THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA
9
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR- Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation
REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS No. 1801.
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
AUTHORITY, petitioners, claimants
vs. Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly Kalibo, Aklan.
situated, respondents.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008 secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners, immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
10
vs. realty taxes on them.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
AKLAN, respondents. susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
DECISION Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
REYES, R.T., J.:
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
11
1
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as
2
Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in amended.
Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No.
of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705.
No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land. disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership.
The Antecedents
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on
G.R. No. 167707 the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in
possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing
white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20)
premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
4
12,003 inhabitants who live in the bone-shaped island’s respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
12
three barangays.
5 purposes.
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal
Boracay hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution
13
6 upon submission of their respective memoranda.
Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by
7
named persons. 14
The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in Boracay
Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
8 by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of
Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other
the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos.
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
15
5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
issued on lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally
16 31
August 7, 1933. renowned first class resorts on their lots.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby G.R. No. 173775
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING
24
the decision of the lower court. Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
V. Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon
the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands,
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
50
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF Crown. The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines
THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
35 foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
BORACAY? (Underscoring supplied)
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
51
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents- domain."
claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No.
173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
52
do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws. claims.
53
Our Ruling The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in
54
to reclassify lands of the public domain said decree. Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
55
posesoria or possessory information title, when duly inscribed in
the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid
after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill 56
36 which must be actual, public, and adverse, from the date of its
of 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or 57
37 inscription. However, possessory information title had to be
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; (b) Proclamation No.
38 perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until
1801 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 58
39 April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.
1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under these laws and executive acts. In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could
only be founded on royal concessions which took various forms,
namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the
grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de
executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or
59
possessory information title. >
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
40
agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the
provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and 60
of 1902. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by
41 42 Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
law, giving the government great leeway for classification. Then 61
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. The act provided
the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification
43 for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands 62
44 grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). It also
may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively 63
lands." Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular
unclassified land of the public domain. 64
Government:
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such 65
45 timber or mineral lands. x x x (Emphasis Ours)
patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
46
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
47 established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the
have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or 66
Torrens system.
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed evidence must be established that the land subject of the application
84
Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive
the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
67
purchase lands of the public domain. Under the Act, open, executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
85
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 applicant may also secure a certification from the government that
68
was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
86
years is alienable and disposable.
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented
to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
69
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required. disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of
No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
87
amended, remains as the existing general law governing the proof.
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
70
timber and mineral lands, and privately owned lands which Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
71
reverted to the State. portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay
was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v.
88
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919) and De Aldecoa v. The
89
2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain Insular Government (1909). These cases were decided under the
since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a
72
was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
90
imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. contrary is shown."
73
1073, which now provides for possession and occupation of the
74
land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced.
These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of
75
The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely
76
proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or provided the manner through which land registration courts would
grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof
77
16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands shall be presented in each case.
governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3344. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of
the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were
1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or
78
codify the various laws relative to registration of property. It were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
91
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as preponderance of the evidence. This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs
79
unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
92
Palanca v. Republic, in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In Azcuna, viz.:
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
80
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
81
purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
82
delimited and classified." xxxx
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted
that the land subject of the application is alienable or by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there
83
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of
the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge
mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
93
preponderance of the evidence. lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or
926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp]
have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
94
shown." other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land,
Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or
lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
lands of the public domain into agricultural lands. intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No.
1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain"
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs.
1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
95
Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, Forestry, supra) (Emphasis ours)
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of
State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification
totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already
96
became private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to
more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
96-a
confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the
97
under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as public domain.
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were
98
remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, issued their title in 1933, did not present a justiciable case for
continued to be owned by the State. determination by the land registration court of the property’s land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming
absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No.
there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the
the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated: courts were no longer authorized to determine the property’s land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney- 99
General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in We note that the RTC decision in G.R. No. 167707
100
question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, which was
mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole
it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
101 102
present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as Government, De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government, and Ankron
103
we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
"forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question
of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a
land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or totally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. residential lots were included in the general classification of
7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a
trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was
104
classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the prohibited by the 1935 Constitution from acquiring agricultural
exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural agricultural.
today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of
105
Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa. As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify land.
lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million
111
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has already been
create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry,
106
for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso do not negate its character as public forest.
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may
apply for a title in their name. Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
112
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do
107
Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
113
Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The
107-a 114
Natural Resources, ruled: discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is
particularly instructive:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of
the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
115
and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of title do not apply. (Emphasis supplied)
the public domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public
lands." domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification
116
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine
Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
108
alienable and disposable. (Emphasis Ours) restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an land.
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
109
705. The DENR and the National Mapping and Resource judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not
110
Information Authority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
land of the public domain. argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in
1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist
lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain susceptible of private ownership.
which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the
forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
117
factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands" and "areas
118
already existing prior to its effectivity. declared as alienable and disposable" does not by itself classify the
entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public
under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority
premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No.
merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject
department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section to existing vested rights.
5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s
authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
when it provides: Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No.
1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
the Bureau of Forest Development. agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest
under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No.
needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If 6657, thus:
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the
development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for (a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of
119
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability. this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental
and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay limits of the public domain.
Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the
Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural
Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public
Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a domain despite PD No. 705.
few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for 124
Republic, the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond,
the intent of the proclamation. While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
120 125
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only land until released and rendered open to disposition. (Emphasis
the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department supplied)
head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain
121
into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of
public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. 126
the Department of Justice on this point:
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in
122
have no authority to do so. Absent such classification, the land Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the
123
disposition. mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for purposes of determining which are
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest
reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to
side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes. Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against
the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot,
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public
forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been One Last Note
previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
127
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights number of years, thousands of people have called the island their
over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight,
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law
No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their
128
public domain. automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas
they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of
the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as
State property. builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect
their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of
131
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or
132
relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private
grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them
possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one
129 133
clear from the wording of the law itself. Where the land is not such bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether
alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
130
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd.
failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not
notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945. becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike
a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for conservation is as important as economic progress.
declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite
period of possession. To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival.
Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
to prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968
134
1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:
convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation
commenced on June 12, 1945. The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite
having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification.
They say their continued possession and investments give them a For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
No. 1064. necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or
ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry
The continued possession and considerable investment of private up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents.
claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction
the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention
apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be
135
in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable written down in a lumberman’s decalogue.
investment in the island.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a new trial; his
motion was overruled to which he also excepted and presented the
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the corresponding bill of exceptions which was approved and submitted
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND to this court.
SET ASIDE.
The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack interposed by counsel for Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a
of merit. parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and, ceasing to
be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to
SO ORDERED. the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands
which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or
corporations. While from the remote time of the conquest of this
Archipelago the occupation or material possession together with the
JUAN IBAÑEZ DE ALDECOA, petitioner-appellant, improvement and cultivation for a certain number of years, as fixed
vs. by the laws of the Indies, of given portions of vacant Government
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee. lands, was the method established by the Government to facilitate
the acquisition thereof by private persons, later, by the royal decrees
of June 25, 1880, and December 26, 1884, the system of composition
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellant.
with the State and that of sales by public auction were instituted as
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
the means of acquiring such lands.
TORRES, J.:
In view of the difficulties which prevented the rapid dispatch of the
proceedings instituted for this purpose, the royal decree of February
On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new Land
13, 1894, was promulgated, establishing the possessory information
Registration Act, Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa applied for the registration
as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under
of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square meters in extent, situated
certain conditions which were set out in said decree.
in the town of Surigao; a plan and technical description of said parcel
was attached to his application.
After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted Act No.
926, relating to public lands, in accordance with the provisions of
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion
sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Act of the Congress of the United
of the examiner of titles opposing the request of the applicant, had
States of July 1, 1902, section 54, paragraph 6 of which (Act No. 926)
been rendered, the Attorney-General by a writing dated March 21,
is as follows:
1905, objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land
in question was the property of the Government of the United States,
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal
and is now under the control of the Insular Government; that the title
successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine
of ownership issued by the politico-militargovernor of Surigao,
Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
Mindanao, issued on the 19th of June, 1889, to Telesforo Ibañez de
therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been
Aldecoa, antecessor of the petitioner with respect to the land in
perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of
question, was entirely null and void, for the reason that said grant
the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and
had not been made in accordance with the laws then in force on the
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
subject, and because the said governor had no authority to make
such a grant; he prayed the court below to dismiss the application
with costs. xxx xxx xxx
As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of April, 1905, 6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in
amended his former petition, and relying upon the provisions of interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that at the notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public
time he requested the registration of the land in question, comprised lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first,
in the plan then submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of
force, and as the latter affords better facilities for securing titles to ownership except as against the Government, for a period
property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land in of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act,
question, the applicant availing himself of the benefits granted by the except when prevented by a war or force majeure, shall be
said Act, prayed that the same be applied to the inscription of his conclusively presumed to have performed all the
land, inasmuch as it was included within paragraphs 5 and 6 of conditions essential to a government grant and to have
section 54, Chapter VI, thereof, and prayed the court to take into received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of
consideration the amendment of his petition. title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
Evidence was adduced by the petitioner at the trial of the case, and All applicants for lands under paragraph one, two, three,
on February 2, 1907, the judge of the Court of Land Registration four, and five of this section must establish by proper
entered his decision in the matter and, in view of the opposition official records or documents that such proceedings as are
offered by the Insular Government denied the petition without costs, therein required were taken and the necessary conditions
and ordered the cancellation of the entry made of the said property complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements
in the record under No. 408, folio 206 of volume 2 of the municipality shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.
of Surigao.
Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in the subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it
record, it is seen that the land, the registration of which is claimed, does not appear that it was ever mining or forest land.
was of the class of vacant crown or public land which the State could
alienate to private persons, and being susceptible of cultivation, since It should be noted that article 1 of the royal decree and regulation of
at any time the person in possession desired to convert it into the 25th of June, 1880, says: "In the Philippine Islands, all vacant
agricultural land he might do so in the same manner that he had lands, soils, and grounds without a lawful private owner, or, which
made a building lot of it, it undoubtedly falls within the terms of the have never been under private control, shall be deemed to be
said Act of Congress, as well as the provisions of the abovecited alienable crown lands for the effects of the regulation, and in
section 54 and paragraph 6 thereof of Act No. 926, for the reason accordance with law 14, title 12, book 4, of the Novísima
that the said land is neither mining nor timber land. Recopilación;" that article 1 of the royal decree of the 14th of
February, 1894, states: "Vacant lands, soils, grounds, and mountains
We refrain from mentioning herein what originally was the nature of in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed to be alienable Crown lands,
the land whereon was built the greatest cities of the world; and provided they are not included within the following exceptions: (1)
confining ourselves to that on which the cities and towns in these Those of private ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone;
Islands were erected, it can not be denied that, at the (3) those comprised in the communal laws, or within zones reserved
commencement of the occupation of this Archipelago by the for the use in common by residents of the community; and (4) those
Spaniards, and at the time of the distribution of lands, the latter were lands which are susceptible of private appropriation by means of
rural and agricultural in their nature. Rural also were the old towns, composition or possessory information;" and that although section
the cradle and foundation of the present cities and large towns of the 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, directs the Government of
Philippines, and as the inhabitants increased, and added to the the Philippine Islands to classify public lands that are neither forest
number of their dwellings, the farms gradually became converted nor mining lands according to their agricultural character and
into town lots. productiveness, section 14 authorizes and empowers the said
Government "to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms
In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many houses are to and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands
be seen that are erected on lots that form part of land used for in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
agricultural purposes. If for the time being, and to the advantage of the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required
the possessors thereof, they have ceased to be such agricultural by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the
lands, they may later on again become transformed into farming land acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of
and, by the industry of the owner, again be made to yield fruit. title, etc.;" and section 15 authorizes and empowers the said
Government of the Philippine Islands "on such terms as it may
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, prescribed, by general legislation, to provide for the granting, or sale
and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kind of and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of
vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestall in its said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than
nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of timber and mineral lands of the United States on said Islands, as it
agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of may deem wise, etc."
agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again
become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is
contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the
with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the
agricultural land. sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and,
provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or
In the decision rendered by this court in the case of Mapa vs. The reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be
Insular Government, No. 3793 (10 Phil. Rep., 175), the legislation in acquired by any private or judicial person; and considering their
force was interpreted in a similar sense. origin and primitive state and the general uses to which they were
accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urban lands or building
It is not to be believed that it was the sense of the two sovereign lots being included in this classification for the purpose of
powers that have successively promulgated the said laws, to place distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral and timber lands;
those in possession of building lots under title of ownership in an the transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such
anomalous, uncertain and insecure position, rendering it impossible classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into
for them to obtain legal titles to the lands appropriated by them, and rural estates.
denying them the care and protection of the law to which they were
certainly entitled on account of the efforts they have made, both in If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land,
their behalf, and for the benefit of the cities and towns in which they and on the other hand is susceptible of cultivation the Act of
reside, contributing to the wealth and increase of the country. Congress contains no provision whatever that would exclude it from
being classified as agricultural land, and assuming that it falls within
In the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were enacted after that classification, the benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No.
almost all the towns of this Archipelago were established, and it must 926, must forthwith be applied for the reason that it has been fully
be assumed that the lawmakers have started from the supposition proven that the applicant was in possession thereof for more than 13
that titles to the building lots within the confines of such towns had years prior to the 26th of July, 1904, when the said Act went into
been duly acquired; therefore, in special cases like the present one, effect. Furthermore, there is no legal reason or cause to exclude
wherein is sought the registration of a lot situated within a town urban lands from the benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the contrary,
created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply the interpretation that urban real estate, that is not mineral or
thereto the laws in force and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch forestall in character, be understood to fall within the classification of
as it was agricultural prior to its conversion into a building lot, and is agricultural land, is deemed to be most rational and beneficial to
public interests.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the thereabouts, of several parcels of land in the Banilad Friar Lands in
judgment appealed from should be reversed, and that it should be, as which the property in question is located, showing the price to be at
it is, hereby ordered, that, after holding in general default all such P2.37 per square meter. For her part, Victoria Amigable presented
persons as may have any interest in the said parcel of land, the newspaper clippings of the Manila Times showing the value of the
registration of the same shall be granted in accordance with the Land peso to the dollar obtaining about the middle of 1972, which was
Registration Act. No special ruling is made as to costs. So ordered. P6.775 to a dollar.
Willard, J., concurs. Upon consideration of the evidence presented by both parties, the
Carson, J., concurs in the result. court which is now the public respondent in the instant petition,
rendered judgment on January 9, 1973 directing the Republic of the
Philippines to pay Victoria Amigable the sum of P49,459.34 as the
value of the property taken, plus P145,410.44 representing interest
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HlGHWAYS, petitioner, at 6% on the principal amount of P49,459.34 from the year 1924 up
vs. to the date of the decision, plus attorney's fees of 10% of the total
6
HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of amount due to Victoria Amigable, or a grand total of P214,356.75.
First Instance of Cebu City, Branch 11, and Victoria
Amigable, respondents. The aforesaid decision of the respondent court is now the subject of
the present petition for review by certiorari, filed by the Solicitor
Quirico del Mar & Domingo Antiquera for respondent. General as counsel of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines,
against the landowner, Victoria Amigable, as private respondent. The
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. petition was given due course after respondents had filed their
comment thereto, as required. The Solicitor General, as counsel of
petitioner, was then required to file petitioner's brief and to serve
7
copies thereof to the adverse parties. Petitioner's brief was duly
8
filed on January 29, 1974, to which respondents filed only a
DE CASTRO, J.: 9
"comment." instead of a brief, and the case was then considered
10
submitted for decision.
Victoria Amigable is the owner of parcel of land situated in Cebu City
with an area of 6,167 square meters. Sometime in 1924, the
1. The issue of whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the
Government took this land for road-right-of-way purpose. The land
New Civil Code is applicable in determining the amount of
had since become streets known as Mango Avenue and Gorordo
compensation to be paid to respondent Victoria Amigable for the
Avenue in Cebu City.
property taken is raised because the respondent court applied said
Article by considering the value of the peso to the dollar at the time
On February 6, 1959, Victoria Amigable filed in the Court of First
of hearing, in determining due compensation to be paid for the
Instance of Cebu a complaint, which was later amended on April 17,
property taken. The Solicitor General contends that in so doing, the
1959 to recover ownership and possession of the land, and for
respondent court violated the order of this Court, in its decision in
damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the alleged illegal occupation
G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972, to make as basis of the
of the land by the Government, moral damages in the sum of
determination of just compensation the price or value of the land at
P25,000.00, and attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00, plus costs of
the time of the taking.
suit. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-5977 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Victoria Amigable vs. Nicolas
It is to be noted that respondent judge did consider the value of the
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highway and
1 property at the time of the taking, which as proven by the petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
was P2.37 per square meter in 1924. However, applying Article 1250
2 of the New Civil Code, and considering that the value of the peso to
In its answer, the Republic alleged, among others, that the land was
the dollar during the hearing in 1972 was P6.775 to a dollar, as
either donated or sold by its owners to the province of Cebu to
proven by the evidence of the private respondent Victoria Amigable
enhance its value, and that in any case, the right of the owner, if any,
the Court fixed the value of the property at the deflated value of the
to recover the value of said property was already barred by estoppel
peso in relation, to the dollar, and came up with the sum of
and the statute of limitations, defendants also invoking the non-
P49,459.34 as the just compensation to be paid by the Government.
suability of the Government.
To this action of the respondent judge, the Solicitor General has
taken exception.
In a decision rendered on July 29, 1959 by Judge Amador E. Gomez,
the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed on the grounds relied upon by
3 Article 1250 of the New Civil Code seems to be the only provision in
the defendants therein. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the
our statutes which provides for payment of an obligation in an
Supreme Court where it was reversed, and the case was remanded to
amount different from what has been agreed upon by the parties
the court of origin for the determination of the compensation to be
because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation.
paid the plaintiff-appellant as owner of the land, including attorney's
4 Thus, the Article provides:
fees. The Supreme Court decision also directed that to determine
just compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
5 ART. 1250. In case extra-ordinary inflation or
thereof at the time of the taking.
deflation of the currency stipulated should
supervene, the value of the currency at the time
In the hearing held pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court,
of the establishment of the obligation shall be
the Government proved the value of the property at the time of the
the basis of payment, unless there is an
taking thereof in 1924 with certified copies, issued by the Bureau of
agreement to the contrary.
Records Management, of deeds of conveyance executed in 1924 or
It is clear that the foregoing provision applies only to cases where a 6,167 square meters when it was taken in 1924. The interest in the
contract or agreement is involved. It does not apply where the sum of P145,410.44 at the rate of 6% from 1924 up to the time
obligation to pay arises from law, independent of contract. The taking respondent court rendered its decision, as was awarded by the said
of private property by the Government in the exercise of its power of court should accordingly be reduced.
eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. We
14
have expressed this view in the case of Velasco vs. Manila Electric In Our decision in G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972, We have
11
Co., et al., L-19390, December 29, 1971. said that Victoria Amigable is entitled to the legal interest on the
price of the land from the time of the taking. This holding is however
Moreover, the law as quoted, clearly provides that the value of the contested by the Solicitor General, citing the case of Raymunda S.
