A.
Power to Construe is defined under the Rules Implementing said law as the
6. National Food Authority v. Masada Security
Agency, G.R. no. 163448, march 8, 2005
FACTS:
MSA Inc. is a security agency engaged in providing
security services to individuals, corporations or government
agencies. On September 17, 1996, MSA entered into a one
year contract to provide security services to the various
offices, warehouses and installations of NFA within the scope
of the NFA Region 1. In their agreement, the parties
acknowledged the application to their contract of the wage
orders issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Boards (RTWPB) which has wage fixing authority
within the region including wage orders setting the daily
minimum wage rates pursuant to R.A. 6727.
Under Section 4 of R.A. 6727, the statutory minimum
wage rates for all workers and employees in the private
sector, whether agricultural or non-agricultural shall be
increased by P25 per day. Pursuant to this law, RTWPB issued
several wage orders mandating increases in the daily wage
rate. Accordingly, MSA requested NFA for a corresponding
upward adjustment in the monthly contract rate consisting of
the increases in the daily minimum wage of the security
guards as well as the corresponding raise in their overtime
pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, and rest day pay. MSA also
claimed increases in Social Security (SSS) and Pag-Ibig
premiums as well as administrative costs and margin. NFA
however granted the request only with respect to the
increase in the daily wage by multiplying the amount of the
mandated increase by 30 days and denied the same with
respect to adjustments in the other wage related benefits
and remunerations computed on the basis of the daily wage.
ISSUE: Was the NFA correct?
HELD: Yes. The term wage as used in Section 6 of RA 6727
pertains to no other than the statutory minimum wage which
lowest wage rate fixed by law that an employer can pay his
worker. The basis thereof under Section 7 of the same Rules
is the normal working hours, which shall not exceed eight
hours a day. Hence, the prescribed increase or the additional
liability to be borne by the principal (NFA in this case) under
Section 6 of RA 6727 is only the increment or amount added
to the remuneration of an employee for an eight hour work.
Where a statute by its terms, is expressly limited in
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
be extended to others. Since the increase in wage referred to
in section 6 pertains to the statutory minimum wage, as
defined therein, principals in service contracts (like the NFA)
cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage increase in
the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day
pay, premium pay and other benefits granted to workers.
While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the statutory
minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to
include those not included in the subject provision (National
Food Authority vs. Masada Security Agency Inc. G.R. 163448
March 8, 2005. 453 SCRA 70).
CASE 6 - National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada
Security Agency, Inc.
453 SCRA 70 (March 8, 2005)
Facts:
Masada entered into a 1 year contract to provide security
services to NFA-REGION 1. Upon the expiration of the said
contract, the parties extended the effectivity thereof on a
monthly basis under same terms and condition.
The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board
(RTWPB) issued wage orders mandating increases in the daily
wage rate. Masada requested NFA to increase the of the
1
monthly contract rate1. NFA only granted the request only
with respect to the increase in daily wage
Respondent filed a case for recovery of sum of money
against NFA with the RTC.
NFA CONTENTION: Respondent cannot demand an
adjustment on the said salary benefits because it is bound by
their contract expressly limiting NFA’s obligation to pay only
the increment in the daily wage.
Pre-trial Issue: WON respondent is entitled to recover from
NFA wage related benefits of the security guards.
RTC Ruling: NFA is liable to pay the security guards’ wage
related benefits pursuant to RA 6727, because the basis of
the computation of said benefits, like overtime pay, holiday
pay, SSS and Pag-ibig premium, is the increased minimum
wage. It also found NFA liable for the consequential
adjustments in administrative costs and margin.
NFA appealed to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed
ISSUE(Supreme Court): WON the liability of principals in
service contracts under Section 6 of RA 6727 and the wage
orders issued by the RTWPB is limited only to the increment
in the minimum wage.
HELD/ RULING:
Payment of the increases in the wage rate of workers is
ordinarily shouldered by the employer. Section 6 of RA 6727,
however, expressly lodged said obligation to the principals or
1 Consisting of: (1)daily minimum wage of the security
guards; (2) overtime pay; (3) holiday pay (4)13 th month pay;
(5) holiday and rest day pay; (6) Social Security System
[SSS]; (7) Pag-ibig premiums as well as administrative costs
and margin.
indirect employers in construction projects and
establishments providing security, janitorial and similar
services.
