PEOPLE VS DIMAANO
the designation of the offense charged or the particular
Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information. (Sec. 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court)
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if
it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of
the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information.
Facts:
In 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo
Dimaano with two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count
of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape stated as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the
Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts,
but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce it, as a consequence by
reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance
that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's
mother.
Issue: Did the complaint or information for attempted
rape sufficiently alleged the specific acts or omissions
constituting the offense?
Held:
No. For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must
state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of
must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense
is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the
appellant was arraigned does not allege specific acts or
omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape.
Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of
elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of
Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant
'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does
not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or
information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one
who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency therefore
prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of
conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of
the appellant to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him. (People vs Dimaano Case Digest,
G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005)
Sasot vs. People
TOPIC:
1. UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER ART 189 OF RPC
IS A PUBLIC CRIME;
2. THE PHILIPPINES IS UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENT, AS SIGNATORY TO THE MULTILATERAL
TREATY AND AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL INTEREST, TO
PROTECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS EVEN WHEN THE LATTER IS NOT
ENGAGED AND LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
FACTS:
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA
Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible violation
of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair
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competition. The Report stated that petitioners are
engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and
distribution of counterfeit "NBA" garment products.
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the following grounds:
I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN
OFFENSE
II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE
ACCUSED8
Petitioners contend that complainant is a foreign
corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and
cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws since it is
not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they
have been using the business name "ALLANDALE
SPORTSLINE, INC." since 1972, and their designs are
original and do not appear to be similar to
complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s logo
or design.10
The trial prosecutor filed his Comment/Opposition to the
motion to quash, stating that the State is entitled to
prosecute the offense even without the participation of
the private offended party, as the crime charged is a
public crime.11
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s arguments
and denied petitioners’ motion to quash in its Order
dated March 5, 1999.12
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals (CA) which was
dismissed. According to the CA, the petition is not the
proper remedy in assailing a denial of a motion to quash,
and that the grounds raised therein should be raised
during the trial of the case on the merits.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but
this was denied by the CA.16
ISSUE: WON A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED
AND LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES
MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR
COMPETITION
HELD: The petition must be denied.
*** the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code34 is a public crime.
It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter
which principally stands as the injured party. The
complainant’s capacity to sue in such case becomes
immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,35 ***, the
Court succinctly ruled that:
More important is the nature of the case which led to
this petition. What preceded this petition for certiorari
was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging
Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. If prosecution
follows after the completion of the preliminary
investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor
the information shall be in the name of the People of the
Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an
aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an
act against the State. It is the latter which is principally
the injured party although there is a private right
violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become,
therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We
cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes
to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention
that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no
standing to sue.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the
present suit before our courts for unfair competition or
infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we
are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of
foreign states under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines
and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and
enforcing a solemn international commitment of the
Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which
we are a party and which we entered into because it is in
our national interest to do so.36 (Emphasis supplied)
LASOY VS ZENAROSA
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof.
Facts:
Lasoy and Banisa were charged before the RTC with
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for
transporting and selling 42.41 grams of marijuana
fruiting tops. Both pleaded guilty on arraignment and
were later on sentenced to suffer a jail term of 6 months
and 1 day. Both accused applied for probation.
Subsequently, the prosecutor filed two separate
motions: (1) to admit amended Information, and (2) to
set aside the arraignment of the accused. The prosecutor
intended to amend the filed information because for
some reason, Lasoy and Banisa were charged of selling
42.41 grams instead of 42.41 kilograms of marijuana.
The motions were granted. Thus the information now
states “kilograms” instead of “grams". Both accused filed
a motion to quash.
Judge Zenarosa denied the motion to quash and
scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information. Lasoy and Banisa raises a petition
for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy. In
response, respondent claims that the trial based on the
first information was a sham and that the petitioners
participated in tampering the information.
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Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy attaches
Held: Yes. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the
following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction
to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the
charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
The issue boils down to whether or not the first
information is valid.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof.
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that
a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the
language of the statute in the information. The
information will be sufficient if it describes the crime
defined by law.
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is
that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was
committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to
apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against
them, is reasonably complied with.
With respect specifically to the trial courts point of view
that the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the
tampering, we hold that while this may not be far-
fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof.
Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were
arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under
the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering
took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does
not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July
1996. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly
participated in by the accused may well be the subject of
another inquiry.
In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given the
far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double
jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only
instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham.
