07 Chapter 2

Chapter -1
The Sthitaprajna as the Base of the Nation:

Tilak’s Reading of the Gita.
Gita-Rahasya (The Esoteric Import of the Gita) or Karma-Yoga-Sastra 1 is one of
the most celebrated works of Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, It was written during his
long period of imprisonment at the Mandalay jail in Burma. It is said that he completed
the work in jail within five months, from 2nd November 1910 to 30th March 19111
2 This
work, in two thick volumes, runs into a thousand and three hundred pages. In this
massive work Tilak explores the recondite philosophy of Brahman, atman and cosmos,
the ethico-moral principles related to this worldly life, the significance of karma, jnana,
and bhakti and man’s attempt to find a way out from the snares of samsara (worldly
illusions), expressed in different scriptures of ancient times, both sacred and profane,
revelation and half-revelation, beginning from the Vedas down to the Buddhist
literatures in general and the ethics of the Gita in particular.
There was no unusual factor that led Tilak to write this immense work. He
approached the Gita, according to his own admission, with the intention of finding out
solutions for certain fundamental problems that human beings face. In his introduction
to Gita-Rahasya he states three factors that induced him to write this commentary on
the Gita.
First, the gulf between eternal knowledge and the worldly life upheld by the
Samkhya philosophy.3
1 Gita-Rahasya was originally written in Marati and it was published in 1915. In 1917, it was
published in Hindi and Gujarati. Its Telugu and Kannada editions were brought out in 1919. In
1924 it was translated into Bengali and Tamil. Thus in the beginning, it was published in various
vernacular languages. It was in 1935, Gita-Rahasya was translated into English by B.S
Sukthankar, the Solicitor of Bombay High Court, and published by Tilak Brothers at the Bombay
Vaibhav Press, Bombay, (India). The Esoteric Import of the Gita’ is the English version of Gita-
Rahasya found in the translation.
2
‘Translator’s Preface’, Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.xxxv, ‘Author’s Preface’, p.xlv.
3 The term Samkhya is used in two different meanings. The first meaning is the Samkhya
philosophy expounded by Kapilacarya. The word Samkhya is derived from the root sam-khya’
(calculation), which means 'one who counts’. Kapilacarya Samkhya is known by this name
because it counts twenty-five fundamental elements as responsible for the creation of the
Universe. It advances the theory of dualism of intrinsically independent prakrti and purusa, their
interaction causing the world process, the nature and function of the three gunas (constituent
qualities) of sattva, rajas and tamas the twenty-five principles-purusa (spirit), prakrti (matter),
mahan (reason), ahamkara (individuation), mind, Five tanmatras (subtle) or fine elements such as
11
Second, the impression that he obtained when he was a boy, that Bhagavadgita
was universally acknowledged to be a book containing all the principles and philosophy
of the Hindu Religion’.4
Third, the impression that he acquired that the interpretations of it by the acaryas
are doctrinal-oriented’ and not independently arrived at.5
sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, Five organs of perception such as nose, eyes, ears,
tongue, and skin, Five organs of action such as hands, feet, voice, anus, and generative organs
and Five primordial elements (visesas or gross) such as ether, air, fire, water and earth-and
discriminative knowledge of prakrti and purusa leading to emancipation. The Bhagavadgita shows
familiarity with these fundamental tenets of Kapilacarya’s Samkhya system, but it introduces a
few changes in the light of Vedanta, chief of which is the substitution for the basic atheism of
Samkhya the notion of Paramatman (twenty-six), of which purusa and prakrti are viewed as only
two forms, higher and lower respectively. The second meaning is not in this classical sense or
philosophy of the legendary sage Kapila but general philosophy denoting knowledge or
renunciation as the path of salvation.
For Tilak, although, the Gita fully conceded Kapilacarya’s Samkhya philosophy regarding
the construction of Universe and added to it a twenty-sixth element, the Paramatman, it mostly
used the term Samkhya in the second sense. (The same philosophy, which is advanced by
Kapilacarya, is also advanced by Vedanta and hence, the Gita must have borrowed it from the
Vedanta and not from Kapila. When the Gita used it, it used not in the system known by this
name but in the general sense of renunciation). Therefore, Tilak calls Samkara’s interpretation of
the Gita as ‘Samkhya interpretation’, as it argued for the renunciation of the world. Gita-Rahasya,
vol. I, op.cit., pp.167-267. See also P.N Bazaz, The Role of BhagavadGita in Indian History, New
Delhi: Sterling, 1975, p.181, W. Douglas P. Hill, The BhagavadGita, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1953, (2nd edition), p.38, M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian philosophy, London: George
Allen and Unwin 1968 (First Published in 1932), p.128. James Hastings, ed., Encyclopaedia of
Religion and Ethics, vol. II, New York: Edinburg, 1971, p.537, S.N Dasgupta, A History of Indian
philosophy, vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p.455, Swami Sivananda, The
BhagavadGita: Text, Word to Word Meaning Translation and Commentary, Sivanandanagar,
Tehri Garhwal, 1969, pp 42, 66, 121-22, 387-89.
4 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.xxiv. Tilak first came to acquaintance with the BhagavadGita at the
age of 16 years i.e. in 1872. See ‘Author’s preface’, op.cit., p.xliii.

5 Tilak admits that he approached the text with a mind prepossessed by no previous ideas about
any philosophy, and had no theory of his own for which he sought support in the Gita. Gita-
Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p. xxiv.
12
Background and perspective:
Tilak’s reading of the Gita was based on a firm conviction that a nation requires a
moral foundation. A social and politico-legal order in such a nation can last for long only
when they are based on such a foundation. Tilak found that the principles of morality
necessary for the nationalist construct were not adequately expressed in the discourses
prior to the Gita and post Gita literatures. The ethical principles of the later texts were
vague, inconsistent, and bristle with the most obvious internal contradictions.6 The
ethics of the Vedic karma kanda consisted, for instance, in ‘ritualistic performance of
karma’ but this karma was considered as a lower kind of ‘desire-prompted action’ for the
achievement of ‘heaven’7 and ‘purusartha’8 by the later scriptures. The highest morality
of the Vedic jnana kanda, for instance, contained in the acquisition and realization of the
eternal principle, but it conceded an innate antagonism between such an objective and
the material world. The writings of the Upanisads believed in the eternity of atman,
absoluteness of Brahman as the ultimate unity behind the multiplicity of the world, and
the theory of moksa or salvation through jnana or knowledge, but they too, like the
Vedic Jnana kanda, laid an overwhelming emphasis on the physical renunciation of

worldly life. The philosophy of Samkhya believed in the non-perishable and perishable
elements, purusa and prakrti respectively, but it did not acknowledge the Vedic jnana
kanda or Upanisadic conception of a of unifying principle behind the prakrti and purusa
Although, Tilak does not use these words, in many pages of Gita-Rahasya, he attempted to show
how and why he considers the Gita a superior text of all other ancient scriptures and how the Gita
expounded its ethical principles free of any contradiction. Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.27, 70-
101, 167-358, vol. II, op.cit., pp.664-714, and appendix, pp.717-784,800-831, etc. Further, in one
of the chapters of the Gita-Rahasya, Tilak demonstrated that while he was little concerned to
dwell on the inconsistencies and contradictions of the ancient scriptures they were truly full of
them. Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, pp.40-69. In the Introduction to Gita-Rahasya he explicitly stated “But
as these Upanisads have been written by different rsis at different times, they contain various
kinds of thought and some of them are apparently mutually contradictory”. Gita-Rahasya, op.cit.,
p.16. See also pp. 72,401 etc.
7 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p. 73.
8 Tilak defines purusartha as something, which a man desires’, i.e. dharma (morality), artha
(wealth), kama (desire), moksa (release), op.cit., p. 72.
13
in the form of the ultimate Brahman, though regarding the matter of worldly life,
it admitted the Upanisadic assertion. The Manusmriti’s ethic provided for the
arrangement of man’s life into various stages but in the final stage it followed the
Upanisadic path of samnyasa. Although, the Bhagavata expounded the Vedic bhakti in
a most systematic way in the form of the path of devotion, it rejected the worthiness of
Vedic karma kanda. The morality of Buddhism and Jainism consisted in the philosophy
of atheism, denouncing the ultimate authority of the Vedas, but they too like the earlier
scriptures propagated the physical renunciation of this-woridly life.

Tiiak’s central argument is that Indian nation cannot be constructed on the basis
of the old framework of the Vedico-Upanisadic or Smriti’s ethical principles because
they lack clarity and a singled out conclusion. What is necessary is to create a new
framework of institutions that could withstand all these limitations and shortcomings.
Tilak, however, did not think that these limitations could be overcome by taking recourse
to the European approaches on these issues. He took up a two-fold stand in this

context. First, for the purpose of nation-building India need not have to approach the
West in search of ethical elements. Second, no ancient ethical writing could be taken
overboard in its present form because each and every text, in one way or the other,
expounded contradictory elements on ethics. What India then needed was a discourse
on ethics that could negotiate across all the mutually contradictory elements and
rearticulate them into a harmonious whole. Tilak felt that the Gita is a text par-
excellence which not only attempted to synthetise the contradictory and discordant
ethical principles expressed in these writings but presented them in a most scientific
way making the text well suited for modern India.
Tilak put across the following line of reasoning to establish that this text is of
capital importance in the national reconstruction of modern India.
First, Tilak did not agree with the earlier interpretations of the Gita and the
conclusions arrived at by their commentaries. He argued that these interpretations were
limited by ‘expressions of intellectual egoism’ as they had ‘extracted’ only local and
temporal systems of metaphysics from the text in its literal sense, as its core message
to suit their prepossessed ‘ideological cult’.9 As a result they had intentionally
According to Tilak, the acaryas have not approached the text independently. They had their own
'ideologies’ in mind, for which they tried to see justifications in the text. Therefore, even if the text
14
fabricated wrongly constructed new interpretations to words and sentences of the text,
only with the object of showing that the text supports their sectarian beliefs. Hence,
Tilak rejected, calling them as non-authentic interpretations. ‘Pre-conceived’,

prejudiced’, ‘prepossessed’, ‘doctrinal-supporting’, ’wrong’, ‘incorrect’10 etc., were some
of the terms which run all the way through the Gita-Rahasya whenever he was
encountered with the arguments of the earlier commentaries. Among the various
interpretations of the text, Tilak concentrated his attention more on the Samkhya’
interpretation of Samkara because even Tilak had accepted that it was one of the most
possible ways of reading the text. However, while rejecting all the interpretations, Tilak
would admit that his reading could be an alternative for all the earlier readings.
Second, Tilak conceived the Gita as a ‘unique’ text among the scriptures of
ancient times as it expounded the abstruse and deep philosophy of 'adhyatma,-

absolute Brahman, self and cosmos in a simple and succinct manner.*11 Although, the
Gita was not the part of the canon earlier, Tilak admits that its core principles are taken
from earlier scriptures- absolute Brahman, self and cosmos and theory of karma from
the Vedas, the notion of Jnana from the Vedanta, philosophy of ‘construction and
destruction of the cosmos’ from the Samkhya, the concept of bhakti from the Bhagavata
and other principles from the Smritis, Brahma Sutras, Sastras, Mahabharata and
Puranas,12 Thus, the traditional criteria of Srutis, Smritis, sadacaras, sadvipra etc., were
rejuvenated within the central philosophy of the text. As Tilak attempted to establish the
ethical base of Indian nationalism on the principles of the Gita, this attempt took on
board the tradition criteria and the so called ‘Great Traditions’ came to be an integral
dimension of such an endeavour.
contained no slokas, which are suitable to, their ‘prepossessed ideas’, they forcefully twisted it's
meaning and came out with a conclusion that the text suits their beliefs. Mr. Tilak on the Gita-
Rahasya’, Gita-Rahasya, op.cit., pp.xxiv-v.
10 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.xxiv-v, 18-30, 133, 305,345,416-509,etc., Gita-Rahasya, vol. II,
op.cit., pp.662,666,703,705-706, 750,752,758,766 etc.,

11 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.1.
12 At the end of the vol. II, Tilak gives a list of ancient scriptures whose arguments corroborate the
arguments of Gifa. Vol. II, op.cit., pp.112-115.
15
Third, Tilak disavowed the claim on the part of the West that their model of ethics ^
was superior. He insisted that the Christian Bible, from which the ethics of the West
mainly sprang up, owes its central precepts to the Buddhist literature and through
Buddhism to the Gita and other Vedic writings.13 Hence, the foundation of the most
universal and scientific basis of ethics was laid down neither in ancient Greece, where
the Western concern for ethical principles first originated, nor in the Bible, but long
before them in India.14 He felt that, in this regard, the world has not experienced
anything more or new than what India had to convey to the World. For Tilak, therefore,
with the advancement of science and Western materialism, the value of ancient Indian
traditions and ethical principles had not declined; just the contrary these developments
intensified, sharpened and increased their relevance.
Fourth, Tilak rejected out rightly the philosophy of Samkhya (renunciation) as the
central message of the Gita. In fact, his critique of Samkhya appears all through the
pages in Gita-Rahasya. His rejection of Samkhya was, among other things, based on
two major concerns. At the philosophical level, he would reject the Samkhya rejection of
absolute Spirit (God) and second, perhaps the most important one, at the practical level,
he would not admit the antagonistic nature between this-worldly life and spiritual
realization. He insisted that the Samkhya philosophy consistently acted as a chief
impediment to all the attempts by karma yoga to establish a continual relationship
between knowledge and worldly activity or Jnana and karma. By implication, this meant
two things. First, accepting renunciation and cherishing contemplation in deep forests
for emancipation as expounded by the Vedanta and Samkhya is not an apt course for
modern India. Second, he insists through his reading of the Gita that the Indian nation
13
To quote Tilak, “When once the matter has been considered from all points of view, it is not only
impossible that anything should have been taken into the Gifa from the Bible, but on the other
hand, it will be seen to be perfectly possible that such of the doctrines enunciated in the Christian
Bible as are similar to those in the Gifa, must have been taken into the Bible from Buddhism-that
is, ultimately from the Gifa, or from the Vedic religion-by Christ or by His disciples; and some
Western scholars have now begun even to openly say so". Gita-Rahasya, vol. II., op.cit., p.822.
Tilak presumes the existence of the Gita in its present form at least 500 years before the Saka
era and Buddhism arose a few centuries before Christ and one or two centuries after the Gita.
Gita-Rahasya, vol. II, op.cit.,pp.796,799-800,801-831
‘Author’s Preface’, Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op. cit., p.L.
16
must engage with the world without renouncing the spiritual quest. The emphasis on
karma yoga vouchsafes for the same.