15
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be Digsan vs. Auditor General, et al., alleged to have a similar factual
the basis of payment which, in cases of expropriation, would be the environment and involving the same issues, where this Court
value of the peso at the time of the taking of the property when the declared that the interest at the legal rate in favor of the landowner
12
obligation of the Government to pay arises. It is only when there is accrued not from the taking of the property in 1924 but from April
an "agreement to the contrary" that the extraordinary inflation will 20, 1961 when the claim for compensation was filed with the Auditor
make the value of the currency at the time of payment, not at the General. Whether the ruling in the case cited is still the prevailing
time of the establishment of the obligation, the basis for payment. In doctrine, what was said in the decision of this Court in the abovecited
other words, an agreement is needed for the effects of an case involving the same on the instant matter, has become the "law
extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of of the case", no motion for its reconsideration having been filed by
the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation which, the Solicitor General before the decision became final. Accordingly,
as a rule, is always the determinative element, to be varied by the interest to be paid private respondent, Victoria Amigable, shall
agreement that would find reason only in the supervention of commence from 1924, when the taking of the property took place,
extraordinary inflation or deflation. computed on the basis of P14,615.79, the value of the land when
taken in said year 1924.
We hold, therefore, that under the law, in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary, even assuming that there has been an 2. On the amount of attorney's fees to be paid private respondent,
extraordinary inflation within the meaning of Article 1250 of the New about which the Solicitor General has next taken issue with the
Civil Code, a fact We decline to declare categorically, the value of the respondent court because the latter fixed the same at P19,486.97,
peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation, which in the while in her complaint, respondent Amigable had asked for only
instant case is when the property was taken possession of by the P5,000.00, the amount as awarded by the respondent court, would
Government, must be considered for the purpose of determining just be too exhorbitant based as it is, on the inflated value of the land. An
compensation. Obviously, there can be no "agreement to the attorney's fees of P5,000.00, which is the amount asked for by
contrary" to speak of because the obligation of the Government private respondent herself in her complaint, would be reasonable.
sought to be enforced in the present action does not originate from
contract, but from law which, generally is not subject to the will of WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed as to
the parties. And there being no other legal provision cited which the basis in the determination of the price of the land taken as just
would justify a departure from the rule that just compensation is compensation for its expropriation, which should be the value of the
determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of land at the time of the taking, in 1924. Accordingly, the same is
the taking thereof in expropriation by the Government, the value of hereby fixed at P14,615.79 at P2.37 per square meter, with interest
the property as it is when the Government took possession of the thereon at 6% per annum, from the taking of the property in 1924, to
land in question, not the increased value resulting from the passage be also paid by Government to private respondent, Victoria
of time which invariably brings unearned increment to landed Amigable, until the amount due is fully paid, plus attorney's fees of
properties, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation P5,000.00.
13
for the property taken.
SO ORDERED.
In the present case, the unusually long delay of private respondent in
bringing the present action-period of almost 25 years which a stricter Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
application of the law on estoppel and the statute of limitations and
prescription may have divested her of the rights she seeks on this LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
action over the property in question, is an added circumstance vs.
militating against payment to her of an amount bigger-may three-fold MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and
more than the value of the property as should have been paid at the the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH
time of the taking. For conformably to the rule that one should take I), respondents.
good care of his own concern, private respondent should have
commenced proper action soon after she had been deprived of her LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
right of ownership and possession over the land, a deprivation she vs.
knew was permanent in character, for the land was intended for, and FORTUNATO DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY ,
had become, avenues in the City of Cebu. A penalty is always visited and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH
upon one for his inaction, neglect or laches in the assertion of his I), respondents.
rights allegedly withheld from him, or otherwise transgressed upon
by another.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
From what has been said, the correct amount of compensation due DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and
private respondent for the taking of her land for a public purpose the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH
would be not P49,459.34, as fixed by the respondent court, but only I), respondents.
P14,615.79 at P2.37 per square meter, the actual value of the land of
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Jesus B. Santos and Hill & in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the
Associates for petitioner. Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged
falsification of public documents.
Floro B. Bugnosen for private respondents.
In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the
theory of the defense and dismissed the three (3) criminal cases, with
costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction
9
FERNANDEZ, J.: of the three (3) accused.
This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October
Baguio City, Branch I, dismissing the three complaints for annulment 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following
of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 entitled "Republic of grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action carries with it the
the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for being without declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist;
1 (2) the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants of the
merit.
crime charged renders these civil cases moot and academic, (3) the
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, trial court has no jurisdiction to order cancellation of the patents
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the certificates of title in question
Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of Free Patents Nos. V- can no longer be assailed; and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal
10
152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original interest in the subject matter in litigation.
Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of
misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three
defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung (3) civil cases because:
Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles
are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO
a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the DISMISS, these civil cases filed by the defendants as well as the two
Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and
Province. The Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the of all the
party defendant. three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the issuance of said Free
Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with
The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant
2 to the provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and
September 22, 196 l.
consequently, these properties became the private properties of the
The defendants filed their respective answers.
3 defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these
titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles
The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31,
motions for intervention dated February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210
4
cases which were granted.
5 belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible and this Court has
no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel
the same.
The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled
lands in question-.ion is within the intervenor's ordinary timber
license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for renewal on The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are
June 30, 1962 and another portion of said lands is embraced in its ignorant natives of Benguet Province and are members of the so-
mineral claims.
6 called Cultural Minorities of Mountain Province, who are the same
persons accused in the dismissed criminal cases, based on the same
grounds. It should be noted that these cases fall squarely under Sec.
The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended joint 11
7 3 of Rule III of the New Rules of Court.
answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The said
amended joint answer was admitted in an order dated September
10, 1972.
8 They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director
of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company,, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order
Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the 12
dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070. Both motion for
plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of 13
reconsideration were denied by the trial court. Thereupon the
Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City three (3)
intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed the instant
criminal cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as
petition.
Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359 and 2360, against the defendants
Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan,
private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements The petitioner assigns the following errors:
in their applications for free patents over the lands in question. The
proceedings on the three (3) civil cases were suspended pending the I
outcome of the criminal cases.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
criminal cases, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on the 'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO
ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirements
THE REGISTRATION OF THE FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Director of
RESPONDENTS. Lands to dispose of the properties since they are within the forest
zone, the court finds Republic Act No. 3872, to clear this point.
II Section 1, amending Section 44 of the Land Act in its second
paragraph states:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF REPUBLIC ACT A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously
NO. 3872. occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether
III disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF the time he files his free patent application, he is not the owner of
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS Public Land Law.
FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF
THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF THE PRIVATE The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the right of a person to have a
14 free patent issued to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case
RESPONDENTS.
the Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to dispose, whether the
Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The land be disposable or not. This provision of law, certainly, applies to
pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. herein defendants. The reason for this law is explicit and could very
141, provide: well be seen from its EXPLANATORY NOTE, which reads:
Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public 'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising Christian
domain; but timber and mineral lands shag be governed by special brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places
laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or inhabited by members of the National Cultural Minorities, there has
construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of be-en an exodus of the poor and less fortunate non-christians from
the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which being their ancestral homes during the t ten years to the fastnesses of the
privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the wilderness where they have settled in peace on portions of
Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most cases, within the forest
disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which zones. But this is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural
may hereafter be enacted. minorities. Because of the grant of pasture leases or permits to the
more agressive Christians, these National Cultural Minorities who
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of have settled in the forest zones for the last ten years have been
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and
of the public domain into — imprisonment.
(a) Alienable or disposable, The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the Public
Land Act is to give the national culture, minorities a fair chance to
acquire lands of the public domain' ...
(b) Timber, and
It is for this reason — that is, to give these national cultural minorities
(c) Mineral lands,
who were driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire
lands of the public domain — that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
is the new government policy on liberation of the free patent
one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
provisions of the Public Land Act emphasizing more consideration to
disposition.
and sympathy on the members of the national cultural minorities,
15
which our courts of justice must uphold.
The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor,
The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private
petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the patents and
respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872. The
certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore,
pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads:
not alienable. Without receiving evidence, the trial court dismissed
the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the free
SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of
patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as
the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122
follows:
of Act 496, as amended, and said properties became the private
properties of the defendants under the operation of Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act. The trial court concluded that these titles SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the
enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens title, and owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth,
Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 of the ninth hundred and twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously
defendants are now indefeasible. occupied and cultivated, either by, himself' or through his
predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition- or who shall have paid the real estate tax
In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial court
thereon while the same has, not been occupied by any person shall
said,
be entitled, under the provision of this chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed or mineral lands and whether or not the private respondents are
twenty-four hectares. entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in
the criminal case.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the
predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether reception of evidence on (1) whether or not the lands in question are
disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act
the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any 3872 to be issued free patents on said lands.
real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public
Land Law. WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and
1970 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside
There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of and said cases are remanded to the trial court for further
the National Cultural Minorities; that they have continously occupied proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.
and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not SO ORDERED.
the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land
Act at the time they filed the free patent applications. These Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-
qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the Herrera, JJ., concur.
intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the
lands in question when the private respondents applied for free REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
patents thereon. DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA
titles based on the patents awarded to the private respondents have ROSA, respondents.
become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void
when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots
even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
16 17
cancelled. In Director of lands vs. Abanzado this Court said: vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN
4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father
and scholarly opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry v. JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
Muñoz, a 1968 decision. After a review of Spanish legislation, he
summarized the present state of the law thus: 'If a Spanish title G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest
land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated.
