1

Escheats
1. Alvarico v. Sola
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land
Act.[28] Thus:
Sec. 101.All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in
the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which
would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the
basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.[29] Since Amelita Solas title originated
from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee.[30] Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelitas title. It
follows that he cannot recover the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the
rightful owner thereof.
2. Maltos v. Heirs of Eusebio Boromeo
The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent during the five-year prohibitory
period under the Public Land act is void. Reversion of the parcel of land is proper. However, reversion
under Section 101 of the Public Land Act is not automatic. The Office of the Solicitor General must
first file an action for reversion.

Guardians and guardianship

1. Goyena vs. Ledesma Gustilo, Jan. 13, 2003
2. Caniza vs. CA, Feb. 24, 1997
3. Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy, 683 SCRA
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement was valid and binding upon the children of the
deceased (Anunciacion) from her first marriage.
HELD: NO.
Art. 979, NCC: Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other descendants,
without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
xxx
Art. 980, NCC: The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.
xxx
Rule 7 of the ROC; Sec 1: Extrajudicial Settlement by agreement between heirs. xxx

Here, all the heirs of the deceased should have participated in the settlement of the estate, including
her children from her first marriage. Publication is not sufficient to bind the heirs. No extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Therefore, since the 2 children of Anunciacion from her first marriage were admittedly excluded, the
settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
 2

ISSUE #2: Whether or not the sale of the subject property was valid.

HELD: YES, but only in so far as to the proportionate shares of those heirs who validly participated in the
sale.

Part of the requirements of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate is that all minors should be legally
represented. Rule 93 of the ROC; Sec. 7 provides that when the property of the child under parental
authority is P50,000 or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of the court appointment,
shall be his legal guardian, however, if the value is more than P50,000, parents shall file petition (Sec.2)
in the court for them to be considered as guardian of the child’s property.

However, leave of court or court order is needed only when the subject property of the minor is being
conveyed.

Here, Enrique, being the father of the minors and as their natural guardian was merely clothed with
powers of administration. Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the
receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing, but does not include acts of disposition or
alienation. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and only with
the court’s approval. Therefore, the disputed sale entered into by the father, in behalf of the minor
children without proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is
unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.

4. Oropesa vs. Oropesa, 671 SCRA

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven
to be a minor or an incompetent. Finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence. The testimonies submitted which did not include any expert medical
testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it
to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent. Where the sanity of a person is at
issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice.

5. Abad vs. Biazon, 687 SCRA

The Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground of termination of guardianship. It was already
moot and academic because Biason passed away during this petition. It is well established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is terminated by death of either guardian or ward. However, the
petition, regardless of its deposition, will not afford Abad or anyone else for that matter, any substantial
relief.
 3

Trustees
1. Land Bank of the Phil. V. Perez, 672 SCRA
The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or
goods to the prejudice of another, regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not.
In this case, no dishonesty or abuse of confidence existed in the handling of the construction
materials. Therefore, absent any abuse of confidence or misappropriation on the part of the
respondents, the criminal proceedings against them for estafa should not prosper.

Adoption and Custody of Minors

1. Castro vs. Gregorio, 783 SCRA
2. Cang vs. CA, 296 SCRA 128
In this petition for adoption of the three minor children where the consent of their natural father
was not attached to the said petition, the SC ruled that the court erred in affirming the RTC’s grant
of adoption without the consent of the natural father. The Family Code, the governing law at the
time of filing the petition, requires the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption for its
validity. This requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child. Here, the SC held the petition must be denied as it was filed without the required
consent of the natural father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.

3. Vda. De Jacob vs. CA, 312 SCRA 772

4. Republic v. CA, 255 SCRA 99
5. Reyes v. Mauricio, 636 SCRA

We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally
attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.19

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.20 Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo
M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted
that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He
explained thus:

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void."
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this
view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought
only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.21

In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,22 the Court stated that
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack.23
 4

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral
attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,24 this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally
in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v.
Reyes,26 the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.27

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148
is AFFIRMED.

