1. Republic v. CA, GR 100995, Sept.
14, 1994
2. Director of Lands v. CA, GR 102858, July 28, 1997
3. Republic v. Marasigan, GR 85515, June 6, 1961
4. Director of Lands v. Agustin, GR 16179, Oct. 6, 1921
5. Gomez v. CA, GR 77770, Dec. 15, 1988
6. Tirona v. Nañawa, GR L-22107, Sept. 30, 1967
7. Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, GR 168913, Mar. 14, 2007
8. Laburada v. LRA, GR 101387, Mar. 11, 1998
9. Baldoz v. Papa, GR L-18150, July 30, 1965
10. Libudan v. Gil, GR L-21163, May 17, 1972
11. Rublico v. Orellana, GR L-26582, Nov. 28. 1969
12. Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, GR L-26083, May 31, 1977
13. Lu v. Manipon, GR 147072, May 7, 2002
14. Lim v. Chuatoco, GR 161861, Mar. 11, 2005
15. Javier v. CA, GR 101177, Mar. 28, 1994
16. Ferrer v. Bautista, GR 46963, Mar. 14, 1994
17. Valientes v. Ramas, GR 157852, Dec. 15, 2010
18. Rodriguez v. Torreno, GR L-29596, Oct. 14, 1977
19. Delos Reyes v. CA, GR 121468, Jan. 27, 1998
20. Heirs of Roxas v. Garcia, GR 146208, Aug. 12, 2004
__________________________
Republic v. CA, GR 100995, Sept. 14, 1994
FACTS: On August 1988, private respondent Dolor filed an application before the RTC of Daet,
Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and registration of her title to a residential lot located at
Daet, Camarines Norte.
On November 25 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his
appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Dolor moved that an
order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which had filed an
opposition.
At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolor’s counsel marked as Exhibits “A” to “D,”
respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in the Official Gazette (October 17, 1988 issue), the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor
of the “Weekly Informer,” and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court
confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as her exclusive property.
ISSUE: Petitioner assailed the trial court’s decision before the CA on a purely jurisdictional ground.
Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to show proof that on or before the
date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the requirements
specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, , to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order…
By publication. — Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in
the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the court. …
The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were
complied with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20 December 1988 before
its Branch Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, ,
rationalizing thus —
We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of PD No. 1529 have been complied with in the instant
case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial Hearing set on November 25, 1988, issued by
the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration had been published
in the September 10, 1988 issue of the “Weekly Informer and in Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official
Gazette issue of October 17, 1988 …
The appellant (Republic) claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that “the
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with” on November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional
requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court.
Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there
was no notice to interested persons adjoining owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the court on November 25, 1988.
Petitioner concludes that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent CA
which affirmed the decision of the RTC is VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the application of
private respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title over the property described
therein is DENIED.
By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial court
which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID and it
was error for respondent CA to have sustained the same.
The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits, but by the
fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529 had been complied with as shown by those
documents proving compliance therewith. The trial court is not precluded from taking cognizance
of its own record. But, the rule is not without exception. As borne out by the records, at the
scheduled date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the actual hearing on 20
December 1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with.
Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of
the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was however released for
publication only on 31 January 1989
In petitioner’s brief filed before respondent CA, we note that the issue of late publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no apparent reason,
the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court could have easily
resolved the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by competent evidence but
also by ample jurisprudence
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the trial
court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, the
provision of the law in point should be inquired into. Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides
that before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice
of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting. In Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals, citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the authority of
the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. So that where
there is a defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction. And when
the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole
case and all its aspects.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial
hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the
property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application Gomez v. CA, GR 77770, Dec. 15, 1988
should not be granted.

Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in
the Official Gazette but for reasons already obvious, the publication should precede the date of
initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17 October
1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication only on 31
January 1989 when the initial hearing was already a fait accompli. The point of reference in
establishing lack of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was only on that
date when the notice was made known to the people in general. Verily, the late publication of the
notice defeated the purpose for its existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro forma notice.

Director of Lands v. CA, GR 102858, July 28, 1997 (duplicate)

Republic v. Marasigan, GR 85515, June 6, 1961 (duplicate)

Director of Lands v. Agustin, GR 16179, Oct. 6, 1921

Tirona v. Nañawa, GR L-22107, Sept. 30, 1967

FACTS: Respondent Mariano Raymundo applied, on December 22, 1959, for the registration of a
parcel of land with an area of about 133.6628 hectares, situated in the barrio of Anilao, Municipality
of Pangil, Province of Laguna, described as Lot 487 of the Mabitac-Cadastre (Plan Psu-28907),
docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-80 (L.R.C. Record No. N-18254) of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna. In his application said respondent (applicant) invoked the provisions of the
Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended), or in case said Act was not applicable then the
provisions of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
The application was opposed by herein petitioners, Constantino Tirona, who claimed private
ownership of the land, subject of the application for registration, for having purchased the same
from the government; and by the Director of Lands who claimed that the land is a public land.

The case was initially heard on April 18, 1960, and was set for hearing more than twenty-five times
— most of the postponements having been at the instance of the applicant. At least eight actual
hearings were held, during which hearings, testimony of the applicant was received, numerous
documents were presented, identified, examined and marked as exhibits. The applicant was
almost through with the presentation of evidence in support of his application. At the continuation
of the hearing on September 9, 1963, respondent Mariano Raymundo presented a petition,
praying the court that the hearing of the case be held in abeyance or that the case be archived in
the meantime "pending clarification of the Land Reform Code and/or move on the part of the
government authorities concerned towards the acquisition of this land under the Land Reform
Code. . . ."1 This petition was opposed by the oppositors mainly upon the ground that the Land
Reform Code did not in any way affect land registration proceedings pending in courts. On
September 28, 1963, without any of the parties having asked for dismissal, the respondent Judge
Arsenio Nañawa dismissed the case "without prejudice." Oppositor Tirona (now petitioner) moved
for reconsideration praying that the order of dismissal dated September 28, 1963 be set aside,
that the case be again set for hearing, and that oppositors be allowed to present their respective
evidence. Oppositor Director of Lands (now the other petitioner) adopted and made his own
oppositor Tirona's motion for reconsideration. The respondent Judge denied the motion for
reconsideration on October 26, 1963.
Alleging that the dismissal of the registration case constituted grave abuse of discretion and the
refusal to reconsider the order of dismissal and to reinstate the case was neglect in the
performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, on the part of respondent Judge, the instant
petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed jointly by the oppositors Constantino Tirona and the
Director of Lands, praying that respondent Judge be ordered to reinstate the case and to proceed
with the hearing on the merits until its termination.
