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Violence As Economic Power: The Role of the State in Creating the Conditions for a

Productive Rural System


Author(s): Nicolas Inigo Carrera and Peggy Westwell
Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 4, Health, Violence, Race and Class (Autumn,
1983), pp. 97-113
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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VIOLENCEAS ECONOMIC POWER:
THE ROLEOF THE STATEIN CREATING
THE
CONDITIONS
FORA PRODUCTIVE RURALSYSTEM
by
Nicola's Inigo Carrera*
Translated by Peggy Westwell
In actual historyit is notoriousthat conquest, enslavement,robbery,murder,brieflyforce,
play the great part. In the tender annals of Political Economy, the idyllic reignsfromtime
immemorial. Right and "labor" were from all time the sole means of enrichment,the
presentyear of course always excepted. As a matterof fact,the methods of primitiveaccu-
mulation are anythingbut idyllic.
In themselves money and commodities are no more capital than are the means of
productionand of subsistence. They want transforminginto capital. But this transforma-
tion itselfcan only take place under certaincircumstancesthat centerin this,viz., that two
very differentkinds of commodity-possessorsmust come face to face and into contact; on
the one hand, the owners of money, means of production,means of subsistence, who are
eager to increase the sum of values theypossess, by buyingotherpeople's labor-power;on
the otherhand, freelaborers,the sellers of theirown labor-power,and thereforethe sellers
of labor. Free laborers,in the double sense that neitherthey themselvesformpart and par-
cel of the means of production,as in the case of slaves, bondsmen,etc., nor do the means
of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors;they are, therefore,
freefrom,unencumberedby, any means of productionof theirown. With this polarization
of the market for commodities,the fundamental conditions of capitalist production are
given. The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the laborers fromall
property in the means by which they can realize their labor. As soon as capitalist
productionis once on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it
on a continually extending scale. The process, therefore,that clears the way for the
capitalist system,can be none other than the process which takes away fromthe laborer
the possession of his means of production;a process that transforms,on the one hand, the
social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate
producers into wage laborers (Marx, 1967: 714).
The process which produces the workerand the capitalist begins with the
expropriationof the material conditions of existence of some men which
makes possible their exploitationby others.' Historically,this process origi-
*The author is an investigatorfor the Centro de Investigacionesen Ciencias Sociales (CICSO) in
Buenos Aires. A Preliminary version of this article was published by CICSO in its Serie
Estudios, number 35, 1979. Translator Peggy Westwell is a journalist who has spent many years
in Latin America.
'The relationshipbetween the general law of capital and the specific modalities the processes as-
sume according to specific times and places are used in the sense given in Marx (1967: 713-716).
LaFinAmerican
Perspecives,Issue 39, Foil 1983, Vol. X, No. 4 97

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98 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

nates with the division of society into estates and differentclasses, when the
developmentof the productiveforces resultsin the dissolution and disappear-
ance of the primitivecommunity.As the productiveforces develop, the way
social exploitation (social relations) is organized continues to change form,
fromslavery to serfdomand finallyto its most developed form,wage labor.
In the sixteenth century, with the formation of the world market, the
capitalist era began. Capital broughtabout the decomposition and subordina-
tion of all existing social relations, and became dominant on a worldwide
scale. In each place (social space) as a result of the phase (mercantile,
industrialor finance) in which capitalist development was found (momentin
historicaltime) and of the relationshipsit encountered,the process appeared
under differentmodalities.
Wage labor has its originin a process of expropriationof large masses of
men who have been divested of the material conditions of their existence.
The motor force of this process is violence - extraeconomic coercion
applied whenever the functioningof the laws of accumulation make it
necessary, i.e., when the mechanisms of economic coercion are insufficient.
Extraeconomic coercion uses the power of the state, the concentrated and
organized force of society monopolized by one class, to maintain its
conditions of exploitation by means of governmentpolicies. The conditions
under which this process and its mechanisms develop are dependent on the
relationship of power between the classes. These presuppositions, which
underliethis study,allow us to understandthe process of the formationof the
working class through the expropriation of the material conditions of
existence of the hunting,food-gathering,animal-herdingaborigines of the
ArgentineChaco at the end of the nineteenthcenturyand the beginningof
the twentieth.
The hunting, food-gathering,animal-herding Chaco Indians were the
owners of the material conditions of theirexistence - the main one being the
possession of wilderness and rivers- and, in the period under examination,
they were already linked to mercantile capital. By the beginning of the
sixteenthcenturyin the Chaco, mercantilecapital had destroyedthe relation-
ships upon which the primitivecommunitywas based.
With the process of the general law of accumulation as our point of
departure,we examine violence, measured on the basis of coercion, as related
to extraeconomic coercion. The purpose of this study is to pinpoint in a
concrete case the mechanisms linking the wage form to the specific condi-
tions of seasonal and transitorywork within the rural productive system,
including aspects related to the mechanisms of discipline imposed by the
reduccion ("reservation," or Indian settlement,administered by the state).
In the mid-1880s,the Chaco was the only area in Argentineterritorystill
in the hands of the Indians. In the second half of 1884,troops fromthe Argen-
tine army,supported by a navy battalion (headed by the Ministerof War and
the Navy, Dr. Benjamin Victorica),carried out a militarycampaign against the
Indians in this region.This campaign, like the one in the Pampa and the Pata-
gonia in 1879,took place withinthe frameworkof capitalist expansion as a re-
sult of Argentina'sposition in the world marketduringthe second half of the
nineteenthcentury.

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INIGO CARRERA: VIOLENCE AS ECONOMIC POWER 99

