1

C1U11Uoat101l ~~~,~lOtl" 2I1cl'. ee

WD DldC'rlV1Io·

28 NUMBERED
0 TARCinS HIT PAl)l 6

e MAP Of DAMAGE
TO H"'GOY" PACil 7

PAU 10

e 5"'T UIUTIOH
OF "'" PEFUSIS 'AGII!

MAP or JAP
O AA DEFENSES PACiE 16

'IOSPECTS or ,,.CiI17
• J"P sUUEMDU

, APD 234
 XXI B 0 hl BE R COM MAND

~I.TElLiGENCE REPORT
26 -'1 1945
XXI BOOCCII opmATIONS
Two strikes on Nagoya
SIlloke over Nagoya
,,
Picture of Nagoya Burning 5
28 Numbere~ Targets Hit
Map of Nagoya Damage
6
,
Kawanlshl Plant Vis sed 6
:5 Mining Missions 6
Airfield Strikes Halted 6

JAPAnESE Am OE'FEI1SE

Peashooter Pete Co.Co_Pl1ot 10

Reluctant Kamikaze 10
Pass the Saki, suzak! 10
Combat va Heavy Bombers 11
11
Little Cl'lg1nal Thinking 12
l7anted: I.~ore Into on this Ship
~ INTELLIGENCE
13
saturation ot AA DefelUl8 15
Flak Changes in Jap Homeland 16
Iolap of Jap AA Defenses
SPECIAL REPORTS
17
Japanese surrender PrOllpects 20
Morale Low on Okinawa
11 Mare XXth Crewmen Rescued
01 teh 1s sarer
""
'~c~ov-Cer--ph""-o~t-o-ta'-'''''-n~b=1C-:-:a1rCratt
or 873rd squadron, 4ttattr or~PI
73rd ."ins_ '
 t~:l- ~

14,,1 ,~ .. Il
o'
~l xXJ<f30/J/«Jom,. OPERATIONS
rwt,
M ~ paid I in addition to ~e to hl.S
city. 23 [1ghters destroyed 12
probablY destroyed and ~ da~!ed.
T'IO STRIKES The miSsion 1t65 notable Cor an·
)ther innovation: Rether than bCDb

ON NAGOYA by wingS. the groupS assembled into

cor.l'posi te w1ngS without resard to
whether they were [rtnl the 13rd,
313th. etc. 'l'1e idea was to san
tioe in the assembly. It warJ!l;d

It 11 intended that this "eakly re-
port be a source or information tor eO:ll-
bat cre", and starr of ricers who hava a
leSl t1lllate interest 1n the operations or
the XXI BOIIIbv Command. "'I1th1n those
limits it sho~ receive the ~leest pos-
sible clrculntlon p.r~15s1bl. under the
prov1.aloDS of AR ~eo.!l.
In order that a 1PX11la11ll or inte11t-
genee may be included, the report 1.
given an overall classification or Sec-
ret. 7fhen the natura of the material
warrants, individual IU"tlcles have ra-
eeivld a lowar security classification.
The report 1s 10 .sselDbl.~ that the
eOlllponent sections lIIay be rerl\oved and
clreulated or f11ad separately.
tions are reproduced, security regula-
tions ~st ba observed and the source
credited.
Correspondence regudlng this pub-
l1eatlon should be a4draslIed to the CQIII-
IMMin« General, XXI Bomber COIllilIU~,
APO 234, c/o Postmaater Sen Jl'ranc1sCo,
Ca11rcrn1e, Attent10n: At or s. A-e.
1m""..
Japan and
Mc' or. .1111
0n
and in
iLaU people, second largest city a
the hear t of the enemy
well, accord1ng to the reports.
statiStiCS of the miSs10n are Dtas
tallOWs: 66th Wlng, 141 aU'bor ,
ltra industry was the target for 125 effective, 639.6 t9 n5 MOp';lldi
tt or attthe Bo:':lber Co-mnand's largest 73rd, 160.146. 950. 3 ·tons; 31.3th.
arrar
D thiS week. two incendiary 79.66, 433.3 tons; 31+th, 144-132,t
attac'd,ts one by day and one by 658 tonS. on. 58th iUrli aU'craf
Dlsht, leCt 5.9 Square miles of the and flve frOCl the 313th attaeked
tHl devastated; destroyed or danl- targets or opportunitY.
'led es m1:1bered targets and raiSed
t.~e total of area burned to almo t
s
OPPCSITIOW
O!'lt rew-th or the enUre city.
APproXlOatelY 142 ene-Y aU'cratt
DAY InSSION were encountered. result1n1raUJ in 180-
200 unabgreSSlve and !ene in·
1ha rirst mUsion, flo'ffn on 11 effective attac1t:l during th~,.r·JD,
rrom tne oSs8lllb11 area until I» ter
.r against north llagoya. "as the
luSlSt attack the command had made bOll1bS a1l'&Y' Th1"8e silver run1denU.
~ 1ts Urst daylight incendiary
span.approa~~d
ried single en!1n8 a1tC a!t, with
t
,tr1ke. All [our wingS par t 1cipa • extr sm 1dni
lI5, launching 4'11 effective sorues. ed 9_ the 7:'ll'd 'lng ~t
etrrelY or aU
295
Iroppina 2,722 tons of banbs. The
It por- .ba1on cost 11 B.29s bUt the enemY
Bil1owin& sooke
['rom burning tlagoya 1S

