreforms(at-largeelections) weakenedpolitical

parties and dramaticallylowered voter turnoutrates, especiallyamong ethnic
urbanimmigrants."17 By weakeningpoliticalpartiesand patronage,Progressive
reforms served to consolidate white middle and upper class political power.
While not without a cost, the net effect of Progressivereformswas to rebuild
trust in the institutionsof representativedemocracy.
Examplesof contemporarygovernancepolicies adoptedin the last two de-
cades of the twentieth century include campaignfinance reform, legislative
term limits,legislativeredistrictinglaws, supermajorityrules for tax increases,
mail ballots,same-dayvoter registration,and online registration.Sponsoredby
both liberaland conservativegroups,the dual characterof these reformsis ap-
parent.Legislativetermlimitsandtax limitationsmayweakenstate legislatures
and ultimately representativeinstitutions.'8Other reforms or proposed re-
forms,such as publiclyfinancedcampaigns,publicdisclosurelaws,free airtime
for ballot-qualifiedcandidates,electronic town-meetings,proportionalrepre-
sentation,cumulativevotingsystems,a nationalreferenda,electoralcollege re-
form,instantrun-offvoting,Internetor mailballots,computerizedelection bal-
lots, and even a value-addedtax may offer a means of updating American
democracyfor the twenty-firstcenturyand rebuildingtrustin government.

CYCLICALPATTERNIN USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

An importantgovernancepolicy was the adoption of the initiativeand refer-

enda in nineteen states duringthe first two decades of the twentieth century.
The reformswere passed in response to widespreadcorruptionand the per-
ceived stronginfluenceof the powerfulrailroadsover state legislatures.Today,
twenty-fourstates include constitutionalprovisionsfor the initiativeprocess,
whichallows citizensor groupsto draftnew state laws or amendthe state con-
stitution.The processallowsgroupsoutsideof the legislativearenato draftleg-
islation and qualifyit for the statewideelection ballot by collectinga specified
numberof voter signatures.19 In the referenda,by contrast,voters can only re-
to
spond policy formulated by the legislature.Often used by politicalentrepre-

16Skowronek, Building the New American State.

17Rodney E. Hero, Faces of Inequality:Social Diversity in American Politics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998);MarkBaldassare,Californiain the New Millennium:The ChangingSocial and
Political Landscape (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 2000).
18David Broder, DemocracyDerailed:InitiativeCampaignsand the Power of Money (Orlando,FL:
HarcourtBrace Publishers,2000);Tolbert, "Changingthe Rules for State Legislators";Rosenthal, The
Decline of RepresentativeDemocracy.
19Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, Demanding Choices:Opinion, Votingand Direct Democracy
(Ann Arbor:University of MichiganPress, 1998);David Magleby,Direct Legislation:Votingon Ballot
Propositions in the UnitedStates (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1984);Thomas E.
Cronin,DirectDemocracy:ThePolitics oflnitiative, Referendumand Recall (Cambridge,MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989).
 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT
I 473

FIGURE1
Frequency of Initiatives on State Election Ballots
120

100
Ballots

State 80
onaverage)
60
moving
Initiatives
40
of year
(6
20
Number
0
1904 1912 1920 1928 1936 1944 1952 1960' 1968' 1976' 1984 1992 1996
Year
Source: Rawdata fromthe Initiativeand ReferendumInstitute,Washington,DC.Analysisby the author.

neurs,20the initiative has been the most common tool of state governmental
reform,largelydue to its agenda-settingpower.
Historicaluse of ballot initiativesby state electoratesreveals two distinct
periodsof voter activismduringthe twentiethcentury.Figure1 presentsa mov-
ing averageof the numberof initiativesappearingon state election ballots for
the period from 1904-1996.21 Use of the initiative process was dramatic during
the Progressive era: between 1910 and 1919, a record-setting 269 measures went
to a vote, of which ninety-eight were approved. The initiative process was used
only sparingly during most of the middle decades of the twentieth century
(1940-1960). On average in the 1950s and 1960s, fewer than eight initiatives
were enacted per election cycle.22The passage of California's Proposition 13
property tax limitations in 1978 sparked a renewed interest in direct democracy
in the states and gave rise to a tax revolt that rolled eastward all the way to
Washington, DC. In the last two decades of the twentiethth century, an un-
precedented number of initiatives have appeared on statewide ballots, many
demandinga greaterrole for the publicin issues of governance.
20Daniel Smith, Tax Crusadersand the Politics of DirectDemocracy (New York:
Routledge, 1998).
21
Data is from the Initiativeand Referenda Institute,Washington,DC, and is the most comprehen-
sive source available.
22
David Magleby, "DirectLegislationin the American States"in David Butler and Austin Ranney,
eds., ReferendumsAround the World:The GrowingUse of DirectDemocracy(Washington,DC: Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute, 1994).
474 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

During the contemporary period, state legislatures also referred an increas-

ing number of statutes and constitutional amendments to citizens for a popular
vote (that is, legislative referenda). State legislatures were the primary source
of 226 ballot proposals in 1998 by a margin of almost 3:1.23NOt only has there
been a significantincreasein the use of local initiativesandreferenda,but many
states have also consideredadoptingthe initiativeprocess,includingNew Jer-
sey and Minnesota,while only Mississippisucceededin 1992.State legislators
of both politicalpartiesresist efforts to adopt the processfor fear of givingtoo
much power to the voters.
While a causal mechanismis difficultto prove, increasedusage of direct
democracymay be a response to rapid demographicchange. The late nine-
teenth and early twentiethcenturieswere distinguishedby growingethnic di-
versityin America,withhistoricallyhighratesof immigrationfromeasternand
southernEurope. Progressivereformerswere concernedwith the dispropor-
tionate representationof ethnicimmigrantsin urbanpoliticalmachinesand re-
sentful of how local politicalmachinesmade use of the immigrantvote.24Re-
formersused the initiativeprocessto pass politicalreforms(at-largeelections,
merithiringsystems,professionalcity managers,directprimaries,secretballot,
nonpartisanlocal elections, and direct election of United States senators) to
weaken urbanpartymachinesthat were perceivedas overlyresponsiveto eth-
nic immigrants.Progressivereforms, especially at-large elections, weakened
the partiesand lowered voter turnoutrates among ethnic urbanimmigrants.25
Today,use of ballot initiativesby state electoratesmay be partiallyunderstood
as constrainingstate legislatures'perceived overresponsivenessto ethnic and
racialminorities.
Is direct democracya safety valve that helps preserverepresentativegov-
erning institutions,as proponents'claim? Or has direct democracybecome a
preferredform of decisionmaking,as in California,26 threateningto replace or
underminerepresentativegovernment?27 Given the explosionin usage of direct
democracyin the last two decades,will its legacybe to undermineor strengthen
representativedemocracy?The majorityof researchexaminingdirect democ-
racyin the contemporaryperiodfails to situatethe processin its historicalcon-
text or relies on an idealized accountof the Progressiveera.28However, some
researchfinds that the same combinationof well-fundedindustrygroups and

November
23 Initiative and Referendum Institute, Washington, DC (http://www.ballotwatch.org),

1998.
24 Charles Price, "The Initiative:A ComparativeState Analysis and Reassessment of a Western

Phenomenon," WesternPolitical Quarterly28 (Summer 1975): 243-262.

