RULE 68

G.R. No. 138292 April 10, 2002

KOREA EXCHANGE BANK, petitioner,

vs.
FILKOR BUSINESS INTEGRATED, INC., KIM EUNG JOE, and LEE HAN SANG, respondents.

FACTS: Respondent FILKOR had three transactions with the respondent KOREA EXCHANGE BANK:

1. Borrowed US$ 140,000.00, of which only US$ 40,000.00 was paid;

2. Executed nine (9) trust receipt but failed to turn over the proceeds of the goods or the goods themselves; and

3. Negotiated the proceeds of seventeen (17) letters of credit, which were all dishonored because of discrepancies.

To secure payment for these obligations respondent FILKOR executed a Real Estate Mortgage. It mortgaged to the bank the improvements it
constructed on the lot it was leasing in Cavite Export Processing Zone Authority. Respondents Kim Eung Joe and Lee Han Sang on their part executed
a Continuing Suretyship binding themselves jointly and severally with FILKOR to pay the obligations to the bank.

When FILKOR breached all its obligations, petitioner KOREA EXCHANGE BANK filed a civil case with the RTC of CAVITE. The petitioner
sought to be paid for 27 causes of action and that the mortgaged property be foreclosed and sold at a public auction in case the respondent fails to pay
within ninety days from the entry of judgment.

The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner for all 27 actions but failed to order the foreclosure and public auction of the
mortgaged property in the event that FILKOR fails to pay its obligation. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration seeking that the relief of
foreclosure be granted but such motion was denied saying that the petitioner in opting to file a civil action for the collection of the defendant’s obligation,
has abandoned its mortgaged lien on the property subject of the real estate mortgage.

BASIS of TC’s DECISION: Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 446, citing Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Co Kim, et al., 71 Phil. 448
“The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with
the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor including the subject matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if
he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived.”

ISSUE: (Assigned by petitioner) Whether or not the petitioner had abandoned the real estate mortgage in its favor, because it filed a simple collection
case. NO

(Resultant Issue) Whether or not petitioner’s complaint before the trial court was an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, or an
action for collection of a sum of money.

HELD: It was an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. Petitioner’s allegations in its complaint, and its prayer that the mortgaged property
be foreclosed and sold at public auction, indicate that petitioner’s action was one for foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

 In petitioner’s complaint before the trial court, petitioner alleges:

To secure payment of the obligations of defendant Corporation under the First to the Twenty-Seventh Cause of Action, on February
9, 1996, defendant Corporation executed a Real Estate Mortgage by virtue of which it mortgaged to plaintiff the improvements
standing on Block 13, Lot 1, Cavite Export Processing Zone, Rosario, Cavite, belonging to defendant Corporation covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5906-1 and consisting of a one-story building called warehouse and spooling area, the guardhouse, the
cutting/sewing area building and the packing area building. (A copy of the Real Estate Mortgage is attached hereto as Annex “SS”
and made an integral part hereof.)

 This allegation satisfies in part the requirements of Section 1, Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on foreclosure of real estate
mortgage, which provides:

SECTION 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure. – In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other encumbrance upon
real estate, the complaint shall set forth the date and due execution of the mortgage; its assignments, if any; the names and
residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee; a description of the mortgaged property; a statement of the date of the note or
other documentary evidence of the obligation secured by the mortgage, the amount claimed to be unpaid thereon; and the names
and residences of all persons having or claiming an interest in the property subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage,
all of whom shall be made defendants in the action.

 Prayer of the complaint before the trial court reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered:

x xx
2. Ordering that the property mortgaged be foreclosed and sold at public auction in case defendants fail to pay plaintiff within ninety
(90) days from entry of judgment.
 Petitioner’s action being one for foreclosure of real estate mortgage the trial should have ordered the foreclosure and public auction of the mortgaged
property in the event that respondent Filkor fails to pay its outstanding obligations. This is pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:

SEC. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale.- If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set forth in the
complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other
charges as approved by the court, and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to
the court or to the judgment obligee within a period of not less than ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days
from entry of judgment, and that in default of such payment the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED The Order dated March 12, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch
88, in Civil Case No. N-6689 is hereby MODIFIED, to state that the mortgaged property of respondent Filkor be ordered foreclosed and sold at
public auction in the event said respondent fails to pay its obligations to petitioner within ninety (90) days from entry of judgment.

G.R. No. 137792 August 12, 2003

SPOUSES RICARDO ROSALES and ERLINDA SIBUG, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES ALFONSO and LOURDES SUBA, THE CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, Respondents.

The spouses Ricardo Rosales and Erlinda Sibug were indebted to a certain Felicisimo Macaspac. Later, Macaspac sued the spouses for their failure to
pay. During trial, it was found out that there existed an equitable mortgage between the spouses and Macaspac. The court ordered the spouses to pay
Macaspac and if they fail to do so, their property shall be foreclosed.
The spouses failed to pay Macaspac hence the court ordered the sale at a public auction of their land in May 1998. The highest bidder was the spouses
Alfonso and Lourdes Suba. In June 1998, the trial court issued an order confirming the sale made to the spouses Suba. The spouses Rosales then filed
a motion for reconsideration. The trial court ruled against their motion as it ruled that there is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosures. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debtor-mortgagor can exercise the right of redemption in judicial foreclosure.
HELD: No. There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure. What can be exercised is equity of redemption.
Equity of redemption is simply the right of the mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within
the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its
confirmation by the court (prior to the court’s confirmation of the sale).
In this case, unfortunately, the spouses Rosales never exercised their equity of redemption.
When can equity of redemption be exercised?
The mortgagor may exercise his equity of redemption even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure
sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale.
Are there any exceptions to the rule that “there is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure”?
Yes, the only exemption is when the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or a banking institution. In such cases, the mortgagor can
exercise the right of redemption.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 1998 and February 26, 1999 in CA
G.R. SP No. 49634 are AFFIRMED.

RULE 65

SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO P. CERICOS, Petitioner, vs. NESTOR M. CANDA,
BIENVENIDO LIPA YON, JULIAN D. AMADOR, BOHOL PROVINCIAL CHIEF, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, AND NATIONAL DIRECTOR, RESPECTIVELY,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ALL SUED IN BOTH THEIR OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE CAPACITIES, Respondents.

FACTS: Secial People, Inc. Foundation was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in Barangay Jimilia-an in the Municipality
of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of
Loboc and six other municipalities. On the other hand, respondents are administrative agencies responsible for enforcing environmental laws. In this case,
Special people Foundation applied for Certificate of Non-Coverage with the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR. It seek to to be exempt
from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.

The Chief of the EMB denied the said application. In 2002, the petitioner appealed the decision, claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because the
project was no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) that had recently been issued
a CNC. The Regional Director still denied the application because the Philvolcs issued a certificate attesting to the fact that the said place is an earthquake
prone area. It alleged that it filed an appeal before the Secretary of the DENR. While the case was pending, it filed a petition for mandamus before the
RTC. RTC dismissed the petition stating that the PHILVOLCS issued a certificate that the place was an earthquake prone area. Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 was filed before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition for mandamus is a proper remedy.

Ruling,

It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern should first avail himself of all the
remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away
from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation.16 The court of law
must allow the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence.17 This
rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so.

Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a pending appeal with the DENR Secretary.1âwphi1 However, the records reveal that the subject
of the appeal of the petitioner was an undated resolution of the DENR Regional Director, Region VII, denying its application for the CNC,24 not the decision
of RD Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending appeal with the DENR Secretary had related to RD Lipayon’s decision, the petitioner should
still have waited for the DENR Secretary to resolve the appeal in line with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Its failure to do so rendered
its resort to mandamus in the RTC premature. The omission is fatal, because mandamus is a remedy only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.25

Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the petitioner did not establish that the grant of its application for the CNC was a purely
ministerial in nature on the part of RD Lipayon. Hence, mandamus was not a proper remedy.

The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not covered by the Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS System) and
that the project proponent is not required to secure an ECC.26 The EIS System was established by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that required all entities to submit an EIS for projects that would have a significant effect on
the environment, thus:

The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the EMB Director or Regional Director, who must determine whether the project or project area is
classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by the applicant.

Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement to submit the needed certifications. For one, it
submitted no certification to the effect that the project site was not within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCS’s certification showed that the project site
had experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place the site in the category of "areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by
natural calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its
application.

Fallo: The petition is dismissed.

MAYOR EDGARDO G. FLORES, petitioner vs. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA, GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID OF PAMPANGA,
MUNICIPAL COUNCILORS VANZALON F. TIZON, ROMULO N. MANDAP, EDGARDO P. YAMBAO, JEROME M. TONGOL, MARCIANO L. SACDALAN,
and RICKY Y. NARCISO, respondents.

FACTS: Mayor Flores was the elected mayor of Minalin, Pampanga. On the other hand, respondents councilors of the said municipalities. A complaint for
gross misconduct and dishonesty was filed with the Sangguniang PAnlalawigan of Pampanga against Mayor Flores. It was alleged that Mayor Flores
executed a Purchase Request No. 1 for the acquisition of a communication equipment amounting to P293,000.00 without any Resolution or Ordinance
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalin. A public bidding was held and it was awarded to kai Electronics. Prior yo the grant Notice of Award of Bid,
Kai Electronics delivered the said equipment upo the execution of the Purchase Request No. 1. It was alos alleged that the sale was overpriced. The
Sanggunian Panlalawigan issued an order recommending to governor Lapid to suspend Mayor Flores for a period of 60 days.

Mayor Flores executed a letter requesting Governor LApid to veto the said order. Before waiting for the decision, a petition for certiorari before the CA was
filed. The Ca denied it for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari may be filed even in the presence of an appeal.

Ruling: No. Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) partly provides:

SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the
Office of the President; and

The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed with respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga in accordance with the above provision.
After receiving the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan preventively suspending him from office, petitioner should have filed a motion for
reconsideration in order to give the latter the opportunity to correct itself if there was any error on its part. Such motion is a condition sine qua non before
filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[5] Section 1 of the same Rule requires that petitioner must
not only show that respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in issuing the questioned Order, acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, but that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.[6] We have held that the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order
or Resolution.[7] Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.[8] To dispense with
the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so.[9] This, petitioner failed
to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that petitioner should have first interposed a motion for reconsideration of the questioned Order issued by
respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
We must add that petitioner, before filing with the Court of Appeals his petition for certiorari, should have waited for respondent Governor Lapids action on
the recommendation of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan that he be preventively suspended from office; and on his letter requesting the Governor
to veto the questioned Order, considering that the latter is the one empowered by law to impose preventive suspension upon him. Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 partly provides:

SEC 63. Preventive Suspension.

(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;

(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality; or

(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.

x x x. (underscoring ours)

Petitioner has not shown any valid and compelling reason why, without waiting for the Governors action on the matter, he immediately filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari. By doing so, petitioner effectively deprived the Governor of his duty to take appropriate action on the controversy.

FALLO: Decision is dismissed.

RICARDO SANTOS and PAULA SANTOS WONG, Petitioners, vs. ILUMINADA CRUZ, represented by Attorney-in-fact GLORIA ISRAEL, JUDGE
FRANCISCO LINDO, MeTC, Branch 55, Malabon City, Respondents.

FACTS: Iluminada Cruz was the owner of parcels of land, part of which was occupied by petitioners Ricardo Santos and Paula Santos Wong. Two
ejectment suits were filed by respondent Illuminada Cruz against petitioners contending that petitioners occupied the land owned by her without her
consent and established buildings to her detriment. Since petitioners were relative of Cruz, she allowed the former to occupy or stay her lands with the
condition that they would vacate the area upon demand. But petitioners refused to adhere to such condition. Due to that< Illuminada Cruz was constrained
to file this petition. Petitioners claimed that the land that they occupied was sold by Illuminda to Paula’s husband. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
The decision was appealed before the RTC. RTC reversed the decision alleging that photocopies of the absolute sale was insufficient to prove the
ownership of petitioners. Instead of filing motion for reconsideration, the petitioners elevated the matter before the Supreme Court via Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of Rule 65 is premature

Ruling: yes. In Cervantes v. Court of Appeals,14 we further stressed that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right,
never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration
is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason
for doing so.

In the case at bar, petitioners did not file a prior motion for reconsideration from the decision of the trial court. Even as they alleged in the petition that the
lower court acted without jurisdiction when it rendered a decision without due process in the proceedings, the averment of facts was incomplete.

Moreover, the instant petition for certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Disregard of
this rule warrants the dismissal of the petition. While the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not allow an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.15 Petitioners have not
alleged sufficient ground why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. Thus, we reaffirm the established rule that this Court will not entertain a
direct appeal unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to
the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.16

Fallo: The petition is dismissed.

ROSALINO P. ACANCE, in his capacity as Attorney-in-Fact, Administrator of property and as counsel of SPOUSES JESULITO P. ACANCE and VILMA
ACANCE, SPOUSES MANUEL P. ACANCE and GUIA ACANCE, and SPOUSES NESTOR P. ACANCE and LYNNE ACANCE, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, SPOUSES YOLANDA QUIJANO TRIA and AMBROCIO TRIA, SPOUSES EPIFANIA QUIJANO and RAPHAEL VILLANUEVA, and
SPOUSES NAPOLEON PAGLICAWAN QUIJANO and PILAR Z. QUIJANO, represented by their attorney-in-fact, ENGR. JULIUS VILLANUEVA,
respondents.

FACTS: Respondents were resident of the Philippines while on the other hands, petitioners were residents of the United States of America. Respondents
filed a case before the RTC asking the court to declare the Extrajudicial settlement of estate of the deceased Jesus Acance and the Waiver of Rights be
declared void. They alleged that the properties that were the subject of the inquiries were acquired by Angela during the subsistence of her first marriage
and therefore excluded from the conjugal properties or exclusive properties of Jesus Acance. The petitioner failed to give an answer although summon by
publication was effected by the respondents. Due to that, the Court, through motion of the respondents declared Petitioners in default. The respondents
upon the knowledge of the said declaration filed before the RTC a motion to lift the order of defendant.
The RtC denied the motion. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court alleging extreme urgency due to
jurisdictional defects before the Court of Appeals

The CA denied the said petition. The petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: The threshold issue that needs to be resolved is whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of the
petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration with the court a quo.

RULING:

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.[2]
However, this rule admits of exceptions including:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.[3]

It appears that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari for failure of the petitioners to move for a reconsideration
of the default order when it had been sufficiently shown that the need for relief was extremely urgent. The procedural requirement that a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to the special civil action of certiorari may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice and, among
other recognized instances, when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[4] Among other
remedies, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even
if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.[5]

FALLO: Petition is granted.

LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NAPOLEON K. FLOJO, Presiding Judge of
Branch II, RTC Manila; ATILLA ARKIN, the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MAKATI, METRO MANILA, respondents.

FACTS: In 1988 Jose H. Imperial Organizations, Pty., thru Atty. Jose H. Imperial entered into an agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines to promote
two concerts featuring a group known as "Earth, Wind and Fire" on June 12 and 13, 1988 with Coca-Cola sponsoring the concerts and the former promoting
the same.

The Coca Cola Bottlers required Jose H. imperial Organizations to file a performance bond to secure the performance of the act. Jose H. Imperial
Organizations complied with the said directive and filed the bond through Liberty insurance corporation for 3, 000,000 to secure its agreement with Coca
Cola Bottlers. It will answer all the advances made by Coca cola bottler in case of non performance.

Liberty Insurance Corporation required Jose H. Imperial Organization to execute an indemnity agreement to answer for all the damages that the former
would obtain for failure of Jose H. Imperial Organization to comply.

In the date of the concern, Jose H. Imperial Organization failed to comply with its obligations. The performance bond was forfeited. Petitioner filed a petition
for damages with writ of prelimary attachment before the Court alleging that Hose H. Imperial Corporations defrauded it when he passed a fake certificate
of title to it. The Court granted it. Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion to quash writ of preliminary attachment. It was granted by the court and on
that day the court ordered the discharge of the properties by the sheriff.

The petitioners filed a special civil action before the Court of Appeals. The Court of appeals dismissed for the failure of petitioners to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the case for certiorari.

Rulling: Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless an inferior court, through a motion for reconsideration, had been given an opportunity to correct the imputed
errors. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as 1) when the issue raised is one purely, of law; 2) where public interest is involved; 3) in cases of
urgency (Quirino vs. Grospe, 169 SCRA 702 [1989]); or 4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action (People vs. Dacudao,
170 SCRA 489 [1989]).

In the case at bar, petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the trial court before commencing certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals
is not fatal considering the existence of special circumstances that warrant immediate and more direct action (Saldaña vs. CA, 190 SCRA 396 [1990]).

The indecent haste with which respondent Arkin had been disposing of his properties demonstrates the imperative need for a more adequate relief requiring
an immediate and more direct action. There was an urgency which caused the present case to fall under one of the exceptions thereby allowing petitioner
to file a petition for certiorari without the need of first filing a motion for reconsideration.

Filing a motion for reconsideration would have served no useful purpose nor can it be considered a plain, speedy and adequate remedy since the order
directing the sheriff to discharge or lift the writ of attachment was issued on the same day the order granting the quashal was made. It would not have
automatically forestalled Arkin from further disposing of his properties. It is rather disturbing how respondent judge, after ruling in his order of October 19,
1989, denying respondent's motion to quash, that the trial court's finding of fraud in incurring the obligation under the indemnity agreement was supported
by substantial evidence, would, in his order of March 6, 1991 granting the motion for reconsideration, based on the same substantial evidence supporting
a finding of fraud, later reverse himself and declare that "the plaintiff (petitioner herein) did not prove the intent of defendant Arkin to defraud creditors."

Through the order for the "immediate" lifting of the writ, respondent Judge, in one swift stroke, completely subverted the valid order of attachment issued
after a finding of fraud, which finding he himself has declared as supported by substantial evidence. We hold that respondent judge in issuing the contested
orders has acted capriciously, whimsically and arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction correctible by
the special writ of certiorari.

Fallo: Petition is granted.

CARMELITA V. LIM and VICARVILLE REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs.

HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan and VALENTIN GARCIA and
CONCEPCION GARCIA, Respondents.

FACTS: In 1997, respondent Petitioner Lim Filed a criminal case for Falsification and perjury against Spouses Garcia alleging that the spouses Garcia
with intent to prejudice petitioner executed an affidavit stating that the duplicate copy of the TCT of their property was lost after entrusting the same to his
agent for purposes of selling the property covered by the title. Garcia on the other hand filed a criminal case against petitioner Lim for Falsification of
document and used of falsified document.

The prosecutor dismissed the complaint of Garcia but pursued the case filed by Petitioner Lim. Garcia filed a complaint for the the Delivery of the owner’s
duplicate copy of the TCT and annulment of absolute sale against Petitioner Lim. Thereafter, Garcia filed a motion for suspension of proceedings due to
the existence of prejudicial question. The court denied it. On the other hand, the spouses Lim filed a motion dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. The
same was denied. Lim filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence Lim filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is premature to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

RULING: YES. On the procedural aspect, we find that petitioners disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy which we enjoin litigants and lawyers to
strictly observe. The Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, as in the case at bar, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
an established policy necessary to avoid inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to preclude the further clogging of the Court’s docket. 31

Moreover, the instant petition is procedurally flawed as it is not accompanied by copies of relevant pleadings mandated by the second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said provision reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.

Specifically, as pointed out by respondents, the instant petition is not accompanied by copies of the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration that
petitioners filed with the trial court. These are documents important for the Court’s appraisal, evaluation and judicious disposition of the case. Failing to
fully apprise the Court of the relevant details of the case, we find this egregious error a sufficient cause for the dismissal of the instant petition. As held in
Santiago, Jr. v Bautista, 34 to wit:
x x x the lower court’s holding that appellant’s failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by precedents
as well. 35

In any case, even on the substantive aspect, the petition fails to persuade us. While we agree with petitioners’ lament that the Order dated 3 September
1998 is defective as it did not state clearly and distinctly the reasons for the denial of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, it is noteworthy, however, that public
respondent corrected his error in the Order dated 13 November 1998 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. There is no objection to a judge
correcting or altogether altering his case disposition on a motion for reconsideration, it being the purpose of such recourse to provide the court an
opportunity to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed, or, with like effect, to allow the aggrieved party the chance to convince the court that its
ruling is erroneous. A motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari is required precisely to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct
any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. 37

Parenthetically, assuming that the two orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. As long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. All errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Petitioners’ rights can be
more appropriately addressed in an appeal. 38

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN
and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS: There was a corruption case pending before the SAndiganbayan against Miriam Defensor Santiago for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. A
warrant of arrest was issued against her. She through her counsel requested the court to allow her to file a cash bond amounting to 15, 000.00 because
she could not appear personally because she was still under the stage of recovery for the vehicular accident that she involved. The court fixed the amount
of 15, 0000.00. She went to the office of the Ombudsman to talk to hum regarding her case. She filed a petition for certiorari and issuance of preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court. The supreme Court granted the preliminary injunction and because of that the Sandiganbayan deferred the scheduled
of arraignment. She requested the Court to release the cash bond that she filed. However, the Court denied the petition and Miriam filed a motion for
reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan continued the case upon the lifting of the preliminary injunction. The court also issued a hold departure order against
Miriam on the basis of the statement of Miriam that she would leave the country to study. Another petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court
alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred in continuing the case although her motion was still pending that showed disrespect t the higher court. She also
faulted Sandiganbayan to the issuance of hold departure order ex parte without notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari is a correct remedy in this case

RULING: NO. One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may
be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated
bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the
trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first
instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts
of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu propio
by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions,
or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked
through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.

EMBASSY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND SIROS SOLATI, Petitioners, v. FOP CORPORATION, FELIX O. PONTINO, AND JOVER D.
PONTINO, Respondents.

FACTS: In 1996, the IFCO entered into a FIsherery and management contract with FOP. The said contract provides that IFCo would deliver to vessels to
be used by FOP and in exchange of this, the FOP should deliver 5000 tons of Tuna and IFCo would have 40 percent share to all the proceeds that would
be obtained by FOP regarding the use of the said vessel. They issued an agreement terminating paragraph 4 of the Fishery and Management Contract.
Under the said contract, FOP has the right to nominate the person or corporation that would receive the amount due to it by FOP. The IFCO nominated
the Iran embassy. IFCO issued a check named to Iran Embassy but the same was dishonored. The Embassy filed a criminal case for bouncing check law
under BP blg 22. On the other hand, FOP filed a case for the declaration of the Negotiable Instrument that it issued to the Embassy . The Embassy filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that it is immune from suit. The court denied the motion. It filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
It filed a petition for certiorari but the same was denied due to late filing. The court said that Iran Embassy failed to file it within the reglementary period.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari was filed beyond the reglemenary period.

Ruling: No. Sec. 4.When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution.
In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion. [Emphasis supplied]

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of
a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.

In Systems Factors Corporation v. NLRC ,8 this Court declared that the amendment introduced under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC is procedural or remedial in
character, as it does not create new or remove vested rights, but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules
of procedure. In the present case, when the amendment providing that when a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion took effect on September 1, 2000, the Petition for Certiorari before the CA was still pending and
undetermined.

Fallo; WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals on August 8, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59781 are hereby SET
ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

Rule 60 - REPLEVIN DIGEST

CHIAO LIONG TAN V. COURT OF APPEALS

Replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly
put in issue by the defendant’s plea and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the possession
of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.

FACTS:

Petitioner claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, Isuzu Elf van, relying on the Certificate of Registration in his name. He claims that he sent
his brother to look and purchase a car which the latter did. However, the brother is claiming ownership on the van.

The brothers contention is that the purchase money was from the loan he acquired from a friend-lender. He asked petitioner to purchase the
van and gave him the downpayment (P5,000). This is the reason why the car is registered in petitioner’s name. However, the balance (P133,000)
was paid by respondent himself. The friend-lender and an Isuzu Motors employee corroborated the claim of the respondent.

Petitioner files action of replevin. He lost in the lower courts. He appeals to overturn the order of replevin by proving ownership

ISSUE: W/N ownership may be decided in a proceeding for replevin.

RULING: YES. (still in this case, the petitioner lost because the SC affirmed the findings of the lower court)

1) A certificate of registration creates a strong presumption of ownership. But such is rebuttable by competent proof.

2) In this case, it is undeniable that an IMPLIED TRUST has been created in the name of petitioner (The court was able to conclude this because
it affirmed the allegations of respondent).

3) Replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of possession. However, when the title to the property is
distinctly put in issue by the defendant’s plea and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the
possession of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding. In this case, the ownership was
established through evidence and testimonies presented by defendant.

4) Also, replevin is sufficiently flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising from or growing out of the main
controversy. Hence, the winning party may in the same court procure relief for the return of the property.

G.R. No. 96356 June 27, 1991

NONILLON A. BAGALIHOG, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GIL P. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of Br. 45, RTC of Masbate; and MAJOR
JULITO ROXAS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a
motorcycle. On the same day, the BAGAHILOG’s house, which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see if the killers had
sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless.

Two days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the petitioner's motorcycle and took it to the PC
headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant. The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles used by
the killers.

After investigation, the petitioner and several others were charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder for the killing of Espinosa and
three of his bodyguards and the wounding of another person. The petitioner filed a complaint against Capt. Roxas for the recovery of the
motorcycle with an application for a writ of replevin, plus damages. RTC and CA dismissed the petition because they are in the custody of the
motorcycle.
ISSUE: whether Replevin is proper to recover the possession of said motorcycle

RULING: Not answered. Property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the law and cannot be replevied until such custody is
ended.

However in this case, the warrantless seizure of the motorcycle was unquestionably violative of "the right to be let alone" by the authorities as
guaranteed by the Constitution. The vehicle cannot even be detained on the ground that it is a prohibited article the mere possession of which
is unlawful.

It must be noted that the motorcycle was seized two days later after the commission of the crime. During that period, the private respondent had
all the opportunity to apply for a search warrant and establish probable cause in accordance with the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court. He
did not.

The circumstance that Judge Fernandez ordered the motorcycle to be deposited with the clerk of court on motion of the petitioner did not place
the vehicle in custodia legis. The respondent judge had no authority over it because it had not been lawfully seized nor had it been voluntarily
surrendered to the court by the petitioner. The private respondent observed in his comment that "it is only when the exhibits are offered in
evidence and admitted by the court that they are submitted to the custody of the Court, and, before that, "they are usually in the possession of
the prosecution." Even he agrees therefore that the motorcycle is not in custodia legis.

REINSTATED for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993

ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY AND ALEX DE LEON, respondents.

FACTS:

After examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two (2) other witnesses, a search warrant was issued directing the immediate search of the premises
of R.R. Construction located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-175. At twelve
noon of the same date, respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took custody.

A civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession o f the same Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner against respondent
Canoy and one "John Doe" in the RTC, presided by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares alleging among other things, petitioner's lawful ownership and
possession of the subject vehicle; that he has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor carnapped it, and that he has
never been charged of the crime of carnapping or any other crime for that matter. Further, petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant
and the subsequent seizure of the subject vehicle on the strength of the aforesaid search warrant.

RTC issued writ of replevin.

The appellate court ordered the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that possession of the subject vehicle be restored to Canoy. It
applied the ruling in the case of Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez (21 SCRA 1275 [1967]) which held:

Once a Court of First Instance has been informed that a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot require a
sheriff or any proper officer of the court to take the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore it came into custody of another public
officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such a search warrant may order its release.

ISSUE: W/n replevin must be granted.

SC: No It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that
it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ (Bagalihog vs.
Fernandez) SC affirmed CA.

G.R. No. 42142 August 9, 1934

THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., petitioner, vs. MARIANO A. ALBERT, Judge of Branch AB of the Court of First Instance of Manila,

ISABEL ABLAZA, and PEDRO VALDEZ LIONGSON, respondents.

FACTS:

Isabel Ablaza and Pedro Valdez Liongson executed promissory notes, and chattel mortgages on autocalesas, in favor of the Bachrach Motor
Company, Inc. An action for the foreclosure of the chattel mortgages was begun. In aid of the foreclosure proceedings, the plaintiff in that case
filed an action for the delivery of personal property and presented a bond in order to obtain possession of the autocalesas. The sheriff of Manila,
after taking over the control of the chattels, gave notice to the defendants to file a bond for the return of the property if they desired to retain it.
Within the five-day period the defendants failed to file any bond. Upon such failure the sheriff of Manila delivered the chattels to the plaintiff. Five
days later the defendants filed an urgent motion in which they asked the court to approve a bond in the sum of P6,000 for the return to them of
the replied chattels. After hearing the trial judge granted the petition on the theory that he had general jurisdiction, and that there was nothing in
the law which prohibited him to take action.

ISSUE: w/n replevin is proper

SC: Yes. granted replevin

Aside from the intendment to be deduced from the language used by the Legislature and aside from the authorities, it is readily apparent that
one to avail himself of the privilege of retaining the possession of property, compliance with the conditions precedent imposed is necessary, and
failure to comply therewith entitles plaintiff to possession. The initial steps in obtaining redelivery must be taken within the same time limited by
the statute. In this connection it should be recalled that the autocalesas had passed out of the possession of the defendants and out of the
control of the court into possession of the plaintiff because of the failure of the defendants to file the necessary bonds in time.

G.R. No. L-43236 December 20, 1989

OLYMPIA INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALPHA INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., and
JUDGE. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents.

FACTS:

On various dates from November 1965 to March 1966, Olympia sold several typewriters to private respondent Alpha Insurance & Surety, Co.,
Inc. For alleged non-payment of the purchase price, Olympia instituted two (2) actions against Alpha: both replevin with damages but referring
to different typewriters.

The court issue an order for the seizure of the typewriters and their delivery to Olympia to protect its interest thereon and to confirm its ownership
over said personal properties; that should delivery thereof be unavailing, that Alpha be ordered to pay Olympia the typewriters' actual value; that
the amounts deposited by Alpha be forfeited and considered as rents for the typewriters; and that Alpha be ordered to pay 12% interest per
annum commencing from the date of payment indicated on each invoice until the unpaid amount is fully paid, plus attorney's fees and damages.

After Olympia had posted a bond in an amount twice the value of the typewriters involved and its assistant manager for credit and collection had
filed an affidavit showing that Olympia was entitled to the ownership of the said typewriters, the lower court ordered the issuance of a writ of
replevin and directed the deputy sheriff of Pasay City to seize the personal properties involved and to retain the same in his custody "to be dealt
with as prescribed in Rule 60 of the Rules of Court until further orders" from the court.

Alpha alleged that since the invoices presented by Olympia in its application for a writ of replevin had not been signed by its authorized corporate
officers, they were not reflective of the real terms and conditions of the sales. It prayed for the redelivery of the 24 typewriters seized and in
addition, asked for the delivery of six (6) more units which Olympia had allegedly failed to deliver to it pursuant to the sale agreement.

For more than one and a half years thereafter, neither of the parties filed a motion for reconsideration nor questioned the legality of said order
in a higher court. Sometime in October, 1975, Alpha filed a motion in the lower court praying, on equitable grounds, for the cancellation of the
"preliminary provisional writs of replevin" previously issued by the court "inasmuch as no judgment was even rendered in this case affirming
plaintiff's right to its possession of the typewriters involved in this suit conformably to the provisions of Sec. 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court."

ISSUE: W/n the writ of replevin may be cancelled.

RULING:

Yes. Indeed, logic and equity demand that the writ of replevin be cancelled. Being provisional and ancillary in character, its existence and efficacy
depended on the outcome of the case. The case having been dismissed, so must the writ's existence and efficacy be dissolved. To let the writ
stand even after the dismissal of the case would be adjudging Olympia as the prevailing party, when precisely, no decision on the merits had
been rendered. The case having been dismissed, it is as if no case was filed at all and the parties must revert to their status before the litigation.

The allegation of Olympia that to cancel the writ of replevin would result in Alpha's unjust enrichment does not persuade. Alpha has consistently
denied liability to Olympia, and even assuming Alpha to be liable to Olympia, the latter, having failed to properly exercise its right of action
against Alpha, must suffer the consequences thereof.

It is equally important to note that the right to file a new action in this case has long prescribed, for while the commencement of a civil action
stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly
the same position as though no action had been commenced at all. The commencement of an action, by reason of its dismissal or abandonment,
takes no time out of the period of prescription

PETITION is denied.

G.R. No. L-16880 April 30, 1963

LUNETA MOTOR COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MENENDEZ and CARLOS BARANDA, defendants, LUZON SURETY CO., INC.,
defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Antonio Menendez obtained a loan from the Luneta Motor Co. of 6,200 with which to complete payment for a motor vehicle which the former
had purchased from a certain Salud Vda. de Vergara. A promissory note was executed to evidence the loan secured by a chattel mortgage on
the same motor vehicle. Of the said loan, only P3,012.00 and interest up to July 29, 1953 was paid by Menendez, and as he failed to settle the
balance of despite of repeated demands, So, the Luneta Motor Co., instituted action for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage to satisfy the
indebtedness and for replevin. Co-defendant of Menendez in this action was Carlos Baranda who was in actual possession of the car, claiming
ownership thereof thru purchase prior to the execution of the chattel mortgage in favor of the plaintiff.

For the manual delivery of the motor car, pending trial, the plaintiff Luneta Motor Co. posted a bond. Hence, the Sheriff of Manila, by order of
the court, seized the said motor vehicle for delivery to the plaintiff. \Baranda, to regain possession thereof, filed a counterbond of P8,000.00
subscribed by the Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to secure delivery of the car if adjudged, and to pay whatever amount may be awarded in favor of the
plaintiff. Accordingly, the order of seizure was set aside by the court and the car was returned to Baranda. The case came up for hearing,
although, apparently, trial was had without notice to the surety. Judgment was rendered against defendants Menendez and Baranda.

Luzon Surety was not furnished a copy of the decision.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and

Baranda interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Said court affirmed the decision in toto. Again, the record does not show that the surety
was served a copy of the same.

Pending finality of the Court of Appeals decision, the plaintiff filed with the trial court a motion for leave to claim damages from the Luzon Surety
Co. Against the surety's opposition, the claim was admitted by the trial court on but action thereon was held in abeyance until the record of the
case was returned from the Appeals Court. A day before the decision was to be final and executory, the plaintiff filed with the Court of Appeals
a motion to have the record of the case remanded to the trial court for proper action on the claim. The said court, however, allowed first the
decision to become final and executory before remanding the record of the case to the lower court.

The said order is now the subject of the present appeal interposed by the said surety. Appellant surety prays for the annulment of the order
holding it liable for damages upon the bond subscribed by it for defendants on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff-appellee has not sufficiently
complied with the procedure prescribed for the recovery of damages against sureties; and that (2) the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction
to pass upon appellee's claim against the said bond.

ISSUE: W/N the replevin bond may be recovered

RULING:

No. Third requisite is wanting.

in order to recover on a replevin bond, the following requisites must be complied with:

1. Application for damages must be filed before trial or before entry of final judgment;

2. Due notice must be given the other party and his surety; and

3. There must be proper hearing and award of damages, if any, must be included in the final judgment (Alliance Surety Co., Inc. V. Piccio, et al.,
G.R. No L-9950, July 31, 1959.)

There is no question that the plaintiff-appellee here, in claiming damages against the surety, has complied with the first two requisites above
stated. But although there was a hearing on the claim, the award of damages was not included in the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
became final and executory on September 2, 1959.

The purpose of the Rules in requiring notice and hearing before the entry of final judgment on a bond is to include in said judgment the award,
if any, that the claimant may recover from both or either the principal and the surety.

".. The Rule plainly calls for only one judgment for damages against the attaching party and his sureties; which is explained by the fact that the
attachment bond is a solidary obligation. Since a judicial bondsman has no right to demand the exhaustion of the property of the principal debtor,
there is no justification for the entering of separate judgments against them. With a single judgment against principal and sureties, the prevailing
party may choose, at his discretion to enforce the award of damages against whomsoever he considers in a better situation to pay it." (Alliance
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Piccio, supra.).

In other words, it is not only the filing of the claim before final judgment that is required. The claimant on the bond must see to it that the award
against the surety be included in the final judgment. In Joseph Abelow v. De la Riva, G.R. No. L-12271, January 31, 1959, this Court has ruled
that the surety may only be held liable if, before the judgment becomes final, an order against the surety is entered after a hearing with notice
to the surety (See also Cajefe, etc., et al. v. Fernandez, et al., G.R. No. L-15709, October 19, 1960.).

The plaintiff-appellee could have very well obtained an award for damages in the main decision had it taken the right step in filing its claim
against the surety. It was improper for said appellee to file its claim with the Court of Instance after the case had been appealed to the Court of
Appeals. At that stage, the trial court had no more jurisdiction over the case than to adopt conservatory measures to protect the rights of the
parties. It has been settled in the case of Rivera v. Talavera, G.R. Nos. L-16280 and L-16805, promulgated on May 30, 1961, that application
for damages against the surety may not be made to the Court of First Instance when the case is pending with the appellate court, unless
expressly allowed by the latter; and that without express permission from, or reference by, the appellate court, the Court of First Instance can
not validly hear or determine such claims against the surety.

G.R. No. L-19423 January 31, 1963

PEOPLE'S SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. CRISANTO ARAGON, Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila,
The Sheriff of Manila and EULOGIO P. FLORES, respondents.

Alfredo Baura filed a complaint for the recovery of a car against Eulogio P. Flores in the Municipal Court of Manila. To secure immediate
possession of the car, Baura filed a bond subscribed by the petitioner People's Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. "to answer for the prosecution of
the action, the return of the property to the defendant if the return thereof should be adjudged, and for the payment to him of such sums as may
in the cause be recovered against the plaintiff, and the costs of the action."

The respondent Judge issued a warrant for the seizure of the car but the warrant was not carried out in view of the request of plaintiff's counsel
to hold service of the same in abeyance. Sixty days having elapsed without any instruction from either the plaintiff or his counsel, the sheriff
returned the writ to the court unsatisfied.

When the case was called for hearing, neither plaintiff Baura nor his counsel showed up, prompting defendant Flores to file a motion to dismiss
with a counterclaim against Baura for P2,000.00 for "embarrassment, mental anxiety and torture." A copy of the motion was served on plaintiff
Baura; none was given to the surety.
No action was taken on the motion to dismiss. Instead the court reset the case for hearing. Again, despite due notice, neither Baura nor his
lawyer appeared. The court, therefore, tried the case and rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint and ordering Baura to pay defendant
Flores P2,000.00 as damages.

When the decision became final, Flores moved for execution of the bond. The judge granted the motion. Accordingly, a writ of execution was
issued. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was. Petitioner contended that execution of its bond was improper because
of the following:

1. No application for damages had been made by defendant before the trial or before the entry of judgment;

2. No notice of application for damages was given to it; and

3. There was no judgment against its bond.

This is a petition for certiorari to annul two orders of respondent Judge directing execution of petitioner's bond in a suit for replevin.

ISSUE: w/n the bond was improper.

RULING:

Section 10, Rule 62, of the Rules of Court provides:

The amount, if any to be awarded to either party upon any bond filed by the other in accordance with the provision of this rule, shall be claimed,
ascertained, and granted under the same procedure as prescribed in section 20 of Rule 59.

Section 20 of Rule 59 states:

If the judgment on the action be in favor of the defendant, he may recover, upon the bond given by the plaintiff, damages resulting from the
attachment. Such damages may be awarded only upon application and after hearing, and shall be included in the final judgment. The application
must be filed before the trial or, in the discretion of the court, before the entry of final judgment, with due notice to the plaintiff and his surety or
sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof ....

Under the above-quoted provisions, in order to recover on a replevin bond, the following requisites must be observed:

1. There must be an application showing the right to damages and the amount thereof;

2. Notice of the application for damages must be given to the plaintiff and his surety;.

3. There must be a hearing in case the application is opposed; and

4. Any award for damages must be included

in the judgment of the court.

In this case, no application for damages arising out of any wrongful seizure of defendant's property was ever filed by defendant Flores. While it
is true that he filed a motion to dismiss with a counterclaim for damages, yet the damages claimed were those caused by plaintiff's alleged bad
faith in filing his complaint.

Indeed, defendant Flores can claim no damages arising from loss of possession of his car because, as already stated the writ of replevin was
never carried out by the sheriff. In order to recover damages against the Surety Company, it was not shown that defendant Flores suffered
damages as a result of the deprivation of possession of his car. Defendant Flores' failure to file such an application for damages before the entry
of final judgment is a bar to recovery on the bond and relieves the surety of its obligation under it.

Even assuming that defendant's counterclaim can be considered a claim for damages under the bond, still We hold that execution of the bond
is improper because no notice of the same was given to the surety. As this Court held in Aguasin v. Velasquez, 88 Phil. 357 —

If the surety is to be bound by his undertaking, it is essential ... that the damages be awarded upon application and after proper hearing and
included in the final judgment. As a corollary to these requirements, due notice to the plaintiff and his surety setting forth the facts showing his
right to damages and the amount thereof under the bond is indispensable. This has to be so if the surety is not to be condemned or made to
pay without due process of law. It is to be kept in mind that the surety in this case was not a party to the action and had no notice or intervention
in the trial. It seems elementary that before being condemned to pay, it was the elementary right of the surety to be heard and to be informed
that the party seeking indemnity would hold it liable and was going to prove the grounds and extent of its liability.

RULE 69

LEONARDO LIM DE MESA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODRIGO V. COSICO, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Biñan, Laguna; ROGELIO S. MOLINA, Branch Sheriff; and ALFREDO, NUMERIANO, ZENAIDA, ROGELIO, YOLANDA, OLIVIA, BENJAMIN,
TERESITA and WILSON, all surnamed LIM DE MESA, respondents.

G.R. No. 109387 April 25, 1994

FACTS:

The case stemmed from an action for partition filed by herein private respondents against their eldest brother, herein petitioner Leonardo Lim
de Mesa. Private respondents prayed therein for the partition of the property left by their parents consisting of a house and lot in Laguna and a
funeral parlor and for him to be compelled to render an accounting of the income of the funeral parlor business. The petitioner admitted that their
deceased parents left the house and lot but claimed that the funeral parlor was solely owned by him.

The RTC ordered the partititon, ordered the defendants to execute a deed of confirmation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Sale, render an
accounting of the funeral business, and pay moral damages and the cost of suit. The RTC then rendered a writ of execution of the said orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the RTC is null for failure to conduct prior notice and hearing before its execution.

HELD: Jurisprudentially entrenched is the rule that a judgment ordering partition with damages is final and duly appealable, notwithstanding the
fact, which petitioner seeks to capitalize on, that further proceedings will still have to take place in the trial court.

There are two stages involved in the special civil action of judicial partition and accounting under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court:

The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested
in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that
partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and
the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or
accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.

The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be
effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an
award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an
order is, to be sure, also final and appealable.

In the decision ordering partition, the execution of that part of the judgment which will not necessitate any further proceedings may be enforced.
Further proceedings, such as the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition and the rendition and approval of the accounting, may
be had without prejudice to the execution of that part of the judgment which needs no further proceedings. Thus, it has been held that execution
was entirely proper to enforce the defendant's obligation to render an accounting and to exact payment of the money value of the plaintiffs'
shares in the personal property and attorney's fees due defendants, as well as the costs of the suit and damages.

In the present case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of accounting had already become final and executory. The execution
thereof thus became a matter of right on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, and is a mandatory and ministerial duty on the part
of the court. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment
debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for execution nor be afforded prior hearings thereon.

However, the orders of the trial court dated October 14, 1992 and November 25, 1992, respectively directing Atty. Luzod, Jr. to sign the deed of
partition for and in behalf of petitioner and granting the writ of possession, must be set aside for having been rendered in excess of jurisdiction.
The trial court cannot compel herein petitioner to sign the extrajudicial deed of partition prepared solely by private respondents. Concomitantly,
it cannot issue a writ of possession pursuant to the said extrajudicial partition.

CONCEPCION V. VDA, DE DAFFON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEÑA VDA, DE DAFFON, AILEEN
DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA DAFFON, LEILA DAFFON and SUZETTE DAFFON.

FACTS: Respondents Lourdes Osmeña Vda. De Daffon, together with her six minor children, instituted an action for partition against petitioner
Concepcion Villamor Vda. de Daffon before the RTC. Respondents alleged that Amado, the husband of Concepcion, left several real and
personal properties which formed part of his conjugal partnership with petitioner. Joselito being a forced heir of Amado was entitled to at least
one half of Amado's estate, consisting of his share in the said conjugal properties. However, the said properties were never partitioned between
petitioner and Joselito. After Joselito's death, petitioner's behavior towards respondents, her daughter-in-law and grandchildren, changed. She
claimed absolute ownership over all the properties and deprived them of the fruits thereof. Thus, respondents prayed that the conjugal properties
of Amado Daffon and petitioner be partitioned.

The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss which the RTC denied until it reached the SC via petition for certiorari after the same having been denied
by the CA.

ISSUES: WON

(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case;

(2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; and

(3) waiver, abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation.

HELD: The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A
complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

The allegations contained therein are sufficient to establish respondents' right to the estate of Amado Daffon. By stating their relationship to the
deceased, they established their line of succession as the basis for their claim. Their rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the fact that she repudiated the co-ownership between her and respondents did not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition. In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner
of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.16 As the Court of Appeals correctly held, an action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the
defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case.

The statement of Lourdes, saying that the deceased only left the said Mandaluyong property to his son Joselito, does not exclude the possibility
that Amado owned other land and personal belongings during his lifetime, which he may not have left to his son. This does not deprive Joselito
or his successors-in-interest of the right to share in those other properties.

RULE 70

PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI VS. FE S. FACTOR

Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located in Almanza, Las Pias City. The ownership of the land
originated from respondents paternal grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor who had been in actual, continuous, peaceful,
public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the land even before 1906.

On December 9, 1975, the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor filed a Petition for Original Registration and Confirmation
of Imperfect Title to the said parcel of land, or Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Psu-253567, before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 71n and the trial court
granted the petition and declared the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor as co-owners of the property. The children of
Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor thereafter sold seven (7) hectares of the Factor family property during the same year. The siblings,
except Enrique Factor, respondent’s father, shared and divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, with the agreement that Enrique
would have as his share the portion of the property located in Antioch Street, Pilar Executive Village, Almanza I, Las Pias City, known as the
Factor compound.

Following his acquisition thereof, Enrique caused the construction of several houses in the compound including the subject property, a rest
house, where members of the Factor family stayed during get-togethers and visits. Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her mother, Mila Bunyi, were
tenants in one of the houses inside the compound, particularly in No. 8 Antioch St., Pilar Village, Almanza, Las Pias City since 1999.

When Enrique Factor died on August 7, 1993, the administration of the Factor compound including the subject rest house and other residential
houses for lease was transferred and entrusted to Enrique’s eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao.

Gloria Factor-Labao, together with her husband Ruben Labao and their son Reggie F. Labao, lived in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila but visited
and sometimes stayed in the rest house because Gloria collected the rentals of the residential houses and oversaw the Factor compound. When
Gloria died on January 15, 2001, the administration and management of the Factor compound including the subject rest house, passed on to
respondent Fe S. Factor as co-owner of the property. As an act of goodwill and compassion, considering that Ruben Labao was sickly and had
no means of income, respondent allowed him to stay at the rest house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the Factor family.

ISSUE:

Who between petitioners and respondent, would be entitled to the physical possession of the subject property?

RULING:

In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent
of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself.[15] Possession de facto is the physical possession of real property. Possession de facto and not possession de
jure is the only issue in a forcible entry case.[16] This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party’s possession, provided, that he has
in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times.[18]
Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.[19] Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law
gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and the
inscription of possessory information titles.

While petitioners claim that respondent never physically occupied the subject property, they failed to prove that they had prior possession of the
subject property. On record, petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted that Gloria Factor-Labao and Ruben Labao, as spouses, resided in Tipaz, Taguig,
Metro Manila and used the subject property whenever they visit the same.

The right of respondent’s predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient to uphold respondent’s right to possession over the
same. Respondent’s right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their fathers death.[23] As heir, respondent
had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration
in testate or intestate proceedings.

All things considered, this Court finds that respondent Fe S. Factor successfully proved the extent and character of her possession over the
disputed property. As a consequence of her ownership thereof, respondent is entitled to its possession, considering petitioners failure to prove
prior possession.

As regards the means upon which the deprivation took effect, it is not necessary that the respondent must demonstrate that the taking was done
with force, intimidation threat, strategy or stealth.
Respondent, as co-owner, has the control of the subject property even if she does not stay in it. So when petitioners entered said property
without the consent and permission of the respondent and the other co-owners, the latter were deprived of its possession. Moreover, the
presence of an unidentified man forbidding respondent from entering the subject property constitutes force contemplated by Section 1,[34] Rule
70 of the Rules of Court.

ROSANNA B. BARBA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TEODORA GARCIA, TESS GARCIA, SEVILLA GARCIA, RODRIGO SALAZAR, and
ABRAHAM VELASQUEZ,

FACTS:

Petitioner alleged that Teodora Garcia is petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, while Tess Garcia and Sevilla Garcia are her sisters. Rodrigo
Salazar and Abraham Velasquez are supposedly staying in the premises by tolerance of Teodora Garcia. According to petitioner, private
respondent Teodora Garcia obtained a loan from her in the amount of P36,000.00. To secure such loan, Teodora executed a mortgage over
the subject property which was then covered by TCT No. 257427-R in her (Teodora’s) name. Upon the latter’s failure to pay when the debt was
due, petitioner foreclosed on the property and the same was sold at public auction to her as highest bidder. When the property was not redeemed
within one year, TCT No. 257427-R was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 353973-R, was issued in petitioner’s name on May 27, 1993. There
after, on September 1, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, sent demand letters to private respondents asking them to vacate the subject premises
within fifteen days from notice and charging them the amount of P450.00 a month as rental from April 1, 1993 and for every month thereafter
until they finally vacate said premises. Private respondents’ continuous refusal to surrender the property and to pay rents thus prompted petitioner
to lodge a complaint for ejectment against them before the municipal circuit trial court.

ISSUE:

RULING: While it is true that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the action as pleaded in
the complaint,6 a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. In an unlawful detainer case,
the defendant’s possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess.7 Hence, the phrase "unlawful
withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a
contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.8

Where the cause of action is unlawful detainer, prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non.10 A complaint for unlawful detainer
should be distinguished from that of forcible entry. In forcible entry, the plaintiff has prior possession of the property and he is deprived thereof
by the defendant through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In an unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession
of the property after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied; hence, prior physical possession is
not required.11 This is especially so where a vendee seeks to obtain possession of the thing sold.

In the case under review, the subject property was mortgaged to herein petitioner by private respondent Teodora Garcia who had presumptive
title to the said property by virtue of the transfer certificate of title in her name. Upon failure of private respondent to redeem the mortgage, the
property was foreclosed and purchased by petitioner at public auction. A certificate of sale and later on a transfer certificate of title were issued
in her name. Thus, petitioner acquired possession of the property when she was declared highest bidder at public auction and a certificate of
sale was issued in her favor. From the time that the property was sold to petitioner as highest bidder, she acquired the right of possession over
the same, possession being one of the attributes of ownership. As new owner, petitioner had the right of action against private respondents to
recover possession of the property pursuant to Art. 428 of the Civil Code.

In dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals also took into consideration the fact that an action for annulment of deeds, reconveyance and
damages as well as a criminal complaint for falsification was filed by private respondent Sevilla Garcia against petitioner. Such fact is of no
moment. In an unlawful detainer case, the only issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Consequently, the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for
the annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the municipal trial court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful
detainer case before it20 and the same may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.21 This
is because an ejectment suit is summary in nature and the same cannot be circumvented by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over
the property.

SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR. represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
LUPO CALAYCAY

FACTS:

Subject of this controversy [are the] premises identified as 24-B Scout Santiago Street, Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, also identified as
26-B [South] D Street, Quezon City. It was the object of a written lease contract executed by the late Nazario Penas in favor of [private
respondent] Lupo Calaycay on June 26, 1964, at an agreed monthly rental of One Hundred Ten (P110.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency. The
written lease contract was on a month to month basis. Nazario Penas, Sr. died on February 5, 1976 and, thereafter, on June 15, 1976, an extra-
judicial settlement of his estate was executed by his surviving heirs, one of whom is his son, Nazario Penas, Jr. Likewise, after the death of
plaintiff's mother Concepcion P. Penas on March 2, 1985, her children including [petitioner] Nazario Penas, Jr. executed an extra judicial
settlement of her estate.

In a letter of January 18, 1990, [petitioner]-spouses Penas, through counsel notified the [private respondent] that effective March 1990, they
were terminating the written month to month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew the same and demanded from the latter
to vacate the premises in question on or before February 28, 1990. In the same letter, [petitioners] opted to allow the defendant to continue
occupying the leased premises provided he will agree to execute a new lease contract for a period of one (1) year at an increased monthly rental
of Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus two (2) months deposit and, further, gave the [private
respondent] up to February 28, 1990 to decide, otherwise judicial action for unlawful detainer against the [private respondent] shall ensue.
[Petitioners] later finally reduced the monthly rental to Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, only.
[Private respondent] failed to abide by the demand of the [petitioners]. However, he continued staying on the leased premises and effective
March 1990, he deposited the monthly rentals in the subject premises with the PNB in his name ITF (in trust for) spouses Lucila and Nazario
Penas, Jr. under Account No. 688930

ISSUE:

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the trial court decision was upheld, the RTC ruling that herein petitioners' remedy was converted from an
actio de mero hecho to an accion publiciana since more than one (1) year had elapsed from the demand upon defendants to vacate. The
Regional Trial Court concluded that herein petitioners could initiate a proper complaint with the Regional Trial Court.

In the present case, it is of note that the first demand letter addressed by petitioners to private respondent gave the latter the option to either
vacate the premises on or before 28 February 1990 or agree to execute a new lease contract for one (1) year at an increased rental rate of
P2,500 per month.

The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from said settled doctrine. It should be noted that even if the private respondent was depositing
rentals in trust for the petitioners, what was being deposited were rentals at the old rate, which petitioners were not bound to accept or withdraw.
When private respondent elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent him the letter of 18 January 1990 giving him the option to
vacate by 28 February 1990 or to sign a new lease contract for one (1) year at an increased rental rate of P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00)
a month, he assumed the new rental rate and could be ejected from the premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the petitioners.
The demand was made on 10 August 1992, followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992

GABRIEL ELANE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA,

FACTS:

Private respondent Inocencio V. Chua filed an action for forcible entry in the then City Court of Olongapo City for the eviction of petitioner Gabriel
Elane from a portion of a parcel of land designated as Block V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, which was the subject of a
permit to occupy issued to private respondent by the Bureau of Forestry on August 16, 1961. Private respondent alleges that on February 15,
1980, while visiting the property, he discovered that petitioner was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof, without his
knowledge and consent. The order made by private respondent upon petitioner to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter. 4 When his demand
letter of March 1, 1980 to stop said construction was refused, private respondent filed an action for forcible entry. 5

In his answer, petitioner Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development over a parcel of land located at Upper
Kalaklan, with an area of 360 square meters, more or less, designated as Block V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, as
allegedly evidenced by a certification from the said bureau dated April 10, 1979; that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel
of land continuously and uninterruptedly since 1970, having originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow; and that
the land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him for the years 1970 to 1979.

