The Unconscious in the Anthropology of Claude Lbvi-Straussl

IN0 ROSS1
St. John’s University

Levi-Strauss claims that the unconscious activity of mind is more important than
the conscious one for understanding social phenomena and that the unconscious
consists of an aggregate of forms, which are imposed o n psychological and physical
content. The real inspiration of Ldui-Strauss’ notion is the Kantian notion o f mental
constraints and the postulate o f isomorphism of mental and physical laws The
methodological usefulness of the unconscious as a principle o f intelligibility is
placed in evidence.

IN THE LAST TWO DECADES Lkvi-
Strauss’ structuralism has been the focal
point of controversy among philosophers,
linguists, anthropologists, and other social
scientists. Some recent developments of the
controversy give the impression that what
was an open dialogue is turning into an
attitude of mutual rejection. Phenomenol-
ogists seem to conclude that their position is
irreconcilable with structuralism (Ricoeur
1967:11, 30). Some linguists assert that
Uvi-Strauss has had a unilateral contact
with linguistics and misinterprets the specific
c o n t r i bu t i o n s of structural linguistics
(Mounin 1970: 200-205). Some empirical an-
thropologists seem intended to put an end to
a long debate by concluding that structural-
ism is not a science but a bricolage whose
structural arrangements are to be taken as an
expression of “personal whim” (Maybury-
Lewis 1969:118-119), or an intellectual
game for self-amusement (in LBvi-Strauss
1971b:ll). Earlier admirers of Levi-Strauss
have come to a disagreement with the master
on many issues (for example, Leach 1970)
or have been charged by LBvi-Strauss with
having misunderstood his work (as happened
to Needham) (LQvi-Strauss1969a:xix). LBvi-
Strauss finds that many of his critics raise
objections so worthless that they do not
deserve to be mentioned by name (Levi-
Strauss 1971a:564). Authoritative phe-
nomenologists, such as Ricoeur, are told that
20
they cannot be taken seriously when they
accuse him of abolishing the notion of mean-
ing (Zbid.:571). Sartre is serious enough to
be given consideration, but the compromise
he offers is defined by LBvi-Strauss as unac-
ceptable dialectics-a fact which leaves him
astonished (r6ueur) (Ibid.:616). Levi-Strauss
submits the most tenacious of his ad-
versaries, the existentialists, to a caustic scru-
tiny and finds them involved in a self-
admiration which leads them into an ecstasy
of self-contemplation; the atmosphere of
their dialectic smoking room impedes their
seeing beyond their local interests ([bid.:
572).
On the other side, when Lkvi-Strauss is
reminded that his English and American
critics complain about the unverifiability of
his theories, he makes the gesture “of brush-
ing away a fly” (1971c:40). They still do
not understand that the criterion of proving
something true or false, characteristic of the
natural sciences, is not applicable in human
sciences. Social scientists deal with repre-
sentations and, therefore, their task cannot
be one of proving their truth or falsehood
but only of understanding them better and
b e t t e r , a l t h o u g h never definitively
(1971b312). To this remark one can reply
that the question of truth or falsity concerns
the understanding of social phenomena and
not the phenomena themselves, and the
question of the validity of LBvi-Strauss’
Rossi ] LEVI-STRAUSS: THE UNCONSCIOUS
understanding of cultural phenomena has
still to be faced and given an answer. I will
return to this question at the end of this
article.
Is this polemic stage of the controversy
going to lead to an impasse and perhaps to a
breaking point? A careful reexamination of
the origin of the thinking of LBvi-Straussand
a clear understanding of his intentions might
prevent this possible outcome and help to
foster an enriching dialogue among struc-
turalists and social scientists of different
epistemological and methodological persua-
sions.
The purpose of this article is to clarify
the historical and theoretical dimensions of
the fundamental hypothesis of anthropologi-
cal structuralism, that is, the notion that
unconscious structures underlie cultural phe-
nomena. I will also present a brief overview
of some of the basic controversies surround-
ing this hypothesis and will conclude with
some considerations on its scientific merits.