The court found merit in NFA’s contention that its
additional liability under the aforcited provision is
only limited to the payment of the increment in the
statutory minimum wage rate i.e. the rate for a regular
eight (8) hour work day.
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since
the increase in wage referred to in Section 6 pertains to the
“statutory minimum wage” as defined herein, principals in
service contracts cannot be made to pay the corresponding
wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential,
holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits
granted to workers. While basis of said remuneration and
benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be
unduly expanded as to include those not stated in the subject
provision.
Moreover, the law secures the welfare of the workers by
imposing a solidary liability on principals and the service
contractors. Under the second sentence of Section 6 of RA
6727, in the event that the principal or client fails to pay the
prescribed wage rates, the service contractor shall be held
solidarily liable with the former.
The parties therefore acknowledged the application to their
contract of the wage orders issued by the RTWPB pursuant to
RA 6727. There being no assumption by NFA of a greater
liability than that mandated by Section 6 of the Act, its
obligation is limited to the payment of the increased
statutory minimum wage rates which, as admitted by
respondent, had already been satisfied by NFA. Under
Article 1231 of the Civil Code, one of the modes of
extinguishing an obligation is by payment. Having
discharged its obligation to respondent, NFA no longer
have a duty that will give rise to a correlative legal
2
right of respondent. The latter’s complaint for
collection of remuneration and benefits other than the
increased minimum wage rate, should therefore be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 12,
2004 decision and the April 30, 2004 resolution of the Court
of Appeals which dismissed petitioner National Food
Authority’s appeal and motion for reconsideration,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76677, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent MASADA
Security Agency, Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-43988,
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, City, Branch 83, is
ordered DISMISSED.
CHAPTER III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
1. Intrinsic Aids
A. Title
CASE 1 - PEOPLE VS. RIVERA
FACTS:
The accused Faustino Rivera was being charged by the
crime of Indictment of the Innocent planned and punished
under the Art 363 of the Revised Penal Code. The Provincial
Prosecutor filed a case against Rivera for filing a complaint in
writing and executing an oath accusing falsely and without
probable cause Vito Sunday and Felisa Moreno of the crime of
theft.
ISSUES OF THE CASE: WON Art 363 of the R.P.C should
apply in this case.
HELD:
It does not apply since the law that the crime Rivera was
accused of committing is not explicitly stated in the R.P.C
(although it is worthy to mention that the crime of indictment
of the innocent is present in the Old Penal Code)
The old penal code described it as the charge of the offense
is the imputation itself if made in front of the administrative/
judicial officer while the R.P.C defines the offense as the act
that leads (tends directly) to imputation of the offense.
The art 363 of the R.P.C was defined or described as
“planting of evidence.”
COURT HELD THAT THE ACCUSED FAUSTINO RIVERA IS NOT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME FO INCRIMINATION OF THE INNOCENT.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear,
it is improper to resort to a caption or title to make it
obscure.
It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative
intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. (Lau Ow Bew vs. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 59;
36 Law. ed., 340, 344.)
CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. RIVERA
Facts: Rivera signed and swore to a complaint accusing Vito
and Moreno the crime of theft. According to the information,
the items stolen were a white American suit with one
eyeglasses amounting to P30, one buntal hat which costs P3,
and to two buttons which cost P3 each, with the total amount
of P39. The justice of the peace dismissed the case. After
which, Vito and Moreno filed complaints against Rivera,
charging him with incriminating innocent people, which falls
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. Rivera objected
3
and claimed that the facts alleged did not fall under Article
363 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, Article 363 of the
Codigo Penal does not appear in the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, there is no offense embracing acusacion o denuncia
falsa.
Issue: Whether or not Rivera can be charged guilty of
incriminating innocent people under Article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code
Held: No. Not guilty and inapplicable.
Ratio: The crime Rivera was accused of is not explicitly
stated in the Revised Penal Code, although the crime of
indictment of the innocent is included in the Old Penal Code.
Article 363 of the Old Penal Code talks about punishment for
false prosecutions. In the Revised Penal Code, Article 363
pertains to punishment for any act which may tend directly
to cause a false prosecution. This provision is limited to acts
of planting evidence which do not constitute false
prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions.
StatCon maxim: The title may indicate the legislative intent
to extend or restrict the scope of the law and a statute
couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to
conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.