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21,
mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. In this case, the
accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they
were already in the stage where they were applying for
probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to
ask for the amendment of the information and seek to
try again accused for the same offense without violating
procedural rules and their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution. (Lasoy vs. Zenarosa, G.R. No. 129472. April
12, 2005)
Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for
the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without
conducting a competitive public bidding as required by
law, which caused damage and prejudice to the
government. An information was filed for violation of
Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the
Government. The information was quashed for failure to
prove the actual damage, hence a new information was
filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving
unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused
moved for a new preliminary investigation to be
conducted on the ground that there is substitution
and/or substantial amendment of the first information.
Issue: Whether or not there is substitution and/or
substantial amendment of the information that would
warrant an new preliminary investigation.
Ruling: No, there is no substitution and/or substantial
amendment.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
That there are two (2) different modes of committing
the offense: either by causing undue injury or by giving
private person unwarranted benefit. That accused may
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be charged under either mode or under both. Hence a
new preliminary investigation is unnecessary.
Bonifacio VS RTC of Makati, Br. 149
Facts:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime
of libel after private respondent Gimenez, on behalf of
Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a
criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor for
libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code .
The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with
several John Does, publicly and maliciously with
intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and
integrity, character and reputation of Malayan Insurance
Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to
public hatred and contempt, and published in the said
website http://www.pepcoalition.com a defamatory
article persuading the public to remove their
investments and policies from the said company. This is
after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their
pecuniary loss under the policies they obtained from the
company. Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable
cause to indict the petitioners, filed separate
information against them .
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a
Motion to Quash on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in
the Information are not punishable by law since internet
libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners
maintained that the Information failed to allege a
particular place within the trial court’s jurisdiction where
the subject article was printed and first published or that
the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the
alleged defamatory material was printed and first
published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the
venue of the case in the place where the offended party
accessed the internet-published article.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ Motion to Quash due to lack
of jurisdiction is valid.
Held:
Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that
the place where the crime was committed determines
not only the venue of the action but constitutes an
essential element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases
where the complainant is a private individual is limited
to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published.
The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the
venue by stating that the offending article was first
published and accessed by the private complainant in
Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to
be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and
first publication. This is wrong. For the court to hold that
the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction
in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory
article was accessed therein would open the floodgates
to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable
of being accessed. This goes against the purpose as to
why Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as
to prevent the offended party in written defamation
cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of
out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in
remote municipal courts (
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the
Amended Information.
Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan Digest
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of
Brigadier General. when he served as President of the
AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS).
During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the
Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition
of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General
Santos City for development as housing projects.
AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J.
Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors,
executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the
subject property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per
square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment
to the individual vendors.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral
deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral
deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only
P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual
purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter.
Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for
registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the
basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
4

Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing
the first district of South Cotabato, which includes
General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a
complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with 27
other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or
property through falsification of public documents.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found
petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.
THE Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12
informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and
12 informations for falsification of public documents
against petitioner and several other co-accused.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP)
recommended that petitioner be excluded from the
informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs
(OMB-OLA) recommended the contrary, stressing that
petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the
contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various
agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of
the subject property.
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were
forwarded for comment to the Office of the Ombudsman
for Military (OMB-Military). The OMB-Military adopted
the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the
dropping of petitioner’s name from the informations.
Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the
recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the
recommendation of the OMB-Military was not
manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final
disposition of petitioner’s first motion for
reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records
of the case. It found that petitioner indeed participated
in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell,
bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements,
vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at
the price of P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of
prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign
ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of
sale, which indicated the false purchase price of
P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors
concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s
continued prosecution.
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the
recommendation of the panel of prosecutors.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding
of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading.
The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or
evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the
trial of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in denying
petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending
resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him
POLITICAL LAW: The Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, sanction the immediate filing of an
information in the proper court upon a finding of
probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion
for reconsideration.
HELD:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of
2001, sanction the immediate filing of an information in
the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even
during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration.
Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall
be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from
notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the
proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with
corresponding leave of court in cases where the
information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of
the corresponding information in Court on the basis of
the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of
the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of
the corresponding information, then neither can it bar
the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal
course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of
the information.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must
proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30
days from the filing of the information or from the date
the accused has appeared before the court in which the
charge is pending, whichever is later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and
Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. - The
arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty
5
(30) days from the filing of the information, or from the
date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge
or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date
last occurs. x x x
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which
implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or
Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held
within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last
clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that
the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, which is when the accused appears before the
court.