6. In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga-Garcia, 454 SCRA

The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in
rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section
1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3)
of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or
claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In

Favor Of Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
 5

adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so.

7. In re: Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim, 588 SCRA (2009)

The Court ruled that Petitioner.The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar.
In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word
“shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by
Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American
Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency
and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7.
Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing
the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and
physical character and well-being.

8. Nery vs. Sampana, 734 SCRA

Under the Domestic Adoption Act, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the 4th
degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt is waived.

9. Bartolome vs. SSS, 740 SCRA

Biological parents are entitled to benefits.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under
such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological
parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship
and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and
obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and
the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
 6

simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a
tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted
after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern
contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by
the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the
best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest
of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter
fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his
formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else
could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.

Change of name vs. Correction/Cancellation of Entries

1. Eleosida v. Civil Registrar of QC - May 9,2002

We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the *CCN civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.[10]

This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia[11] where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the
proceedings under Rule 108 adversary, thus:

The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties.--When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.--Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.--The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his opposition
thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register are--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any
 7

interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the
court to--(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the
order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the
civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
can no longer be described as 'summary.' xxx[12]

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or
harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner
and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature,
however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with.

2. Republic v. Kho - 526 SCRA

Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out
that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment
on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been
impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.

Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a
person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[22]

3. Petition for change of name of Julian Lim Carulasan Wang - 454 SCRA

We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.

The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of
birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.[14]

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for
which the change is sought.[15] To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
 8

and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest. RLA CSC

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left
to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and
not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced
in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.[17]

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to change
the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name
altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with
requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the
given name[18] and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow
one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.

A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We quote, thus:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in
the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by
which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he
bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.
Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of
persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that,
when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.

4. Braza v. Civil Registrar of Neg. Occ. - 607 SCRA (2009)

In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber;
a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed. **Compare with Fujiki case.
 9

5. Republic v. Silverio - 537 SCRA

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
RHA
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; rte
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as
the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at
all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned.

6. Republic v. Cagandahan - 565 SCRA

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.

7. Republic v. Uy - 703 SCRA (August 12,2013)

*failure to implead indispensable parties. Fatal.

Rule 108 section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
 10

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded. Respondent should
have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the
persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy
of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated

If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and
not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching. Petition nullified.

8. Minoru Fujiki v. Marinay, June 26,2013

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to take judicial recognition of foreign judgement
regarding the decree of absolute nullity and consequently direct the Local Civil Registrar and NSO to
annotate the Japanese Family Court Judgement on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

HELD: YES.
Unlike in the case of Brazo vs. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental where the party seeks to nullify the
marriage and rule on the legitimacy and filiation, here, the recognition of a foreign judgement only
requires proof of fact of the judgement and it can be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the rules of court.

Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to
the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequences such as birth, death, or
marriage, which the State has an interest in recording.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgement nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgement concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason, he has the personality to file a petition
under rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

9. People v. Merlinda Olaybar, February 10,2014

Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage. What the respondent sought is the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is
the marriage certificate was a forgery. In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
 11

 Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence
of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the
marriage certificate was a forgery.
 While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage
to speak of.

10. Onde v. The Office of the Local Civil Registration of Las Piñas, 734 SCRA, Sept 2014

A petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the
proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction
of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
correction.

In Republic v. Uy, we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least
implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect
them.

Habeas Corpus (R - 102)

1.Ilusorio v. Bildner, 332 SCRA 169
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant of such
petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of
age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the
capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be
the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to
privacy.
 12

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child, but the right of a
wife to visit the husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is
at liberty to do so without a threat or penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter
beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out
by the sheriffs or by any other process.

2. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443

The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The
general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue
the same[115] applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued
by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily
surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile[116] that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty
which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no
application in the present case because the hearing on petitioners application for bail has yet to
commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail cannot be
pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is
partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting ones right to bail.[117] It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a
matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in
refusing to grant bail,[118] or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file
an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings
thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt the
Sandiganbayans resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of
petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.