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
Before private interests have intervened, the government may
vs.
decide for i what Portions of the public domain shall be set aside and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN
reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however long,
and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father,
cannot ripen into private ownership.' Nor is this all He reiterated the
JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
basic state objective on the matter in clear and penetrating language:
'The view this Court takes of the cages at bar is but in adherence to
CRUZ, J.:
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands.
many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite
often, above the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation. The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that
protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the
1
For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural discovery is made be private. In the cases at bar, which have been
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number Of adverse or not correctly applied.
ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry
up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of
The fish disappears. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo.
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the
to property — crops, livestock, houses and highways — not to application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his
mention precious human lives, ...' children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
2
1964.
The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for
falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles. The The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated,
only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether there Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots
was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through
3
had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations. the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
The factual issues of whether or not the lands in question are timber
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to
claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the the land because it is not alienable and registerable.
Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
4
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. Alberto said he It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and
received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not
declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in- impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67
years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June
5
by Alberto's father. Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral
6
and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, Alberto his tax claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining
7
1964. locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug
mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it
successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of
of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had
8
its payment of taxes on the land. religiously paid the taxes.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of
were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives
Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the
January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by
Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma
possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of
work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from
9
annual taxes thereon. the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet
and Atok.
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with
Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that: It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed and to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this
unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid
open to exploration, occupation and purchase location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
and the land in which they are found to domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
occupation and purchase by the citizens of the discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
United States, or of said islands. perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the
United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the
arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
10
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By
had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the
11
land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v.
respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and
12
Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of "The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the
while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim,
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the
superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana
14
Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by land, against even the government, without need of any further act
the United States of the right of present and exclusive such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over
15
possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface it. As the land had become the private property of the locators,
ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and
except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and Atok.
this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the
patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private
virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the property was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to
fee remains in the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
(Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method
Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two
Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266) reasons.
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous,
patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was
physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves had
a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in
laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-
16
as good as though secured by patent. in-interest. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the
evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in
the requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of
17
the public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines discretion or without sufficient basis.
can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having
become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the
13
deprived thereof without due process of law. de la Rosas had really been in possession of the subject property,
their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The
Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural
public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the
categorically provided that: mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of
18
the diggings being undertaken "down below" but she did not mind,
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all the said land.
forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the
Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the interest" between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its
right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it
19
government established under this Constitution. Natural resources up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be especially in its practical application.
granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels
the measure and the limit of the grant. underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere
with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high
1935, declared: can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where
is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the
contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that
February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already
declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land
respective locations. ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral —
20
once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so,
because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those SO ORDERED.
who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act
No. 137, providing as follows: ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, R E S O L U
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or TION
utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is PER CURIAM:
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of government Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
established under the Constitution. prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right to Rules).
extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the
surface. In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
1
respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents Chairperson
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous
minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural land Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents. implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment
to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted
are excluded and excepted from all such titles. On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the
implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of
persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it
be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than prays that the petition be granted in part.
mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen.
him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen,
permission of the State to which such minerals belong. a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders
and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al),
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non- defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal
mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that of the petition.
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which
it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise
State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and
thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the dismissed.
21
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation
property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and
was not and could not have been transferred to the private mandamus be dismissed.
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
agricultural and mineral purposes. organizations were granted.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties
1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they
REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during Commissioner of the National Development Corporation,
the hearing. the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of "(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
Article XII of the Constitution: interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands; "(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that indigenous peoples; and
ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water,
mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are "(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction
private but community property of the indigenous peoples; over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
5
indigenous peoples."
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands; Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of
the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains; President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship
for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands; executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
6
Constitution.
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous
peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of Petitioners pray for the following:
minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be
their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with "(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58,
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for are unconstitutional and invalid;
not more than 25 years; and
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and
to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A.
and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
2
areas, forest cover or reforestation." "(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing Resources to cease and desist from implementing
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and No. 2, series of 1998;
3
3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist
the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the
4
due process clause of the Constitution. "(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
These provisions are: with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of development, utilization and conservation of Philippine
7
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and natural resources."
which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands; After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court
voted as follows:
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by
the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an
upon notification to the following officials, namely, the opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part
II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely
on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of
R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality
of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must
await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and
Vitug.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate
opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
On May 6, 1999, the RTC issued an order denying the defendants’ The petition is meritorious.
motion for reconsideration and at the same time denying the
plaintiffs’ motion for execution on the ground that public policy The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it
prohibited the issuance of a writ of execution against the filed on May 30, 1997 the defective motion for reconsideration.
government. The RTC recalled the writ of execution it earlier issued. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for
reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be made in writing
Thereafter, the defendants, now the petitioners, filed with the Court stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which
of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. Such written
Court, as amended, for the nullification of the February 5, 1999 and notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
May 6, 1999 Orders of the RTC alleging that the: Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of hearing
on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the parties
I concerned at least three days before the date of
hearing.1âwphi1 Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice
of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state
the time and place of the hearing of the motion. The requirements,
far from being merely technical and procedural as claimed by the service. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the OSG, as part of the
8
petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process. government bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its duties with
the highest degree of professionalism, intelligence and skill and to
13
Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to the public.
party may file his reply or opposition, the trial court would have no
way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or objects to Trite to state, this Court is impelled to do so anew in this
the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on his objection. Hence, case.1âwphi1 The CA cannot be faulted for ruling that having lost
the need for the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its their right of appeal through the negligence of the OSG the
9
motion. The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 petitioners are not entitled to a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of
14
of the Rules of Court are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure.
fatal and renders the motion pro forma; a worthless piece of paper
which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court However, prescinding from all the foregoing, this Court grants not
10
has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or only petitioners’ plea that it suspend its own rule on the perfection of
for the reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for appeals but also directs the reopening of the trial of the case for the
11
appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of said motion. parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Court excepts this
case from the said rule in the interest of justice, to avert a grave
In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, miscarriage of justice to the State through the negligence of the OSG.
1997 the decision of the RTC; hence, they had until June 4, 1997 The State has the right to adduce its evidence, testimonial and
within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new trial documentary. Courts should proceed with caution so as not to
or to perfect their appeal from said adverse decision. Although the deprive a party of this right but, instead, afford every party litigant
petitioners filed the motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of its
15
within the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. The trial court no
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof less declared in its January 28, 1999 Order that although the
that the respondents were actually served with a copy of said petitioners’ May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was defective,
motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of the Rules of Court should be liberally construed only to make a volte
Court.1avvphi1 The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion face and issue ex parte an order dismissing the appeal of the
for reconsideration containing the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 petitioners and canceling the hearing on the petitioners’ motion for
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. reconsideration set on February 19, 1999.
The OSG offered no valid justification for its failure to comply with What is involved in this case is a portion of land consisting of no less
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court except the self-serving than 145,682 square meters or less than fifteen hectares which they
claim of Solicitor Evaristo M. Padilla that his omission was sheer claim is part of the Mt. Apo National Park as shown by the relocation
inadvertence, caused by heavy pressure of work in preparing survey of the panel of commissioners. The case is one of public
numerous pleadings and in the almost daily attendance in court for interest. If the aforesaid property is, indeed, part of the forest
naturalization cases and those for nullity of marriage, among others. reserve as claimed by the petitioners but their right to adduce their
Other than the barefaced allegations of Solicitor Padilla, he offered evidence is foreclosed by the dismissal of the present petition, the
no specific details as to what pleadings he prepared and the hearings said property would be forever lost to the prejudice of the State.
16
he attended which prevented him from complying with Sections 4 In Republic v. Imperial, this Court held that:
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, if Solicitor Padilla
was able to prepare within the reglementary period the May 30, The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands
1997 Motion for Reconsideration, he offered no valid justification for subject of petitioner’s reversion efforts are foreshore lands
his failure to incorporate in said motion or append thereto a simple constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules
one-paragraph notice of hearing which could have been and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file
accomplished in a few minutes. What is so nettlesome is that the appellant’s brief. Petitioner’s appeal presents an exceptional
May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners was signed circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given
17
not only by Solicitor Padilla but also by Assistant Solicitor General due course.
Aurora P. Cortes. Even if Solicitor Padilla, through his negligence,
failed to incorporate in said motion for reconsideration the requisite The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents as it
notice of hearing, the Assistant Solicitor General should have noticed ordered the petitioners to vacate that portion of the subject property
the omission before she affixed her signature thereon and sought the occupied by them and to return possession thereof to the
immediate rectification thereof by Solicitor Padilla before said motion respondents, without requiring the parties to adduce evidence on
was filed. She did not. She offered no valid explanation for her faux the factual issues of (a) whether or not the property covered by the
pas either. The general rule is that the clients are bound by the title of the respondents is part of the Mt. Apo National Park (a forest
12
mistakes and negligence of their counsel. reserve); (b) whether or not the building constructed by the
petitioners is inside the forest reserve; and (c) whether or not the
In a case of recent vintage, the Court took to task the OSG for its petitioners installed a generator unit in the respondents’ property.
lackadaisical attitude and complacency in the handling of its cases for
the government and reminded the OSG that: It bears stressing that the trial court formed a panel of
commissioners to conduct a relocation survey of the subject
… just like other members of the Bar, the canons under the Code of property. The panel of commissioners found that 145,682 square
Professional Responsibility apply with equal force on lawyers in meters which is a portion of the Mt. Apo National Park had been
government service in the discharge of their official tasks. These included in the respondents’ title to the subject property. The trial
ethical duties are rendered even more exacting as to them because, court ignored this and did not even bother to receive the parties’
as government counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the respective evidence on the said report. The panel of commissioners
policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public
was not even called to testify on its findings. The appellate court will by TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 to petitioner Sta. Monica Industrial and
be able to review on appeal the decision of the trial court and Development Corporation. TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 were
ascertain whether there has been a travesty of justice to the gross cancelled and TCT Nos. T-12054 and T-12055 were issued to
prejudice of the State. petitioner. Petitioner consolidated the two (2) parcels of land and
subdivided them into five hundred thirty-six (536) residential lots
The respondents will not suffer substantial prejudice if the trial is which it sold to individual buyers.
reopened. The records show that the trial court denied respondents’
motion for a writ of execution although the trial court had dismissed In 1985, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
the appeal of the petitioners. The respondents did not even assail the General, filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for the
order of the trial court. annulment of the decree in LRC No. 6431, OCT No. 48 (issued to De
Perio), TCT No. T-1369 (issued to De Valencia) and TCT No. T-7696
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of (issued to Baloy). Respondent alleged that the decree in LRC No.