The development of capital in Europe required marketsfor its products,


raw materialsforits industry,and food for its growingpopulation. This led to
the development of means of transportation and productive techniques
(fencing of fields, animal cross-breeding,slaughter houses) which made it
possible to link products (firstwool, then mutton,and finallybeef and grain)
fromthe Argentinelittoralto European markets.The ports of Buenos Aires,
Rosario, and La Plata were built along with the railroads (2,000 km. between
1876 and 1889) which joined the differentregions with Buenos Aires. The
total area under cultivationgrew from580,000hectares in 1872 to 2.5 million
hectares in 1888; the amount of wool and tallow exported - the two main
products derived from stock raising - rose during this period from 89,200
tons and 29,700 tons respectively to 128,400 tons and 32,000 tons in 1885
(DiTella and Zymelman, 1967). One condition for the development of the
productiveforces,implied by this growth in production,was the increase in
population broughtabout by the immigrationpromotedby successive govern-
ments beginningin the 1860s. Part of the proletariatand the lowest strata of
the bourgeoise were made up of European immigrants.Between 1859 and
1880, 172,564 persons had emigratedto Argentina (Ortiz, 1955). In 1914, 29.9
percent of the population was foreign-born(Lattes, 1975).
The new form of articulation within the world market led to the
expansion of capitalist relations in Argentina, especially in the littoral,
resulting in the domination of industrial capital over mercantile capital.2
Some indications of this change were the appearance of rentas the dominant
form of access to agriculturalland after 1870 and the existence of 900,000
members of the proletariat and semiproletariat(54.4 percent of the active
population) in 1895 (Ortiz, 1955: 224). Among other indicators was the
increase in the import of capital from 2,108,000 gold pesos in 1881 to
198,300,000in 1888 (DiTella and Zymelman, 1967).
The stage of capitalist development which Argentinahad reached when
industrialcapital came to dominate determinedthe compositionof the nation-
state. In a dual process the Argentinebourgeoisie established the territorial
boundaries within which it would exercise its dominion and, at the same
time,the dominantsector of the bourgeoisie (landowners, bankers,importers-
exporters), whose interests coincided with those of finance capital on an
internationalscale, imposed their domination over the remaining bourgeois
fractionsin Argentina.Both processes were linked to the new position of the
Argentinelittoral in the world market.
The forms of confrontationsran from so-called civil wars and guerrilla
strugglesto the federalizationof the city of Buenos Aires (1852-1880).These
strugglesfor political hegemonyon the part of the Argentinebourgeoise as a
whole were also interwovenwith struggleswhich marked the passage from
the domination of mercantile capital to that of industrial capital. The war
2"In the middle of the nineteenthcentury,new European demands for agriculturalproducts from
the temperatezone changed the orientationof world demand, making it more active with regard
to our products. Urged on by that external suction, this marked the starting point for the
extensive developmentof commodityproductionin the littoral.This growthin the productionof
exportable commodities had a reflex effect locally, causing the spread of capitalist relations
internally,even when mixed with strong precapitalist characteristics" (Ramil Cepeda and
P6rsico, 1974).
LafinAn,ericcm Issue 39, Fdl 1983, Vol. X, No. 4
Perspec*ives,

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100 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

with Paraguay (1865-1871)and the threatsof war with Chile correspondto the
process of setting territorialboundaries by the Argentine bourgeoisie in
relation to the bourgeoisie of Brazil, Paraguay, and Chile and to the
interimperialiststruggles.
The militarycampaigns in the Chaco, the Pampa, and the Patagonia were
related to the creation of the conditions necessary for the domination of
industrial capital and the setting of territoriallimits by the Argentine
bourgeoisie. The land conquered and its occupants had differentfates
depending on the requirements of the world and national markets, the
possibility of Argentine capitalism meeting these requirements, and the
quality of the land. The Pampean region, with its high-qualitysoil, ranked
among the best in the world for agriculture and livestock raising, was
immediatelyappropriated and occupied, and its products were destined for
Europe. Patagonia received the herds of sheep sent there fromthe Pampa. Its
natives were exterminated since they were not needed to carry out this
activityand in fact hindered the development of livestock production in the
area with their "robberies."
In the Chaco, the hilly forested zone along the Parana River and its
tributaries,wood was in great demand duringthe period of expansion for its
uses in the constructionof buildings,railroads, and communicationsystems.
This demand multiplied when the industrial uses of tannic acid, which
existed in large quantities in the red quebracho forests,were discovered. In
the central western region,however, red quebracho was much less abundant,
and the quality of the soil, althoughsuperior to that of the hilly region,could
not compete with the fertilePampa. This is why, followingthe world crisis of
1890, capital expansion within the Chaco was limited to areas already
occupied and the central western region remained in the hands of its
aborigines for another twenty-fiveyears.
The resultof the 1884 campaign was the militarydefeat of the Indians, al-
though they were not totally or immediately subjugated. The national
government had previously established that all conquered lands were to
remain under its jurisdictionand proceeded to hand out concessions to these
lands under the Law of Immigrationand Colonization Number 817.3Through-
out the country investmentsin land and colonization were very important
duringthis period, surpassing investmentsmade in such things as railroads,
streetcars,navigation, and banks.
The land concessions granted in the Chaco were located in the hilly
eastern zone up to 40 km. fromthe banks of the Parana' River. Both the grant-
ing of land concessions and investmentin them were halted by the crisis of
1890 which, at the same time, allowed some concessionaires to appropriate
land already granted to others. Law 2875 allowed concessionaires to become
landowners by paying for the land without any obligation to colonize it.
Investments made in the Chaco were oriented toward the extraction of
lumberforconstruction,railroads,and coal, and in the case of the Las Palmas
refinery,toward sugar production. With the onset of the world economic
3"Colonization"was a policy of land distributionhaving the purpose of creating a landed rural
bourgeoise. During the period under consideration,land was distributedin units suitable for a
family farm.

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INIGO CARRERA: VIOLENCE AS ECONOMIC POWER 101

crisis in 1890, the expansion of productive agent-owners (colonists) in the


eastern zone ended and the exploitation of the land using wage labor began.
To the west of the "borderline,"4 the Indians continued to own the land. At
the time of the 1884 campaign, the productive activityof the various Indians
-Tobas, Mocovis, Matacos and Vilelas-was based on hunting, fishing,
food-gathering,and horse breeding. These activities were complemented by
wage labor in the lumber camps on the banks of the Parana River or in the
harvesting of sugar cane in northwest Argentina. No Indian was without
some commercial link with the white man.
The militarycampaign of 1884 deprived the Indians of the rivers they
fished,while the occupation of the hilly lands along the Parana River and its
tributariesreduced the size of their huntinggrounds.
It will be difficultnow for the tribes to reorganize themselves afterthe punishmentthey
have suffered;the presence of militaryquarters on the Bermejo and Salado Rivers has
both demoralized and intimidated them. Deprived of the recourse to fishing by the
occupation of the rivers,and with huntingmade more difficultbecause of the necessity to
make their presence known, the dispersed members of these tribes rushed to receive the
benevolence of the authorities,presentingthemselves at the reservationsor lumber camps
where many of themwere already enjoyingthe benefitsof civilization(Victorica,1885: 15).

