.R. No.

129169 November 17, 1999

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA), petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION, and HYDRO
RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, respondents.

In this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the National Irrigation Administration (hereafter NIA),
seeks to annul and set aside the Resolutions 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 37180 dated 28 June 1996 and 24
February 1997, which dismissed respectively NIA's petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (hereafter CIAC), and the motion for reconsideration thereafter filed.

Records show that in a competitive bidding held by NIA in August 1978, Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation (hereafter
HYDRO) was awarded Contract MPI-C-2 for the construction of the main civil works of the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. The
contract provided that HYDRO would be paid partly in Philippine pesos and partly in U.S. dollars. HYDRO substantially completed
the works under the contract in 1982 and final acceptance by NIA was made in 1984. HYDRO thereafter determined that it still had
an account receivable from NIA representing the dollar rate differential of the price escalation for the contract. 2

After unsuccessfully pursuing its case with NIA, HYDRO, on 7 December 1994, filed with the CIAC a Request for Adjudication of the
aforesaid claim. HYDRO nominated six arbitrators for the arbitration panel, from among whom CIAC appointed Engr. Lauro M. Cruz.
On 6 January 1995, NIA filed its Answer wherein it questioned the jurisdiction of the CIAC alleging lack of cause of action, laches
and estoppel in view of HYDRO's alleged failure to avail of its right to submit the dispute to arbitration within the prescribed period as
provided in the contract. On the same date, NIA filed a Compliance wherein it nominated six arbitrators, from among whom CIAC
appointed Atty. Custodio O. Parlade, and made a counterclaim for P1,000,000 as moral damages; at least P100,000 as exemplary
damages; P100,000 as attorney's fees; and the costs of the arbitration. 3

The two designated arbitrators appointed Certified Public Accountant Joven B. Joaquin as Chairman of the Arbitration Panel. The
parties were required to submit copies of the evidence they intended to present during the proceedings and were provided the draft
Terms of Reference. 4

At the preliminary conference, NIA through its counsel Atty. Joy C. Legaspi of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel,
manifested that it could not admit the genuineness of HYDRO's evidence since NIA's records had already been destroyed. NIA
requested an opportunity to examine the originals of the documents which HYDRO agreed to provide. 5

After reaching an accord on the issues to be considered by the arbitration panel, the parties scheduled the dates of hearings and of
submission of simultaneous memoranda. 6

On 13 March 1995, NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss 7 alleging lack of jurisdiction over the disputes. NIA contended that there was no
agreement with HYDRO to submit the dispute to CIAC for arbitration considering that the construction contract was executed in
1978 and the project completed in 1982, whereas the Construction Industry Arbitration Law creating CIAC was signed only in 1985;
and that while they have agreed to arbitration as a mode of settlement of disputes, they could not have contemplated submission of
their disputes to CIAC. NIA further argued that records show that it had not voluntarily submitted itself to arbitration by CIAC
citing TESCO Services, Inc. v.Hon. Abraham Vera, et al., 8 wherein it was ruled:

CIAC did not acquire jurisdiction over the dispute arising from the sub-contract agreement between petitioner
TESCO and private respondent LAROSA. The records do not show that the parties agreed to submit the
disputes to arbitration by the CIAC . . . . While both parties in the sub-contract had agreed to submit the matter
to arbitration, this was only between themselves, no request having been made by both with the CIAC. Hence,
as already stated, the CIAC, has no jurisdiction over the dispute. . . . . Nowhere in the said article (sub-contract)
does it mention the CIAC, much less, vest jurisdiction with the CIAC.

On 11 April 1995, the arbitral body issued an order 9 which deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss and resolved to
proceed with the hearing of the case on the merits as the grounds cited by NIA did not seem to be "indubitable." NIA filed a motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. CIAC in denying the motion for reconsideration ruled that it has jurisdiction over the
HYDRO's claim over NIA pursuant to E.O 1008 and that the hearing should proceed as scheduled. 10

On 26 May 1996, NIA filed with the Court of Appeals an original action of certiorari and prohibition with prayer for restraining order
and/or injunction, seeking to annul the Orders of the CIAC for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. In support of
its petition NIA alleged that:

A RESPONDENT CIAC HAS NO AUTHORITY OR JURIDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY THIS DISPUTE
BETWEEN THE HEREIN PARTIES AS E.O. NO. 1008 HAD NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT.

B THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES SHOULD BE SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GC NO. 25,
ART. 2046 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND R.A. NO. 876 THE GOVERNING LAWS AT THE TIME CONTRACT
WAS EXECUTED AND TERMINATED.

C E.O. NO. 1008 IS A SUBSTANTIVE LAW, NOT MERELY PROCEDURAL AS RULED BY THE CIAC.

D AN INDORSEMENT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL DECIDING A CONTROVERSY IS A DECISION

BECAUSE ALL THE ELEMENTS FOR JUDGMENT ARE THERE; THE CONTROVERSY, THE AUTHORITY
TO DECIDE AND THE DECISION. IF IT IS NOT APPEALED SEASONABLY, THE SAME BECOMES FINAL.

E NIA HAS TIMELY RAISED THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION. IT DID NOT WAIVE NOR IS IT ESTOPPED
FROM ASSAILING THE SAME.

F THE LEGAL DOCTRINE THAT JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED BY THE STATUTE IN FORCE AT THE
TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION DOES NOT ONLY APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASE. 11

The Court of Appeals, after finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CIAC in issuing the aforesaid
Orders, dismissed the petition in its Resolution dated 28 June 1996. NIA's motion for reconsideration of the said decision was
likewise denied by the Court of Appeals on 26 February 1997.
On 2 June 1997, NIA filed before us an original action for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for temporary restraining order
and writ of preliminary injunction, praying for the annulment of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 1996 and 24
February 1997. In the said special civil action, NIA merely reiterates the issues it raised before the Court of Appeals. 12

We take judicial notice that on 10 June 1997, CIAC rendered a decision in the main case in favor of HYDRO. 13 NIA assailed the
said decision with the Court of Appeals. In view of the pendency of the present petitions before us the appellate court issued a
resolution dated 26 March 1998 holding in abeyance the resolution of the same until after the instant petitions have been finally
decided. 14

At the outset, we note that the petition suffers from a procedural defect that warrants its outright dismissal. The questioned
resolutions of the Court of Appeals have already become final and executory by reason of the failure of NIA to appeal therefrom.
Instead of filing this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, NIA should have filed a timely petition for review under
Rule 45.

There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before it by
NIA. The original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over special civil actions for certiorari is vested upon it under Section 9(1) of
B.P. 129. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Supreme Court 15 and with the Regional Trial Court. 16

Thus, since the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise
of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. 17 If
the aggrieved party fails to do so within the reglementary period, and the decision accordingly becomes final and executory, he
cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament being the effect of his deliberate inaction. 18

The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45 and Rule 65, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 19 Rule 45 is clear that
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings
involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case. 20 Under Rule 45 the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of
motion for reconsideration.21

In the instant case the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 24 February 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of its
Resolution dated 28 June 1997 was received by NIA on 4 March 1997. Thus, it had until 19 March 1997 within which to perfect its
appeal. NIA did not appeal. What it did was to file an original action forcertiorari before this Court, reiterating the issues and
arguments it raised before the Court of Appeals.

For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. 22 A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and
adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or
agency. 23 In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.

Obviously, NIA interposed the present special civil action of certiorari not because it is the speedy and adequate remedy but to
make up for the loss, through omission or oversight, of the right of ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action
of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. 24 Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal, including that under Rule 45, 25 especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice
of remedies. 26

For obvious reasons the rules forbid recourse to a special civil action for certiorari if appeal is available, as the remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 27 Although there are exceptions to the rules, none is present
in the case at bar. NIA failed to show circumstances that will justify a deviation from the general rule as to make available a petition
for certiorari in lieu of taking an appropriate appeal.

Based on the foregoing, the instant petition should be dismissed.

In any case, even if the issue of technicality is disregarded and recourse under Rule 65 is allowed, the same result would be
reached since a review of the questioned resolutions of the CIAC shows that it committed no grave abuse of discretion.

