Anillo vs. Commission On The Settlement of Land Problems

2/25/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 534
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Anillo vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
*
G.R. No. 157856. September 27, 2007.
CONCEPCION C. ANILLO of Barangay San Nicolas

(formerly Molino), Bacoor, Cavite, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND
PROBLEMS represented by Commissioner ERNESTO A.
CARDIÑO; OIC-Associate Commissioner NOEL
GALAROSA, DEMETRIO T. VILLANUEVA, JR., Sheriff
IV of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Bacoor, Cavite; Provincial Director, PNP, Province of
Cavite; National Police Task Force on Professional
Squatters and Squatting Syndicates, Hon. Mayor JESSIE
B. CASTILLO of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite; Hon.
Barangay Chairman GAUDENCIO PAREDES;
GREENVALLEY HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION INC.;
and SOUTHRICH ACRES, INC., respondents.
Hierarchy of Courts; It is necessary to stress that a direct

recourse to the Supreme Court is highly improper for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts; A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs is allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.—It is necessary to stress that a
direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence
is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as to
which court the application for
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
229
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000161ca3ef568f53c924e003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/15
VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 229
the writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.

That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals and
should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. This Court is a
court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Petitioner failed to
show that such special and important reasons obtain in this case.
Same; Same; Commission on the Settlement of Land

Problems; Orders, decisions or resolutions of Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) cannot be brought
directly to this Court, whether on appeal or on certiorari.—In Sy v.
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, 365 SCRA 49
(2001), and subsequently in Republic of the Philippines v.
Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc., 400 SCRA 664 (2003), the Court
expressly ruled that orders, decisions or resolutions of COSLAP
cannot be brought directly to this Court, whether on appeal or on
certiorari. The Court stated, thus: It is readily apparent that
appeals from the COSLAP may not be brought directly before us
in view of Rule 45, Section 1. Likewise, if a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy, the Court of Appeals
cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the doctrine of
judicial hierarchy. In this connection, it cannot be doubted that
the COSLAP is among those quasi-judicial agencies exercising
quasijudicial functions. No convincing reason exists why appeals
from the COSLAP should be treated differently from other quasi-
judicial agencies whose orders, resolutions or decisions are
directly appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the enumeration of the
agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive. In that sense, Section
3(2) of E.O. No. 561 declaring that the COSLAP’s orders,
resolutions or decision are appealable exclusively to this Court is
erroneous in the light of Section 1, Rule 45 and Section 1, Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, x x x x
Administrative Law; Notice and Hearing Requirements; Due

Process; Requisites.—In administrative proceedings, procedural
due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of

proceedings which
230
may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be

heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
Judgments; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res judicata

means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment; The doctrine of res
judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action.—Another formidable stumbling block to a finding of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COSLAP is the principle of res
judicata or bar by prior judgment. Res judicata means a matter
adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res judicata provides
that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties
and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The
Court of Appeals’ resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 68640 amounts to
res judicata in this case. The petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 68640
also sought the annulment of COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46, the
same proceedings being assailed in this petition by parties
claiming ownership rights derived from the Estate of Rodriguez.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, the dismissal of said petition
effectively foreclosed the right of petitioner or any person claiming
ownership rights under the Estate of Rodriguez to institute a
subsequent action to nullify the proceedings in COSLAP Case No.
2001-05-46.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Procedural law has its

own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to
ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing
for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.—All told, the
procedural lapses of the instant petition cannot be ignored. The
doctrines of judicial
231
VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 231
hierarchy and res judicata are not meaningless procedural rules

because they are grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice. Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that
obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the
settlement of disputes.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lorenzo D. Sanchez for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
TINGA, J.:
This is a special civil action under Rule 65 for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining
1
order, praying for
the nullification of the Resolution2 dated 30 July 2001,
3
including the writ of execution and demolition in
connection therewith, for having been issued by the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
4
4
The instant controversy stemmed from a letter dated
29 May 2001 of Jessie B. Castillo, Municipal Mayor of
Bacoor,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 63-69.

2 Id., at pp. 70-71.
3 Id., at pp. 72-84.
4 Id., at pp. 86-87.
232

Cavite, to COSLAP Commissioner Ernesto A. Cardiño,

seeking immediate assistance in the settlement of a land
dispute brewing in Green Valley Subdivision, San Nicolas,
Bacoor, Cavite. The letter averred that squatters, claiming
to have bought portions of the subdivision land from the
estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, had invaded
the subdivision and turned vacant lots therein into a
squatter colony. A certain Henry Rodriguez had been
purportedly representing the estate and claiming
ownership over a big portion of the Municipality of Bacoor
including the subdivision land by virtue of a Spanish title,
and selling small lots to clueless victims. Armed security
guards were allegedly preventing registered owners and
legitimate residents of the subdivision from entering their
own property and exacting money from them in exchange
for the peaceful occupation thereof. The complaint was
docketed as COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46.
Acting on the complaint, COSLAP directed the parties
to participate in a series of mediation conferences. On 29
June 2001, Atty. Larry Pernito appeared on behalf of the
Estate of Rodriguez. He questioned the jurisdiction of
COSLAP and argued that the matter had already been
settled in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
the Estate of Rodriguez. The representatives of Green
Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. and Southrich Acres,
Inc., registered owners of lots within the subdivision,
prayed that their Torrens titles be respected. At the next
conference, only complainants appeared. COSLAP directed
the parties to submit position papers, but only
complainants complied. 5
On 30 July 2001, COSLAP issued a Resolution in
COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“Accordingly, this Commission rules in favor of complainants

and against respondents. This body upholds the contention of
complainants that any person desiring to contest their titles must
do so in a proper proceeding in accordance with law and not thru
force,
_______________
5 Supra note 1.
233
VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 233

intimidation and acts of harassment. This Commission further

rules that respondents and all persons claiming rights over the
subject properties are hereby ordered to vacate the premises and
return possession thereof to complainants. Finally, this
Commission resolves to order respondents to cease and desist
from:
A. Deploying of armed security guards;

B. Constructing of fences and putting of signboards in the
area; and
C. Collecting fees from persons for “rights” to occupy said lots
and selling lots to innocent purchasers.
6
SO ORDERED.”
COSLAP affirmed its jurisdiction over the land dispute on

the ground that the dispute would fall under the all-
inclusive proviso
7
of Paragraph 2, Section 3 of Executive
Order No. 561, which created the commission.
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 68-69.

7 SECTION 3. Powers and Functions.—The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of

the various government offices and agencies involved in the
settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline
administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and
landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and
time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems

or disputes;
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to
the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the
following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or
disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for
instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or
emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical
situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders

or timber concessioners;
234

8
Upon motion, COSLAP issued a Writ of Execution on 23
October 2001, directing the Sheriff of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacoor, with the assistance of the Cavite
Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police, to
implement its Resolution dated 30 July 2001. Edwin A. San
Miguel, Sheriff IV of the RTC-Bacoor, filed a Sheriff’s
Report stating that 9he served copies of the writ and a ten-
day notice to vacate to the squatters but the latter refused
to leave and remove the structures.
On 21 January 2002, a Rule 47 petition, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 68640, was filed with the Court of Appeals
by a certain Eduardo Cabesa Abear and 106 others
included as petitioners. Named respondents in said
petition, which sought to nullify the COSLAP Resolution
dated 30 July 2001, were Green Valley Homeowners
Association, Inc., South Rich Acres Inc. and COSLAP.
On 4 February
10
2002, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution in the said case, denying the petition on
grounds of improper remedy and lack of jurisdiction.
Because the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied
and in view of the finality of the Court of Appeals’11
resolution, COSLAP issued a Writ of Demolition on 29
January 2003 directing Sheriff San Miguel to remove the
structures and improvements illegally constructed within
Green Valley.
_______________
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation

grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of
the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude. (Emphasis supplied.)
8 Supra note 2.
9 Id., at p. 85.
10 Id., at pp. 91-92.
11 Supra note 3.
235
VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 235

On 21 April 2003, through a caretaker, petitioner received

the notice to vacate issued by Sheriff San Miguel.
Petitioner Concepcion C. Anillo, identifying herself as the
owner of Lot No. 5825 of the Imus Estate measuring
approximately 553,853 square meters, immediately wrote
COSLAP, requesting, among others, for copy of the
Resolution dated 30 July 12
2001, the writ of execution and
the writ of demolition. 13
On 30 April 2003, petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction. Named respondents are the
COSLAP, represented by Commissioners Ernesto A.
Cardiño and Noel Galarosa, the Sheriff of the RTC of
Bacoor, the PNP Provincial Director of Cavite, the
National Police Task Force on Professional Squatters and
Squatting Syndicates, Bacoor Mayor Jessie B. Castillo,
Barangay Chairman Gaudencio Paredes, Green Valley
Homeowners Association, Inc. and South Rich Acres Inc.
The instant petition is anchored on the following
arguments:
A. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COSLAP,

REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER ERNESTO
A. CARDIÑO AND OIC-ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER NOEL A. GALAROSA, HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER COSLAP CASE NO. 2001-
05-46 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED JULY 30,
2001 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN [sic]
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND EXTRINSIC
FRAUD.
B. PETITIONER WERE [sic] DENIED OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND SHE WAS NEVER
MADE PARTY TO COSLAP CASE NO. 2001-05-46
AND WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD TO REFUTE AND CHALLENGE THE
ALLEGATIONS STIPULATED IN THE
COMPLAINT.
_______________
12 Id., at p. 89.
13 Rollo, pp. 3-60.
236

C. PETITIONER, HER TENANTS AND

CARETAKERS ARE IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
UNDER A VALID CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OF
THE LAND BY VIRTUE OF A DEED OF SALE
EXECUTED BY THE ESTATE OF
HERMOGENES AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER DULY APPROVED BY
THE HONORABLE 14
COURT OF PROBATE
JURISDICTION.
15
In a Resolution dated 15 May 2003, the Court granted
the prayer for a temporary restraining order conditioned
upon the posting of a bond and enjoined COSLAP from
enforcing the Resolution dated 30 July 2001, the writ of
execution as well as the writ of demolition. The Court also
directed respondents to file their comment or opposition to
the application for16 a writ of preliminary injunction on 29
September 2003. On even17
date, the temporary
restraining order was issued.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct
recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the
established policy 18of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts. While we have concurrent jurisdiction
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of
certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an

unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the
application for the writ will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate
19
forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. This Court is a court of last resort
and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions
_______________
14 Id., at p. 16.
15 Id., at pp. 100-104.
16 Id., at pp. 355-356.
17 Id., at pp. 357-359.
18 Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil. 28, 34; 384
SCRA 589, 592-593 (2002).
19 Paradero v. Abrogan, G.R. No. 158917, 1 March 2004, 424 SCRA 155,
163.
237
VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 237

assigned 20to it by the Constitution and immemorial

tradition. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is
allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Petitioner failed to show that
21
such special and important
reasons obtain in this case.
In Sy 22 v. Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems and subsequently in Republic 23
of the
Philippines v. Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc., the Court
expressly ruled that orders, decisions or resolutions of
COSLAP cannot be brought directly to this Court, whether
on appeal or on certiorari. The Court stated, thus:
“It is readily apparent that appeals from the COSLAP may not be
brought directly before us in view of Rule 45, Section 1. Likewise,
if a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy,
the Court of Appeals cannot be bypassed without running afoul
of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this connection, it cannot
be doubted that the COSLAP is among those quasi-judicial
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions. No convincing reason
exists why appeals from the COSLAP should be treated
differently from other quasi-judicial agencies whose orders,

resolutions or decisions are directly appealable to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, the enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned is
not exclusive. In that sense, Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561 declaring
that the COSLAP’s orders, resolutions or decision are appealable
exclusively to this Court is erroneous in the light of Section 1,
Rule 45 and Section 24
1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, x x x x.”
Petitioner insists that COSLAP did not acquire jurisdiction

over her person because she was not made party to the
case before the said commission.
_______________
20 Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., supra.

21 Paradero v. Abragan, supra.
22 417 Phil. 378; 365 SCRA 49 (2001).
23 448 Phil. 823; 400 SCRA 664 (2003).
24 Supra note 13 at pp. 393-394.
238

The records belie petitioner’s claim.

Even before COSLAP conducted the series of mediation
conferences, it sent through registered mail notices to
persons, including herein petitioner, claiming ownership
rights derived from the Estate of Rodriguez, directing
them to appear at the mediation conference. At the first
scheduled mediation conference, a certain Atty. Larry
Pernito appeared on behalf of the Estate of Rodriguez,
questioning the jurisdiction of COSLAP. He was the same
counsel who represented the petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No.
68640 who eventually sought, albeit unsuccessfully, the
nullification of the COSLAP resolution being assailed in
the instant petition. COSLAP likewise gave both parties
the opportunity to present their claims when it directed
them to submit their respective position papers.
Respondents therein and Atty. Pernito, however, failed to
appear in subsequent proceedings or to submit any position
paper.
Petitioner cannot disavow and in fact does not even
disown the authority of Atty. Pernito to represent the
Estate of Rodriguez or deny knowledge that said lawyer
was representing the Estate of Rodriguez. The records

