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RUBY SHELTER vs FORMARAN  Without payment having made by Ruby Builders on Dec.

31, 2005, Tan and Obiedo presented the DoS to RD


Petitioner: Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Devt Corporation - They were able to secure TCTs in their names
Respondents: Hon. Pablo C. Formaran III, Romeo Y. Tan.  March 6, 2006: Ruby Builders filed a Complaint against Tan,
Roberto Obiedo and Atty. Tomas Reyes Obiedo and Reyes for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales
Citation: GR No. 175914 and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
Date of Promulgation: February 10, 2009 preliminary injunctiom and/or TRO
Ponente: Chico-Nazario - Upon filing, Ruby Builders paid PhP 13, 644.25 for
docket fees and legal fees
FACTS: - OCC: considered the action incapable of pecuniary
 Ruby Shelter: obtained a loan from Respondents, Romeo estimation and computed the fee due thereon according
Tan and Roberto Obiedo to Rule 141, Sec. 7(b)(1)
- PhP 95, 700, 620  Tan: the only one who filed an Answer; had a counterclaim
- Such loan was secured by REM over 5 parcels of land, - filed an Omnibus Motion contending that the present
all located inTriangulo, Naga City action involved real properties in which the docket fees
 When Petitioner was unable to pay when the loan shoul be computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not
became due and demandable, Tan and Obiendo agreed to Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
an extension of the same amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on
- MOA: Ruby Shelter was given until Dec. 31, 2005 to 16 August 2004.
settle its indebtedness, and condones with interests, - Alleged that Since petitioner did not pay the appropriate
penalties and surcharges accruing from October 1, 2004 docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, the RTC did
to Dec. 31, 2005, which amounted to PhP 74, 678,647 not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Hence,
 MOA respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order
- Required Ruby Shelter to execute simultaneously with requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate
the MOA, by way of Dacion en Pago, Deeds of Absolute docket fees pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the
Sale in favor of Tan and Obiedo, covering the same Rules of Court, as amended; and should petitioner fail to
parcels of land do so, to deny and dismiss the prayer of petitioner for the
- Deeds of Absolute Sale would be uniformly dated annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been
January 2, 2006 and state that Ruby Shelter sold to Tan executed in contravention of the law or of the
and Obiedo the parcels of land Memorandum of Agreement as pactum commisorium.
- Ruby Shelter: could choose to pay off its indebtedness  RTC: granted Tan’s Omnibus Motion, and held that Tan and
with individual or all five parcels of land; or it could Ruby Builders must pay docket fees in accordance with
redeem said properties by paying Tan and Obiedo the Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
following prices for the same, inclusive of interests and  Ruby Builders: moved for the partial reconsideration of the
penalties 24 March 2006 Order of the RTC, arguing that Civil Case No.
 In the event that Ruby Builder is able to redeem any of 2006-0030 was principally for the annulment of the Deeds of
the aforementioned parcels of land, Absolute Sale and, as such, incapable of pecuniary
- The DoS covering such property shall be nullified and estimation. Petitioner submitted that the RTC erred in
have no force and effect applying Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
- Tan and Obiedo shall return the owner’s duplicate of the amended, to petitioners first cause of action in its Complaint
corresponding TCT in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
- Execution of Deed of Discharge of Mortage  RTC: refused to reconsider its Order
 However, if Ruby Builder is unable to redeem the parcels  RTC Clerk, April 19, 2006: computed, upon the request of
of land within the specified period, counsel for the petitioner, the additional docket fees petitioner
- Tan and Obiedo could already present the DoS to the RD must pay for in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as directed in the
for them to acquire the properties in their names afore-mentioned RTC Orders. Per the computation of the
 MOA RTC Clerk of Court, after excluding the amount petitioner
- Further provided that should Ruby Builders contest, previously paid on 16 March 2006, petitioner must still pay
judicially or otherwise any act, transaction or event the amount of P720,392.60 as docket fees
related to or necessarily connected with the said MOA  Ruby Builders: had not yet conceded, and it filed a Petition
and the DoS involving the 5 parcels of land, it would pa for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
Tan and Obiedo 10Million as liquidated damages and - denied
attorney’s’ fees
- Ruby Builders would likewise pay Tan and Obiedo the ISSUES:
condoned interest, surcharges and penalties
- Should a contest arise from the MOA, Mr. Ruben Sia 1. W/N Ruby Builders should be made to pay additional
(President of Ruby Builders), personally assumes jointly docket fees?
and severally with Ruby Builders the latter’s monetary
obligation to Tan and Obiedo HELD: YES.
 Atty. Tomas Reyes: Notary Public who notarized the MOA
dated March 17, 2005 Relevant to the present controversy are the following provisions
 Pursuant to the MOA, Ruby Builders through Sia executed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
separated DoS over the 5 parcels of land in favor of Tan and 04-2-04-SC[30] and Supreme Court Amended Administrative
Obiedo Circular No. 35-2004[31]:
- On the blank spaces provided for said Deeds,
somebody wrote January 3, 2006 as the date of their SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.
execution
- Deeds were notarized by Atty. Reyes (a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY
counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim against an estate
not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. January 2006 and presented the same to Register of Deeds for
complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, Naga City on 8 March 2006, they were already issued TCTs over
INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, the real properties in question, in their own names. Respondents
DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEYS FEES, Tan and Obiedo have also acquired possession of the said
LITIGATIO NEXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving properties, enabling them, by petitioners own admission, to
property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in demolish the improvements thereon.
litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR
CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF It is, thus, suspect that petitioner kept mum about the afore-
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE mentioned facts and circumstances when they had already taken
IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN place before it filed its Complaint before the RTC on 16 March
LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY 2006. Petitioner never expressed surprise when such facts and
IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL circumstances were established before the RTC, nor moved to
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, amend its Complaint accordingly. Even though the Memorandum
is: of Agreement was supposed to have long been registered on its
TCTs over the five parcels of land, petitioner did not pray for the
[Table of fees omitted.] removal of the same as a cloud on its title. In the same vein,
although petitioner alleged that respondents Tan and Obiedo
If the action involves both a money claim and relief pertaining to forcibly took physical possession of the subject real properties,
property, then THE fees will be charged on both the amounts petitioner did not seek the restoration of such possession to itself.
claimed and value of property based on the formula prescribed in And despite learning that respondents Tan and Obiedo already
this paragraph a. secured TCTs over the subject properties in their names,
petitioner did not ask for the cancellation of said titles. The only
(b) For filing: logical and reasonable explanation is that petitioner is reluctant to
