petitioners herein.

ELIS V. REPUBLIC Art. 15 adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person
7 SCRA 962 is determined by the latters' nationality.
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California and is married to Pursuant to this theory, the Court has jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she
Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over
Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959. the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Four or five days later, the mother of Rose Under the Philippine’s political law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American
left her with the Heart of Mary Villa — an institution for unwed mothers and their legal system, the Court have, likewise,
babies — stating that she (the mother) could adopted the latter's view to the effect that personal status, in general, is
not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family.). determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The
Court of First Instance of Pampanga for Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II,
the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on pp. 713-714).
January 14, 1960, petitioner Marvin G. This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by non-
Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned resident aliens, and we have consistently
thereto as staff sergeant in the United States refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce — regardless of the
Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in grounds upon which the same are based
the Philippines before, or, to exact, in — involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the
1953. forum, even when our laws authorized absolute
Issue: divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil.
Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil.
adopt Baby Rose.
Held: 851; Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29,
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines — and, hence, non- 1955)".
resident aliens – the Court cannot assume
and exercise jurisdiction over the status, under either the nationality theory or the
domiciliary theory.
Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:
xxxxxxxxx
(4) Non-resident aliens;".
xxxxxxxxx
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation.
Since adoption is a proceedings in rem, no court may entertain unless it has
jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter
of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status
of Baby Rose as well as that of
1

G.R. No. L-16922 April 30, 1963
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE,
MARVIN G. ELLIS and GLORIA C. ELLIS, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Leonardo F. Lansangan for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the adoption
of a Filipino baby girl named Rose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California, is 28 years of age. On
September 3, 1949, he married Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both
are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959, at the
Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with
the Heart of Mary Villa - an institution for unwed mothers and their babies - stating that
she (the mother) could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the
mother's family.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At
the time of the hearing of the petition on January 14,1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis
and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as
staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both
lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to exact, in
1953.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent residents in the
Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, provides that:
2
"The following cannot adopt:
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
(4) Non-resident aliens;".
xxx xxx xxx
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we
sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners
herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualified
deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court
may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and
over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well
as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality.
Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Under our political law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, we
have, likewise, adopted the latter's view to the effect that personal status, in general, is
determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of
the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol.
II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit
adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the
validity of foreign decrees of divorce - regardless of the grounds upon which the same
are based - involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the
forum, even when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v.
Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil.
851; Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29,
1955)".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines - and, hence, non-
resident aliens - we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status, under
either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. In any event, whether the above -
quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the res or
merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by
petitioners herein, and it has been so held in Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25,
1962) and Katansik v. Republic L-15472 (June 30,
1962).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be
entered denying the petition in this case.

3
Tecson v. Comelec absence of any other evidence, could
424 SCRA 277 have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
Facts: have benefited from the "en masse
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
(FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy have benefited from the "en masse
for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
to be a natural-born citizen of the during which regime respondent FPJ has
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, initiated, on 9 January 2004, a
petition before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. And
even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan
F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ.
Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the
President of the Philippines.
Held:
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954
at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
4
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004] MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.
DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004] ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004] VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by
those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question
of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to
challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the
land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the
presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American
colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no
less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
5
of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to
a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy
of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in
Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,
attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the
National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said
office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of
merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before
this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R.
No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC
6
deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation
of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC,
petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,
Government. to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12,
Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view
could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed,
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of
government post in the land.
the Philippines.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634,
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-
warranto shall not include an election protest.
003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
[4] President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on the
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. [5] In
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear
Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third
and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-
highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a
President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
post-election scenario.
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section
adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 presidency before the elections are held.
Constitution.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post- Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez
7
vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in
the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be
governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was
active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty
and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political
power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship,
which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social
security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as
it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization
of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were
8
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish
laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship
laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was
extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among
experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to
Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal
Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in
the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870,
which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of
the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special
laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were
Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants
of any town of the Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state
of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of
the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined
by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain
by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory
or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including
the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have
the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased
to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to
be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the
Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
9
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant
was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11
April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the
time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the
Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of
the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of
the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens
of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be
a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was
a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such
link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
10
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose
their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children
of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found
status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted
the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated
by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and
the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the
earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo
Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him
to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of
11
his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a
mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy
of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on
05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the
date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe
was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth
certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-
one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the
entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents,
the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years
old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been
submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3"
for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts
which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death
of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by
petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three
documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded
in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima
facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September
1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that
Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a
colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
12
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San
Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound
to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of
his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the
Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil
status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of
the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son
according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a
will, or a public document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the
Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the
father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
being an authoritative document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court
ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here
really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy
of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon
it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all
that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data
to be entered in the civil register.Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is
in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may
also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there
must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or
her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a
document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and
those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was
required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full
blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially
declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
13
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however,
could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply
as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public
instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official)
or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and
Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which
to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the
code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that
Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place
according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of
laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea
of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in
favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect
his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions
on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of
the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to
14
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons,
govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all
questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority,
division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil
effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are
questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on successional rights and family
relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of
his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such
legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law [41] and not his political
status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which,
while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided
distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-
up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly
according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by
foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil
Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however,
remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that 3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and 4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded Magdalena Street, Manila.
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our
with pedigree.
mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
between 1943-1944.
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
xxxxxxxxx
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of
Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to 18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate
i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
one house, and as one family -
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby Ruby Kelley Mangahas
declare that:
Declarant
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr. DNA Testing
15
 In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on
July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent
marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no
less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a
Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or
on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship
16
of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.
[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ,
is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a
decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the
Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the
naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not
have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section
1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The
issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still
needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed
that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his
father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in
fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore
was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino,
Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about
Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the
case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum
in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in
the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate
child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by
People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and
illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose
but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child
from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had
illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his
own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to
punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in
that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this
Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have
expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on
pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship
of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality
17
for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother
had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction
over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the
petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ
from running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on
the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions
in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in
the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential
election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court
can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or
not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and,
in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the
year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend
to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section
78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed
to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there
has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission
on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

18
AASJS vs. Datumanong renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly,
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007 from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
Sec. 3, RA 9225 stayed clear of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting
of confronting the issue of whether or not the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. country. What happens to the other citizenship
FACTS: was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Datumanong, the official tasked to Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with
implement laws governing citizenship in order to prevent the Justice Secretary from by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court
implementing R. A. 9225. Petitioner argues is without any jurisdiction to entertain
that RA 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution issues regarding dual allegiance.
which states that dual allegiance of citizens is Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and
inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law. The Office of the Solicitor it is not a self-executing provision. The
General (OSG) claims that Section 2 legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of Act No. 9225, the framers were not
another country shall be deemed not to have concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 who maintain their allegiance to their
does not allow dual allegiance since the oath countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to
taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his draft a law that would set specific
foreign citizenship. The fact that the parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the premature for the judicial department,
Philippines is an unmistakable and
categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic. including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Issue:
Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the court
Held:
R.A. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no jurisdiction yet to pass upon the
issue of dual allegiance. The court held
that that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away
with the provision in Commonwealth Act
No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other
countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
19

EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 160869 : May 11, 2007]
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN
CALILUNG, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his
official capacity as the Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner
prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens
Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers
that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the
1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003,
reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
20
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
"The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; andcralawlibrary
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act
No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue
of dual allegiance?cra lawlibrary
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers
that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born
or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship
without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said
21
law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship
by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The
Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national
interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the
oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former
Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship.
The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority
of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided
loyalty to the Republic.3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is
necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law.
During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual
allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:
x x x
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist -
- the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He
pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He
thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of
foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a
violation of the Constitution'
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional
injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed
law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means.
However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by
requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will
be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the
United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine
government will have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual
allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the
bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this
oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country concerned, he explained.
x x x it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his
foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at
the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now
a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a
matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign
parliament but a Member of the House.
x x x distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to
national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance
problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill
which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is
recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country
and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his
country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had
22
left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is
required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He
then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines
but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face,
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section
3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed
any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be
justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while
it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court,
through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual
allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and
it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned
with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress
was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since
the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance.
Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes
dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed
laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of
the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial
restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers
demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

23
 As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a controversy,
Republic v. Maddela the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond
27 SCRA 702 judicial power. Thus, for instance, no
This is a petition to have the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat, and Chan Po Lan, all action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or
Chinese Nationals, to be declared a Filipino petitioner is married, or single, or a
citizens. legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to
That sometime in the year 1937 Miguela was legally married to Sy Ing Seng, a Filipino justify a given relief available only to one
citizen; likewise, in the year 1961, Chan enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as
Po Lan was legally married to Cu Bon Piao, a Filipino citizen; and that the petitioners naturalization by judicial decree. But
have all the qualifications and none of the there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
disqualifications to become Filipino citizens. declare that a given person is a Filipino
The court inquired from Fiscal Veluz, who represents the Solicitor General, if he has
any opposition to the petition to which the Citizen. (Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960).
Fiscal answered that he has no opposition. The Court had it announced to the public if
there is any opposition to the petitions of
both to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered
his opposition.
As such, the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat and Chan Po Lan were declared a Filipino
citizens by marriage and the Commissioner
of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration
and immigrant certificate of residence of
the petitioner and to issue the corresponding identification card.
The Solicitor General filed the instant petitions instead, including the Commissioner of
Immigration as co-petitioner in view of
the fact that the dispositive parts of the decisions of the lower court are addressed to
him for compliance.
Issue:
Whether or not a person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial declaration of
citizenship.
Held:
Under Philippine laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a
given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
24
 married to Sy Ing Seng, a Filipino citizen; and that the petitioner has all the
G.R. No. L-21664 March 28, 1969 qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
After the submission of the evidence for the petitioner, the court inquired from
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF Fiscal Veluz if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal
IMMIGRATION, petitioners, answered that he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant
vs. opposition. The Court had it announced to the public if there is any opposition
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, to the petition of Miguela Tan Suat to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody
Branch II, and MIGUELA TAN SUAT, respondents. in the crowded courtroom registered his opposition.

----------------------------- IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, petitioner Miguela Tan Suat is hereby
declared a Filipino citizen by marriage and the Commissioner of Immigration is
G.R. No. L-21665 March 28, 1969 hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration and
immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF corresponding identification card.lâwphi1.ñet
IMMIGRATION, petitioners,
vs. On the same day the same court rendered another similarly worded, decision in its
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, special Proceeding No. 4013, this time in favor of Chan Po Lan. This second decision
Branch II and CHAN PO LAN, respondents. reads:

First Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for
petitioners.
De Mesa and De Mesa for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
These are actually two (2) separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction but are decided jointly because the issues presented proceed
from the same factual background.
The pertinent facts are not disputed. On April 29, 1963 the Court of First Instance of
Quezon (Branch 11), Hon. Manolo L. Maddela presiding, rendered a decision in its
Special Proceeding No. 4012, which is hereunder quoted in its entirety:
This is a petition to have the petitioner Miguela Tan Suat, a Chinese National,
to be declared a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General has been represented by
Assistant Fiscal Jose Veluz. During the trial it has been established to the
satisfaction of the Court that sometime in the year 1937 petitioner was legally
25
This is a petition to have the petitioner Chan Po Lan, a Chinese National, to be
declared a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General has been represented by
Assistant Fiscal Jose Veluz. During the trial it has been established to the
satisfaction of the Court that sometime in the year 1961, petitioner was legally
married to Cu Bon Piao, a Filipino citizen; and the petitioner has all the
qualifications and more of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
After the submission of the evidence for the petitioner, the court inquired from
Fiscal Veluz if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal
answered that he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant any
opposition. The Court had it announced to the public if there is any opposition
to the petition of Chan Po Lan to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody in
the crowded courtroom registered his position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Chan Po Lan is hereby declared a
Filipino citizen by marriage and the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of
registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue
the corresponding identification card.
 On July 1, 1963 the Solicitor General 1 filed separate notices of appeal from said
decisions, at the same time requesting an extension of ten (10) days within which to file
the corresponding records on appeal. However, because of the unexplained failure of
the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Quezon to forward the records
immediately despite repeated requests therefor by the Solicitor General, the latter,
unable to prepare the records on appeal, filed the instant petitions instead, including the
Commissioner of Immigration as co-petitioner in view of the fact that the dispositive
parts of the decisions of the lower court are addressed to him for compliance.
On August 10, 1963 we issued in each case a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
execution and enforcement of the judgment. Thereafter these two cases were submitted
for decision without any answer from the respondents.
Before these cases were submitted for decision, the Solicitor General filed a motion,
dated February 14, 1964, to cite the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon for contempt by reason of his failure to forward the records of these cases to
this Court despite our resolution to that effect. It appears, however, that after the said
resolution was issued the Clerk did send those records and the same were received here
on January 24, 1964. The question of contempt has therefore become moot.
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are hereby granted; the questioned decisions are
set aside and the writs of preliminary injunction previously issued are made permanent.
Costs against private respondents.

