Malaga vs.

Penachos (Digest)

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.

GR No. 86995 03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western
Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The
notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock
in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built
Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon
of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of
them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC
for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-
qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of
their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the
bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground
that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been
awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure
project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested
by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the
state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by
P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created
in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and
offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of
P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its
charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the
General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree
as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as
regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
EUGENIO VS CSC
280 SCRA 713 – Law on Public Officers – Creation and Abolition of a Public Office is Essentially Legislative

In 1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was then recommended
to be appointed as a Civil Service Officer Rank IV. But her appointment to said rank was impeded when
in the same year, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB). CESB is the office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the selection,
classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive Service.

Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the CSC does not have the
power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued that
it has the power to do so pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right
to reorganize the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive Service
Board.

HELD: No. The CESB is created by law. It can only be abolished by the legislature. The creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function, except for Constitutional offices. The power
to restructure granted to the CSC is limited to offices under it. The law that created the CESB intended
said office to be an autonomous entity although it is administratively attached to the CSC.

Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba

October 30, 2011

112 SCRA 294 – Political law – Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law
involved – BP 129

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing
its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the
reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can
remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such
statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction
that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect
to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the
two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has
been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought
to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it
with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the
choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the
former is to be preferred.”

#1Medalla vs. Sayo103 Phil. 587

FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr, is the chief of clinics of the Caloocan City general
Hospital,Caloocan city. Private respondent Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident Physician thereat.
When theposition of assistant, hospital administrator of the Caloocan City general hospital became
vacant upon theresignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan city mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated
and subsequentlyappointed, as assistant hospital administrator private respondent Dr. Mackay, a
Resident Physician in saidhospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr, Protested Dr. Mackaydesignation and
subsequent appointment allegingamong others that, chief of clinics, he (Medalla) wasnext-in-rank, the
then acting city Mayor Virgililo P.Robles, who succeeded former mayor, nowAssemblyman Alejandro A.
Fider, in his 4thendorsementdated September 20,1978, sustained Mackayappointment state that as of
April 18, 1978 when Dr.Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to assistant hospitaladministrator from his
previous position of ResidentPhysician, he was next in rank to the said higher positionby reason of his
having completed all academicrequirements for the certiFicate in Hospital administration contrary to
the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.
 ISSUE:Whether or not that appointment of Dr. HonoratoG. Mackay as assistant hospital Administrator is
valid

HELD:when a presidential act is challenged before thecourt of justice, it is not to be implied there from
that theexecutive is being made subject and subordinate tocourts the legality of his acts are under
judicial review,not because the executive is inferior to the courts, butbecause the law is above the chief
executive himself,and the court seek only to interpret, apply or implementit a judicial review of the
President decision of a case ofan employee decided by the civil service board ofappeals should be
viewed in this light and the bringing ofthe case to the courts should be governed by the sameprinciples
as govern the judicial review of alladministrative act of all administrative o²cer. The courtmay always
examine into the exercise of power by aministerial o²cer to the extent of determining whether itis a
legal power that could have been granted to himand whether it has been exercised in a legal
manner.And under the civil service section 19 (3) of the civilservice PD no. 807 the recruitment of
selection ofemployees for promotion is drawn from the nix-in-rank.

Leonardo Montes v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals (Digest)

G.R. No. L-10759 20 May 1957
TOPIC: Principle of Exhaustion of Admin Remedies

FACTS: In Administratice Case No. R-8182 instituted against Montes for negligence in the performance
of duty as a watchman of the Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbours Division of Bureau of
Public Works, the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him on the basis of findings made by a
committee. On appeal, the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty
of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge which sunk the dredge under his
watch, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without
prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.

Petitioner files an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision. On a
Motion to Dismiss, the said court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted
all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action as provided in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 598. Montes argued that there is no duty imposed upon him to appeal to the
President. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Montes erred in filing the action immediately before the Court of First Instance of
Manila instead of filing an appeal before the President of the Philippines?

HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires where an administrative remedy
is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts
will act. The doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to
the courts, not only to give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 598 provides that:

The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear and decide all
administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless
revised or modified by the President of the Philippines.

The above-mentioned provision is a clear expression of the policy or principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies. If the President, under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our
administrative system as head of the executive department, may be able to grant the remedy that
petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be made to him before
recourse can be had to the courts.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was
granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project
or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens,
fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region
interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits
for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It
is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot
be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which
grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code
of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

November 12, 2011

151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was
enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said
law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of
videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts
payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following
grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the
law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in
enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general
object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate.
What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution,
enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority
of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies
concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB]