China's Americanized Military

The PLA is set to become the largest “American” military force to pose a threat to the
U.S.

By Don Tse
December 13, 2017

Two Chinese armored brigades clashed in a week-long training exercise at the Zhurihe Training
Base in Inner Mongolia in 2015. Both brigades were equipped with identical armored vehicles and
weapons. The Blue opposing forces brigade (OPFOR), however, was organized and fought in the
fashion of a United States brigade combat team.

The Red friendly force was crushed. “Within an hour we were hit with airstrikes, enemy satellite
reconnaissance, and cyberattacks … Frankly, I never imagined it would be this hard,” said Wang
Ziqiang, the armored brigade commander of the Red force. Wang’s political commissar Liu Haitao
was caught on camera sobbing after the defeat. In a documentary aired on state television days
before the 19th Party Congress in October, Liu said that his unit was initially very confident of
victory over the Blue team, which was formerly a sister unit. “But over the course of seven days, we
were beaten … we lost because we didn’t meet realistic combat standards when training our
troops,” he said.

Subpar training tells only part of the story. Between 2014 and 2016, the “American” Blue team
scored a total of 32 victories and one defeat against Red forces that comprised some of the best and
most well-equipped units in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On average, Red forces sustained
70 percent simulated casualties after clashing with the Blue team. The PLA’s poor performance
against a modern military unit gave President and Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping sufficient
reason to seek an overhaul.

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In September 2015, Xi announced sweeping military reforms that included a 300,000 troop cut,
the creation of a joint command structure that has drawn comparisons with the United States’s
Goldwater-Nichols Act, and a military-civilian integration program that appears to draw
inspiration from the American military-industrial complex. During his speech at the 19th Party
Congress, Xi set three goals for the PLA: By 2020, achieve basic mechanization, make significant
progress in using information technology, and elevate strategic ability; by 2035, become a
modernized defense and military force; by 2050, become a world-class military.

If Xi can fully implement his reforms while successfully fending off military and political
opponents, the PLA should most closely resemble the U.S. military in terms of organization and
chain of command. The reformed PLA, however, is unlikely to best the U.S. military in a
conventional war given its technological gap and lack of warfighting experience. But factor in
unconventional warfare tactics and next-generation technology, and the PLA may stand a chance of
rivaling the world’s strongest fighting force.

Reasons for Reform

Xi’s military reforms appear to be driven by two factors: China’s need as an aspiring world power
for a modern military that can fight and win wars, and Xi’s need to consolidate power in the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The former factor is the more obvious of the two. While previous CCP leaders had carried out some
military reform and updated the military’s weaponry, the PLA had long remained organized along
the Soviet model. Combat tactics and doctrine didn’t differ much from the low-tech, ground forces-
heavy style utilized during the 1950 Korean War. While militaries around the world had been
moving toward joint service operations since the 1980s, the army was still the most prominent
service branch in the PLA. The navy and air force played an auxiliary role.

From a national defense and overseas security standpoint, the relative backwardness of the PLA is
a pressing concern for the Xi administration. China has pledged hundreds of billions of dollars for
its Belt and Road Initiative, a major transnational development strategy to promote trade between
China and Eurasian countries through an overland route and a maritime route. The PLA also
periodically faces border issues with India and Vietnam, and maritime run-ins with neighboring
countries in the South China Sea. And in the east, China has to contend with a nuclear-capable
North Korea whose leadership is aligned with Xi’s political rivals.

The need for modern tactics and joint operations was firmly impressed upon the commanders who
participated in or observed the training exercises in Zhurihe. Previously, training exercises were
formulaic affairs that usually ended up with friendly Red teams defeating Blue teams made up of
rotated units. Xi, however, required a professional OPFOR to test the combat effectiveness of PLA
units more rigorously. So the 195th mechanized infantry brigade under commander Xia Minglong
underwent reorganization between 2013 and April 2014 to serve as a dedicated Blue team. State
media hinted that the “foreign combat doctrine” embraced by the Blue team was similar to that of
the U.S. military, and its organization should more closely resemble a U.S. combat brigade.