In his answer, respondent Raymundo claims that even if he really wanted the case to be archived
only, yet after considering the implications of the continuance of the proceedings, he believed that
the dismissal was proper for the following reasons: (1) The land in question, being more than 100
hectares, the government in implementing the Agricultural Land Reform Code would certainly
intervene and acquire the land; (2) petitioner Constantino Tirona, being merely an oppositor in the
registration case, had no right to ask for the continuance of the case after the applicant himself
had agreed to the dismissal without prejudice. Respondent Raymundo claimed, furthermore, that
the instant petition for certiorari should be dismissed, there having been no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge, and there are another adequate remedies available to
herein petitioners — among them, an appeal or the filing of an application for registration on his
own name.
RULING: We hold the view, however, that respondent Judge erred when he ordered the dismissal
of the registration case over the objection of the oppositors; and when he refused to reconsider
the order of dismissal and reinstate the case he had neglected to perform an act which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, and had thereby deprived the oppositors of a right to
which they are entitled. The law governing the dismissal of a land registration case is Section 37
of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3621, which in part provides as follows:
Sec. 37. If in any case without adverse claim the court finds that the applicant has no proper title
for registration, a decree shall be entered dismissing the application and such a decree may be
ordered to be without prejudice. The applicant may withdraw his application at any time before
final decree, upon terms to be fixed by the Court: Provided, however, That in a case where there
is an adverse claim, the court shall determine the conflicting interests of the applicant and the
adverse claimant, and after taking evidence shall dismiss the application if neither of them
succeeds in showing that he has proper title for registration, or shall enter a decree awarding the
land applied for, or any part thereof, to the person entitled thereto, and such decree, when final
shall entitle to the issuance of an original certificate of title to such person; . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Pursuant to the above-quoted provision a dismissal without prejudice, such as the one issued by
the respondent, Judge, is conditioned upon the absence of an adverse claimant. In the present
case, there was an adverse claimant; it was, therefore, incumbent and mandatory upon the court
to determine the conflicting interests of the adverse claimants and the applicant. The adverse
claimants must be given an opportunity to prove then claim, and in the event oppositor Tirona
proved that he had the proper title for registration, the court must order the land registered in his
name. This the lower court (respondent Judge) failed and refused to do; but instead it dismissed
the case over the objection of the oppositors, and even though the applicant himself did not ask
for the dismissal. Such dismissal is not in accordance with law and the jurisprudence on the matter.
In the case of Ng Sam Bok vs. Director of Lands, G. R. No. L-11988, Dec. 22, 1958, Ng Sam Bok
applied fair the registration of certain lots. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands.
After the parties had presented their respective evidences, and while the case was pending
decision, the applicant filed a motion for dismissal without prejudice, which the court granted over
the opposition of the provincial fiscal who was representing the Director of Lands. On appeal, this
Court, after Section 37 of Act No. 496, said:
As the Director of Lands has registered herein an adverse claim, the lower court was bound to
determine the conflicting interests of said claimant and the applicant-appellee and accordingly
reversed the order of dismissal appealed from.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of respondent Judge of September 28,
1963 dismissing Land Registration Case No. N-80 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna is set
aside; and respondent Judge Arsenio Nañawa, or whoever is the presiding judge of the branch of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna to where Land Registration Case No. N-80 is assigned, is
ordered to reinstate said registration case and to proceed in hearing and deciding the same. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, GR 168913, Mar. 14, 2007
FACTS: On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application was docketed as
LRC No. 1437-N.[1]
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L.
Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who
were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioners application by Branch 21 of the
Cebu RTC, filed their Answer[2] calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No.
N-983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred
the filing of petitioners application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of
respondents, dismissed petitioners application on the ground of res judicata. [3]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether the
decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and executory
on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA);[4] it was only on July 26, 2003 that the extinct decision belatedly surfaced as basis of
respondents motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;[5] and as no action for revival of the said decision
was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, the cause of action in
the dormant judgment pass[d] into extinction.[6]
Petitioner thus concludes that an extinct judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application for land registration should be barred for being res judicata
Held:
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without
opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case
may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a
judgment of confirmation and registration. The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land
registration court‘s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza‘s
application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world
including Ting.
Ting insists that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree
must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they
have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the
preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in
this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of
the court. They are specifically called upon to “extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings.”

As for Ting‘s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading: SEC. 6. Execution
by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed
on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before
it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the December 10, 1976 decision
became “extinct” in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to
execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6,
Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
Baldoz v. Papa, GR L-18150, July 30, 1965
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act
On January 7, 1957, the spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina Agaceta, parents of herein appellees,
to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
applied for the registration under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area of
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
37,671 sq. meters in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No. 2215, L.R.C. Record
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
No. 12389). After the requisite publication of the application in the Official Gazette, the case was
sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
called for hearing on May 16, 1957 in the course of which an order of general default was entered.
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the
On the same date, however, Baldomero Baldoz, father of herein appellant, filed a petition to lift
adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
the order of default as against him and praying that his opposition to the application, thereto
him therefrom.
attached, be admitted. On the same date, the court granted the petition, and the case was reset
for hearing on October 1, 1958. Prior to this date, however, oppositor Baldoz died. His son, herein
Laburada v. LRA, GR 101387, Mar. 11, 1998
appellant Superior Baldoz, appears not to have informed the court about his father's death. As a
result, the notice of the hearing scheduled for October 1, 1958 was addressed to the latter and
was returned unserved.

On September 11, 1958, appellees were allowed to substitute the original applicants from whom
they appeared to have purchased the land in question.

At the scheduled hearing on October 1, 1958, appellees and their counsel were present but there
was no appearance for any oppositor. Upon motion of the former, the court allowed them to
present evidence in support of their application while, at the same time, declaring the original
oppositor, Baldomero Baldoz in default for non-appearance. On October 10, 1958, the latter's
counsel filed a motion to set aside the order of default alleging that the reason for the non-
appearance of oppositor Baldoz was his death on July 28, 1957 and praying that his son, appellant
herein, be substituted as party-oppositor. Although this motion was denied on October 31 of the
following year, appellant appears not to have appealed from the order of denial aforesaid.

On February 16, 1959, the court rendered judgment decreeing the registration of the parcel of
land described in Psu 59688 in favor of appellees. After this judgment had become executory, the
court issued an order for the issuance of the decree on May 4, 1959. By virtue thereof, the Land
Registration Commission issued on June 16, 1959 Decree No. N-71779, and pursuant thereto the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan subsequently issued Original Certificate of Title No. 15264 in
their names.