CASE 2 – ALALAYAN V. NAPOCOR
24 SCRA 172 – Political Law – Title Must Express One Subject
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as
Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred
and Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter of
NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA
3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall
not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their
customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all
existing contracts with franchise holders for the
supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development
Company (PPDC) assailed the said provision.They averred
that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in
the title of the amending law nor was it included in the
amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to
increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al
believed that Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
4
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise
or fraud upon the legislators.
CASE 2 – ALALAYAN v. NAPOCOR
FACTS: This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the
lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power and
Development Company, both franchise holders of electric
plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section of an
amendatory act, empowering respondent National Power
Corporation "in any contract for the supply of electric power
to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric
power and energy from it to require as a condition that such
franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than
twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month
operating expenses." Respondent, under such provision,
could likewise "renew all existing contracts with franchise
holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that
the provisions of the Act could be given effect. This statutory
provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is
violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill,
which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than
one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, as well as
the due process guarantee, the liberty to contract of
petitioners being infringed upon. The lower court sustained
its validity.
ISSUE: W/N Section 3 of the subject act, which further
amends Commonwealth Act No. 121 has a due process
infringement on the right to non-impairment of contracts.
HELD: This argument has the ring of futility. Precisely, this
Court in an opinion by the present Chief Justice upheld such a
figure as against the contention that it was rather too
generous to the public utility. To speak of it as confiscatory
then is to employ the language by hyperbole. Moreover, in
the absence any evidence to demonstrate the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there would
be no basis for its nullification, in view of the well-known
presumption of validity that every statute has in its favor. In
the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for
yielding assent to the claim of petitioner that the legislation
assailed contravenes the due process clause. Statutes
enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper
exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not
only to those public utilities coming into existence after its
passage, but likewise to those already, existence established
and in operation.
CASE 3 – CITY OF BAGUIO v. MARCOS
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of
Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings.
In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land
involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public
land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the
civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his
predecessors have been in continuous possession and
cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his
predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to
file their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr.,
and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the
following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-
year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the
5
case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they
have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed
outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was
ENACTED on June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral
proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing
in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of
Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land,
by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years
Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act
reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account of their
failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared
land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings
INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval
of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922
is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the
reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date
of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12,
1912, the petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a
statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text
may be supplied or remedied by its title.
PREAMBLE
CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. PURISMA
FACTS:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by
the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General,
are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one
basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging
the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before
them — the details of which will be recounted below — an
Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common
ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in
form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential
Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the
carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet,
or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying
of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard
to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory
construction.
HELD:
COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER
AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT
JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
6
 The problem of determining what acts fall within the
purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the
intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among
others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that
there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure,
and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequence
CASE 1 – PEOPLE v. PURISIMA
Facts:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the
People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
question of law.
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII
and XVIII and CFI of Samar
Several informations were filed before the
abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential
Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash
the said informations after which the respondent-courts
passed their own orders quashing the said informations on
common ground that the informations did not allege facts
constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to
state an essential element of the crime, which is, that the
carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed,
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion
of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection,
or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read
in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and
order in the country as well as the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-
inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be
distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal
possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular,
reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose
of possession of the weapon was intended for the purposes
of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the
purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because
the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an
action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The
City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the
intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is
voluntary is enough.
Issue: Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in
form and substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal
possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 9?
Held:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands
charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a
complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the
designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
7
3. The Supreme Court says that the preamble of PD#9 states
that the intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which
are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness,
rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is
not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the
decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate
the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
The petition is DISMISSED.
CASE 2 – PEOPLE v. ECHAVEZ
FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate
informations against sixteen persons charging them with
squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before
the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves
motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five
informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was
alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth
and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be
effected “with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis
the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court
under Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes
squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.
HELD: NO. Appeal was devoid of merit. Trial court’s dismissal
was affirmed.
RATIO:
[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not
apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas
made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of
involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or
species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this
case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is
intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to
illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a
tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain.
Punctuation Marks/ Capitalization
CASE 1 – U.S. v. HART, MILLER, NATIVIDAD
CASE 2 – AGCAOILI v. SUGUITAN
G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926
FACTS:
Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of
the municipality of Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte on
the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to
hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and
emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him,
subject to the conditions prescribed by law. The conditions
prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at
the time of his appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No.
2041 which provides that "All justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ."
On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine
Legislature adopted Act No. 3107. Said Act in section 203
provides for “ That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age
of sixty-five years."