25 McDonagh, "Race, Class and Gender in the Progressive Era."

26Peter Schrag, Paradise Lost: California's Experience,America's Future (New York: The New
Press, 1998).
27 Broder, Democracy Derailed;Rosenthal, The Decline of RepresentativeDemocracy.
28Broder, Democracy Derailed.
 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT
I 475

broad-basedcitizengroupshave used the initiativeprocesssince its inception.29

A partial answer to what drives use of direct democracyby state electorates
may be found in examiningwhat the processis used for, namelypublicpolicy.
There are strong parallels between the general subject matter of ballot ini-
tiativesduringthe beginning(1900-1920)and end (1980-1996)of the twentieth
century.30 In the firsttwo decadesof the twentiethcentury,350 initiativesquali-
fied for the ballot in the nineteen states that providedfor direct democracy.
Governmentalreformwas the most common subjectduringthis period, com-
prising36 percent of all initiativesappearingon state election ballots. Fiscal
policy (taxation,spending,andbond issues) was the second most commonsub-
ject matter,accountingfor 22 percentof the total.
During the last two decades (1980-1996) a record570 initiativesappeared
on statewideballots.Governancewas againthe most commonsubject,account-
ing for almost a quarterof the total (23 percent). This percentagewas down
slightlyfrom the 36 percentduringthe period from 1900 to 1920.Twenty-two
percent of the total dealt with issues of taxation,spending,and bonds, exactly
the same proportionas duringthe Progressiveera.Fifteen percentof initiatives
dealt with social policy duringthe Progressiveera (1900-1920), roughly the
same (17.5 percent) duringthe contemporaryperiod. Labor issues, however,
were clearlya moreimportantpolicyissue duringthe Progressiveera (6 percent
of the total) than today (3 percentof total). The overallpassagerate for initia-
tives from 1900-1920was 43 percentand has increasedmodestlyto 47 percent
for the period from 1980-1996.
While state policy agendashave been subjectto an evolutionaryprocess,in
the past and today the processcreatesa venue for substantivereformin social,
environmental,criminaljustice, and educationpolicy.But duringboth the his-
torical and contemporaryperiods, governancewas the most common subject
to appearon state electionballots.Whilesome policiesadoptedby ballotinitia-
tive may weaken specificgoverninginstitutions,othersmay serve to reconnect
citizenswith their elected officialsand rebuildpoliticaltrust.The targetof re-
form duringthe Progressiveera was politicalparties,while today state legisla-
tures are the focus.
Progressivereformerswere able to accomplishbroad sweepingreformof
municipal,state, and nationalgovernmentinstitutionsby relyingon two strate-
gies. First,they promotedgovernancepolicies to changethe rules,procedures,
and operationof representativegovernments.Second, they used ballot initia-
tives to shape the political agenda and as a catalystfor early adoption of new
policy ideas. To accomplishtheir reformagenda,Progressivereformersintro-
duced legislationin state legislaturesand as ballot measures.Policies initiated

29 John A. Allswang, TheInitiativeand Referendumin California,1898-1998 (Palo Alto, CA: Stan-

ford University Press, 2000).

30Subjectmatterof initiativescoded by author.Raw data is from the Initiativeand Referenda Insti-
tute, Washington,DC.
476 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

in state legislaturesoften diffused across the states, becoming the subject of

state ballot initiativesand vice versa.31
While the Progressivesare commonly rememberedfor lobbying for the
passageof directdemocracymechanismsat the state level, whatis less well un-
derstoodis that once these politicalinstitutionswere in place, reformersrelied
on the initiativeprocessto adopt muchof their reformagenda.Progressivere-
formers'most importantinnovationmay have been to use the initiative as a
catalystfor politicalreform.Accordingto David Schmidt,"Inthe initiativepro-
cess the Progressivescreateda perpetualreformmachinethat not only contin-
ues to be a vehicle for politicalchange,but is increasingin its usefulnessto re-
formers more than three-quarters of a century after it first gained widespread
acceptance."32A brief examination of historical Progressivism provides a better
understanding of the social and economic context associated with the contem-
porary shift toward participatory democracy and citizen initiatives.

INSTITUTIONALDEALIGNMENTDURING
ERAS
THE PROGRESSIVEAND CONTEMPORARY

Duringthe late 1800sandearly1900s,Americashiftedfroman agrariansociety

to an industrialeconomy. Historianswidely consider the rise of the Populist
and later Progressivemovementsto be a politicalresponseto rapideconomic
and social change.Progressivereformerswere faced with two types of institu-
tional dealignment:one social and one economic. Progressivesdesired to re-
formgovernmentinstitutionsto preventpoliticalcorruptionandcreate a safety
net from the perils of the new industrialeconomy. But they were concerned
with the growingpoliticalpower of urbanethnicimmigrantsand the partyma-
chinesandwantedto concentratepoliticalpowerin the handsof the white mid-
dle and upperclasses.33To achieveboth goals, they used governancepolicy to
change the rules and proceduresof the politicalsystem.
The IndustrialRevolutionof the late nineteenthcenturypenetratedall fac-
ets of Americanlife; growingincome inequalitywas a definingfeature of this
period.The economicadvanceswere achievedat the cost of labordislocations,
loss of agrarianprofits,concentrationof economicpower,robberbarons,ineq-
uitable taxation,railroadmonopolies, political corruption,labor strikes, land
evictions, and crowded slums.34"Progressivismis a reform orientation that
31See Karen Mossberger,The Diffusion of Innovationsand the Spreadof EnterpriseZones (Wash-
ington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000) on policy diffusion and learning.
32 David Schmidt, CitizenLawmakers:The Ballot InitiativeRevolution (Philadelphia:Temple Uni-

versity Press, 1989): 115.