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53440 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The 6431 was null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13, dated inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within the forest
February 5, 1999 and May 5, 1999 in Civil Case No. 23,168-94 are SET zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only in 1961, and
ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to reopen the trial to hence cannot be the subject of disposition or alienation as private
enable the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Office of property. Named defendants were De Valencia and her husband,
the Solicitor General is hereby directed to represent the petitioners Baloy and his wife and the Register of Deeds of Zambales. The case
during the trial. No costs. was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, With leave of court, petitioner intervened and filed an answer-in-
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, intervention. Later, petitioner filed its first motion for preliminary
Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. hearing on the affirmative defense of res judicata, which the Court of
Appeals denied. Petitioner did not seek reconsideration thereof.
STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, Trial on the merits ensued. The Republic offered its evidence,
vs. consisting of a land classification map prepared by the Director of
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE Forestry in 1961 to prove that the land became alienable and
PHILIPPINES, respondents. disposable only in 1961, and rested its case. Petitioner then
proceeded to present its evidence. This was, however, cut short
Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo for petitioner. when the Republic moved to amend its complaint to include as party
defendants all the other transferees of the land and, thereafter, filed
its amended complaint. Petitioner again moved for a preliminary
hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata in an effort to
CORTES, J.: shorten the proceedings.
This case arose from proceedings to annul a 1912 decision of the land The Court of Appeals, holding that res judicata cannot be invoked as
registration court. a bar to an action for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, denied the motion. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied, hence this petition.
In 1912, the Tribuna del Registro de la Propiedad (Court of Land
Registration) of Zambales, through Judge James Ostrand, in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 6431, confirmed the title of Justo de After the comment and reply were filed, the Court gave due course
Perio over two (2) parcels of land in Zambales. On August 28, 1912, to the petition and, as required, the parties filed their respective
Decree No. 9328 was issued by the court ordering the registration of memoranda.
the two (2) parcels of land in the name of De Perio. On December 6,
1912, Original Certificate of Title No. 48 of the Registry of Deeds of On April 2, 1990, the Court set the case for hearing on May 7, 1990
Zambales was issued to De Perio. Parcel No. 1 consists of an area of because, as stated in the resolution:
eleven thousand six hundred ninety-seven square meters (11,697
sq.m.) while Parcel No. 2 consists of three hundred forty thousand ...after deliberating extensively on it, the Court finds the need to hear
eight hundred twenty square meters (340,820 sq.m.). In 1936, a the oral arguments of the parties on issues which are considered
portion consisting of ten thousand four hundred square meters determinative of the case, including the following:
(10,400 sq.m.) of Parcel No. 2 was sold to the Province of Zambales.
The sale was annotated at the back of OCT No. 48. In 1954, OCT No. 1. the nature and classification, under the pertinent laws traced back
48 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1369 was issued to Mercedes de to the turn of the century, of the two parcels of land decreed and
Valencia pursuant to an extrajudicial settlement of De Perio's estate. originally titled in 1912 to De Perio; and
In 1962, De Valencia sold Parcel No. 1 to Ricardo Baloy. Baloy was
issued TCT No. T-7696 in 1966. In 1967, De Valencia subdivided 2. the legal considerations that compelled the Government to seek
Parcel No. 2 into five (5) lots (Lots 2-A to 2-E). TCT No. T-1369 was the annulment of the decree of the Court of Land Registration issued
cancelled and TCT Nos. 11865, 11866, 11867, and 11869 were issued in favor of De Perio, his title, and the titles of his successors-in-
to De Valencia. TCT No. 11 868, corresponding to the portion interest.
previously sold to the Province of Zambales, was issued to the
Republic of the Philippines. In 1970, De Valencia sold the lots covered
The parties were heard in oral argument and thereafter they were 767 as "lying within the Civil Reservation, town site of Olongapo,
required to submit their memoranda in amplification of their situated in the municipality of Olongapo, Province of Zambales, P. I."
arguments. [Annex "A" of Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 222-223].
The question presented before the Court is whether or not On the other hand, the public respondent, through the Office of the
respondent CA committed reversible error of law in denying Solicitor General, contended:
petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense
of res judicata. Records disclose that by virtue of Proclamation dated November 11,
1908, then Governor-General James F. Smith reserved for naval
As iterated in a long line of cases, the following requisites must purposes certain lands of the public domain in Subic, Zambales which
concur for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case: included the parcels of land embraced under Original Certificate of
(1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have been Title (OCT) No. 48 secured by De Perio in 1912. It was only in 1961
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and that such Proclamation was revoked by a subsequent issuance,
the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there Proclamation No. 731, issued by then President Garcia on February 2,
must be between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, of 1961 and such portions already classified as alienable and disposable
subject matter, and of causes of action [San Diego v. Cardona, 70 and not needed for government purposes were declared open for
Phil. 281 (1940); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax disposition under R.A. No. 274, in relation to C.A. 141 and Act No.
Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; Yusingco 3038. This means that the lands, subject matter of the case, were
v. Ong Hing Lian, G. R. No. L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA portions of the U.S. naval reservation and were declared open for
589; Aroc v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. L- disposition only on February 2, 1961 [Public Respondent's
39674, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 350; Republic v. Alagad, G.R. No. Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, p. 230].
66807, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 455; Vencilao v. Vano G.R. No.
L-25660, February 23, 1990]. Public respondent then reiterated that "[a]t the time Original
Certificate of Title No. 48 was issued on December 9, 1912, the parcel
In contending that the judgment in LRC No. 6431 should be annulled of land covered by the title was still within the forest zone and it was
because the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the not until January 31, 1961 that said land was released by the Bureau
subject matter of the case, the respondent Republic puts in issue the of Forest Development as alienable and disposable under Land
presence of the second requisite. Therefore, the ultimate issue Classification Map No. 2427" [Ibid].
before the Court is whether or not the land registration court had
jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land claimed by De Perio, the It also added that "Land Classification Map No. 665 dated June 7,
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner herein. 1927 ... shows that the parcels of land covered by OCT No. 48 were
still part of the unclassified public forest at the time of the
Necessarily, the resolution of this issue requires an inquiry into the registration" [Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 4; Rollo, p. 231].
nature of the subject parcels of land in light of the laws prevailing at
the time the judgment in the land registration case was rendered. Weighing the arguments raised by the parties, we find that the
Republic has failed to make out a convincing case for the annulment
Petitioner's primary argument, as summarized in its memorandum, of the decree in Land Registration Case No. 6431. It has been
was as follows: established that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the
two (2) parcels of land, and that OCT No. 48 and the Transfer
17. It must, therefore, be presumed that in LRC Case No. 6431, the Certificates of Title (TCT) derived from OCT No. 48 are valid.
court found from the evidence adduced by the parties that (1) the
two parcels of land in question were agricultural lands as the phrase Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into
is used in Act No. 926, (2) Justo de Perio had been in the open, law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26, 1904, was
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof for at least 10 the law applicable to De Perio's petition for confirmation of his title
years, before July 26, 1912, and (3) his possession of the said parcels to the two (2) parcels of land. It provided:
of land was in the concept of owner; and thus the court confirmed
Justo de Perio's title thereto and ordered their registration in his SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in
name. If the Attorney General, the Director of Forestry, the Director right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to
of Lands and the Director of Public Works opposed the application, own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such
then it must be presumed that the court declared the said two lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land
parcels of land to be agricultural lands over their opposition. If they Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims
did not oppose, then it must be presumed that they agreed with the and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
court that the said lands were really agricultural lands. It must be
pointed out that the question as to whether the two parcels of land xxx xxx xxx
in question are agricultural lands and not timber lands is a question
of fact and the finding of Judge Ostrand that they are agricultural can 6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest
not be reviewed by this Honorable Court at this point in time have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
[Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 211-212]. possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by
said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a
Additionally, petitioner argued that the boundaries of the two parcels bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
of land, as described in Decree No. 9328, debunk the contention that period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act,
they are forest lands. The parcels of land were bounded by privately except when prevented by war or force majeure shall be conclusively
owned property. Moreover, they were described in the notice presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
published in the March 1912 issue of the Official Gazette, pp. 766- government grant and to have received the same, and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of the unclassified public forest and the territory comprising the Subic
this chapter. naval reservation way back in 1961.
xxx xxx xxx Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was
released in 1961. In a few more months, the possessors of the land
In other words, a person who had been in open, continuous, would acquire title to the portions they adversely possess through
exclusive and notorious session and occupation of public agricultural acquisitive prescription, without need of title or of good faith,
land for a period of at least ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904 could pursuant to the Civil Code [Art. 1137].
petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so
possessed and occupied. Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to annul a
judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's nullity rests upon
The land registration court confirmed De Perio's title to the two (2) the petitioner. The petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
parcels of land after due notice and hearing. From this, the following evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When the
conclusions may be derived: proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of
Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of
1. that the two (2) parcels of land are agricultural as defined by law, De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land
i.e., that they are neither timber land nor mineral land [Mapa v. were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's
Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175 (1908)]; case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years
after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps fail to
2. that De Perio had been in open, continuous, exclusive and conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and
notorious possession and occupation of the two (2) parcels of land the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said
for at least ten (10) years prior to 1904; 'contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation
reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging
3. that his possession and occupancy was under a bona fide claim of that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These, for reasons
ownership; and discussed earlier, are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption
in favor of the decree's regularity, more so when we consider that
notice of the application for registration and the date of hearing
4. that under the law De Perio had title to the land as of 1904,
thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the Director of Lands,
although it was confirmed only later in 1912.
the Director of Public Works and the Director of Forestry, among
others, was published in the Official Gazette and that Governor
These conclusions serve as premises to arrive at other conclusions
General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private rights.
determinative of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the Court of Appeals is
If the land is agricultural as defined by law, and as confirmed by
ordered to DISMISS CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.