8
 On the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of
Justice sent a to Agcaoili which provides that the former has
the honor to advise the latter that he has ceased to be a
justice of the peace by operation of said amendment of the
Administrative Code.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Act. 3107 applies to justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to
the passage of said act.
(2) Whether or not Sec. 216 applies to public officers.
HELD:
(1) No. Attention is called to one of the provisions of section
3 of the Jones Law "That no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject
shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Considering that
there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in
the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that
justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed
to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years”,
the court is forced to the conclusions that, that provision is
illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the
Jones Law, and that said law cannot be applied to justices
and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior
to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili
was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to
leave his office as justice of the peace, he was forced to do
so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be
restored to his position as justice of the peace of the
municipality of Laoag, without delay.
(2) No. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation,
in the English language, to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed
by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have
relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is
not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A
semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the
expression of a thought, a degree greater than that
expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose
of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are
both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences
and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the
semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than
the comma. The punctuation used in a law may always be
referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning
of a doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all
of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the
semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the
semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or to
officers of a corporation.
The present case is anomalous under American
sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance with the
law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he
had faithfully and honestly served the Government for a
number of years the legislature adopted a new law which
arbitrarily, without giving any reason therefore, provided that
said officer cease to be such when he should reach the age of
65 years. Said law contained no express provision or method
for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its
Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in said
law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer
in the judicial department of the Government and must
vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who was
designated by said Undersecretary. When the officer
protested against such arbitrary action, giving reasons
therefor, and without answering said protest, he was
threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not
immediately vacate his office.
CASE 2 – AGCAOILI v. SUGUITAN
9
Facts: Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of
the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte by Francis Harrison on
March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said
office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments
thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to the
conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili received a letter from
Luis Torres, Undersecretary of Justice, saying that he should
cease to be a justice because he is now over 65 years old.
Justice Agcaoili filled a protest through a letter addressed to
the undersecretary to which he asserted that he will not
cease from the office because he was appointed as justice of
peace before the enactment of Act 3107, and he has the
right to hold office during good behavior. Agcaoili filed
protest at Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a
reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of
quo warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to
the petitioner with regard to his petition for quo warranto
Held: No.
Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of
office and franchise. Section 216 provides “Nothing herein
contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for
forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within
five years after the act complained of was done or
committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer
to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the
cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose.”
The Supreme Court held that this provision is applicable only
to private officials. Hence, it has no applicability to the
petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point the
court made is with regard to the rules of Statutory
Construction, given that the said provision is applicable to
public officials, the sentence after the word “committed;”
should not be treated as a separate thought from the
preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the
petitioner remain in office.
StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical
punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation
in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that
expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon
must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A
semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new
idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the
expression of a thought, a degree greater than that
expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose
of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are
both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences
and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the
semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than
the comma.
Context of Whole Text
CASE 1 - Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX
Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 83736
Facts: TMX Sales Inc. filed its quarterly income tax for the
1st quarter of 1981. It declared P571,174.31 and paying an
income tax of P247,019 on May 13, 1981. However, during
the subsequent quarters, TMX suffered losses. On April 15,
1982, when TMX filed its Annual Income Tax Return for the
year ended in December 31, 1981, it declared a net loss of
P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with the Appellate
Division of BIR for refund in the amount of P247,010
representing overpaid income tax. His claim was not acted
upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On May 14,
10
1984, TMX Sales filed a petition for review before the Court of
Tax Appeals against CIR, praying that the CIR be ordered to
refund to TMX the amount of P247,010. The CIR averred that
TMX is already barred for claiming the refund since more
than 2 years has elapsed between the payment (May 15,
1981) and the filing of the claim in court (March 14, 1984).
The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the
petition of TMX Sales and ordered CIR to refund the amount
mentioned. Hence, this appeal of CIR.
Issue: Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is entitled to a refund
considering that two years gas already elapsed since the
payment of the tax
Held: Yes. Petition denied.
Ratio: Sec. 292, par. 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code
stated that “in any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be
begun after the expiration of two years from the date of the
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening
cause that may arise after payment.” This should be
interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code.
The most reasonable and logical application of the law would
be to compute the 2-year prescriptive period at the time of
the filing of the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income
Tax Return, where it can finally be ascertained if the tax
payer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled
to a refund of overpaid income tax. Since TMX filed the suit
on March 14, 1984, it is within the 2-year prescriptive period
starting from April 15, 1982 when they filed their Annual
Income Tax Return.