33 McDonagh, "Race, Class and Gender in the ProgressiveEra."
34Samuel
Hayes, The Response to Industrialism1885-1914 (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,
1957);Samuel Hayes, "The Politics of Reform in MunicipalGovernment in the ProgressiveEra,"Pa-
cificNorthwestQuarterly55 (Summer1964):157-169;Samuel Hays, "The Social Analysis of American
Political History:1880-1920,"Political Science Quarterly80 (Fall 1965):373-394; RichardHofstadter,
TheAge ofReform: From Bryanto F.D.R. (New York:Vintage Books, 1955);RichardHofstadter, The
ProgressiveMovement,1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall,1963);MartinShefter, "Regional
 DIRECTDEMOCRACY REALIGNMENTI 477
AND INSTITUTIONAL

seeks to implementthe power of state authorityand governmentinstitutions

to solve social and economicinequalitiesviewed as the sourceof societalills."35
The aim of Progressivereformerswas to create a countervailingforce (big gov-
ernment)to an economicsectordominatedby industrialcorporations(bigbusi-
ness). The centralized,hierarchical,administrativestate was the institutional
formof governmentcapableof regulatingan economydominatedby industrial
corporations.36 Progressivereformersestablishedregulatorypolicies encom-
passinga wide rangeof factorsof production,includinglabor,land,trade,capi-
tal, and taxation.37Perhapsthe most importantreformduringthis period was
the adoptionof a progressiveincometax, expandingexponentiallythe financial
resources,regulatorycapabilities,and social servicesprovidedby the national
government.To lessen the irongripof railroads,mining,and oil industriesover
legislaturesand politics,they createdthe administrativebureaucracyand merit
system to insulategovernmentfrom the influenceof industry.38
Americaexperiencedhistoricratesof immigrationduringthisperiod.39 The
new immigrantswere poorer and less educatedthen their northernEuropean
predecessorsand createdjob competitionfor the more establishedimmigrant
groups.Progressivereformerswere concernedwith the disproportionaterepre-
sentationof ethnicimmigrantsin urbanpoliticalmachinesandresentfulof how
localpoliticalmachinesmadeuse of the immigrantvote. The immigrantwasthe
instrumentof the urbanpoliticalmachine,whichprovidedquicknaturalization,
jobs, socialservices,personalaccessto authority,anddeferenceto ethnicpride.
In return, it garnered votes, herding to the polls new citizens, who were grateful
for services rendered and submissive to experienced leadership.4 Progressive
reforms such as the merit system, secret ballot, at-large elections, and compli-
cated voter registration laws weakened political party machines by reducing
patronageand resultedin a dramaticdecline in immigrantvoting.Thus,politi-
cal participation of immigrants was hampered by "good government" legisla-
tion, which had the effect of disenfranchising urban immigrants.41Between 1903
and 1908, 130 state laws were passed that regulated party machines and busi-
ness interests, all of which increasingly restricted the participation rates of ur-
ban immigrants.42

Receptivity to Reform: The Legacy of the Progressive Era," Political Science Quarterly98 (Fall
1983):459-483.
35McDonagh, "Race, Class and Gender in the ProgressiveEra," 147.
36 Skowronek, Building the AdministrativeState.
37Morton Keller, Regulatingthe New Society:Public Policy and Social Change in America, 1900-
1933 (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1994).
38Skowronek, Building the AdministrativeState.
39 In
1890, for example, first generation newcomers made up an incrediblefour-fifthsof New York
City's population. See Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers.
40Hofstadter, TheAge of Reform.
41McDonagh, "Race, Class and Gender in the ProgressiveEra."
42Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote (New York: Pan-
theon, 1988).
478 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

A New Era of InstitutionalRealignment?

Today, almosta centurylater,we are againat an historicjunctionas our econ-
omy changesto informationtechnologyin a global arena.Beginningin the late
1970swith the unveilingof the personalcomputerand in 1980with twenty-four
hour cable networknews,Americahas experiencedanotherdramatictransfor-
mation from an industrialeconomy to one based on computers,the Internet,
and informationtechnology.Popularliteraturesuggests a new progressivism
may be on the horizon.43Just as the institutionalcapacitiesof a government
designedfor the agrarianera failed to meet the demandsof an industrialsoci-
ety, the institutionalcapacitiesof a governmentdesignedfor the industrialera
may be unable to meet the demandsof a technology-basedsociety.44Govern-
ment institutions,especiallystate legislaturesand Congress,have come under
increasingattackas they struggleto addressnew problemsarisingunderan in-
formation-ageeconomy.45Traditionalstrategiesused by the public sector to
managethe privatesector,such as state-localsales taxes and regulation,are no
longer effective when commercetakes place over the Internetor when multi-
nationalcorporationsmove productionoverseas.46
There is widespreadand persistentdistrustof representativegovernment.
In 1964,76 percentof Americanssaidthey thoughtthey couldtrustthe govern-
ment in Washingtonto do whatwas rightnearlyalwaysor most of the time. In
1997, only half as many,38 percent,agreed,while 62 percentsaid they trusted
the governmentonly sometimesor never.47The lack of politicaltrustis gener-
ally related to the perceptionthat governmentis unable to solve problems,to
spend money in an effective and efficientmanner,or to representthe interests
and policy preferencesof averagevoters. It is also related to impatiencewith
the overall responsivenessof elected officials.Only one in five Americansin
1997thoughtthat the decisionsCongressmade were the same as they or most
people would make even as muchas half of the time. Most of the time, the vast
majoritysaid that theirrepresentativeswere not representingthem.48Growing
publicdistrustin governmentmay be indicativeof the dealignmentof political
institutionswith economic and social conditions.

Economic Change:TechnologicalRevolution
Like the IndustrialRevolution, the technologicalrevolutionpervades all as-
pects of Americanlife. The rise of informationtechnologyand a global econ-
43 E. J. Dionne, They Only Look Dead: WhyProgressivesWillDominate the New Political Era (New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Kevin Phillips, Boiling Point: Democrats,Republicansand the De-
cline of Middle-ClassProsperity(New York: Random House, 1993).
44Osborne and Gaebler, ReinventingGovernment;Peters, The Futureof Governing.