~ 4Jk-
seen 1n this shot
from the nose or a 4.S7th
Group, 8715t Squ~dron
J'4BS D,' GARCIA plane of the 73rO
·i;~.\<· ." : Wing on 14 llarch. The
.t... . . . ... COIODII1, G.S.C •
...e or s, ... -2 B_29 Which took the
... "
~,~..... picturo waS pi.
AUTH: C.G.XXIB.C. lnitialsllib loted by Lt. carroll

- DATI 26 Kay 194.5 ~ G. Rorno r •

br 3:l1h PTU

not r1.re. ~8te of closure was ex-
tre-ely fest end they were first
thoUght to be Jet_propelled, but no
JEts were observed.
One aircraft of th~ 313th Wing,
forced to drop out of tomation "1 th
Olle engine out snd a fire 1n the
bO:Db bay, received 24 attacks by
eight eoeo)' fighter!. Four of the
fLghters were destroyed and the
B-29 continued on and bombed Seta.
::'lak over the target was of hae_
vy caliber, meager to intense, ac-
cill'ate to inaccurate.
~eather "as generally clear with
1110 low clOUd, base 2,000 reet
top 4,000 feet and 8110 middle cloud
11th bese at 21,000 feet. All
crews reported visibllity greatly
restricted by sooke after the first
£ireraft bo:nbed.
or the 11 aircraft lost, three
ditched, two were lost to enemy
aircraft, one crashed at Iwo, three
'ere abandoned over Iwo (Which was
Jocy.e~in) and one was l~st to un-
Snown causes. Air·sea rescue pick-
ed up 27 cr6lJlllen.
Weather conditions at two caused
cancellation or the fighter escort
"hich had been scheduled.
The damage asseSSment for this
oission is 2.8 sqU8r& mUes. Rea_
sons for this comparatively small
total were given by those who par.
ticipated as bad bombing, lack of
surface Wind to Spread the flames
the high concentration on a smali
area. Some inaccuracies in timing
~i..,~ombing end the bombing of wrong
sm~k~pr~~t~;sov~;sghei~::eQtsed
·•••,;ge •
the
!IIGHT IdISSlon
On the
night ot 16·17 llay, 516
~
---~---.------' -
B-29s were alrborne r
engagement at lIagOYa I)r l
469 effectives dropp~' S1
of bo:nbs on the Mrth ~~~I
city. Two B-29s W8re lCilt {(,
eneIllY' fighters destl'G7tl1, IlII
N·.l.IlIbers of alrCl'&tt
effective, and tons drl)Pp~ • NAGOYA on 15 MAY •
en by Will8S as toll.Clws: ~
122, 903; 73rd, lSe_l!?
313th, 93.81, 59'1; 314t.h,'~
The smoke '018 to 20,000
664. Five aircraft hCllll ~"I
one frOID the 731'd, three ...
the 3l3th and 3l4th, bG:lbed
targets.
OPPOOITHII
Forty four eneiD1 a1J'~
sighted, With only a rAtII 1111
sive passes being made. l
of balls of fire were rePGMII
f(lllll'ing B-2gs as tar ~t as 111
The 7:3rd and 314th 'Un&' .. ~I
strayed one eteoy aircraft.
Flak was medium and herrr,
er and inaccurate ill the rt
although seven B_29s r1Cll1'"
damage over the target.
Weather over the tar,.,
3/10 10'lf cloud to 9/10I1P,
visibility restricted to 11
in haze.
Two aircraft of thll
"ere lost. one, returll.1DI
crashea short of tM runli
ing five cre'lJlllen and Il1
There was one operatiClna].
the ere" bailed out w1~
ties over T1niao. 0:...
aircraft crashed atd 11 na'
rUrJ'IJay on takeoff an bllCllll'
in the agave to~1S crill
never airborne. - em' 115Cl1h
picked up by aU_sea r
111 51101
DMage from thiS (s.et~1
3.1 square miles.
,
 'h~.\~~¥~IWi.;\l'l_,\~~'I»_<"'~"" __
~~~~~~~~~

d(ltl4~'
,,1''' ". Total to r.all:0Y' taUS" by XXI Bonber Co=e.nd da
,,,.! .".,,, " ".17 I"Y U , •• "uor' .11 ; ""''''' ""
, .• n'''''''' IT'" thO ' " " " , . " . ,., IT" tho ,,,ht ..:.; or thb.
01".':".>"
" t . .,.".. ".t""''''
t" ..,..' "" ..,g.t "",,,,, ...... '"' ..... ",.,t .f , . -•~u......
" " ,,,,OS' (<h'" " " . , tho to'" to 1l.' ." 10 ...
,.."or"'. .. "",n, 0'0"'"
",g'" m. ':0" '11"

,
•f
lb.
1" _ .,,,.,,,,,;.IC ,,,,,,,,, oor'" -- four .""n bUll'"'''' ,-
~st:-OYB~.

1~4 _ flt.SubUhl Ale .,or'a .- 10 percent ne'lf dam&gfl.

19'1 _ A,uuta !'actor1 of Nagoya Arsenal.· minor damage.
,.
". _ ",bI;.IC ,.,"'. ·,,,.ho ..."h .- ,,.,,,,,ny ,.",. ...
lIiPpon ",llicle ';anuracturl l1 !i COl:lpany .- severe daca&e.
• ••
e41 _
d8I:l$ie.
24'lC
24~D
_
_
De.1do Slaeule Steel, Tsulllje Branch
OaUlo Electric steel, "1n8:T\1 Plant .- severe de.mage.
•
lU
eMB _ MallOY' ilepair ShOPS -- several small bul1 ngs destroyed.

251 _
e
1:,,010. HerOOr •• dalll4g •
••
~ltsUbllhl Electric ~r& COl'lpany .- Carnage.
,~
-- Toyeda },!aehlnery "rg company .- d8Jll8g
fl .i\ Cl
•
0,. •
.>0

'" - O\cUlllA Iron ~or\o;l, Otan1 Plant -- c)aoage.

Okul!l& lroo. ':'1or'KS. Hag1M i'lant -- severa da!:klloga.
.0

• " '"
s
114& - A1ch1 Alc "/ork5, E1to}oJ. Plant _. several bullc)lr.g c)esU'07ea.
:7E9 -
onlla ".ch1nery "orka -- dutrOyed.
r-
severe 4al1&&l.
n98
RokolN v.ach1nery plant, r.,sadera Plant

""
1000
t1e1c)0 l'.ch1ntry c~pany
. ' severe c)aJ!I&&a. severe 4.,.a&1.
toloahu L1ght 1.:etalS Co, Otsuta Plant,
1818 a
~1ken Alun1te Plant __ savere c)aa8g •
'''' Tolta1 Electroda Co, J'''Coya Plant No.2 -- severe~'
1cany 41,tr"...
1'" to\al.1 nlctrocll Co, tl:l.gOyll plant 110. ~
.- practt "lstr 07 ec!·
1'" cen
~O destreJr""

'~
0.1 111ppon cellophanl Plant __ about per d1n6S --001.
1"7 l
A1ch1 Alc ':'Icrka, Tluk1j1 Plant __ severe bull
C/)
''''
:::.~).1
Yahe.g1 Steal plant __ about 25 percent destrOyed. str
d1ngs
''''
2040 _ SUI:I1tOCllo Light !'etall Co __ H l;ull dl 0z-6'
d~gl. ~.
~~&g:~ §i dama&~o
Target nl B.C. 4058 Un1dent1fied Sh1pYard _. sUght
B,'C, 4059 Un1dentH1ed __ sl1ght perc80t 4es
't.ttor1 cott~' .."067 SUldtOlllO L1ghte tlete.ls Co ••
I .•
nan Silk r1ll 111 -- severe 4a:nag •
O~.a:a .- :::e.,en dlW4ge.
cnoclow Ale "lorks -- levere da::l!.6e
• ~!~ort ~lsnt __ ~·ver~ 4~~r~. '6--!!!IiiI!!!ii°iiii-b
... :;II ......
?
I KAWANISHI PLANT
rarg et 1702, the }(awanlshl Alr-
crBft Company plant In Kob~,escaped
almost unscathed on 11 Val' I'fhen at_
tacked by a small force frO'll three
wings under very poor bombing condi-
tions.
11[Uting7I(isst
Three times durl
aircraft of the ~~!\.
!'he target, though not a major v is i ted the h0!!l8 lIa~ }I~
plent. Is important In the large Japan on mining UltsS1Q!IS~ •
Kawanlshl system. It offered pos-
sibilities as a good visual target. bn the night of 13.1C It.