StatCon maxim: The intention of the legislature must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is taken into view.
CASE 1 - Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX
Sales
G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992
FACTS: Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly
income tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an
income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income
tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the
subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered
losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual
Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it
declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions
of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00. On July 9,
1982, TMX Sales filed with the Appellate Division of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the amount
of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. This claim
was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
on the ground that "granting, without admitting, the amount
in question is refundable, the petitioner is already barred
from claiming the same considering that more than two years
had already elapsed between the payment and the filing of
the claim in Court.
ISSUE: Does the two-year period to claim a refund of
erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 or the
National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the
date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date the
filing of the Final Adjustment Return?
HELD: Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from
the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax
Return and final payment of income tax. The Court states
that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as
will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid
an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity
is to be adopted. The intention of the legislator must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is to be taken into view. Section 292 should be
interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code
in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an
11
application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and
absurdity.
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed
by private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its
Adjustment Return required in Section 87, is equivalent to the
tax paid during the first quarter. A literal application of
Section 292 would thus pose no problem as the two-year
prescriptive period reckoned from the time the quarterly
income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if
the quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot be
ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292 would
lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
The most reasonable and logical application of the law
would be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the
time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual
Income Tax Return, when it can be finally ascertained if the
taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is
entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax.
CASE 2 – AISPORNA v. CA
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal
Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros,
through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of
12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro.
The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the
aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed
against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court
of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance
Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the
soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of
authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner.
Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo,
she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy
was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had
called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband,
Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her
husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court
found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of
P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the
trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-
GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22
October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the
Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals,
submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent
within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the
present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a
person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance
without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from
the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph
defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the
section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to
be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that
the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph
of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible
error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2
applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is
“any person who for compensation shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of
compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the
12
insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be
held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
“Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a
misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect
compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of
authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing
to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation
either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the case of
Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's
Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize
persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without
license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and
concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be
noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege
that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused
with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation
is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of
the crime must be alleged and proved. After going over the
records of this case, we are fully convinced, as the Solicitor
General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189
of the Insurance Act.”
CASE 2 – AISPORNA v. CA
FACTS:
1. Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros,
with license to expire on 30 June, 1970
2. Eugenio S. Isidro was issued a Personal Accident Policy
by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo for a
period of 12 months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro
for P5,000
3. Personal Accident Policy insured died by violence
during lifetime of policy
4. Fiscal filed against Mapalad Aisporna, wife of Rodolfo
with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in
the solicitation for insurance by soliciting the
application of Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of
Perla Compaña de Seguros, ... without said accused
having first secured a certificate of authority to act as
such agent from the office of the Insurance
Commission, Republic of the Philippines
5. Defense: she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk,
and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and
at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so
she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew
6. RTC and CA: guilty as charged
ISSUE: W/N the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of
Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act is governed by the definition of
an insurance agent found on its 2nd paragraph
HELD: NO. Reversed
Section 189 of the Insurance Act
“No insurance company doing business within the
Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any
commission or other compensation to any person for services
in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have
first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate
of authority to act as an agent of such company as
hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-
agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of
applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining
new insurance, any commission or other compensation from
any insurance company doing business in the Philippine
Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate
of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner,
which must be renewed annually on the first day of January,
13
or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be
issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written
application of persons desiring such authority, such
application being approved and countersigned by the
company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon
a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such
information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner
shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke
any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall
be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of
the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal
certificates may be issued upon the application of the
company.
Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits
for a person other than himself an application for a policy of
insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to
act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an
insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall
thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company
is subject.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this
section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On
the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or
broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the
business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall
immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him
and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such
convicted person.”
Careful perusal of the provision shows:
1. First paragraph - prohibits a person from acting as agent,
sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate
of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner (no
necessity that a person solicits an insurance for
compensation in order to be called an insurance agent)
2. Second paragraph - defines who is an insurance agent
within the intent of this section (a person is an insurance
agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for
compensation)
3. Third paragraph - prescribes the penalty to be imposed for
its violation
- The appellate court has established ultimately that she did
not receive any compensation for the issuance of the
insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
It must be noted that the information, in the case at
bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance
contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been
omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained.
It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant
conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and
proved.