Levi-Strauss’ remarks on the criterion of
verifiability takes us directly to the heart of
the debate. On the one side, he is accused by
empirical anthropologists of not being a
scientist and by phenomenologists and
existentialists of excluding the conscious
activity of man from his anthropological
analysis with the consequence that the struc-
tures he discovers amount to the syntactic
arrangement of “a discourse which tells
n o t h i n g ” ( R i c o e u r , i n LQvi-Strauss
[1963b:653]; in L’Homme Nu [1971a:571]
LBvi-Strauss quotes Ricoeur without men-
tioning him by name). On the other side,
Lkvi-Strauss accuses empirical anthro-
pologists of using a scientific method still
embedded with mechanism and empiricism
(Ibid.:615) and scolds phenomenologists and
existentialists for giving exclusive attention
to man, the unbearable and spoiled child
who has until now impeded any serious
work (Zbid.:614-615). In the past, LBvi-
Strauss has suggested that phenomenology
might be useful as a means of verification
but not of discovery (1963c:31, 1966a:
253) and that empirical analysis is a sub-
sidiary instrument or precondition for struc-
21
tural analysis (1966b:116). He has also made
clear that while structural anthropology
merely prepares for the advent of a truly
scientific anthropology, it already possesses
the characteristics of a true science (1971a:
133) and enables the social scientist to reach
a level of intelligibility inaccessible through
an empirical description of facts (Ibid.:614).
Of course, phenomenologists and empir-
ical anthropologists cannot limit themselves
to a subsidiary role and challenge Levi-
Strauss’ scientific pretenses. Empirical an-
thropologists insist on the notion that
science must be free from any ideological
commitment and philosophical assumptions,
while Levi-Strauss describes his anthro-
pology a s a quasi-Kantian enterprise
(1969b:lO); for many social scientists,
science must be based on scientific experi-
mentation, while Levi-Strauss claims to dis-
cover unconscious infrastructures, which by
their nature seem to elude any experimental
verification. The problem is that many
empirical social scientists, who define them-
selves as “pure” scientists, in actuality know
only one notion of science, the one codified
by Francis Bacon and introduced by Comte
into the social sciences. Even some inter-
preters of structuralism follow the posi-
tivistic method in the neopositivistic version
of Nagel, Hempel, and Reichenbach (see
Nutini 1970, 1971). Neither empirical an-
thropologists nor neopositivistic interpreters
of structuralism appear to realize that cer-
tain positivistic and behavioristic premises
jeopardize their contention that the method
they advocate is the only and universally
valid scientific method. Perhaps anthro-
pologists ought to be more cautious and
realize that they cannot decide about the
appropriateness of a scientific method in
terms of a prioristic criteria but only in
terms of a careful definition of the phe-
nomena under investigation. Unfortunately,
too many empirical and behavioral social
scientists have skirted the problem of the
scientific definition of cultural phenomena;
rather they take for granted that social
phenomena are endowed with external and
objective characteristics which are con-
22 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
sidered to be a solid basis for scientific
investigation (see, for example, Jarvie 1971
contested by Fabian 1971 and Rossi 1972a).
Lki-Strauss deserves credit for having
justified the choice of his method by a
systematic discussion about the symbolic
nature of social phenomena. Even though
not all of his conceptualizations are thor-
oughly clarified or unexceptionably estab-
lished, a sound analysis and evaluation of
LQvi-Strauss’works is impossible without a
clear understanding of these conceptualiza-
tions. LQvi-Strauss’formulations have raised
the discussion on the scientific method to a
sophisticated epistemological level from
which the inadequacies of the positivistic
method can be clearly seen; even though
some writers find structuralism to be a more
s u b t l e form of positivism (Aubenque
1971:353ff.), still it must be considered a
partial step away from it.