Thus began the deprivation of the Indians' material conditions of


existence. A process was underway to turnthem into workers obliged to sell
their labor in order to subsist - a necessary condition for the existence of
capital. This requirementof capital found its expression in policies directed
toward the Indians and implementedby the state apparatus, in which the mil-
itary campaign of 1884 was crucial. A policy of extraeconomic coercion
throughviolence was practiced against those who had been expropriated in
order to make the establishmentof exploitativelabor possible. The objective
of this policy was clear to its executors. In the reportssubmittedon the 1884
militarycampaign, Leopoldo Arnaud, one of the technical members of the
scientificcommission that accompanied the expedition,said: " . . . the Chaco
dedicated to the sugar industry,with refineriesthat can be run by Indian la-
bor, may become in the near future the principal base of wealth of this
Republic" (Victorica, 1885: 556-557).Jose I. Garmendia, also with the expedi-
tion, said that among the results was the "establishment of a line of
fortificationobtained by linkingthe fortsto defend a rich territoryof more
than six thousand leagues, which will force fifteen to twenty thousand
formerlyuseless males, abandoned to barbarism and theft,to surrender
themselves to the benefits of civilization" (Victorica, 1885: 151-152). "These
benefits,"were explained by Dr. Victorica,head of the expedition,as follows:
"I thinkthat by favoringthe contact of these tribes with the coastal colonies,
we are helpingto civilize them;it won't be long untilthey findwork in the in-
dustriesgrowingup in the area. I do not doubt that these tribes will provide
cheap labor forthe sugar industryand the lumber camps, as some are already
doing in Salta and Jujuy,althoughI do consider it imperativeto adopt an ade-
quate systemforlocating them permanentlyat convenientpoints,limitingthe
4This termwas given to the border between Indian territoryand land under the jurisdictionof
the state. Later the term frontierwas used to refer to the farthestlimits of land used for
production.
LahinAmerican Issue 39, Fall 1983, Vol. X, No. 4
Perspectives,

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102 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

land that theyand theirfamilieswill be permittedto occupy, in orderto begin


modifyingtheir customs little by littleand to civilize them" (Victorica, 1885:
23).
As mentionedabove, the occupation of the eastern area of the Chaco was
followed by the expansion of capitalist relations of production in that area,
subsequently accentuated with the discovery of the industrialuses of tannic
acid. In the northernpart of Santa Fe Province and the eastern part of the
Chaco, there were large forests of red quebracho rich in tannic acid.
Consequently,withoutending the productionof telegraphpoles, railroad ties,
and lumber for construction, there was a substantive increase in the
exploitationof the forestsin search of quebracho, and factorieswere installed
for extractingtannic acid. In the central western part of the Chaco - which
would become a cotton-growingregion in the future- the Indians managed
to continue theirproductiveactivitywith the modificationsmentionedabove.
But during the firstdecade of the twentiethcentury,economic expansion5
paved the way fora new march on the Chaco, this time in the centralwestern
region.
In 1909 constructionbegan on the railroad that would unite the port of
Barranqueras on the Parana River across the Chaco to the province of Salta.
In 1911, when the railroad entered Indian lands, another militarycampaign
was launched to definitivelyoccupy the area. And, as had been the case in
the campaign of 1884, the policy of turningthe Indians into workers was ex-
plicit. The second objective set for the campaign was to " . . . surrenderthis
immense region of woods to the progressiveenergies of our agriculturaland
stock-raisingpopulation and to the Indian who wishes to subordinate himself
and work under the directionof the colonists or the Ministryof Agriculture
(Rostagno, 1969: 31). Among the instructionsto the regimentleaders
who participatedin the campaign was the duty to provide informationabout:
The locations of the Indian camps, any changes in them, their approximate number,
indicatingin this case the source of the information;the presence of troublemakersand
rabble rousers; whether the Indians work or not; in which lumber camps and refineries
they work and at what time of the year; what type of arms they have or bringfromtheir
places of work; if they are peaceful; if they have much livestock and what kind of work
they could do if we subdue them;what pretensionsthey have in this regard,etc.. .. (Ros-
tagno, 1969: 68).

The objective of the campaign of 1884 was completed in the 1911


campaign: the Indians would not be permittedto continue their attacks in
search of livestock; they lost access to the rivers and lost their herds of
horses. Conditions were created in the central western part of the Chaco to
permitthe entrance of new "colonists" (lumbermen,farmers,and cattlemen)
whose mere presence reduced the size of the Indians' huntinggrounds and
scared away the game. In short,the previous mode of production had been
destroyed: the first condition reauired by caDital to make this territorv
5The "increase in agricultural production, especially grain, stimulated the economy ....
Increased productionprovided large exportable surpluses and gave the countrysignificantbuying
power. With this buying power at its disposition, the countrybecame involved in increasingly
importantand numerous transactionsthat reproduced the climate of progress prior to the 1890
crisis . . . With the increase in resources obtained fromexports,investmentsin all sectors grew
. . . " (DiTella and Zymelman, 1967: 257-258).

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INIGO CARRERA: VIOLENCE AS ECONOMIC POWER 103

productivehad been created: the existence of "free" and independentworkers


deprived of theirmaterial conditions of existence. But this was not enough; it
was also necessary to train a certain kind of worker and "discipline" him for
the type of work he was to perform.The "disciplining"and trainingof the In-
dian took place in an institutioncreated for this purpose: the "reservation."
There were two reservations created in the Argentine Chaco: the Napalpi
Reservationin the centerof what would soon becom cotton-growing land (the
present province of Chaco) and the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Reservation
(in the present province of Formosa).
The reservationwas not the firstinstitutionused to discipline the Indians.
In 1884 the militarychief of the Northernfrontier,Coronel Obligado, had
founded a colony (San Antonio de Obligado), giving plots of land to the
Mocovis Indians, whom he had defeated in battle and then militarized,
incorporatingthem as a regimentin the National Guard. The Indians received
militaryinstruction(the "disciplining").This colony lasted only a very short
time; the Mocovfs rebelled against "the excessive severity of the veterans
giving them militaryinstructions"(Miranda, 1955: 74), and after killing the
commander of their battalion,they fled, returningto their formerlife in the
wilderness. This is undoubtedly what Lieutenant Coronel Rostagno, Com-
mander of the 1911 campaign, had in mind when he said:
It is impossible to make them (the Indians) submit to regular,methodical work at a fixed
time marked by a bell, coronet, or foreman's whistle, or to believe that the Indians will
fightagainst the temptationsofferedby nature at certain times of the year, givinghim cha-
nar and carob to eat and mead and other types of alcohol to drink,and so many other
things that grow abundantly in these warm regions. Nor can habits generations old be
brokenfromone day to the next,especially when needs haven't been created beforehand
which force the Indians to work in order to earn their living (Rostagno, 1969: 24).