On June 17, 1959, appellees filed a "Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition" and a "Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession", to which appellant filed an "Opposition to the Petition for
Demolition of Fences, and Counter Petition to Stay the Effects of Judgment". The opposition was
denied in an order of February 9, 1960. Three weeks later, appellant commenced the present
action in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-1036) against appellees for
the annulment of the decision in Registration Case No. 2215 on the grounds (1) that the Court in
said case committed a reversible error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his having
filed a written opposition which was duly admitted by it and (2) that its order denying appellant's
motion for substitution as oppositor therein has deprived him of his day in court.
Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: that appellant had no legal
capacity to sue; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred
by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations.
On September 30, 1960, the court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the grounds (1)
that the final judgment in Registration Case No. 2215 is res judicata in the present action and (2)
that the instant action, being in the nature of a petition for review of a decree, cannot prosper
because it was filed more than one year from the date of the issuance of the decree and because
it is not based on fraud as provided for in Section 38 of Act 496. The present case is an appeal
from said order.
Appellant contends that when the lower court rendered its judgment it had already lost its
jurisdiction over the person of Baldomero Baldoz who died on July 28, 1958 a fact known to said
court since October 10, 1958 when the heirs of said deceased filed their motion for leave to take
his place as oppositor.
RULING: We find this to be without merit.
As stated heretofore, the motion aforesaid filed by appellant and his co-heirs was denied by the
lower court. The order of denial was obviously final and conclusive upon the matter of their right
to substitute the deceased. On the other hand, it seems clear that by filing said motion and asking
for an affirmative relief, appellant and his co-heirs had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
This notwithstanding, they failed to appeal from the order of denial, with the result that the same
as well as the registration proceedings must now be deemed final and conclusive against them.
In the remaining assignment of errors, appellant assails the ruling of the trial court to the effect
that the judgment rendered in the registration proceedings is res judicata. This We also find to be
without merit.
It is settled that registration proceedings are in rem binding upon the whole world and that a final
decree of registration issued therein in accordance with law is reviewable only within one year and
upon the ground of fraud. The allegations of the complaint filed below do not make out any case
of fraud justifying the reopening of such decree. This on the one hand. On the other, any petition
to set aside the decree and reopen the registration proceedings must be filed within one year from
the issuance thereof, not in the form of a separate action but in the form of a motion filed in the
same registration proceeding where the decree was issued.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Libudan v. Gil, GR L-21163, May 17, 1972
FACTS: The factual setting stretches some 35 years back. On June 18, 1937, the late Pascual
Libudan filed a petition for the registration of a 188,725-square-meter land in Barrio Babac, Island
of Samal, Davao, (described in Plan SWO, submitted as Exhibit A, in Registration Case 281),
asserting title thereto by inheritance from his late father, coupled with continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession since time immemorial under a bona fide claim of ownership.5 Jose Palma
Gil claiming that he purchased the entire land from one Mangob (Samal), opposed the petition.6
But later, or on August 3, 1939, the oppositor amended his opposition by reducing his claim to
only 15 hectares, delimited within points 1 to 4, 7 to 17 and 1 of the plan.7
Three months after he filed his amended opposition in the registration case, Jose Palma Gil sought
in Civil Case No. 204 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Samal, the ejectment of Libudan
from the 15-hectare area claimed by the former in the registration case. Judgment was rendered
by the Justice of the Peace Court on December 18, 1939 ordering Libudan (and his agents) to
vacate the premises, restore the possession to Jose Palma Gil and pay him P320 for the value of
the products taken thereform plus P100 as damages for the illegal occupation.8
Nine months thereafter, or on September 7, 1940, the Davao Land Registration Court rendered
judgment confirming the title of Jose Palma Gil over the 15-hectare portion of the land, and
awarding the remainder thereof or the 31,040-square-meter portion to Libudan.9
Libudan appealed to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Sheriff of Davao, to satisfy the alias writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 204 (the judgment having already become final) levied upon the 31,040-
square-meter portion previously adjudicated to Libudan by the Registration Court, and on
December 27, 1940, sold it at public auction to Jose Palma Gil.10 Failure of Libudan to redeem
the property within the one year statutory period resulted in the execution of the final deed of sale,
followed by the delivery of the possession of the property to Jose Palma Gil. The deed of
consolidation was registered in the Davao Registry of Deeds under entry No. 1297 on January 3,
1944.11
Meanwhile during the Second World War, the records of the land registration case pending with
the Court of Appeals were destroyed, and, as said Court failed to reconstitute them, the case was
remanded to the lower court for new trial on October 21, 1951.12
It is not clear from the records when the new trial in the registration case began. But in the interim,
on February 21, 1950, the Administratrix of the estate of Jose Palma Gil commenced, before the
Davao Court of First Instance against Palinkud Samal (widow and successor-in-interest of the
deceased Pascual Libudan), and four others, an action for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of the parcel of land located in Babac, Samal, Davao, with an area of 31,040 square
meters, which land was previously conveyed by the Davao Sheriff to Jose Palma Gil. It was therein
alleged that after the death of Palma Gil in December, 1944, the defendants, taking advantage of
the chaotic conditions obtaining, illegally entered the land in question. This case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 458.
The Davao Court of First Instance dismissed the case on the procedural technicality: that the
action should have been instituted against the judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased
Libudan. But on appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed, after finding that "... the land ordered
registered and title issued in the name of the late Pascual Libudan in Registration Case No. 281,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 51986 ... is the same as that described in the complaint as well as in the
certificate of sale issued in Civil Case No. 204."13
Not satisfied with this decision, Palinkud Samal appealed to Us, but we sustained the Court of
Appeals.
RULING: We affirm the appealed order.
We resort to the law. The pertinent portion of Section 38 of Act 496, reads:
Sec. 38. ... Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability
of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decree; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any state or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest. ..."
The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree, therefore, are: (1)
that the petitioner has real or dominical right;20 (2) that he has been deprived thereof; (3) through
fraud;21 (4) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree;22 and (5)
that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
Rublico v. Orellana, GR L-26582, Nov. 28. 1969
FACTS: On 13 July 1957, the herein respondent-appellee, Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in
Cadastral Case No. IL-N-2, L. R. C. Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with the Court
of First Instance of Lanao, claiming ownership thereof and praying that the said lots be adjudged
and decreed in his favor. The herein petitioners-appellants, Timoteo Rublico and Juliana
Madrazo, did not file any answer. After an order of general default was entered, the court
commissioned its clerk of court to receive the evidence of claimants for non-contested lots. Lots
1664 and 1665 were non-contested (Exhibits "G"), so the clerk of court received the evidence for
the sole claimant, herein respondent-appellee Fausto Orellana.