Ho-;vever, the B_295 found it largely 12 B-29s mined Sht:~1
cloud-covered and achieved poor re- Straits. Twenty ettlt
sults frO!!! 17,500 feet, bO'llblng by 171 nines in the Jap hlXlt:
radar end ,In e few cases I visually. ers on the night of 16.11

The 58th ",ling had 38 aircraft There were no lCIs!llI.

airborne, 35 of which dropped 167
tons. The 73rd mounted 22, 17 of
which dro?ped 169 tons. Forty of
42 from tile 314th dropped 204 tons.
One 58th "ling plane bombed a target
of 0lJPortunl ty. Bombs were 500-
pocnd GFs. fused to burst elBht to
10 feet below the roof and cause
internal da!!lage to the plant t which
is unusually \"1ell constructeeJ.
OPPOSITI OIl
-All winp:s !!let with 1:35 to 150. at-
tacks from enemy aircraft betvreen
the IP and land's end, mostly just
after the bomb run. Two ineffec_
tive attenpts ''lere made to drop
phcsphorus bonbs on the B-29 forma-
tims. One Single engine aircraft
vra.~ observed firing from a flexible
~un mounted on top the fuselage.
Claims against the enemy were 11
destroyed, 25 probably destroyed
and two dal:l8ged. Flak was h'"'avy ,
!:laager to intense and accurate t~
inaccurate over the target.
One 3l4th Wing alrcraft crashed
into the water shortly art"r tar:e-
off, 11 crel1l:len being killed Thi
7~e~;~i~art received battle damag~:
18-19 34 aircraft 'ere bi..et
a !Dining miSSion. FOIlr
ed early. (Secret)
141
AIRFIE It.~ Snl~1
h"tut
Five missions on Uk!_
313th ',7ing brought to an d
series of strikes aga1!l9t it.'
airfields on Y.yushU.
On "~lssions 167 and lS!,
'l/as hit by 17 aircraft, e
100 tons and Saek1 by sin'
craf't dropping 45 tons. flO
bombed targets of oppcrtuDltr.
Five enemy aircraft-
one of \vhich dropped a llfoJ
phosphorus bombs,eau.silll
Three bursts of flak'"
tered over Saeki ao1 1& ".
There were no casualties,
1I.issions 169, 170 and illri
by the 313th ',11ng, ~~

>< -. '"""~'
........:~
cloud and bombed as ~It... •
of ~iyaz8ki, 16 '11t cr-o"!-
'!lya z akl Airfield, cal
tons; town of "1:
craft, 46 tons; one
ho:nl'ed y'ochi A/F. ~

~ Jlaval Air BSSe,

Shl'\8 and KubO kad •
opposition and nO
•... - - -
 . , 4,'
~' ~ .",~'t't'
~""CV'.
'J ., -----------,...---
J::
I'T1
>1.
,,~

-C::"

~'
>t
>0
I; ~ 1
0- ~ 'ft)e folloWing article ha5 been prepared by a Starr QUlcer ot
1'T1) the R.A.A.F. COIIllD6ncS 1'Iho has l1ve(l soot years 1n Japan.
subject 1s a semlMpolltlcal one, it should be clearly understood
AS its
"TI Z that the vUI7S expressed are 1n no sense official. The article
mO
• • •
,,, ,c• !o 0~ ,. Z
Z
1s publ1shed as presenting new angles on a subject which 1s ezer·
cUing !:lOst minds at present.

, .,
0
rn
VI
m
!
,~
.":' "o ,..!
"
", , .'
"

'" .: "'"
".cl:
.. .( -I ..

~,
VI
11th the Japanese i:sv,y committed
~ luicide tactics on a
uil the homeland
large scale
threatene(l by
hold out the nope of tuture dis-
unity among the Allies. 1M Japan-
ese may consider that the share of
framing the peace settle-:ent clai::l-
( ' , illltd luoe,!,.' 1n the 1yukyu. and