Private respondents' identical prayer in the lower court was for a declaration of their
Filipino citizenship and for an order to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to
cancel their respective alien certificates of registration on the ground that they had
married Filipino husbands. In granting the said prayer the lower court was clearly in
error. At that time jurisprudence had already set the question at rest: no person claiming
to be a citizen may get a judicial declaration of citizenship.

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident
only of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a controversy, the court
may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise,
such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or
proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or
petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon
may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to
one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given
status, such as naturalization by judicial decree. But there is no similar
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a
given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April 18,
1960).2

26
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
41 SCRA 292 Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
Facts: born or naturalized, becomes
On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
a non-immigrant. In the under Section 4 of the same law.
interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
Philippines, she stated that she follows the Philippine citizenship of
was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
to the Philippines to visit her suffer from any of the
great-grand-uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
into the Philippines on 13 March naturalization proceedings, Section 15
1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13 April is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as
1961. On the date of her arrival, Filipino, who dies during the
Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
Lau Yuen Yeung would actually considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is
country or within the period as in plain common sense and there is
his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of
allow. After repeated our country, both substantive and
extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization
1962. On 25 January 1962, she proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that
Filipino citizen. Because of the she may not have to be called
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or
arrest and immediate deportation, business or exercise a right reserved
after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
injunction. At the hearing which marriage or the husband's acquisition of
took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
write either English or Tagalog. Filipinos. Everytime the
Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino Whatever the corresponding court or
name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
The Court of First Instance of adjudicata, hence it has to be
Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Nota bene:
Issue: There are two laws, which govern the Loss of Philippine citizenship. These are Commonwealth
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino Act No. 63 and Commonwealth
citizen. Act No. 473. The former applies to both natural-born and naturalized citizens and the latter
Held: applies only to naturalized citizens.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her As stated in Commonwealth Act. No. 63,
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
27
1. By naturalization in a foreign country; Commonwealth Act No. 473, Section 18 of said law provides that:
2. By express renunciation of citizenship; A naturalization certificate may be cancelled by a competent judge on any of the following
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign grounds:
country upon attaining twenty-one 1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
years of age or more: Provided, however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine 2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said
citizenship in any manner naturalization certificated, return
while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country; to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence
4. By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign there: Provided, That the
country: Provided, That the rendering fact of the person naturalized remaining for more than one year in his native country or the
of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, country of his former
and the taking of an oath of nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered prima facie evidence
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest of his intention of taking
a Filipino of his up his permanent residence in the same;
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present: 3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention
a. The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the 4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a
said foreign public high school
country; or recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
b. The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent government and civics
of the Republic are taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by
of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said neglecting to support them or by
service, or transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree of naturalization
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he certificate shall be
does so only forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior and the Bureau of Justice.
in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided, finally, That any Filipino 5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in
citizen who is violation of the
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of constitutional provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use
the or enjoyment of a right,
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote franchise or privilege.
in any election The main reason why a decision in a naturalization proceeding is not res judicata is
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the because such is not a judicial
armed forces of adversarial proceeding. Similarly, estoppel or laches cannot apply to the government in action
said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall for the cancellation of a
be certificate of naturalization, since it is a known principle that the government is never estopped
automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen; by the mistakes on the part of its
5. By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization; agents.
6. By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces However, according to the Constitution, marriage to an alien would not automatically
in time of war, unless divest a person of his citizenship,
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and unless he or she performs certain acts or omission which would result to the loss of his or
7. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in her citizenship. This provision,
force in her husband's country, she however, is not retroactive; thus, does not repatriate those who lost their Philippine citizenship
acquires his nationality. by marriage under the 1935 and
28
1973 Constitutions.

29

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN
YEUNG, Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C.
Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil
Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the
fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the
Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and
causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to
do so."chanrobles virtual law library
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied,
the case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are
these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she
was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure
trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of
one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted to come into the
Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month
30
which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed
a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen
Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which
took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she
could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor,
with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-
law, or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds,
that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as set
forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which
read:chanrobles virtual law library
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. - Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be
held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman
may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an
alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang,
etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint,
to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully
naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by
naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to
plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to
be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on
March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of
residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3,
Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified
under the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself is not
disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay
in the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28,
1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one
month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected
merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure,
not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor
on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay
only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she
had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-
9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-
6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the
31
decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very
provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul
the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act
503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the
administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the
performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the
Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in
determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration
CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be
disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and
insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write
either language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some
bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-
appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown
thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant
factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the
lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau
Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her
husband."chanrobles virtual law library
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo,
thus:chanrobles virtual law library
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT
HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED
NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN
WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF
HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE
QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN
THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER
WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR
CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL
CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL
WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE,
MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH
BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION
OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED
TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH
WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF
HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE
FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V
32
COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE
COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO
LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN
THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41,
RECORD ON APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision
upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the
court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on
the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay
only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she
had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-
9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017,
Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);chanrobles virtual law library
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer
on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the
disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No.
L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would
necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We
will base our discussions, more or less, on said
objections.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Ichanrobles virtual law library
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in
appellants' second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy
discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an
alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain
here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign
country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine
port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is
premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We
note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo.
Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of
the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage
to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a
permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of
the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the
Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul
the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors,
legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently
or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities
may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has
vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by alien to convert
their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the
procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao
Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration
33
Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate
and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby
secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go
back on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the
Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure
requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or
"correction", for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any
other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the
Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a limited time, might
then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and
thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent
residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade
his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he
entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here
as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be
required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a
re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when
after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his
assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon
him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is
naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines.
Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have
to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they have
a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a
requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather
absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459,
Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a
citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that,
in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence
the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine
citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be
cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of
an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon
him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to
permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner
of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express
provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens
of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth
assignments of error are well taken.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
IIchanrobles virtual law library
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is
that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making
her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the
qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization
Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly
concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen
Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen
in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for
naturalization.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the
view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-
11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713, 1for it was only in Zita
Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30,
1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held
that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to
34
apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised
Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she
has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for
naturalization, 2albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the
motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging
Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to
reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the
prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im
Ty. 3chanrobles virtual law library
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth
Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4one almost
identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a
temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She
filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the
expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto
Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of
said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said
marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such
request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on
March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the
recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no
obligation to leave, because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond
should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr.
Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a
Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from
the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view,
petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a
citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that,
in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence,
the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a
Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond
shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a
male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political
status.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners
rely, reads:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an
opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of
section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified
from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;chanrobles
virtual law library
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;chanrobles virtual law library
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;chanrobles virtual law
library
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases;chanrobles virtual law library
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;chanrobles virtual law
library
35
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war;chanrobles virtual law library
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws
does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha
does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who
claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified
in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of
proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking,
petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-
appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower
court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha
may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts,
we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should
be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp.
462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the
above decision as regards the following
propositions: .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might
be lawfully naturalized";chanrobles virtual law library
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the
limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under
Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;chanrobles virtual law library
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action
to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;chanrobles
virtual law library
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; andchanrobles
virtual law library
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow
left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications, 5specially
considering that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of
Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most
important of which are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15,
Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision in the
naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman
to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who
may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex
parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s.
1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)chanrobles virtual law library
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to
have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization
by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be
naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)chanrobles virtual law library
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization
Law, it results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after
June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that
she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice
Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)chanrobles virtual law library
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of
inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of
the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473,
36
which reads in part as follows:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above
provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong
to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law
(Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168,
s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to
be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an
illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines
in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the
citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58,
98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must
necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act
No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so
appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The
Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same
ruling on the basis of the following facts:chanrobles virtual law library
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned
out that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her
arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo
Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered
her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so, the
husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the
petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha
v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not
suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law
requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the
decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino
is herself not disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization
Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship
by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court,
therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings,
where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of
Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo
Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957,
101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the
parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of
the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial
naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above
decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at
the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated
in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any
naturalization proceedings under said law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications,
that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact
that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not
be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a
distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent
to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
needs only to show that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those
relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial
37
proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen
[U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s.
1953.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-
10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the
abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits
of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of
the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive
factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire
Philippine citizenship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of
Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground
that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for
naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based
on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may
not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a
Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)chanrobles virtual law library
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau
of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married
to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's
citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the
filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit
of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized
Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts
an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)chanrobles virtual law
library
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-
10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-
quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male
Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may
be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the
benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In
other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is
the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)chanrobles virtual law library
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a
new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and,
quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950;
No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of
section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified
from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S.
Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of
the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the
facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in
the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration
asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from
38
receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the
bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of
Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an
order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash
bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must
enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity
to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before
final judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v.
Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in
the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and
conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of
Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor
of the Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan,
a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices
Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve
the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955,
and the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond - failure to
depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay
in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of
Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice - were committed before the
marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There is
no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in
the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement
therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act
473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other
hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly
Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly
held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman
to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization
by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be
naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)chanrobles virtual law library
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of
the construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the
seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have
been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790,
October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in
Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no
immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue now, since
it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on
the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited
himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed
a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," so that
the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship,
as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v.
Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of
record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy",
without explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and
Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined
that both qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating
on what seemed to be departure from the said first two
decisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of
rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775,
November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a
Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with
authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost
six months before the expiry date of her permit, and when she was requested to leave
after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a
Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating
explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the
39
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial
judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications
referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the
qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect,
etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was
whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown
apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court,
reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of
the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the
Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman "should be a
person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in
respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a
citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a
citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the life
of the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding,
the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not
only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further
qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute
will be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may
have existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon
the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")chanrobles virtual law library
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman
or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen,
because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc.,
she was presumed to be qualified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as
amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become
citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the
pertinent provisions of that law provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens - Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones
Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine
citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (c)
polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and
the Philippines are at war, during the period of such
war.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Section 3. Qualifications. - The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of
this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than
twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition
to being not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition,
have all and each of the following qualifications:chanrobles virtual law library
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five
years, except as provided in the next following section;chanrobles virtual law library
Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the entire period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which they are
living;chanrobles virtual law library
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession; andchanrobles
virtual law library
40
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native
tongue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under
oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to
the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then stood,
alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens
of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof
under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or
(3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States
might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the
qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the
same for all intents and purposes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No.
473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from
the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the
purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the
existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against
Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to
foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 - 11 ed.]), even as it
retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" must be understood in the context in which it is now
found, in a setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard
v. Grant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that,
as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the
law are qualified to become citizens of the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must
not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v.
Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen
of the Philippines, because the law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications" in
separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation
given to the former law, it was to be understood that the alien woman was not
disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was
enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in order
that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case held
was that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she
belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become citizens by naturalization -
the assumption being always that she is not otherwise
disqualified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the
citizenship of her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has
all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino
citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect
that she is not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly
disregarded by the trial court, the same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration,
G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun
Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of
her husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization and required her
to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775,
promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-
13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a
naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It
must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less
showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself.
41
Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition
of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to
make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9
SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San
Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November
12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the
Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a
Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the
necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when
Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R.
No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted
Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same
year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between
Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to expire on
February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of
Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the
reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a
mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the
need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of Justice
Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with
the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. 7chanrobles virtual
law library
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22,
1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower
court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of
Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the
qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none of
the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later
in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA
539.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to
expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of
relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the
other affirmative requirements of the law." 9chanrobles virtual law library
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10Justice
Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the
dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be
allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the
requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in
the process the decision to such effect discussed above, 11even as he impliedly
reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961,
2 SCRA 383.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the
point now under discussion is settled law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. - Any woman, who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the
naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a
foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized,
shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be
a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
42
virtual law library
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the age of majority
he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the
country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married
to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself,
that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law,
she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? if nothing but the
unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be
considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable,
specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on
January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong,
all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other
circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take
up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the
Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was
decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result,
precisely, according to them, because (they wanted to leave the point now under
discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12Truth to tell, the views and arguments
discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration
as well as in the memorandum of the amici curae 13in the Burca case cannot just be
taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner,
not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical
aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of
Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have
always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing
continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative authorities in charge
of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford
the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no part in
Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine
the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang,
Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha.
Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem
to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further
consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are
construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly,
copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision
is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its
history proves this beyond per adventure of
doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature
under American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as
a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the
Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of
March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted
pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the
Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after
the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible
for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own;
everything was American.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of
March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do
43
not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the
effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the
Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however,
abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of
the wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any
provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his
alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one
who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided
thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. - In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far
as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it
had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act
2977, that the following provisions were added to the above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen
and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippine Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being
under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents,
shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens
thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17,
1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted
earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted
practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change
of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than
this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions
of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were
rendered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it
was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a
Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she
becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not
suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473,
with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section
2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of
qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang,
44
that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by
the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to
become a Filipina by marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as
follows: That "like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the
classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were
disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since
1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in
order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the
only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are
qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the
view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of
disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14chanrobles
virtual law library
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference
may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases.
The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications
required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v.
Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30,
1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963;
Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has
submitted the question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling
in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which Section
15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of
February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law,
Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former
Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920.
Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to
three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof;
(b) natives of the other insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become
citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to
foreigners who may become American Citizens is restrictive in character, for only
persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as
racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the
naturalization laws of the two countries and hence there was reason to accord here
persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to the statutory
provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American
citizens.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment
of the Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939.
The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act
No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to
retain the said provision - that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the
alien wife must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is no
longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become
immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as
enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the
woman "might herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage,
contrary to settled norms of statutory
construction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is
believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy
thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a
man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological
beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and
traditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for
naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not
entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen.
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the
same conclusion thus:
45
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been
residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27,
t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13,
t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine
languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized
indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries
a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to
not being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the
appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the
law demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section
4.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at
issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise
pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to
the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established
the rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the
Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one who "might
herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications
enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov.
30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok
Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy
King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829,
June 30, 1965).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section
2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not
mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be
not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be
conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4
disqualifies only -chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; andchanrobles virtual law
library
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,chanrobles virtual law
library
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously
convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that
the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the
requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral
character."chanrobles virtual law library
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in
government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
"herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not
"opposed to organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominance of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on
the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative
requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly
does not possess.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived
from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial
and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same
in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v.
46
Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a
closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely
affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived
thereby not entirely unassailable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927
providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth
Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for
naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of
allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy.
It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the
whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. - Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones
Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any
mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine
citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable
subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the
understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a territory of the United States by
virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved
pursuant to express authority without which it could not have been done, granted by an
amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the
United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the
Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been footed earlier.
In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters
under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15and
not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our Naturalization
Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from
the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the fact that such
discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of
the amendment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision
(c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American citizens is
restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified
thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the
thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship
only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens
of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her
laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any
particular race or color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all
the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the
United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927
became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already provided for the
following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government,
or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching
such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches
the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or
officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the
United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official
character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the
United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship
under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly,
as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of
Aliens throughout the United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement,
except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed
by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its
Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it
were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already
mentioned above. 16Thus, it would seem that the rationalization in the qouted decisions
47
predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by
Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial
discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17chanrobles virtual
law library
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the
construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first
Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that
the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section
13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact
copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as
it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable
construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to
apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it were written in the
statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they
knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting
verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as
thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney
General of the United States and all administrative authorities, charged with the
implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v.
Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v.
Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v.
Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus
Curiae]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and
administrative authorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora
Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523,
decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p.
117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen."chanrobles virtual law library
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February
10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided "that any
woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who
shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a
citizen."chanrobles virtual law library
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7
& 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided that "any woman married, or who shall
be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken
to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born
subject."chanrobles virtual law library
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp.
Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the
Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman
who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not
become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage ..."chanrobles virtual
law library
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are
repealed." chanrobles virtual law library
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or
retained under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of
September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage
of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the
meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised
Statutes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284,
construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might
lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application of the law
to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only
required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person," and
not an alien enemy."chanrobles virtual law library
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the
48
class or race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other
provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the
provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of
aliens.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the
Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed
a citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the
case," the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is
of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who
marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary
that it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time
of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court,
in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the
United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the
concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen
of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions of the
statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7
Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might be
lawfully naturalized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to
the United States from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration
laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with
the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus,
and pending the disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American citizen.
The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court below, that
she was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: "The rule is well
settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be
discharged. The status of the wife follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her
marriage her husband's domicil became her
domicil." .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed.
980, had before it the application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It
appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York
on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel
on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization would be to confer
citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to
pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until
it was determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act
on the express ground that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her.
At the same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization would not
effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become lawfully naturalized.
"Her own capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her
attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer
it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views
expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded
as something more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned
judge, unable to accept them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge
Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married
an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States, could
not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the
immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she bad not
had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911
was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the
relators married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we
assume the contention of the district attorney to be correct that marriage will not make
a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not
affect these relators."chanrobles virtual law library
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said
to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and
the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now before the court is
that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been
made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after such an order was made. But such
an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a
court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances
49
that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change
prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an
order of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted
with a contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual
deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain that
the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the
order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith
marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she
thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes,
American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the immigration
authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and
not to citizens.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right
of the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this
country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken
into custody by the immigration authorities in the following September, and in October
a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of that
order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her
deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the
time of her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman
had married a citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her deportation.
Judge Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown." He
held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the
immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a
naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a
class of persons excluded by law from admission to the United States does not come
within the provisions of that section. The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained
in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were
cited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and
held that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien
prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a
citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due
process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was conceived
in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the
appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed.
1022.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute
by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen.
402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United
States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to
constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the United States
abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and her husband having
continued to reside abroad after the marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an
opinion rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman,
twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at
once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after
her arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by way of instituting
proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat.
4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had
entered this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a
house of prostitution and practicing the same within three years after landing. It
appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United States commissioner, but
prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was lawfully
married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time
of her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with
her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but
professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to
deport her, the claim being advance that by her marriage she bad become an American
citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled against the
right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the words,
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be
lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization
laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
50
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that
Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the
marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ... shall not
invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female
shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts which make her
liable to deportation under this act."chanrobles virtual law library
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the
law:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class
avoiding deportation through the device of marrying an American
citizen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman
of any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention, should not
confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its
intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to
women of the immoral class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We
have found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a
racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other
writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley v.
Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of the
decisions 19simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to
citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization
the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who shall be married,"
do not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated,
but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous
Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship
existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she
becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under
the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women
whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater
number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion,
was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any
application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason
for the restriction suggested.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing
at the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free
white person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L.
153.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York,
in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its
provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized
under existing laws" only limit the application to free white women" 20it hastened to
add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that the
person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ...
not an alien enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United
States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already
been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding
footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race
requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial
requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is
demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the
previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is
impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by
Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be naturalized
under existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white women, must be
interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then
existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen
would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more necessarily,
but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in force at the
time of her marriage or the naturalization of her
husband.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
51
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the
Court drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by
Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section
particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may
be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable
conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write
English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in
certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely
intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the
proper premises, We have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently
justified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already
explained above of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to
indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that
Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a
settled construction by American courts and administrative
authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted
above, there can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded
provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken,
from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously
agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to the
Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only eligibility to be
taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the
conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21In the very case of Leonard v.
Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such
posture of the American authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act
of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that the
person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the
usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and
proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less
a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and,
therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of
any person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning "such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly.
When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the
usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in
a situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for
word, it is understood that the construction already given to such statute before its
being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can
give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have
already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in
accurate factual premises related to the real legislative background of the framing of
our naturalization law in its present form.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927
cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2
of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act
2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the
same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase
"who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act
3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without
regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1
have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the
American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was
approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their
counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into
account and that what should be considered only are the requirements similar to those
provided for in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section
4?chanrobles virtual law library
52
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized"
in Section 15 could have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given
to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448
which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473,
was enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States was no longer in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of
September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of
American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization
proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other
words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as already
demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already
abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be
natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the
time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of
Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the
Americans of requiring judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for
the first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or
previous American Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was
approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the
American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make
one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922,
but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law. What then is
significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even
after the Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what is now
contended to be the construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated
differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the
American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those given
upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction here
different from that of the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature
borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is
more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the modification of the American law
and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would
be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that Section
15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed
independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of
circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the
construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when
the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to indicate
otherwise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and
in effect, the so called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or the
Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same sense as
those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473. More accurately, they have always been considered as disqualifications, in the
sense that those who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be lawfully
naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under
Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473,
which, incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in
paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone will
surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited
in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of
this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the
opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23Such being the case, that is, that the so-called
racial requirements were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the
other disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or
understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should
such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as
irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the
holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act
2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the
latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in
question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial
disqualification but to the qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473?
Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be
naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under Section 2,
and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not
have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing,
the disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what
alchemy of logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications into
disqualifications specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are
disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from
53
qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications
had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be
lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status of alien
wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied verbatim
from the American statutes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial
opinions, whether here or in the United States, there are practical considerations that
militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration
of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo
Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications" -chanrobles virtual
law library
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that
Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove
that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be
deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes
unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The
unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization under Section 2
of the law is that the applicant "must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous
period of not less than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an alien wife married
to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to
acquire the citizenship of her husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country
whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses her
citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a
period of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired
continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her
petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for
an indefinite period of time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he
"must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation." Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien
of real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution),
an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to prove that
she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The
income requirement has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the
one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong
vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November
29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income derived
from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common
knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the
Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law,
recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the
duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that
universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty is to
be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how
can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?
chanrobles virtual law library
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have enrolled his
minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized
by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during
the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of
his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has minor
children by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such
minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of
residence in the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation
of this Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in
recognized educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their father.
(Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117
[1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177,
May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that
said minor children by her first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien
father, the basis for such requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione
legis cessat ipsa lex.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2
54
"shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a
Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be
required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship,
whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino husband must reside for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife
related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner
who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the
first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of
her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It will be
recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927
(the old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien
wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy
this situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the
observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the
nationality of the husband; but the Department of State of the United States on October
31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing
out that our Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil.
315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political have been abrogated
upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the stated
taken by the Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that
marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this
counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section
13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941;
emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court
did, in such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications
prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is
submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the
statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is
susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such
manifest object, it should receive the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt.
493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v.
Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85
[1910).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the
court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in
injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which
will result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a
construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in
unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd
consequences.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent
inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or
which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the
legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to
produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the legislature, an
interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague
is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an
illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for
aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission
to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose
that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult
if not practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino
to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been
demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was
intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino
irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that
marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there can
and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from
Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases
are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not
55
farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow
disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after
all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even
before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension of
citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband.
Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy rationalization in
Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question.
The avowed policy of "selectives admission" more particularly refers to a case where
citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a
case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who
are worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting
the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where
citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to
accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in
legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do
otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who
is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines,
"irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino
ideals, customs, and traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized under the law,
who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen,
regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the
Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove
only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her
citizenship status as a fact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this
regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is
universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien
wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of
allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.
W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical
Background and Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily
achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively through the husband.
This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed the
husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of
the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity
of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and
enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in
our country, there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and
wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De la
Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic
identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of
husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law
upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1,
130 Fed. 839, held: "The status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue
of her marriage her husband's domicile became her domicile." And the presumption
under Philippine law being that the property relations of husband and wife are under
the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that
of the other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity
that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment
of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form
part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot,
through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition,
and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances
where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of
all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way
as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied
verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. There is
merit, of course in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of
Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We
should realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-
called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a
56
developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly,
the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our
jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be
sure, entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and
indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the
provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely
American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under
the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad
commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given
the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that
direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of
September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the
United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose
to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently
and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying
Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and
without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral
character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show
they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American
Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court
indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications under said Section 4.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will
be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this
provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala
fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these
possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated
inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical.
There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every case can
be dealt with accordingly as it arises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
III.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this
Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before
the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case
which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided
earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to
dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications,
her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any
naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that she is not
disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling,
the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without
submitting to a naturalization proceeding?chanrobles virtual law library
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must
necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has
not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for its
reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by
this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this
case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the
issue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a
citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting
that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said
petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least
one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any
other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise - other than the
judgment of a competent court of justice - certifying or declaring that an alien wife of
the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and
void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
57
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a
"petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will
reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards,
compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court
itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared
petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to
be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications
prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its
Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial
naturalization apparently from declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can
become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no
consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be
the national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she
desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that
any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year
residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle local
languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage
in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her
declaration of intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the
affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral character and other
qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she has to
undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as
citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines.
Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial
declaration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other
hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to
spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as
plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself
clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it,
rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take
a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have
overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that
complained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance,
considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling
therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our
decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated
either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to
endorse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and
standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal
acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in
the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to
the impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case --
that an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso
facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary
naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all
administrative actions "certifying or declaring such woman to be a Philippine citizen
are null and void" - has consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the present
case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita
N. Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to
Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of many
and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian,
Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of
whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised rights
and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired,
separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they
will have sold and transferred such property. Many of these women may be in
professions membership in which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless
stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in business activities for
which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these
married women are now faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights
acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of
the law that has been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very
agencies of government charged with the administration of that law. We must
respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such comprehensive and
far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive
scrutiny and reexamination.
58
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung
vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 - when Chief Justice
Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases -
although referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining
in the case at bar - may have contributed materially to the irregularities committed
therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe,
although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the
Solicitor General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state "how
many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have
been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been
published in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January 28,
1950" (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957"
(when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29,
1965" (when the decision in the present case was
rendered).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion
for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data
contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui
case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not
on or before May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to
expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction of the law made in a
previous decision, 24which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice and
equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the
decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San
Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become the law
of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have
to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. - Any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization
of the parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born
minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be
deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be
a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of
majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate
of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised
Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete
procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens.
After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of
all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our
citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an
alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his immediate
family, his wife and children, 25and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a)
all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered
citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling
here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but
those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such
naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose
59
said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before
becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after
such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate
themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of
the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to
the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized". 26chanrobles virtual law library
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the
minor children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and residence
prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative
fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or
declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision, is not
susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression "shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily
connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the
antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone
the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a
Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and
intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately
treats the wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial
naturalization.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority
of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat.
(U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon,
Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular
individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27hence there is no reason it cannot do it
for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the
members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born
or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature hag
done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr.
Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law in the
Philippines 28observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is often
observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign
woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to
any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco,
Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is
substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo
Cua, supra.)chanrobles virtual law library
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of
the United States statutes from which our law has been copied, 28a the American courts
have held that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by
operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect
of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States
becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and
regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v.
Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed.
297.) .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as
paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of
November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already had a
long accepted construction among the courts and administrative authorities in that
country holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen
became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of
the marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided
that, it could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be
naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made of
these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The
only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the
United States, the American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects
of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all
such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal terms
than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine
Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted Act
3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994
of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and its
settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of
1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
60
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that
as the United States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national
policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic
incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial
scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but
proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country,
the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own
legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis
for Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the American
Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not
institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going
precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative
intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite
clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization
Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the
proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in
order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16
provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. - In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far
as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it
had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court
held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under
said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same
proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications
of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor
children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or after
final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes
executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said
Section 16 contemplate the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains
the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in
the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same
legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology
emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased as the
theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor
children.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not
be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal
matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for
the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to
take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the
naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been completed, not on
behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the
benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the
oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No.
473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do
not show that the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the
time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born
in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a
citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on
Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required
to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
61
Legislature intended to treat them differently.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for
reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views of
counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be
considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that
Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which
foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by
legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1
Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution
itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization,
under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with
legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire
citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the
"naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by
marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152,
172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil
Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law
3).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the
Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship.
Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes,
1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the
alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if
she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General
dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28
Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp.
Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2),
"shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens" while it may imply that the person to
whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual
way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet
it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a
citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and
therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of
any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly.
When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in the
usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited
in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis
ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first
paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual
analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically become"
as used in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or
purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon
certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by
affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of
relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of
citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said persons to
become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean
that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of
relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the
statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for
naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in
respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the
Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such
citizenship commences. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a minor child
of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso
62
facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the
fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time when the child became a citizen does not
depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The
child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in
the Philippines and should, therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not
mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien
woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after
her marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her
citizenship status became in question), that she is one who might herself be lawfully
naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship
only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not
reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had
proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized."chanrobles virtual law library
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of
the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be
deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it
is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum
probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as
used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine
citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the
laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496,
19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such power long after her marriage does not
alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a
citizen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status
of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully
naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of citizenship by the
alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is
not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It
is clear from the words of the law that the proviso does not mean that she must first
prove that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by
Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by this Court
(at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen
only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled
was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and
therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to the lower court for
determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a
Filipino was disputed by the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for
the purpose of " proving her alleged change of political status from alien to citizen" (at
464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported,
claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that
there was no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of
assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to
petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited by this
Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be lawfully
naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth and in fact,
citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these
wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven
fact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when
citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is
established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose
citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for
instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his
claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status commences from the time of birth,
although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise,
an alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen
at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish
that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a
citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself
be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes
a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon
marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
63
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But
neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the
Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she
obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the
presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil.
375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a
representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A.
Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is,
what substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so
that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act
or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos?
The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof
that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the
husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same
situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice
Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed,
only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may
make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the
antecedent official findings, even if these are not really
binding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and
so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following
observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice
Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the
interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau
of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married
to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's
citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the
filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit
of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized
Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts
an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition.

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien,

there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other
proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the
opposition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon
was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court
prefers that the matter be settled once and for all
now.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing
appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of
Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing
the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen
Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of
her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.

64
Oh Hek How v. Republic petitioner shall "solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever
29 SCRA 94 all allegiance and fidelity to any
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or
motion alleging that he had complied with citizen." The obvious purpose of
the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine
oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued citizenship, because, otherwise,
the corresponding certificate of naturalization. he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties,
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order which our laws do not permit,
authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a
date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. natural-born Filipino citizen from
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not
February 9, 1966 and filed its record on produce loss or forfeiture of his
appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens
and executor. and such had been agreed upon
Issue:
Is the oath valid? by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is
Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of acquired."
the Interior of Nationalist China.
Held:
First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not — and up to the present has
not — become final and executory in
view of the appeal duly taken by the Government.
2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the
naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of the
Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any
foreign law. However, the question of
how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed —
pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our
Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines.
As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the
Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws
of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the
renunciation of nationality.
• Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, however, that before the
naturalization certificate is issued, the
65

G.R. No. L-27429 August 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
OH HEK HOW, petitioner appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Eliezer M. Echavez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General
Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
A decision granting his petition for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines having
been rendered on January 16, 1964, petitioner Oh Hek How filed, on January 17, 1966,
a motion alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530
and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued
the corresponding certificate of naturalization. Upon petitioner's testimony, taken on
February 9, 1966, the date set for the hearing of said motion, the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath.
On that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to
him.
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of
February 9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal. Before the same was approved, it also
moved to cancel petitioner's certificate of naturalization, upon the ground, among
others, that it was issued and the oath taken before said order of February 9, 1966, had
become final and executory. Acting upon this motion and petitioner's opposition
thereto, the court issued, on October 3, 1966, an order granting the motion, but, at the
same time, authorizing the taking of a new oath by the petitioner and the issuance in his
favor of another certificate of naturalization, after thirty (30) days from notice to the
Solicitor General. Thereafter, or on November 26, 1966, the court approved the record
on appeal and, once more, authorized the petitioner to "take a new or proper oath to
validate the first one made on February 9, 1966." The case is now before us on said
record on appeal filed by the Government.
66
At the outset, it is obvious that the oath of allegiance taken by petitioner on November
28, 1966, and the certificate of naturalization issued to him in pursuance thereof, as
well as the authority given therefor by the lower court, are null and void. Indeed, the
order of February 9, had not — and up to the present has not — become final and
executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government. What is more,
petitioner's second oath was taken, not only after the filing of the notice of appeal 1 and
the submission of the record on appeal, but also after the approval thereof. In other
words, the lower court had already lost its jurisdiction over the case. 2
Again, petitioner's net income in 1960 and 1961 was P3,945.65 and P5,105.79,
respectively, or from about P330 to P425 a month. His income tax return for 1962, filed
subsequently to the institution of this case, showed a net income of P6,485.50 for that
year, or about P540 a month. Considering that petitioner has a wife and three (3)
children, one of them of school age, at the time of the filing of his application for
naturalization, his aforementioned income is not a lucrative one. Indeed, it has been
held that the following incomes are not lucrative, from the viewpoint of our
naturalization laws, namely: (1) P4,200 3 or P5,000 a year 4 for one married, with five
(5) children; 5 (2) P6,000 a year for one married, with two (2) minor children; 5 and (3)
P6,000 6 or P6,300 a year 7 for one married, with only one (1) child.
Lastly, it is conceded that petitioner has not required from the Minister of the Interior of
Nationalist China the permission required by the laws thereof for a valid renunciation
of his Chinese citizenship. In Go A. Leng v. Republic, 8 a decision granting the
application for naturalization of a Chinese national was reversed by this Court, upon
the ground, among others, of "his failure to secure" the aforementioned permission.
It is argued that the same is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an
alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot
be controlled by any foreign law. Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides,
however, that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall
"solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he
is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his
former nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he
would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties,
which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the
acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and
any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture
of his Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its
citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the
foreign country from which citizenship is acquired." The question of how a Chinese
citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed — pursuant to Articles
15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by those of the
Philippines. 9 As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen
of the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring
previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.

The view to the contrary, adhered to in Parado v. Republic, 10 Chausintek v.

Republic, 11 and Lim So v. Republic 12has been superseded by our ruling in the
subsequent case of Go A. Leng v. Republic 13 which we hereby reiterate.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the oath of allegiance taken,
on November 28, 1966, by petitioner Oh Hek How, as well as the certificate of
naturalization issued in pursuance thereto, are hereby declared null and void, with costs
against said petitioner, who is, moreover, directed to surrender the aforementioned
certificate of naturalization to the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte, within ten (10) days after this decision shall have become final. It is so ordered.

67
Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there
Facts: being no proof of Chinese law
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine
the Bureau of Immigration as a law.
native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much
June 27, 1961, Willian, then more on respondent William
twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago
Santiago. They had with them was not pressed by the Citizenship
certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content
a cablegram bearing the signature with the testimony of Santiago
of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of
citizens. China.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of The testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine
William and was released upon consular and immigration authorities
posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29th of the same month, he filed a petition for regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are
certiorari and prohibition before the admissible in evidence as statements or
RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied. declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130).
Petitioners, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point out Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage
that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage formally valid where celebrated is
with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now
to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in Art. 26 of the Family Code)
China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was provides that "all marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
there any showing what the laws force in the country where they
of China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ."
in this country, it should have And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the
been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There validity of such marriage may be
being none, petitioners extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this
conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's manner: "In case of doubt, all
children, including Francisco, presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
followed the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. leans toward the validity of
Similarly, the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the community of property during
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any
national. member of the family in case of
Issue: unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption"
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen enunciated in Miciano and other
Held: cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. present the foreign law.
472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows
Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the the citizenship of his father
contrary, foreign laws on a particular Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a
68
Filipino being the legitimate child of
Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens who became as
such at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution. . . .
Nota bene: for Gatchalian
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration (supra),
this Court declared that:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248
[1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely
resolved by a court or by an
administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing
with the active participation of the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the
party is affirmed by this Court,
the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any
other case or proceeding. But it is
made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be
considered conclusive or binding in
any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the
following must be present: 1) a
person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person
is a party; 2) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3)
the finding or citizenship is

affirmed by this Court.

69
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM
T. GATCHALIAN,respondents.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T.
GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and
WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.
70
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1)
to set aside the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990,
issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or
continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of
respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of
respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90
which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges
against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting
in the aforesaid civil cases.
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent
Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person with prayer that he be declared a
Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's
counter-petition. The Court considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as
answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as answer to the counter-petition and
gives due course to the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition).
Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five
(5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian,
Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-
petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchali`an, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila
from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian.
They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino
citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago
Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July
6, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex
"C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification
Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex "D",
petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting
aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on
appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The
same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those
cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the
proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and
ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A
warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the decision of
the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and
executory (Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether
on July 6, 1962 or July 20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case
of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court sustained the validity of the
decision of the new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962,
or within the reglementary period for review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6,
1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned.
71
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board
of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5",
counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July
6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him
(Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the
Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other
applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with
violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940
(Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to
the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20",
counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation * issued a mission order commanding the arrest of
respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", counter-petition). The latter appeared
before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day
upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by
respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214
alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners
and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued
the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by
respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of
preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that petitioners acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against
William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary
restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no
jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of
the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2)
assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion
in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and
determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process
determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his
discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the
competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs.
Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the
Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4)
respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for
forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that
the evidence on record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners
have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have
finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously
and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case
because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for
which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the
petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial
agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board
of Special Inquiry.
72
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies
and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand injunction which
may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested
with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is
vested with —
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of
and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose
decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are those which under the
law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the
Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals,
171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus,
under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the decisions of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the
matter when We ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
 . . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not
inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing
law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved
by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment of the Court of
Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic
Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum
Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act
Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial
Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Social Security
Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the
Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the Court of
Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether
the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or
questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or
decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal
by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special
courts, jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently,
determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code,
decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and
executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a petition
for certiorari and not by way of appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land
Registration, en consulta, are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise
appealable to the Appellate Court, and so are decisions of the Social Security
Commission.
73
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain
administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-
equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically,
beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose
decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as
Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the
Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be
considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond
the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to judicial review
in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code,
which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial
review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or,
in the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with
the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and
which thus modifies the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau
of Immigration should be subject to review by the court specified by the statute or in
the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank
of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the
Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable
to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec.
21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine
also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere
claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531
[1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar
as deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the
alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to
continue or should the question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding?
In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the
question in the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship,
the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should
promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in
peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed
by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the
courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on
the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence
thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has
finished its investigation of his undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be
protected on time, to prevent undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or
misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this much boasted right to
peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation Board has
unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of
public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over
deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33
74
SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention,
however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In
other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent
court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs.
Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that
respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial
intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the
proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional
Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers
upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court
in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the
case at bar.1âwphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and
the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this
instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of
procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful
purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez
vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974])
Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs.
Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also
stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead
of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the
ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when
 public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court
had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112
SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs.
Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra;
Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time,
effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay
in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A
marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs.
Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citingSamal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al., Jan. 29,
1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court
but also before Us in the form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the
other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated September
6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration already
stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the deportation
charges against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision
in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already settled respondent's alienage.
Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship specially so
where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past
thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this
Court in the Arocha and Vivocases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the
sole issue resolved therein was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision
of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was rendered on July 6,
1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and over it
was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year
reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be reviewed.
This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that of
respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from
75
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in
behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case
cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962)
finding respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved,
constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make any categorical
statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections
(supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board,
122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA
248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is
definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue
in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter
shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or
proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the
question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any
other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure
herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship,
the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or
citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in inexistent in
the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William
Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a
matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962,
coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same
devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the
Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis
supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the
Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration,
to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang
Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA
363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua
Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA
411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
76
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does
not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And
if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the
probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an
administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged
alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass
the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183,
counter-petition) issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the
same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian
included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence
Agents/Officers to:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113,
Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46
Administrative Code;
xxx xxx xxx
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct
custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain
silent and a right to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the
July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission
order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final
order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate,
which petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to
the counter-petition of respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously
covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion
for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1 the reconsideration of the July 6,
1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961
decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of
arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the
Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was
due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was
dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of
applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the
cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the
place of a passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the
applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the
Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6",
counter-petition) which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July
6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the
July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the
government on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised
the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of
citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of
July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that
Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the
citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated July 12, 1960.
(Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
77
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not
satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago
Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated
in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being the
descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in
Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he
reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco
and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July
25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on
November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of
January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago reiterated his claim of
Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien
registry which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on
July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was
issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and
H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago
Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even put in issue, is quite much to
late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July 20,
1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final
decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even
question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent
William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in this
case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest
came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37
(b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the
consequences of such inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the
reach of the resultant consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the
 mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained entrance into the
Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other
than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be the
subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years
had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above irregularity was
divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an
spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in the investigation
conducted in connection with the landing of the minor on September 24, 1947,
and not through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities. And
considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be
married to another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a
restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of
P500 a month, the immigration officials then must have considered the
irregularity not serious enough when, inspire of that finding, they decided to
land said minor "as a properly documented preference quota immigrant"
(Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the
immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take steps to
institute deportation proceedings against the minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the
attitude of the mother would be condemned for having made use of an improper
means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire permanent residence
there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having
allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her
residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of prescription to set in and to
elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would be to
condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby
leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection
of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of immigration officials has
created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved
in favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein
respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by
Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now
be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore,
78
the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification
certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then
Acting Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide,
Jr., that the BOC decision dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was
found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to respondent William Gatchalian
even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37 (b) of
the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only where the
deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7,
8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is applicable in deportations under clauses
2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such
deportation proceedings should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the
same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the offenses therein enumerated
with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2)
years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who—
(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual,
or falsely appears in the name of deceased individual, or evades the
immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name; fictitious name; or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not
authorized by law to receive such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false;
or
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by
the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false,
or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a material fact; or
 (e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a
Philippine citizen in order to evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false
statement or representations; or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an
immigration clearance certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts,
shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than two years, and
deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90,
Revised Penal Code); correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised
Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended,
(Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances)
"violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those
punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses
enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive
period, the Immigration Act being a special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after
entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not
imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the
crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the
lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the
government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time
(Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
79
however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to
due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five (5) years from the
date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be
enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144
(3) of the Civil Code, an action based on judgment must be brought within 10 years
from the time the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after
the cause of deportation or exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other
than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act;
and
2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion
proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on
July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against
respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated
July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has
continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973
(Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage
contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports and
earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a
registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised
his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in business in the
Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp.
and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-
petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in which
he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and
approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino
citizenship and discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the
deportation proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority
of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has
helped the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be
considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in its
concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien
who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that
respondent is an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if
not downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically
opposed to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their
position, petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in
China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu
Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-
serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the
postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country,
it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same
were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages
cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed
the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly,
the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated, William and
Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be
sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are
80
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no
proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the
same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago
Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year
old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship
Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been
content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's
testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless,
the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine
consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship
to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34,
Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law.
Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment
or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the
Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco
Gatchalian aforementioned are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation
(Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage
formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted
abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll
marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the
extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences
of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of
doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without
the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the pronouncement as to costs.
"processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that
the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign SO ORDERED.
law.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.
follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the
latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago
Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens

contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution. . . .

This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent
William Gatchalian.

The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied
upon by petitioners. The ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar
for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to have been married in China by
a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those authorized to solemnize
marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).

Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised
by the parties.

WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos.
95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a
Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing with the
deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over
81
NUVAL VS. GURRAY the subscribed affidavit
Facts: Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors of precinct No. 1 of Balaoan, by virtue of
• This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court of which he was registered as
First Instance of La Union, an elector of the said precinct, having made use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in
upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing the quo warranto proceedings instituted the general elections of
by the said Gregorio 1925. In his cedula certificates issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the
Nuval against Norbeto Guray and others, with costs against the petitioner. year 1923 to 1928,
• Gregorio Nuval filed, in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and registered in the included, he made it appear that his residence was the residential district of Balaoan. In the year
election list of the municipality of 1926, his wife and
Luna and as a duly registered candidate for the office of municipal president of said children who, up to that time, had lived in the municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the
municipality, a petition against town of Luna in the
Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said house of his wife's parents, due to the high cost of living in that municipality. Norberto Guray
municipality, not being a used to go home to Luna
qualified voter of said municipality and he had not resided therein for six months as house of his wife's parents, due to the high cost of living in that municipality. Norberto Guray
required by section 431 of the used to go home to Luna
said Administrative Code. in the afternoons after office hours, and there he passed the nights with his family. His children
• Norbeto Guray was elected to the office of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of studied in the public
votes, Gregorio Nuval school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a house of strong
obtaining second place. materials in Luna, which
• Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto asking that Norberto Guray be has not yet been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1,
declared ineligible had a legal 1928, Norberto Guray
residence of one year previous to the election as required by section 2174 of the said applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of the same month
Administrative Code in order to he filed his resignation
be eligible to an elective municipal office. by telegraph, which was accepted on the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he
• Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his birthplace, where he had was already provided
married and had held the with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him
office of municipal treasurer. On that date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, resident of said town, he
Province of La Union. obtained another cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated
The rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray was subject as such January 15, 1928, in
municipal treasurer, which it is presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna, Province of
require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the municipality where they La Union. On February
perform they official duties, 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in the election
in order to be able to give an account of their acts as such treasurers at any time. In order to list of the municipality
qualify and be in a position of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he applied for registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that
to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925, Norberto Guray asked for the he had been residing in
cancellation of his name said municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate antedated.
in the election lists of Luna, where he had voted in the general elections of 1922, alleging as a Issue:
ground therefore the Whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal residence of one year immediately prior to the
following: "On the ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day general elections of June 5, 1928, in
of June, 1922. My order to be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of La Union?
correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in order to be registered in Ruling:
82
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires
one in another state, he cannot
again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of
residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71,
par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports
not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention." (People vs.
Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and acquired
another in Balaoan, in order to vote
and be a candidate in the municipality of Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter
municipality for the length of time
prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so, but
his personal presence in said

municipality.

83

G.R. No. L-30241 December 29, 1928
GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL., respondents.
NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.
Mabanag and Primicias, Gibbs and McDonough, and Mariano Alisangco for appellant.
Sison and Siguion and Franciscco Ortega for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of La Union, upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing
the quo warranto proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval against Norbeto
Guray and others, with costs against the petitioner.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assign the following alleged errors as committed
by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered upon Gregorio
Nuval's petition for the cancellation of Norbeto Guray's name on the election
list of Luna is conclude and constitutes res judiata in the present case.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that Norbeto Guray at the time of his
election, was ineligible for the office of the residence in said municipality.
3. The lower court erred in not finding in its judgment that the petitioner is
entitled to hold the office in question.
In regard to the first assignment of error, the evidence adduced during the trial of the
case shows:
That on May 11, 1928, and within the period fixed by section 437 of the Administrative
84
Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, Gregorio Nuval filed, in civil case No. 1442 of the
Court of First Instance of La Union, in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and
registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered
candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality, a petition against
Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said
municipality, not being a qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not resided
therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative Code.
Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance with sections 437 and 438 of the
same Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered
judgment dismissing it because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona
fide resident of the municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not
appealable, Norberto Guray's name remained in the election list of the municipality of
Luna.
The general election having been held on June 5, 1928, Norbeto Guray was elected to
the office of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of votes, Gregorio Nuval
obtaining second place. On June 7, 1928, the municipal council of Luna, acting as the
municipal, Norberto Guray, elected to the office of municipal president of the said
municipality of Luna for the next triennium.
On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto as provided
in section 408 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, asking that
Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to the
election as required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be
eligible to an elective municipal office.
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the
judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's
name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and
prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Act. No. 3387 is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not
appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital
or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with
whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for execution was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as qualified
voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of
the president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the
election list of said municipality. The present proceedings of quo warranto was
intreposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the
office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate
for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is
not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of
capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs.
Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165.)
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious
matter was the conclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the
municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter in his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which
he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray
had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified
voter thereof, while in the present proceedings of quo warranto, the case of this action
is that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for the eligibility
to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist, therefore, identity
of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) Identity of parties;
(b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.,
850). And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in the present quo
warranto proceeding, as there is no identity either of parties, or of things or litigious
matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.1awphi1.net
For the above considerations, the trial court erred in holding that the judgment rendered
in the case on the petition of Gregorio Nuval asking for the cancellation of Norberto
Guray's name in the election list of Luna is conclusive and constitutes res judicata in
the present case.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the evidence establishes the following
85
facts:
Up to June 27, 1922, Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his
birthplace, where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. On that
date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, Province of La Union. The rules
of the provincial treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray was subject as such
municipal treasurer, require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the
municipality where they perform they official duties, in order to be able to give an
account of their acts as such treasurers at any time. In order to qualify and be in a
position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925, Norberto
Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, where he had
voted in the general elections of 1922, alleging as a ground therefore the following:
"On the ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day of June,
1922. My correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in order to be
registered in the subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors
of precinct No. 1 of Balaoan, by virtue of which he was registered as an elector of the
said precinct, having made use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in the
general elections of 1925. In his cedula certificates issued by himself as municipal
treasurer of Balaoan from the year 1923 to 1928, included, he made it appear that his
residence was the residential district of Balaoan. In the year 1926, his wife and children
who, up to that time, had lived in the municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the
town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents, due to the high cost of living in that
municipality. Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna in the afternoons after office
hours, and there he passed the nights with his family. His children studied in the public
school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a house of strong
materials in Luna, which has not yet been completed, and neither be nor his family has
lived in it. On February 1, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation
leave to be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of the same month he filed his resignation by
telegraph, which was accepted on the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding
that he was already provided with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of
Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him resident of said town, he obtained another
cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated January
15, 1928, in which it is presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality
of Luna, Province of La Union. On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and
obtained the cancellation of his name in the election list of the municipality of Balaoan,
and on April 14, 1928, he applied for registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he
had been residing in said municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made of the
cedula certificate antedated.
In view of the facts just related, the question arises whether or not Norberto Guray had
the legal residence of one year immediately prior to the general elections of June 5,
1928, in order to be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of
La Union.
There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed the office of
municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union, he transferred his residence from the
municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.
The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more established his
residence in the municipality of Luna.
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and
acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence
until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28).
"The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of
Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time
prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so,
but his personal presence in said municipality.
By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of the rules of
the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction was such municipality,
Norberto Guray had to reside and in fact resided in said municipality until the 6th of
February, 1928 when he filed his resignation from his office, which was accepted on
the same date. The fact that his family moved to the municipality of Luna in the year
1926 in order to live there in view of the high cost of living in balaoan; the fact that his
children studied in the public shool of said town; the fact that on afternoons after hours
he went home to the municipality of Luna and there passed the night with his family,
are not in themselves alone sufficient to show that from said year he had transfered his
residence to said municipality, since his wife and children lived with his father-in-law,
86
in the latter's house that only in the month of January, 1927, did he begin the
construction of a house of strong materials, which is not yet completed, nor occupied
by himself or his family, His aftrenoon tips to Luna, according to his own explanation
given to the provincial treasurer, were made for purpose of visiting his sick father. His
own act in recording in his cedula certificates for the years 1927 and 1928 issued by
himself in his favor as municipal treasurer of Balaoan, that his place of residene was
that municipality, and in taking out a new cedula in the municipality of Luna of
February 20, 1928, and having the date of its issuance surreptitiuosly put back to
January 15 1928, show that until the date of his resignation he did not consider himself
as a resident of the municipality of Luna. The fact that his wife and children lived in
Luna not in his own house but in that of his wife's father since the year 1926, cannot be
looked upon as a change of residence, since a change of residence requires an actual
and deliberate abandonment of the former (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have
two legal residences at the same time.
The present case is different from that of Doctor Apacible cited by the appellee in his
brief. Doctor Apacible never had abandoned his legal residence in the Province of
Batangas, nothwithstanding that he had been living with his family in the City of
Manila, taking out his cedula certificates here, but he never exercised the right of
suffrage here. Norberto Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of
Luna, transferring it to the municipality of Balaoan by reason and an account of the
requirements of the rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose
jurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right of suffrage in the
latter.1awphi1.net
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law
Norberto Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and
began to acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he
filed his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had
been holding, and which resignation was accepted; and on being elected municipal
president of Luna in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the
legal residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of
municipal president of Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and, in
consequence, he has no right to take possession of said office, petitioner Gregorio
Nuval being the one legally elected to said office with a right to take possession
thereof, having secured second place in the election. With costs against the respondent. candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since
So ordered. the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has
obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the
Avanceña, C. J., Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur. second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to
Villamor, J., dissents. declare who is entitled to occupy the office.

RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION In view of the foregoing, we are of opinion that the judgment rendered in this case on
December 29, 1928, should be, and is hereby, amended, eliminating from the
February 1, 1929 dispositive part thereof, the holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has been
legally elected, so as to read as follows:
VILLA-REAL, J.:
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the
This is a motion praying for the reasons given that the judgment rendered in this case office of Municipal president of Luna, is hereby declared unlawful and quashed
on December 29, 1928 be reconsidered, and another rendered affirming the judgment and, consequently, that he has no right to take possession of said office, with
appealed from. costs against said respondent.

In regard to the grounds of the motion with reference to the defence of res judicata, as So ordered.
the movant does not adduce any new argument in support thereof, and inasmuch as this
court has already discussed question at length, we find no sufficient reason to grant the Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
motion on said grounds.