show that in the various notarized documents purportedly
authorizing their holders to occupy portions of the
disputed property, petitioner was a signatory therein as
one of the witnesses whereas Atty. Pernito, described
therein as “Chief Legal Counsel of the Rodriguez Estate,”
attested to the execution. These documents were executed
between January and October 2001, or exactly during the
pendency of the COSLAP proceedings. Petitioner’s claim
that she was totally uninformed about the proceedings
before the COSLAP is not worthy of belief. On the
contrary, petitioner is deemed constructively notified of
the said proceedings.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real oppor-
239
VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 239

tunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of

counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor,
and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained 25
in the records or made known to the parties
affected.
Another formidable stumbling block to a finding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COSLAP is the
principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Res
judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment
on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and
their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions26 involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action.
The Court of Appeals’ resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
68640 amounts to res judicata in this case. The petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68640 also sought the annulment of
COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46, the same proceedings being

assailed in this petition by parties claiming ownership
rights derived from the Estate of Rodriguez. Under the
doctrine of res judicata, the dismissal of said petition
effectively foreclosed the right of petitioner or any person
claiming ownership rights under the Estate of Rodriguez
to institute a subsequent action to nullify the proceedings
in COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46.
All told, the procedural lapses of the instant petition
cannot be ignored. The doctrines of judicial hierarchy and
res
_______________
25 Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 624,
631.
26 Lanuza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131394, 28 March 2005, 454
SCRA 54, 61.
240

judicata are not meaningless procedural rules because they

are grounded on fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice. Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
27
in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. Procedural
law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of
justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism
28
or whimsicality in the
settlement of disputes.
It bears emphasis that the special civil action for
certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of
last recourse. The Court has often reminded members of
the bench and bar that this extraordinary action lies only
where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy
29
and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It is no longer necessary to resolve the question of
jurisdiction of COSLAP.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

The temporary restraining order dated 29 September 2003
issued by the Court is LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales

and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
_______________
27 Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417; 330 SCRA 208, 214
(2000).
28 Balindong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159962, December 16, 2004,
447 SCRA 200, 212.
29 Heirs of Lourdes Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147205, March
10, 2004, 425 SCRA 236, 242.
241
VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 241

People vs. Evangelista
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The doctrine of the hierarchy of courts serves

as a general determinant of the proper forum for the
availment of the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(Del Rosario vs. Montaña, 430 SCRA 109 [2004])
Res judicata does not apply where the dismissal was on
the ground of failure of petitioner to furnish a copy of her
formal offer of evidence to the city prosecutor and the
solicitor general since the decision does not constitute an
adjudication on the merits, but a resolution only of an
interlocutory matter. (Page-Tenorio vs. Tenorio, 443 SCRA
560 [2004])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Anillo vs. Commission On The Settlement of Land Problems

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Anillo vs. Commission On The Settlement of Land Problems

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

2/25/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 534

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CONCEPCION C. ANILLO of Barangay San Nicolas

Hierarchy of Courts; It is necessary to stress that a direct

VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 229

Anillo vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems

the writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.

Same; Same; Commission on the Settlement of Land

Administrative Law; Notice and Hearing Requirements; Due

right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Anillo vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems

may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be

Judgments; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res judicata

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Procedural law has its

VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 231

Anillo vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems

hierarchy and res judicata are not meaningless procedural rules

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

This is a special civil action under Rule 65 for certiorari,

1 Rollo, pp. 63-69.

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cavite, to COSLAP Commissioner Ernesto A. Cardiño,

“Accordingly, this Commission rules in favor of complainants

VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 233

intimidation and acts of harassment. This Commission further

A. Deploying of armed security guards;

COSLAP affirmed its jurisdiction over the land dispute on

6 Id., at pp. 68-69.

1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of

time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation

VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 235

On 21 April 2003, through a caretaker, petitioner received

A. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COSLAP,

2001 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

C. PETITIONER, HER TENANTS AND

certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an

VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 237

assigned 20to it by the Constitution and immemorial

differently from other quasi-judicial agencies whose orders,

Petitioner insists that COSLAP did not acquire jurisdiction

20 Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., supra.

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The records belie petitioner’s claim.

was representing the Estate of Rodriguez. The records

VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 239

tunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of

COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46, the same proceedings being

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

judicata are not meaningless procedural rules because they

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales

VOL. 534, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 241

Notes.—The doctrine of the hierarchy of courts serves

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Anda mungkin juga menyukai