Furthermore, Petitioner failed to show that any of the
instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of
arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded
with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7
of RA 8493.
Luis Panaguiton Jr., vs DOJ, Ramon Tongson and Rodrigo
Cawili,
Facts:
This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing
Luis Panaguiton, Jr. petition for certiorari and motion for
reconsideration
In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and
later issued checks as payment both signed by Cawili and
his business associate Tongson. But checks were
dishonored either for insufficiency of funds or closure of
account.
Panaguiton then made a formal demands to Cawili and
Tongson to pay but to no avail.
So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and
Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22 before QC Prosecutor's
Office.
During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming
that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent
since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in Cawili's
personal capacity. He averred that he was not Cawili's
business associate and claimed that he himself has
criminal cases against Cawili. Tongson also denied that
he had issued bounced checks and that his signatures on
the checks had been falsified.
As cpunter, Panaguiton presented documents showing
Tongson's signature which was the same as the
signatures on the checks. Panaguiton presented also an
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.
December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only
against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson.
Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the
case against Cawili was filed before the proper court.
Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was
possible to co-sign the bounced checks and had altered
his signature in pleadings submitte during PI, Chief State
Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of QC to conduct
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and refer the
signatures to NBI.
On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring to the NBI,
holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant to
Act. No. 3326, stating that in this case the 4 year period
started on the date the checks were dishonored and that
the filing of complaint in QC prosecutor's office did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as the
law contemplates judicial and not administrative
proceedings. Four years had elapsed and no information
was filed against Tongson. And the order to refer the
matter to NBI could no longer be sanctioned under
Section 3, Rule 112 of rules of criminal procedure
because the initiative should come from the petitioner
himself and not from the investigating prosecutor.
Petitioner appealed to DOJ through undersecretary
Teehankee but was dismissed. Petitioner then filed a
motion for reconsideration of DOJ and through
undersecretary Gutierrez ruled in his favor and declared
that the prescription period was interrupted by the filing
of the complaint in the Prosecutor's office.
However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson ruled the subject
offense had already prescribed and ordered the
withdrawal of 3 informations for violation of BP Blg. 22
against Tongson. DOJ explained that Act No. 3326
applies to violations of special acts that do not provide
for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA
assailing the august resolution of the DOJ, but was
dismissed by CA in view of failure to attach a proper
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
6
Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that
CA committed grave error on dismissing his petition on
technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it
was without merit and questions are too unsubstantial.
The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the rules of court.
Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment
arguing that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari, and they also claim that the offense of
violation of BP Blg. 22 has prescribed and the long delay,
attributable to petitioner and the State violated their
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The
petition is meritorious.
Issues: (1) Technical Issues, (2) Substantive Aspects
Ruling: (1) verification is merely formal requirement
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are true and correct-the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them
and waive strict compliance so that the ends of justice
may be served. We find that by attaching pertinent
verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
has sufficiently complied with the verification
requirement.We also agree that CA erred in dismissing
the petition on the ground of failure to attach a certified
copy or duplicate original of the 3 resolution of DOJ.
(2) This court ruled that the filing of the complaint with
the fiscal's office for PI suspends the running of the
prescriptive period.The delay was beyond petitioner's
control but that of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and
misapplications.
Petition is granted.
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE v. JUDGE
ROBERTO L. AYCO
The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the
defense witnesses in the absence of public prosecutor or
a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a
clear transgression of the Rules.
Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
South Cotabato allowed the defense in a criminal case to
present evidence consisting of the testimony of two
witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor
Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State
Prosecutor Pinote was at that time undergoing medical
treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal
case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense
witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco,
maintaining that prior proceedings conducted in his
absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the
prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine
the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint
lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for “Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and
Serious Misconduct.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on
Criminal Procedure for allowing the defense to present
evidence in the absence of a prosecutor
HELD:
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit,
however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a
private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the
approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of
the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person
directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining
witness. It is on this account that the presence of a
public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is
necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of
which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people.
Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused
to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble
it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the
accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.
Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the
court of his inability to attend the hearings or to file a
motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file
a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the
defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may
be mitigating. It does not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter
disregard of the Rules.
7
Buntiong vs Balboa
Case Doctrine:
● A separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability
in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the
civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Facts: Vicente Balboa filed two (2) cases against Sps.
Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng:
(1) A CIVIL CASE for sum of money based on the three (3)
post-dated checks issued by Caroline in the total amount
of P5,175,250.00. The Regional Trial Court found the
spouses liable and ordered them to pay the amount.