On 20 November 1964, the court a quo approved the report and recommendation of the clerk of
court and rendered judgment adjudicating Lots 1664 and 1665 in favor of respondent-appellee
Orellana.
On 19 July 1965, petitioners-appellants filed with the said cadastral court a petition to annul the
judgment and/or review the decree of registration, alleging ownership of the lots adjudicated to
the respondent; that respondent, "by means of fraud, made the court to believe that he is the
owner" and that said judgment "was secured . . . . . . . . by means of fraud" (Record on Appeal,
pages 3-4).
Respondent Orellana filed a motion to dismiss the petition and the court, on 23 September 1965,
sustained the motion, holding that petitioners-appellants had no personality to file their petition
because they did not file an answer and were declared in default and that they should have first
secured the lifting of the order of general default, with respect to themselves, before they filed their
petition for review.
RULING: The pertinent portion of Section 38 provides, as follows:
". . . . . . . . Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability
of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees: subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registra-tion obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance
a petition for review with-in one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest. . . . . . . . ."
It will be noted that the essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening or
review of a decree are: (a) that the peti-tioner has a real or dominical right; (b) that he has been
deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance
of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser
(Ponce, The Phils. Torrens System, page 208). It will also be noted from the provision that "any
person" may file the petition, provided the other requisites are present; and that the provision does
not require that the petitioner be an original claimant who had filed an answer. And reasonably
so, because fraud might inter-vene precisely to prevent a person from filing an answer. Thus, a
party deprived of an estate in land was accorded relief where the fraud con-sisted in deliberate
failure to notify the party entitled to notice (Salva vs. Salvador, 18 Phil. 193), or in inducing him
not to oppose an application (Reyes vs. City of Manila, 38 Phil. 350), or in misrepresentation to
the true owner by an applicant of the identity of the lot, causing the true owner to withdraw his
opposition (Marquiala, et al. vs. Ybañez, et al., 92 Phil. 911). Under these rulings, it follows that
a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act 496, as amended, need not be an original claimant
in a cadastral proceeding and need not secure the lifting of the order of general default with respect
to himself. The aim of the law in giving aggrieved parties, victimized by registration pro-ceedings
of their estate in land by means of fraud, the opportunity to review the decree would be defeated
if such parties would be limited to those who had filed their opposition to the petition for registration
or to first require them to procure the lifting of the order of general default before they could file a
petition for review.
The foregoing considerations notwithstanding, We are of the opinion that the order of dismissal is
substantially correct, for the reason that the petition for review failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, as also contended by the appellees in their motion to dismiss in the
court below (Record on Appeal, pages 8 - 9). The petition for review merely alleges that
respondent "by means of fraud made this Honorable Court believe that he is the owner of said
lots". This is not a sufficient allegation, for it is a mere conclusion of law, and does not aver facts
showing in what acts the alleged fraud consisted. Certainly, to make the court believe that the
respondent (claimant in the cadastral case) was the owner of the lot concerned is not fraud; at the
most, the court might have committed an error in believing the claimant to be the owner, but that
would not justify a review of the decree of adjudication and registration. Review of the decree
demands a showing of actual (not constructive) fraud (Government vs. Tombis Triño, 50 Phil.
717), i.e., actual malice, and there is nothing in the petition to show it.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, without prejudice to the
subsequent amendment of the petition according to Rule 16, section 3, within 15 days from finality
of this decision. Costs against the appellants.
Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, GR L-26083, May 31, 1977
FACTS: Ruperto Inciong (hereinafter referred to as private respondent) is the registered owner of
a parcel of land located in Barrio Santol, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, with an area of 34,263 square
meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Rt-379 (T-211) of the Register of Deeds of
Batangas. The land was formerly Identified as Lot No. 8151 of the Cadastral Survey in the area
during the cadastral proceedings from 1936 to 1940. Private respondent acquired this land in 1946
by purchase from Matias Amurao. In 1961, after a relocation survey of the land was effected it
was discovered that its southern boundary covering an area of 8,591 square meters was in the
possession of petitioner, Consuelo Malaluan Vda. de Recinto. In due time private respondent filed
an action for recovery of possession of the portion held by the petitioner. In her answer to private
respondent's complaint, petitioner claimed to be the owner of the area in question and as counter-
claim demanded its reconveyance from the private respondent.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment declaring the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the
land in question and ordering private respondent to execute a deed of reconveyance over the
same in favor of petitioner. However, on appeal said judgment was reversed by the Court of
Appeals in a decision the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment rendered by the trial court is hereby ordered reversed, and another
one entered, by ordering defendant-appellee to return that portion of 8,591 square meters of the
land in question to plaintiff-appellant; to pay damages in the sum of P100.00 a month from the
time of the filing of the action until the property is returned; to pay further the sum of P1,000.00 for
attorney's fees; and for defendant to pay the costs in both instances.
A motion to reconsider said decision proved unavailing. Hence, this petition for review.
RULING: Obviously then, the inclusion of said area in the title of Lot No. 8151 is void and of no
effect for a land registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have put no
claim in it and who have never asserted any right of ownership over it. 1 the Land Registration Act
as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit
its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself
at the expense of another. Resort to the provisions of said Acts do not give one a better title than
he really and lawfully has. 2 In the case at bar, private respondent could not have acquired an
area more than what was actually conveyed to him by Matias Amurao which extended only as far
as the dividing fence on the south thereof (Exhibit I). The mere possession of a certificate of title
under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property
described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land
illegally included. 3 It is evident from the records that the petitioner owns the portion in question
and therefore the area should be conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date
of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance
or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 4
This was what petitioner did. But was private respondent an innocent purchaser for value? We
can hardly consider private respondent one because at the time he purchased the land covered
by the certificate of title now in his hands he was aware that the disputed portion was not included
in the area conveyed to him by Matias Amurao. This is clearly evident when he acknowledged as
the true boundary the one (Exhibit I) pointed to him by Matias Amurao. between his land and the
disputed portion by not raising any question about it and not disturbing the possession of the
petitioner over the area in dispute for almost 15 years.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person
in the property.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed and set aside and another one entered, ordering private respondent to return to petitioner
the disputed portion of the land in question covering an area of 8,591 square meters.
Lu v. Manipon, GR 147072, May 7, 2002
“The registration of a sale of real estate will not protect a buyer in bad faith, for the law cannot be
used as a shield for fraud. On the other hand, the preferential right of a first registrant in a double
sale is always qualified by good faith.”