45 Rosenthal, The Decline of RepresentativeDemocracy.

46Susan Clarke and Gary Gaile, The Work of Cities (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,
1998).
47 Pew Research Center 1997, cited in Broder, Democracy Derailed, 229.
48Center on Policy Attitudes 1999, cited in Broder, Democracy Derailed, 227-228.
 DIRECTDEMOCRACY
AND INSTITUTIONAL
REALIGNMENT I 479

omyhasrevolutionized the privateandnonprofitsectors,fosteringcorporate

mergers,billionaires,anddot.comcompanies,whileelectroniccommercehas
becomethefastestgrowingsectorof theeconomy.Thisrapideconomicchange
has led to reneweddislocations,increasingincomeinequality,the creationof
a digitaldivide,andstagnatingwagesfor the lowerandmiddleclasses.It has
alsoledto demandsto updatepoliticalinstitutions
to neweconomicconditions.
Inthelatetwentiethcentury,inflationandunemployment werelowandthe
stockmarketandcorporateprofitswerehigh,buttheearlyyearsof thetwenty-
firstcenturyhavebeenmarkedby a weaknationaleconomy.Thisperiodhas
also been distinguishedby growingeconomicinequalitybetweenthe lower/
middleandupperincomeclasses.49 In 1997,the majorityof Americanworkers
earnedlessmoneyin realdollarsperhourthancomparable workersdidtwenty
yearsago;inflation-adjusted earningsof the medianworkerin 1997were3.1
percentlowerthanin 1989.At thesametime,thetypicalmarriedcouplefamily
worked247 hours (over six weeks) more per year in 1996than in 1989.50
In the
new economicorder,individuals with a collegeeducationcan prosper,while
thosewithouthavefaltered.
Duringthe late twentiethcentury,rapidtechnological changeled to a re-
newedconcentration of wealthin America.Between1962and1983,the share
of total privatenet worthheld by the top 1 percentof U.S. familiesbarely
changed.Yet, from 1983to 1989,it surgedfrom31 percentto 37 percent,reach-
ingheightsunseensince1929.Thetypicalmiddleclassfamilyhadnearly3 per-
centless wealthin 1997thanin 1989,despitethe stockmarketboom,because
it is the richest10percentof householdsin the UnitedStatesthathavereaped
85.8percentof the growthin the stockmarketin thisperiod.5'
The digitaldividemayfurthermagnifyinequitiesin incomedistribution.
Previousstudieshaveshownwidedisparitiesin computerownershipandIn-
ternetaccessbasedon incomeandrace/ethnicity, affectingworkforcedevelop-
ment,education,andpoliticalparticipation. ComputerownershipandInternet
usage have grown withinall but
groups, the low use of informationtechnology
amonglower-income individualsandracialminoritieshaswidenedthe dispar-
ity or digitaldivide.52Possiblefuturepoliticalreforms,suchas onlinevoting
andvoterregistration, maymagnifyexistingdisparities inpoliticalparticipation
ratesunlessbarriersfor low-incomecitizensareaddressed.53
49 Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and John Schmitt, The State of WorkingAmerica 1998-99

(Ithaca, NY: ILS Press, 1999).

50Ibid.
51Ibid.
52 Karen Mossberger,Caroline J. Tolbert, and Mary Stansbury,Beyond the Digital Divide (Wash-

ington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement,In-
formation Poverty, and the InternetWorldwide(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001). See
also RichardNeu, Robert Anderson, and Tora Bikson, E-mail Communicationbetween Government
and Citizens:Security,Policy Issues, and Next Steps (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 1998).
53Mossberger,Tolbert, and Stansbury,Beyond the Digital Divide; Michael Alvarez and Jonathan
Nagler, "The Likely Consequences of InternetVoting for Political Participation"(paper presented at
Internet Voting and Democracy symposium,Loyola Law School, 26 October 2000).
480 I POLITICAL
SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Social Change:Immigrationfrom Mexico and Asia

The United States is among the most racially and ethnically diverse of the
Western democracies,and growingdemographicchange is a definingfeature
of U.S. politics.54In 1980, 79 percent of the U.S. populationwas white (non-
Hispanic),12 percentblack,6.4 percent Latino, and 1.6 percent Asian. In less
than twentyyears,whites as a percentageof the populationdroppedto 71 per-
cent, while the Latinopopulationrose to over 11 percent.In 1998,blackscom-
prised roughly 13 percent of the populationand Asians, 4 percent. The U.S.
CensusBureau projectsthat by the year 2025, whites will accountfor only 61
percent of the U.S. population;Latinos, 18 percent;blacks, 14 percent; and
Asians, almost7 percent.
Our nation, and Californiain particular,has experienced rapid demo-
graphicchange and historicrates of immigrationsince 1980not seen since the
turn of the twentiethcentury.The state of Californiaalone gained 2.8 million
residentsthroughimmigrationbetween 1980and 1994,not includingillegalim-
migrantsduringthis period, estimatedto be an additional1.4 million to 2 mil-
lion people. Most of the legal and illegal immigrantsarrivedfrom Mexico and
Asian countries.By 1994,nearly24 percentof Californianswere foreign-born,
and 42 percent of the school-age populationof Californiaconsistedof immi-
grantsor the childrenof immigrants.Immigrationhas transformedCalifornia
from a state where the vast majoritywere white to a multiethnicsociety con-
sisting of sizable portionsof whites, blacks,Asians, and Latinos.55
Californiais the first majority-minoritystate, that is, a state in which no
racial or ethnic group representsover 50 percent of the population.In 2000,
non-Hispanicwhites representedonly 49 percent of the state's population,as
Latinosincreasedto 31 percentand Asians to 12 percent.Latinoswill outnum-
ber non-Hispanicwhitesin the early2020s and could well become the outright
majorityin the 2040s. Projectionsby the U.S. Census Bureau indicatethat by
the year 2025, whites will comprisejust 30 percent of the state's population.56
California'sracialmake-uptoday mirrorsthe projectedmake-upof the whole
countryin the middle part of this century.
Scholarsand policy makers alike have long recognized differentialvoter
turnoutrates by socioeconomicstatusand race/ethnicityin Americanpolitics;
individualswith higherincome, education,and occupationalstatus are signifi-
cantly more likely to vote.57States with high racial and ethnic diversity,such

54Hero, Faces of Inequality.