Ibnbere. the question ot a gen-
ed by each l:Iember of the .HUed
o. ,~ Nations may arouse mutual resent-
" ' "-
.
tl'l1 Japallllse capitulation hns nat. ments. It is certain that they
!
.' "0- ~i
, "" : 11."111)' arisen, but it 15 considered
"

t, ~~c ,
0 ., tblt surrender at this stege is un-
'11'111 depend on disunity, obtuseness
and war_weariness amotll their con-

• . ..
Uktl1. Rowever, such a course querors to soften, to so::e extent
.C
0 .'"" , r.al4, to the realist, heve much to the peace ter~ and to blind th';
I' '. e. .~ it. 'n'Ie main islands "ith

$I;
" ,"
0'
...'
'" "'
.~
,
,-
,~
.,
Ul1r beavy industries, communica-
tl~, and their scanty natural re-
;:eel would be preserved trClll
ther devutation. 'nl,e sacred
to the war that will be prepared
over the next few decades.
Time not a,.,.i"ed
HOw8VtJ', it is un.Uke~ that thet
• • o.
..'.'.
0'
0' • uti or Japan with all that 'it means Japanese believe that the oO:\lIIO

'.
Z<
~~.pUbUe _orale and national pres-
f.
00 has yet arrived when diSun1ty can
" •o. • .., Would not be invaded •
",t
,c
0,
be expected or when nr_weariDISS

:J
ha' reached 1t!I l:l&XillUll, and there
:' ~.~ lIilht .ell be thought that,

,.,- -, r are other considerations 1lbie'le _ka

'0
\, ,- "Ct ~
Itrle~ eace conditions misht re-
,,.1 a genaral surrender 1Clprobabl , be-
'~ "', nttustry, they could not fore the oa1n1and its,lf bas been
o' ,0 , • bGlbi the errect 0(' continuous heavy
Cl:IPlt~8, while the presence ot 00-
invaded. In ,pite ot naval dUas-

"" 0 •
.~ "o~ 'oitl on forces in Japan, atter
Plt1n~t1u had ended, could be ex_
ttJ" and the predominance of the
navy in the new cabinet, arflJ1 in-
• '.
~, ~~ • 'lid With less da'llage to I:'IUita1'7
flu,nc' 11 !Itill strong and tha
arlllY bU alway' been on the sHle or
•• •• Oll&b ~tional prestige than a thor- be.d'tl"OClI a4nntur- and of f18tltl,
• "o' 0: el:qnt::re,at Witnessed by all in the to the tinl,b. t"W'tber. the tu
-
,•• "" :"
o tseu. .tr'eftl or thl erC1 cannot yet btt
. .td tothba" MeD ...lo,-d 1I*1..

! !
"••
tlet;rh nder now would permit
•
j
C ,,•
o·"o' to illJ btory in a ve.ry short
....teo. ent a -stab in the back- b1
or.
t l. . tbe AlU-.
IQp~t
I;
i, ~, ." ',
0/
~d e~ native or fozoelgn grOllp
~Ibazl's mat!le the 'cap.,oat for
.'UI _''1,>10 ....-J.ibelU"l"lf
Inll wlthoat
.or' tbU 1..17 _ ,
_. '1-1:
-

ranure. It IIUht Illao

l
....'KbM _ _
- *-, .. "
that it could r:al'e lendings on the
mainland at le:lst as costly, in n
relative sense, as the Iwo JiDO
operations, and thus bring about a
major contribution to the "1aI'-wear-
iness hoped for in AlUed nntions.
Japanese indifference to heavy
loss of life, coupled with their
kr.O'11ledge of Allied caution on this
score, must here be considered. The
ctvil population can be expected to
play its part by providing passive
resistance and any obstruction pos-
stble to Allied moves ,and an Allied
i~V8sion and occupation \'1111 De