The decree that created the reservationin the Chaco, which listed among
its objectives the "conservation" of "the economic factor" (Rostagno, 1969:
129) orderedland to be given to the Indians, along with "seeds, farmtools and
work animals, so that they can cultivateit and obtain the fruitsnecessary for
theirsustenance under the close directionof competentpersonnel" (Rostagno,
1969: 130). In other words, the Indian would be removed "from the
temptationsthat nature offered. . . " and, at the same time,be placed "under
the close directionof competentpersonnel" to train as a worker. Two years
later, the governmentexplained:
the industrychosen to give work to the Indians has been lumberingand not farming,as
was the case in the religious missions. Since, without ignoring the great educational
advantages of this latteractivity,Your Excellency will not fail to see that,with regard to
the Indian, it constitutesa higherstep in his evolution and cannot be reached immediately.
The lumber camp is an intermediatepoint between the nomadic life of the wild hunter,
fishermanor animal herder and that of the farmer,a stable production element firmly
rooted in the land he cultivates (Ministerio del Interior,1915-1916:85).

The reservation fulfilled still another function. We mentioned that a


worker was prepared for certain branches of production which had a
common trait:all of them (lumber,sugar, and, later, cotton) required a great
concentrationof labor at certain times during the productive process: sugar
and cotton at harvest time, and lumber when the tree is ready and the
Ld9in hmria P.pcie, Issue 39, Fdl 1983, Vol. X, No. 4

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104 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

temperaturerightto fell. The seasonal nature of the wage labor posed the
problem of how to maintain or "conserve" the workers when theirlabor was
no longer necessary.6 The alternative of permittingthem to continue their
hunting and food-gatheringactivity during periods when labor was not
needed was discarded because:
The abundance of big and small game in the Reservation [the proposal to create an Indian
reservationon the Teuco River is being referredto here] cannot even be considered by this
Commission; the settlementsand reservationsdecreed and founded for the Indians should
fulfillthe ulteriorpurpose of having the Indians live in them,betteringtheirmoral and ma-
terialsituationthroughwork,and not so that theycan live by huntingand fishing,because
the only way to force the Indian to change his way of life and his customs, teaching him
how to engage in paid labor, is to take him away fromthe woods, fromthe wilderness and
the places where he will be temptedto continue to live in misery,ignorance and vagrancy
(Comisi6n Honoraria de Reducciones de Indios, 1928:14-15).7
In other words, because his formerlife did not serve to discipline and
train the aborigine for wage labor, the reservation had the "advantage" of
trainingits inhabitantsto be agriculturaland forestlaborers withoutimposing
militarydiscipline as had been the case in the unsuccessful San Antonio
colony. It is interestingto note that the objection to hunting and food-
gatheringwas not made with regard to the Matacos, who had been selling
their labor for a long time to the sugar refineriesin the northwest.In their
case, no special disciplinaryperiod was necessary. For the Matacos, farthest
from the Salta border, the function of reservation was filled by the New
Pompei Mission, founded by the Franciscan Order at the beginningof this
century.
On the reservation the Indians received land on which to grow crops
which would allow them to subsist when not needed as wage laborers. In this
way these workers were "conserved," assuring the permanentavailability of
their labor. In 1915 Enrique Lynch Arribailzaga,the directorof the Napalpi
Reservation, said " . . . the settlers in the area frequently try to have
reservation Indians go and work on their farms; they ask permission of the
administrator,who has not, up to this time,denied a request because the sys-
tem adopted is that of total freedomfor labor." (Ministeriodel Interior,1919-
1920: 410-411). Subsistence farmingalso helped to keep the price of the labor
force down, since the worker obtained part of his livelihood fromhis plot of
land. Given the level of accumulation and the productivebranches to which it
was applied, the capital in the Chaco could accumulate at approximatelythe
average rate of profit only with a cheap labor force, i.e., with a greater
exploitation of the workers.The national governmentexpressed this concept
in its message to Congress in 1925:
The Executive Power considers that the problem of the Indian should be definitively
confronted,in order to solve it in the best possible way, and as a testimonyto the culture
of the Republic, not only for humanitarianreasons and reasons of a superior moral order,
but also because, once incorporatedinto civilization,the Indian will be a valuable auxiliary
force for the development of the economy in the northernregions of the country.Already
6For a similar situation in Chile, see Marin (1978).
7The quotation corresponds to a reportof the Comisi6n Honoraria de Reducciones de Indios, the
officialorgan in charge of administeringthe policy related to the aborigines. Althoughthis quote
refersto a somewhat later date (1927), it reflectssubjects discussed in 1911; see, for example, the
Rostagno quote above.

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INIGO CARRERA: VIOLENCE AS ECONOMIC POWER 105

crops and industrieswhich require cheap labor and acclimated personnel are to be found
in several provinces,and depend almost entirelyon Indian labor which, in spite of the at-
tempts made, has not been satisfactorilyreplaced by immigrantsfrom India or other
countries (Camara de Diputados, 1925).

Previouslyan intellectualfromthe capital had givena technicalcast to


this reason explaininghow certain"inferiorraces" (inferiorto him) were
suitedforthis type of production:
Thereis no doubtthattheblackmanrepresents an importantfactorin cottonproduction
in theUnitedStates:owingto his number, his limitedrequirements,and - morethanto a
- his simplecustoms,onlyhe can producecottonmorecheaplythanthe
real frugality
competition.
Similarconditionsare to be foundin othercotton-growing regionsas in Egyptamongthe
poorfellahs,in India amongthe miserablehindus,in China amongthe Chinesepariahs,
and theseformsconstitute a factof no smallimportance in thepropagation of thiscrop.
It is notthatthe whiteworkercannotcultivatethiscrop,butthereis no doubtthatthe
nonwhitepopulationoffersadvantagesforits production, especiallywhen the price of
cottonis not high.
Reflections on these conditionshave led me to concludethat the best possibilityfor
propagating regionof Argentinais througha greater
this crop in the cotton-growing
utilizationof,the Indiansthanis presentlythe case (Girola,1910:162-163).