Contrary to the claim of NIA, the CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy. Executive Order No. 1008, otherwise known as the
"Construction Industry Arbitration Law" which was promulgated on 4 February 1985, vests upon CIAC original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines,
whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The disputes
may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the
same to voluntary arbitration. 28

The complaint of HYDRO against NIA on the basis of the contract executed between them was filed on 7 December 1994, during
the effectivity of E.O. No. 1008. Hence, it is well within the jurisdiction of CIAC. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. 29

NIA's argument that CIAC had no jurisdiction to arbitrate on contract which preceded its existence is untenable. E.O. 1008 is clear
that the CIAC has jurisdiction over all disputes arising from or connected with construction contract whether the dispute arises
before or after the completion of the contract. Thus, the date the parties entered into a contract and the date of completion of the
same, even if these occurred before the constitution of the CIAC, did not automatically divest the CIAC of jurisdiction as long as the
dispute submitted for arbitration arose after the constitution of the CIAC. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of CIAC is over the
dispute, not the contract; and the instant dispute having arisen when CIAC was already constituted, the arbitral board was actually
exercising current, not retroactive, jurisdiction. As such, there is no need to pass upon the issue of whether E.O. No. 1008 is a
substantive or procedural statute.

NIA also contended that the CIAC did not acquire jurisdiction over the dispute since it was only HYDRO that requested for
arbitration. It asserts that to acquire jurisdiction over a case, as provided under E.O. 1008, the request for arbitration filed with CIAC
should be made by both parties, and hence the request by one party is not enough.

It is undisputed that the contracts between HYDRO and NIA contained an arbitration clause wherein they agreed to submit to
arbitration any dispute between them that may arise before or after the termination of the agreement. Consequently, the claim of
HYDRO having arisen from the contract is arbitrable. NIA's reliance with the ruling on the case of Tesco Services Incorporated
v. Vera, 30 is misplaced.

The 1988 CIAC Rules of Procedure which were applied by this Court in Tesco case had been duly amended by CIAC Resolutions
No. 2-91 and 3-93, Section 1 of Article III of which read as follows:

Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction — An arbitration clause in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration

of a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement
to submit an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reference to a different
arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission. When a contract contains a clause for the
submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to enter into a submission
agreement before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC.

Under the present Rules of Procedure, for a particular construction contract to fall within the jurisdiction of CIAC, it is merely
required that the parties agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. Unlike in the original version of Section 1, as applied in
the Tesco case, the law as it now stands does not provide that the parties should agree to submit disputes arising from their
agreement specifically to the CIAC for the latter to acquire jurisdiction over the same. Rather, it is plain and clear that as long as the
parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration, regardless of what forum they may choose, their agreement will fall within the
jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even if they specifically choose another forum, the parties will not be precluded from electing to
submit their dispute before the CIAC because this right has been vested upon each party by law, i.e., E.O. No. 1008. 31

Moreover, it is undeniable that NIA agreed to submit the dispute for arbitration to the CIAC. NIA through its counsel actively
participated in the arbitration proceedings by filing an answer with counterclaim, as well as its compliance wherein it nominated
arbitrators to the proposed panel, participating in the deliberations on, and the formulation of, the Terms of Reference of the
arbitration proceeding, and examining the documents submitted by HYDRO after NIA asked for the originals of the said
documents. 32

As to the defenses of laches and prescription, they are evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in
the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits
wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. 33 Under the rule 34 the
deferment of the resolution of the said issues was, thus, in order. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to
dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. 35 In the instant case, the issue of
prescription and laches cannot be resolved on the basis solely of the complaint. It must, however, be pointed that under the new
rules, 36deferment of the resolution is no longer permitted. The court may either grant the motion to dismiss, deny it, or order the
amendment of the pleading.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the disposition of C.A. G.R. No. 44527 and include in the resolution thereof the issue of laches and
prescription.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163928 January 21, 2015

MANUEL JUSAYAN, ALFREDO JUSAYAN, AND MICHAEL JUSAYAN Petitioners,

vs.
JORGE SOMBILLA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Court resolves whether a lease of agricultural land between the respondent and the predecessor of the petitioners was a civil
law lease or an agricultural lease. The resolution is determinative of whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had original
exclusive jurisdiction over the action commenced by the predecessor of the petitioners against the respondent. The Case

Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on October 20, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
judgment in favor of the petitioners rendered on April 13, 1999 in CAR Case No. 17117 entitled Timoteo Jusayan, Manuel Jusayan,
Alfredo Jusayan and Michael Jusayan v. Jorge Sombillaby the RTC, Branch 30, in Iloilo City. 2