3. Lacson v. Perez, 357 SCRA 756

No, it is manifest that the writ habeas corpus is not called for since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative to this very day. Restraint
must be ACTUAL and EFFECTIVE not merely SPECULATIVE.

4. Sangca v. City Prosecutor of Cebu, 524 SCRA 610

On the issue of whether or not a writ of habeas corpus may be granted when a detained person was
ordered released, the Court held that the petition has become moot.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and
to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas
corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.
 13

In the instant case, records show that the detainee has been released upon order of the trial judge
upon the grant of Motion to Withdraw Information therefore, the petition has become moot.

5. Mangila v. Pangilinan, 701 SCRA 355

Mangila, an accused of estafa arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest, cannot file a habeas corpus as
her recourse. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed
irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant
for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct
access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s
transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.17 We agree with the CA, therefore,
that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy.18

6. Tujan-Militante v. Cada Deapera, July 28, 2014

Section 20 of AM 03-04-04 SC states:

A petition for writ of habeas corpus concerning the custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region top which the Family Court belongs.

On this point Sec. 13 of BP 129 finds relevance:

National Capital Judicial Region includes the following cities and municipalities: Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Caloocan, Mandaluyong, Navotas, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa and
Valenzuela.

 The filing of a petition in any of the cities enumerated within the National Capital Region
is proper.
 When respondent filed the petition before the Family Court of Caloocan and since
Caloocan and Quezon City belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC
of Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.

7. Datukan Malang Salibo v. the Warden, 755 SCRA 296

Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such
cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.

First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the Information and Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based on the evidences presented, Salibo
sufficiently established that he could not have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not
arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or
an order of a court. Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the
presence of authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police
 14

officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Salibo was also not
an escape prisoner.

The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo
correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest is the proper remedy in cases
where a person with a mistaken identity is detained

No, the CA’s contention is not correct. Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to
him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured
by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from “Butukan S. Malang” to “Datukan Malang
Salibo” will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion for
reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation.

Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the RTC ruling on the Return before the CA

Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before CA or any of
its members, the CA or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC or any of its
presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of
the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ
is then conducted.

The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the court
issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court acquires
the power and authority to determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the
decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of the lower court

Writs

1.Tapuz v. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA

The Writ of Amparo To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as
a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary
and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently,
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be
supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: "(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b)
The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or,
if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c)
 15

The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any,
specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The
actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed
for.

2. Caram v. Segui August 5,2014

When what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule
cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is
envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free
from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

3. Vivares et al v. St. Therese College et al, Sept 29,2014

In this petition for the issuance of a Writ of habeas Data where the petitioners posted their photos on
facebook, the SC ruled that the RTC was correct in denying the writ.

It held that the respondent Saint Theresa’s College did not violate the petitioners’ right to privacy.
The Children should have manifested their intention to keep certain posts private through the
employment of measure to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility through the use of the
Online Social Network’s privacy tools. Records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions
that they utilized FB’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a chosen few.
Without any proof that they placed the photos within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy,
they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the said photos. Also,
STC did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to
them by persons who had legtimate access to the said posts.

4. Razon v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA

JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific
definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can
proceed to formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same. CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: As things
stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances so initially also we
have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances [to be
covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances will define the jurisdiction of
the courts.

First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators.

Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e., the corpus delicti or the victims body is
usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may
 16

have begun.[145] The problem for the victims family is the States virtual monopoly of access to pertinent
evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case
of Velasquez Rodriguez[146] that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use
of the States power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear
attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime.[147]

Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred.[148] Deniability is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards
ensuring the victims human rights.[149]Experience shows that government officials typically respond to
requests for information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance,
that the missing people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.[150]
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or
another, in our consideration of this case.