(2) A CRIMINAL CASE for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 against Caroline covering the said three checks.
The Municipal Trial Court acquitted Caroline but held her
civilly liable. On appeal, the RTC modified the MTC
Decision by deleting the award of civil damages.
The spouses now comes to court charging Balboa with
forum-shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the Balboa's act of filing civil and
criminal cases constitutes forum-shopping.
Held:
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the
supposition that one or the other court would render a
favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly
to get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than
by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following elements
concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the
parties who represent the same interest in both actions;
(2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as
the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3)
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration or will
constitute litis pendentia.
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic
Electrix Corp., the Court ruled that there is identity of
parties and causes of action between a civil case for the
recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of
bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the prosecution
of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal
of the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the
claim.
In the said case, the Court applied Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 effective September 16, 1997, which
provides that "the criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include
the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such action separately shall be allowed or recognized."
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: (b) The
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.
The foregoing, however, is not applicable as the civil and
criminal case were filed on February 24, 1997 and on
July 21, 1997, respectively, prior to the adoption of
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16,
1997. At the time of filing of the cases, the governing
rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to
wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action, then the civil case may proceed
independently of the criminal cases and there is no
forum shopping to speak of. Even under the amended
rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil
liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed
when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the
civil and criminal cases. (Bun Tiong vs. Balboa, G.R. No.
158177, January 28, 2008)
Jose vs Suarez
Case Doctrines:
● The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal
cases. The cause or reason for the issuance of a check is
inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under
B.P. Blg. 22. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check, which is a malum prohibitum, and not
the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance.
8
● Filing a Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC after a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings was denied by the MTC
constitute forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act of
one party against another, when an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and
possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than
by appeal or by special civil action of certiorari.
Facts: Spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had availed
of Carolina Jose’s (Carolina) offer to lend money at the
daily interest rate of 1% to 2% which was later on
increased to 5% per day. Respondents were forced to
accept because they allegedly had no other option left.
Purita would then issue checks in favor of petitioners in
payment of the amount borrowed from them with the
agreed 5% daily interest.
In 2004, Sps. Suarez filed a Complaint against Jose
seeking to nullify the 5% interest per day, alleging that
same is iniquitous, contrary to morals, done under
vitiated consent and imposed using undue influence by
taking improper advantage of their financial distress.
Thereafter, Jose filed several cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 against respondent Purita before the MTCC.
Purita, in turn filed motions to suspend the criminal
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question.
Respondents claimed that if the 5% interest per month is
nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it
would mean that the checks subject of the B.P. Blg. 22
cases are not only fully paid but are also in fact overpaid.
The motion to suspend was denied. Hence, Sps. Suarez
filed before the RTC a “Motion for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with Temporary Restraining Order” seeking to
restrain the MTCCs from further proceeding with the
B.P. Blg. 22 cases on the ground of prejudicial question.
The RTC granted the motion. CA affirmed. Hence,
petitioners appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a prejudicial question exists such that
the outcome of the validity of the interest rate is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
respondent spouses in the criminal case.
2. Whether or not respondent spouses are guilty of
forum shopping.
Held:
1. No. There is none.
A prejudicial question has two essential elements: (i) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal
cases. The cause or reason for the issuance of a check is
inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under
B.P. Blg. 22. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check, which is a malum prohibitum, and not
the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance.
Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by
petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra
bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg.
22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the
mere issuance of bouncing checks. The primordial
question is whether the law has been breached, that is,
if a bouncing check has been issued.
2. Yes. There is forum shopping when a party seeks to
obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had
already been solicited, and in other courts and other
proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is the act
of one party against another, when an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and
possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than
by appeal or by special civil action of certiorari; or the
institution of two or more acts or proceedings grounded
on the same cause on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.
Respondents filed their motions to suspend proceedings
in the MTCCs hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases but
unfortunately, the same were denied. Failing to get the
relief they wanted, respondents sought before the RTC,
the suspension of the criminal proceedings which was
granted. Respondents tried to extricate themselves
from the charge of forum shopping by explaining that
after the denial of their motions to suspend, their only
remedy was the application for preliminary injunction in
the civil case—a relief which they had already asked for
in their complaint and which was also initially not
granted to them. Any which way the situation is viewed,
respondents’ acts constituted forum shopping since they
sought a possibly favorable opinion from one court after
another had issued an order unfavorable to them. (Sps.
Carolina and Reynaldo Jose vs. Sps. Laureano and Purita
Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008)