bring to the attention of the Court certain facts and circumstances,
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be keeping its Complaint safely worded, so as to institute only an
estimated action for annulment of Deeds of Absolute Sale. Petitioner
deliberately avoided raising issues on the title and possession of
2. Special civil actions, except judicial foreclosure of mortgage, the real properties that may lead the Court to classify its case as
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, PARTITION AND a real action.
QUIETING OF TITLE which will
No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal
3. All other actions not involving property them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint in
Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real
[Table of fees omitted.] action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its
title to and possession of the five parcels of land from
respondents Tan and Obiedo.
The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases
involving real property depend on the fair market value of the A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the property; or, as indicated in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the
docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or
a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary recovery of possession of real property.[33]
estimation.
Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, prior to its
In order to resolve the issue of whether petitioner paid the correct amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, had a specific paragraph
amount of docket fees, it is necessary to determine the true nature governing the assessment of the docket fees for real action,
of its Complaint. The dictum adhered to in this jurisdiction is that to wit:
the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body
of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by its title or In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there
heading.[32] However, the Court finds it necessary, in is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the
ascertaining the true nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030, to take claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
into account significant facts and circumstances beyond the
Complaint of petitioner, facts and circumstances which petitioner Considering that respondents complaint is a real action, the Rule
failed to state in its Complaint but were disclosed in the preliminary requires that the assessed value of the property, or if there is
proceedings before the court a quo. none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant
and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
Petitioner persistently avers that its Complaint in Civil Case No.
2006-0030 is primarily for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute It is also important to note that, with the amendments introduced
Sale. Based on the allegations and reliefs in the Complaint alone, by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which became effective on 16 August
one would get the impression that the titles to the subject real 2004, the paragraph in Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
properties still rest with petitioner; and that the interest of pertaining specifically to the basis for computation of docket fees
respondents Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the Deeds for real actions was deleted. Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as
of Absolute Sale sought to be annulled. amended, provides that in cases involving real property, the FAIR
MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
What petitioner failed to mention in its Complaint was that CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL
respondents Tan and Obiedo already had the Memorandum of VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Agreement, which clearly provided for the execution of the Deeds WHICH IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED
of Absolute Sale, registered on the TCTs over the five parcels of VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION x x x shall be the
land, then still in the name of petitioner. After respondents Tan basis for the computation of the docket fees. Would such an
and Obiedo had the Deeds of Absolute Sale notarized on 3
amendment have an impact on Gochan, Siapno, and Serrano?  Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to
The Court rules in the negative. negotiate with the bank the terms of its purchase
- DMI offered to pay 8M for the property, but such offer
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees was rejected, suggesting 15M instead
for a real action would still be determined in accordance with the - DMI made a second offer of 10M, but the bank still
value of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in refused
what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket  While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that
fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of they continued to use the property in their business. But the
relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using Bank posted at the place private security guards from
the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Philippine Industrial Security Agency (PISA).
Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal - The Lims also claimed that on several occasions in
Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the 2000, the guards, on instructions of the Bank
stated value of the same. representatives Titolaido Payongayong and Evylene
Sison, padlocked the entrances to the place and barred
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted the Lims as well as DMI’s employees from entering the
by petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to and property.
possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving - One of the guards even pointed his gun at one employee
real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in and shots were fired.
accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as - Because of this, DMI was unable to close several
amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not commit any projects and contracts with prospective clients. Further,
error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay the Lims alleged that they were unable to retrieve
additional docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006- assorted furniture, equipment, and personal items left at
0030. the property.
 Lims: Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance
The Court does not give much credence to the allegation of of TRO or Preliminary Injunction
petitioner that if the judgment of the Court of Appeals is allowed to  Bank: filed its Answer
stand and not rectified, it would result in grave injustice and  DMI and Lims: Supplemental Complainy, alleging that the
irreparable injury to petitioner in view of the prohibitive amount Bank urreptitiously took such properties, resulting in
assessed against it. It is a sweeping assertion which lacks additional actual damages to them of over ₱27 million.
evidentiary support. Undeniably, before the Court can conclude  RTC: in favor of DMI (di ko na nilagay ibang nangyari ha)
that the amount of docket fees is indeed prohibitive for a party, it  Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning
would have to look into the financial capacity of said party. It among other things the RTC’s authority to grant damages
baffles this Court that herein petitioner, having the capacity to considering plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their
enter into multi-million transactions, now stalls at paying supplemental complaint.
P720,392.60 additional docket fees so it could champion before
 RTC denied the motion.
the courts its rights over the disputed real properties. Moreover,
 On appeal to the CA, the latter found for the Bank, reversed
even though the Court exempts individuals, as indigent or pauper
the RTC decision, and dismissed the complaint as well as the
litigants, from paying docket fees, it has never extended such an
counterclaims.
exemption to a corporate entity.
 DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but the
CA denied the same, hence this petition
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES vs SECURITY BANK ISSUES:

Petitioner: Do-All Metal Industries, SPS. Domingo and Lely Kung 1. W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and
Lim adjudicate plaintiff’s supplemental complaint
Respondents: Security Bank, Titolaido Payongayong, Evylene against the Bank considering their failure to pay the
Sison. Phil Industrial Security Agency Corp and Gil Silos filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in
Citation: GR No. 176339 it?
Date of Promulgation: January 10, 2011
Ponente: Abad HELD:
FACTS: YES.
 Dragon Lady Industries: owned by SPS Lim
- 1996 to 1997: they took out loans from Security Bank One. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that
amounting to PhP 92, 454. 776. 45 plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental
- Unable to pay the loans on time, they assigned some complaint is fatal to their action.
of their real properties to the bank to secure the same,
including a building and the lot on which the property But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees
stands, located at Santolan, Pasig City for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired
 1998: Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed
the Do-All Metal Industries, primarily for business although their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the
the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence. filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of
- DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not
from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the
Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the lease. The case.6
contract also provided that, should the Bank decide to
sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal. Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their
 Dec. 3, 1999: before the lease was up, the bank gave notice supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC
to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on Dec. 31, 1999
committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they DEE vs HARVEST ALL
had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees
constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this Petitioner: Jonathan Dee
after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on Respondents: Harvest All Invested Limited ( consolidated case
a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases ‘to, main parties lang nilagay ko)
where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or Citation: GR No. 224834
where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the Date of Promulgation: March 15, 2017
award.8 None of these circumstances obtain in this case. Ponente: Perlas Bernabe