As to the other grounds touching this court's holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one
who has been legally elected to the office of municipal president of Luna, La Union,
and entitled to take possession thereof, having received second place, we consider them
meritorious, for the reason that 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in case a
person not eligible should be elected to a provincial or municipal office, does not
authorize that it be declared who has been legally elected, thus differing from section Separate Opinions
479 of the law, which contains such an authorization, and for the reason, furthermore,
that section 477 of the said law provides that only those who have obtained a plurality
of votes, and have presented their certificates of candidacy may be certified as elected
to municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature different from the appointive VILLAMOR, J., dissenting:
offices. The occupation of the first depends on the will of the elector, while that of the
second depends on the will of the authority providing for it. In quo In consequence of my dissenting opinion from the decision in this case, I am compelled
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is to dissent likewise from the ruling on the motion for reconsideration. And I take this
the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to opportunity of stating the grounds of my dissent. In the opinion prumulgated on
offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In December 29, 1928, among other things, the following was stated: "Proceedings were
the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the had upon the petition in accordance with section 437 and 438 of the same Code, as
87
amended by Act 3387, and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered judgment dismissing it
because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident of the municipality of
Luna from January 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable Norberto Guray's name
remained in the election list of the municipality of Luna."
The same decision states: "In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of
the litigation, or the litigious matter was the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter
from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo
warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter in his exclusion
or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does this exist, then,
any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray
had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be qualified voter
therefor, while in the present proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is that
Norberto Guray has not the one year legal residence required for eligibility to the office
of the municipal president of Luna. Neithe does there exist, therefore, identity of causes
of action.
Further on, it states: "In the year 1926, his wife and children who, up to that time had
lived in the municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the town of Luna in the house
of his wife's parents. Due to the high cost of living in that municipality. Norberto Guray
used to go home to Luna in the afternoons after office hours, and there he passed the
night with his family. His children studied in the public school of Luna. In January,
1927, he commenced the construction of a house of strong materials in Luna, which has
not been completed, and neither he nor his family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928,
Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the
16th of the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph, which was accepted on
the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with a
cedula issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928,
declaring him a resident of the said town, he obtained another cedula from the
municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated January 15, 1928, in
which it was presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna,
Province of La Union. On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained
the cancellation of his name in the election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on
April 14, 1928, he applied for the registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he had
been residing in said municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made use of the
88
cedula certificate antedated."
Considering the facts that related in the majority opinion, I believed that, setting aside
technicalities, the question of the residence of the protestee-appellee Guray was
decided by the court holding that he was a bona fide resident of the municipality of
Luna, since January 1, 1927. I believe it is plain that Norberto Guray's residence
follows him as the shadow follows the body that casts it, whether it be in his capacity
as voter, or in his eligibility for the office of municipal president. The fact is that the
Court of La Union found Guray to be a bona fide resident of the municipality of Luna
since January 1, 1927. From that date until the general elections (June 5, 1928), I
believe more than one year has elapsed, and consequently, Guray had the legal
residence of over one year at least, in the municipality of Luna at the time of his
election as municipal president.
In this jurisdiction the courts have ever looked upon resident as purely a matter of
intention, manifested by the acts, conduct and circumstances of the person choosing a
place as his permanent dwelling place and home. It was so understood by the
Philippine Commission in discussing the first election law, whose provisions upon the
residence of voters and eligibles have not been amended up to the present time. The
domicile or legal residence has been define as the place where a person has a principal
house or habitation, or where he kepts his family and his chief place of business. The
intention in every case is the real object of investigation. If a man leaves his town and
removes to another by reason of his business, but with the intention to return to it, he
has lost his residence in said town. The mere change of dwelling place does not
involved a change of residence if it be not accompanied by intention. Hence it has been
held that if one has removed to another town solely by virtue of his appointment as the
municipal treasurer, but with the intention to return to his original town, he has not lost
his residence in his original town. The words good faith accompanying the word
residence must be taken as a description of the state of mind of the person claiming
residence. For example, if a man removes to province with the sole object of remaining
one year in order to become a candidate for the governorship, he may be held to be a
resident in bad faith, while he may be bodily absent from the province for a long time
and yet have in his mind the constant intention to return. If it be so, he would be a
resident in good faith of the place he had left.
It is evident that bodily presence in a place, accompanied by the intention to live
therein forever, establishes domicile or residence. But bodily presence in this place is
not residence; it is a mere proof, if you wish, tending to demonstrate residence. At
most, personal presence is presumptive proof that a person intends to reside where he
is. But such a presumption may be rebutted by other acts, conduct, and circumstances
of the person, clearly showing his intention to establish his home elsewhere. The herein
protestee-appellee Guray, at least January, 1927, kept his family in the municipality of
Luna, he went there at night to sleep with them, his children studied in the public
school of said municipality, and he had a house of strong materials built in Luna,
although it was not yet completed, as stated in the majority opinion. But all these acts
show his intention to establish his legal residence in the municipality of Luna.
The fact of having paid his personal cedula in Balaoan is of trivial importance in
showing legal residence, for, as Governor-General Smith said in the resolution of the
protest against the election of the provincial governor of Batangas, Apacible, hundreds
of persons have taken out their cedulas outside of their residential province without
having lost their legal residence as a result thereof. Governor-General Smith himself,
who lived nine years in the Philippines, and took out his cedula in Manila, had his
residence in San Francisco, California, because his intention was to go back and live
there permanently.
There is no further need of amassing citations, but let a recently decided case be
remembered, namely, the quo warranto proceeding of Ira vs. Abano (p. 380. ante). The
facts in that case are: Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. At the competent age he removed to Manila to complete his education. While
living temporarily in Manila, Abano registered as a voter there. Shortly after having
been admitted to the bar and after the death of his father, Abano went back to live in
Meycauayan. From May 10, 1927, up to the present Abano has considered himself a
resident of Meycauayan. When in 1928 the election where about to be held, he filed a
petition for the cancellation of his registration in Manila, which was dated April 3,
1928, but his petition was denied by the city officials because it had not been deposited
in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless, Abano presented himself as a
candidate of the municipal presidency in Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was by
popular vote elected thereto. In that case it was held:
1. A candidate who was elected to the office of municipal president and who at
the time the election was registered as a voter of Manila and not the
municipality in which he was a candidate, is nevertheless eligible to the office,
and proceedings in the nature od quo warranto instituted by virtue of the
89
provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended, by the vice-
president elect of the municipality, who challenged the right of the municipal
president elect, to the position to which elected on the ground that the municipal
president was ineligible, cannot be successfully maintained.
2. The Election Law makes use of the terms 'qualified voter in his municipality,'
and qualified elector therein. To be a qualified voter, does not necessarily mean
that a person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient for the candidate to
possess all of the qualifications prescribed in sectio 431 and none of the
disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to
register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to
become a candidate to be voted for.
3. One may be qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering
does not confer the right; it is but a condition presented to the exercise of the
right. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of the suffrage. It is not a
qualification of such right.
4. The question of the residence for the purposes of the Election Law is largely
one of intention.
In another, and yet a more recent case (Vivero vs. Murillo, G. R. No. 30271) 1, it was
held: "A student living with his parents in a certain barrio of a municipality, which
barrio is latter separated to be organized as an independent municipality, who for
several years pursues his studies in several provinces of the archipelago, supported by
his parents, returning to the latters' home during his vacations in the newly organized
municipality, does not lose his residence in said municipality, either on account of
having resided in different provinces as a student, or of having registered as a voter in
the former municipality and is eligible as municipal president of the new municipality
even if his registration as a voter in the municipality to which the new one originally
belonged has not been cancelled."
The same view of the question of legal residence has been sustained by the Philippine
Assembly in the protest against the election of the representative of the southern district
of Manila, Fernando Guerrero, and in that of the representative for the second district
of Manila, Luciano Cinco. (Journal of Sessions of the Assembly, December 6, 1917,
and November 29, 1927, respectively.)
Wherefore, I am of opinion that the motion for reconsideration should be granted on
the ground that the protestee and appellee had the legal residence to become eligible to
the office of the municipal president of the municipality of Luna. With respect the
second ground of the motion for reconsideration, I agree with the majority opinion that
a candidate who received second place in the election cannot be declared elected to said
office simply because the one who received first place turned out to be ineligible.

90
VELILLA VS. POSADA Ida M. Palmer through her
Facts: attorney.
• That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. • The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of the present
• That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, by virtue of which case.
will, he bequeathed all his • Manila, August 15, 1933.
property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of • In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and
the State of New York, documentary evidence from which
United States of America. it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or
• That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of 1903 and engaged
the deceased Arthur actively in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February
Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila. 18, 1931. He had no
• That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition to the will of the deceased Arthur Graydon business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and
Moody, and the same was, shares of stock of
after hearing, duly probated by the court in a decree dated May 5, 1931. corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other
• That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the intangibles and personal
deceased Arthur Graydon property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by the
Moody Collector of Internal Revenue
• That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of bonds and for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his
shares of stock of death was located and had
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of
personal properties. any kind located
• That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of the late anywhere else. In his will,he made a statement that: Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United
Arthur Graydon Moody States of America,
an inheritance tax return. residing in the Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and
• That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period from January 1, Testament . . ..
1931 to June 30, 1931, was also Ruling:
prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable
Moody. choice of a new domicile, coupled
• That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the court its with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should
report. be one's fixed and permanent
• That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding paragraph, place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody
the Bureau of Internal ever established a new domicile in
Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked a foreign country.
Exhibit NN is hereto Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, the court affirm the
attached and made a part hereof. judgment of the trial court, first, because
• That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000 on the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its
July 22, 1931, and the other situs within the Philippine Islands
sum of P40,019.75 on January 19, 1932, making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of and, second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the
P13,001.41 covers the Philippine Islands.
assessment for income tax against said estate.
• That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by
91
 [G.R. No. 43314. December 19, 1935.]
A. L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, Plaintiff-
Appellant, v. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, Defendant-
Appellee.
Ohnick & Opisso for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. INHERITANCE TAX; DOMICILE OF TAXPAYER. — To effect the abandonment
of one’s domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile,
coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent
that it should be one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home. There is a
complete dearth of evidence in the record that M ever established a new domicile in a
foreign country.
2. INHERITANCE AND INCOME TAXES. — As M’s legal domicile at the time of his
death was the Philippine Islands and his estate had its situs here, the inheritance and
income taxes here involved were lawfully collected.
DECISION
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in an action
to recover from the defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P77,018,39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against the
estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.
The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
92
"I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.
"II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, certified
copy of which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached and made a part hereof, by virtue
of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then
was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, United States of
America.
"III. That on February 24, 1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of
the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same being designated as case No.
39113 of said court. Copy of said petition marked Exhibit BB is hereto attached and
made a part hereof.
"IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition was filed by Ida M. Palmer,
asking for the probate of said will of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody, and the
same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in a decree dated May 5, 1931.
Copies of the petition and of the decree marked Exhibits CC and DD, respectively, are
hereto attached and made parts hereof.
"V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress
of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by the court in said
case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE is hereto attached and made a part
hereof; and that during the hearing for the declaration of heirs, Ida M. Palmer presented
as evidence a letter dated February 28, 1925, and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon
Moody, copy of which marked Exhibit FF is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of
bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more fully shown in the
inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator with the court in said
case No. 39113, certified copy of which inventory marked Exhibit GG is hereto
attached and made a part hereof. This stipulation does not, however, cover the
respective values of said properties for the purpose of the inheritance tax.
"VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of
the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return, certified copy of which
marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period from
January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy of which marked Exhibit II is hereto
attached and made a part hereof, was also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.
"IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the
court its report, certified copy of which marked Exhibit KK is hereto attached and
made a part hereof.
"X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the
attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter, copy of which marked Exhibit LL
is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the letter of
the Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in the preceding paragraph. Said answer
marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. Palmer
another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached and made a part
hereof.
"XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in a
letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of
P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019,75 on January 19, 1932,
making a total of P90,019,75, of which P77,018.39 covers the assessment for
inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax against
said estate.
"XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest
made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
93
"XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of
the present case.
"Manila, August 15, 1933."cralaw virtua1aw library
In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and
documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American
citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in
business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18,
1931. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate
consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal
property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by
the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47.
All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the
Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of any kind located
anywhere else. In his will, Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance
with the formalities of the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his
sister, Ida M. Palmer, he stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the
Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and
Testament . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The substance of the plaintiff’s cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands
under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected
upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not
domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of
inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other
intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation
of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of
the Philippine Islands."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. — Every transmission by virtue of
inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance,
devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and real rights in
such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands; of
any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima
organized or constituted in the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any
shares or rights in any partnership, business or industry established in the Philippine
Islands or of any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to
the following tax:"
x x x during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during
It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a "non-
resident of the Philippine Islands." The answer, besides the general denial, sets up as a
special defense that "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date of his
death, a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was engaged
actively in business." Issue was thus joined on the question: Where was the legal
domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?
The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any
evidence that Moody’s domicile was elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his death
based on the proposition that as no such objection was made before the Collector of
Internal Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax,
this objection cannot be considered in a suit against the Collector to recover the taxes
paid under protest. He relies upon the decision in the case of W. C. Tucker v. A. C.
Alexander, Collector (15 Fed. [2], 356). We call attention, however, to the fact that this
decision was reversed in 275 U. S., 232; 72 Law. ed., 256, and the case remanded for
trial on the merits on the ground that the requirement that the action shall be based
upon the same grounds, and only such, as were presented in the protest had been
waived by the collector. In the case before us no copy of the taxpayer’s protest is
included in the record and we have no means of knowing its contents. We think,
therefore, the preliminary objection made on behalf of the appellee does not lie.
We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to whether
94
Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his
death. Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in
the Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a
fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands. He lived in the Elks’ Club in Manila
for many years and was living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of
February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He was afflicted with leprosy in an
advanced stage and had been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the
Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the
law. Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise
to Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the Islands
the latter part of February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket,
passport or tax clearance certificate. The record does not show where Moody was
the months of March and April of the year 1929 where he was receiving treatment for
leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. The record does not show where Moody was in the
interval between April, 1929, and November 26, 1930, on which latter date he wrote a
letter, Exhibit B, to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his interest in the
Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of
603 shares. In this letter, among other things, he states: "Certainly I’ll never return there
to live or enter business again." In this same letter he says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I wish to know as soon as possible now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently
decided either to sell or put in a line of school or office supplies . . . before I go to the
necessary investments in placing any side lines. I concluded to get your definite reply
to this . . . I have given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be
executed until March and this will give you plenty of time . . . anything that kills a
business is to have it peddled around as being for sale and this is what I wish to avoid."
He wrote letters dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the same line to
Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written,
there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion
Leper Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive,
not from justice, but from confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance with
the law of the Philippine Islands.
There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a
new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for
some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not
claim that Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he
wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no
intention to live there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he
established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no writing
whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any
fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he
acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account
there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a
legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to
return to Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short
stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient
in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in
the record indicates clearly that Moody’s continued absence from his legal domicile in
the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that
caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Culion Leper
Colony; for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately confined,
because his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on the day of his
precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was
well known, as he might do in foreign parts.
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their
usual residence." The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual
residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and
"outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a
century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the
date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one’s domicile, there must
be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in
the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one’s fixed and
permanent place of abode, one’s home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the
record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
The contention under the appellant’s third assignment of error that the defendant
collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is, in
our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the Collector of
Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of
P259,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of surplus
by the Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the evidence. The appellant
95
contends that this assessment involves triple taxation: First, because the corporation
paid income tax on the same amount during the years it was accumulated as surplus;
second, that an inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed against the estate, and
third, the same amount is assessed as income of the estate. As to the first, it appears
from the collector’s assessment, Exhibit II, that the collector allowed the estate a
deduction of the normal income tax on said amount because it had already been paid at
the source by the Camera Supply Company. The only income tax assessed against the
estate was the additional tax or surtax that had not been paid by the Camera Supply
Company for which the estate, having actually received the income, is clearly liable. As
to the second alleged double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the
additional income tax in question are entirely distinct. They are assessed under different
statutes and we are not convinced by the appellant’s argument that the estate which
received these dividends should not be held liable for the payment of the income tax
thereon because the operation was simply the conversion of the surplus of the
corporation into the property of the individual stockholders. (Cf. U. S. v. Phellis, 257
U. S., 171, and Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended,
which is relied on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from exempt
property shall be included as income subject to tax.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody
at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and,
second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine
Islands. Costs against the Appellant.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
UJANO VS. REPUBLIC citizen of the United States of
Facts: America, was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court maintained at the time of the filing of
of First Instance of Ilocos the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to
Sur. Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is the present. Such being the
married to Maxima O. Ujano with case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence
whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left the Philippines for the before filing his present
United States of America in
1927 where after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by petition."
naturalization. He returned
to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a temporary
stay. He owns an agricultural
land and a residential house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. He receives a monthly
pension from the Social Security
Administration of the United States of America. He has no record of conviction and it is his
intention to renounce his
allegiance to the U.S.A. After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition
on the ground that petitioner
did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his petition for
reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Ruling:
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the
qualifications for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have resided in the Philippines at least
six months before he applies
for naturalization' [Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This 'residence' requirement
in cases of naturalization,
has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home
otherwise known as legal residence
or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a
country or state where he lives
and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter
how long, is his domicile. In
other words domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been
admitted into this country as a
temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually
present in this country cannot be
said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in
nature and must leave when the
purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is presently a
96