55Baldassare, Californiain the New Millennium,3.
56 Hans P. Johnson,How Many Californians?A Reviewof PopulationProjectionsfor the State,Cali-

fornia Counts:PopulationTrendsand Profiles,vol. 1 (October 1999) San Francisco:PublicPolicy Insti-

tute of California.
57Angus Campbell,Philip Converse,WarrenMiller,and Donald Stokes, TheAmerican Voter(Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Raymond Wolfingerand Stephen Rosenstone, Who Votes?
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Piven and Cloward, WhyAmericansDon't Vote.
 DIRECTDEMOCRACY
AND INSTITUTIONAL
REALIGNMENT I 481

as California,Florida,Texas, and New York are distinguishedby a mismatch

between the compositionof the electorateand the demographicsof the state's
population.For example, in Californianon-Hispanicwhites made up only 52
percent of the populationin 1998, but accountedfor about 75 percent of the
voting electorate."58
Changingdemographicsare historicallyimportantin periods of political
change. During the late nineteenth century, the influx of immigrantsfrom
southernand easternEurope fueled sentimentsof nativismand a voter back-
lash. Today the increasedsize and perceived political influence of racial and
ethnic populationsmay have a similarimpact. Recent scholarlyand popular
researchsuggestsa new populismhas arisenin California-largely concerned
with the political influence and access of ethnic minoritiesto representative
governmentssuchas the state legislatureandbureaucraticagencies.59 Stateleg-
islaturesmay be perceivedas overly responsiveto minoritygroups,just as the
urbanpartymachineswere seen as overlyresponsiveto the ethnic immigrants
a hundredyears ago. A clear manifestationof the new populismis the use of
ballotinitiativesto circumventrepresentativeinstitutions,especiallystatelegis-
latures,where blacks and Latinoshave gained influence.
While governancepolicies, such as tax limitations,may not on the surface
appearto affectracialand ethnicminorities,some have arguedthat these poli-
cies have emerged because of concerns that state governancepolicies have
been "overlyresponsive"or overly generousto variousminoritygroups.6Tax
limitationsand supermajorityrules to pass tax increasesreduce state welfare
benefits that disproportionatelyaid racial minority groups,61and proposed
Internetvoting may decrease turnoutrates among racial and ethnic minority
groups.62

Examples of Contemporary Governance Policies

At the turnof the twenty-firstcentury,reformof politicalinstitutionshas once
again lagged behind socioeconomic change. This lag has led to renewed at-

58 Voter News Service Exit Polls, 1998.

59 Bruce Cain, "VotingRights and DemocraticTheory:Toward a Color-BlindSociety?"in Bernard
Grofmanand ChandlerDavidson, eds., Controversiesin MinorityVoting(Washington,DC: Brookings
Institution, 1992); Caroline J. Tolbert and Rodney E. Hero, "Dealing with Diversity: Racial/Ethnic
Context and Social Policy Change,"Political ResearchQuarterly54 (Fall 2001):571-604; Schrag,Cali-
fornia in the New Millenium.
60Hero, Faces oflInequality,114; Cain, "Voting Rights and Democratic Theory."
61 Schrag,Californiain the New Millenium.The campaignto adopt legislativeterm limits in Califor-

nia gained momentum by advertising that it would oust long-term black Assembly Speaker Willie
Brown, who had proposed a number of controversialpolicies includinglegislation calling for "educa-
tional equity", meaning that students and faculty at public schools and universities must reflect the
diversityof the state. See Linda Chavez, The Color Bind: California'sBattleto End AffirmativeAction
(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1988).
62Tolbert and Hero, "Dealing with Diversity."
482 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

temptsto restructurepublicsectororganizations.The stateshave led the wayin

passinglaws to updateelection procedures.Some politicalanalystsand leaders
believe online voting and voter registrationwill be a reality in a number of
states in the next decade. Absentee voting is encouragedin many states, with
a quarteror more of the ballots being cast in advanceof election day in some
places.In 1988,Oregonvoters eliminatedneighborhoodpollingplaces,requir-
ing state voters to cast ballots exclusivelyby mail in the 2000 primaryand gen-
eral elections.63Mail ballots may be a firststep towardonline voting. Arizona
(a state withfrequentuse of directdemocracy)has led the nationin usingcom-
puterizedvoting systems,while Californiaexperimentedwith online voting in
the 2000presidentialelections.In the firstbindingtest of onlinevoting,Arizona
Democratsin 2000elected nationalconventiondelegatesby usingInternetvot-
ing. Computervotingballotsprovidea meansof updatingelection systemsfor a
new technology-basedeconomywithimprovedaccuracyandlowercost, thereby
improvingcitizens'perceptionsand trustin government.At the same time, such
reformsmay adverselyaffectturnoutratesfor the poor and racialminorities.64
Opinionpolls showwide supportfor a rangeof otherpoliticalreforms,from
term limitationsto a balanced budget amendmentto the U.S. Constitution.
Since 1990,when legislativelimitswere firstadoptedby initiativesin California,
Colorado, and Oklahoma, term limits have been adopted in twenty-three
states.65Term limits have only been adopted in one state, Louisiana,without
the initiativeprocess.A 1992NationalElection Studypoll foundoverwhelming
supportfor term limitsin virtuallyevery segmentof the population.66 Thirteen
states have constitutionalprovisionsrequiringa supermajorityor a two-thirds
vote of the legislatureto raise all taxes. The most sweepingstate campaignfi-
nance reformsin recent years are commonlyreferredto as "clean elections"
that provide for public financingof political campaigns.In addition, twelve
states have passed legislationmandatingelectronicfilingof and access to cam-
paign financeinformationfor politicalcandidatesin upcomingelections. Very
low contributionlimitsis anotherstate innovationin campaignfinancereform
that has been adopted in six states. In 1994,voters in Missouri,Montana,and
Oregonpassedcitizeninitiativesthatset limitsas low as $100on individualcon-
tributionsto legislative candidates.6Sixteen states, including the four with
blanket primaries,have completely open primaries.These election systems
allow any personwho is registeredas an independentor with no partyprefer-
ence or is registeredin a party that is not representedon the ballot (minor

63Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci, "Going Postal: How All-Mail Elections Influence Turnout,"
Political Behavior 22 (Fall 2000): 223-239.
64Mossberger,Tolbert, and Stansbury,Beyond theDigital Divide; Alvarez and Nagler, "The Likely
Consequences of Internet Voting."
65Tolbert, "Changingthe Rules for State Legislatures."
66Citrin, "Who's the Boss?" 275.
67Jean Drage, "CampaignFinance Reform," National Conferenceof State LegislaturesLegiBrief
(June/July1999).
 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT I 483

party)to vote in the primaryelectionof the majorpoliticalparties.In states

with the blanketprimary,both majorpoliticalpartiesand minorpartiesare
presentedon one slateorblanketballot.Voterscanpickandchoosethecandi-
datesof theirpreference.