Facts
 May 9, 1981 - Juan Peralta executed a Deed of Sale by installment in favor of spouses
Orlando and Rosita Manipon . The deed covered 350 square meters of the 2,078
square-meter lot located at Barrio Dilan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The said Deed was not
registered with the Registry of Deeds.
 June 10, 1981 - Juan Peralta mortgaged the aforesaid lot to Thrift Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (TSLAI). Since he failed to pay the loan, the mortgage was judicially
foreclosed and sold to TSLAI for P62,789.18 which was the highest bidder.
 July 15, 1988 – TSLAI sold the lot in the amount of P80,000.00 to Francisco
Lu. Thereafter, he caused the subdivision of the said lot into five (5) lots, one of which
includes the portion earlier sold by installment to the Manipons. In the interim, or on July
30, 1983, Juan Peralta executed another Deed of Sale covering a 339 sq m lot in favor
of the Manipons after the couple paid a total amount of P8,000.00. The aforesaid Deed
was however also not registered.
 February 26, 1990 - Lu filed the present action alleging therein that he is the owner of
the lot in question including that which was being occupied by the respondents.
 In the Answer filed by respondents, they claim that Lu is a buyer in bad faith because
even before he bought the 2,078 square-meter lot, he knew for a fact that they already
bought a portion of it from the original owner of the said lot and have been residing
therein since 1981.
 RTC ruled in favor of the Manipons. The trial court ruled that Lu was not a buyer in good
faith despite the fact that he was able to register his ownership of the disputed lot. He
admitted knowing that respondents had constructed a house on the disputed lot.
 CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue Who between petitioner and respondents have a better right of ownership over the lot in
question?
Ruling: The Manipons have a better right.
Lu claims to have a better right to the disputed portion of the real property. First, although
respondents had bought it first, he was the first to register his purchase of the mother lot. Second,
respondents’ ownership follows that of their vendor who mortgaged to the bank his title to the
mother lot and failed to redeem it. But the Supreme Court was not convinced.
Registration is not the equivalent of title. Under the Torrens system, registration only gives validity
to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. It was not established as a means of acquiring title
to private land because it merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. . Moreover, the RTC
and the CA have correctly ruled that the preferential right of the first registrant of a real property
in a case of double sale is always qualified by good faith under Article 1544 of the Civil Code. A
holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law
cannot be used as a shield for fraud.
When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a party cannot base his preference of
title thereon, because the law will not protect anything done in bad faith. Bad faith renders the
registration futile.
Equally important, under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No.
1529), every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good
faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted on the certificate and
enumerated therein. Petitioner is evidently not a subsequent purchaser in good faith. Therefore,
between the parties, respondents have a better right to the property based on the concurring
factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts.
Lim v. Chuatoco, GR 161861, Mar. 11, 2005
FACTS: Spouses Jose Chuatoco and Leoncia Yap were the registered owners of a land with
improvements located Binondo, Manila. On the property, the spouses established a hospital and
a school, reserving the building’s second floor as the family residence.
In 1972, Jose died. His wife Leoncia and five (herein respondents) proceeded to execute a deed
of adjudication and partition. On 1981, a TCT in the name of the spouses was replaced by a TCT
in the names of Leoncia and their children. Soon thereafter, Leoncia died. Jorge then took over
as sole administrator of the school until 1984 when he was joined in this task by Rafael’s wife,
Teresita.
Respondents alleged that their brother Rafael had in the meantime succeeded in obtaining title to
the property in his own name by using a fictitious deed of sale dated 27 February 1979, purportedly
executed by them and their deceased mother Leoncia in favor of Rafael. It would later be claimed
by respondents that their signatures, as they appeared on the deed of sale, were forged. In 1982,
the TCT was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of Rafael.
In 1986, respondent Jorge allegedly discovered that the title to the property had been transferred
to Rafael’s name.
In 1986, Rafael through his wife filed a petition for reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate of the
TCT alleging therein that their owner’s duplicate of the title had been lost. After obtaining the
reconstituted title, Rafael, acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Teresita, executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale to petitioners Lim covering the disputed property The Lims subsequently caused
the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Rafael and a TCT was issued in their names.
In 1991, after the Lims refused to heed the demands of respondents for the reconveyance of the
property, a complaint was filed with the RTC Manila. Respondents prayed for the declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale purportedly executed by them in favor of Rafael, as well as the deed of
sale executed by Rafael in favor of the Lims; the cancellation of the TCT in the name of the Lims;
and for the return of the property to them.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision, hence this petition.
RULING: ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LIMS ARE BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH AND
FOR VALUE, HENCE THEY ARE PROTECTED BY LAW.
HELD: The instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA is hereby
REVERSED, and the Decision of the RTC is REINSTATED.
1. YES. It is a familiar doctrine that a forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a
valid title, if the property has already been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the
forger.
Given the failure to establish that the Lims had known the Chuatoco siblings as the collective
owners of the property prior to 1986, it was error on the CA to declare that Jaime should have
become suspicious enough. The Lims had no obligation to look beyond the face of the Torrens
title.
It likewise does not escape our attention that the Lims nonetheless exerted efforts beyond a facial
examination of the title to verify the ownership thereof. As admitted by respondents, 2 of the Lims,
along with Atty. Rivera, went to the RD of Manila to verify Rafael’s claim over the property, and
saw therein the Deed of Sale executed by respondents and their mother in favor of Rafael, as well
as the certificates of title. They discovered that indeed a TCT was issued solely in the name of
Rafael, canceling the TCT issued in the name of Leoncia Chuatoco and her sons.
Moreover, even as the deed of sale was subsequently proven a forgery, the Lims had every reason
to rely upon it due to the fact that it is a notarized document. Notarized documents, as public
documents, are entitled to full faith and credit upon these face when appreciated by the courts,
and so much more when relied upon by the layman.
In fact, a good deal of respondents’ claims on this matter rest upon the proposition that the Lims
should have known that the transfer to Rafael was not valid, rather than proof of actual knowledge
of its supposed invalidity. We are satisfied that the Lims had exerted perhaps a greater effort than
that required by law to ascertain the validity of the TCT and that nothing on the face of the
documents they examined should have led to indubitable knowledge that it was derived from an
infirm or spurious source.
If such innocence or good faith is established by the evidence, or insufficiently rebutted by the
disputant, then the corresponding duty of the Court is simply to affirm the rights of the purchaser
in good faith. Relief for such injury should be obtainable instead in a proper proceeding against
the malfeasant transferor, and not the innocent transferee.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Lims were innocent purchasers for value.
Javier v. CA, GR 101177, Mar. 28, 1994
FACTS : On 2 April 1985, petitioner filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession
with damages against respondents Demetrio Caringal and spouses Dionisio Caay and Nazaria
Caringal involving a parcel of land situated at Barangay No. IV, Poblacion, Balayan, Batangas,
with an area of 973 square meters. The evidence for the petitioner shows that the property was
the subject of a prior Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 14-2-305 filed by petitioner with the
Bureau of Lands on 2 April 1973. Petitioner claims that he has been in peaceful and adverse
possession of the property since 1971 and this possession was confirmed by Bureau of Lands
Investigator Felix O. Laude, Sr., when the latter recommended that the miscellaneous sales
application of petitioner be given due course.
On 14 August 1974, petitioner sold the land covered by his sales application to Santiago de
Guzman by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. During this time, respondents Dionisio Caay and
Cesaria Caringal constructed a house on the disputed lot with permission and upon tolerance of
Santiago de Guzman. Respondent Dionisio Caay was then the driver of Santiago de Guzman.
On 31 August 1981, petitioner repurchased the property from Santiago de Guzman with
knowledge that the house of respondents Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal was existing on the
property but did not immediately eject them as respondent Caay was a good friend of petitioner.
Petitioner later discovered that in 1982, respondent Demetrio Caringal, father of respondent
Cesaria Caringal, was awarded by the Bureau of Lands a free patent over the property in question
and was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-462 in his name.
On the other hand, evidence for private respondents shows that on 1 July 1981 respondent
Demetrio Caringal filed a free patent application covering the disputed property; that his
possession started in 1981 when it was sold to him by Gavino Tesorero who appeared to be the
only surviving heir of Gregoria Pineda, the original applicant for free patent. Gregoria Pineda had
been in possession of the property since 1942 and had applied in 1951 for a revocable permit with
the Bureau of Lands in Tanduay, Manila. During the lifetime of Gregoria, respondent Caringal had
introduced improvements on the property including the house presently occupied by respondents
Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal.
After Gregoria died in November 1976, her surviving heir, Gavino Tesorero, sold the disputed
property to respondent Caringal in 1981 for a consideration of P5,000.00 as evidenced by an
affidavit executed by Tesorero. After proper inspection and investigation by the Bureau of Lands,
the free patent application of respondent Caringal was given due course. In 1982, the land was
awarded by the Bureau of Lands to respondent Demetrio Caringal under Free Patent Application
No. 18220 and registered under Original Certificate of Title No. P-462 in his name.
On 7 July 1986, the trial court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the legal owner of the
disputed property. It also ordered the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel the name and
personal circumstances of respondent Caringal as the registered owner in OCT No. T-462 and to
substitute, in lieu thereof, the name and personal circumstances of petitioner. The court further
directed the Register of Deeds to issue to petitioner an owner's duplicate certificate of OCT No.
T-462 upon payment by the latter of the fees required by law. The court also ordered respondents
Demetrio Caringal, spouses Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal to pay petitioner jointly and
severally litigation expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of
P3,000.00.
In granting the complaint, the trial court found circumstances showing that fraud attended the
issuance of the free patent thus making it null and void, to wit: (a) The existence of a prior
miscellaneous sales application of petitioner should have barred the acceptance and processing
of the free patent application of respondent Demetrio Caringal; (b) The said free patent was issued
on 21 August 1982 to Caringal without the technical description of the property having been first
issued; and, (c) The survey plan of Gregoria Pineda, original applicant for free patent and
predecessor-in-interest of respondent Caringal, was spurious as it was approved only after her
death.
Respondent Demetrio Caringal appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 26 March 1991
overturned the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint of petitioner.
In finding for respondent Caringal, the appellate court cited the following reasons for its decision:
(a) While petitioner had filed a prior sales application of the property in 1973, no action on the
application was taken by the Bureau of Lands even after respondent Caringal filed a free patent
application in 1981; the mere filing of the miscellaneous sales application does not mean that
petitioner Guillermo Javier had acquired any vested right or title over the disputed property, the
application being evidence only of a claim over the land; (b) Petitioner had not established
continuous, adverse and open possession of the land because he sold his rights over the same
to Santiago de Guzman in 1974 and reacquired the same from the latter in 1981. There was also
no evidence that petitioner occupied and possessed the land under claim of ownership after he
reacquired the same. On the other hand, unrebutted evidence for private respondents shows their
continuous possession and that of their predecessor-in-interest since 1951 until 1981 when
respondent Demetrio Caringal filed an application for free patent; and, (c) No survey plan was
ever submitted by petitioner for the lot in question. Thus, it is doubtful whether the lot claimed by
petitioner, which contains 1,000 square meters, is the same property awarded to respondent
Caringal by virtue of the free patent which covers a 973-square meter lot.
Hence, this petition.
RULING : We cannot sustain petitioner. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a
decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with
actual fraud. This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is
still available.[2] The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one
(1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in court
for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always available as long as the property
has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages. In this case, the disputed
property is still registered in the name of respondent Demetrio Caringal, so that petitioner was
correct in availing himself of the procedural remedy of reconveyance.
However, despite the availability to petitioner of the remedy of reconveyance, this Court finds no
merit in petitioner's claim that he has legal title over the property in question that will justify its
return to him. Petitioner failed to show sufficient proof of ownership over the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-462. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 March
1991 is AFFIRMED.
Ferrer v. Bautista, GR 46963, Mar. 14, 1994
FACTS : Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay,
La Union. Petitioner claims its ownership by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980
covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately north of the land in question. On the other hand,
private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation and
by virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon,
pursuant to Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 (p. 29, Rollo).
On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then Court of
First Instance of La Union to "Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano
Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated Civil Case No. A-514.
Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union,
Branch III, a complaint for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965, against
private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also handled the case, dismissed, on 10
February 1976, the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority to
cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere
collateral attack.
On 07 December 1976, Judge Antonio G. Bautista issued an order dismissing petitioner's
complaint, thus: the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants because the Patent
title issued in favor of the Firmalos (defendants here) by the Director of Lands is by now already
indefeasible due to the lapse of one year following the entry of the decree of registration in the
records of the register of deeds.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the court in its order of 03 May 1977. Hence
this petition.
RULING: The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed
to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or
conveyed by him would be null and void (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37). The nullity
arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not
those that are privately owned (Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793).
Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of
the free patent since at the time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a
part of the disposable land of the public domain.
Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a public
grant, the rule does not apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare the nullity
of that void title does not prescribe (Agne vs. Director of Lands, supra); in fact, it is susceptible to
direct, as well as to collateral, attack.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 514-A is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING petitioner to be the
owner of the disputed parcel of land and ORDERING private respondents to reconvey the same
to said petitioner. No costs.