RULING:

private respondent has priority of possession over petitioner whose entry into the subject lot may be reckoned only as of 1979. There is no merit
in the suggestion that petitioner was authorized by the Bureau of Forest Development to occupy the land by virtue of an alleged permit issued
by said bureau. A cursory examination of said document readily shows that it is a mere certification that the lot claimed by petitioner is part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Nowhere is it stated therein that petitioner is allowed to take possession of the subject
lot. Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that private respondent was issued a residence permit way back in 1961 which entitled him to possession
of the disputed land starting in the same year.

private respondent was in earlier possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of petitioner; his warehouse and gasoline
station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the parcel of land in question; and he has been paying taxes and rental fees
thereon since 1968.

LABRADOR VS. BUGARIN

FACTS:

On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, docketed as Civil Case No.
328, with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales. She alleged that she is the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at
Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having purchased the same in 1976 from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto.
In 1977, she was issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid the taxes due thereon.

In 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways constructed a road which traversed Cadastral Lot No. 2650 thereby separating 108 sq.
m. from the rest of petitioner’s lot,

Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas
of petitioner. Hence, on January 18, 1996, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against respondent.

RULING:

In Lopez v. David Jr,[13] it was held that an action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance
of the summary nature of the action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which
the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year. After the lapse of the one year period, the suit must be commenced
in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause
of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted before the same
court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.[14]

Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Thus, in ascertaining whether or not the action falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.

It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back
in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by respondent. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two
years[17] prior to the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case. Petitioners complaint therefore should have been filed with the proper RTC.

Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint should still be dismissed because petitioner failed to prove
that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Petitioner admitted that she has never seen the Cadastral Map of San
Felipe, Zambales, and relied only on the Survey Notification Card[20] from the Bureau of Lands,[21] with a sketch of Cadastral Lot No. 2650.
Said card, however, does not reflect the 108 sq. m. lot subject of this case. Neither did petitioner cause the survey of Cadastral Lot No. 2650
after the construction of a new road to prove that the segregated portion on the western side is part thereof. Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non
qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.[22] Failing to discharge this burden, the dismissal of the complaint is proper.

RECEIVERSHIP

Pilar Nomandy vs. Calixto Duque

(JOSE COCHINGYAN, SR. and SUSANA COCHINGYAN, intervenors-appellees, vs. RAMON E. SAURA, former first receiver-appellant)

G.R. No. L-25407 August 29, 1969

DOCTRINE: It is inherent in the office of a receiver not only that he should act at all times with the diligence and prudence of a good father of a
family but should also not incur any obligation or expenditure without leave of the court and it is the responsibility of the court to supervise the
receiver and see to it that he adheres to the above standard of his trust and limits the expenses of the receivership to the minimum.

Facts: Rmaon Saura was appointed to serve as the first receiver for the World War II Veterans Enterprises, inc or WARVETS. He then went to
Japan with the authorization of the receivership court to check the goods to be shipped to WARVETS. After such trip, Saura asked for the
reimbursement of expenses incurred during his trip and also for the court to fix his compensation. The court granted the motion, along with the
P10,000 fixed payment as receiver. On another note, his lawyer, Atty. Magno asked for his compensation as lawyer who represented Saura
during his term as receiver, upon which the lower court granted only for the amount of P1,000. However, on another motion Saura asked that
he be compensated for the payment he made for the clerk he hired during his receivership. This the lower court did not allow any more.

Issue: Whether or not he Saura is entitled for compensation of the salaries he paid to his clerk whom he hired during his receivership.

Held: No, he is not entitled to such.

A receiver is a representative of the court appointed for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property in litigation and prevent its
possible destruction or dissipation if it were left in the possession of any of the parties. The receiver is not the representative of any of the parties
but of all of them to the end that their interests may be equally protected with the least possible inconvenience and expense. It is inherent in the
office of a receiver not only that he should act at all times with the diligence and prudence of a good father of a family but should also not incur
any obligation or expenditure without leave of the court and it is the responsibility of the court to supervise the receiver and see to it that he
adheres to the above standard of his trust and limits the expenses of the receivership to the minimum. For these reasons, it is generally the
receivership court that is in a better position to determine whether a particular expenditure is reasonable and satisfied or not and its ruling thereon
may not be disturbed by this Court.

The receivership court's reasons for withholding approval of the reimbursement in question are precisely because "whatever amount he (the
receiver) now seeks in addition thereto (P10,000) would be improper. Moreover, he is now estopped from claiming any further amount as
compensation for alleged clerical services employed by him as such receiver without prior approval or authority of this Court." With these reasons
it is cogent enough that in the premises, the appellant's alleged employment of a clerk was made without prior leave of court.

Surigao Development Bank vs. Hon. Teofilo Buslon

G.R. No. L-23577 December 27, 1972

DOCTRINE: Appointment and discharge of receivers are matters primarily addressed to, and resting largely on, the discretion of the trial court,
not being a matter of strict right, and a reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless convinced that the same has
been abused.

Facts: Surigao Development Bank is established under development bank laws of the Philipines having fulfilled the required capital and place
of business. During its existence, the Central Bank found that Surigao’s operation entailed numerous irregularities and violations of its own
charter and by-laws. The Republic of the Philippines and Central bank applied for the receivership pende lite of Superintendent of Banks over
Surigao. The lower court granted ex parte the motion on the basis of the investigation reports and findings of the Central bank. However, Surigao
contended that the lower court abused its discretion in granting such receivership as there is no urgency or emergency to dispense investigations.
It was further averred that Superintended, as subordinate of Central Bank, cannot serve as a receiver to Surigao.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court abused its discretion in appointing Superintedent of Banks as receiver of Surigao Development Bank.
Held: No, the lower court did not commit any abuse of discretion.

It is well settled that the appointment and discharge of receivers are matters primarily addressed to, and resting largely on, the discretion of the
trial court, not being a matter of strict right, and a reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless convinced that the
same has been abused.

The Central Bank presented records and findings that conclusively depicted the various violations of Surigao in its operation. These
served as the basis of the lower court in determining the proper grounds for appointing a receiver. They were deemed sufficient by the court in
granting such receivership to Superintendent.

With respect to the claim of the petitioners that the appointment of the Superintendent of Banks as receiver pendente lite of the Surigao
Development Bank was improper since he is an officer of the Central Bank of the Philippine is improper. It is true that in the cases cited by them
the Court ruled that a subordinate of the applicant for the appointment of a receiver should not be appointed without the other party's consent
because a receiver ought to be an indifferent, impartial and disinterested person. However, the prohibition does not apply in the instant case.
There is no showing that the Central Bank has any property or money claim against the Surigao Development Bank. Neither is there any showing
that the Superintendent of Banks has a personal pecuniary interest in the assets of said petitioner bank. Consequently no conflict would ever
arise between any personal interest on the part of the Superintendent or that of his employer and the performance of his duties as receiver. The
court, therefore, could expect him to be impartial in his actuations.

Pacific Merchandising Corp. vs. Consolacion Insurance and Surety Co.,

G.R. No. L-30204 October 29, 1976

DOCTRINE: The receiver performs his duties subject to the control of the Court, and every question involved in the receivership may be
determined by the court taking cognizance of the receivership proceedings. Thus, a receiver, strictly speaking, has no right or power to make
any contract binding the property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in his hands without the authority or approval of the court; Unauthorized
contracts of a receiver do not bind the court in charge of receivership. They are the receiver's own contracts and are not recognized by the
courts as contracts of the receivership.

Facts: Atty Gregorio Pajarillo was appointed as receiver of Paris Theatre operated by Leo Enterprises, Inc. in which he undertook by virtue of
the judgment rendered in favor of Pacific against Leo Enterprises, Inc. Greg availed of a bond in his favor, being the principal, from Consolacion
Insurance to assure the performance of his obligation as receiver. He then entered into an Indemnity Agreement with Consolacion without the
consent and authorization of the receivership court. However, when Consolacion was demanding payment from Greg, he refused to pay. He
averred that his receivership already ceased and therefore, he is not anymore liable to any obligations of the company.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Greg validly entered into the Indemnity Agreement thereby binding the receivership court and the company with its
obligation for the bond.

Held: No, the contract cannot bind the company and the court.

A receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to the action. He is an officer of the court exercising his functions in the interest of
neither plaintiff nor defendant, but for the common benefit of all the parties in interest. He performs his duties subject to the control of the Court,
and every question involved in the receivership may be determined by the court taking cognizance of the receivership proceedings. Thus, "a
receiver, strictly speaking, has no right or power to make any contract binding the property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in his hands
without the authority or approval of the court. As explained by Justice Moran, speaking for the Court in a 1939 case the custody of the receiver
is the custody of the court. His acts and possession are the acts and possession of the court, and his contracts and liabilities are, in contemplation
of law, the contracts and liabilities of the court. As a necessary consequence, receiver is subject to the control and supervision of the court at
every step in his management of the property or funds placed in his hands.

Unauthorized contracts of a receiver do not bind the court in charge of receivership. They are the receiver's own contracts and are not recognized
by the courts as contracts of the receivership.

In the case at bar, appellant Pajarillo does not dispute the fact that he never secured the court's approval of either the agreement of March 11,
1963, with Pacific Merchandising Corporation or of his Indemnity Agreement with the Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. on March 14,
1963, in consideration of the performance bond submitted by the latter to Pacific Merchandising Corporation to guarantee the payment of the
obligation. As the person to whom the possession of the theater and its equipment was awarded by the court in Civil Case No. 50201, it was
certainly to his personal profit and advantage that the sale at public auction of the equipment of the theater was prevented by his execution of
the aforesaid agreement and submission of the afore-mentioned bond. In order to bind the property or fund in his hands as receiver, he should
have applied for and obtained from the court authority to enter into the aforesaid contract.