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the FACTS:
actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still
plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast
claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua
no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities, minority
merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc.
had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of
any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint Alliance's Board of Directors.5 As per Alliance's by-laws, its
need to be paid upon its filing.9 The rules do not require the court Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15.6
to make special assessments in cases of supplemental However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3)
complaints. o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors,
over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a Board
To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM pending
the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (SRO)
for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late consisting of shares with total value of ₱l Billion which was earlier
payment before the case could be submitted for decision, approved in a Board Resolution passed on February 17, 2015. As
assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not per Alliance's Disclosure dated May 29, 2015 filed before the
then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous Philippine Stock Exchange, such postponement was made "to
failure to pay the fees they owed the court. Consequently, the trial give the stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the
court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not annual meeting, after taking into consideration their subscription
filed. to the [SRO] of [Alliance]."7 This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file
the instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ
Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining
non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)8 involving an intra-corporate
rendered its decision in the case. The implication is that the Bank controversy against Alliance, and its other Board members,
should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission. namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See,
But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M. Elechicon,
waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board). In said complaint,
supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant Harvest All, et al. principally claimed that the subscription to the
exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these new shares through the SRO cannot be made a condition
exemptions are embodied in its rules. precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their right
to vote in the 2015 ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had the full voting rights proportionate to their existing shareholdings.9
burden of proving that the movable properties in question had Thus, Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of
remained in the premises and that the bank was responsible for nullity of the Board Resolution dated May 29, 2015 indefinitely
their loss. The only evidence offered to prove the loss was postponing the 2015 ASM, as well as the Board Resolution dated
Domingo Lim’s testimony and some undated and unsigned February 17, 2015 approving the SR0.10 The Clerk of Court of the
inventories. These were self-serving and uncorroborated. RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees amounting to
₱8,860.00 which they paid accordingly.11 Later on, Harvest All, et
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and al. filed an Amended Complaint:12 (a) deleting its prayer to
REINSTATES with modification the decision of the Regional Trial declare null and void the Board Resolution dated February 17,
Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 68184. The Court DIRECTS 2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed that the Alliance
respondent Security Bank Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and Board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out the SRO
spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim damages in the following prior to and as a condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.13
amounts: ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱500,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱100,000.00 for attorney’s fees. The For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of
Court DELETES the award of actual damages of ₱27,974,564.00. jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay the
correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have paid P20
Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO which was
valued at Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did not mention
(YUNG CASE NA ‘TO, COPY-PASTED AS IS YUNG FACTS SA such capital infusion in their prayers and, as such, were only made
ORIGINAL TEXTS. SOBRANG AYOS AT SUMMARIZED NA to pay the measly sum of ₱8,860.00. On the other hand, Harvest
KASO SO DI KO NA PINAIKSI LALO) All, et al. maintained that they paid the correct filing fees,
considering that the subject of their complaint is the holding of the
2015 ASM and not a claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO.
Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out that they simply relied on
the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to
defraud the government
ISSUE: qualification, was the applicable provision. Even the
1. W/N Harvest All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees for Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during
their complaint, as the same should have been based which time the applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a)
on the Pl Billion value of the SRO; and (b) if Harvest and (b) 1 & 3 shall be the basis for computing the filing fees
All, et al. indeed paid insufficient filing fees, whether in intra-corporate cases, recognizing that there could be an
or not such act was made in good faith and without intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject
any intent to defraud the government. matter cannot be estimated, such as an action for inspection
of corporate books. The immediate illustration shows that no
HELD: mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in
the assessment of the docket fees.32 (Emphases and
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition in underscoring supplied)
G.R. No. 224871 is partly granted.
Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate
I. controversy always involves a property in litigation" and that "there
can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct filing the subject matter cannot be estimated" are clearly non-
fees for Harvest All, et al.'s complaint should be based on the Pl determinative of the antecedents involved in that case and, hence,
Billion value of the SRO - and, thus, essentially holding that such cannot be controlling jurisprudence to bind our courts when it
complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation - both the RTC and adjudicates similar cases upon the principle of stare decisis. As it
the CA heavily relied on the is evident, these passages in Lu only constitute an opinion
delivered by the Court as a "by the way" in relation to a
Court's pronouncement in Lu. In Lu, the Court mentioned that in hypothetical scenario (i.e., if the complaint was filed during the
view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which it was not) different from
introduced Section 21 (k)27 to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, it the actual case before it.
seemed that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a
property in litigation" and that "there can be no case of intra- In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,33 the Court had the
corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter opportunity to define an obiter dictum and discuss its legal effects
cannot be estimated."28 as follows:

However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest All, [An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made, or opinion expressed,
et al. correctly pointed out29 that the foregoing statements were by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the way, that is,
in the nature of an obiter dictum. incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question
before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case involving determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or
an intra-corporate controversy instituted therein, i.e., declaration analogy or argument. It does not embody the resolution or
of nullity of share issuance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation determination of the court, and is made without argument, or full
and, thus, the correct docket fees were paid.30 Despite such consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an adjudication,
pronouncement, the Court still went on to say that had the being a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for
complaint therein been filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04- purposes of res judicata."34 (Emphasis and underscoring
2-04-SC, then it would have ruled otherwise because the supplied)
amendments brought about by the same "seem to imply that there
can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of For these reasons, therefore, the courts a quo erred in applying
the subject matter cannot be estimated,"31 viz.: the case of Lu.