Antecedents

Wilson Jesena (Wilson) owned four parcels of land situated in New Lucena, Iloilo. On June 20, 1970, Wilson entered into an
agreement with respondent Jorge Sombilla (Jorge),3 wherein Wilson designated Jorge as his agent to supervise the tilling and
farming of his riceland in crop year 1970-1971. On August 20, 1971, before the expiration of the agreement, Wilson sold the four
parcels of land to Timoteo Jusayan (Timoteo).4 Jorge and Timoteo verbally agreed that Jorge would retain possession of the parcels
of land and would deliver 110 cavans of palay annually to Timoteo without need for accounting of the cultivation expenses provided
that Jorge would pay the irrigation fees. From 1971 to 1983, Timoteo and Jorge followed the arrangement. In 1975, the parcels of
land were transferred in the names of Timoteo’s sons, namely; Manuel, Alfredo and Michael (petitioners). In 1984, Timoteo sent
several letters to Jorge terminating his administration and demanding the return of the possession of the parcels of land. 5

Due to the failure of Jorge to render accounting and to return the possession of the parcels of land despite demands, Timoteo filed
on June 30, 1986 a complaint for recovery of possession and accounting against Jorge in the RTC (CAR Case No. 17117).
Following Timoteo’s death on October 4, 1991, the petitioners substituted him as the plaintiffs.

In his answer,6 Jorge asserted that he enjoyed security of tenure as the agricultural lessee of Timoteo; and that he could not be
dispossessed of his landholding without valid cause.

Ruling of the RTC

In its decision rendered on April 13, 1999,7 the RTC upheld the contractual relationship of agency between Timoteo and Jorge; and
ordered Jorge to deliver the possession of the parcels of land to the petitioners.
 Judgment of the CA

Jorge appealed to the CA.

In the judgment promulgated on October 20, 2003,8 the CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the case, declaring that the contractual
relationship between the parties was one of agricultural tenancy; and that the demand of Timoteo for the delivery of his share in the
harvest and the payment of irrigation fees constituted an agrarian dispute that was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC, and well
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DAR) pursuant to Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).

Issues

The petitioners now appeal upon the following issues, namely:

a.) Whether or not the relationship between the petitioners and respondent is that of agency or agricultural leasehold; and

b.) Whether or not RTC, Branch 30, Iloilo City as Regional Trial Court and Court of Agrarian Relations, had jurisdiction
over the herein case.9

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review lacks merit.

To properly resolve whether or not the relationship between Timoteo and Jorge was that of an agency or a tenancy, an analysis of
the concepts of agency and tenancy is in order.

In agency, the agent binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of the principal, with the
consent or authority of the latter.10 The basis of the civil law relationship of agency is representation, 11 the elements of which are,
namely: (a) the relationship is established by the parties’ consent, express or implied; (b) the object is the execution of a juridical act
in relation to a third person; (c) the agent acts as representative and not for himself; and (d) the agent acts within the scope of his
authority.12 Whether or not an agency has been created is determined by the fact that one is representing and acting for
another.13 The law does not presume agency; hence, proving its existence, nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging
it.14

The claim of Timoteo that Jorge was his agent contradicted the verbal agreement he had fashioned with Jorge. By assenting to
Jorge’s possession of the land sans accounting of the cultivation expenses and actual produce of the land provided that Jorge
annually delivered to him 110 cavans of palay and paid the irrigation fees belied the very nature of agency, which was
representation. The verbal agreement between Timoteo and Jorge left all matters of agricultural production to the sole discretion of
Jorge and practically divested Timoteo of the right to exercise his authority over the acts to be performed by Jorge. While
inpossession of the land, therefore, Jorge was acting for himself instead offor Timoteo. Unlike Jorge, Timoteo did not benefit
whenever the production increased, and did not suffer whenever the production decreased. Timoteo’s interest was limited to the
delivery of the 110 cavans of palay annually without any concern about how the cultivation could be improved in order to yield more
produce.

On the other hand, to prove the tenancy relationship, Jorge presented handwritten receipts 15 indicating that the sacks of palay
delivered to and received by one Corazon Jusayan represented payment of rental. In this regard, rental was the legal term for the
consideration of the lease.16 Consequently, the receipts substantially proved that the contractual relationship between Jorge and
Timoteo was a lease.