The "free"settlements and those belongingto different companiesalso


servedto make a cheap labor forcepermanently available,as we will soon
see.
The reservationallowed the productiveactivityof the aboriginesto be
managed,and,whennecessary,it couldsupplyworkers.In 1928,owingto the
growthin cottonproduction,the demand for workersraised the cotton
pickers'wages above those for harvestingsugar cane in the Las Palmas
refineryin southernChaco. As a result,the Indianswho usuallyharvested
cane workedat pickingcotton,thuscausinga shortageat the refinery. After
failingin an attemptto recruitnative workersfromthe cottonfields,the
Inspectorof the HonoraryCommissionon Indian Reservationsmade the
followingrequest of the presidentof the commission:"owing to these
circumstances and considering interestof the
at the same timethe legitimate
firm[refinery],allow me to ask thepresidentforthevaluablesupportof this
honorablecommissionfor the shipmentof a certainnumberof Indians,
selectedfromamongthosewho presently occupythereservations" (Comision
Honorariade Reduccionesde Indios,1928:69). The Commissionrepliedthat,
Taking into account the help that "Las Palmas of Southern Chaco" had given the
initiativesof the Commission in tryingto gain all kinds of improvementsforthe aborigines
and, moreover,considering that the request formulatedpresented an opportunityin the
hiring of Indians to eliminate the intermediarywho offersno effectiveguarantees with
regard to the treatmentthat the Indians hired will receive, the Commission prepared for
the departure of the Indians requested from the Bme. de las Casas Reservation . . .
(Comisi6n Honoraria de Reducciones de Indios, 1928: 70-71).

Finally,the "reservation"served anotherpurpose:it kept the Indians


togetherand undersurveillancein one place duringthosetimesof the year
whentheirlabor was notneeded.In its requestforland forthe Indiansnear
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AmericanPerspectives,
Lotlin

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106 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Napalpi, the same Honorary Commission said that land would be used to
"Concentratein one place the tribesthat wander about in the places called La
Tambora, Tres Isletas, Colonia Benitez, Zapallar, etc., along with the majority
of the Indians in the Teuco region and the contingentof Indians that leaves
"Las Palmas of SouthernChaco" every year once the cane is harvested,in or-
der to preventthem fromdoing damage to nearby settlementsbecause they
have no fixed nor stable place to settle" (Comision Honoraria de Reducciones
del Indios, 1928: 11). The reservation offered other "advantages" as well.
Instead of requiringthat wages be paid to the "settler-soldiers,"as had been
the case in San Antonio,the reservationIndians supported themselves by the
sale of what they produced. "The Argentine system of Indian reservations
consists of providingthe Indian with a job forwhich he is paid at once in or-
der to cover the cost of feeding such a large number of people without
reducing the public treasury;in other words, on the basis of an autonomous
financial and commerical organization" (Ministerio del Interior,1915-1916:
85).
The reservationwas not the only formof Indian settlementin the Chaco.
There were also "free" settlementswhich were neitherfounded nor adminis-
tered by the state apparatus but by the Franciscan Order (New Pompei
Mission) or by private companies. In all cases, the functionsfulfilledwere
similar to those of the reservation:the "conservation" of the workers when
the work force was not required and the reductionin cost of this labor force.
At the same time,and to the degree that it was no longer possible to continue
the huntingand food-gatheringactivity,these settlementscontinued to serve
a disciplinaryfunction,that of requiringthe cultivationof the land or the fell-
ing of trees. The noncompany settlementswere located on land not occupied
by colonists8 or lumber camps, generally in the farthest reaches of the
colonized region (at Pampa del Indio, for example, or Miraflores or Cabo
Naro). In the central western region,the land was not privatelyowned, and
the Indians could locate in gorges in the woods. As colonization advanced
and settlersbecame more numerous,there was less land for the Indians. But
they were never totally expelled in order to maintain a reserve labor force
and complete their socialization process.
An example of a private company that settled Indians on its land is Las
Palmas of Southern Chaco, which was dedicated basically to sugar produc-
tion. They used the Tobas Indians, who came fromdifferentparts of the Cha-
co territory, to harvest cane.9 With the spread of cotton in the 1920s, the de-
mand for workers grew, and rising wages made it increasinglydifficultfor
companies to obtain workers. We have already seen how the Honorary
Commission on Indian Reservations moved at once to solve the problem by
sending Indians fromthe Bartolome de las Casas Reservationto Las Palmas.
But the long-rangesolution lay in locating Indians on company land.
8The colonists in Argentina were farmers, generally European immigrants given land in
accordance with governmentpolicy. The colonist, along with his family,was a direct producer
and boughtlabor mainly at harvest time. Behind the figureof the colonist are found widely dif-
feringsectors of the agrarian bourgeoise.
9At the time of a 1920 strike,which mainly involved factoryworkers,the Indians who worked
in the fields were mobilized by the company and participated in the bloody repression that
followed (see Garcia Pulido, 1977).

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INIGO CARRERA: VIOLENCE AS ECONOMIC POWER 107

By the early 1920s, the Indians had been incorporatedas workersinto the
productive activity of the Chaco territoryto such an extent that "
ferocious and wild Indians only exist in the imagination of the timid,since
one very seldom finds an Indian who has not spent some time in the sugar re-
fineriesor the lumber camps . . . " (Ministerio del Interior,1915-1916:303).
... without them (the Indians) providingthe labor for all forms of regional work, there
would be no crops nor flourishingindustriesin the land where they were born and which
has been taken fromthem.Tobas and Mataco workershave laid the two national railroad
lines throughthe woods, gorges, and marshes of the marvelous territoriesof the North,
which advanced side by side from Resistencia and Formosa, heading for Metan and
Embarcaci6n, crossingthese lands fromone side to the other;theyhave made up the work
crews in charge of channelingthe Bermejo River;theyhave planted sugar cane, cotton and
corn, and the lumber industryhas recruitedabundant and excellent workers fromamong
them (Niklison, 1919: 23).

In the mid-1920s,cotton became the main crop in the Chaco, especially in


the central western part; this development was linked to conditions in the
world market. At the end of the nineteenthcentury,cotton was one of the
principal raw materials needed by industryin the central capitalist countires
and the most important category in international trade. European capital
encountereda problem,however. More than 90 percentof the most sought af-
ter varieties of cotton were concentratedin the United States and subject to
the variations of productionand price in that country.The need to break this
monopoly led European capital, especially English,to create cotton-producing
zones in the territoriessituated between 400 latitude North and 400 latitude
South, where natural conditions were favorable. The search for new areas
was intense untilthe economic crisis of 1930 and continued even afterthe cri-
sis was over (Zischka, 1960). Afterthe firstdecade of this century,conditions
in the world market for cotton changed, making room for new sellers. The
cottonfields of the United States were attacked by a plague (the boll weevil)
which destroyed production and forced the United States to redefine its
productive zones. As a consequence, North American production fell for a
decade (1914-1925),and by the time NorthAmerican productionrecovered its
earliervolume,the cottonmarkethad redefineditself.The United States went
fromproducing 60 percent of world productionin 1914 to 40 percent during
the 1930s. During the time that U.S. production declined, South American
countries (Brazil, Peru, Argentina) increased their participationin the world
market (Garcia Mata, 1937).