Calixto Duque vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

G.R. No. L-18359 March 26, 1965

DOCTRINE: The appointment and discharge of receivers are matters primarily addressed to, and resting largely on, the discretion of the trial
court, not being a matter of strict right, and a reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless convinced that the
same has been abused.

Facts: (This is connected with the 1st case herein digested, Normandy vs. Duque).

Lorenzo Camins, one of the minority stockholders of WARVETS, sought to annul the decision of the lower court in appointing Ramon Saura as
receiver of the said corporation. They contended that a co-receiver be appointed. The receivership court then appointed Macario Ofilada, the
clerk of court of the CFI of Manila. Camins contended that Ofilada, being a clerk of court, has considerable official duties to be performed. They
proposed that Philippine Veterans Bank be appointed instead. The receivership court outrightly dismissed such motion.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court gravely abused its discretion in the appointment of receivers in the case.
Held: No, the lower court did not abuse its discretion.

The appointment and discharge of receivers are matters primarily addressed to, and resting largely on, the discretion of the trial court, not being
a matter of strict right, and a reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless convinced that the same has been
abused.

Such finding does not preclude a more accurate appraisal by the trial court three years later, whether or not the official duties of Mr. Ofilada, as
the Clerk of that same court, impaired his efficient discharge of the functions of a receiver, taking into account his actuations as temporary
receiver from 1961 to 1964. The Court saw no evidence that the lower court, in concluding that Mr. Ofilada could well perform the work of a
permanent receiver, despite his official duties, the lower court's decision was so arbitrary and capricious a determination as to warrant
intervention of the appellate court. It does not appear, however, that such action of the court was arbitrary, since the charges were fully discussed
by the parties and considered by the Court. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the conclusion made by the court below was erroneous,
that per se does not render its appraisal of the facts adduced before it any grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the grant of a writ of
certiorari.

Antonio De La Riva vs. Rafael Molina Salvador

G.R. No. L-10106 November 23, 1915

DOCTRINE: Any unauthorized interference with a receiver's possession of the property committed to his charge, or with the receiver in the
discharge of his official duties, is a contempt of the court by which he was appointed; No action can be brought against a receiver without leave
of the court appointing him.

Facts: Joaquin Navarro was appointed as receiver of the properties of Antonio De La Riva in a case filed against him (Antonio) by Rafael. As
the properties in the possession of the receiver were inventoried, it turned out that the value of the real property subject of the receivership
lessened and deteriorated. Joaquin contended that it was due to natural calamities and not through his alleged negligence. Antonio deemed to
file a case for damages and claim in another court, against the receiver and Rafael for the condition of the properties in his (Joaquin) possession
during receivership.

Issue: Whether or not the cases filed against the receiver were proper.

Held: No, they are not.

It is the duty of the court to protect the possession of its receiver and to prevent all interference with him in the performance of his official functions
and duties. So thoroughly is this recognized, that it is well settled that any unauthorized interference with a receiver's possession of the property
committed to his charge, or with the receiver in the discharge of his official duties, is a contempt of the court by which he was appointed. It is the
relationship which exists between the court and the receiver which has led to the general rule, followed in jurisdiction where statutes have not
been passed to the contrary, that no action can be brought against a receiver without leave of the court appointing him. And this rule applies as
well where suit is brought to recover a money judgment merely as where it is to take from the receiver specific property whereof he is in
possession by order of the court. If actions against him are permitted indiscriminately, the interest of those concerned in the property held by
the receiver will suffer and court will be hampered and limited in its control over him. One who feels himself sufficiently aggrieved by acts of a
receiver to warrant active intervention should take the matter into the court which appointed the receiver and ask either for an accounting or take
some other proceeding, and ask for the consequent judgment of the court on the acts complained of, or for leave to bring action directly. If,
under the facts presented, it is the judgment of the court that the interests of all concerned will be best observed by such a suit or by any other
proceeding, permission will be given to bring it.

When this action was brought there was pending before the court in the action in which the receiver was appointed a proceeding
wherein the receiver was accounting for the property which he had in his possession. There had been certain objections presented to such
account by the plaintiff herein but based on grounds entirely apart from the negligence or misconduct of the receiver. . The Court did not believe
it to be the policy of the law to permit actions to be brought against a receiver based on his management of the receivership property without
leave of the court which appointed him.

CONTEMPT EJECTMENT

In re CONTEMPT OF DOUGHERTY WILLIAMS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

Facts: The Williams International protesters were enjoined from trespassing upon Williams' land. They admittedly violated this injunction and
were therefore subject to contempt of court. The circuit judge found appellants in contempt and ordered them incarcerated until they purged
their contempt by promising to obey the injunction in the future.

Issue: Whether or not the order incarcerating the appellants until they purged their contempt was proper

Ruling: No. Williams International protesters were not in present violation of the injunction at the time of the contempt hearing. They were only
in past violation of the injunction. Furthermore, there was no act that could be coerced that would put defendants into compliance with the
injunction. The injunction prohibited trespassing and defendants were not trespassing at the time of the contempt hearing. Therefore, any
coercive sanction would accomplish nothing.

While it is clear the trial court was seeking a way to secure the property rights of Williams International, by imposing a coercive sanction
when appellants were in compliance with the injunction, the trial court exceeded its civil contempt authority. The trial court's requirement of a
promise in order to purge the defendants of their past misconduct was improper as it could not undo what had already been done. Since
appellants' past misconduct was a thing accomplished, and they were no longer in violation of the injunction, there could be no coercive sanction.

Notes:

Civil and Criminal Contempt Distinctions

If the contempt consists in the refusal of a party to do something which he is ordered to do for the benefit or advantage of the opposite party,
the process is civil, and he stands committed till he complies with the order. The order in such a case is not in the nature of a punishment, but
is coercive, to compel him to act in accordance with the order of the court. If, on the other hand, the contempt consists in the doing of a forbidden
act, injurious to the opposite party, the process is criminal, and conviction is followed by fine or imprisonment, or both; and this is by way of
punishment.

ABAYA INVESTMENTS vs MERIT PHILIPPINES

Facts: Abaya leased a commercial building to respondents. Respondents failed to pay rentals and subleased a portion of the building to a
computer gaming entity without Abaya’s consent. Abaya filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against respondents for non-payment of rentals
and illegal subleasing.

MTC- abaya

RTC- abaya

CA: Respondents; Rescission of the contract is condition precedent for the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of realty.

Issue: Whether or not rescission of the contract is condition precedent for the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of realty.

Ruling: No. The availability of the action for rescission does not preclude the lessor to avail of the remedy of ejectment. A lessor is not required
to bring first an action for rescission but could ask the Court to do so and simultaneously seek to eject the lessee in a single action for illegal
detainer.

Article 1673 of the Civil Code provides that the lessor may judicially eject the lessee for non-payment of the price stipulated and
violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract. In instituting an action for unlawful detainer, Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court requires the lessor to make a demand upon the lessee to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises. It is the
owner’s demand for the tenant to vacate the premises and the tenant's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of possession.
Such refusal violates the owner's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.

ROSENDO T. UY et al vs Hon. Santiago et al

Facts: MTC rendered a Decision in favor of Petitioner Uy et al in four consolidated ejectment cases. RTC affirmed MTC’s decision. Respondents
filed a Petition for Review with CA assailing the Decision of RTC Judge. Uy then filed a writ of execution pending appeal. Judge issued an Order
denying Uy’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.

Issue: Whether or not decisions of RTC in appealed ejectment cases pending appeal with the Court of Appeals are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed

Ruling: Yes. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in an ejectment case is immediately executory without prejudice to a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals.

It is only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court which may be
stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the
Regional Trial Court has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme
Court.

Notes:

Requirements to stay immediate execution of judgment (Judgment ng MTC)

(1) perfection of appeal;

(2) filing of a supersedeas bond; and

(3) periodic deposit of the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.

TEODORO ARAOS et al vs CA and Jovan Land

Facts: The petitioners Araos et al are lessees of a ten-door apartment, which they have been occupying for 25 years. The building was originally
owned by Bernardino and later on sold to respondent Jovan Land. Demands to vacate the units where made upon Araos et al. When the
demands went unheeded, ten separate cases for unlawful detainer were filed against them. Metc increased the rentals to be paid by Araos et
al.

Issue: Whether or not the order of MeTC increasing rental fee is proper

Ruling: No. The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or
the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. 18 The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue
raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.

It should be borne in mind that although the rent control laws allow unilateral increases in rentals by the lessor within the period and the maximum
rates provided therein, still the demand for such increase must be made upon the lessee himself. The courts have no authority to fix the same
for the parties where no valid demand for an increased rent has been made by the lessor.
SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION vs. CA

Facts: Elisa in her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of her mother filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Mogar and 46 other
persons who were occupying several parcels of land owned by her deceased mother. A writ of demolition was issued. Meanwhile, another group
of persons occupying portions of the parcels of land organized themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood Association. Sunflower argued that
its members should be excluded from the demolition order as they were not parties to the original unlawful detainer case.

Issue: Whether or not Sunflower members, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land

Ruling: Yes. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she
is:

(a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;

(b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant;

(c) a transferee pendente lite;

(d) a sublessee;

(e) a co-lessee or

(f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant

In this case, the records show that petitioner’s members are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to occupy the property of
respondent, kaya pwede sila paalisin dun.