A typical training exercise at Zhurihe would see the Blue team launch nuclear strikes, carpet
bombing runs, and electronic attacks against the attacking Red force, as well as conduct nightly
raids. Special forces tactics were also utilized — Blue team troops impersonating local government
representatives delivering goodwill provisions to a Red team force successfully met with and
captured their commander. While the Blue team was equipped with outdated Type 59 main battle
tanks and Type 63 armored troop carriers, it is likely that they were simulated as M1 Abrams and
Bradley Fighting Vehicles using multiple integrated laser engagement systems. Lastly, the Blue
team usually emerged overwhelmingly victorious as both a defender or aggressor force.

The sobering performance of the various PLA units at Zhurihe seemed to be sufficient for Xi to
convince the top PLA brass to adopt deep reforms for the military to stay relevant. The reforms that
have been rolled out thus far appear to largely take reference from the United States:

The Central Military Commission (CMC) was reorganized to accommodate a permanent joint
command and control structure. This is reflected in the abolishing of the four General
Departments and the creation of 15 new departments, as well as inclusion of top naval and air
force generals in the CMC of the 19th Central Committee.
The chain of command was separated into an operational chain and an administrative chain. For
instance, the new military theaters oversee combat preparations, while the service branch
headquarters see that the various units are organized, trained, and equipped for missions.
The PLA is now organized around brigade combat teams as opposed to divisions.
China’s new civilian-military integration program is geared toward the development of a
military-industrial complex like the United States’
On November 10, the CMC announced regulations governing the creation of a new civilian
service.
On November 24, state media announced the piloting of a military professional education
program.
Operationally, the PLA may more closely resemble the U.S. military after reform, albeit with a
Leninist dual command structure that allows the CCP to retain full control over the troops.

The success of Xi’s military reforms, however, hinges on his efforts to consolidate power in the
CCP. While Xi emerged from the 19th Party Congress with greater authority, he still faces
resistance from the influential Jiang Zemin faction. Top CMC members and the PLA newspaper
continue to stress the importance of cleaning out the “pernicious influence of Guo Boxiong and Xu
Caihou,” two former CMC vice chairs and Jiang faction elites, from the military. Many of the other
64 top ranking generals who were purged under Xi’s anti-corruption campaign are also associated
with the Jiang faction. Furthermore, there might be senior military leaders who aren’t clearly
linked with the Jiang faction but are unhappy with Xi — Hong Kong media reported that vanished
former CMC members Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang (who was later confirmed to have committed
suicide) were dissatisfied with Xi’s military reforms. Perhaps the best indicator that Xi is genuinely
worried about internal resistance is the inclusion of CMC Discipline Inspection chief Zhang
Shengmin in a downsized CMC.

China vs. The United States: The Gap

The PLA should become a modernized fighting force if Xi is successful in implementing his
reforms, but it will unlikely surpass the U.S. military in a conventional skirmish.

Every year, America spends 3.3 percent of its GDP (about $611 billion in 2016) to develop and
maintain a military force that is widely regarded as the strongest in the world. In terms of
equipment, the U.S. military has 10 aircraft carriers, combat-proven vehicles like the M1 Abrams
tank and the Apache helicopter, next-generation fighter jets like the F-35, advanced military
communications satellites, and about 6,800 nuclear warheads. There are about 1.3 million active-
duty personnel, of which under 200,000 are deployed overseas. Training standards and
professionalism are high, and U.S. troops have participated in conflicts around the world since
World War II.

In contrast, China spends just 1.9 percent of its GDP (about $216 billion in 2016) on its military.
China’s defense ministry acknowledges a “definite gap” between the PLA’s military technology and
that of other developed countries. For instance, China’s maiden aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is a
refurbished Soviet-era steam turbine vessel, while the PLA’s next-generation fighter jet, the J-
31, lacks an advanced engine to fly at the supersonic speeds of an F-35. The Type 99 is a modern
main battle tank, but it hasn’t been combat-tested. And except for a handful of senior commanders
who fought in China’s disastrous war against Vietnam in 1979, most of the PLA’s 2 million-strong
military is lacking in combat experience. Worse, the PLA has to overcome a severe professionalism
problem: Under Jiang Zemin’s era of dominance (1997-2012), senior military officials had to bribe
their way up the ranks, training exercises were routine and conducted for show and profit, and the
military had a problem with binge drinking.