counted on to plant the seeds of
hEtred among the Japanese people as
nothing el~e ~lould. True, the nl)-
t:'on's heavy inoustries would be
hst, but this o1ght be expected i f
surrender tooK nlace now. Further
th.e main islar.jS, \vith their rugge~
m)untain ranges across which com-
lliunications are scanty, and their
isolated centres of population
offer good ground for long ter~
hostilities against superior forces.
The loss of face by any govern-
l:I~nt which even discussed terms of
slrrender now would be so enormous
tJ.!!.t all credit would be lost, not
only by the governwent itself, but
by the class from which it was re-
cruited. It must also be borne in
nind that Japan, unlike most ~uro_
~an and Asiatic countries, has
never experienced foreign occupa-
tion. ~'hatever their feeling as to
overseas adventures, the population
as a whole would have!.. only one idea
as to the course o~ action to be
taken rlhen .Japan itself is attack_
Ed, and that would certainly be to
resist.
Nllt Disillusioned
It is tru~ that in the l~ng ser-
tes of acts of bad faith and aggres-
Sion, co~~encing With the Manchur_
tan inCident and ending With the
present war. Japan has been led
along the road to disaster by a
ninority who were very powerful,but
that minority,none the less.thought
~t ~orth while to pander to public
opinion by fitting high-sounding
principles to their unscrupulous
~olicies. It is necessary to under_
stand that very great nU~bers or
~he Japanese completely believed in
the applic3tiin of those principles
to recent event
fora SUdden d1$11i' ~!t.
be expected. llSl~l~,
They believed th
ga1nst China was !It ~ ..
and that it a .rltlA.... .
liberation or ~e III ~1
from the dominatioll Oll~~
and foreign BOVerlt! Of' __
protection of Japaflei'ts ~ ~
They believed that ~ ~
dent could not be set~14Q1br.'
of the aS S1stance Btf ~
Kai Shek by Britalll ~ll ...
and that war against the 111!,
the only \7ay to end that ~
They believed that theA.l~if
tries hed been tor Year, ~
by European PO;rers ll'll
~
Japanese in ItalaYa , _
the Philippines "ere nlt-'- repl
\'lhere as liberators. llItJ
ated the great "~ter1al' IItI
the Allies t dispOSal ~ ~
that it could be OYereO"..I "
they termed the greater 'I~
pOI'fer of Japen al'lll ot!lIr
nations. 'lery l1ttlt bI ~
curred in the experience of I
in the Japanese hblaafll
these beliets.
It is true that., ..
ceived 1ncreas~ prIG.
success of "material" ....
the approach ot iDnI_·
bombing raids on tile IlIfU'
main islandsi but IIpV1t11'
in any way that.oald
Japanese tend.ocr to ......
"·1
hardly yet been in ",I"
fiPERS
"Cj{lOW war lost
lessit is more than
IOnt the the high command fully
1k*l1 tbS t that in the present
~rltancl~! dere~t is now certain.
_, J.p6nth n$Xt trial ot strength
pUBS tor dye have been laid and,
flU .lr&a planl!l the building up
~ th~: war p~tential will have
of J'panrOlDinant place. To this
UUI\' P..ould obviou~l1y be desir-
eod, t avoid rurther ~amage at