Last, for Tilak, karma yoga15 is the central theme of the Bhagavadgita. The
Sthitaprajna16- a completely integrated person whose reason is steadied by the practice
of karma yoga combined with Jnana and bhakti, whose heart is throbbing with the heart
of all humanity- is a central figure, who is to set himself an ideal for the people
regarding the ethical ‘doability’ and ‘non-doability’. He is to show the people the
essentiality of the desireless performance of one’s duty in his life’s station i.e. the karma
of the category to which he belongs. Further, the ethicality of all actions including the
‘unethical like himsa, warlikeness, stealing, untruth’ etc., is to be determined by the
Sthitaprajna. In short, 'karma yoga’ is the way and the karma yogi Sthitaprajna’ is the
goal of the Bhagavadgita. This reading of the text by Tilak in the midst of the articulation
of his meaning of Indian nationalism indicates that he considered the karma yoga of the
Gita to become the core of modern India. It is going to be guided by the Sthitaprajna’
sort of ‘new-brahminism’ as the basis of its ethical norms and rule of law. It is not
expressed in constitutional democracy or any other form of government but on the

‘heroic personality -karma yogi Sthitaprajna. Further, although Tilak emphasizes karma
yogi Sthitaprajna as the central figure in modern India, he is conscious of the mass base
of Indian nationalism and attempts to reconcile between Sthitaprajna (elite) and the
masses through bhakti. While karma and knowledge is the quest of the former, it is
karma and devotion for the ‘low-reasoned’ masses. Thus a kind of unity is established
between the elite and the large masses.
15 Tilak also entitled his monumental G\ta-Rahasya as Karma-Yoga-Sastra- the Hindu Philosophy
of Life, Ethics and Religion- which also implies the central teaching of the text according to him.
16
Sthitaprajna is a person whose mind is steadied in Brahman and who performs all karmas
saturated with jnana and bhakti. Tilak regarded karma yogi Sthitaprajna as the central teaching of
the Gifa. References to atmanista, Jna, brahmanista, ananda, brahmatmaikya-stiti, jnanin, jivan-
mukta, arhat, antasukha, antararama, antarjyoti, chinnadvaidha, yatatma, yati, yatacetas,
sarvabhutahite ratah, caratinihsprhah etc. corroborate this. G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op. cit., pp.
191,219, 315,317, 320, 408, 414, 415, 417, 519 etc., vol, II, op. cit., pp. 640,652,675,etc.,
17
Orientalist construction of the Gita:
Tilak mostly counterposes Gita-Rahasya to its orientalist understanding.17 As the
nationalist writers differ so the orientalist writings too diverge in understanding the
nature and the central theme of the Gita. For orientalist scholars such as Bohtlingk,
Garbe, Hopkins, Holtzman etc., the text contains contradictory and irreconcilable ethical
arguments and contradictory statements regarding its central theme.18 For many such
as Hill, Arnold, Franklin Edgerton, Wintemitz, Max Muller etc., the Gita has a definite
message to offer and it is a Vedico-Upanisadic synthetic text. It attempted to

reformulate certain brahminical ideas within the framework of orthodox traditions, so as
to consolidate those traditions at a time of major social, philosophical and spiritual

change.19
For Tilak, the Bhagavadgita draws significant materials from earlier scriptures and in many
pages of Gita-Rahasya he gives the names of the Gifa’s ancestry. It includes- Vedas, Upanisads,
Samkhya, Mimamsa, Bhagavata, Manusmriti, Sastras, Mahabharata, and a few other texts.
Samkhya is not confined to Kapila Samkhya and Yoga to Patanjali. He felt that these were the
generic names used in the text. Similarly the names of the Vedic ritualism, Vedanta, Samkhya,
Yoga, Bhakti, Dharmasastra, etc., are used in the light of its larger karma yogic philosophy. Gifa-
Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., vol. II, op.cit.
18
Bohtlingk, quoted in Dr. Ambedkar, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Wntings and Speeches, vol. 3,
Bombay: Government of Maharastra, 1987, p.357; Holtzman, Dr. Ambedkar, Ibid., p.358; Garbe,
‘The Bhagavadgita‘ in James Hastings, ed. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. II, New
York: Edinburg, 1971, p.538; E. Hopkins, The Religions of India, New Delhi: Munshiram
Manoharlal, 1977, pp. 390-400. He argues that the present version of the text contains alterations
or interpolations in the original, op.cit., p.389. Garbe favours its composition after Christ i.e., in the
second century A.D, op.cit., p.538.
19 W. Douglas P. Hill, The Bhagavadgita, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953. He asserted that
the message of the Gifa is a message to the ordinary man. p.44. Karma yoga in the
Bhagavadgita is a corrective to the prevailing philosophy of Renunciation, p.59; Edwin Arnold,
The Song Celestial, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970; Franklin Edgerton, The
Bhagavadgita or Song of the Blessed one, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1925. To quote
him, “None has had a larger influence on the development of Hindu religious thought as Gita
had", op.cit., p.ii; M. Wintemitz , History of Indian Literature, vol. I, New Delhi: Motilal Banrsidas,
1972. For him, Gifa was composed a few centuries before Christ, p.438; Max Muller, The Sacred
Books of the East, vol. Ill, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1970.
18
Although, Tilak referred to several orientalist writers and many modern
philosophers of the West such as August Compte, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer,
Hegel, Hobbes, Kant, Neitzsche, Morley, Green, Haeckel, Sidgwick, Weber etc. in many
places of the Gita-Rahasya, he explicitly stated that he compared the philosophy of the
Gita with that of these writers only with a view to show how the issues raised by the Gita
are still pertinent.
Some of our new scholars are of opinion that as a result of the present growth of the Material
Sciences in the West, the deductions laid down in ancient times with reference to the Karma
yoga, on the basis of the philosophy of the Absolute Self, cannot possibly be fully applicable to
modem conditions. In order to prove that this idea is wrong, I have briefly mentioned in various
places in my exposition of the Gita-Rahasya (Esoteric Import of the Gita) the doctrines of Western
philosophers, which are similar to those in the Gita. Really speaking, the exposition of Ethics in
the Gita is in no way fortified by such a comparison. Yet, those people whose eyes are dazzled
by the present unheard of growth of the Material sciences or who have learnt to consider the
Science of Ethics, only externally, that is to say, only in its Material aspect, as a result of the
present one- sided methods of education, will be made to see clearly by means of this
comparison that, not only has human knowledge not yet gone beyond the doctrines laid down on
this subject by our philosophers, for the simple reason that Ethics and the science of Release are
both beyond Material Knowledge, but, deliberations are still going on, on these questions in the
West, from the Metaphysical point of view, and the opinions of these Metaphysicians are not
materially different from the doctrines laid down in the Gita. This fact will be clearly borne out by
20
the comparative exposition appearing in the different chapters of the Gita-Rahasya.
His opposition to certain orientalist interpretations was quite explicit. Referring to

Garbe he says,
These theories, in my opinion, are entirely wrong. These people have conceived these wrong
ideas as a result of their having failed to understand the historical tradition of the various aspects
of the Vedic religion, and the real meanings of the words 'Samkhya' and ' Yoga’ used in the Gita,
and especially because these people had before their eyes the history of the unphilosophical, that
is, purely devotional Christian religion.21
20
‘Author’s Preface’, Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.xlix.
21 Gita-Rahasya, vol. II, op.cit., pp.760, 792, 799-800, 829. Tilak rejects the arguments of 'certain
Christian Missionary Treaties’ and Dr. Laurincer that the Gita must have borrowed its central
19
Critiques of the earlier Interpretations:
Tilak begins his Gita-Rahasya with a statement that the Vedas have advanced
two distinctive philosophies- philosophy of renunciation (jnana kanda) and philosophy of
energism (karma kanda). (Tilak himself in the Gita-Rahasya uses these terms) The
Upanisads were basically written with the objective of defending the Vedic jnana kanda.
As the Upanisads were produced by different rsis at different times, they contain
contradictory thoughts and Badarayanacarya in his Vedanta Sutras harmonized them.22
The Bhagavadgita was later on written with the purpose of harmonizing Vedic karma
kanda and Vedic jnana kanda (Upanisads). As these three were the lineal of Vedas,
they came to be regarded as 'prasthana-trayi,23 the authoritative texts on the Vedas,
and the value and acceptance of subsequent literature came to be determined with their
consistency of arguments with these ‘prasthana-trayi. This is what has happened in the
case of earlier interpretations.24
theme from the Christian religion, pp. 820-21. He criticizes Thompson for taking the yoga of the
Gita to mean Patanjala Yoga. “........ Mr. Thompson has said that the karma yoga in the Gita is a
form of the Patanjala Yoga: but such a thing is absolutely impossible; and I say that this confusion
has arisen in the mind of Mr. Thompson, because he has not understood the correct meaning of
the word ‘yoga’ in the Gifa. Gita-Rahasya, vol. II, op.cit., p.747. His other criticisms are Thibaut’s
understanding of the Gifa, p.758, Buhler’s understanding, pp.788, 773-774, Rhys-Davids, p.827
etc.
22
To quote him: “Badarayanacarya has reconciled these inconsistencies and he has in his Brahma
Sutras harmonized all the Upanisads, and on that account, the Vedanta Sutras are considered to
be as authoritative on this matter as the Upanisads themselves”. Vedanta Sutras are also known
as Brahma Sutras and Sariraka Sutras, Gita-Rahasya , vol. I, op.cit., p.16.
23 Upanisads, Vedanta Sutras and the Bhagavadgita. Prasthana’ means the authority, trayl
means three - three authoritative texts on Vedas. Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.17.
24 Tilak’s commentary on the earlier commentaries of the Gifa covers the writings of Samkaracarya,
Madhvacarya, Ramanujacarya, Vallabha, Nimbarka, Sridhara Swamy, Jnanesvari and few

Modem Marati saints. He draws a sharp line of demarcation between “criticism’ (tika) and
commentary (bhasya). Criticism means paraphrase the text or “explaining the plain meaning of
the original work and making the understanding of the words in it easy”. On the other hand,
bhasya includes critical and logical examination of the entire work and explaining “what its purport
is according to his opinion and how that work has to be interpreted consistently with that purport.”
Tilak calls all the earlier interpretations as bhasya and not tika. Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.16.
20
The acaryas had religious cults of their own and to invest these religious cults
with authority and make them acceptable to a section of the society, they wrote
commentaries on the Gita and attempted to find in it a justification for their ‘religious
cults’.
When once the Bhagavadg/fa came in this way to be included in the “prasthana-trayf and the
sovereignty of this “prasthana-trayP came to be firmly established, all religious opinions or cults
which were inconsistent with these three works or which could not find a place in them, came to
be considered as inferior and unacceptable by the followers of the Vedic religion. The net result of
this was that the protagonist acaryas of each of the various cults which came into existence in
India after the extinction of the Buddhistic religion, such as, the Monistic (advaita), the Qualified-
Monistic (visistadvaita), the Dualistic (dvaita) and the Purely Monistic (suddhadvaita) cults with
the superadded principles of Devotion (bhakti) or Renunciation (samnyasa) had to write
commentaries on all the three parts of the prasthana-trayi (and, necessarily on the Bhagavadgita
also), and had somehow or other to prove that according to these three works, which had
become authoritative and acceptable as scriptures long before those cults came into existence,
the particular cult promulgated by them was the correct cult, and that the other cults were
inconsistent with those scriptures. Because, if they had admitted that these authoritative religious
treatises would support other cults besides those propounded by themselves, the value of their
particular cult would to that extent suffer and that was not desirable for any of these protagonists.
When once this rule of writing sectarian (sampradayika) commentaries on the prasthana-trayi
supporting a particular doctrine came into vogue, different learned writers began to propound in
their criticisms their own interpretations of the moral of the Gita on the authority of the
commentaries pertaining to their particular doctrine and such criticisms began to gain authority in
those particular sects. The commentaries or criticisms which are now available on the Gita, are
more or less all of this kind, that is to say, they are written by acaryas pertaining to diverse sects;
and on that account, although the original Bhagavadgita propounds only one of them, yet it has
come to be believed that the same Gita supports all the various cults25
Tilak felt, although, the Gita was a text of quite a homogeneous composition on
the philosophy of karma yoga (energism) and the self, the acaryas had made it
heterogeneous by highlighting bhakti or Jnana besides karma, and used their favourite
interpretations to critically encounter, if not marginalise other interpretations or other

subaltern traditions, and to justify their philosophies. In short, what they had tried to find
in the text was whether the text contained any statement that could support their
25 Glta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp. 17-8.
21
doctrines and if it did not comprise any such statements they freely twisted the text in
tune with their doctrine. Hence, they kept their doctrinal philosophy in their mind as pre
eminent and with that pre-conceived mind of their religious cult they began to read the
text, and picked up those sentences in its literal sense by undermining the central
ethico-moral teaching. This is the major complaint that runs all the way through the Gita-
Rahasya against the earlier interpretations.26
Whatever religious cult may be taken, it is quite clear that ordinarily it must be based on some
authoritative religious text or other; otherwise that cult will be considered to be totally without
authority and will not be acceptable to people........ Therefore, different commentators, who have
propounded different doctrines, usually accept as important only such of these statements as are
consistent with their own particular cult, and either say that the others are unimportant, or skillfully
twist the meanings of such statements as might be totally inconsistent with their cults, or
wherever possible, they draw hidden meanings or inferences favourable to themselves from easy
and plain statements, and say that the particular work is an authority for their particular cult27
For Tilak, there is nothing in the text which is hard to understand or make sense
of it for the laymen, it has no paradoxical statements regarding its central philosophy
leaving the reader to choose this or that statement as its central teaching either. It
consisted no eulogistic hymns of higher and lower levels in its content to suit the
different categories of people and religious beliefs. Nor its verses, sentences and words
can be understood in several antagonistic meanings as the earlier interpreters did. It
advances one universal philosophy transcending all sorts of sectarianism, and to realize
it, it outlined jnana, bhakti and karma as three autonomous but interdependent courses.
How these three courses are autonomous and mutually interdependent can be
understood, according to Tilak, in the life-illustration of Sthitaprajna, whose mind is to be
For Tilak, Samkarabhasya considers the Gifa as a text on knowledge and renunciation and
highlights the antagonistic nature of jnana and karma. For Ramanujacarya the Gita teaches
bhakti and renunciation. Madhvacarya considered the Gifa as a text on bhakti, and karma as a
means to reach the bhakti state. Jnanesvara felt the Gita was a text on Patanjala Yoga. Tilak
argues that it is not possible to arrive at these variant conclusions unless one approached the text
with pre-possessed mind of their religious beliefs. Glta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp. 18-26.
Glta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.29.
22
filled with the knowledge of the absolute (jnana) who is to perform all duties that befall to
his lot (karma) and who is to dedicate all activities for the pleasure of the divine (bhakti).
The Sthitaprajna, a spiritual giant, in the text, is not merely to perform all activities, he is
to channelise that karma through jnana and bhakti. Tilak felt this attempt on the part of
the G/fa-blending karma, jnana and bhakti in the highest realisation-is crucial as no
other scriptures earlier or later has attempted to propose it, and this purport of the Gita
is not understood by the bhasyakaras. Thus, its message is single and sharply precise.
In answering question how and why a text on moral philosophy could manage to
receive so many variant interpretations, Tilak would argue that that was the fault of the
reader and the way in which he read the text, and not the text itself.
Suppose, looking at a sweet and nice food-preparation, one says that it is made of wheat, and
another one says it is made of ghee and a third one says, it is made of sugar, according to his
own taste; then, which one of them will you call wrong? Each one is correct in his own way and
ultimately the question what that food-preparation is, remains unsolved. Because, as it is possible
to mix wheat, clarified butter, and sugar and to prepare from them various kinds of eatables such
as ‘ladus’, jilebi’, ‘ghiwar etc., the particular eatable cannot be sufficiently defined by saying that
ghee or wheat or sugar is the principle element in it. Just as when the ocean was churned,
though one person got nectar, another one got poison, and others got Laksmi, Airavata,
Kaustubha, Parijata and other articles, yet the real nature of the ocean was not thereby fixed, so
also is the case of the commentators who have churned the ocean of the Gita on a doctrinal
basis, or one may even say that just as, the same Sri Krisna Bhagavana who had entered the
Durbar at the time of the assassination of Kamsa, appeared to various persons in different forms,
that is, he appeared to athletes like adamant and to women like the God of Beauty (Madana) and
to parents like their own son etc., (Bhag. 10.PU.43.17), so also although the Bhagavadgita is one
28
and the same, people following different cults see it in a different light.
To Tilak, then, the reason why the text being a single theme on ethics became a
subject of varied kinds of readings was not due to the intrinsic quality of the text but the
commentators and the perspectives with which they read the text. The Gita is not such
a pot of jugglery, that any one can extract any meaning he likes out of it’29
This argument of Tilak that the diverse kinds of interpretations were due to the
failure of the bhasyakaras to understand the text and not of the text itself, was later on
28
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit, pp.28-9.
29
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op cit., p.28.
23
combated by Vinoba, who saw reason to it in the nature of the text itself,30 and not in the
bhasyakaras, and partly by Radhkrishnan, who saw fault both in the text as well as in
the readers.31
To Tilak, then, the best way to determine the true meaning of a particular work or
chapter or a sentence, particularly of a book like the Gita, was not the one adopted by
the acaryas but as was suggested by the mimamsa writers,32 according to whom the
30 Vinoba sees an unusual innate quality of the text as the reason for the variety of interpretations.
Acarya Vinoba Bhave, Talks on the Gita, Kashi (U P ): Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh
Prakashan, 1959.
31 Unlike Vinoba, and like Tilak, Radhakrishnan sees reason for the variety of interpretations in the
bhasyakaras themselves- "The teachers of the Vedanta are obliged to justify their special
doctrines by an appeal to these three authorities (prasthana-trayi) and so wrote commentaries on
them expounding how the texts teach their special point of view............. After the decline of
Buddhism in India, different sects arose, the chief being advaita or Non-dualism, visistadvaita or
Qualified non-dualism, dvaita or Dualism and suddhadvaita or Pure non-dualism. The various
commentaries on the Gifa were written by the teachers in support of their own traditions
(sampradaya) and in refutation of those of others”. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, London:
George Allen of Unwin Ltd., 1967, p.16. And unlike Tilak and like Vinoba, Radhakrishnan finds
the share of mistake also in the text as it expounded its philosophy of ‘brahma-vidya’ in many
different ways- “These writers are able to find in the Gifa their own systems of religious thought
and metaphysics, since the author of the Gifa suggests that the one eternal truth which we are
seeking, from which all other truth derives, cannot be shut up in a single formula”. Ibid., p.16.
Thus, Radhakrishnan reconciles the different reasons given by Tilak and Vinoba.
32 When the Vedas propounded two paths of release-the path of jnana or renunciation and the
path of karma, the Upanisads were written with the sole object of justifying the path of jnana or
renunciation. As there are more than hundred Upanisads, they occasionally advance
contradictory positions, which were harmonized by Badarayanacarya in his Vedanta Sutras.
Vedanta Sutras is also known as Brahma Sutras, Sarira Sutras and Uttara Mimamsa. Hence the
text written by Badarayanacarya in justification of Vedico-Upanisadic jnana is known as Uttara
Mimamsa. Jaimini wrote the Purva Mimamsa in justification of Vedic karma kanda, and its sole
purpose was to harmonise contradictory philosophies, which were to be found in the Vedic
treatise regarding the performance of sacrificial rituals. The Purva Mimamsa had not given any
importance to the Upanisadic jnana or knowledge but had maintained that release was obtained
solely by performing sacrificial rituals. In short, the path advanced by Jaimini in his Mimamsa
based on Vedic karma kanda (sacrificial rituals) came to acquire the name of the “Mimamsaka
Marga”. And the rules laid down by Jaimini were known as “Mimamsa Sutras’’ or the Purva
Mimamsa. Thus, the Purva Mimamsa and Uttara Mimamsa written by Jaimini and
24
true purport of a scripture could be determined by chronologically following seven
things- the commencement of the work, the end of the work, repetitive words and
sentences, newness of the statement, effect, statement on subsidiary matters and value
of such statements.33 Now Tilak’s argument was that however one applies these
principles to the text of the Gita either singly or together, one would certainly come to
the conclusion that the true moral teaching of the text was never touched by these
acaryas.
Not that the acaryas did not know these principles and suggestions given by
Jaimini in his Pun/a Mimamsa for determining the purport of the text. They perfectly
knew it, but their intention of finding out support for their religious beliefs in the Gita
debarred them from following these principles, or they knew them, but they were least
or not at all bothered about these suggestions while reading the texts.
Here someone may ask: Did not the various acaryas, who founded the various cults, know these
rules of Mimamsa? And, if one finds these rules in their own works, then what reason is there for
saying that the purport of the Gita drawn by the Mimamsa school is one-sided? To that, the only
answer is, that once a man’s vision has become doctrinal, he naturally adopts that method by
which he can prove that the cult, which he follows, is the cult established by authoritative religious
treatises. Because, doctrinal commentators start with this fixed pre-conceived notion regarding
the purport of a book, that if it yields some purport, inconsistent with their own doctrines, that
purport is wrong, and that some other meaning is intended; and though some rule of the
Mimamsa logic is violated when they attempt to prove that the meaning, which in their opinion is
the proved correct meaning has been accepted everywhere, these commentators, as a result of
34
this fixed pre-conviction are not in the least perturbed thereby.
Badarayanacarya respectively were Vedic texts, one supporting Vedic sacrifice and other
knowledge and renunciation. G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I. op.cit., pp. 72, 401, 435, 613,voL II, op.cit., p.
761.
33
Upakramopasamharav abhyaso Purvata Phalam |
arthavadopapatti ca lingam tatparyanirnaye ||