Yet, the lease of an agricultural land can be either a civil law or an agricultural lease.1âwphi1 In the civil law lease, one of the parties
binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use ofa thing for a price certain, and for a period that may be definite or
indefinite.17 In the agricultural lease, also termed as a lease hold tenancy, the physical possession of the land devoted to agriculture
is given by its owner or legal possessor (landholder) to another (tenant) for the purpose of production through labor of the latter and
of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the latter agrees to share the harvest with the
landholder, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both. 18 Specifically, in Gabriel v.
Pangilinan,19 this Court differentiated between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease in the following manner, namely: (1) the
subject matter of a leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land, but that of a civil law lease may be rural or urban property; (2) as
to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to and cultivate the agricultural land; the civil
law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased; (3) as to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted
to agriculture; in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits; and(4) as to the law that governs, the civil law
lease is governed by the Civil Code, but the leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.

The sharing of the harvest in proportion to the respective contributions of the landholder and tenant, otherwise called share
tenancy,20 was abolished on August 8, 1963 under Republic Act No. 3844. To date, the only permissible system of agricultural
tenancy is leasehold tenancy,21 a relationship wherein a fixed consideration is paid instead of proportionately sharing the harvest as
in share tenancy.

In Teodoro v. Macaraeg,22 this Court has synthesized the elements of agricultural tenancy to wit: (1) the object of the contract or the
relationship is an agricultural land that is leased or rented for the purpose of agricultural production; (2) the size of the landholding is
such that it is susceptible of personal cultivation by a single person with the assistance of the members of his immediate farm
household; (3) the tenant-lessee must actually and personally till, cultivate or operate the land, solely or with the aid of labor from his
immediate farm household; and (4) the landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or the legal possessor of the land, leases the
same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce.

It can be gleaned that in both civil law lease of an agricultural land and agricultural lease, the lessor gives to the lessee the use and
possession of the land for a price certain. Although the purpose of the civil law lease and the agricultural lease may be agricultural
cultivation and production, the distinctive attribute that sets a civil law lease apart from an agricultural lease is the personal
cultivation by the lessee. An agricultural lessee cultivates by himself and with the aid of those of his immediate farm household.
Conversely, even when the lessee is in possession of the leased agricultural land and paying a consideration for it but is not
personally cultivating the land, he or she is a civil law lessee.

The only issue remaining to be resolved is whether or not Jorge personally cultivated the leased agricultural land.
Cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, but includes the various phases of farm labor such as the
maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the landholding. Moreover, it covers attending to the care
of the growing plants,23 and grown plants like fruit trees that require watering, fertilizing, uprooting weeds, turning the soil, fumigating
to eliminate plant pests24 and all other activities designed to promote the growth and care of the plants or trees and husbanding the
earth, by general industry, so that it may bring forth more products or fruits. 25 In Tarona v. Court of Appeals,26 this Court ruled that a
tenant is not required to be physically present in the land at all hours of the day and night provided that he lives close enough to the
land to be cultivated to make it physically possible for him to cultivate it with some degree of constancy.

Nor was there any question that the parcels of agricultural land with a total area of 7.9 hectares involved herein were susceptible of
cultivation by a single person with the help of the members of his immediate farm household. As the Court has already observed, an
agricultural land of an area of four hectares,27 or even of an area as large as 17 hectares,28 could be personally cultivated by a
tenant by himself or with help of the members of his farm household.

It is elementary that he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof.29 Hence, Jorge, as the one claiming to be
an agricultural tenant, had to prove all the requisites of his agricultural tenancy by substantial evidence.30 In that regard, his
knowledge of and familiarity with the landholding, its production and the instances when the landholding was struck by drought
definitely established that he personally cultivated the land.31 His ability to farm the seven hectares of land despite his regular
employment as an Agricultural Technician at the Municipal Agriculture Office 32 was not physically impossible for him to accomplish
considering that his daughter, a member of his immediate farm household, was cultivating one of the parcels of the land. 33 Indeed,
the law did not prohibit him as the agricultural lessee who generally worked the land himself or with the aid of member of his
immediate household from availing himself occasionally or temporarily of the help of others in specific jobs. 34 In short, the claim of
the petitioners that the employment of Jorge as an Agricultural Technician at the Municipal Agriculture Office disqualified him as a
tenant lacked factual or legal basis.