5. Roxas v. GMA, 630 SCRA

No, the doctrine of command responsibility is inapplicable in an an amparo proceeding. The doctrine of
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability. Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a
full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in summary amparo proceedings. The principal
objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance,
extralegal killing or threat thereof had transpired, the writ does not, by doing so, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threat.

6. Burgos v. Esperon, 715 SCRA, February 2014

After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all the
developments of the case, including the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of the
Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the writ merely
embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to
address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and
a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the
investigation and remedial action that it directs.24 The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather
than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature
of Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to
achieve. In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms “responsibility” and “accountability” signify
in an Amparo case. We said:

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.26 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by the Court
outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the
criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court,
 17

Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga
and has ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’ disappearance.27

7. Dolot v. Paje 703 SCRA (continuing mandamus)

Jurisdiction and Venue

In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011,
apparently relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional
Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating
the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within
their respective territorial jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within
the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran
and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such
authority rests before another co-equal court."15

None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court
to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over
the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.17 By
virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over
special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section
21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction – in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced
in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)

Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the
National Capital Judicial Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer
jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-observance thereof
would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the
administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.21

At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that
of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules)
specifically states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC]
exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x."23 In
this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of
Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even then, it does
not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the
action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even expressed that what the
RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the case (an election protest) to the
proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of
Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying
the Rules in its disposition of the case.

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is
 18

aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.
Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive
allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very
least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of
government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes
another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an
office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule
or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
course of law.32

[FINAL DEGREE]
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion
on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of
continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by
final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the
judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing
mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such
judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective
performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.34 A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits
the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the court’s decision."

[NEED FOR EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES]

Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes.36 But the
petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged
negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog;
the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the
perceived indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these
matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but
requires an exercise of judicial function.

[FAILURE TO ATTACH JUDICIAL WRITS]

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial
affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting
 19

evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in
Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of
the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits
(affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.39

Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the
case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the
petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by technicalities,
and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the
parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard."40

8. Meralco v. Lim, 632 SCRA (10/5/2010)

The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in
possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or informationregarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty
or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.13
Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when
the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.17 It is
evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the
threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-
quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they
existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real
 20

intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the
issue is labor-related.

9. Lee v. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59

The petition is meritorious.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing
the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals,17 which is
defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about
oneself.”18

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such
writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right
to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately
show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported
by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue
to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.21

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this
video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to
life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As
the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus
between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas datacases,
so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this
case.

10. Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102

immunity from suit - state
11. Paje v. Casino, 749 SCRA 39
We now summarize our findings:

1. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the
construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to establish
that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage, through its Environmental
Management Plan, which will ensure that the project will operate within the limits of existing
environmental laws and standards;

2. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz
in the ECC’s Statement of Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the
appellate court. While the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular circumstances
of this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue of lack of
signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and arguments on this point, as the issue
only arose during the course of the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the appellate court.
 21

Consequently, RP Energy cannot be faulted for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it
learned that the ECC had been invalidated on the ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013
Decision of the appellate court. The certified true copy of the ECC, bearing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz in
the Statement of Accountability portion, was issued by the DENR-EMB, and remains uncontroverted. It
showed that the Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008. Because
the signing was done after the official release of the ECC on December 22, 2008, we note that the DENR
did not strictly follow its rules, which require that the signing of the Statement of Accountability should be
done before the official release of the ECC. However, considering that the issue was not adequately
argued nor was evidence presented before the appellate court on the circumstances at the time of
signing, there is insufficient basis to conclude that the procedure adopted by the DENR was tainted with
bad faith or inexcusable negligence. We remind the DENR, however, to be more circumspect in following
its rules. Thus, we rule that the signature requirement was substantially complied with pro hac vice.

12. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Angelo Reyes et al, 756 SCRA
513, April 21,2015

Yes, the SC in the exercise of epistolary jurisdiction allowed the petition. “The need to give the
Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that
there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are
therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.”

13. West Tower Condominium v. Phil. Ind. Corp. 758 SCRA 289 (on precautionary principle)

Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest

Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the action must be
brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.

In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the
condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at
the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was shut
down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their
condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-
interest.

There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit
owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a
condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4 726, otherwise known as The Condominium
Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium
corporation .is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some
or all of the condominium unit owners or users.
 22

It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the
petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the
CA, not measured by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the
existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disaster.

As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit owners and
residents of West Tower and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join
the petitioners.

Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical
personality

Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang
Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers
International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the
Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already
granted their intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.

This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be
directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the
petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened with violation.

1. Applicability of the Precautionary Principle

Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of
the WOPL's Commercial Viability

With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular
cleaning scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent
PIG, now known as in-line inspections (ILI), which is done every five years; (c) pressure monitoring
valves; and ( d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it also undertook the following: (a)
monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as segment
pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d) inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection
and reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement.47Furthermore, in August 2010,
with the oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI
inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall
thinning of the pipeline and check it for cracks.

The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for
purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary
caution and level of assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free from leaks and is
safe for commercial operation, the CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification
that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was
to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection
systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with
existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.
 23

The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to
obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to
require said certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this case requires the
specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and various other administrative agencies. On
October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of
the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos Jericho I. Petilla submitted a
letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL
operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.

After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court
adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied
with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE
should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5,
2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening of the
WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the
other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use
and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others,
the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.

The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must, therefore, be availed of to
arrive at a judicious decision on the propriety of allowing the immediate resumption of the WOPL's
operation. In a host of cases, this Court held that when the adjudication of a controversy requires
the resolution of issues within the expertise of an administrative body, such issues must be
investigated and resolved by the administrative body equipped with the specialized knowledge and
the technical expertise.54 Hence, the courts, although they may have jurisdiction and power to
decide cases, can utilize the findings and recommendations of the administrative agency on
questions that demand "the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact."55

Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the
Precautionary Principle, provides that "[ w ]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply
the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it."

The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human
activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be
established with full scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue.
Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the
case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the
surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other
organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment
and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.

It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL's compliance with
pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be
determined on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL's actual state.
Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and
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the amici curiae on the WOPL' s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the
dissent propounds.

Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the
resumption of the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its
proposed activities and timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the DOE that
the WOPL's soundness for resumption of and continued commercial operations is not yet fully
determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of the pipeline's actual
physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely through a short-form integrity
audit,56that the factual issue on the WOPL's viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the
pipeline's structural integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this
Court's resolution. Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE's issuance of the certification
adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.

The dissent also loses sight of the fact that the petition not only seeks the checking of the WOPL's
structural integrity, but also prays for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the leak, the
creation of a special trust fund, the imposition of liability upon the directors of FPIC, among others.
These issues, undoubtedly, are matters that are not addressed by the DOE certification alone.
Furthermore, these are issues that no longer relate to the WOPL' s structure but to its maintenance
and operations, as well as to the residues of the incident. It will, thus, be improper for Us to simply
dismiss the petition on the basis solely of the alleged resolution of only one of several issues, which
purportedly renders the issue on the WOPL' s soundness moot, without disposing of the other
issues presented.

Lastly, any delay in the reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure that the
pipeline is commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive
check on its structural integrity when experience shows that there were and may still be flaws in the
pipeline. Even the DOE, the agency tasked to oversee the supply and distribution of petroleum in the
country, is well aware of this and even recommended the checking of the patched portions of the
pipeline, among others. In this regard, the Court deems it best to take the necessary safeguards,
which are not similar to applying the precautionary principle as previously explained, in order to
prevent a similar incident from happening in the future.

2. Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund

SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which
shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of
attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the
violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.
(emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases expressly
prohibits the grant of damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the
court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
 25

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

xxxx

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to
the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners.

A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer
is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited
purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to
rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already suffered. Hence, the Court
affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for
damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court
is of the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on
petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is
without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by
petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.

3. Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers

On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA
found FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil
Case No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint (Complaint-Affidavit for
Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed against them, the
individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual capacities.