Upakrama (commencement of the work), Upsamhara (end of the work), Abhyasa (repetition),
Apurvata (newness), Phala (effect), Arthavada (subsidiary matters) and Upapatti (value). By
arguing that a text should be read without pre-conception, Tilak subscribes to a positivistic
understanding of reading a text. Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., 30.
34
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.33.
25
It should be noted here that, although, Tilak rejects in this way ail the earlier
interpretations of the Gita as 'doctrinal’ and ‘prejudiced’35 and considers his
interpretation as superior,36 an alternative to the existing ones, yet Gita-Rahasya on the
whole is an attempt to co-opt earlier commentaries and through it to co-opt the major
traditions of India. And by underplaying the earlier interpretations of the Gita expressed
in different sects in India, he attempts to construct a homogeneous nationalism based
on the ethical principles of the Gita. Because he reads the Gita basically as an attempt
by Krsna to harmonize the contradictory traditions of ancient India.37 Further, although,
he rejects the earlier interpretations he attempts to incorporate the latter within his
energetic (karma yogic) reading of the Gita as he explicitly stated that except the
conclusions arrived at by these commentators, he has fully acknowledged their way of
interpretation, and admitted that he has come into contact with the major traditions of
India through bhasyakaras.38
Critique of European Ethical Visions: Superiority of the Gita:

One of the major contributions which Tilak made to the interpretation of the
Bhagavadgita which has not received the attention of scholars, as it really deserves, is
his scholarly exposition of the ethical doctrines of the Gita in relation to those of the
35
Tilak confesses that he approached the text independently, with a mina prepossessed by no
previous ideas. Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.xxiv, xxv, xliv, xlvii, liii etc.
36
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.lii.
37 The earlier attempts to harmonise contradictory traditions of India were Jaimini s Purva Mimamsa
and Badarayanacarya’s Uttara Mimamsa. Tilak sees the Gita basically as a work of the above
kind. Quite interestingly later on Ambedkar was to argue that the Gifa was ater to Jaimini’s Purva
Mimamsa and continues to support the traditions started by Jaimini counter-revolution, a
revolution against Buddhism in justification of Brahminical domination’).
38
Although, Tilak was in sharp disagreement with the bhasyakaras, and aavanced quite a sharp
criticism of them, yet he fully admitted their scholarship and philosophica. positions as it added
significantly to the general scheme of knowledge and the indepth understanding of the text. “ No
one can entertain any doubt that these various acaryas who wrote the commentaries were
learned, religious and extremely pure-minded. Nay, one may even say that the world has not to
this day produced a philosopher of the calibre of Sri Samkaracarya”. Gita-Rahasya. vol. I, op.cit.,
p.28. Also, pp.xliii, liii-iv etc.
26
European moralists. In fact, his knowledge of the European moralist writings seems to
be quite impressive,39 although their analysis was neither hi? object nor an essential
part of his undertaking. He explicitly stated this in the 'Author’s Preface’ that the
comparison was basically done with the object of showing the relevance of the Gita to
the present age.

Further, he cites a number of European moralists and their ethical writings in the
pages of the Gita-Rahasya with three other major objectives in view.

First, to defend the ethico-spiritual writings of India as offering a suitable moral
philosophy for the man living in a modern scientific age vis-a-vis the Western ethico-
philosophical writings, and to argue for the greater congruence of Indian ethics with the
scientific temper of the modern age.

Second, to establish that the Gita expounded superior ethical principles to those
of Europe.
In many pages of the Glta-Rahasya, Tilak compares and contrasts the ethical principles of the
Gifa with those expressed in European writings. The objective of this comparison was not merely
to argue that there is a similarity between the Gifa and European ethical writings, but to establish
that the Gifa expounded superior ethical principles, which are also anterior in time to that of
Europe. Tilak seems to be thoroughly conversant with the European traditions as he mentions
more than fifty European writings for such a comparison in his G\ta-Rahasya. The chief among
them are, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, Theory of Ethics, Leslie
Stephen's Science of Ethics, T.H. Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics, Hobbes’s Leviathan, Hume’s
Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
Haeckel’s The Riddle of the Universe, J.S Mill’s Utilitarianism, Sidgwick's Method of Ethics, Bain’s
Mental and Moral Science, Whewell’s Elements of Morality, Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Ethics,
and Politics, Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation, Macmillan’s Promotion of
Happiness, Spencer’s Date of Ethics, Martineau’s Types of Ethical Theory, Paul Carus’s The
Ethical Problems, Morley’s Diderot, Butler’s Sermon's on Human Nature, Nietzsche’s Anti-Christ,
Beyond Good and Evil, and Eternal Recurrence, Sully’s Pessimism, Paulsen’s System of Ethics,
Maudsley’s Body and Mind, Deussen’s Elements of Metaphysics, Comte’s A System of Positive
Polity, Plautarch’s Morals- Theosophical Essays etc.
27
Third, to justify, according to his own admission, the ethics of the Gita in a much
more forcible way than the earlier commentators and European understandings of
ethics. His arguments proceed as follows.

First, Tilak argues that the universally accepted ethico-moral principles were
cradled (originated) not in the Greek philosophical writings but long before them in the
Indian scriptures. Therefore, the claim on the part of the Europeans that their religion
could offer a suitable moral philosophy for the man living in the modern age was a
frivolous act. In fact, Europe had simply reproduced the ethical principles expounded in
the Gita and other Vedic writings. The attempts by Pythagoras to teach ‘renunciatory
doctrine,’40 for instance, or the ethical principles enunciated by Socrates and in the
writings of Aristotle, were not totally unknown to the world, and these principles or
criteria of ethics, long before Pythagoras or Socrates or Aristotle, were expressed in the
Gita.
Western scholars say that the first systematic treatise on the discrimination between Right and
Wrong Action or on Morality was written by the Greek philosopher Aristotle. But in my opinion,
these questions had been examined long before Aristotle in a more exhaustive and scientific
manner in the Mahabharata and in the Gita: and no moral doctrine has yet been evolved, which is
different from the doctrines metaphysically expounded in the Gita. The solution given by Aristotle
of the question whether it is better to spend one’s life peacefully, in philosophical meditation, and
living like a hermit, or to spend it in all sorts of political activities, is to be found in the Gita; and the
opinion of Socrates that whatever sin is committed by man, is committed by him only as a result
of ignorance, is also to be found to a certain extent in the Gita, because it is a doctrine of the Gita
that it is not possible for a man to commit any sin, after his Reason has become equable as a
result of the knowledge of the Brahman. The doctrine of the Epicureans and the Stoics that the
conduct of the perfect jnanin is a standard for everybody, from the moral point of view, is to be
found in the Gita; and the description of the perfect jnanin, given by the philosophers belonging to
these sects, tallies with the descriptions of the Sthitaprajna (steady-in-mind) given in the Gita.
Similarly, the dictum of Mill, Spencer, Kant, and other Materialistic philosophers, that the highest
peak or test of Morality consists in everybody acting so as to promote the welfare of the whole of
mankind, is included in the external characteristic of a Sthitaprajna described in the Gita in the
words “sarvabhutahite-ratah”.............. and the arguments relating to Ethics, and the doctrines
4H
Gita-Rahasya, vol. II, op.cit., p. 825.
28
regarding Freedom of Will, enunciated by Kant and Green, are to be found mentioned in the Gita,
on the authority of the Knowledge contained in the Upanisads.41
Further, not merely Greek philosophy where the Western ethical concerns were
first reflected upon, but Christianity and its revered book, the Bible from which the moral
principles of the modem Europe sprang up, owe their beliefs for their greater part, to the
Gita and other Vedic writings. There is no independent moral philosophy of its own,
whatsoever, in Europe apart from Indian moral philosophy. Therefore, the attempt on
the part of Christianity and Christian missionaries to Europeanize Indian social
structure, its popular religious practices and observances or moral preaching, in some
form or the other, is an attempt of great irrationality. For Tilak, the activistic ritualism of
the Jewish religion, for instance, or the name ‘Jehovah’, the principle deity of worship in
the Jewish religion, or the Esi sect from which Christianity arose, or the renunciatory
and bhakti ideal of Christianity, or even the idea of the tradition of sending missionaries
to other countries to preach and propagate religion, for instance, are literally borrowed
by Christianity from Buddhism.42 In other words, the two religious writings, 'The Old
Testament and ‘The New Testament, making the Bible and its core teachings such as
renunciation, non-enmity, devotion or the practice of idol worship etc. are more or less
the word by word reproductions of Buddhist and other Vedic writings.
After the Buddhist religion had in this way spread everywhere at the time of Ashoka, the
principles of Renunciation began to find a way into the purely activistic Jewish religion; and Christ
ultimately added to it the Philosophy of Devotion, and established His own religion. When one
gives proper weight to this gradual growth, which is established by historical facts, one comes to
the definite conclusion that far from the Gita having taken something from the Christian religion,
as suggested by Dr. Laurincer, there is a very strong probability, and almost a certainty, that the
principles of Self-Identification, Renunciation, Non-Enmity, and Devotion to be found in the New
Testament of the Bible, must have been taken into the Christian religion from Buddhism, and
Gita-Rahasya , vol. I, op.cit., pp.l-li.
For Tilak, the central philosophy of Christianity is taken from Buddhism. In his comparison
between the Gifa’ and the ‘Christian Bible’, Tilak establishes both from the historical and
philosophical point of view that not merely the central doctrine of Christianity but the life of Christ
too is an imitation of Buddha and his life. Gita-Rahasya, vol. II, op.cit., pp. 820-831.
29
therefore, indirectly from the Vedic religion; and that, Indians had no need to look to other people
43
for finding these religious principles.
Second, Tilak argued that even the modern world had not experienced anything
new regarding the ethical doctrines, or had advanced anything more that was different
from the Indian religious texts. He would insist that modern knowledge of ethics and its
exploration of moral principles too, more or less, were mere reproduction of the ancient
Vedanta. The Vedico-Sastric methodological categories of basing human knowledge or

ethics as adhibhautika, adhidaivika and adhyatmika, and the superiority of the
adhyatmika method of examining the object over the adhidaivika and adhibhautika, for
instance, were literally followed in the most popularly acknowledged Western
philosophies, particularly in the Comtian positivistic writings.44 Similarly, the European
classification of its society between karma and renunciation and the same division in
their ethical writings as in Aristotle, Spencer, Mill, Comte, Nietzsche and others
upholding karma and Schopenhauer and Hartmann propagating renunciation, for
instance, could very well be seen in the Vedic karma kanda, and the Vedic jnana kanda
respectively. Thus the European social set up too assimilated Indian social structure.
Third, not only the modern world had not experienced anything new, the progress
of modem science and the advancement of the materialistic moral philosophy could not
in anyway lessen the value of the ethico-spiritual writings of India, nor the value of the
ethical principles had come down by the progress of modem European science. In fact,
for Tilak, the achievements of the modern materialism of Europe by the use of the most
sophisticated tools and instruments of analysis was less or not at all comparable with
43 Gita- Rahasya, vol. II, op.cit., p.831.
44
The Vedic methods of adhibhautika, adhidaivika and adhyatmika are respectively called Positive,
Theological and Metaphysical in the Comtian writings. The only distinction between the two is
that the Vedas considered adhyatmika, as superior to the adhibhautika and adhidaivika, Comte
considered other way round i.e., positive method, as superior to Theological and Metaphysical.
Tilak called this re-ordering of the Vedic tripartite method on the other way round as “new
historical order", but it was not their original contribution to the sociological analysis. For Tilak,
this also makes Europe more materialistic, and India spiritual. Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.84-
86. Tilak devoted more than three hundred pages in his Gita-Rahasya to analyse the three
methods of considering ethics and to show how the Gita considered adhyatma as superior to the
rest. Gita- Rahasya, vol. I. op.cit., pp. 83-358
30
the achievements of the ancient Indian spiritual scriptures when the tools of search
were underdeveloped and essentially conventional. This was an issue of national pride.
When we realize that this kind of examination has been made even in the Western countries, and
that the doctrines advanced by Western Philosophers like Kant etc. are very much akin to the
doctrines of Vedanta Philosophy, we cannot but feel a wonder about the supermanly mental
powers of those persons, who laid down these doctrines of Vedanta by mere introspection, in an
age when the Material Sciences were not so advanced as they are in the present day; but we
45
must not stop with feeling wonder about this matter,- we must feel proud of it.
In this context, Tilak advances a significant response to one of the recurrent
issues, i.e., the relative unpopularity or low popularity of the ethical principles expressed
in the Gita to those of the Europeans. Why is it that the Indian ethical discourses were
less popular to European philosophy? He did not think that the answer to this question
lies in the incapability or impotentiality of the Indian moral tenets. He, in fact, did not
subscribe to such a position. He, on the other hand, saw answer to this question in the
colonial system of education.
But, as the works of purely materialistic philosophers on ethics are principally taught in our
colleges the fundamental principles of the karma yoga mentioned in the Gita, are not well
understood even by learned persons among us, who have had an English education.46
Fourth, Tilak argued that the moral principles of Indian scriptures had greater
intrinsic value than the one expressed in the Western philosophy because the Indian
ethical elements contained in different scriptures were bounded by transcendental

concerns, which was totally absent in the European moral philosophy, which was
concerned only with the external effect of an act, adhibhautika or positivism. In fact,
Tilak’s argument was that the ethical elements expressed in European writings were
limited by finite concerns, but the ‘pure’, ‘permanent’, ’universal’, ‘complete’ ethical
elements could not be material but metaphysical having had its clear orientation to the
45 G\ta-Rahasya, vol, I, op.cit., p. 201.
46 G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p. 93.
31
next world.47 Only those elements, which take into consideration the transcendental
consequences, could endure for long and provide lasting basis for the society. For Tilak,
the positivistic ethics was incapable of providing solid basis for national reconstruction.
This argument of Tilak was sometimes explicit and at times was implicit in the pages of
Gita-Rahasya. One such explicit expression was his understanding of the universal
nature of Truth and its exceptions. The exceptions to Truth under certain special
circumstances, for instance, Tilak argues, were clearly expressed both in European
writings such as in the writings of Sidgwick, Mill, Millman, St. Paul, L. Stephen, Green,
Bain etc. and in the Indian writings. But the exceptions laid down in the Indian scriptures
were based on its metaphysical implications and hence, had a greater respect and
command over the European understandings.
If you compare the rule laid down by the Western Philosophers mentioned above, with the rules
laid down by our lawgivers, you will clearly see who had greater respect for Truth............“There
is no sin in speaking the untruth on the following five occasions, namely, if in joke or while
speaking with women or at the time of marriage, or if your life is in danger, or for protecting your
own property.”.......... But that does not mean that one must always speak the untruth in speaking
with women, and these exceptions are to be understood in the same way in the Mahabharata, as
those mentioned by Prof. Sidgwick with reference to “children, or madmen or invalids”. But
Western philosophers, who have shelved the Metaphysical as also the next-world view of the
matter, have gone further and have barefacedly permitted even merchants to tell any lies they like
for their own benefit, which is a thing our lawgivers have not done.48
Tilak regarded the ethical principles expounded in the Gita superior to the one
expressed in European writings and contends against Western morals particularly as
advocated by the missionaries. Europe, he felt, gave much importance to positive

knowledge, and in deciding the ethicality of an act they emphasized only its external
effects (adhibhautika parinam). The philosophy of the Gita took into account, besides
the external effect, the metaphysical orientations of the act. In short, Tilak’s claim for the
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp. 40-69, 268-358. To quote him “.............they look upon the
moral laws of Truth etc., as permanent, that is to say, immutable under all circumstances.....”
JO
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp. 50-51, 526.
32
superiority of the Indian ethical vision was based on the finite limits of the positive
science of Europe and its refusal to consider metaphysical concerns in deciding the
ethical ‘doable’ and ‘not-doable’ actions.