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that once there is an agricultural tenancy, the agricultural tenant’s right to security of
tenure is recognized and protected. The landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the
proper court for causes provided by law. Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, enumerates
the several grounds for the valid dispossession of the tenant.35 It is underscored, however, that none of such grounds for valid
dispossession of landholding was attendant in Jorge’s case.

Although the CA has correctly categorized Jorge’s case as an agrarian dispute, it ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the
case based on Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, which vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the "primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters" and the "exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform" except disputes falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

We hold that the CA gravely erred. The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of an action.36 In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act), the
Courts of Agrarian Relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the Courts of Agrarian Relations
was vested in the Regional Trial Courts.37 It was only on August 29, 1987, when Executive Order No. 229 took effect, that the
general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to try agrarian reform matters was transferred to the DAR. Therefore, the RTC still
had jurisdiction over the dispute at the time the complaint was filed in the RTC on June 30, 1986.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari by PARTIALLY AFFIRMING the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the extent that it upheld the tenancy relationship of the parties; DISMISSES the complaint for recovery of possession and
accounting; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

The parties are ordered to comply with their undertakings as agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 87-93, penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (retired), with the concurrence of Associate Justice
Roberto A. Barrios (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale (retired/deceased).

2
Id. at 49-55.
3
Rollo, pp. 31-32.

4
RTC records, pp 186-188.

5
Id. at 192 (Exhibit G, the letter dated October 17, 1984); at 195 (Exhibit H, the letter dated August 7, 1985); and at 197
(Exhibit I, the letter dated September 10, 1985).

6
Id. at 67-70.

7
Id. at 407-413.

8
Supra note 1.

9
Rollo, p. 11.

10
Article 1868, Civil Code.

11
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 117356, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 663, 675; Bordador v. Luz,
G.R. No. 130148, December 15, 1997, 283 SCRA 374, 382.

12
Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, G. R. No. 167552, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 584, 593; Yu Eng Cho v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. 123560, March 27, 2000, 328 SCRA 717, 728.

13
Yun Kwan Byung v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp.,G. R. No. 163553, December 11, 2009, 608 SCRA 107,
129; Angeles v. Philippine National Railways, (PNR), G.R. No. 150128, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 444, 452 .

14
Tuason v. Heirs of Bartolome Ramos, G. R. No. 156262, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 408, 415.

15
RTC records, p 356 and its dorsal portion (Exhibits 1-A-1 and 1-A-1); at .387 (Exhibit 32); at 388 (Exhibit 34); at. 389
(Exhibit 35).

16
Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, 1988, p. 814.

17
Article 1643, Civil Code.

18
Section 3, Republic Act No. 1199.

19
No. L-27797, August 26, 1974, 58 SCRA 590, 596.

20
Section 4, par. 2, Republic Act No. 1199.

21
Section 4, par. 3, Republic Act No. 1199.

22
No. L-20700, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 7, 15.

23
De Los Reyes v. Espineli, No. L-28280-81, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 574, 587.

24
Marcelo v. De Leon, 105 Phil. 1175, 1178 (1959).

25
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, No. L-44570, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 136, 145.

26
G.R. No. 170182, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 474.

27
Teodoro v. Macaraeg, supra note 22.

28
Agustin v. De Guzman, No. L-11920, July 31, 1958, 104 SCRA 250.

29
Adriano v. Tanco, G.R. No. 168164, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 218, 230.

30
NICORP Management and Development Corporation v. De Leon, G.R. Nos. 176942 & 177125, August 28, 2008, 563
SCRA 606, 612.

31
TSN dated March 22, 1993, pp. 17-20.

32
TSN dated July 24, 1997, p. 9.

33
RTC record, p. 47.

34
Cuaño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107159, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 122, 135-136.

35
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except
when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
 (1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the
gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or
any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section
twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the nonpayment of
the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event,
the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section
twenty-seven.

36
People v. Mariano, No. L-40527, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 600, 607.

37
Romero v. Court of Appeals,No. L-59606, January 8, 1987, 147 SCRA 183, 190.