Consistent with LQvi-Strauss’own termi-
nology (1971a:614), I use the word epis-
temology to refer to the assumptions con-
cerning the level of reality we know, the
cognitive apparatus by which we know it,
and the theoretical premises which justify
the scientific procedures used. I refer to the
operational techniques used in conducting
the investigation.
Since his early works, LQvi-Strauss ex-
plicitly asserts that the epistemological
premises of his anthropology are based on
the rejection of the immediate and sponta-
neous evidence as a criterion of truth. As a
consequence, he has questioned the ad-
equacy of the empiricist method insofar as it
claims to reach reality only through sensory
perceptions, and rejects the phenomenologi-
cal and existentialist methods insofar as they
maintain that reality can be reached through
our conscious experience without offering
any guarantee against the illusions of subjec-
tivity ( 1965a:61-62).2
LQvi-Strauss compares his own approach
to the geological method and claims that his
major sources of inspiration are Freud,
Marx, and Saussure. These masters have
shown him that true reality rather than
being obvious, evades our efforts of detec-
[75,1973
tion (Idem). Consequently, the operation of
understanding consists of reducing apparent
reality to its hidden dimension through a
process of decoding (1966d:33). What is,
then, the relation between rational and
sensory knowledge? Marx and Rousseau
have shown that knowledge in physics and
social sciences is not based on sense percep-
tion, but on the construction of a model
(1965a:61) through which we can interpret
empirical reality and discover its uncon-
scious infrastructure.
LQvi-Strauss’ notion of unconscious can-
not be reduced to an arbitrary epistemologi-
cal idiosyncrasy, since he claims that this
notion is present in a specific socio-anthro-
pological tradition which is opposed to the
empiricist mode of analysis. There has been
a good deal of literature on the issue of the
intellectual antecedents of LQvi-Strauss, but
there is not always agreement on the relative
importance of the influence of particular
thinkers on his works. Some of these intel-
lectual influences have been denied by LQvi-
Strauss in various private correspondences,
while others have been admitted by him
with some qualifications (1969b:ll).
LQvi-Strauss does not belong to one
specific anthropological tradition nor to a
homogeneous group of traditions. Rather, he
borrows some elements, and not necessarily
the most important ones, from certain
recent theoretical perspectives which are pre-
sent in psychology (Gestalt, Freud), soci-
ology and anthropology (Rousseau, Durk-
heim, Mauss, Marx), linguistics (Saussure,
Troubetzkoy , Jakobson), philosophy (Kant,
Rousseau), cybernetics (Wiener, Von Neu-
mann, Shannon), etc. The elements which
LQvi-Straussborrows from these thinkers do
not make up a heterogeneous eclecticism
but are organized in a consistent and some-
what flexible epistemological and method-
ological perspective. However, the highly
personal way by which Levi-Strauss has
selected, systematized, and applied these ele-
ments has made it difficult for many social
scientists to understand and even label his
approach to socio-cultural phenomena. Per-
haps one can assert without simplification
Rossi ] LEVI-STRAUSS: THE
that the most fundamental notions of Levi-
Strauss’ structuralism are, at the epis-
temological theoretical level, the postulate
of the unconscious meaning of cultural
reality3 and, at the epistemological method-
ological level, the notion of structure with
the related notions of model and transforma-
tion. In this paper I am limiting my atten-
tion to those intellectual antecedents of
Levi-Strauss that are important for clarifying
these fundamental notions of structuralism.
As early as 1955, Levi-Strauss explicitly
mentioned as his sources of inspiration,
Saussure, Marx, Rousseau, Freud, and, with
some reservations Durkheim (1965a:59-63).
In explaining the reason for not choosing the
individual and its consciousness as the
central perspective of his approach, Levi-
Strauss has very recently mentioned the
same masters once again. What structuralism
wants to accomplish after Rousseau, Marx,
Durkheim, Saussure, and Freud is to unveil
to consciousness an “object other” and more
important than consciousness itself (197 la:
563), that is, its unconscious infrastructure
or the mechanisms and conditions of its
functioning. Since I am discussing the in-
fluence of the intellectual antecedents of
Levi-Strauss from the point of view of his
most fundamental epistemological notion, I
follow a systematic rather than a historical
method of exposition.