UNDERSTANDING STATE GOVERNANCEPOLICYADOPTIONS

Introduced byactivistsfromtheleftandtherightof thepoliticalspectrum,poli-

cies changingthe institutionalrulesof the gameare an ever-growing compo-
nent of statepoliticalagendas.Whilethereare manyexamples,this analysis
examinesthe adoptionof ninepoliticalreformsadoptedacrossthe statesdur-
ingthe pasttwodecades:legislativetermlimits;supermajority rulesfortaxin-
creases;voter approvalof tax increases;completeopen primary;blanketor
nonpartisan primary;verylow campaigncontribution limits;publicfinancing
of statelegislativepoliticalcampaigns;
mandatedelectronicfilingof campaign
contributions;andexclusiveuse of mailvotingballots.68The rawdatais from
theNationalConferenceof StateLegislatures, Denver, is currentasof July
and
1999. An ordinalindex of the numberof state politicalreformsis used as the
dependentvariablein a multivariateregressionmodel.69Californiahas adopted
sixof thenineprocedural policiesexaminedhere,forexample,whileKentucky
has adoptednone.
Opinionpollsshowthatpublicsupportforgovernance policiessuchasterm
limitsandcampaignfinancereformis fairlyconstantacrossindividualstates,
but thereare significantvariationsin state provisionsfor directdemocracy.
Ratherthanmeasuringthe presenceof the initiativeprocess,the classification
schemeused here reflectsimportantvariationsin usageof the processover
time.Use of theinitiativeprocessreflectsvariations
in thestringency inpetition
signaturethresholds,geographical distribution
requirements, and time limita-
tionsforcirculatingpetitions.70In statessuchas CaliforniaandOregon,voters
facemanyballotinitiativeseachelection.In others,suchas Wyoming,thepro-
cessis rarelyused.Usageof directdemocracyby stateelectoratesis measured
bytheaveragenumberof statewideinitiativesappearing on electionballotsper
yearfrom1970-1992.71 If directdemocracyshapespolicyadoptions,we would
expectstateusageof ballotinitiativesto accountforsomevariationin passage
of governancepolicy.
A numberof otherexplanatory variablesthatmayalsodrivegovernance
policyadoptions are included in the analysis.Manyarguethatrace/ethnicity
68In an effort to understandwhat factors drive the use of
governance policy, state laws that have
been invalidated by the courts are included in the analysis, including term limit provisions in three
states, blanket primaries,and some of the campaignfinance reform legislation.
69 Raw data is available from the author.

70Caroline J. Tolbert, Daniel Lowestein, and Todd Donovan, "Election Law and Rules for Using
Initiatives"in Bowler, Donovan, and Tolbert, eds., Citizensas Legislators.
71
Ibid.
484 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

has playeda centralrole in both nationalandsubnationalpoliticsin the United

States and that variationin state public policy reflects this diversity.72Given
the hypotheseslaid out in this article,we would expect states experiencingthe
greatestdemographicchangein the last two decadesto be more likely to adopt
governancepolicies. Changein state racialand ethnic diversityis measuredby
indicesdevelopedby Rodney Hero and myselfwith 1980and 1990census data
on the percentof Latinos,AfricanAmericans,whites, and Asian Americans.73
Economic change is measured by the change in state income inequality
(Gini coefficientvalues) for each state between 1979 and 1989.74 We would ex-
pect states with greater income inequalityto be more likely to adopt gover-
nance policy. State socioeconomicconditionsare also measuredwith indepen-
dent variables for urbanizationand income.75'" States with less competitive
elections should be more likely to adopt governancepolicies as a means to
makegovernmentmoreresponsiveto its citizens.Partycompetitivenessis mea-
sured by an index of district-levelelectoralcompetition.76 Publicopinion is an
important factor in understanding variations in policy outcomes across the
states. Average (conservative)policy opinions (ideology) of state electorates
are from Robert Erikson, Gerald Wright,and John McIver.77If internalfea-
tures of state legislaturesare important,supportfor many governancepolicies
shouldbe strongestin states with more professionallegislatures.78 State legisla-
tive professionalismis measuredby an index created by Peverill Squire that
uses the Congressas a baseline againstwhich to measurethe salary,staff, and
time-in-sessionof all fifty state legislatures.79
Adoption of governancepoliciesmay also be a functionof a state'spolitical
historyanddevelopment.Stateswith a stronghistoricalProgressivepartytradi-

72Hero, Faces of Inequality;Vladimir O. Key, SouthernPolitics-In State and Nation (Knoxville:

University of Tennessee Press, 1949).
73 The index is a measure of a state's racial/ethnicpopulation. The index was computed with the
following formula:Minoritydiversity = 1 - [ (proportion Latino)2+ (proportion black)2+ (propor-
tion white)2 + (proportionAsian)2].See Rodney E. Hero and Caroline J. Tolbert, "A Racial/Ethnic
Diversity Interpretationof Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S.," AmericanJournalof Political
Science 40 (Fall 1996): 851-871.
74LauraLanger, "MeasuringIncome Distributionacross Space and Time in the American States,"
Social Science Quarterly80 (Winter 1999):55-67.
75Per capita income and the percentage of population living in metropolitan areas in 1990 is from
the StatisticalAbstractsof the UnitedStates.
76 Thomas Holbrook and Emily Van Dunk, "ElectoralCompetitionin the American States,"Amer-

ican Political Science Review 4 (Winter 1993): 955-962.