The new Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as II.
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (July 20, 2004), expressly
provides that "[f]or petitions for insolvency or other cases In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated in Lu
involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed was actually incorrect. This is because depending on the nature
under Section 7 (a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that of the principal action or remedy sought, an intra-corporate
paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was omitted from the controversy may involve a subject matter which is either capable
reference. Said paragraph refers to docket fees for filing "[a]ctions or incapable of pecuniary estimation.
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" and
"all other actions not involving property." In Cabrera v. Francisco,35 the Court laid down the parameters in
determining whether an action is considered capable of pecuniary
By referring the computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) estimation or not:
only, it denotes that an intra-corporate controversy always
involves a property in litigation, the value of which is always the In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
basis for computing the applicable filing fees. The latest which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
amendments seem to imply that there can be no case of intra- adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum
cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere inspection of corporate of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
books. estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on the amount of
If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find refuge in the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the express phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 that the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
paragraph (a) alone applies. purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
In the present case, however, the original Complaint was filed the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
on August 14, 2000 during which time Section 7, without money, and are cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of [F]irst
[I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts).36 (Emphases and of the subject matter can be determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees
underscoring supplied) for actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated], or 7 (b) (3) [fees for all other actions not involving
This case is a precise illustration as to how an intra-corporate property] of the same Rule to cases involving intra-corporate
controversy may be classified as an action whose subject matter controversies for the determination of the correct filing fees, as the
is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A cursory perusal of Harvest case may be, serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the
All, et al.'s Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that its amendments concretize the Court's recognition that the subject
main purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date matter of an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be
set in the corporation's bylaws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO capable of pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were
has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting interest with the also made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
corporation would somehow be preserved. Thus, Harvest All, et SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum)
al. sought for the nullity of the Alliance Board Resolution passed implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject matter
on May 29, 2015 which indefinitely postponed the corporation's which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
2015 ASM pending completion of subscription to the SR0.37
Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the While the Court is not unaware that the amendments brought by
concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016 only came after the
by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere filing of the complaint subject of this case, such amendments may
mention of Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot nevertheless be given retroactive effect so as to make them
transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable applicable to the resolution of the instant consolidated petitions as
of pecuniary estimation, considering that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do they merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not
not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares substantive law. In Tan, Jr. v. CA,39 the Court thoroughly
subject of the SRO; and (b) such mention was merely narrative or explained the retroactive effectivity of procedural rules, viz.:
descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their
voting interest as minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 The general rule that statutes are prospective and not
ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed. If, in the end, retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has
a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which
would be recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or
it would simply be the consequence of their principal action. creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a
new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already
Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or
pecuniary estimation. modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
At this juncture, it should be mentioned that the Court passed A.M. confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal
No. 04-02-04-SC38 dated October 5, 2016, which introduced conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
amendments to the schedule of legal fees to be collected in retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule against giving
various commercial cases, including those involving intra- statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the
corporate controversies. Pertinent portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04- obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent
SC read: the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of
their enactment where they neither create new nor take away
RESOLUTION vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is
xxxx
presumptively applicable to all actions - those which have accrued
or are pending.
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 04-2-04-SC effective 16 August 2004, incorporated the equitable Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
schedule of legal fees prescribed for petitions for rehabilitation under
Section 21 (i) thereof and, furthermore, provided under Section 21(k) as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
thereof that the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of the said rule shall their passage.1âwphi1 Procedural laws are retroactive in that
apply to petitions for insolvency or other cases involving intra-corporate sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
controversies;
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
xxxx retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new schedule of person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
filing fees as follows:
retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally
xxxx objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby
DELETED as the fees covering petitions for insolvency are already
that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
provided for in this Resolution. As for cases involving intra-corporate litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
controversies, the applicable fees shall be those provided under Section 7 whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
(a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court procedure."40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
depending on the nature of the action.

xxxx In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et


al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable
national circulation. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all
is directed to circularize the same upon its effectivity. (Emphases other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of
and underscoring supplied) Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October
5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R TC in
Verily, the deletion of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, order:
the application of Section 7 (a) [fees for actions where the value
(a) to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing fees in
the amount of ₱8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of
Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-
SC;

(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is insufficient, to


require Harvest, et al.' s payment of any discrepancy within a
period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment,
proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or

(c) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is already


sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with
dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while


the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May
25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM'L. CASE
NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial

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