I (Zbid.:508-509).
THE NOTION OF UNCONSCIOUS
The symbolic meaning of socio-cultural
phenomena is made possible by their uncon-
scious infrastructure.
Levi-Strauss has repeatedly refused to
consider structuralism as a philosophy and
has denied having or even being interested in
one. However, he participated comfortably
in philosophical roundtable discussions (see
Levi-Strauss 1963b) and does not dislike
interviews with professional philosophers. It
is especially in these circumstances that Lkvi-
Strauss’ philosophical training emerges as an
important theoretical component of his an-
thropological method. In one such interview,
u~co~sc~ous 23
LQvi-Strauss states: “Philosophically I find
myself more and more Kantian, not so much
because of the particular content of Kant’s
doctrine (for the good peace of mind of
some Levi-Straussian interpreters!), but
rather for the specific way of posing the
problem of knowledge. First of all, because
anthropology appears to me as a philosophy
of knowledge, a philosophy of concept; I
think that anthropology can make progress
only if it is situated at the level of the
concept” ( 1 9 6 3 ~38).
: Elsewhere, Levi-
Strauss quotes Mauss’ assertion that “the
mental and the social component of social
reality are undistinguishable” ( 1 9 6 6 ~22)
:
and explains that the raw material of social
phenomena consists in the common aspects
of mental structures and institutional
schemata (1969a:95).
LCvi-Strauss’ position is characterized by
the peculiar conception of the symbolic
component of culture. LQvi-Strauss, trained
in philosophy at the Sorbonne, finds con-
genial the task of purifying and continuing
some elements of Durkheimian thought,
which philosophically was under the pre-
dominant influence of Kant (1945:518). In
Levi-Strauss’ view both Durkheim and Mauss
insisted on the psychic nature of social
phenomena, and Durkheim did not limit
himself to stress “the mental side of social
processes” but went so far as to conclude
that they belong to the realm of ideals
Among the various deficiencies or con-
tradictions of Durkheim’s thinking LCvi-
Strauss mentions his conceptualization of
social phenomena. In LQvi-Strauss’ opinion,
Durkheim was at his best when he stated
that intellectual activity, far from being the
reflection of social organization, is pre-
supposed by the latter, and therefore was at
his worst when he proposed the opposite
view of the primacy of the social over the
intellectual component of culture. Levi-
Strauss praises Bergson for having clearly
perceived that the concepts of class and
opposition are immediate data of the under-
standing, which are used in the formation of
social order; in Levi-Strauss’ view this con-
24 A M E R ICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
ception constitutes “the foundations of a
genuine sociological logic” (1967a:96-97).
In The Savage Mind, LBvi-Strauss has
somewhat elaborated his idea of “socio-
logic” as the basis of sociology (1966a:76).
He asserts that “the universe is an object of
thought” (Ibid.:3),and against the Naturalist
school he maintains that natural conditions,
rather than being passively accepted, are
defined, given meaning, and developed in
specific directions. Man reduces natural
reality to concepts which are organized into
an unpredetermined system, and this is the
reason why facts are “not of a natural but a
logical order” (1966a:95). L6vi-Strauss
clarifies the Durkheimian thesis of the social
origin of logical thought by stating that
between social structures and the conceptual
system there is a dialectical relationship
rather than a causal relationship. The rela-
tionship between man and universe is the
common substratum of the social and intel-
lectual system, a substratum from which
each one of these systems translates specific
historical and spacial modalities (Ibid.:214).
One can see here elements of a dialectical
view capable of avoiding the shortcomings of
a causal and/or idealistic conception of
culture.
In a famous passage to which we shall
return later, Lbvi-Strauss explains that the
human mind mediates between infrastruc-
ture or praxis (man’s activity) and super-
structure or practices (cultural institutions)
by elaborating a conceptual system which is
a synthesizing operator between ideas and
facts; through this mediation, facts are
turned into signs (1966a:131)> It follows
that since “men communicate by means of
symbols and signs,” all cultural domains are
“pregnant with meaning,” and the anthro-
pologist must work with meaning (1966b:
115).