G.R. No. L-22041 May 19, 1966
MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
Tagayuna, Arce and Tabaino for petitioner and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor F. C. Zaballero and
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for oppositor and appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is
married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal
age. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a
residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. He
returned to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for
a temporary stay. He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in
Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension of
$115.00 from the Social Security Administration of the United States of America. He
has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the
U.S.A.1äwphï1.ñët
After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that
petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his
petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the
qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have
resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization'
[Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This 'residence' requirement in cases of
naturalization, has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive
permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu
97
vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he
lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary
absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words domicile is characterized
by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary
visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present
in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period
of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming
is accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is presently a citizen of the United
States of America, was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has
maintained at the time of the filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship and which continues up to the present. Such being the case, he has not
complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before
filing his present petition."
We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a
correct interpretation [Section 3 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63] which requires that
before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization." The word
"residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic,
L-18885, January 31,1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that term cannot
refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been admitted only on the
strength of a permit for temporary residence. In other words, the term residence used in
said Act should have the same connotation as that used in Commonwealth Act No. 473,
the Revised Naturalization Law, even if in approving the law permitting the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by
foregoing the qualifications and special disqualifications prescribed therein. The only
way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a
quota for permanent residence so that he may come within the purview of the residence
requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
CAASI VS. COURT OF APPEALS elections on January 18, 1988.
Facts: Ruling: Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in
• These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
disqualification under Section 68 of the domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely
Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of to visit his children or his doctor there; he
municipal mayor of Bolinao, entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by
Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the his application for an immigrant's (not a
ground that he is a green card visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. Government the requisite green card or
• In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to authority to reside there permanently.
him by the US Immigration Service, To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly candidate who is a green card holder must
obtained the green card for convenience have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
and to visit his children there. candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all his status as a permanent resident or
previous elections, including the immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by
plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the some act or acts independent of and done
congressional elections on May prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior
18,1987. waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any
• After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC dismissed the
petitions on the ground that: The elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish
that he has abandoned his
residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent
has sufficiently indicated his
intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive
elections in said municipality.
As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for
candidates to elective local officials
(sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal
obstacle to his candidacy for mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
Issues: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident
of the United States, and
(2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or
immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local
98

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private
respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan,
to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that
he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America,
not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13,
1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito
Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C.
Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to
the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the
decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the
99
position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel
on account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to
him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of
the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he
may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that
he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent
has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao
as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said
municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of
citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as
provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no
legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12,
Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a
foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card
holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This
respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel,
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon.
Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by
Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from
further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning
the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the
COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic
requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local
officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy
of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts
on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the
COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that
the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent
Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A.
prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec.
25, 1971, EC).
100
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials
in the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards
in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the
Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of
State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy
in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to
Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so
state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent
Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the
back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States." (Annex A
pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered
the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in
it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose
of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes
 give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S.,
the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to
him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain,
are in general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their
rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted
to remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to
their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution
that no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of
the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to
earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an
alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth
Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer
or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to
Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he
was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
101
Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself
as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he
was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as
municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence
in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at
the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a
candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local
Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a
permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only
three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987
and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents
or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear
policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine
citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege
for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or
purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign
country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their
homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on
their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve
their status as permanent residents thereof.

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in
the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he
wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other
words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S.
under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but
kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow
itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him
the best of both worlds so to speak.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was
disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in
SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are
hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent.

SO ORDERED.

102

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision —
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility
of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor
on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed
a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his
petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one
year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued
103
declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the
filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on
or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with
the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred
that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning
respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending
to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended
registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said
city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month
actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC
to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose
being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on
 such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First
District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections
on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition
for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her
original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one
year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed
word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should
subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was
asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which
she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying
affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of
the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever
absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her
memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became
a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts
that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in
Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban
City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this
intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and
104
not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of
"residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is
curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her
actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because
there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item
no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding
the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be
made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The
reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only
applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result
of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to
secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in
that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or
an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy,
specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in
the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the
amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds
of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the
election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of
her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood"
is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission.
The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent
indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in
her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995
which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6
months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said
accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so
that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time,
starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will
only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that respondent has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the
residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila.
105
Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not
Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the
First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It
cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in
her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In
1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered
voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor
of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed
her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she
claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact
on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered
or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that
she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up
to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her
claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of
the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and
on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila.
Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to
have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the
Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2)
intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile.
 In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non
revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must
likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's
statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is
not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented
any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the
First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident
of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly
pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at
precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her
Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her
failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior
to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution
declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely
stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
106
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition
for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the
same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains
the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental
Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution
suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the
First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
 disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said
Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining
a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken
up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave
107
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal
for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid
this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is
used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.
A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies
or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in
our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the
mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period
of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it
was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile
and not physical residence. 30
31
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court concluded
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to
the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
108
domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to
be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and
events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution,
albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First
District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently
noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would
reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is
followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
 8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in
Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down
her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in
Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she
could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of
April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked
for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila."
The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's
domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of
her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as
a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not
been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion
lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears
repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
109
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence
in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile
for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having
ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either
alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the
former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector
in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for
various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures,"
as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study
in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When
an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve
his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are
to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation
why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss
of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing
of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive
proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional
commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's
assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied
in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School,
still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E.
Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered
there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic
in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home
to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the
Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated
that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the
last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was
born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew
up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in
different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
110
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting
well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing
a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power
either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or
consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and
lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely
ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not
know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers
that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for
many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change
of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically
gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred
from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,
writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but
in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should
live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
111
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla
de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar
o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of
the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act
of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same
provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from
one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move
his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of
the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the
wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for
the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single
place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife
to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences
(as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live
together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the
domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
(various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with
reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a
question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made
from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence
is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established
in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on
the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other
such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her
husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from
being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that
"[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to
choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts,
.under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could
not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques
de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
112
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not
within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded,
an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by
process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the
purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife;
and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a
mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even
by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon
v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not
the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights
in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be
enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884)
abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for
the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so
far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred
 to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the
Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code.
It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American
Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid
requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative,
upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain
money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband,
as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest
which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by
any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her
in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear
that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed
by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time,
Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as
his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as
the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She
did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have
been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the
Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between
the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has
been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly
different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes
revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by
113
making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear
is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after
her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to
"rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in
her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested
in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals.
Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila
merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act
of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage
itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh
heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
 II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering
that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before
the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover,
petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is
untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with
them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory
and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same
view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of
the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the
aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely
to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it
lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would
then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a
decision within a given or prescribed period.
114
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section
78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction
to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for
us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground
here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for
the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred
ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established
principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in
law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and
May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
MARCOS vs COMELEC
(residence and domicile, for purposes of election laws are synonymous…)
The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks
to prevent is the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community."
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995. elected does not constitute loss of
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other
Leyte and a candidate for the same election law cases, this Court has
position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
Elections alleging that petitioner did not intention to abandon it does not result in a
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended loss or change of domicile.
that Mrs. Marcos lacked the In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court concluded that the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. framers of the 1987 Constitution
Held: obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law having the same meaning as
cases, this Court has stated that the domicile.
mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to A Person cannot have 2 domiciles. As long as the Domicile was not lost, it continues to be
abandon it does not result in a loss the same until replaced by a new
or change of domicile. one. Marcos did not overtedly abandon her domicile since even if living in Malakanyang,
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the she constantly goes home to her
word "seven" in the space provided domicile.
for the residency qualification requirement. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to Prior to this:
deliberately and knowingly make a The civil code provides that the wife follows the domicile of her husband.
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or
more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by
living in place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that,
once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is
also established in some other place.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is
the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such
intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications
of the respondent therein to the
post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the
absence from residence to pursue
115