Thus the situationin the world marketand the developmentof Argentine


capitalism had created the conditions fo'rthe expansion of cotton production,
a new productivebranch,orientedat firsttoward foreigntrade and then after
the 1930s toward the internal market.The Chaco, and especially its central
western region which had suitable conditions,was dedicated to the produc-
tion of cotton. After1923, the Ministryof Agriculture,following a decline in
the world market price paid for the farm products that Argentinaexported,
began a campaign encouraging cotton growing in the Chaco. The campaign
consisted of distributinginformation explaining about cotton production,
importationand distributionof seeds, and the installation of cotton gins in
railroad cars that go fromtown to town, and the hiringof North American
LahinAmrn Issue 39, FdIl 1983, Vol. X, No.
Porspeclives, *

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108 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

specialists to investigateproduction and marketing.The result was that the


area under cultivationin the Chaco quadrupled from20,610 hectares in 1922-
1923 to 82,690 hectares in 1924-1925.The Chaco territorybecame the largest
producer of cotton,and by 1929-1930112,000hectares were under cultivation
(JuntaNacional de Algodon, 1938).
Althoughcottonrequires constantattentionwhile it is growing,it requires
few workers; ginningand picking the cotton,on the other hand, call for an
abundant labor force with little specialization used intensely for relatively
shortperiods of time. With two types of tasks requiringtwo types of workers,
two policies were necessary to create the necessary labor force for this type
of capitalist expansion. The unskilled worker, the "cotton picker" and the
cottonginnerwere to be found in the Chaco:,theyhad emergedfromthe ruins
of the huntingand food-gatheringeconomy of the natives. But, as we have al-
ready seen, the Indian was occupied in other branches of production:lumber
and sugar. Once again extraeconomic coercion was needed to create the
conditions necessary for the development of the new productive branch:
workers to gin and pick the cotton.
In 1920 a policy aimed at familiarizingthe natives with agriculturewas
begun: the Napalpi Reservation stopped buying wood fromits inhabitants
the main productive activitypromoted up to that time - and began buying
only cotton;at the same time cottonseeds were distributedamong the Indians
living on the reservation.The idea was to create workers who knew how to
grow and gin cotton. But, as noted above, the most difficultproblem to solve
was the exodus of the Chaco Indians (even those who lived on the Napalpi
Reservationand especially the Mocovis), to the sugar plantationsof Salta and
Jujuyto harvest the cane (see Rutlege,n.d.). To illustratethe "crisis of field
hands" caused by the lack of "free" workers and the measures that were tak-
en to solve it,we quote froma petitionsent by colonists in Saenz Peniato the
Minister of Agriculture:
The undersigned,colonists of this locality ... aware of the desires to aid the progress of
this region encouraged by Your Excellency, ask to be allowed to direct your attentionto
what is happening in this colony. At the beginningof the cotton harvest,we called local
business's attentionto the almost certain lack of field hands so that help could be sought
frompublic powers to avoid what in fact is occurringat the presenttime,with the Indians
who live in this area having been recruitedby a local businessman to work in a refineryin
Salta and having been taken to that province; this because labor sent to the refineryis al-
most irreplaceable for the cotton harvest. Business groups promised to look into the
matter;but certainlybecause of acquiesence to the recruitersand forfear of being accused
of attackingthe progressof the region,they did nothing,and thus we found that the large-
scale shipmentof Indians had begun. When a plague makes us fear for the success of our
efforts,we have recourse to the public powers to ask for help; today, with the same
vehemence,we ask foryour interventionin the face of the threatof the disaster which the
lack of field hands would mean. If you stop the departureof more Indians and make those
who have gone return,you will have found a great solution for this problem; then,if you
order a reduction in the train fare of farmworkerscoming to this region and direct
immigrantsto settlehere, the danger will be warded off.Mr. Minister,we are at the height
of the harvest and cannot bringin the cotton for lack of hands. The massive recruitingof
Indians continues and there are no farmhands; your immediate interventionis therefore
urgentlyrequested to avoid the disaster that we announce withoutexagerating.(Signed by
fiftycolonists of Saenz Pefha,quoted in InstitutoTorcuato DiTella-Consejo Federal de
Inversiones, 1970.)

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INIGO CARRERA: VIOLENCE AS ECONOMIC POWER 109

The solution to this problem was attempted first by the territorial


government,which, in 1924, forbade the Indians to leave the Chaco territory,
thus preventing the better working and wage conditions of the sugar
refineriesof Salta and Jujuyfromattractingthe indigenous harvest workers.
In May of that year, preventedfromselling theirlabor power under the best
possible conditions,the indigenous wage workers fromdifferentparts of the
territory, such as Resistencia, Colonia Popular, Colonia Benitez, Las Palmas,
etc., began to congregatein a place withinthe Napalpi reservation.They were
joined by indigenous peasants, also inhabitants of the Napalpi reservation,
who protested the reduction in the price of cotton made by the reservation
administrationto which they had to deliver the cotton. Others, who were
affected by the government measure suppressing the use of the hunting
grounds north of Saenz Penia, also joined them. The two government
measures - reductionof the price of cottonand suppression of huntingrights
- had forced the peasants and hunters to obtain a livelihood as wage
workers.Added to these dissatisfactionswere insults sufferedby the Indians
in the Alto Bermejo.
Leaders of this protestmovementproclaimed a "general strike" in which
the wage workers refused to work and the peasants refused to cultivate and
harvestthe cotton on theirplots. The general strikewas convertedinto a mil-
lenial-typemovement. One of the leaders told the assembled strikersthat a
cacique, or medicine man, murdered by the police had appeared to him in a
dream and announced that soon the Indians who had been assassinated by
the Christians were going to come back to life and conquer the Christians,
who would then abandon the land, chased away by the spirits of the dead;
the world order would change and the Indians would once again become the
owners of the land. Between 450 and 800 people met,carried out small attacks
on cotton crops, and appropriatedlivestock to feed themselves.The governor
traveled to Napalpi and met with the leaders of the movementand promised
to negotiate a change in the administrator,the suppression of the discount,
the freedom of indigenous prisoners,and food for the assembled group; and
he named some of the leaders as police. Those who had assembled agreed to
break up. A month later-with none of the governor'spromises fulfilledand
after an Indian was killed by the police - a new meeting took place in El
Aguara (Napalpi). The police began to persecute all the Indians whetherthey
were mobilized or not; the indigenous police (leaders of the movement)
confrontedthe police. Armed confrontationswith the colonists began in the
small farms where those assembled wer,e appropriating livestock to eat.
Finally on July19, 130 policemen and some civilians attacked the groups as-
sembled at El Aguara, where poorly armed Indians were dancing. In the
confrontationapproximately 200 participants in the assembly died. The
following is an account of the event:
They saw them first on horseback, then they (the soldiers) dismounted and took up
positions.The poor devils never believed they would be attacked,so theymade no attempt
to defend themselves.The firstvolley sounded and, afteran interval,a second and a third
followed,and then therewas general firingat will. The firstvolley was aimed high,killing
only a few; the second and third were well-aimed and swept through the settlement,
producing panic and dispersion.
It should be remembered that the medicine man, or "Dios" G6mez, had said that the