Because social phenomena are made
possible by the fundamental mediation of
the conceptual schemata and are pregnant
with meaning, their only suitable explana-
tion must be dialectical. In an early theoreti-
cal essay, LBvi-Strauss peculiarly defines
dialectic explanation in opposition to
[ 75,1973
mechanic explanation, that is, as an explana-
tion which consists in “rethinking (social
phenomena) in their logical order.” Durk-
heim advocates this type of sociological
explanation since social phenomena are
“objectivated systems of ideas.” At the same
time, Durkheim also advocates the “method-
ical experiment” to study social facts as if
they were “things.” How can we apply both
the dialectical and experimental method?
LBvi-Strauss solves this Durkheimian an-
tinomy by saying that the objectified system
of ideas are unconscious “or that un-
conscious psychical structures underlie them
and make them possible”; “the unconscious
teleology of mind” explains “how social
phenomena may present the character of
meaningful wholes and of structuralized
ensembles” because of this basic fact, social
phenomena present the character of
“things,” and at the same time can be
treated as ideas to be rethought in their
logical order (1945:518, 528, 534). Since it
is a question of unconscious logical order,
the anthropologist must aim at discovering
the mechanisms of an objectified (un-
conscious) thought on an ethnographic basis
(1963b3640, 1969b:10-11), that is, at find-
ing out how the human mind works in the
most different societies or “incarnated
mental activities” ( 1 9 6 3 ~31).
:
One question immediately arises: where
should we search for the meaning that LBvi-
Strauss defines as being the proper concern
of social anthropology? Does the notion of
unconscious structures and objectified
thought imply that the meaning of which
social actors are aware has to be totally
rejected as a spurious or deceptive meaning?
I1
Conscious and unconscious meaning are
both integral parts o f social phenomena;
evidence for the existence o f unconscious
meaning.
LBvi-Strauss recognizes that social facts
“are lived by man, and that subjective con-
sciousness is as much a form of their reality
as t h e i r objective characteristics”
Rossi] LEVI-STRAUSS: THE UNCONSCIOUS
(1966b:113). In his view, however, the con-
scious level of social processes is the proper
object of history, while anthropology should
be concerned with its “unconscious founda-
tions” (1963a:18).
How does LBvi-Strausssupport the notion
of an unconscious level of cultural phe-
nomena and unconscious teleology of mind?
Postponing the discussion on Levi-Strauss’
contention that these notions are based on
“the main results of modern psychology and
linguistics” (1945:518), let us first focus our
attention on some of the anthropological
evidence he utilizes. Boas had already shown
that the structure of language remains un-
known to the speaker until a scientific
grammar is introduced (1963a:lg); LQvi-
Strauss adds that even the linguistic knowl-
edge of the scholar “always remains dis-
associated from his experience as a speaking
agent” (Ibid.:57). Boas made clear that not
only the forms of the phonetic systems but
also single sounds are outside the conscious-
ness of the speaker; for instance, a terminal s
does not convey the idea of plurality as a
separate entity, but rather as a part of a
sound complex. The speaker becomes con-
scious of single phonetic units only through
purposeful analysis (Boas 1968: 19-20). The
use of language in general is so automatic
that its basic notions rarely emerge into
consciousness, while religious practices al-
most universally become a subject of reflec-
tion (Ibid .:64).
Levi-Strauss also comments that Tylor’s
definition of culture includes, among the
other components, habits and unconscious
reasons for practicing customs (1963a: 18).
Kroeber had demonstrated that fashion ap-
parently seems to follow an arbitrary evolu-
tion, but in reality it follows definite laws.