77 The measure is based on the result of 122 CBS/New York Times telephone polls for the years
1976-1988, which included identical questions about respondents' self-reported ideology. Data for
forty-seven states are available for the ideology measure. See Robert Erikson, Gerald Wright, and
John McIver, StatehouseDemocracy (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993).
78 Jeffrey Mondak, "Elections as Filters: Term Limits and the Composition of the U.S. House,"
Political ResearchQuarterly48 (Summer 1995): 701-727.
79Peverill Squire, "The Theory of Legislative Institutionalizationand the California Assembly,"
Journal of Politics 54 (Summer 1992): 1026-1054.
 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT
I 485

tion, weakpoliticalparties,and low ethnicdiversity,especiallythose in the

WestandMidwest,weremorelikelyto adoptdirectdemocracy mechanisms in
Statespoliticaldevelopmentis measuredwitha dummyvari-
the firstplace.80
ablefora "moralistic" politicalculture,whichmostcloselyapproximates a tra-
ditionof Progressivepartyinfluence.81

Findingsfrom the Analysis of Fifty-StateData

The impactof initiativeuse on governancepolicy adoptionsis measuredby the
numberof governancepolicies adopted in each state. The statisticalanalysis
indicatesthat frequentuse of directdemocracyis a strongand statisticallysig-
nificantpredictorof governancepolicy adoptions, even after controllingfor
other factors.States with more initiativeson the ballot are also more likely to
adopt governancepolicies.Thereis evidencethat states with the largestdemo-
graphicchangein terms of racial/ethnicdiversityare also more likely to adopt
a range of political reforms.Changein income inequality,however,is not re-
lated to policy adoptions,but this may reflecta roughempiricalmeasurerather
than the lack of a relationship.Many of the control variablesdo not have a
statisticallysignificantimpact. States with a "moralistic"political culture or
moreprofessionallegislaturesare also not morelikelyto adoptgovernancepol-
icies, raising doubts whether these policies target more professionallegisla-
tures.82States with lower electoral competition,however, are more likely to
adoptgovernancepolicies,suggestingthat governancepolicies aimto makepo-
litical institutionsmore responsive.
The statisticalmodel employed providesa frameworkto examine specific
policy scenarios.83 Two scenariosare examined:the firstfor states with average
racialdiversityand the second for states with high racialdiversity.The projec-
tions based on the data analysisreveal a clear patternof policy adoptionsrela-
tive to state use of direct democracy(Figure 2). States without the initiative
processand averageracialdiversityare predictedto adoptone of the nine gov-
ernancepolicies studiedhere. Noninitiativestates,thus, have a smallprobabil-
ity of adoptingmanygovernancepolicies.The estimatessuggestthat moderate
80Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers;Price, "The Initiative."
81 Daniel Elazar, American Federalism:A View from the States, 3d ed. (New York: Harper and
Row, 1966).
82Rosenthal, The Decline of RepresentativeDemocracy.
83 To facilitate interpretationof the statistical findings,the regression coefficients from a Poisson

regression model were converted to expected values (probabilities)of state policy adoptions by using
a simulationprocedure,Clarifysoftware.The simulationsprovide an estimate of the numberof gover-
nance policies that are likely to be adopted in states with varyingreliance on ballot initiatives,analysis
that would not be possible from an examinationof the regressioncoefficients alone. All independent
variables are held constant by setting their values to the mean except frequency of state initiative use
(for the simulations,states are assumedto have a moralisticpolitical culture). See Gary King, Michael
Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg,"Makingthe Most of StatisticalAnalyses: ImprovingInterpretationand
Presentation,"AmericanJournal of Political Science 44 (Spring2000): 347-361.
486 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

FIGURE2
Expected Number of State Governance Policies
14

12
12

10
Adoptions

9
8
Policy

6 Types of States
6
No InitiativeProcess
Numberof
4 4
Mod. InitiativeUse
3
Mean
2 I
2
High InitiativeUse
I
0 VeryHigh Use
Average High

State Racial/EthnicDiversity
Note: Expectednumber(probability)of state governancepolicyadoptionsare based on a multipleregres-
sion model availablefromthe author.

use of the initiative process is associated with a dramatic increase in the use of
governancepolicy, recognizingthat policies may be adopted via ballot initia-
tives, legislativereferenda,elected officials,or state legislatureunderthe threat
of petition drives.84Stateswith moderateuse of directdemocracy(averagetwo
initiativesper election cycle) and averageracialdiversityare expectedto adopt
two governancepolicies;stateswith highracialdiversity,three governancepol-
icies. States with high use of ballot initiatives(averagefour per election cycle)
and average racial diversityare predictedto adopt four governancepolicies;
states with high racialdiversityare expected to adopt six of the policies. States
with very frequentuse of ballotinitiativessuch as Californiaand Oregon,aver-
aging six per election cycle, are expected to adopt between nine and twelve
governancepolicies, dependingon the racialcompositionof the state.
In sum, moderateto high usage of ballot initiativesis associatedwith sharp
increasesin the numberof governancepolicies a state will adopt. States with
participatorymechanismsfor policy making,in additionto the legislativepro-
cess, are significantlymore likely to adopt governancepolicy than are states

84Gerber, The Populist Paradox.

 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT I 487

with very low or no usage of the process.However,even states with low usage
of the initiativeprocess are more likely to adopt governancepolicies than are
states without direct democracyprocedures.This does not preclude the fact
that stateswith andwithoutthe initiativeprocessmay adoptgovernancepolicy
via legislativeactivityor referendareferredby the legislature.

CYCLES OF DEMOCRACY

Researchershave long recognizedcyclicalpatternsin partisanrealignmentsas

a way in whichthe politicalsystem adaptsto changeover time. Althoughrela-
tively understudiedcomparedto other electoralinstitutions,this researchsug-
gests that directdemocracyat the state level mayfunctionas an adaptivemech-
anism,realigninginstitutionsof representativegovernmentwithnew socialand
economic conditionsin a continuingcycle of democracy.Unlike partisanre-
alignment,institutionalrealignmentvia directdemocracymay allow for politi-
cal systemchangeat the statelevel.A two-stagemodelis proposedin whichrapid
demographicand economic change leads to frustrationwith governmentthat
is perceivedas outdatedand to the increasedsalienceof state ballot initiatives
and referenda for policy decisions. Historical analysis suggests that the in-
creaseduse of directdemocracyduringthe Progressiveera coincideswith eco-
nomic transitionsand periods of increasedimmigration.Use of directdemoc-
racyby state electoratesis in turnused to change,andin some casesmodernize,
the politicalsystem.In the wake of the 2000 presidentialelection,updatingthe
U.S. election systemfor the twenty-firstcenturyis of primaryimportance.Sta-
tistical analysissuggests that states with frequent use of ballot initiativesare
more likely to adoptthe nine contemporarypoliticalreformsdescribedearlier.
The researchsuggeststhat institutionalchange is not alwaysa responseto
crisis(for example,war),butthe slow buildingup of pressurewhen government
institutionsare out of sync with socioeconomicconditions.One measureof in-
stitutionaldealignmentis growingpublic disapprovalof elected officials,coin-
cidingwith rapideconomicandsocial (demographic)change.Whenfederalism
is decentralizedwith state legislationshapingfederalpolicy, state ballot initia-
tives are more salient. Thus, trackingcitizen usage of the initiative process,
which circumventselected officialsand representativedemocracy,may be an
importantindicatorof politicalsystemchange.A finalindicatormaybe the im-
portanceof governancepolicy relativeto substantivepolicy adoptions.
Progressivereformersat the turnof the twentiethcenturywere able to ac-
complishsuch broad sweeping change of municipal,local, state, and national
politicalinstitutionsby promotinggovernancepoliciesthatchangedpublicsec-
tor rules and proceduresand by using the initiativeprocessfor early adoption
of manynew policyideas. Are provisionsfor directdemocracyonce againserv-
ing as a catalystfor politicalreform?The statisticalanalysesin this articlepro-
vide supportfor this hypothesis.States with frequent use of ballot initiatives
488 1POLITICALSCIENCEQUARTERLY