.bll t~ to industry, communications
prt'ln -r• Howsver, surrender
~..A ..np,,~~
- ill order to preserve these as-
~u 15 tOO palpable a ~evlce to
:,. Sleh appeal rar the Japanese
alr.l ,tarfs: They would no doubt
th.t control and restriction
of iMll5try by the victors "ould be
strieter and more thorough if it
lIS eO::lp8rstively undalll8ged when
tbt nr ended, than i f it had sur-
rued '0 mucb 6evastation as to ap-
p-.r .lready impotent.
~ee the initie.l "har~" perio("
or PM-el was over, it would be hop-
K that A1l1ed corumissions could be
bOQd...inked and toreign governments
bW'tld by the usual alternation of
threet, and blandishments in whieh
.~pee.15 to humani tarian and paci-
tut unttment would rigure. F'ur-
tbIr, tor rea,ons discusse~ above,
ID;J talk or surrender at present
IOIllcl not 01\17 discredit the goV-
en.nt and lose it its army sup-
~, but would mean that its poll-
tr~e:OUhld always be suspect by pa-
_1 erearter. But when the
~ ~lands have been invaded,
IDd hi re has been heavy action
'IbII1 avy lossel!l on both sIdes. and
jOift ClX:ll:lUnlcatlons are breaking
tloU an orter tor peace negotia-
j1\10l\l1ll81 be expected. These eon_
-1441 "1 not be rult'illed tor e
... crable time at't8r iavaslon
-.nced.
'_ill!bat th IS rulers ot Ja~ he....
.\lOtl..rid th,e probab1l1 t7 or OCICU-
_. d s eertain. aDd that thu
h Il'Illlraed measures to aueneW
lItI.lcb i 0 shorten the period dUl'lq
~l t WIll be canled ClQt. 11
'_I'.~t~:'Obable.
Ol'SGnlsed l bUt
-.; ",4J spontaneous aoU or 10-
1 be eouated 011 to .....
.
enough 8I:!l ona ~~atlon
l,:ontinued oc
unpo~~
-.-.-..
their falll1l1es at lied troops and
public opinion ~ol:le to intluenca
nuence increas; s pacitist in-
~an easily be re~~el!l;~~:~ ebruPtiom
ese diplomacy 'I Japan_
but natural re:~ the regrettable
people to foreign ~~~~na~,ron.a proud
To produce the d1sord 1
tions most suitable t er y eondi_
Allied invasion r or this, an
tages than peace~ients core advan.
surrender would ot occupation, but
strable before' d cour,e, be de_
country and lOS5e:v~~tation ot the
coune a l!Ierioul!I tlroblel:' llI~npO!rer be_
• KONOYB
l!.0s."bte peatemoller
:~i~ p~obable that the chief' ~eD~;
'/het. surrender does COl:li:t t
e a governcent healled b
civllian--pret'erably. l1ke "on/ a
ot the nobili tJ. Al though te~mS
will be asked tor, it is probab18
that a f1rlll delll8nd tor uncornUtion.
al surrender will eventually lI"t
with acceptance by any &overment
so anxious tor peace as to ope.a ~­
gotlatio ns •
Rere it may be recalled that
the Japanese are adept at 8ftl'1
form or large and smell scala sub-
terfuge in turning negotiatIons to
their own advantage; subSequtet dl-
nial ot a represenuti,..'S author-
ity il!l perhaps the COOlllOnest trick,
but on such 1& gran 15,UI a; the
surre~er ot' the natioD, it ..ould
accord with traditlO1l. aDl! popular
beliet's tor the ehiat' negotiator to
canit suicide as a sigD that hit
action had bean talren under dureSS.
orders may be iSsued br sar"ici
ministerS to cease bost! Uies but
it 15 unlikelY that IIJ1 ar~ or
navy c(llllllnd8l" would obe7 tbla,
whU. there 15 alV' bope ot infliCt.
i08 ~.. OIl Allied troo~. l'bUS,
altboush first poUc, end than M-
cassit,. .., torce ~ap1tulatlO!l rroa
tile Ja~ GOf'8I"Qa8Dt IICtual IDd
cc*plaW ,\!HtI.laD nb ool1 be
..a. wb,n baa.,. dat'aats ba" bHD
slIIta1Dtd b7 tba toroeI 111 lapaD,
whU. toroel • tbI Atu\1e . . .
!aDd'" coat.... bal'Ullt1el •
1011I: .. ~.lb1al"'-': ~
are i.nee! tr_ toIlP!
C _ Illtol. _ , (c.or~
(1'&...','
 7
ItfDAE XX # Clln'''''/t
RESCUED
, The 11 Cl'etr..
l'Oen of the 1(Xtb,
I Bomber COllIaaIld
referred to 1tt
, the last Para.
,on graph on P~a
21 of A. 1. R.
No. 10 as beill8
in a Jap prison
in Rangoon have
Froo 8 1st Lt. PO"I taken on Okln_ been liberated.
: 8"8 additional information 1s ob- According to a
I talned on the state of morale of teleeon frotl
! the Japanese soldier., The follow_ the XXth, the,
ing Inforoatl?n Is taken from a G-2 are in good
I report or the 10th Army. bealth. (Secret)
Amons the Japanese troops I and
especielly those in the front lines,
: there Is an appreciable number who
would 11k8 to surrender to the Amer-
: toans. T~e pcrJ had heard soldiers
dlsCU3S1ng our surrender leaflets
I and there Is a growing belief among

them th3t the statements made in

the leaflets are true and that they
will be rrell taken care of it they
surrender. However, they are pre_
'vented from doing so by t~elr lead-
ers.
The morale 1s l~ among the Jap-
'anese front line troops and Is d Seasonal advice f'rCZl the lip'"
steadily deteriorating. The sol_ io on harvesting the 1lIlut 11'
diers continually complain of the gives this timely tip:
complete absence ot the Japanese "The l7heat harvesting St&SlCll
, air power or land reinforcements.
drawing near. 1'l'e mtUlt ~
The genera! teeling is that Okinawa
will be lost. As evidence that the wheat, which is a nour1Shl~ !~t
Japanese military authorities on fran being dall8ged by air raidS.
the isla~ beiieve that, the POW "If yOU are (J"{U "U1lJlll, ell
s8id,e1l troops are receiving large
rations or tood, equipment and cig- w111 hBlllper the productlOD or ~
arettes on the theory that all such Therefore. in order to sta1 It 11
as much as possible, it 11 1IUI ff
Select an Air nef.ns' x-:r~.
stores will eventually be lost end
that they mey 85 well enjoy them
the village to g1,e D!!.,

II
while they still have them.
At present the Japanese Army on
Okinawa has a six months supply ot
nent danp;er by proper sw-'
"Also as yOU art
the field, get t.nto
.
,=-,-'
'
'~I t
tood and sufrieient ammunition. wear1ng a str.- rd : ifill
However, sOlDe soldiers are begin_
ning to lluf"fer trorn lllI1lputrition be_ ease ot emergeDC7,1C ~~.
face down in the . - J
"J~P1D& \Res
cause they are unable to build fires
to cook their ro~ and their diet 1Il12 • d1tiIllJlll'
is pr1mE.rlly Japanese hard tack. triOiilJ
(Secret) !2! ,-set_" II I