Since we rarely notice why the style of
fashion changes, the change must “depend
on the unconscious activity of the mind”; as
a matter of fact, its laws cannot be dis-
covered by merely empirical observation or
intuition, but only by measuring funda-
mental relationships between the elements
of custom (Ibid.:59). We shall see that
Haudricourt would, on the contrary, argue
25
that a structure which is statistically demon-
strated does not necessarily mean that it is
unconscious.
In support of the notion of the uncon-
scious dimension of culture, LBvi-Strauss
could also have referred to Edward Sapir
whom he mentions when he discusses the
relationship between language and culture
(Ibid.:85, 96). Sapir clearly stated that our
individual behavior is influenced by an un-
conscious patterning of social behavior
which we cannot consciously describe; how-
ever, while asserting that the individuals are
not aware of the significance of their behav-
ior, Sapir excluded the existence of a myste-
rious social mind which would find expres-
s i o n in individual minds (E. Sapir
1927~121-123).
Levi-Strauss does not limit himself to
appeal to anthropological authorities; h e also
uses ethnological arguments to show that the
conscious or surface dimension of a cultural
institution can be adequately accounted for
only in terms of its unconscious infrastruc-
ture. LQvi-Strauss’ discussion of the Murngin
system offers a classic example of this view.
Levi-Strauss argues that the Murngin
marriage system originally consisted of four
patrilineal groups which later, intersected by
matrilineal moieties, became an asymmetrical
system of eight sections. This implied that
an original system of generalized exchange
had to reproduce twin structures to give the
appearance of a system of restricted ex-
change. Since the generalized system estab-
lished reciprocal relationships between any
number of partners, and the restrictive sys-
tem between two partners or between a
number of partners in multiples of two,
these systems can be represented respec-
tively by a three dimensional and a two
dimensional geometric structure. How, then,
can a three dimensional geometrical struc-
ture take the appearance of a two dimen-
sional structure? Cartographers solve this
problem by representing twice the geo-
graphical areas at the edges of the map. The
Murngin people in order to conceptualize a
system both as a restricted and generalized
exchange, unconsciously made analogous
26 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
duplications in their kinship system (1969a:
189-192).
LBvi-Strauss argues that the dualistic
organizations found in the Americas,
Melanesia and Indonesia are superficial dis-
tortions of more complex structures (1963a:
161). The explanations offered by the
natives are not merely a part or reflection of
their social organization, but may show a
lack of awareness of certain characteristics
and contradict them; moreover, the explana-
tions offered by members of different social
strata are shown to contradict each other.
Consequently, “the actual functioning of
these societies is quite different from its
superficial appearance” (Ibid.:130-131,
133).5
Does this difference imply that the un-
conscious functioning is more genuine than
the conscious functioning?
I11
The unconscious meaning is more impor-
tant than the conscious one.
LBvi-Strauss refers to Boas when he
asserts that “all types of social phenomena
(language, beliefs, techniques, and customs)
have this in common, that their elaboration
in the mind is at the level of unconscious
thought” (1969a:108). Boas made the point
that the classificatory concepts of primitives
never rise into consciousness and, therefore,
must originate in unconscious mental pro-
cesses (Boas 1968:63). Linguistic and other
cultural facts are grouped together under
certain ideas and categories which are uncon-
scious. Our experience gives evidence of the
unconscious origin of certain clusters of
activities, such as table manners, habits, and
a u t o m a t i c repetition of actions. For
example, the danger of cutting the lips is
easily given as the reason for not bringing
the table knife to the mouth; however, this
explanation is only a “secondary rationalis-
tic” explanation, since we know that the
fork came into being later than the knife,
and that in certain areas people use sharply
pointed forks no less dangerous than the
knife, while in other areas people use dull
[75,1973
knives. The conclusion is that we do not
know the origin of this particular custom
which may have been caused by entirely
different reasons than those we give (Zbid.:
64-65). In LBvi-Strauss’ perspective, one
could say that the unconscious reason or
origin of cultural phenomena is more genu-
ine and important than the conscious ex-
planation.