are considerablymore likely to adopt governancepolicies, as are those experi-

encing the greatestdemographicchange.
The targetsof institutionalrealignmentduringthe Progressiveera were the
political parties,while today blame for an unresponsivegovernmentis often
placed on state legislaturesand Congress."85 Just as politicalpartieswere seen
as overly responsiveto ethnic/immigrantgroups at the turn of the twentieth
century,86 state legislaturesmaybe seen as overlyresponsiveto racialandethnic
minoritiesat the turn of the twenty-firstcentury.87 During the Progressiveera,
white middle and upperclass voters used governancepolicy and directlegisla-
tion to change access and participationin government.Governancepolicy was
a tool to consolidatepoliticalpower in the handsof the white middleclass;this
power was perceivedas slippingaway to the new ethnic immigrants.Analysis
suggestsa similarphenomenamay be occurringtoday.
At the turnof the twentiethcentury,Progressivereformersalso used gover-
nancepolicyto adaptpoliticalinstitutionsto the demandsof an industrialecon-
omy by creatingthe administrativestate. One hundredyearslater, "hierarchy"
is the evil most directlyaddressedby advocatesof moreparticipatorymodels of
government.Focusingon publicmanagementtrendsworldwide,B. Guy Peters
notes that twenty-firstcentury governments are more participatory;hier-
archical,rule-basedorganizationin the publicsectoris seen as a severe impedi-
ment to effective managementand governance.88 Participatorymodels call for
"flatter"governmentorganizationswith fewer tiers between the top and the
bottom that encourageemployee and citizenparticipationin decisionmaking.
Governmentsin the futurewill likely continueto rely on participatorymecha-
nismssuch as electronictown meetingsandvoter referendato increasethe dia-
logue between governmentleaders and citizens.
Whattype of governancepolicy is necessaryto update and modernizerep-
resentative democracyfor the technological revolution? Historical Progres-
sives advocatedthe direct primaryand presidentialprimary,while today the
open primary,a proportionalelection system, or instant run-off system may
encourageminorandthirdpartycandidatesand increasevoter turnout.Histor-
ical Progressivespromoted the progressiveincome tax, while today a value
added tax may be the only viable means of taxing commerceon the Internet.
Historical Progressivesadvocated the secret, long, and nonpartisanballot,
while today computerizedballots, digitizedsignatures,mail and internet bal-
lots, and same-dayvoter registrationmay be necessaryto increasevoter turn-
out, the accuracyof elections,and citizentrust.The Progressivesadvocatedthe
directelection of U.S. senatorsto increasethe role of citizensin selectingmem-
bers of Congress,while today publicly financed campaigns,free airtime for
ballot-qualifiedcandidates,and contributionlimits are proposed.Progressive
85 Rosenthal, The Decline of RepresentativeDemocracy.
86McDonagh, "Race, Class and Gender in the Progressive Era."
87 Cain, "Voting Rights and Democratic Theory";Hero, Faces oflInequality;Schrag,Paradise Lost.
88Peters, The Futureof Governing,46-47.
 DIRECTDEMOCRACY
AND INSTITUTIONAL
REALIGNMENTI 489

reformssuchas the directelectionof U.S.senatorsanddirectprimaries weak-

ened politicalparties,whiletodaywe desireto strengthenthe partysystem,
evenviaproportional electoralsystemsor cumulative voting.89Justas Progres-
sive reformssuchas at-largeelectionsreducedimmigrant voterturnoutrates,
contemporary policiessuchasinternetvotingmayfurthermagnifyexistingdis-
paritiesinpoliticalparticipation
ratesbyrace/ethnicity andsocioeconomic status.
Thisresearchalsohasimportantimplications forassessingwhetherthe in-
creaseduse of ballotinitiativesservesto undermineor strengthenrepresenta-
tive democracy. Somescholarsarguethatreferendums arechangingthe prac-
tice of liberaldemocracies90 and makinggovernmentmore participatory,91
whileotherssuggestthatballotinitiativesare supplanting representative de-
mocracy,92 tyrannizingminoritygroups,93 and weakeninglegislativeinstitu-
tions.94 Giventhe cyclicalpatternpresentedin thisresearch,frequentusageof
directdemocracy in thelatetwentiethandearlytwenty-first centuriesis under-
stoodnot as a permanentshiftto directdemocracy,but as a temporaryphe-
nomenon.If thisinterpretation of politicalhistoryis correct,as institutionsof
representative democracy (statelegislatures, bureaucratic agencies,andelec-
tionsystems)modernizeandadaptto changingeconomicandsocialconditions,
it is expectedthatusageof directdemocracy willwaneconsiderably in thenext
twodecades.Ratherthana safetyvalve,the initiativeprocessmaybe anadap-
tive mechanismfor institutional realignment of representativedemocracy.

89 Todd Donovan, Tracey Sulkin, Shaun Bowler, and David Brockington, "Contested Local Elec-

tions and Active Campaigns:The Effects of CumulativeVoting and Districting,"LegislativeStudies

Quarterly23 (Winter 1998): 152-153.
90Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin, eds., ReferendumDemocracy: Citizens, Elites, and
Deliberationin ReferendumCampaigns(New York: Palgrave,2001).
91Peters, The Futureof Governing.
92Broder, Democracy Derailed.
93Schrag,Paradise Lost.
94Rosenthal, The Decline of RepresentativeDemocracy.