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110 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Christians' bullets would not penetrate the Indians; this is why, afterthe firstround and
beforethe third,no one atttemptedto escape. On the contrary,they came out to look at the
soldiers who, chest to the ground, were firing. The Indians did nothing to defend
themselves,and made even less of an attempt,as has already been mentioned,to attack
the soldiers. Almost everyone, or the majority of those who came out to look at the
soldiers, fell either dead or wounded, the Moscovi group gettingthe worst of it as their
tents were to the rightof the attackingforces who firedfrom500 to 600 meters.Afterthe
third round, the shooting stopped for a moment, and then the Indians broke up, not
withouttakingadvantage of this lull to pick up theirwounded who couldn't walk and take
along some of their clothes and household goods, heading for the woods which were
behind them . . .
When therewas no longer anyone to be seen on foot or in the tents,since even the horses
thathad been grazing nearby were dead, the police withdrewto advance immediatelyand
finishoffthe wounded who were still there,committingheresy on theirbodies, cuttingoff
the ears and in one case the testicles,which were shown in the Commisary in Quitilipi
shortly afterward,puttinglighted cigarettes in the half-opened mouths, and even more
indecent things which the pen resists writing.
Then came the sacking; the soldiers grabbed everythingthatwas leftin the tents. . . . The
members of the police force arrived in Quitilipi loaded down with the war booty,
exhibitingthe trophies acquired so easily and withoutthe least danger, at a cost of 4,000
shots fired in barely a half an hour (Camera de Diputados, 1924: 422).

. . .until they noticed that therewas not one Indian leftin the tentswho was not dead or
wounded. The police had used 5,000 cartridges.The airplane notifiedthe police that there
was no longer any danger . . . sure of themselves,the police advanced . . . toward the
tents . . . any Indian found alive, regardless of sex or age, was finished off,riddled with
bullets or chopped with machete blows . . . They extracted the male member,testicles
and all, which the scoundrels kept as trophies . . . The inhabitantsof Quiltilipi declared
that these sad trophieswere even exhibited later amid boasts of braveryin the police sta-
tion . . . To complete this dark picture,the police set fire to the tents; the bodies were
buried in common graves . . . up to eightbodies per grave . . . (and some burned) . . . the
troops returned'. . . drivingsheep, cows and burros belongingto the Indians (in addition
to chickens,geese and ducks and household goods . . . ) (Cordeu and Siffreddi,1971: 87).

The governorof the territorydenied accusations made against the police


in declarations to the newspaper La Razon:
In the firstplace, Mr. Centeno begins telling us, it should be pointed out - because it
makes a big differencein the nature of the deeds - that what occurred on the Napalpi
Reservationwas not an Indian uprisingas it has been called, but rather,purelyand simply,
a strikeby Indian settlers. . . because the mattershould be considered, not as a riot,but
as a strike.In spite of the hostile attitudeof the armed Indians, I myself confrontedthe
conflictas a simple labor question arising between aborigine settlersand the administra-
tion of the reservation,and so I went to speak to them . . . . We arrived in the month of
Julywhen the events of May were repeated,but this time with a subversive character . . .
. The Indians, at the instigationof those named above (the leaders of the movement)who,
for disgracefulmotives,took advantage of the remains of an earlier movementand ceased
being strikersand turned into common criminals,attackingsettlers,savagely killingsome
of them, butcheringlivestock and, finally,attackingthe police detachment in Machanga
.... Aware of my duties, I ordered the Chief of Police and the Commissionerof the Day
to concentrateall theirforces and tryto impress the Indians with the mere presence of a
large number of policemen . . . . But the Indians . . . chose to resist the police, greeting
them with gunfire when the police wanted to talk with them . . . . Faced with this
rebellious attitude,faced with 400 armed Indians who, even worse, had been turned into
fanatics, what attitude could the authorities take when they numbered only 100 men?
Accept the combat they were obliged to engage in and, once accepted, wage it in the best
possible conditions . . . " (Camara de Diputados, 1924: 454-455).

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INIGO CARRERA: VIOLENCE AS ECONOMIC POWER 111

During the same year of 1924, the national government,"motivated by


complaints to the Ministryof the Interiorabout poor treatmentof Indians in
the sugar refineriesin Salta and Jujuy,dictated a resolutionwhich prohibited
the hiringof Indians by private parties and the sale of firearmsto them as
well" (Ministerio del Interior,1924-1925:638).
Finally, in 1927, the national government issued a decree signed on
January11, in which Article six ordered that "fromthis day on the hiringof
Indians for work in the lumbermills,in the harvestingof sugar cane, and on
canals and railroad lines, outside of the zones where they reside, is forbidden
without the prior intervention of the Honorary Commission on Indian
Reservations" (Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision, 1945). In this way the
Indians were prohibited from working in the cane fields and the lumber
camps but were not prohibited from picking cotton.
The sugar refineriesof northwesternArgentinahad hired Matacos, Lules,
and Vilelas for wages ever since the middle of the nineteenthcenturywhen
the introductionof more modern machineryended the "encomienda" system
to which these Indians had been subjected. Later the Tobas and Mocovis
were added. The policy of the national governmentprohibitingthe hiringof
Indians outside theirplace of residence, which in this case meant preventing
them fromgoing to work in the sugar cane fields in the northwest,meant a
redistributionof the available work force,taking into consideration the new
branches of production that were developing. The Chaco Indians were
destined forthe productionof cotton.The Puna Indians, in the province of Ju-
juy, who, until that time, had worked small plots of land belonging to the
large latifundistas,paying rent in kind and eventually in personal service,
were forced to work for wages as cane cuttersfor the refineries(see Rutlege,
n.d., especially the chapter titled "Integraciondel campesinado en las tierras
altas").
This measure taken by the national government reflected a general
population problem in Argentina which, at this place and time, was
manifestedin a labor scarcity. The interventionof the national government
prevented the free circulation of labor as commodity. In this way, the
bourgeoisie resolved the problem of scarcity and upkeep (settlement)of the
existing work force. The fraction that had continued being proletarianized
after the militarycampaign were halted in their progress toward becoming
members of the working class, and thus were prevented fromconstitutinga
permanent work force.
The labor force of the indigenous workers of the Chaco was not sufficient
forthe cottonharvest.It became necessary to attractworkersfromelsewhere.
Economic coercion, the need to obtain their livelihood - which they could
not secure in their places of origin due to the growth of the population
relative to the new productive conditions resultingfrom the development of
capitalism - led the small livestock producers, peasants, and peons of the
provinces of Santiago del Estero and Corrientes to migrate to the Chaco
where they found their livelihood in the form of wages. Since the principal
productive activitywas the forest industry,the migrantswere employed as
lumberjacks. With the development of cotton productionthey began to work
in the harvest. Since the number of migrantswho came for the;harvest was
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112 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