Judge Ostrand, it could not have been forest land as claimed by
public respondent, the subsequent land classification map
SO ORDERED.
notwithstanding. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the
two (2) parcels of land were in the Olongapo townsite and
were bounded by privately-owned land. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
If De Perio had title to the land in 1904, although still imperfect, then Fernan, C.J., is on leave.
it could not have been prejudiced by the proclamation of Governor-
General Smith in 1908 which reserved for naval purposes land in THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
Subic, Zambales. Said proclamation recognized the existence of vs.
private rights, thus: RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
...por la presente exceptuo de venta o colonizacion hasta nueva The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of
orden y separo para reserva naval, salvo los derechos privados, todos mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If
y cada uno de los terrenos publicos comprendidos dentro de los they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
siguientes limites, a saber: [Proclamation del Gobernador General de the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they
las Islas Filipinos, 11 Noviembre 1908, para. 2, 6 O.G. 1885 (2 may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's
December 1908)]. claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
Public respondent has also failed to explain the Republic's sudden The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove
interest in the annulment of the decree and the certificate of title swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal
issued to De Perio and the subsequent titles issued to his successors applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
after some seventy-three (73) years of inaction and after a portion of his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for
the land has been developed by petitioner into a subdivision and more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including
hundreds of residences have been built thereon. At this point in time, the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial,
that portion of land developed into a subdivision cannot, by any the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of
1 2
stretch of imagination, be conceived as forest land. Anyway, the area Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
wherein the two (2) parcels of land are found, were released from Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature
and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
be reversed. Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year,
thus:
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the
private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this
dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially
the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual. It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the
Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years
7
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry:
Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the
country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine ...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We
mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation
in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land
it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a
expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or
commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
3
permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. This
provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in xxx xxx xxx
4
the present Constitution.
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in swamps does not change the general character of the land
force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be from manglare to timber land.
5
alienated. Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141.
Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section
ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and 1820, the Court declared:
so released for alienation.
6
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, promulgated Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926
in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglareswere defined by the Court means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber
as: or mineral lands.
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under
grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the
by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
we are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior
which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American to its enactment.
jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court
impairment of the public interest in what remains.
should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are
agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established
xxx by Act No. 926.
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de
law, the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands 8
Centenera v. Obias, promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than
into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917.
the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land
public disaster.
covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in his
opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided
susceptible of private ownership. that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared,
despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate
14
on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling Court, where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's
9
was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, with Justice submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp
Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not
in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of registerable. This case was decided only twelve days after the De
the trial court that: Porkan case.
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a
where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and
and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural
convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in lands or forest lands.
character. They do not form part of the public domain.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to
10
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, the Court, citing Krivenko the legislature, which has the authority to implement the
11
v. Register of Deeds, reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain
public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role,
administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with
line of decisions holding the contrary view. the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the
picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or,
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly
12 observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments,
Resources, promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau
of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural
are still classified as forest lands. resources.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of
13 the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of
Forestry, the Court was more positive when it held, again through
Justice Gutierrez: public lands, thus:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify
'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is the lands of the public domain into:
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that (a) Alienable or disposable,
no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, (b) Lumber, and
they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still
subject to land registration proceedings because the property had (c) Mineral lands,
been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and
therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted and and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification. disposition.
The petition is without merit. Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land under this Act.
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same
mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by law provides:
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to follows:
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect (a) Agricultural;
titles do not apply.'
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for
similar productive purposes;
15
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar Court of Appeals, where the possession of the land in dispute
purposes; and commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as
timberland.
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and
quasi-public uses. It follows from all this that the land under contention being
admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could
classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and
in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support
of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the
as follows: certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of
same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove
16
the approval of the Department Head, the President of the swamps approved by the Director of Lands, to prove that the land
Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence
he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove
and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is
not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was
such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is
as public forest. the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether
forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses,
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for
alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to private ownership.
time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation
such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as Thus we held in the Yngson case:
though such proclamation had never been made.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as
in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau
of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other
required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion: of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain
while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised not released for fishery or other purposes.
within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest
discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The
no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
department. More importantly, the said provision has not been confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after
challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into
scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. private property.'
We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the
classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive
the land actually looks like. That determination having been made possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the
duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall. existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the
original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied.
agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been
over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land
Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage
17
acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we Law. These matters are not presumed but must be established
ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters
were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938,
sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued
5
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 (OCT No. 11585) in the name
much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held of spouses Carag.
18
in countless cases.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer
right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
6
the petition must be granted. 1277, issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot
2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate
7
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative of Title No. T-1278, issued in the name of the private respondents,
definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and
and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the
agricultural land. annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time
the application for registration of title of private respondent is of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately
executory. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating
team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the
SO ORDERED. subject property.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, The investigating team reported that:
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur. A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for
spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao,
Fernan, C.J., took no part. Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time
of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as
Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC
Office No. 2, petitioners, Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others
TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their
FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,respondents. predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151,
covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time
8
DECISION immemorial.
CARPIO, J.: Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-
151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February
The Case 1982."
1 2
This is a petition for review of the 21 May 2001 and 25 September In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the
3
2002 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands
The that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its
derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the approved the recommendation.
Philippines’ (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment
of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928,
September 2002 Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment
9
reconsideration. of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles on the
ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
The Facts a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000
square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly
still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No.
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial
4 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22
court) issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag
February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable
and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of
and disposable.
private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
(private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No.
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to 2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the
10
dismiss. Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to ground of lack of jurisdiction;
comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground 3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues
for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to
petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed dismiss;
of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or 4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had
other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of
added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;
copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also 5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party
maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land
judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance
11
496. Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of over the land;
spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an 6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case;
effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed and
that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso 7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this
12
Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents. case.
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for The Ruling of the Court
reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of
13
nullity of titles. While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on
procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals complaint for annulment of decree has no merit.
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
The Court of Appeals declared: First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either
of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the
15
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in complaint for annulment of decree.
civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint,
remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains petitioner stated:
no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such
circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive
actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore,
the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses
Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland,
alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the
within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and
of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the
381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of
1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.
Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the
provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. xxxx
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as 15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the
well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the
should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses,
14
Section 101 of the Public Land Act. (Citations omitted) specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area,
by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for
2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
reconsideration. did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the
said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are
Hence, this petition. null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect
16
whatsoever. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The Issues
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint
Petitioner raises the following issues: that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as
relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer timber land and was not alienable and disposable.
available;
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable.
22
ground of petitioner’s failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of In Aldecoa v. Insular Government, we ruled:
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available." From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is
deduced that, with the exception of those comprised
17
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, we ruled: within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the
final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is use of the public in general or reserved by the Government
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any
23
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, private or juridical person x x x (Emphasis supplied)
the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or
or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with
own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.
the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any
time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public
18
invoked, unless barred by laches. purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or
24
thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the
Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was
the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information
remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the
25
disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner’s
complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was
26
proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act No. 2874, which provides:
19
Act.
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides: recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be of the public domain into -
observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may
be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial (a) Alienable or disposable
Court.
(b) Timber and
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in
the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the (c) Mineral lands
case.
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the government and disposition.
merits.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land
pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only
property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable.
classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Section 8 provides:
Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits
that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for
Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor
declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain. in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of
20
over the subject matter of the claim. Jurisdiction over the subject public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to
matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or
21
at the time of the filing of the action. been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of The finality of the trial court’s decision is further recognized in
the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied) Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law. to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate the inauguration of the Government established under this
these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
disputed portion had not become private property prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural,
disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it
claimed under any existing law at that time. recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant,
lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
27 29
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Republic established under this Constitution." When the Commonwealth
sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses
Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the
application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by
alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the trial court.
the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land
applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic
classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in of the Philippines’ complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
28
Act Nos. 926 and 2874. The Court ruled: cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the We now consider the merits of these cases.
issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the (1) G.R. No. 127245
disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land.
The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that In G. R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic moved for reconsideration
spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a on the following grounds:
certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original
proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the
I. THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT
decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural.
CASES;
Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and
II. ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING
beyond review.
THAT RES JUDICATA MAY BE APPLIED, THE
REGALIAN DOCTRINE WHICH IS HIGHER AND and notorious possession and occupation" is fraught with untenable
MORE COMPELLING THAN RES JUDICATA implications since OCT No. 4216 was not evidenced by any judicial
WARRANTS THE EXEMPTION OF THIS CASE FROM record, decision or decree; thus private respondents invocation of
THE RULE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS; "private rights" is hearsay and self serving.
III. THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION IS THAT On the other hand, private respondents Margolles et al and Peltan
UNLESS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED AS ALIENABLE AND argue that this case must be decided on the basis of the law and
DISPOSABLE, UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE NOT jurisprudence in force during 1927-1929 covering the time when the
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE; AND application for registration was filed in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO
Record No. 30406) and when OCT No. 4216 was issued; that it is not
IV. IF THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER correct to say that no valid torrens title to land can be obtained by
2, 1999 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IS NOT individuals and entities in a land registration case unless the land was
RECONSIDERED PETITIONER STANDS TO LOSE previously covered by an executive proclamation declaring the land
VAST TRACK (SIC) OF PRIME LAND NOW VALUED as alienable and disposable. Respondents claim that property that
AT ABOUT P27,892,900,000.00. was already privately owned or under private ownership at the time
the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to
Petitioner Republic submits that the decisions of this Court in the United States remained private property, even if the owner had
1 not obtained a muniment of title to his property; thus, such person
Margolles et al. vs. CA 230 SCRA 97., Peltan Development
2 who has held the property under color of title may institute a land
Corporation et. al. vs. CA 270 SCRA 83., and Goldenrod, Inc. vs.
3 registration case to have the property brought under the torrens
CA August 10, 1994 resolution.do not constitute a bar to the present
case based on the rule of res judicata, as the said cases pertained to system and have a title issue in his name; that even assuming that a
the superiority of conflicting titles of the parties therein whereas the particular piece of property was not yet privately owned when the
present case resolves on the validity of the judgment covering a vast Spanish crown ceded sovereignty, private individuals or entities who
parcel of land rendered at the time when the land was still forest held "agricultural public land" openly, continuously, exclusively and
land; that the subject matter of the present case is the entire parcel notoriously, in the concept of owners "for a period of ten years next
of land covered by OCT No. 4216 with an area of 996,175 square preceding the twenty-sixth day of July 1904 were conclusively
meters, whereas the cited Margolles case involved only a 188,254 presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
square meter portion of the land covered by OCT No. 4216. "government grant" and to have received the same, and shall be
4
Petitioner insists that it was not a party in the Margolles case and entitled to a certificate of title to such land, Section 54 (6) Act No.
that its cause of action in the present case is based on the 926 of the Philippine Commission otherwise known as the Public
inalienability and indisposability of the subject land and consequent Land Act.as a qualified possessor of "agricultural public land"; that
lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court over the same. Thus there was no requirement under Act No. 926 that the land subject of
there is no identity of parties or of subject matter, or of cause of a government grant must have been previously declared as alienable
action that would justify application of the rule of res judicata. and disposable by the Governor General. Respondents claim that it
was under Act No. 2874 that the Governor General was given for the
Petitioner Republic further contends that land not classified as first time the authority upon recommendation of the Secretary of
alienable and disposable remain so and it is the private claimant who Agriculture to classify lands of public domain into alienable and
bears the burden of showing that the Executive Department has in disposable, timber and mineral, and to transfer such lands from one
fact classified the land as disposable and alienable; that under the class to another, for the purposes of their government and
5
regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly disposition. Section 6 Act No. 2874.Respondents submit that under
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, thus, Act No. 2974 just as in Act No. 926, such power of the Governor
whatever title issued before such classification is considered null and General did not affect lands that may have already become "private
void ab initio. It contends that during the oral argument, the Solicitor property" or have become impressed with a "private right authorized
6
General stated that initially it is the government which has the and recognized by this Act or any other valid law" Section 8 Act No.
burden of proof to show that the title of the Spouses Gana is invalid 2874.and the fact that such properties were not previously covered
or not legal but the burden is shifted to private respondents once the by a declaration by the Governor General that these lands are
government has established the fact that the title was issued before alienable and disposable does not affect the validity of the titles of
the land had been declared as alienable and disposable; that since the owners, e. g. the friar lands, the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati,
the land covered by OCT No. 4216 was still part of the unclassified the Tuason Entail, the Hacienda de Maricaban, Hacienda de Navotas,
forest land in 1927, the then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land registration the Piedad Estate, which were issued before World II. The ownership
court, which took cognizance of the land registration case and all the of these parties who owned property during the Spanish regime was
proceedings conducted therein including but not limited to the not affected by Act No. 926 or Act No. 2874, which referred only to
issuance of the published notice of initial hearing in the 1927 issue of public lands. They further contend that under the laws and
the Official Gazette were invalid, that land registration courts at the jurisprudence in force at the time the proceedings in LRC Case No.
time the Ganas filed their application, had no power nor authority to 678 (GLRO Record No. 30406) were conducted, and insofar as the
determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural confirmation of imperfect titles is concerned, the determination of
land subject of registration since the authority to classify lands was whether land is "agricultural public land" susceptible of registration in
then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 the name of a private party, or "forest land" which is not susceptible
(1903) and 2874 (1919). of private ownership, is a question of fact that the land registration
court has the power and/or jurisdiction to determine on the basis of
Petitioner Republic also claims that private respondents' reliance on the judicially prescribed or formulated test i.e., whether the land is
Section 45 of Act No. 2874 at this final stage of the proceedings, "more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than
which only indicates that the Gana spouses instituted their it is for agricultural purposes?".
application for land registration on confirmation of imperfect title
supposedly grounded on their alleged "open, continuous, exclusive We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner's arguments have been squarely discussed and were duly case, the petitioner contended in the proceedings filed by the
considered in our decision and we reiterate that the Court of Appeals Republic in the Court of Appeals, that when the decree in favor of De
did not err in denying the petition to annul judgment in view of the Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were
decision of this Court in the Margolles case. Petitioner's contention still part of the inalienable public forests.However, petitioner's case
that it was never a party to the Margolles case is not decisive of the rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the
issue. We have stated that absolute identity of parties is not required issuance of the decree in 1912 which maps fail to conclusively
but only substantial identity of parties for the application of the rule establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years
on res judicata. We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that prior to that.Before this Court, petitioner reiterated said contention
although petitioner was not a party in the Margolles case, its claim in and referred, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the
the instant case and that of the losing parties in the Margolles case land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject
raised exactly the same argument and relied on the same evidence to parcels of land are parts thereof.The Court held that these maps are
justify invalidation of OCT No. 4216, namely, that said title insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the
supposedly covers unclassified public land (forest land) so that the decree's regularity.The Court held that land classification maps drawn
CFI of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in 1929, did not several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912 fail to
acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject property in favor of the conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and
original applicants, the Gana spouses. Such a shared identity of the years prior to that, and are insufficient to overcome the
interest as shown by the identity of the relief sought by one person in presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.
a prior case and the second person in the subsequent case, i. e., to
declare the nullity of OCT No. 4216, is sufficient to make them "privy Respondents correctly posit that the court's jurisdiction is
7
in law" Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon City, 184 SCRA 80; Comilang vs. determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the
10
Buendia, 21 486; Santos vs. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 289; Widows and action. Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1995
Orphans Associations v. CA, 212 SCRA 360.for purposes of the edition, p. 55.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
operation of the rule on res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment. and is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not to recover upon
The main argument of petitioner Republic in seeking the claim asserted therein, a matter that can be resolved only after
11
annulment of the decision of the then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land and as a result of the trial. Ibid.It bears stress that what the
registration court in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) was petitioner sought to annul was the 1929 decision of the land
that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case because the registration court which became the basis for the issuance of OCT
property subject matter thereof was "forest land" since at the time No. 4216. The law prevailing at the time the original land registration
the land registration case was filed in 1927, the Governor-General was sought, Act No. 2874 (1919) entitled "An act to amend and
had not issued a proclamation declaring the subject property as compile the laws relative to lands of public domain, or better known
alienable and disposable. as "the Public Land Act" pertinently provides:
Since the petitioner is assailing the jurisdiction of the Land "Section 6. The Governor General, upon the recommendation of the
Registration Court which rendered the judgment in LRC Case No. 672 Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
(GLRO Record No. 30406) that became the basis for the issuance of time classify the lands of the public domain into-
OCT No. 4216 seventy (70) years ago relies on the very same
evidence (FAO 4-1141 [1968] implementing LC Map No. 2623 Project (a) Alienable or disposable,
No. 13-A), (namely land classification maps), that was judicially
determined by this Court as insufficient to conclusively establish the (b) Timber, and
actual classification of the land in 1929 and to overcome the
overwhelming documentary evidence adduced to support the validity (c) Mineral lands,
of OCT No. 4216, we are compelled to affirm the dismissal of the
petition to annul the judgment which resulted in the issuance of OCT and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
No. 4216. one class to another, for the purposes of their government and
disposition.
We are not unmindful of the long settled rule that a presumption lies
in favor of state ownership and it is the individual who claims that the xxx
land is alienable and disposable who must present clear, positive and
absolute evidence to over the presumption of state ownership. While
Section 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to
it may be true that an applicant for original registration of a parcel of
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
sought to be registered forms part of public domain, compliance with
reserved for public or quasi public uses, nor appropriated by the
this burden should be proven in the original proceedings instituted by
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those
the Gana spouses in 1927, and must be legally presumed to have
on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any
been satisfied as a decree was issued in favor of the petitioners-
other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
spouses. Thus where a petition is filed to annul the said judgment on
appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor General
the ground that it is fatally void, the burden of proving the nullity
may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public
rests with the petitioner.
domain open to disposition before the same have had their
boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same
In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of reasons, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again
8
Appeals 189 SCRA 792.this Court emphasized "that in an action to declared open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly
annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's nullity rests published or by Act of the Legislature.
upon the petitioner, and the petitioner must establish by clear and
9
convincing evidence that the judgment is fatally defective." In that
xxx 'If in this instance we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be
noted that the government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy.
