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1. Crespo v.

Mogul evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr.
G.R. No. L-53373 In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, set the arraigniment stating:
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL ORDER
COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal
BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents. premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of
Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things,
the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved
GANCAYCO, J.: having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of
the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to
dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the
Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the
grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements
of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18,
No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.
accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution SO ORDERED. 11
of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order
of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary
the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3 SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court
of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court
injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23,
as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused
Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the
Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby
May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge
writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the
the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the
have finally resolved the petition for review. 7 information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent
Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, purely civil. 16
Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving
information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition,
not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party
filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other
course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be
to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme
be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration
Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive
February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the and vindictive manner. 30
petition.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or
General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review
respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the
ordered to dismiss the information. action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct
that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by information be filed in Court. 31
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear
follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information
the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested,
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of
according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal
equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct
convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must
case. 22 be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the
fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not
determines the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been
prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in
and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35
for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the
him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process
insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the of law. 36a
fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since
this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the proceed for the proper determination of the case.
defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond
reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did not
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss
filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that Teehankee C.J., took no part.
there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of 2. Saldivia v. Reyes
Justice.
G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all
know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the vs.
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of
of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal,
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for
the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The CRUZ, J.:
least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution
although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive
prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38 period for violations of municipal ordinances.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a
filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1 The referral-
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. 4

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that
of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from Summary Procedure:
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when
the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
be left entirely for the determination of the Court. Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to costs. xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED. B. Criminal Cases:


two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
2. Violations of rental law;
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
offenses charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one Procedure, providing as follows:
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . . Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary
(Emphasis supplied.) procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

xxx xxx xxx a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting
Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said
cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila
That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the
complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party. fiscal.

She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as
follows: Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing
of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases,
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary
by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Procedure.

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for
Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
for reasons not constituting jeopardy. complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
supplied) reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the
complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct
requisite complaint. a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two any date before that.
months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August
1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which
incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are
January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2
1, 1988. thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it
the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that does.
the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent. Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the
110. decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense
involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a
obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is
thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here
pesos. sought to be corrected.

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.


Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the
petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 DECISION
of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was PEREZ, J.:
the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this
was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision[2] of
October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma. Theresa
Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C.
prescription. It is so ordered. Malolos.
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is
3. People v. Pangilinan REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153
against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.[3]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an


affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22
- versus - against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine
(9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private
complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
Respondent. commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
G.R. No. 152662 performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Present:
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to
CARPIO, Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office
Chairperson, of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil
BRION, action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
PEREZ,
SERENO, and On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
REYES, JJ. the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil
action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela
Promulgated: City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon
June 13, 2012 City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court
Justice (DOJ). a petition for review[5] on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of In a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with the CA for appropriate action.
her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00
and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring
totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed. In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision
of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had
1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February already prescribed.
2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000. In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified
extinguished by reason of prescription. by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and,
the five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four
an Order dated 5 October 2000. years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or
information against the petitioner before the proper court.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal
cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City. The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic)
against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly
Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent prescribed.
portion of the decision reads:
xxx
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000
with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be
2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had,
therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes[7] the Supreme Court held that the
considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet. proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the
proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this
Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the
computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws,
finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8] likewise between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this
applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.[9] case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the
to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted
and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the the period of prescription of such offense.
period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal
actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, We find merit in this petition.
that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.[10] It submits
that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the
Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision
Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal
subject BP Blg. 22 cases. of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a
certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively
the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the judicial erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already
proceeding that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
Zaldivia,[12] the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
superseding the aforesaid ruling. Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22
cases. Appositely, the law reads:
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,[13] the Supreme Court ruled that
the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for preliminary investigation SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx;
filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the and punishment.
decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses
are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of
period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law. not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be
anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are
therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)[14] and In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.[15] filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes
Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the
BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling
was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal
et. al.[17] when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that
also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right
involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The
cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to
interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] file the requisite complaint.
is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the
period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even ruled that investigations
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the SO ORDERED.
Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively
interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in


all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before
the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties,
especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because
of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995
is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of
BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified
by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day
grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16


September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised
before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition
to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered
that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC
of Quezon City.

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