Bypassing the Gap

To match or even surpass the United States, the modernized PLA will resort to the unconventional
means that it has already been experimenting with in recent years.

In his bestselling book The Hundred-Year Marathon, Pentagon consultant Michael Pillsbury
described simulated war games between the American military and the PLA where the Chinese side
“was the victor” whenever it “employed Assassin’s Mace methods.” Assassin’s Mace,
or shashoujian, are weaponry that the PLA has developed to cripple or bypass technologically
superior militaries. Such weaponry includes anti-satellite and anti-aircraft carrier missiles, high-
powered microwave and electromagnetic pulse weapons, and radar jammers. Because Assassin’s
Mace weapons are far cheaper than carriers or next-generation fighter jets, they are a cost-effective
way for the PLA to gain an advantage over more powerful militaries that rely on satellites,
networks, and the internet for communications.

Getting China-manufactured components into the high-tech military hardware of other countries is
another way that the PLA can gain an edge. Microchips made in China are known to be counterfeit
in some cases or actual spyware in others. In 2010, the U.S. Navy found that it had bought 59,000
fake computer microchips from China. These chips were meant for use in missiles, fighter planes,
warships, and other equipment. Reuters reported in 2014 that the Pentagon had approved the use
of Chinese magnets in the construction of the F-35’s sensitive hardware. In the best case scenario,
the made-in-China parts work as advertised and no harm is done. In the worst case scenario, the
Chinese parts could cause catastrophic system failure or serve as surveillance devices for the PLA.

Perhaps more disturbing is what the PLA could potentially develop. Stuart Russell, an artificial
intelligence scientist at the University of California in Berkeley, released a short film on November
13 which highlighted the devastating capabilities of fictional autonomous “slaughter bots” — using
tiny weaponized AI drones, malicious figures eliminate politicians and activists in broad daylight.
Russell’s vision of the future is stark, but China could make it a reality. Presently, China is at the
forefront of drone manufacturing and has a sizable slice of the civilian drone market (Dajiang
Innovation alone has 70 percent of the global market share). Meanwhile, Beijing plans to spend
$100 billion to grow its semiconductor industry under a Made in China 2025 program. It is not
inconceivable that the PLA could eventually develop advanced AI-powered drones and put them to
use, even if their ethical use becomes a concern. The CCP has proven that it has no scruples about
crushing “anti-revolutionaries” (political opponents, students at Tiananmen, ethnic minorities, and
religious groups), and its military will likewise pursue asymmetrical hybrid warfare tactics to
achieve its ends against external foes.

Finally, the PLA is a legitimate cybersecurity threat. In recent years, PLA cyber units have
successfully breached the networks of U.S. businesses, infrastructure companies, and the
government. In May 2014, the U.S. Justice Department announced indictments against five
members of the former General Staff Department’s Unit 61398 for hacking Westinghouse Electric,
the United States Steel Corporation, and other companies. Chinese hackers backed by the state also
allegedly breached the computer system of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
compromising the private data of its 4 million current and former government employees.
Militaries that rely on cyber networks for communications may find their operations severely
hampered in a conflict with the PLA.

This year, four U.S. Navy vessels were involved in collisions in the East China Sea. Internal
investigations indicated that crew negligence was to blame. But the particularly severe collisions of
destroyers USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain with commercial ships, as well as the
frequency and close timing of the accidents, have led government investigators and technology
experts to consider the possibility of the warships being targeted by cyber attacks. If cyber sabotage
is indeed a reason for the collisions, then the PLA is suspect.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping’s military reforms appear to draw inspiration from the U.S. military, and serve the dual
purpose of modernizing the PLA and consolidating his control over the CCP. A modernized PLA
will unlikely surpass the United States in a conventional engagement, but the outcome will scale
toward the PLA if it uses unconventional tactics and weapons. In this scenario, the PLA is set to
become the largest “American” military force to pose a threat to the U.S.

Translated by Larry Ong.

Don Tse is the CEO and co-founder of SinoInsider Consulting LLC, a consulting and research
company based in New York City.

Larry Ong is a senior analyst with SinoInsider Consulting LLC.