Tilak advances the same argument in criticizing the utilitarian philosophy 49 of J.S
Mill and others. He rejected the utilitarian philosophy on ethics on two major grounds.
First, the utilitarian method 50 does not discriminate between dharma (moral) or
adharma (immoral) or papa (sin) or punya (non-sin) or karma (action) or akarma (non
action) from the metaphysical or ‘next-world’ point of view but purely from the material
or ‘this-world’ point of view by substituting just (nyaya) for dharma and unjust (anyaya)
for adharma by merely taking into account the external result of an action. But the ethics
of actions can only be resolved on the basis whether they are conducive to atmic benefit
or not which is completely absent in the utilitarian conception of ethics.

Second, the adoption of the positive method for scientifically considering the
science of karma yoga is not proper because just and unjust can not be resolved only
on the basis of the external effect of an object.
Tilak hierarchically organizes Utilitarian ethics into pure or naked selfishness, long-sighted
selfishness, enlightened selfishness and benevolent selfishness. In the hierarchy the naked
selfishness was to occupy the lowest rung and the benevolent selfishness the highest of the
hierarchy. He calls the first two schools as tamasic, third one as rajasic, and the benevolent
selfishness i.e., ‘the greatest good of the greatest number' as sattvika. He criticizes the Utilitarian
school of Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, and Utilitarian principles expressed in the writings of Hobbes,
Hume etc. on four major grounds. First, number alone cannot be the sufficient basis for deciding
the question of morality. Second, the external effect or result of an action cannot be the definite
measure for moral action because the same external acts may not have same external effects if
the persons were different. Third, the ethical principles decided on the basis of the external
effects of an action are relative and time-bound. Last, in determining the ‘universal benefit ’ it is
essential to take into account the individual motives, passions, emotions, reasons etc. Gifa-
Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.102-128.
50
Nowhere in the G\ta-Rahasya, Tilak’s claim for the superiority of ethics enunciated by the Gifa
over European Utilitarian philosophy was clear than his analysis of ‘the materialistic Philosophy’.
This analysis runs into more than two hundred pages of G\ta-Rahasya. The central argument is
based on the issue that the pure, just and universal ethical principles cannot be material but
metaphysical, the method employed by the Utilitarians to determine the moral philosophy is
insufficient. G'\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.102-267.
33
It will be noticed here that Tilak never considered the orientalist classification that -
West is superior in the sphere of politics and science, and East is superior in spiritual
domain, and that an ideal-type nationalist reconstruction would assimilate the good
elements of the both. He, on the other hand, felt that the ancient Indian moral
discourses are capable of providing necessary foundation for the Indian Nation. Further,
he considered two models of the West and the East within the domain of the moral
philosophy, the Western moral philosophy including Greek philosophy, Christianity and
Bible and modern positivist utilitarian writings and the Indian model of moral philosophy
beginning from the Vedas down to the Buddhist literature. His argument, then, was that
the ethical philosophy discussed in the Vedic writings were incorporated into the ^
Christian Bible and other moral writings through Buddhism, but these principles of ethics
never became the spirit of life in Europe. Therefore, European claim that they were the
founders of the universal ethical principles and they represent superior ethical
philosophy is, for Tilak, a counterfeit argument. Hence, in the nationalist project and its
ethical foundations, India need not consider the European understanding on the issue
as a suitable moral philosophy.
Universality of Ethical Principles and their Exceptions:

The contrast between the transcendental ethics and this-worldly morality brings ,
out another crucial aspect of Tilak’s ethico-philosophical system: the notion of non
violence. In fact, nowhere in Gita-Rahasya Tilaks’s arguments were particularly so
striking as in relation with two major issues; First, when he was to deal with the issue of
ethical ‘doability’ and ‘non-doability’ and its practical aspects such as non-violence,
truthfulness, peacefulness, forgiveness etc. and Second, when he was to engage with
Samkara’s interpretation of the Gita and his Samkhya arguments. Regarding the
second point Tilak’s argument was that Samkara’s interpretation of the Gita was not
legitimate because it was neither unprejudiced nor his conclusions were independent,
but it was done with the sole intention of justifying the Vedic system of samnyasa (jnana
kanda) and belittling its karma arguments (karma kanda). This is the central argument,
which Tilak advances against Samkara’s reading of the Gita.
Regarding the first point i.e., his arguments on non-violence and its related
concepts were deeply influenced by his extensive readings of various scriptural texts
34
including the Vedas, Smritis, Mahabharata, etc. but they differed from the preceding
scriptural writings in a fundamental way both in terms of its basic assumptions and
underlying principles. He considered non-violence, truthfulness, forgiveness etc. as

having the highest ethico-moral values, but these values were to be fixed not on the
basis of their universally accepted, permanent and established principles, but they were
to be determined in relation to the nature of the actor, action and the circumstances in
which the action was being performed. This is a very crucial aspect in Tilak’s
understanding of these notions because he never thought that these were universal
ethical principles in a substantive sense or these principles should always be followed
and everywhere to be followed without any qualification. He would explicitly insist that
these were to be and should be followed only in a society where internal conditions are
perfect, or in a society where everyone respects these principles as the highest virtues,
or at least in a society where one considers others interest as of having greater value
than his own. Its application in its absolute form in an imperfect state would have
destructive consequences.
So long as every human being in this world has not started living according to these rules, should
virtuous people, by their virtuous conduct, allow themselves to be caught in the nets spread by
rascals or should they give measure for measure by way of retaliation and protect themselves?51
Otherwise, ‘life in this world, which is full of villains, is difficult’.52
It is in this context that Tiiak argues that the nationalist movement could not
attain its goal only through peaceful method. Although certain results could be achieved
on various occasions by following a peaceful method, which cannot be achieved by

anger and hatred,53 anger and hatred too cannot be repudiated under imperfect social
conditions. "Forgiveness in all cases or warlikeness in all cases is not the proper
thing”.54

52 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.46
53 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.546

54
35
In short, a certain degree of involvement of himsa, untruthfulness, non
peacefulness and non-forgiveness etc. are essentially needed because India is not a
society consisting of perfect internal relations, but a society with imperfect condition.55
Hence, the universal ethical principles have very limited utility. For Tilak, the Gita
sanctioned and enjoined violence, untruthfulness or non-forgiveness under certain
specific circumstances and conditions, it does not mean that anybody, in an imperfect
society, could follow these exceptions in any way and in any form. These circumstances
and conditions are, in fact, meant not for those whose mind acts with desire, sense of
separate ego, ill-will, passion, anger or with attachment; use of it by them would have
the most pernicious consequences, but they are meant for those whose mind has
attained equability of reason, who are non-inimical, or at least, those who act without
self-interest and for universal welfare. The latter are the ‘Sthitaprajnas’, ethico-spiritual
giants. The understanding of these circumstances and conditions are very important,
Tilak argues, otherwise it would encourage casuistry, blinding people to several forms
or harm and destruction, using the authority of the Gita to sanction unacceptable
violence.
Those ordinary persons whose Mind has not reached the state of equability, add their feeling of
mine-ness (mamatva) to this law of Cause and Effect, and making the counterblow stronger than
the blow, take their revenge for the blow; or if the other person is weak, they are ready to take
advantage of some trifling or imaginary affront, and rob him to their own advantage, under pretext
56
of retaliation.
Hence, the state of mentality or frame of spirit behind the act (bhavana) is
important; all the activities of Sthitaprajna become yoga actions performed for the
lokasamgraha (welfare of all), justice and for truth, and violence is not different from any
other activity. The abstention from desire for one’s own welfare and the results of action
implies, its replacement by detachment and universal welfare; action done in such a
state or mood would certainly bring about lokasamgraha. It is the mentality of the doer
and the object of the action that transforms an action involving great deal of violence in
the empirical world to an action of non-violence. Tilak advances these arguments in his
55
56 G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.550.
36
chapters on ‘Karma JiJnasa’57 and ‘State of a Siddha and World Affairs’ where he goes
on stating references from various authoritative texts and justifying the necessity of
co
using both violence and non-violence under different occasions.
It will be noticed that the whole argument of Tilak regarding non-violence,
truthfulness and other related moral virtues are based on three underlying principles.
First, there is no such thing as permanent and universal ethical principle for an
imperfect society and a society that bristles with internal contradictions, but they may be
applied in its absolute form, without exception to a society in a perfect state. Second,
the effect of the violent action done by a Sthitaprajna with a mind restless for
lokasamgraha should be morally decided as an action of non-violence. By such a
violent action the actor attains merit, and its victim is truly the sinner.59 Third, ahimsa
does not consist in abhorring violence at all times and under all conditions and following
non-violence at all times and under all circumstances
Tilak’s notion of non-violence and the specification of circumstances constituting
exception to this principle were in keeping with his ideas of moral right, moral duty, self
protection and just war. The first argument of Tilak was that practice of absolute non
violence was an impossibility and this impossibility was due to unavoidable and
inescapable situations in life that necessitate men to entail in both conscious and
unconscious or intended and unintended violence. Non-violence, therefore, does not
enjoin ‘ahimsa in all cases’ but necessitates ‘himsa’ in several other cases because
‘even the most principled maxim of ethics, namely that of harmlessness, does not
escape the necessity of discrimination between the duty and the non-duty”.60
Having defined himsa as ‘not only destroying life but also harming the minds or
the bodies of others’, and patricide, matricide, homicide etc., being the most terrible
forms of f?/msa,61 and ahimsa as ‘not harming, in any way, any living being’,62 Tilak
makes exceptions very clearly throughout his expositions between justified himsa and
57
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.40-69.
M
60
Gita-Rahasya, vol I, op.cit., p.44.
37
unjustified himsa (violence); between justified non-violence and unjustified non-violence
(ahimsa), and takes justified himsa (violence) and unjustified non-violence (ahimsa) as
part of ahimsa. Regarding the unconscious himsa, Tilak’s argument is that it is
impossible to lead even a single minute of life on this earth without doing violence to
other creatures in a big or small way, or in some form or the other.
The slaughter of animals for the purposes of ritualistic sacrifice (yajna) is considered blameless
even by the Vedas; (Manu. 5. 31) yet, that at least can be avoided by making an animal of flour
for purposes of sacrifice...... But how are you going to stop the killing of the numerous micro
organisms with which the air, water, fruit etc., and all other places are filled?63
Hence, himsa being so much a part and parcel of life, without exception, there is
no meaning whatsoever for the principle of ‘absolute non-violence’. He adduces in this
context references to conversation between a hunter and a Brahmin, and states that
even in ordinary life ‘everybody eats everybody’, and therefore, ‘life is the life of life’
(‘>/Vo jivasya jivanam)64 It is on the basis of this argument that Tilak criticizes the
Buddhist and Christian ethical commandments such as Thou shalt not kill’ (do not kill
any living beings) as having limited value at least in relation to microscopic organisms.
Second, the principles of non-violence or truthfulness do not suffer in cases,

which involve self-defence and just war. Although, in these cases there is conscious
himsa, it should be regarded as ahimsa in the ethical world of non-violence.
But, assuming for the sake of argument that some villain has come, with a weapon in his hands to
kill you, or to commit rape on your wife or daughter, or to set fire to your house, or to steal all your
wealth, or to deprive you of your immoveable property; and, there is nobody there who can
protect you; then should you close your eyes and treat with unconcern such a villain (atatayin)
saying: “ahimsa paramo dharmah?’ or should you, as much as possible, punish him if he does
not listen to reason?.......... On these occasions, self-protection is considered to be of higher
importance than Harmlessness. The killing of tender infants (bhruna-hatya) is considered to be
the most objectionable of murders; but, if the child is being born by transverse presentation, is it
65
not necessary to cut the child and deliver the mother?
63
G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.43-4.
gj
G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.44.
65
38
Third, non-violence also consists in enjoying moral rights, this moral right is in
relation to the ‘general interest’, ‘self-protection’ and ‘the protection of innocents’. Tilak
argues that the principles of non-violence would not be violated or affected in cases
where one commits violence for the protection of the society and social order, and thus,
save the general interest.
But, though I may have no object to achieve for myself, I nevertheless commit the sin of helping
evil-doers or undeserving persons, and of harming deserving saints and even society itself to that
extent, if I allow some one to take that which he ought not to get. Just as, though a multi
millionaire like Kubera goes to purchase vegetables in the market, he does not pay a lakh of
rupees for a bundle of coriander leaves, so also does the man, who has reached the state of
perfection, not forget the discrimination as to what is good for whom. It is true that his Reason has
become equable. But, ‘equability’ does not mean giving to a man the grass, which is fit for a cow,
and to a cow, the food which is proper for a man; and with the same intention, the Blessed Lord
has said in the Gita that sattvika charity which is to be made as datavya that is, because it is a
duty to give, must be given, considering “dese kale ca patre ca”, that is considering the propriety
€6
of the place, the time, and the deservingness of the person.
Further, the principle of non-violence or truthfulness is not violated If one

commits violence or untruthfulness for self-protection. In the chapter on ‘Karma Jijnasa’,
Tilak gives a good example and argues that such a man is totally excused and his
action would be considered ethically just.
If stealing or taking away by force that wealth which a man has lawfully acquired is permitted,
then people will stop accumulating wealth, and all will suffer; and chaos will reign as a result of
the arrangement of society being broken up. But, there are exceptions to this rule. When such a
calamity (apatti) arises that food can not be had, whether for money or by labour or for charity on
account of a general famine, shall we look upon as a sinner, some person who thinks of saving
his life by committing theft? There is a story in the Mahabharata that when such a difficult
contingency befell Visvamitra, as a result of famine for twelve consecutive years, he was on the
point of saving his life by stealing a leg of dog’s flesh hung up in the home of a butcher, and by
eating that uneatable food; thereupon, this butcher gave him much advice based on the sastras,
not to commit the sin of eating such uneatable food, and that too by theft,.............. “panca
pancanakha bhaksyah” But Visvamitra rejected that advice.67
fifi
39
Besides, the principle of non-violence is not violated if one is permitted to commit
violent action for the protection of the innocent people from possible massacre. It is
rather the duty of a Sthitaprajna to save the life of saints from such circumstances.
Suppose, you have seen some persons escaping from the hands of marauders and hiding in a
thick forest; and the marauders, who follow them with naked swords in their hands, stand before
you and ask you, where those people are! What answer will you give? Will you speak the truth or
will you save the lives of unoffending and innocent people? I ask this question because,
preventing the murder of innocent people is according to the sastras a religion, as highly
go
important as Truth itself.
Fourth, when the question of general welfare is involved, then it is the moral duty
of the Sthitaprajna to punish the evil-doers without the slightest hesitation and
repugnance because in that case neither the principle of ‘non-violence is violated by

killing an evil-doer’ nor does he entangle himself in the net of the bondage of sin.69 On
the other hand, he would be morally permitted to follow the course of ‘counter-kick for a
kick’,70 ‘thorn by a thorn’71 or ‘measure for measure’72
But, if a man, whose Mind has become free from the feelings of revenge, enmity, or pride, or free
from the desire of robbing the weak as a result of anger, avarice, or hatred, or free from the
desire of obstinately making an exhibition of one's greatness, authority, or power, which inhabits
the minds of ordinary people, merely turns back a stone which has been thrown at him, that does
not disturb the peacefulness, non-inimicality, and equability of his Mind; and it is on the other
hand his duty, from the point of view of universal welfare, to take such retaliatory action, for the
purpose of preventing the predominance of wrong-doers and the consequent persecution of the
weak in the world; and the summary of the entire teaching of the Gita is that: even the most
horrible warfare which may be carried on in these circumstances, with an equable state of mind,
is righteous and meritorious. It is not that the karma yogin Sthitaprajna, disregards the religious
doctrines of behaving non-inimically towards everybody, not doing evil to evil-doers, or not getting
68
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.46-7
69

72
40
angry with those who are angry with one. But, instead of accepting the doctrine of the School of
Renunciation that Non-inimicality (nirvaira) means inactivity or non-retaliation, the philosophy of
73
karma yoga says, that ‘nirvaira’ means merely giving up vaira’ or ‘the desire to do evil;........
Here, Tilak takes resort to the highly suffused terms of ‘non-inimicality’ and ‘self-
identification’ to highlight activist meanings, and even equates and interlocks them with
general interest and desireless karma. For Samkara, Tilak argues, nirvaira’ means
inactivity or non-retaliation even if one commits terrible harm or unjustified violence on

another. For the Gita never supported the position, which Samkara took by reading it,
because the karma yogi is not a Vedic samnyasi, who lives on silence and inactivity; he
is an active ethico-spiritual man who lives for the general welfare.
The Gita neither advises nor intends that when one becomes non-inimical, one should also
become non-retaliatory. To that man who does not care for universal welfare, it is just the same
whether or not evil-doers predominate in the world, and whether or not he continues to live. But,
the philosophy of karma yoga teaches us that though the karma yogins, who have reached the
most perfect state, behave non- inimically towards all created beings, recognizing the identity of
the atman in all, they never fail to do that duty which has befallen them according to their own
status in life, after discriminating between who is worthy and who is unworthy, with a frame of
mind, which is unattached; and that any Action which is performed in this manner, does not in the
74
least prejudicially affect the equability of reason of the doer.
Three points are absolutely clear from the above arguments. First, when one
eliminates 'mine-ness' (mamatva) and ‘hope for fruit’, and replaces them with general
welfare, even if he performs violent actions they would be considered as morally just,
and on account of whom he performed that action, would be considered a sinner.75
73
74 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.555-56.
75 To quote him: “According to metaphysics, when a man’s reason has become desireless and has
reached the state of equability, he does not of his own accord do harm to anybody; and if
somebody is harmed as a result of something which he does, that harm is the result of the karma
of such other person; or in other words, the desireless Sthitaprajna does not, by the act which he
performs in these circumstances- even if it appears as terrible as matricide, or the murder of a
preceptor- incur the bondage or the taint of the good or evil effects of the act.........the rules of
41
Therefore, Tilak’s firm conclusion is that Sthitaprajna, who has nothing to achieve for
himself in this material world, would never perform amoral action, if he does it, over
whom that is carried out would be regarded as amoral. This, according to Tilak, is the
central metaphysics of the Gita. Second, ethically unjustified violence should be met
with ethically just violence and not with unjustified non-violence. Similarly, morally just
violence should be measured and treated as ethical non-violence and therefore,
exception to the principle of non-violence. Tilak’s argument is that the unjust should not
expect from the just to be just towards them as the latter are towards the just.
.......... it must be borne in mind that, that man who has come forward to cut the throats of others
by his own evil-doings, has no more any ethical right to expect that others should behave towards
76
him like saints.
Third, for Tilak, the duty of non-violence i.e., refraining from violence, except
when morally justified, is a higher duty from the ethical point of view than considering
whether the ‘universality’ of the principle is affected or not by pursuing such morally
justified violent actions. That is, when a circumstance could be turned beneficial for
social welfare, or one could avoid unjustified violence, one is permitted to observe these
exceptions and that is the morality of the Gita.
To Tilak, then, the European moralist writings, which saw these principles as
universal, permanent, absolute and eternal regulating public life without any exception
at all times and under all circumstances, were religious gimmicks to expand and
popularize their religious cult. “Moralists will not in the present times, as a rule, consider
it justifiable to delude people or to cheat them and convert them.’’77
This is nothing but a hypocritical action on the part of the Europeans, which the
Gita does not uphold, and therefore, its ethics is in better accord with the modern
nationalist construct.
self-defence included in criminal law are based on the same principle" G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I,
op.cit., p.549.
76
42
'Our religion does not ask us to save the life of a murderer by telling a lie. Because, as the
sastras themselves have prescribed the punishment of death for a murderer, such a person is
78
certainly punishable or fit for death’.
Tilak is particularly harsh here on Western moralists, and argues that the
European religion has failed to understand and establish the relationship between the
philosophical aspect of religion and the practical aspect of life, which the Gita does
scientifically.79
Hence, for Tilak, the ideal nationalist orientation should be a mixture of
saintliness and power and reason with considerations towards general welfare.
Sthitaprajna: the central figure in the nation.

The exposition of karma yoga and its fundamental aspects also brings out
another crucial aspect of Tilak’s philosophy, perhaps the foundation of the

philosophy of karma yoga: the importance of the life of Sthitaprajna80 as an
exemplar for the ordinary people of poor intelligence for deciding the propriety
and impropriety (karmakarma-vicikitsa) of ethics, good and pure life, and to surmise
the subtleties of the Absolute Self.81 This is, perhaps, central to the philosophy of karma
78
79
To quote him: “Western moralists find it very difficult to harmonise properly the advice of Non-
Enmity given by Christ with worldly morality, and Nietzsche, a modern German philosopher, has
fearlessly stated his opinion in his works, that the ethical principle of Non-Enmity is a slavish and
destructive principle, and that the Christian religion, which gives a high place to that principle, has
emasculated Europe.” G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.546-47.
80
Reference to Jivanmuktavasta, Trigunatita, Paramabhakta, Siddhavasta, Brahmabhuta, Buddha,
Siddha and Yogi also corroborate this term. For Tilak there is no distinction among these terms
and the life of Sri Krsna is a good example in this regard. Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.14, 15,
22, 512 etc.
81
Tilak draws a sharp line of demarcation between the karma yogin Sthitaprajna and the
samnyasin Sthitaprajna, and would argue that the Bhagavadglta's description is that of a karma
yogin Sthitaprajna and not the samnyasin Sthitaprajna. The essential traits of a karma yogin
Sthitaprajna such as, knowledge of the Brahman, peace of mind self-identification, the desireless
equability of mind etc., do not differ from those of a samnyasin Sthitaprajna. The difference is
that, after realization the karma yogin Sthitaprajna would continue to perform all the activities till
43
yoga 82 because, Tilak thought that, his life could serve as a complete ideal for all men
of all social categories of life. In his chapter on ‘State of a Siddha and Worldly Affairs’,
Tilak outlines the fundamental traits of Sthitaprajna as a virtuous, sober, tranquil and a
completely integrated person whose mind had acquired the status of desireless frame
with indifference to the transient world and had become perfectly controlled due to the
practice of dispassionate karma yoga and the realization of the Absolute Self. Hence,
Sthitaprajna is a man of pure reason and pure practical reason. Tilak, then, compares
those traits with the ‘Philosopher-King’ portrayed in Plato’s writings, the notion of 'Jnanf
in the writings of Aristotle, ‘Ideal-Wise Man’ depicted in the literature of Epicures and the
concept of ‘Absolute Ethics’ illustrated in the writings of Herbert Spencer, and argues
that European history is full of similar descriptions.
death. While, samnyasin Sthitaprajna would renounce such activities as painful and insipid.
Therefore, the words and sentences used in the stanzas of the text such as 2.64, 4.20, 6.1,
12.16, 12.19, 18.50, etc. (the first number indicates the chapter and the second figure the
stanza), are related to the karma yogin Sthitaprajna, and the claim of the protagonists of the path
of renunciation that these are related to the samnyasin Sthitaprajna are, according to Tilak, due to
the misunderstanding of the words and the context. Hence, for the science of karma yoga the
mode of life of the karma yogin Sthitaprajna is an example to the ordinary people to determine
what is right and wrong, and not the samnyasin Sthitaprajna. Therefore, in the Gifa, Arjuna was
asked to become a karma yogin Sthitaprajna and perform all the actions desirelessly. Gifa-
Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.520-21.
82
According to Tilak, the protagonists of renunciation and devotion do not consider the issue
important because their purpose is to renounce the world and not reform the world. Therefore,
“they do not trouble to deal with the question of the doable and the not-doable in the state of a
householder, beyond, concisely and when occasion arises, considering how one should lead
one’s worldly life, and advising that one should go up the ladder of the four states of life (asrama)
described by Manu and other philosophers and reach as quickly as possible the last step of that
ladder, namely, of samnyasa. That is why Srimat Samkaracarya, who was the principal
protagonist of the path of renunciation in the Kali Yuga, has in his commentary on the Gita either
belittled the statements in the Gifa advising energism, or considered them to be merely laudatory,
and drawn the ultimate conclusion of the Gifa that the whole of it has supported the doctrine of
the Abandonment of Action (karmasamnyasa); or why other commentators have, consistently
with their own doctrines, stated the import of the Gifa to be that the Blessed Lord advised Arjuna
on the battle-field to follow only the renunciatory paths of Release, namely, the path of pure
Devotion, or the Patanjala-Yoga.” Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.510-11.
44
It is true, he says, that the underlying traits of Sthitaprajna and his course of life is
difficult to accomplish, but it is not an absolutely impossible course of life to achieve, if
men try in this direction by means of mental control and effort. Ancient India, for
instance, in the age of Krta Yuga had produced such a state of society. The criticism of
Kant, therefore, that such a state of society could only be an imagination and not real
was, according to Tilak, highly mischievous.
As this state is extremely difficult of accomplishment, the German philosopher Kant says that the
description given by Greek philosophers of such a state, is not of the state of any living being; but
that they have personified the ‘Pure Desire’, which is the root of all Ethics, in order to impress the
elements of pure morality on the minds of people; and have created this picture of a super-Jnanin
and moral person out of their own imagination. But, our philosophers say that such a state of
things is not an imaginary state, and that man in this life can accomplish it by mental control and
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effort; and we have seen actual examples of such persons in our country.
According to Tilak, Sthitaprajna was an ideal man in the society whose sublime
character and ethical observations were living examples for the ordinary men of all
occupations. As his discriminatory reason (vyavasayatmika buddhih) had acquired
purity and it follows by the pure practical reason (vasanatmika buddhih) (only those
persons whose discriminatory and practical reasons are pure would be regarded as
Sthitaprajna), he would not perform any sinful action contrary to the will of the society
and hence, it is meaningless to imagine that in such a quietist and accomplished state,
he would perform actions for self-interest.
............it is as impossible that a person who has acquired this highest Knowledge, and is
fli
possessed of the purest Reason, should commit sin, as that nectar should cause death.
Once the mind is so constructed, then it is natural that self- interest (asihkarma)
would merge in the other’s interest (nirmama) and karma yogin Sthitaprajna would not
think otherwise except public welfare. Therefore, whatever action he performs in the
society, no matter what its nature, would be prima facie for the benefit of the world
83
45
(.sarvabhutahita). Hence, the laws, which are followed by the Sthitaprajna, are, in fact,
‘dharma’ or the mode of pure behaviour for the ordinary men.
That man whose Pure Reason (vyavasayatmika buddhih) has become capable of realizing the
identity, that “there is only one atman in all created things”, on account of its having become
steady by means of mental control, must also possess a Desire (vasana) which is pure. And
when his Practical Reason (vasanatmika buddhih) has in this way become pure, equable, mine
less (nirmama) and sinless, it is impossible that he should commit any sin or any action
obstructive of Release; because, (i) whatever action is prompted by a pure desire, is bound to be
pure, seeing that in the usual order of things, there is first a desire, and that such desire is
followed by appropriate action; and (ii) whatever is pure, is promotive of Release. We have,
therefore, in this way found such a preceptor as will give to us a visible reply, in the form of his
own life, to the difficult question of the discrimination between what should be done and what
should not be done (karmakarma-vicikitsa), or, between what is a duty and what is not a duty
85
(karyakarya-vyavasthiti).
Hence, ‘just as an assayer tests the golden ornament, which has been taken to
him for examination, by comparing it with a simple piece of hundred carat gold in his
possession’, so also one’s activities, behaviour, attitude could be tested for the ethical
doability and non-doability or between morality and immorality by comparing them with
those of the Sthitaprajna.
To Tilak, then, restricting and binding the Sthitaprajna with the rope of morality or
amorality would be a futile exercise based on ignorance. It is true, Tilak argues, that the
Gita shows due respect to Sthitaprajna, but this due respect was not by laying down
ethico-moral guidelines, rules or code of ethics to be observed by him in his life course.
In fact, the practical nature of the Bhagavadgita does not bind the Sthitaprajna with
ready-made list of traits and principles to be observed by him in his actions in the
material world, but it allows him to follow whatever action he wishes to do, with a firm
belief that he would continually tax himself for general welfare, and the combination of
pure reason (vyavasayatmika buddhih) and pure-practical reason (vasanatmika
buddhih) would definitely bring out social amelioration and progress. Hence, laying
down laws of ethics and constricting him would be an act of great irrationality.
85
G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit,. pp.511-12, 528.
46
However difficult of accomplishment this state of a Sthitaprajna (Sthitaprajnavastha) or this state
of being free from re-birth (jivan-muktavastha) may be, it follows from the description of such a
man, which has been given above, that the man, who has once accomplished this ultimate state,
does not need to be taught any laws about what should be done, or should not be done i.e., of
ethics; because, as the purest, the most equable and the most sinless frame of mind is the
essence of morality, laying down laws of ethics for such a Sthitaprajna would be as unreasonable
as imagining that the Sun is surrounded by darkness, and holding up a torch for it. There may be
a doubt as to whether or not a particular person has reached this highest of states. But, when
once it has been established by whatever means that a particular person has reached this state;
no proposition is possible, except the metaphysical proposition mentioned above, regarding the
merit or demerit of his actions. Just as regal authority is vested in one independent person or
collection of persons, and as, according to some Western Jurists, the ruler is not governed by any
laws, though the ruled are so governed, so also are the Sthitaprajnas vested with authority in the
kingdom of ethics. No desire exists in their minds; and, therefore, they are not induced to perform
action by any motive, except the fact that it is a duty enjoined by the sastras; and therefore, the
words sin or meritorious action, morality or immorality, can never be applied to the conduct of
such persons, who are filled by a stainless and pure desire. They have gone beyond the bounds
86
of sin and merit.
In turn, this invariably self-satisfied, God-realized, egoless, moral person is to
work out the essential elements of morality for common people and the underlying
principles that would bind the society. Of course, he would frame the laws with keeping
in mind the maximum benefit that it would cause for human beings, but while doing so,
he would keep himself above and beyond the clutches of the laws that govern the
(imperfect) society.
We see in ordinary life that if millionaire snatches away money from a beggar, the millionaire is
not called a thief, but it is believed that the beggar has committed some wrong, and that on that
account the millionaire has punished him. This argument applies still more appropriately, or more
fully, to the conduct of the Sthitaprajna, the arhata or devotee of the Blessed Lord; because, the
Reason of the millionaire may on occasion falter, but it is a settled fact that such emotions cannot
touch the Reason of the Sthitaprajna, As the Paramesvara, the Creator of the universe, is
untouched by sin or merit, notwithstanding that He performs all Actions, so also is the state of
these saints, who have become merged in the Brahman, always holy and sinless. It may even be
86 G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.515-16, 533, 543.
47
said that laws of conduct are framed on the basis of the Actions performed by such persons on
previous occasions, of their own free will; and on that account, these saints become the fathers of
87
those laws of behaviour, and are never the slaves of them.
It will be noticed here that Tilak’s understanding of the Gita’s notion of
Sthitaprajna is not in a limited material sense, but as person of highly and profound
spiritual depth. His characters, therefore, cannot be measured by material scale or by
the effects of his action, but purely by his inner reason. To Tilak, then, the objections
raised against the arguments related to the Sthitaprajna by the ‘utilitarian philosophy’
and some ‘Christian missionaries’, that - ‘the Sthitaprajna is at liberty to commit any sin
he likes’, or ‘not bound by rules of right and wrong’, or ‘his is an extremely self-centred
egoistical personality’, or ‘there is no meaning whatsoever for the permanence of ethical