CASE 3 - Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals
MANILA LODGE NO. 761 BENEVELONT & PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF THE ELKS V CA
FACTS
1. On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted
Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to
14
 reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area
was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act
provided that the reclaimed area "shall be the property
of the City of Manila" and that the City of Manila is
authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land
formed by the Luneta extension at the north end for a
hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of
the Governor General, to a responsible person or
corporation for a term not to exceed 99 years.
2. Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on
May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so
as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to
sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.
3. The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares.
The City of Manila applied for the registration of the
reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, original
certificate of title was issued in the name of the City of
Manila. The title described the registered land
[Translation: A land known under the name of Luneta
Extension, situated in the district of Ermita.]
4. The registration was subject, however, to the
encumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of the Land
Registration Act as may be subsisting and [Translation:
Subject to the dispositions and conditions provided by
Act No. 1360; and subject also to contracts of sale
celebrated and entered into by the City of Manila in
favor of the Army and Navy Club and Manila Lodge No.
761 Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks (BPOE for
short), dated 29th of December 1908 and 16th of
January 1909.]
5. On July 13, 1911, the City of Manila conveyed 5,543.07
square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila
Lodge No. 761, BPOE on the basis of which a transfer
certificate of title was issued to the latter over the
"parcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta
Extension, Situada en el Distrito de la
Ermita."[Translation: Parcel of land which is part of the
Luneta Extension, situated in the District of Ermita]
6. At the back of this title was an annotated document
which in part reads as follows: [Attempted Translation:
That the said city of Manila has the legal option to
repurchase the said property solely for public
purposes, at any time after fifty years from the 13th of
July 1911, at the price previously paid to the buying
entity or the future market price of the property,
whichever value is higher.]
7. In January 1963 the BPOE petitioned the CFI of Manila,
Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City
Manila to repurchase the property. This petition was
granted on February 15, 1963.
8. On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of
P4,700,000 the land together with all the
improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid P1,700,000 as
down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the same
realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid
in quarterly installments. At the time of the sale, there
was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to
the property.
9. On December 12, 1963 TCT No. 73444 was issued to
TDC over the subject land still described as "Una
parcela de terreno, que es parte de la Luneta
Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita."
10.In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the CFI of
Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to
repurchase. The court, after hearing, issued an order,
dated November 19, 1964, directing the Regrister of
Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the
entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to
repurchase the property after fifty years. From this
15
 order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on
July 31, 1968 affirmed the trial court's order of
reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring
another action for the clarification of its rights.
11.After trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its
decision finding the subject land to be part of the
"public park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public
domain. The court consequently declared that the sale
of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila
Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff
TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith and for
value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the
latter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the
City of Manila whatever consideration it had paid the
latter.
12.In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the CA
concurred in the findings and conclusions of the lower
court.
ISSUES
1. WON the property subject of the action was
patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a
park or plaza
2. WON the City of Manila is estopped from questioning
the validity of the sale it executed on July 13, 1911
conveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge
No. 761, BPOE
3. WON the CA has departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings in that it did not
make its own findings but simply recited those of the
lower court
HELD:
1. NO. We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for
public use.
a. Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the
City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the
City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of
the whole reclaimed area without need of
authorization to do so from the lawmaking body.
Thus Article 348 of the Civil Code of Spain
provides that "ownership is the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing without further limitations
than those established by law." The right to
dispose (jus disponendi) of one's property is an
attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as
amended, however, provides by necessary
implication, that the City of Manila could not
dispose of the reclaimed area without being
authorized by the lawmaking, body. Thus the
statute provides that "the City of Manila is
hereby authorized to set aside a tract at the
north end, for a hotel site, and to lease the
same x x x should the municipal board x x x
deem it advisable, it is hereby authorized x x x
to sell said tract of land x x x." If the reclaimed
area were patrimonial property of the City, the
latter could dispose of it without need of the
authorization provided by the statute, and the
authorization to set aside, lease, or sell given by
the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so
construe the statute as to render the term
"authorize," which is repeatedly used by the
statute, superfluous would violate the
elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that
effect must be given to every word, clause, and
sentence of the statute and that a statute
should be so interpreted that no part thereof
becomes inoperative or superflous. To
authorizemeans to empower, to give a right to
16
 act. Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb
"authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which
means "by means of this statue or section."