Valientes v. Ramas, GR 157852, Dec. 15, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Valientes who, before his death, was the owner of a
parcel of land in Zamboanga delSur. In 1939, Valientes mortgaged the subject property to secure
his loan to the spouses Belen. In the 1950s, the Valientes family purportedly attempted, but failed,
to retrieve the subject property from the spouses Belen. Through an allegedly forged document
captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject property between
Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter obtained title over the land. On February 28, 1970, the
legitimate children of the late Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim. Upon the death of
the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement with partition and
sale in favor of private respondent Minor, the present possessor of the subject property. On June
20, 1979, Minor filed with the then CFI a "PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM
OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN THE TITLE IN HER POSSESSION" which the RTC
granted. On the other hand, petitioners filed a complaint for the cancellation of the title in Minors
possession and its reconveyanceto them. On this complaint, Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and litis pendentia, which the RTC dismissed.
Undeterred, Minor filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration based on this decision which was denied. They appealed it to the CA, which
although found that there was no forum shopping nor litis pendentia, dismissed the case on the
ground of prescription and laches.
ISSUE: Whether or not prescription or laches has already set in to bar the filing of the case at
hand.
HELD: Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED
CIVIL CODE; PRESCRIPTION
When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting
of title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at bar, petitioners are not in possession of
the subject property. In this case, if it were to be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust,
should have therefore been filed within ten years from the issuance of TCT to spouses Belen.But,
the case was instituted beyond the prescriptive period.
As to the alternative defense of petitioners, applying Arts. 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code,
thus entitling them to a 30 year period to assail the title, the Court ruled that the applicable law in
this instant case is Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree (since it is more specific that the general rules of the above mentioned articles of the Civil
Code). Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and
the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date
of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the
applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.
It took petitioners 28 before filing this case. This period is unreasonably long for a party seeking
to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus, petitioners claim that they had not slept on
their rights is patently unconvincing.
The Decision of the CA and the Resolution are AFFIRMED.
Rodriguez v. Torreno, GR L-29596, Oct. 14, 1977
FACTS: It appears that during her lifetime, one Valentine Quiñ;ones owned a parcel of land in
Davao City with an area of 39,043 square meters which is designated as Lot No. 2017, formerly
Lot No. 1226-G of the cadastral survey of Davao. On her death, Valentine was survived by her
children, namely, Maximina, Martiliano, Felix, Petra Eugenia, Restitute and Ana, all surnamed
Bocase and all of whom are now deceased.
Maximina died in 1940 and was survived by her children Sabina Toreno and Timoteo Toreno, two
of the herein respondents. Martiliano was survived by his children Eugenia Simplicia, Pedro,
Bernardo and Green, of whom the latter four are some of the herein respondents. Felix was
survived by his children Gliceria and the three minors Luciana Alejandro and Lourdes who are
likewise respondents Martiliano Petra died a widow and without any issue. Eugenia does not
appear to have left any children. Restitute was survived by her 12 children who, fake Ana's four
children, are not parties to the case at bar.
The land left by the late Valentina Quinones was brought for tration before a cadastral court in
1922 and the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15 was issued on August 7, 1950 in the name of
26 petition, to wit: the three arriving children of Valentine, namely Petra Eugenia and Felix Bocase
and their 23 nephews and nieces. The certificate of title, after its issuance, was delivered to the
petitioner by the respondents' counsel in the cadastral case, one Atty. Suazo. The petition still had
the said certificate of title in his possession at the tune the case was comnienoed in the trial court.
On July 9, 1958, the respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao, a complaint for
ejectment and damages against the petitioner, alleging basically that, together with their cousins,
the children of Restitute and Ana, they are pro-ndiviso registered owners of the land covered by
O.C.T. No. 0-15; that in or about June 1953, the petitioner reply maliciously' and by means of force
and intion entered the land in question and occupied approximately 27,500 square meters thereof,
which portion, prior thereto, was in their possession as their share pursuant to a partition agreed
upon by the co-owners thereof; and that since June 1953, the petitioner had been collecting rentals
from the owners of houses built thereon in the total sum of P300.00 a month.
In his answer, the petitioner claimed that the heirs of Valentine Quinones, with the exception of
Restitute and Ana Bocase had already sold their rights over the land covered by O.C.T. No. 0-15
to him as early as 1941 and 1950 either through themselves or their successors in interest, thus
making him the rightful and legal owner of approximately 27,899 square meters thereof; that he
had been in the peaceful, continuous and public ion of the same; that there was no hen,
encumbrance or adverse claim annotated on O.C.T. No 0-15 so that the series of sales made in
his favor, although not registered and annotated thereon, are valid and binding between the
parties, the said land not having passed to a third person; and that he had spent no less than
P5,000.00 in improving the land in question.
On October 31, 1960, after hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the
petitioner to vacate the land in question and to pay the respondents the sum of P750.00, the value
of the coconut trees the petitioner had ordered cut down; P125.00 a month from July 10, 1958,
representing the rentals collected by him from tenants with their houses built on the questioned
estate; P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court's decision was anchored on the
following rationale: (a) to entertain petitioner's claim that he had bought the questioned portion of
the land covered by O.C.T. No. 0-15 as shown in evidence 1 before the decree of registration was
issued would virtually re-open the cadastral proceeding in contravention of the indefeasibility of
Torrens titles; (b) the petitioner, being the respondents' counsel in the land registration case, had
all the opportunity to have the questioned deeds of sale annotated on the certificate of title in
connection with the cadatral case but did not do so; (c) petitioner's failure, despite his having been
respondents' counsel to have his adverse claim brought to the attention of the cadastral court and
to have the supposed deeds of sale annotated later are proof enough that the alleged deeds of
sale were really contracts of loan.
ISSUE: (1) whether the existence of a decree of registration is a bar to an action filed after one
year from the issuance of the decree to compel reconveyance of the property in question
RULING: Contrary to the opinion entertained by the courts below, the prevailing rule in this
jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered
under the Torrens system from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree
for the reconveyance of the property in question 2 Such an action does not aim or purport to re-
open the rginstration Proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that
the person who the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 30053-R is hereby affirmed.
No costs.