principles through him’- are not rational because the Gita’s intention of exempting him
from laws is not for an imperfect man, or for a desireful egoistic, or for those who still
differentiate one’s own interests and the interests of the others. It is illogical and
irrational to think that a man who utterly denounced his interests for the interests of the
others, and has nothing to achieve for himself, ‘he is at liberty’ in the material sense. It is
impossible to see any room for selfish desire or egoistical motive in the actions of
Sthitaprajna other than the welfare of the society.
Those who have got into the habit of arriving at a decision about morality by merely considering
the external Action, without attaching proper importance to mental purity, may consider this
doctrine as strange; and some people perversely interpret 'not bound by rules of right or wrong’
as meaning 'one who commits any wrong he likes’, and distort the doctrine mentioned above by
me as meaning “the Sthitaprajna is at liberty to commit any sin he likes”. But, just as the fact that
a blind man does not see a pillar, is not the fault of the pillar, so does the fact of these objectors,
who have become blind because they support a particular doctrine, not clearly understanding the
meaning of the doctrine mentioned above, not become a fault of the doctrine. Even the Gita
accepts the position that the purity of anybody’s mind has first to be tested by his external
actions; and the Metaphysical science does not wish to apply the above mentioned doctrine to
those imperfect persons, the purity of whose mind remains to be tested, even a little, by that test.
But the case is different with the man who has reached the state of perfection, and whose mind
has undoubtedly become entirely merged in the Brahman and infinitely desireless; and although
some Action of his might appear improper from the ordinary point of view, yet, as it is admitted
87 G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.518-19.
48
that his mind is perfectly pure and equable, it follows that such Action, however it appears to the
ordinary observer, must be essentially sinless; or, it must have been committed for some ethically
correct reason, and is not likely to be founded on avarice or immorality like the actions of ordinary
people. The same is the reason why Abraham in the Bible was not guilty of the sin of attempting
infanticide, though he was about to kill his son; or why Buddha did not incur the sin of murder.
when his father-in-law died as a result of his curse; or, why Parasurama was not guilty of
88
matricide though he killed his own mother.
Hence, the criticisms levelled against the philosophy of the Gita by the Christian
missionaries are the result of the overwhelming admiration of their own religion and this
conceit made them to either overlook or misunderstand the import of the Gita.
But, I do not feel the slightest compunction in characterizing these allegations or objections as
totally foolish and perverse. Nay, I may even go so far as to say that these missionaries have
become as incapable of even understanding the Metaphysical perfection of the Sthitaprajna
described in the Vedic religion on account of an over-weening admiration for their own religion, or
of some other nefarious or evil emotions, as a black-as-ebony Negro from Africa is unfit for or
89
incapable of appreciating the principles of Ethics accepted in civilised countries.
Tilak then brings up what he thinks is the central problem of relationship between
the absolute ethical principles and the perfect society, and the relative ethical principles
and the imperfect society. In the perfect society, Tilak argues, the ethical principles
would be applied without any exceptions and no change is made in its absolute form.90
G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.517-18

89
90
According to Tilak, "If all men in this world become knowers of the atman and karma yogins in
this way, there would be no necessity of a science of karma yoga....... because, as all persons
will be jnanins in such a state of things, no one will cause harm to no one. Not only that, but every
one will always keep before his own mind in what the general welfare lies, and regulate his
conduct accordingly, with a pure and desireless frame of mind......... every person in this state.
which is supposed to be the highest or most perfect state of society, will be full (of) a jnanin, and
every Action of his is bound to be pure, beneficial, and moral, or the pinnacle of dutifulnessGifa-
Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.512-13. For Tilak, that society will recur soon, “ There is no doubt that
the state of every human being in the world, will improve gradually and reach the stage when
every one realizes the identity of the atman in every created being”, op.cit., p.556.
49
The application of these principles in its absolute form without any exceptions to an
imperfect society would produce the most fiendish and malignant effects, or would have
most diabolical consequences over morality, because a show of harmlessness,
truthfulness, kindness by a saint to all kinds of offenders and evil doers would ultimately
lead to the total destruction of himself and the social structure. Therefore, for the
imperfect society these absolute ethical principles have to be varied into relative and
only relative ethics would be applied, and even in that case its purpose would be
elevating the ‘imperfectness’ of the society.
But, in making this disquisition, one must also bear in mind that the Sthitaprajna, whom we are
going to consider, is not a man living in a society which has reached the perfect state of the Krta
Yuga, but is one who has to live in a society in this Kali Yuga, in which almost all people are
steeped in their own selfish interests. Because, however great and complete the Knowledge of a
man may be, and whatever the state of equability of Mind which he has reached, it will not do if
he adopts the practice of harmlessness, kindness, peacefulness, forgiveness etc., which are
permanent virtues of the highest order, in dealing with persons whose minds are impure, and who
are caught within the toils of desire, anger etc. It need not be said that the rules of Right and
Wrong, applicable to a society in which the majority is of avaricious persons, must be at least
somewhat different from the rules of Right and Wrong and absolute ethics applicable to a society
in which every person is a Sthitaprajna; otherwise, saints will have to leave this world, and evil
doers will be the rulers everywhere. This does not mean that saints must give up their equable
frame of mind; but there are kinds and kinds of equability of mind. It is stated in the Gita that the
hearts of saints are equal towards "brahmane gavi hastinf, (G/.5.18) i.e., “Brahmins, cows and
elephants”. But if, on that account, some one feeds a Brahmin with the grass which has been
brought for the cow or feeds the cow with the food which has been cooked for the Brahmin, shall
91
we call him a wise man?
What is important, according to the ethics of the Gita, is that there is no change
in the nature of the absoluteness or the permanence of the ethical principles whether it
is a perfect society or an imperfect society. But when these principles are to be applied
by the Sthitaprajna to an imperfect society then the relative change and exceptions to
these principles would be made according to the nature of ‘imperfectness’ of an

imperfect society.
91 Gita- Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.522-23.
50
The Sthitaprajna lives his life in this world, taking into account what the nature of Right and
Wrong was in the perfect state of the Krta Yuga, and deciding what changes are necessary in
those rules, in this world of selfish persons, having regard to the difference of Time and
92
place.........
But this change would be viewed from the ‘imperfect societal point of view’ and
not from the point of view of the ‘absolute ethics’, which is always universal and
unchanging. Neither the permanence nor the universality nor the absoluteness would be
affected by this change. Therefore, the blame for such a change should be levelled
against the imperfect society and not the ethics; it is the fault of the social order.
It is true that in a society which is full of cruel and avaricious persons, it is not possible to fully
observe the immutable ethical laws of harmlessness, truth etc; but one cannot blame these
ethical laws for that. Just as one cannot, from the fact that the shade of an object cast by the
Sun’s rays is flat on a flat surface, but is undulating on an undulating surface, draw the inference
that the shade must be originally undulating, so can one not, from the fact that one does not
come across the purest form of ethics in a society of unprincipled persons, draw the inference
that the imperfect state of ethics which we come across in an imperfect society is the principal or
the original form of ethics. The fault here is not of ethics, but of the society; therefore, those who
are wise, do not quarrel with pure and permanent laws of ethics, but apply their efforts towards
elevating society, so as to bring it to the ultimate highest state.93
Hence, the Gita, according to Tilak, consciously works out the necessity of
reforming the society first from the clutches of imperfectness to perfectness or at least
make it free from the cruel, avarice, ignorance, arrogance and unprincipality in order to
apply the absolute ethical principles in its original form (applicable to perfect society). So
long as the imperfectness in the internal structure of the society remains, it affects the
‘universality of the ethical elements to that extent without however affecting the intrinsic
quality of the principles.
In short, when a man descends from the state of perfection to ordinary life, it is undoubtedly
necessary to make some changes in the rules of Right or wrong which apply to the highest
state.94
92
G\ta- Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.523.
93
51
Nationalism:
Having defined the fundamental principle of the philosophy of karma yoga that
'that is to be called religion which leads to the benefit of the entire human race, nay of
all living beings’, Tiiak locates the notion of nationalism within the fundamental frame of
the concept of ‘universality’. It was, in fact, entirely in keeping with the 'imperfectness’ in
the existing social structure of the world. Tilak’s argument was that nationalism was not
an ultimate object to be achieved by mankind; the final goal being ‘universal welfare’.
Nevertheless, nationalism is to imbue both the perfect society and an imperfect one, but
the reasons for both are very different. These reasons are within the underlying principle
of the philosophy of absolute self.
Tilak’s considerations towards the two kinds of nationalism, perfect and imperfect
were of the same kind as the Sthitaprajna confronted with good and evil. There are two
grounds on which Tiiak justifies nationalism for an imperfect society.
First, the pride for one s nation in an imperfect society is a natural means to
reach the perfect state.
Just as the worship of the qualityful (saguna) Brahman is necessary in order to attain to the
qualityless (nirguna) Brahman, so also is the ladder of pride of one’s family, pride of one's
community, pride of one's religion, pride of one's country etc. necessary in order to acquire the
feeling of “vasudhaiva kutumbakam’ (i.e., "the whole universe is the family”); and as every
95
generation of society climbs up this ladder, it is always necessary to keep this ladder intact.
As the self-identification ('all created things are in me, and I am in all created
things’) cannot be achieved ail at once, one should proceed by narrowly applying it in
the family, and then gradually and comprehensively substituting one’s friends, one’s
relations, one’s gotra (clan), one’s village, one’s own co-religionists, the members of
one’s own country, and finally, all human beings,96 so also the perfect state cannot be
reached all at one stroke, and therefore, pride of one’s family, one’s religion, one’s
95
G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit. p.556.
96
To quote him: “As, when the child is young, one has to make its clothes as will fit its body - or
perhaps slightly bigger, because it is growing - so also is the case with the realization of identity
of the atman, in all created beings”, op.cit., p.560
52
village or pride of one’s own country are the necessary ascending steps which lead to
the highest of all states.

Second, just as a Sthitaprajna makes certain changes in the highest ethical
principles when he descends to the ordinary life to counteract the unprincipled;
nationalism should be cherished to meet the nationalism of the other countries.
But, it naturally follows that so long as every one has not reached this ultimate state of
development of the atman, saints must, having regard to the state of other countries or other
societies, preach the creed of pride of one's country etc., which will for the time being be
97
beneficial to their own societies.
Because, that country, which has come forward to destroy the other countries by
its own evil-doings, or ‘one nation is prepared to cause any amount of harm to another
nation for its own benefit, or on the basis that the pride of one’s own country is the only
and the highest ideal’, has no more any ethical right to expect that the other countries
should act towards them like the evil doers expect of the Sthitaprajna. Therefore, self
protection of the country against the imperial nations is just.
Yet, as there is one and the same atman in all created things, everyone has an inherent natural
right of being happy in this world; and no single individual or society in the world can ever
ethically acquire the right to cause the detriment of another individual or society by disregarding
this universal, important, and natural right, merely because the one is more than the other in
numbers, or in strength, or because the one has a larger number of means than the other for
conquering the other. If, therefore, some one seeks to justify the selfish conduct of a society,
which is bigger in numbers than another society, on the ground that the benefit of a larger
multitude, is of higher importance than the benefit of an individual or of a smaller multitude, such
a method of reasoning must be looked upon as demonical (raksasi). Therefore,............ if other
people behave unjustly in this way, then the inherent ethical right of everybody of protecting
himself, is of higher importance than the benefit of a larger multitude; nay, of even the whole
world;................. 98
Tilak also justifies the nationalist pride in a perfect society on two major planks.
97 Gita- Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.556-57, 60, 61.

98
Gita- Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.559.
53
First, just as a karma yogin who had reached the highest state never fails to
perform his duty in his life’s station, though the ‘life’s station is transient’, the pride for
one’s family, one’s relations, one’s village, one’s country etc., would never become
unnecessary. Therefore, perfect nationalism should perform a double function of lifting
the imperfect societies to perfection, and to circumvent the injustice on ethical basis.
In the same way, if persons around one, or the other countries around one’s country, are on a
lower rung of this ladder, it is not possible for a man to say that he will always remain alone on a
higher rung of the ladder; because, as has been stated above, those persons who are on the
higher steps of that ladder, have occasionally to follow the principle of ‘measure for measure', in
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order to counteract the injustice of those who are on the lower steps.
Second, patriotism in the perfect society is quite natural.
Besides, another thing, which must also be borne in mind, is that, as it is not possible to do away
with the lower floors of a building, when the higher floors are built; or, as the pick-axe does not
cease to be necessary, because one has got a sword in one’s hand; or, as fire does not cease to
become necessary, because one has also got the Sun, so also does patriotism, or the pride of
one's family, not become unnecessary, although one has reached the topmost stage of the
welfare of all created things. Because, considering the matter from the point of view of the reform
of society, that specific function, which is performed by the pride of one’s family, cannot be got
merely out of pride of one’s country, and the specific function, which is performed by the pride of
one’s country, is not achieved by the realization of the identity of the atman in all created beings.
In short, even in the highest state of society, patriotism and pride of one’s family and other creeds
100
are always necessary to the same extent as Equability of Reason.
It will be noticed here that, for Tilak, nationalism is neither the highest ethical
ideal nor the permanent stage of the life of the human race. It is only a preparatory
stage; it would have to be liquidated, if necessary, from the universal point of view of
ethics.101

101 Quite interestingly Tilak finds a corresponding stand in the Mahabharata: “for protecting a
family, one person may be abandoned; for protecting a town, a family may be abandoned; for the
protection of society, a town may be abandoned; and for the protection of the atman, even the
earth may be abandoned”, op.cit., p.558.
54
Bhakti and the Mass base of Indian Nationalism:
The notion of bhakti is yet another fundamental principle which Tilak employs to
demonstrate that Gita’s philosophy of karma yoga, the philosophy of the absolute self
and its social institutions do not isolate themselves from the large mass of the
population although, it regarded Sthitaprajna with knowledge as the central figure. The
path of knowledge, Tilak argues, is accessible and susceptible exclusively for those
persons who are endowed with sound reason (buddhigamya)102 and not meant for the
people who possessed with limited receptive reason (duhka-karaka). But the reality of
nature is that it has not satisfied itself with the creation of only the 'keen intelligent
people’, it has also produced and consisted of those persons who possessed ‘weak’
and ‘immature’ reason. And hence, it is a fact of nature that there are some whose mind
is susceptible to grasp any and all kind of recondite knowledge, but there are others
whose mind is naturally inane and incapable of apprehending such knowledge,

particularly knowledge of the Brahman who is destitute of all attributes. In case only
jnana marga is suggested to acquire knowledge in all its bearings and attain release,
then millions of people who do not possess keenness of intelligence would be
considered last to attain the release because “highly intelligent people are necessarily
always few.”103
T) 0(33
102
Tilak mentions the following passage to show that the Vedic ii
substantially limited to a few. “It is stated in the Gifa and in the Kathopanisad that though there
are many who, being struck by astonishment, describe their experience of the atman (that is, of
the Brahman), and though there are others who listen to that description, yet, no one understands
that atman, (Gl. 2.29; Katha. 2.7); and there is even a very instructive story about this in one
place in the Sruti texts. In this story, there is a description that when Baskali asked Bahva the
question; “My lord, explain to me, please, what the Brahman is,” Bahva would not give any
answer. Though Baskali repeated that question, Bahva was still silent. When this had happened
three or four times, Bahva said to Baskali: “I have been all this while giving an answer to your
question, and yet you do not understand it. What more can I do? The form of the Brahman cannot
be described in any way, and therefore, remaining quiet and not giving any description of it, is the
truest description of the Brahman. Have you now understood it?” Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit. p.
567.
103
G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.567 t«o> . 574 199
a^crw-v57
55
In order to avoid such a possibility of knowledge and salvation becoming an
asset of gentility, elitist and a monopoly of a few, the Gita outlines bhakti as an ‘easy’
(,kartum susukham) path to reach the highest Brahman.
Yet, in as much as the consideration of that subject-matter, which has been made so far, as also
the path or manner of acquiring that equability of reason, is wholly dependent on the reason itself,
ordinary persons feel a doubt as to how one can acquire that keenness of intelligence by which
that path or manner can be fully realized, and whether, if somebody’s reason is not so keen, that
man must be considered as lost; and such a doubt is certainly not ill-founded. They say: if even
the greatest of jnanins have to say ‘neti, neti (i.e., ‘It is not this, It is not that’) in describing that
your immortal highest Brahman (Parabrahman), which is clothed in the perishable Name-d and
Form-ed Maya, how are ordinary persons like us to understand it? Therefore, why should any one
be found fault with if he asks to be shown some easy path or manner, by following which this
deep knowledge of the Brahman can come within the periphery of his limited
receptiveness?.............. In short, how is a man possessing only an ordinary reason to realize this
indescribable, unimaginable Parabrahman, which is absolutely different from the visible world
(idrsyasrstivilaksana)......... and how is a man to acquire thereby the state of equability and
104
afterwards attain release?
Bhakti in the Gita, hence, according to Tilak, is a concept of social leveller and
negation of inequality in the world. The knowledge of the Brahman, who is qualityless,
unknowable, imperceptible, uncircumscribed, omnipotent is too much of an abstraction