Section 11.Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law.
disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise: When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to
(1) For homestead settlement a particular piece of property collide, if the government desires to
(2) By sale demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of
(3) By lease. Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete not more valuable for agriculture than forest purposes. Great
titles: considerations, it must be stated, should and undoubtedly will be,
(a) By administrative legalization (free paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks
patent) with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on
(b) By judicial legalization. the part of the Attorney General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from
Section 45. The following described citizens of the Philippine Islands giving title to the claimant." taking into account the proof or evidence
13
and the United States, occupying lands of the public domain or in each particular case. Ankron vs. Government of Philippine
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose Islands, 40 Phil 10.
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for Notably, petitioner Republic's petition for annulment of judgment in
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title the respondent Court of Appeals contended that the decree in favor
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: of the Gana spouses was issued at the time when the subject land
was still forest land, (unfortunately no copy of the 1929 decision is
xxx xxx xxx available) and rested its case solely on the land classification map No.
2623 Project 13-A which failed to conclusively establish the actual
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in classification of the land in 1929 or earlier. Moreover, FAO No. 4-1
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious 141 signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, Arturo R. Tanco, Jr, on January 3, 1968, which provides:
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against
the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and "1, Pursuant to the provisions of Section
ninety-four, except when prevented by way of force majeure. These 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code, (hereby
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions declare as alienable or disposable and place the
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for
of title, under the provisions of this chapter." administration and disposition in accordance with
the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any
We are inclined to agree with the respondents that it is there be and to the conditions herein specified,
legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare the portions of the public domain situated in the
lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have Municipalities of xxxxxxxx Las Piñas Province of
become private property or lands that have been impressed with a Rizal which are designated and described as
private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. alienable or disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map
By express declaration of section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted LC 2623 approved on January 3, 1968."
above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the categorically avoided intrusion into existing private rights and this
public-domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership pronouncement necessarily includes the issuance of OCT No. 4216 in
since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First 1929; "otherwise, certificates of title issued prior to 1968 could
14
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of possibly be all nullified." Margolles vs. CA, supra.
their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant True, prescription does not run against the State. However, probably
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land due to bureaucratic constraints, vast tracts of land acquired by
registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which private parties in urbanized areas like the city of Manila and Quezon
was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court City were released from classification as forestland belatedly, or long
had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and after their residential character as private property had become a
that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive matter of judicial notice. It appears that the City of Manila was
15
possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It declassified as forest land only in 1955 Republic vs. Alano, CA-G.R.
16
was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to SP No. 08376.and Quezon City only on October 24, 1989. See
determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or Comment to Motion for Reconsideration; p. 154, Rollo.As early as
12
timber In Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175, Ramos instituted 1961, this Court stated that an attorney-at-law "should have known
appropriate proceedings to have his title registered but opposition that no property around the City of Manila or in Quezon City is as yet
17
was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not covered by torrens title". Republic vs. Aricheta, 2 SCRA 469.In
not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the this case defendant claimed that he was a possessor in good faith
18
Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest From petitioners-movants' own submission, Reply, pp. 14-15, Rollo,
land. The trial court agreed with the oppositors and excluded parcel pp. 835-836.a part of Las Piñas comprising 1200 hectares was
no. 1. This Court reversed the judgment and ordered the lower court declared as alienable and disposable on September 3, 1928, thus:
to register parcel no.1 in the name of the applicant. It rationalized as
follows: "The map showing the area included in the 1200
hectares was destroyed during the Second World War, and
it was in view of the loss of the map indicating the 1200
hectares that then Sec. Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 short, the land in question has been the subject of overlapping or
declaring the entire Las Piñas as well as part of the adjacent conflicting claims of private parties. Had the Republic's cause of
municipalities as alienable and disposable on January 3, action been one to cause reversion to the State of public land illegally
1968." titled because it cannot be alienated at all, e.g. military reservations,
public parks, or other lands devoted to public use, and for that
The implication is that the 1968 order was meant to confirm or reason absolutely insusceptible of private ownership, the
reiterate the earlier declaration and serves to affirm that indeed government's plea would have compelled concurrence. As it is,
parts of Las Piñas, albeit the map indicating this area has been lost, petitioners Firestone, et al., the losing parties in the Margolles case,
were already open to disposition to private claimants long before the have asserted their "legal interest in the success of the instant
issuance of FAO 4-1141. Since there are extant numerous titles Government's action" (Motion for Reconsideration) to annul the
19
covering various portions of Las Piñas, Attached to respondents' 1929 judgment of the land court on the basis of its subsequent title
Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration is a list given by the obtained in 1969 covering a portion of the property earlier titled in
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal of at least thirty three (33) original the name of the Gana spouses.
OCTs to lands in Las Pinas, issued before World War II indicating that
there are numerous titles other than OCT No. 4216 which covers Contrary to the Republic's posture in its initiatory and amended
parcels of land in Las Pinas, most of which were issued earlier than petition, the State does not stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as
1929.any conflict or overlapping of titles should be litigated by the the entire municipality of Las Piñas has already been declared as
interested parties, as what happened in the Margolles, Peltan and alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion to be caused in
Goldenrod cases. favor of the Republic, the land recovered would not be for public use,
but for eventual disposition to other private persons. With the
In sum, resurrecting the issue in Margolles will not only seriously classification of the land in question as alienable and disposable in
undermine the principle of res judicata, an old axiom of law, 1968, and in view of the failure of the State to institute reversion
20
"dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age" Carandang vs. proceedings before 1968, any action to cause the cancellation of
Venturaza, 133 SCRA 344.and a fundamental component in every subject title at this time should be subjected to assiduous scrutiny in
21
jural system Ibid.that prohibits relitigation of questions already the light of the existence of numerous titles covering lands within the
settled by final judgment of the court, in this case, the highest court. coverage of FAO-4-1 141 which encompasses 13,495 hectares in Rizal
23
Worse, considering that there are numerous certificates of titles now and Cavite. In Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap and Sons 96 Phil.
in the hands of successors-in-interest of the original awardees of OCT 447; See also Arsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547., this
No. 4216, it will imperil the rule on the indefeasibility of titles which Court upheld the title of an alien who subsequently became a
is a basic underpinning of the torrens system of land registration, and naturalized Filipino before the State commenced escheat
which was precisely instituted to quiet title to land. Again, contrary to proceedings on the ground that the "State is deemed to have waived
the submission of the petitioner that the obtention of OCT No. 4216 its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto
has caused "property rights (to be) unsettled and destabilized, and becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer
the integrity of the torrens system compromised", the relitigation of to him". The court rationalized that "if the ban on aliens from
the question on the validity and genuineness of OCT No. 4216 would acquiring lands is to preserve the nation's lands for future
open the floodgates or pave the way for the assertion of numerous generations of Filipinos, that aim would not be thwarted by making
conflicting claims to 13,495 hectares of land in Rizal and Cavite lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who become naturalized
22
covered by FAO-4-1141 This covers an appropriate area of 13, citizens before the State commences forfeiture proceedings." By
495,22 hectares, situated in Taytay, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, parity of reasoning, even assuming that it was convincingly
Paranaque, Taguig an Pateros, province of Rizal, and in Bacoor and established that the subject land was indeed still classified as forest
Imus, Province of Cavite.which were already titled prior to 1968. land at the time of the registration proceedings in 1929, the fact that
the same was eventually released or classified as alienable and
Finally, the area covered by FAO-4-1141 is 13,495.22 hectares disposable should stay the hand of the Government in bringing an
situated in six municipalities of Rizal and two municipalities of Cavite. action to question the title issued by a court of land registration, an
Pursuing the petitioner's theory that possession before January 3, action which is in rem, considering that the same basic issue was
1968 could not have ripened into ownership, the State would have to already resolved with finality by this Court. Indeed, to annul existing
take action to cause the reversion of the innumerable parcels of torrens titles derived from OCT No. 4216 which was issued seventy
lands which were titled earlier than 1968. An attempt at this time to years ago, only to enable the government to dispose anew the lands
single out OCT No. 4216 for cancellation and resurrect the contention covered thereby to new or subsequent applicants would betray a
that it is spurious and irregularly obtained, despite the subservience to technicality that will not be in the public interest nor
pronouncement of this Court positively and categorically vindicating serve our declared national land policies any useful purpose. This is a
that very same title in three cases, betrays an unbecoming disregard simple matter of equity and good sense.
for the final judgment of the highest court and does not elicit
sympathy. Indeed, it is time that the validity of OCT No. 4216 is put to (2)G.R. No. 127022
rest.
In G. R. No. 127022, petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. filed their
One final note, our reluctance to give overriding significance to the motion for reconsideration with the following assigned errors:
Republic's invocation of the regalian doctrine stems from a
consideration of the salient fact that we are here dealing with land I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY
which although allegedly to be originally of the public domain was ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HEREIN PETITIONERS'
eventually, if belatedly, released for disposition to private claimants. TITLES (DERIVED FROM OCT No. A-S-47) BEING
Thus the parties who have sought to assert their own title in this case ADVERSE TO OCT NO. 4216, WERE DECLARED "AS
(by way of intervention) and in the cases of Peltan and Goldenrod (in NULL AND VOID" BY THE DECISION RENDERED IN
petitions to cancel title) are private parties who purportedly acquired G.R. NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES CASE).
subsequent certificates of title to, or interests in, the same land. In
II. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY other issues raised in view of the fact that we are dismissing the
ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS, AS principal action of petitioner Republic.
MOVANTS-INTERVENORS IN THE CASE BELOW,
"HAVE NO MORE LEGAL INTEREST WHEREFORE, respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss is DENIED. The
motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic and
IN THE MATTER IN LITIGATION" OVERLOOKING IN petitioners Firestone Ceramics et al. are DENIED for lack of merit with
THE PROCESS, THAT PETITIONERS' LEGAL FINALITY.
INTEREST THERETO IS BASICALLY ANCHORED IN
THE SUCCESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT SO ORDERED.
ACTION.