Hence without the authorization expressly given
by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could not
lease or sell even the northern portion; much
less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed
area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was
granted to the City of Manila, not as its
patrimonial property. At most, only the northern
portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to
be patrimonial property, for, by express
statutory provision it could be disposed of, and
the title thereto would revert to the City should
the grantee fail to comply with the terms
provided by the statute.
b. Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to
the Luneta in the City of Manila." If the
reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta,
then it is of the same nature or character as the
old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said
that a power to extend or continue an act or
business cannot authorize a transaction that is
totally distinct. It is not disputed that the old
Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so
considered by Section 859 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila.
Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a
public park or plaza and for public use. TDC, however,
contends that the subject property cannot be considered an
extension of the old Luneta because it is outside of the limits
of the old Luneta when extended to the sea. This is a strained
interpretation of the term "extension," for an "extension" it
has been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction-in
length, breadth, or circumstances.
c. Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the
Manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea.
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays,
roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the
national domain open to public use. These are also property
of public ownership devoted to public use, according to
Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain. When the shore or part
of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being
property for public use.
d. Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or
sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel
site. The subject property is not that northern portion
authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the
southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius
est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to
sell the subject property. The application of this principle of
statutory construction becomes the more imperative in the
case at bar inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the
reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as above stated,
strictly construed against the City of Manila, but also because
a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as happens in
this case where the city is authorized to lease or sell the
northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to
such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily
incidental to the objectives of the corporation.
e. Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that
property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
works of general service paid for by such towns or
provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the
Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.
We have demonstrated that the Luneta extension was
intended to be property of the City of Manila for public use.
But, could not said property later on be converted, as the
17
petitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It could be. But
this Court has already said, in Ignacio v. The Director of
Lands that it is only the executive and possibly the legislative
department that has the authority and the power to make
the declaration that said Property is no longer required for
public use, and until such declaration is made the property
must continue to form part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or
unequivocal declaration. It should be noted that courts are
undoubtedly not primarily called upon, and are not in a
position, to determine whether any public land is still needed
for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.
2. NO
Ratio The Government is never estopped by mistakes or
errors on the part of its agents and estoppel does not apply
to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is
prohibited by law or its against public policy.
Reasoning The sale of July 13, 1911 executed by the City of
Manila to Manila
Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by law. Estoppel
cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the
benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila
Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for
to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in
this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly
what it could not do directly. The sale of the subject property
executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761,
BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter. [a
park is outside the commerce of man] It suffered from an
incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of
time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761
therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence
to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has been,
cannot be an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for
there was in contemplation of law, no contract at all. The
inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who
asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first
vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also against all
its Successors, including the
TDC, which are not protected by law. The doctrine of bone
fide purchaser without notice, being claimed by the TDC,
does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the
vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot
create title where none exists. The restoration or restitution
of what has been given is in order.
3. NO. We have shown in our discussion of the first issue that
the decision of the trial court is fully in accordance with law.
It follows that when such decision was affirmed by the CA,
the affirmance was likewise in accordance with law. Hence,
no useful purpose will be served in further discussing this
issue.
Disposition The petitions are denied for lack of merit and
the decision of the CA is affirmed, at petitioners' cost.
Extrinsic Aids
A. Dictionaries
CASE 1 – ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
1. Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations charging
Estrada for violation of Plunder Law, among others.
2. Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the
case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
and for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-
affidavits and other documents necessary to prove
lack of probable cause. (Vagueness of law never raised
18
 in the Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness
and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law)
3. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that “a
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused”
4. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Estrada but
was denied by Sandiganbayan
5. Estrada moved to quash the Information on the ground
that the facts alleged did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for VAGUENESS.
a. Failure for the law to provide definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key
phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts”
b. They render the Plunder Law unconstitutional
for being impermissibly vague and overbroad
and violative of his fundamental right to due
process
6. Sandiganbayan denied Motion to Quash. Issues for
resolution raised before the Supreme Court.
Issues: WON R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS
VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY
LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR
PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its
will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-
settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the
following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination — the result or product of combining; the act
or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such
close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series — a number of things or events of the same class
coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the
law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec.