for ordinary persons in the street possessing poor intelligence. Bhakti with the
conception of a personal God with visible quality is the easiest and the highest possible
understanding of the Absolute by limited reason.105 Therefore, bhakti, one of the three
paths suggested for the attainment of release, is relatively easy and less difficult, but is
‘quite potent’ and an ‘effective method’ as the path of knowledge.
104
105
According to Tilak, the exposition of jnana in the G\ta from the ‘sound reason' point of view, and
bhakti from the point of view of ordinary man, and thus its readiness to meet the genteel and the
ordinary man on their own grounds, keeping none apart from salvation, was the major reason
why different Vedantic sects produced extensive commentary on the subject. G\ta-Rahasya, vol.
I, op.cit., p.582.
56
Although the ordinary man in the street may not have sufficient intelligence to investigate into
whether or not it is really quality less, and to discuss the pros and cons, yet, faith is not such a
quality that it is possessed only by persons of the highest intelligence. Even the most ignorant
man has no dearth of faith, and if he carries on all his numerous affairs with the help of faith,
there is not the slightest difficulty in the way of his believing by faith that the Brahman is
106
qualityless.
It is true, Tilak argues the two paths are different due to the variations in reason
and due to the intrinsic qualities of ‘easiness’ and ‘difficultness’. It does not, however,
mean that both would reach different states and equability of reasons. Keeping this in
mind, (thinking that the pursual of karma, bhakti and jnana would produce very different
results in the spiritual life) karma, jnana and bhakti in the Gita were being taken for
different measurements of superior and inferior in the writings of various acaryas. But
such are not the realities, instead both would lead to the same equability of reason and
the realization of the same Brahman, wherein the ‘realiser’ would perform desireless
action {karma), dedicate it to the pleasure of the Paramesvara (bhakti) and would
understand desirelessly the imperceptible nature of the eternal principle (jnana).
Therefore, the definition of bhakti as cultivating an intense and desireless107 love
(nirhetuka) for the eternal principle is in no way fundamentally different from the
definitions of karma as the desireless performance of duty or the performance of one’s
action without expecting the reward, and jnana as the desireless understanding of the
qualityless and the inexpressible Brahman. This non-desired, non-attached and non-
possessive notion of bhakti, karma and jnana was, according to Tilak, the core of the
philosophy of karma yoga in the Gita. Hence, the ethics of the Gita is that mere bhakti

107 According to Tilak, the Gifa sees very limited usefulness of the Vedic bhakti because, bhakti for
the Vedas is a means for achieving some material gains and therefore, it is based on ‘desireful
motive'. For the Gifa, such a bhakti, which is desireful’, is of a lower kind, and the realization of
the absolute Brahman cannot be attained through that path. Such bhakti duly performed is
capable of taking bhakta to ‘heaven’, or ‘transient pleasure’, which is tentative according to Gifa.
For Gifa, like karma and jnana, true bhakti would be ‘desireless’. G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I. op.cit.,
p.572.
57
or karma or jnana alone would not produce release, and the philosophy of karma yoga
would not complete thereby with any one of these characters. Bhakti that does not rely
on the help of knowledge is incomplete; jnana that does not rely on the assistance of
religious faiths (sraddha) is barren and turns out to be mere intellectual snobbery. Both,
jnana and bhakti without the desireless performance of karma are nothing but spiritual
bankruptcy. Therefore, for true realization bhakti would necessarily have to be
combined and united with knowledge.
Therefore, in order to perfect the knowledge which has been acquired by intelligence, and in
order that that knowledge should be translated by means of the intelligence into behaviour and
action, such knowledge has always to rely on faith, kindness, affection, love of duty, and other
inherent mental tendencies, and that knowledge which does not rely on the help of these mental
tendencies after they have been awakened and purified, must be looked upon as bare,
incomplete, perversely inferential, and barren or immature. Just as the bullet in a gun cannot be
fired without the help of gun powder, so also can the knowledge acquired merely by Intelligence
not redeem any one without the help of mental qualities like love, faith, etc., and this principle was
fully known to our ancient rsis............. If Faith is ultimately necessary ................then it
undoubtedly follows that after having gone by the cart-road of Intelligence as far as possible
108
................one has to go further, at least to some extent, by the foot-path of faith and affection.
The Sthitaprajna, eulogised in the Gita, therefore, is not a man of mere bhakti or
mere jnana or karma, he is a man with whom all these ethico-spiritual traits
amalgamated and poised together.109
Gita-Rahasya, vol, I, op.cit., pp.569-70. Tilak cited the following passage from the
Chandogyopanisad. It is stated in the Chandogya that in order to prove to Svetaketu that the
imperceptible and subtle Parabrahman is the fundamental cause of the visible world, his father
asked him to bring the fruit of a banian tree (vata-vrksa), and to see what was inside. When
Svetaketu had cut open that fruit and seen inside, he said: “there are innumerable minute seeds
or grains inside”. When his father again said to him: “take one of those seeds, and tell me what is
inside it”, Svetaketu replied: “I see nothing inside the seed”. To that his father replied, “O my son,
this tremendous banian tree (vata-vrksa) has sprung from that nothing which you see inside”; and
his father ultimately said to him, “sraddhasva" i.e., “put faith in this”, that is, “do not merely keep
this idea in your mind, and say yes’ to my face, but go beyond it; in short, let this principle be
impressed on your heart, and let it be translated into your action.” op.cit., p.569.
* no
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.572, 78, 83, 96 etc.
58
For Tilak, then, the arguments of Christianity that mere faith and devotion to the
perceptible is sufficient for attaining salvation, and by certain leading sections of the
Indian society that mere knowledge would create release, and no other element is
necessary for attaining salvation except jnana, were the result of the impact of science
over metaphysics that has bread either a rejection of science or an overwhelming
adherence to the inferential reasoning of science.
That ail knowledge is acquired merely by intelligence and that no other mental faculties are
necessary for that purpose is an idle belief of certain philosophers, whose minds have become
crude as a result of life-long contact with sciences based on inferential reasoning.110
Neither ‘Christianity’ nor ‘leading sections’ of Indian society would, therefore,

have understood the true import of the Vedic religion.
The importance of this harmony between imperceptible knowledge (jnana) and perceptible
devotion (bhakti), was not fully appreciated by the philosophers pertaining to the religion which
adhered merely to the perceptible Christ; and it is not a matter of surprise, that from their one
sided and philosophically short-sighted point of view, there should appear to them an
inconsistency in the philosophy of the Gita. But, the most surprising part of it all is, that instead of
appreciating this valuable quality of our Vedic religion, some imitative persons among us have
111
come forward to find fault with that very religion!
Having advanced this argument of bhakti that salvation is not the privilege of a
small intellectual minority, Tilak, then establishes very clearly that bhakti has proved
quite useful even for practical reasons. His argument was that bhakti is the basis for
most of the affairs of the material world and thus, the edifice of the whole world is
erected on the bhakti foundation.
The inference drawn by us that because Rama finds sugar sweet, Soma will also find it sweet, is,
as a matter of fact, fundamentally of the same nature; because, though it is true that our
intelligence actually experiences the knowledge that sugar is sweet, yet, when we go beyond
110
111
59
that, and say that all persons find sugar sweet, we have to combine faith with intelligence. In the
same way, it need not be told that in order to understand the principle of Geometry, that it is
possible to have two straight lines which will never touch each other, however far they may be
extended, one has to go beyond the bounds of all personal experience, with the help of faith.
Besides, all the activities of the world go on with the help of inherent mental faculties like faith,
love, etc., and intelligence does nothing beyond controlling these mental faculties
.......................... If we look at the affairs of the world, we see that hundreds of persons carry on
their activities, relying on the statements of trustworthy persons. There will be very few persons
who will be in a position to explain scientifically why two into five is equal to ten and not seven, or
why when a second figure one is placed after the first figure one, we get eleven, and not two.
Nevertheless, the affairs of the world are going on in the belief by faith that these statements are
true. We will come across very few persons who will have an actual personal knowledge of the
fact whether the height of the Himalayas is five miles or ten miles; yet, if someone asks us what
the height of the Himalayas is, the figure of “23000 feet", learnt by heart by us in school from
112
books on Geography at once escapes from our lips!
It is true, Tilak argues, the transactions of the whole world could not really be
carried out without the assistance of bhakti, and without bhakti the whole social set up
would collapse like a house of cards, the explanation of the actual experience of bhakti
would not be forthcoming under certain circumstances. Because the explanation

regarding the experience is not forthcoming that does not mean that experience is not
actual.
It is true that the purpose of intelligence is to analyze the knowledge which has been acquired by
faith, and to give an explanation of it; but though a proper explanation of that realization is not
forthcoming, it cannot, on that account, be said that the knowledge which has been acquired by
113
faith is a mere illusion.
To Tilak, then, the explanation of science is not adequate under all

circumstances, for all subjects. If science cannot explain certain experiences properly,
the actuality of the experience cannot be always negated. Hence, Tilak values bhakti,
experience, emotion and concrete elements above the rationality of science.
112
113
G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p. 571.
60
The characteristic feature of bhakti, Tilak says, is the separation between the
worshipper and the worshipped, or the knower and the knowable, or the mind (citta) and
the object of worship, but all such dualities would be obliterated when the bhakta had
reached the highest state of equability of reason or the highest ideal of brahmi state,114
Therefore, bhakti is not an object to be achieved; the goal being the imperceptible, most
reverential Purusottama, it is only a means employed for the attainment of release.115
114
One of the examples, which Tilak cited in this regard, is the life of Saint Tukarama. He followed
the path of bhakti in his spiritual quest and reached this highest non-dualistic state. His
explanations of the highest imperceptible Brahman are not intellectual but actual and
experienced. This, Tilak says, is the proper clue to state that bhakti with dualities in its earlier
stage, would lead to the non-dualistic state of Paramesvara in its final march. Gita-Rahasya, vol.
I, op.cit., pp.598-99.
115
Tilak draws a sharp line of demarcation among terms such as ‘karma marga’ - karma nistha',
jnana marga’ - jnana nistha' and ‘bhakti marga’. ‘Marga’ means ‘means' (sadana) or the course
of life that sadhaka leads from the very beginning of his spiritual quest. The ‘nistha’, on the other
hand, means being engrossed in the same path even after the realisation of the absolute spirit
and hence, it is the highest stage in the state of perfection (siddhavastha). The following diagram
clearly shows this.
Samnyasa
Karma yoga
(Abandonment & Renunciation)
(Continuation of Karma)
Karma marga, bhakti marga and jnana marga are different paths in the beginning according to
the qualifications of the sadaka, but all having a single, self-same object of attaining the same
equability of reason and the same Paramesvara (Knowledge). But after the realization, the karma
61
As the bhakti in the Gita begins with the idea that most people in the material universe
are ignorant to comprehend the esoteric knowledge of the eternal principles due to the
natural weakness of restlessness of human mind’ and the ‘limited receptiveness’ of
their reason, it (bhakti) requires them to concentrate and steady their mind on the
imperceptible, qualityless (avyakta) Brahman through some perceptible objects
(.saguna). The Gita, therefore, far from marginalising and negating release for the
naturally weak and ordinary persons of poor intelligence, outlines the bhakti marga and
the worship of the perceptible as a concession to the frailties or realities of human
nature.116
marga (nistha) and jnana marga (nistha) would continue as two independent courses of life, the
first being engrossed in the desireless karma and the latter steeped in knowledge abandoning all
actions. Bhakti would not remain as bhakti nistha', it would merge in the jnana nistha’ and the
earlier follower of the bhakti marga would not perform desireless action, as the karma yogi does,
after the attainment of realisation, but turn to be jnani and remain engrossed in the abandonment
of duty. Hence, ‘the ultimate resolution of bhakti is into jnana’. Therefore, according to the Gita,
there are three paths (means) but only two nisthas. Why the pursuer of bhakti would necessarily
merge in the jnana nistha in the final stage and not in the karma nistha Tilak does not explain.
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.435, 577-79.
116
Samnaysi Sthitaprajna
(Jnani+Bhakta, both steeped
in Knowledge)
Knowledge
Worship of the
Worship of the
N. Perceptible in the
Imperceptible
N. beginning
from the very begi
NjWeak Reason)
(Sound Reason)
Jnana marga (Reason) Bhakti marga (Mind)
62
Although the Brahman to be worshipped is in this case qualityful, yet, it is imperceptible (avyakta),
that is, formless (nirakara). But, the natural formation of the human mind is such that man finds it
extremely difficult, or almost impossible, to love or to make his mind uniform, by meditation and
concentration, with an object from even among the qualityful objects, which is imperceptible, that
is. which, having no definite form, smell, etc., is on that account not cognizable by the organs.
Because, as the mind is naturally restless, it cannot understand on what to concentrate itself,
unless it has before itself, by way of support, some steady object, which is perceptible to the
organs. If this mental act of concentration is found difficult even by jnanins, how much more so
then by ordinary people? Therefore, just as in teaching Geometry one has to draw on a slate or
on a board, by way of sample, a small portion of a line, in order to impress on the mind the nature
of a straight line, which, though in itself eternal, endless, and breadthless, that is to say,
imperceptible, is yet qualityful, because it possesses the quality of length, so also, ordinary
people at least have got to keep before the mind, some perceptible object, which has a
'pratyaksa’ (visible) name and form, in order that they should acquire affection for and make their
minds uniform with the Paramesvara, Who is the cause of everything, omnipotent, and
omniscient, that is to say, qualityful, but who is yet formless, that is to say, imperceptible
(avyakta). Nay, unless some perceptible thing has been seen, the human mind cannot conceive
the idea of the imperceptible......You may call this the natural quality or the defect of the human
mind.117
Hence, the perceptible object is only a means, not the final state to be reached,
and when one reaches the final state, the perceptible object would cease to appear.
Therefore, no matter what the object is chosen for worship the imperceptible Brahman,
the object itself would not enlighten the bhakta, in fact, it has exclusively and utterly no
such potency. The matter, which redeems him, is the faith and love, which he invests on
The above diagram would show that both paths are different at the beginning of sadana but
would merge in the same equability of reason. The only difference is that while in the jnana
marga the sadaka, from the very beginning, would concentrate on the imperceptible knowledge,
the other would concentrate on the perceptible in the beginning of sadana but merge in the same
knowledge of the imperceptible. To quote him: “Though the paths may be two, yet, since one
attains the same paramesvara...........these two paths are eternal stair-cases for rising to the
same floor,...according to their respective qualifications;.... the ideals do not become different
because the paths are different. Out of these, the first step of the one stair-case (jnana) is
intelligence, whereas, the first step of the other stair-case is faith and love.... they are ultimately
of the same value in effect, and are both called 'adhyatma' in the Gita". Gita-Rahasya, vol. I,
pp.cit., pp.576-77.
117
63
the object or the mental frame behind the worship. Then, what is important is not the
symbol of worship but the purity of mind.
But. although the worship of Vasudeva has been given an important position in the Gita, in so far
as it is a means to an end, yet, considering the matter from the metaphysical point of view, it has
been stated in the Vedanta Sutras, as also further on in the Gita itself, that a symbol (pratika) is
only a kind of means, and that the true all-pervading and permanent Parmesvara cannot be
118
limited to any one of these symbols.
Having advanced this argument that the Gita maintains a clear-cut distinction
between the faith (mind) and the symbol (pratika), Tilak forms a very crucial answer to a
long-standing controversy regarding the question of relative greatness or smallness, or
superiority or inferiority of objects of worship. His answer was related both to its
practical consequences and metaphysical reasons. He attempted to resolve the
controversy through the true import of bhakti. Since the Gita makes the sharp distinction
between the object and the faith, or between the mind and the symbol, the arguments
that are advanced regarding the relative superiority or inferiority of the symbols, and
regarding the worship or non-worshipping pratika,119 and its resultant ‘physical violence',
are acts of ‘irrationality’, ‘ignorance’, ‘delusion’, ‘false arrogance’, and ‘acts of regrettable
stupidity’ of man. In fact, the ethics of the Gita is that there is nothing in this material
world, which is not eternal.120 Therefore, whatever object is chosen, if the faith is pure, it
would bring about salvation.
It becomes absolutely clear that the worship of even Krsna, or the Cosmic Form showed to
Arjuna, is not the worship of imperceptible but only perceptible, op.cit. p.586.
119
According to Tilak, the physical violence between religions is also due to the reason that
“certain religions of the world have outrightly rejected the idol worship” and some have accepted it
as worthwhile’’. Further, not merely the differences between the symbols, but even the differences
in the ritualistic practices among the religions in Europe have produced such a grave disputes.
120
To quote him: “If all the things or qualities to be seen in the world are only forms or symbols of
the Paramesvara, how can one say that the Blessed Lord is in one of them and not in another;
and who is going to say it?” G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.585.
64
Take the mind, or ether (akasa), or according to the path of the worship of the perceptible, take
the salagrama, or the sivalinga, or the tangible form of Sri Krsna, or of some saint, or take a
temple which contains a stone or a metal idol of a god, or a musjid or a temple which contains no
idol; all these are mere means for steadying the mind, that is, for fixing the mind on the
Paramesvara, like the go-carts of little children. However much these symbols, taken by different
persons according to their own liking or according to their respective spiritual qualifications, may
be loved by them, like the go-carts of children, which are simple or coloured, or of sandal-wood,
or to which a tambourine or a jingling bell is attached, yet, one must realise that the true
Paramesvara is 'not in these symbols’-'na pratike na hi sa/?-but is beyond them;...... The power
of redemption which is contained in the path of devotion is not a power possessed by some living
or lifeless image, or by a building of brick and mortar; but that belief, which every worshipper for
his own convenience holds with reference to such image, to the effect that it is the Isvara, is the
thing which really redeems. Let the symbol be of stone, or of metal, or of anything else, it can
never be worth more than what it really is. Whatever may be your faith with reference to the
symbol, it is the fruit of your devotion, which the Paramesvara-not the symbol-gives you. Then,
where is the sense of fighting that the symbol chosen by oneself is better than the one chosen by
another? If your faith is not pure, then, however good the symbol may be, what is the use of it? If
the whole day you are engaged in deceiving others, then, it will be impossible for you to attain the
Paramesvara, notwithstanding that you go to worship an idol in a temple, or.............and whether
121
every morning and evening, or on feast days.
Hence, the reward of the worship or fruit is equal to the faith and not the object of
bhakti. But a man in a particular case, if, while worshipping a particular object, obtains
some material gains, the ignorant people see that reward, as the reward given to him by
that object, which he has worshipped, and in case he gets more material gains or
prosperity, the object which is worshipped is regarded as superior among the various
symbols.
But, though the Paramesvara Who gives the reward may, in this way, be One, yet, as He gives a
different reward to each one according to his good or evil intentions, the results of the worship of
122
different symbols or deities are seen to be different, from each other.
121
Tilak cited an example from Sri Samartha Ramadasa's writing Dasabodha: “Sensual persons go
to the temple for listening to the sermons, but their eyes are fixed on the ladies who are present;
at the same time, those who have come with the intention of stealing, steal your shoes and go
away". G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.587-88.
122
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I,op.cit., p.589.
65
Although such an attitude leads to a lot of misery and bitter warfare, but such are
the realities of the world. This problem could be overcome by differentiating symbol,
eternal principle and the human faith.

Why such differences arise? Tilak says, they are due to the variations in the
mental construct of human being. This answer, which Tilak gives, is in relation with
metaphysical reasoning. If the reason is initially impure, then, the mind (practical
reason) however sattvika it might be, also becomes impure. And in case mind is weak,
then the reason however pure it might be also follows the impurity of the mind. In such a
situation the advice about the pure, quality less Brahman and the value of the
perceptible object would not impress and stamp on his mind. In turn, it would increase
the already existing impurity and bewilderment.
But, ordinarily the mind and the reason are not individually impure; and if the reason of a man is
inherently impure, his mind, that is, his faith, is also more or less impure; and in these
circumstances, this impure reason more and more confuses the inherently impure faith. We find
in ordinary life that in these circumstances, however much of advice may be given to a person
about the pure form of the Paramesvara, such advice is not fully impressed on his mind; or very
often - and specially if the faith and the reason are both initially immature and weak-the man
123
takes a perverse view of the advice itself.
According to Tilak, it is on the same fundamental reason of immaturity and
impurity of reason and mind that certain sections of the Vedic society were looked upon
as unfit for listening to the Vedas.124 But the Gita, Tilak argues, did not make any such
differentiation on the basis of reason or mind for the acquisition of knowledge, as it was
done by the Vedico-Upanisadic writings. Assuming the natural variations in the mental
faculty of man i.e. purity and impurity and the variations in the sattvika, rajasa, and
123
Tilak cited an example of a backward section of African society: “when Christian missionaries
begin to preach to the ebony-black Abyssinian in Africa about the Christian religion, he cannot by
any means get a true idea of the Father in Heaven or of the Christian religion; and it has been
observed that whatever is said to him, is imbibed by him in an incongruous meaning, according to
his immature reason............. ” G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.593.
124
Tilak, while quoting Max Muller, says that it was principally on the nature of mental frame (weak
reason and mind) that Sudras and other ignorant classes in ancient times were looked upon as
unfit for listening to the Vedas, op.cit., p.594.
66
tamasa qualities in man, it propounded different paths to be followed to attain salvation
by them according to their qualifications. Hence, the Vedic argument that knowledge
and salvation is the privilege of three upper classes, specially, brahmins is not
envisaged in the Bhagavadg/fa.125 For the Gita the social group or gender do not come
on the way of release. What is important is the faith and desirelessness and not the
caste or social category. Therefore, not merely three upper classes, Brahmin, Ksatriya,
and Vaisya, but Sudras, Women and even the lowest of the low are equally competent
and could attain salvation through the easiest path of faith and bhakti.
Although the knowledge which is acquired by this path, and the knowledge of the Brahman
mentioned in the Upanisads, are one and the same, yet, the difference between men and women
or between Brahmins, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras does not any more remain in this
path,......................... From this it follows that, that man whose reason has become equable
towards all, is the highest of men, whether he is a carpenter, or a merchant, or a butcher, by
profession. It is clear that, according to the Blessed Lord, the spiritual worth of a man does not
depend on the profession followed by him, or on the caste to which he belongs, but entirely on
the purity of his conscience. When in this way, the gateway of release has been opened to all
people in society, there arises in the hearts of all such persons, a strange self-consciousness, the
nature of which can be gauged from the history of the Bhagavata religion in Maharashtra. To the
Paramesvara, women, or the lowest of mixed tribes, or Brahmins are the same. “The
Paramesvara craves (only) for your faith”. He does not care for symbols, or for the black or white
colour of the skin, nor does He care for the difference between men and women, or castes like
126
the Brahmins or the Candalas (tribes born of the mixture of Brahmins and Sudras).
In Conclusion:
Tilak considered it imperative that the emerging nationalism in India needs to be
founded on clearly articulated moral principles, ideals and exemplars. The orientalist
125
G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.613. The difference is, while for the Vedas the lower classes due
to their weak reasons are unfit for acquiring knowledge, for the Gifa, bhakti is the path through
which that sections could attain salvation. Bhakti, in the Gifa, therefore, is outlined to meet the
dearth in the Vedic Writings.
126
Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp.614-15. It may be noted here that Tilak seeks an integral Indian
with a combination of bhakti and jnana. Thereby Tilak attempts to co-opt the bhakti tradition within
the fold of his brahmanical pursuasion and insisted the Brahmins to show love and devotion
towards the masses, which was hitherto absent in them.
67
literature had certain clearly articulated positions in this regard. It found an absence of
authoritative texts, like the Bible or the Koran that could suggest such moral
foundations. They pointed out that the contradictions and inconsistencies found in the
scriptural writings, the sects and fragmented traditions within Hinduism could not throw
up a pan-Hindu or a pan-Indian ethical principle, which will hold good across the sects
and traditions. There was the attempt by certain orientalist writers to suggest that
cultural texts of the tradition, such as the Gita, were deeply influenced by occidental
writings such as the Bible.

Tilak makes a three-fold response to such orientalist writings. He admits that
there are certain contradictions and inconsistencies across religious and moral texts in
India as is the case with respect to similar writings in the West. However, he thinks the
Gita is that singular text which rises above these inconsistencies and contradictions
while at the same time not denying the authority of the tradition.
Tilak does not agree to the sectarian appropriation of the Gita by the different
sects and religious traditions in India. He thinks that their appropriation of the Gita and
the paradigm around which they constructed it is necessarily partisan. By underplaying

the earlier interpretations of the Gita articulated in different sects Tilak attempts to
retrieve the Gita to formulate the ethical basis of pan-Indian nationalism.
He finds that the moral principles upheld by the Gita are superior to anything that
came to be formulated in the West in this regard. In fact, Tilak feels that the central
moral themes found in the New Testament are derivatives from the Gita via the
Buddhist interface. In this way he wants to reverse the terms of the orientalist discourse.
One of the most important emphases of Tilak is the necessity of formulating a set
of ethical principles to govern social relations and individual pursuits. His vehement
criticism against sectarian interpretations of the Gita is partly on account of their
emphases on disengagement with the world. Tilak wants to bring the nation to engage
with this world. The emphasis on karma yoga and the downgrading of jnana yoga were
meant to subserve these ends.

He, however, recognizes the importance of wielding together sects and traditions
within the fold of nationalism. Therefore, while he delegitimizes sects and partisan
traditions to the extent they are exclusivist, at the same time he recognizes them as
significant to map out the trajectory of the nation. The nation, however, is irreducible to
them.
68
Tilak constitutes the basis of nationalism around the Sthitaprajnas as its
exemplars. These virtuous characters are guided by nishkama karma and constitute the
models before the nation. The Sthitaprajna may hail from the traditional elite. But he
may also emerge from the masses through the path of bhakti. Consequently, the
national elite in Tilak’s imagination can come from the traditional elite as well as the
masses but to be leaders of the nation, they necessarily need to embody the ideal of the
Sthitaprajna. Tilak subscribes deeply to this form of moral elitism.

However, traditional elites in Tilak do not have automatic claims to be the leaders
of the new national dispensation. Tilak’s emphasis on karma marga and the relation that
he establishes between nishkama karma and karma yoga lay great emphasis on human
agency and its engagement with the world. Tilak has no love lost for Samnyasa. All
those earlier interpretations of the Gita, which emphasize on renunciation in the name of
enlightenment he finds despicable.
The emphasis on the heroic figure of Sthitaprajna makes Tilak to disregard *
ethical norms and rule of law. Indian nationalism is going to be anchored not on
constitutional democracy but on the heroic personality of the Sthitaprajna. The latter is
going to guide the destiny of the nation. Although he leaves space for the emergence of
the Sthitaprajnas from the masses through bhakti marga, the masses are assigned
primarily work and devotion rather than knowledge for their pursuit.
Overtly, Tilak denounces utilitarianism as a set of moral principles characteristic

of the modern West. However, his consideration of the moral basis of the nation
revolves to a great extent on considerations of utility. The kind of modernity that Tilak
has in view for India is deeply seeped in such cannons of utility. In fact, later on
Aurobindo was to draw attention to this issue in a pointed way.

Tilak seeks an integral India with a combination of jnana and bhakti via his
reading of the Gita. He attempts to co-opt the bhakti tradition within the new brahminical
persuasion of Sthitaprajna by asking the new elite to show their love and considerations
towards the masses, which was hitherto absent in them.

As Tilak underplayed sects and exalted his interpretation to the national status,
he underplayed pratika and exalted all India Hinduism as the basis of Indian
nationalism. However, it is difficult to say to what extent it was exclusivist. His journey
through the Gita rests on grounds of reason rather than tradition. Even the most
69
hallowed aspect of the tradition such as Samkara’s Gita Bhasya does not hold much of
sanctity to Tilak.
Tilak deeply contests the traditional four-fold authority on morals based on Srutis,
Smritis, Sadacara (hallowed usages) and Sadvipra (the testimony of the wise) and
replaces them by the conception of Sthitaprajna arrived at through discursive reasoning.
70

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Chapter -1

The Sthitaprajna as the Base of the Nation:

age of 16 years i.e. in 1872. See ‘Author’s preface’, op.cit., p.xliii.

Vedic Jnana kanda, laid an overwhelming emphasis on the physical renunciation of

(wealth), kama (desire), moksa (release), op.cit., p. 72.

scriptures propagated the physical renunciation of this-woridly life.

of the old framework of the Vedico-Upanisadic or Smriti’s ethical principles because

to the European approaches on these issues. He took up a two-fold stand in this

Tilak rejected, calling them as non-authentic interpretations. ‘Pre-conceived’,

ancient times as it expounded the abstruse and deep philosophy of 'adhyatma,-

op.cit., pp.662,666,703,705-706, 750,752,758,766 etc.,

arguments of Gifa. Vol. II, op.cit., pp.112-115.

impediment to all the attempts by karma yoga to establish a continual relationship

‘Author’s Preface’, Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op. cit., p.L.

karma yoga vouchsafes for the same.

Sthitaprajna16- a completely integrated person whose reason is steadied by the practice

expressed in constitutional democracy or any other form of government but on the

message to offer and it is a Vedico-Upanisadic synthetic text. It attempted to

to consolidate those traditions at a time of major social, philosophical and spiritual

His opposition to certain orientalist interpretations was quite explicit. Referring to

two distinctive philosophies- philosophy of renunciation (jnana kanda) and philosophy of

Madhvacarya, Ramanujacarya, Vallabha, Nimbarka, Sridhara Swamy, Jnanesvari and few

interpretations to critically encounter, if not marginalise other interpretations or other

25 Glta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp. 17-8.

Glta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.29.

arthavadopapatti ca lingam tatparyanirnaye ||

interpretation as superior,36 an alternative to the existing ones, yet Gita-Rahasya on the

in different sects in India, he attempts to construct a homogeneous nationalism based

Critique of European Ethical Visions: Superiority of the Gita:

the present age.

pages of the Gita-Rahasya with three other major objectives in view.

scientific temper of the modern age.

ethics. His arguments proceed as follows.

the part of Christianity and Christian missionaries to Europeanize Indian social

Gita-Rahasya , vol. I, op.cit., pp.l-li.

Vedanta. The Vedico-Sastric methodological categories of basing human knowledge or

43 Gita- Rahasya, vol. II, op.cit., p.831.

In this context, Tilak advances a significant response to one of the recurrent

ethical elements contained in different scriptures were bounded by transcendental

45 G\ta-Rahasya, vol, I, op.cit., p. 201.

46 G\ta-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p. 93.

command over the European understandings.

expressed in European writings and contends against Western morals particularly as

advocated by the missionaries. Europe, he felt, gave much importance to positive

Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., pp. 50-51, 526.

ethical ‘doable’ and ‘not-doable’ actions.

or not which is completely absent in the utilitarian conception of ethics.

on the basis of the external effect of an object.

as a suitable moral philosophy.

Universality of Ethical Principles and their Exceptions:

underlying principles. He considered non-violence, truthfulness, forgiveness etc. as

Otherwise, ‘life in this world, which is full of villains, is difficult’.52

on various occasions by following a peaceful method, which cannot be achieved by

Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.42.

53 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.546

sanctioned and enjoined violence, untruthfulness or non-forgiveness under certain

It will be noticed that the whole argument of Tilak regarding non-violence,

Tilak’s notion of non-violence and the specification of circumstances constituting

62 Gita-Rahasya, vol. I, op.cit., p.43.

part of ahimsa. Regarding the unconscious himsa, Tilak’s argument is that it is

other creatures in a big or small way, or in some form or the other.

no meaning whatsoever for the principle of ‘absolute non-violence’. He adduces in this

Second, the principles of non-violence or truthfulness do not suffer in cases,