Delos Reyes v. CA, GR 121468, Jan. 27, 1998
FACTS: On 23 January l995 the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower
court.[2]
Pursuing their recourse with us, petitioners seek the nullification of the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of petitioners
herein by imputing to the Court of Appeals the following errors: (1) in reckoning the 30-year
prescriptive period of real actions as provided under Art. 1141 of the Civil Code from the date of
issuance of the questioned TCT or annotation of the transaction in 1943 and not from 17
September 1962 when petitioners' mother, original owner of subject property, died or 17 July 1963
when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia and consequently holding
petitioners guilty of laches; and, (2) in not applying Arts. 1409, 1410, and 1422 of the Civil Code.[3]
Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land measuring 13,405 square meters originally owned
by the spouses Genaro and Evarista delos Reyes. On 7 July 1942 Evarista delos Reyes sold to
spouses Catalina Mercado and Eulalio Pena 10,000 square meters of the property described as
Lot No. 1210 of the subdivision plan of the Malinta Friar Lands Estate situated at Torres Bugallon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On 4 June 1943 the vendees were able to secure Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 26184 covering not only the 10,000 square meters of land bought by them but also the
remaining 3,405 square meters left unsold. In turn, the Pena spouses sold the whole property to
Isaias de Guzman and Emiliana de Onon who later conveyed the same whole area to Elpidio
Concepcion, Liwayway Serrano, Norberto Concepcion and Marta de Guzman. Eventually, the
land was acquired by private respondents herein, Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia, on 9 July 1963
through a "Deed of Exchange." Eight (8) days later, or on l7 July l963, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42753 was issued in the name of the Caia spouses who since then exercised full ownership
and possession over the property.

On 3 October l978 petitioners, all heirs of Evarista delos Reyes, filed an action against
respondents for reconveyance of 3,405 square meters of the property covered by TCT No. 42753
claiming that this portion was invalidly included by the Pena spouses in the titling of their 10,000
square meters they had bought from Evarista delos Reyes. However, the case was dismissed by
the trial court on the ground of laches. As already adverted to, the order of dismissal was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
RULING: We likewise dismiss the petition. Petitioners argue that their cause of action still subsists
because it accrued either on 17 September 1962 when Evarista delos Reyes died, or on 17 July
l963 when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and his sister Zenaida Caia. This is
incorrect. A cause of action being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right of another
arises at the moment such right is violated. In the instant case, petitioners' cause of action accrued
on 4 June l943 when the Pena spouses caused the registration in their name of the entire l3,405
square meters instead of only 10,000 square meters they actually bought from Evarista delos
Reyes. For it was on this date that the right of ownership of Evarista over the remaining 3,405
square meters was transgressed and from that very moment sprung the right of the owner, and
hence all her successors in interest, to file a suit for reconveyance of the property wrongfully taken
from them.
We ruled that the only remedy of an owner who was fraudulently deprived of his land, which was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value, is to file an action for damages against the
person who perpetrated the fraud within four (4) years after the discovery of the deception.
Unfortunately in this case we may never know why Evarista delos Reyes chose not to go after the
Pena spouses to recover what could be rightfully hers, the reason having apparently been long
interred with her.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, which ordered the dismissal of the complaint of
herein petitioners, the instant petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
Heirs of Roxas v. Garcia, GR 146208, Aug. 12, 2004
PR: REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK; & SOLID BUILDERS, INC.
FACTS: Two (2) parcels of land with a total land area of 438,018 square meters, more or less,
situated in Tagaytay City[2] were surveyed and approved by the Bureau of Lands on March 29,
1941 under Psu-113427 for the heirs of Baldomero Roxas y Hermanos (Roxas property).[3]
A parcel of land also situated in Tagaytay was surveyed under Psu-136750 for Martin Landicho
(Landicho property) and was decreed in his name on May 23, 1953[4] in LRC Case No. 167, LRC
(GLRO) Record No. N-72008. OCT No. 157 was accordingly issued to Landicho.[5]
Lot No. 2 of the Landicho property was later sold to Porfirio Beljica who was issued TCT No.
3255.[6]
Beljica in turn sold Lot No. 2 of the Landicho property to the Taal Development Corporation which
was issued TCT No. 3445.[7]
The Taal Development Corporation later mortgaged Lot No. 2 of the Landicho property to the
Republic Planters Bank which eventually acquired it on July 7, 1965 following the foreclosure sale
thereof after the former failed to comply with its mortgage obligation. Republic Planters Bank was
then issued TCT No. T-4211.[8]
On April 11, 1962, Vicente Singson, Jr., husband of one of the children of the spouses Sixto Roxas
and Alejandra Luz heirs of the late Baldomero Roxas (Roxas), filed an application for registration
covering the Roxas property at the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cavite, docketed as Case
No. N-249, LRC Record No. 22973.[9]
By Decision of April 2, 1963, Branch 3 of the Cavite CFI adjudged in Case No. N-249, LRC Record
No. 22973 the registration of the Roxas property in favor of the heirs. By Order of May 23, 1963,
the court declared its April 2, 1963 decision final and accordingly ordered the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) to issue a decree of confirmation and registration.[10]
The LRC, by Report of October 15, 1963, stated, however, that the confirmation could not be done
due to overlapping claims on the area.[11]
From a Report dated September 5, 1983 prepared by Geodetic Engineer Basilio Cabrera, and a
later Report dated November 12, 1987 prepared by the Chief of the Surveys Division Regional
Management Bureau who was directed by the court to comment on Engineer Cabreras report, it
is gathered that Psu-136750 (covering the Landicho property) overlapped Psu N-113427
(covering the Roxas property).[12]
It turned out that in Case No. 167, LRC (GLRO) Record No. N-7208, the alleged overlapping by
Psu-136750 of Psu-113427 was overlooked.
Vicente Singson, Jr., in the meantime, died on April 20, 1965.[13]
The Heirs of Roxas later filed in Case No. N-249 LRC Record No. 22973 a motion to intervene
dated August 10, 1978[14] which was granted. By Order of June 29, 1988, the land registration
court, Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite which took over the cases pending
before Branch 3 of the former CFI of Cavite, noting that titles to properties cannot be collaterally
attacked, directed the parties to have Plan PSU-113427 amended to exclude the portions already
titled [in the name of Landicho] without prejudice to filing the corresponding case for annulment of
titles.[15]
By Order[16] of July 2, 1991, the land registration court, resolving two motions to reopen the
decree of registration in LRC
RULING: At all events, the remedy of one who has established his ownership over a property but
which property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered through fraud or mistake in anothers
name is, after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of the questioned decree, not to set
aside the decree, it having become incontrovertible and no longer open to review, but to institute
an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance.[39]
If the property, however, has already passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
the remedy is to file an action for damages from the person who allegedly registered the property
through fraud,[40] or if he had become insolvent or if the action is barred by prescription, to file an
action for recovery against the Assurance Fund under Section 95 of P.D. No. 1529[41] (the
Property Registration Decree) within a period of six years from the time the right to bring such
action accrues.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.