4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1
(d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1)
to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law,
the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
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thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a
'general plan of action or method' which the principal
accused and public officer and others conniving with him,
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain
a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where
the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in
this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute
is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice. It
must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does
not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks
to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on
the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is
most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly
stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents
the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The
running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all
other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by
proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable
doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no
need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
B. Legislative History
a) Greenfield v. Meer, 77 Phil 394
FACTS:
Since the year 1933, the plaintiff has been
continuously engaged in the embroidery business. In 1935,
the plaintiff began engaging in buying and selling mining
stocks and securities for his own exclusive account and not
for the account of others. The plaintiff has not been a dealer
in securities as defined in section 84 (t) of Commonwealth
Act No. 466; he has no established place of business for the
purchase and sale of mining stocks and securities; and he
was never a member of any stock exchange. The plaintiff
filed an income tax return where he claims a deduction of
P67,307.80 representing the net loss sustained by him in
mining stocks securities during the year 1939. The defendant
disallowed said item of deduction on the ground that said
losses were sustained by the plaintiff from the sale of mining
stocks and securities which are capital assets, and that the
loss arising from the sale of the same should be allowed only
to the extent of the gains from such sales, which gains were
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already taken into consideration in the computation of the
alleged net loss of P67,307.80.
ISSUE: Whether the personal and additional exemptions
granted by section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 should
be considered as a credit against or be deducted from the
net income, or whether it is the tax on such exemptions that
should be deducted from the tax on the total net income.
Held/Ratio: Personal and additional exemptions claimed by
appellant should be credited against or deducted from the
net income. "Exception is an immunity or privilege; it is
freedom from a charge or burden to which others are
subjected." (If the amounts of personal and additional
exemptions fixed in section 23 are exempt from taxation,
they should not be included as part of the net income, which
is taxable. There is nothing in said section 23 to justify the
contention that the tax on personal exemptions (which are
exempt from taxation) should first be fixed, and then
deducted from the tax on the net income. *SEE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
b) David v. COMELEC, GR No. 127116
FACTS:
Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of
when the barangay elections should be held and questions
the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd
Monday of May 1997. The COMELEC’s basis is R.A. 7160 or
the Local Government Code which mandates barangay
elections every 3 years. Petitioner David contends that an
earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679
provides that barangay elections should be held every 5
years. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. 10,
Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. What the term of office of barangay officials is.
2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the
Constitution.
HELD:
1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two
laws that the later legislative enactment prevails.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC had
the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election
should be when it stated that “the next regular election
involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the
same having been scheduled in May 1997”.
2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, ‘The
term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term
of office for barangay officials.
B. Explanatory Note
a) People v. Lidres, 108 Phil 995
FACTS: Dionisio Lidres and Josita Diotay filed their
applications as substitute teacher for Magdalena Echavez.
The Supervising teacher requested Diotay to sign an
agreement, wherein both Diotay and defendant agreed to
take over Echavez’ position on a “50-50” basis, e.i that is the
period from January to March 1954, would be equally divided
between them. Diotay then took over and began teaching.
However, on February 12, 1954, Lidres went to the
school with a letter of resignation and asked Diotay to sign it,
the latter refused. Lidres told Diotay that whether she like it
or not, he would take over her class on February 22, 1954.
True to his word Lidres went to the said class and insisted to
take over. He held class with the half of the class and erased
Diotay’s name from the attendance chart and place his own.
Diotay informed the principal and the following day they
were summoned by the supervising teacher, ordered Diotay
to continue her teaching and advised Lidres not to go back to
the school. Without heeding the said instruction Lidres
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without any authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay’s
class against the latter’s will.
Lidres was charged and prosecuted with the crime of
Usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in
R.A. No. 10.
ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 10 is only applicable to members of
subversive organizations engaged in subversive activities.
HOLDING: Court ruled that in examination of the discussion
of House Bill No. 126, which became R.A No. 10, discloses
indisputably that said Act was really intended as an
emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation
created by the subversive activities of seditious organizations
at the time of its passage in September 1946. Hence, the
elimination of the element of pretense of official position
required under Article 177 of the RPC. And since it is neither
alleged in the information nor proved during the trial that
defendant is a member of a seditious organization engaged
in subversive activities, he could not be liable or found guilty
under said provision of R.A. No. 10. Granting, arguendo, that
R.A. No. 10 is an amendment to Art. 177, and not merely an
implementation thereof, the subsequent enactment of R.A.
379, effective June 14,1949, would constitute an amendment
thereof restoring the element of pretense of official position
in the offense of usurpation of official functions. Under R.A.
379, the law in force at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense, pretense of official position is an essential
element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But
the information specifically charges that defendant
committed the offense “without pretense of official position.”
Under the circumstances, the facts alleged in the information
fail to constitute an offense.
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