not sufficient,extraeconomic coercion was applied at harvest time. The state


railroad began to charge reduced rates to those who came to the Chaco from
neighboringprovinces. "The delay in the harvest has resulted in trainloads of
braceros(field workers) being unloaded in the town every day; they spend
the day walking fromone side of the town to the other,and at nightfallthey
gather in the street in frontof the station, as if they had come to take the
trainback to theirhome towns. But they couldn't do that even if they wanted
to. The fare to any station in the Chaco costs them one peso; but the return
costs the normal price - five pesos for second class - to Resistencia"
(Pavlotzky, 1960: 37). With these measures the creation of the firstcondition
necessary for capitalist development in production was accomplished: the
existence of a wage labor force.
The living and working conditions of these migrantworkers have been
described as follows:
The migrantsare the real outcasts of our economic environment;men who earn ridiculous
wages, men who are paid approximately60 centavos forevery 10 kilos of cottontheypick,
men who must work hard for 14 hours to pick 50 kilos of this product,i.e., to earn 3 pesos
fora 14-hourworkday. In order to earn enough money to maintain theirfamilies,these mi-
grant workers must, according to what we learned, bring along their wives and children,
sometimes very small children, to work alongside them picking cotton . . . (Camara de
Diputados, 1936: 357).
The farmers,who are small-scale exploitersto us . . . set up filthystores stocked with the
worstgoods at exorbitantprices. These-storesinstalled with premeditationforthe purpose
of assuring that,at the end of the harvest,the honorable farmerskeep all the money that
the workerearned at great sacrificein the cottonfields and, in the end, returnshome with
one year less to live, without money, withouthope, and, why not say it, even with some
diseases (Sindicato de oficios varios de Villa Angela).

In the policies which the various governmentsimplementedthroughthe


state apparatus, violence was the necessary condition which made possible
and gave rise to the development of the new productive system. In the first
place, it was used in order to'expropriatethe material conditionsof existence
of the "natives." The state apparatus used its monopoly of physical force to
militarilydefeat those who would later be expropriated.The measures that
followed (relocation on reservations,disciplining,orientationtoward certain
types of production,puttingdown any resistence) were the expression of this
monopoly as it set out to formthe worker needed by the productive system
that it wanted to establish and that,in general,still exists. "When one speaks
of the 'economic policies of the government'which are implementedthrough
the 'state,' what is in fact expressed is the decision to apply 'extraeconomic
coercion' to the productiveprocess. In other words, the monopoly of force is
utilized in order to implementthe interests(the social being) of some sectors
of society" (Marin, 1978).
REFERENCES
Camdra de Diputados de la Naci6n
1924 Diario de Sesiones, Vol. V, Buenos Aires
1925 Diario de Sesiones, July21, Buenos Aires
Comisi6n Honoraria de Reducciones de Indios
1928 Memoria correspondienteal afno1927 - presentada al Ministeriodel Interior,Buenos
Aires: Imprenta E. Reyes

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INIGO CARRERA: VIOLENCE AS ECONOMIC POWER 113

Cordeu, Edgardo and Alejandra Siffreddi


1971 De la Algarroba al algod6n, Buenos Aires: JudrezEditor
DiTella, Guido and Manuel Zymelman
1967 Las etapas del desarrollo econ6mico argentino,Buenos Aires: EUDEBA
Garcia Mata, Carlos
1937 La economia algodonera norteamericana, Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Agricultura,
Junta Nacional de Algod6n
Garcfa Pulido, Jose
1977 El Gran Chaco y su Imperio Las Palmas, Resistencia, Argentina:Libreria y Papelerfa
Casa Garcia
Girola, Carlos D.
1910 El algodonera - Su cultivo en las varias partes del mundo - Preparaci6n y comercio
del algod6n, Buenos Aires: Compafifa Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco
InstitutoTorcuato DiTella - Consejo Federal de Inversiones
1970 "Situaci6n de la poblaci6n aborigen de la provincia del Chaco y polfticas para su
integraci6na la comunidad nacional," typewritten
JuntaNacional de Algod6n
1938 Anuario Algodonera
Lattes, Alfredo E.
1975 Migration, Population Change and Ethnicity in Argentina, The Hague: Mouton
Publishers
Marfn,Juan Carlos
1978 Seminario interno de CISCO, Buenos Aires
Marx, Karl
1967 Capital, Vol. I, New York: InternationalPublishers
Ministerio del Interior
1915-1916 Memoria, Buenos Aires
1919-1920 Memoria, Buenos Aires
1924-1925 Memoria, Buenos Aires
Miranda, Guido
1955 Tres ciclos chaquefnos,Resistencia, Argentina: Ed. Notre Argentino
Niklison, Jose Elfas
1919 "Los indfgenas del norte en la Argentina (apuntes de actualidad," La Revista del
Mundo, II (April)
Ortiz, Ricardo M.
1955 Historia econ6mica de la Argentina,Buenos Aires: Raigal
Pavlotsky, Jose
1960 Esta tierra es mia, Buenos Aires: Editorial Cogtal
Ramil Cepeda, Carlos and Mario Persico
1974 La formaci6nde la sociedad argentina:1500-1800. . ., Buenos Aires: La Rosa Blindada
Rostagno, Enrique
1969 Informe- Fuerzas en operacions en el Chaco - 1911, Buenos Aires: CfrculoMilitar
Rutlege, Ian
n.d. El dessarrollo del capitalismo en Jujuy,Buenos Aires: Serie Estudios (8), CICSO
Secretarfa de Trabajo y Previsi6n - Consejo Agrario Nacional
1945 El problema indigena en la Argentina, Buenos Aires: Publicaci6n No. 22
Victorica, Benjamfn
1885 Campafna del Chaco, Buenos Aires: Imprenta Europa
Zischka, Anton
1960 La guerra secreta por el algod6n, Buenos Aires: Claridad

LatinAmerican
Perspectives,
Issue 39, Fall 1983, Vol. X, No. 4

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