Freud and Marx are the other two
masters who have convinced LBvi-Strauss of
the fundamental importance of the uncon-
scious. From Freud he has learned that
“what is not conscious is more important
than what is conscious” (LBvi-Strauss
1963b:648), and that “the true meaning is
not the one we are aware of, but the one
hidden behind it” ( 1 9 6 3 ~ 4 1 ) .This belief
has been reinforced by the Marxian creed
that “men are always victims of their own as
well as other people’s frauds” (Zbid.:41).
LBvi-Strauss’ thinking can be clarified
further if we consider its relationship with
French socio-anthropological tradition. Ac-
cording to LBvi-Strauss, Mauss constantly
appealed to the unconscious as the common
and specific character of social facts; “In
magic, as in religion, as in linguistics, the
unconscious ideas are the ones which act”
(1966c:30). The “unconscious categories”
for Mauss are not just one component of
cultural phenomena, but rather their L‘deter-
minants” (1966b: 113). LBvi-Strauss com-
ments on Mauss’ effort in connection with
the work of the linguistic school of Prague.
At the same time that Mauss wrote “The
Gift,” Troubetzkoy and Jakobson with the
help of a new operational technique were
able to distinguish mere phenomenological
data, which evades scientific analysis, from
their simpler infrastructure to which they
owe all of their reality. It was unfortunate
that Mauss did not apply his new discovery
in the anthropological analysis of the eth-
nographical material ( 1 9 6 6 ~35).
: Durkheim
and Mauss in surveying the native categories
of thought, substituted the conscious repre-
sentations of the natives for those of the
anthropologist, but in LBvi-Strauss’ opinion
this important step was still inadequate,
Rossi ] LEVI-STRAUSS: T H E UNCONSCIOUS
since conscious representations may be quite
remote from unconscious reality (1963a:
282).
Echoing Boas’ formulation, Levi-Strauss
asserts that the conscious representations of
the natives are “rationalized interpretations”
of the unconscious categories (1966b: 113)
or, “a sort of ‘dialectical average’ among a
multiplicity of unconscious system” (Ibid.:
117). Consequently, anthropological analysis
can be scientific only if moved to the level
of the simpler unconscious infrastructure.6
A scientific definition of this infrastructure
becomes a precondition for a sound scien-
tific analysis.
IV
The unconscious activity of mind imposes
structures upon physical and psychic con-
text. The aggregate of these structures con-
s t i t u t e s t h e unconscious (LCui-Strauss
1963a:202-203).
The term “unconscious” needs clarifica-
tion, since it has been used to refer to social
behavior which is “unresponsive, indis-
criminating, conditional, subliminal, un-
attending, unsightless, unremembering, un-
learned, unrecognizing, ignored and unavail-
able to awareness” (Machotka, in Bowman
1965:320). Besides, the philosopher Von
Hartmann saw in the unconscious the
primordial foundation of reality, that is, “a
mysterious and hidden power (which) guides
to a definite end and goal, all the phe-
nomena of the objective real world (nature),
as well as that of the subjective-ideal
(mind)” (Damoi 1967:50). The notion that
unconscious behavior influences our con-
scious behavior is even found with poets,
physicians, essayists, mystics, and in the
philosophies of Schopenhauer and Schelling
(Whyte 1962).
Levi-Straws’ notion of the unconscious is
a product of his interpretation of certain
elements he claims to borrow from struc-
tural linguistics, Freud, Kant and cyber-
netics. One may wonder what kind of sys-
tematic notion can emerge from such differ-
ent sources.
27
The Unconscious
and Structural Linguistics
Levi-Strauss gives credit to Jakobson and
Troubetzkoy for having proved the existence
of unconscious linguistic structures (1963a:
33, 1966c:35), a contention that, as we shall
see, has been questioned by more recent
critics. The linguistic facts that Levi-Straus
mentions are mainly related to the phono-
logical level of language. Modern linguistics
has discovered the reality of phonemes and
distinctive features, and has shown that the
same pairs of oppositions exist in different
languages (1963a:20). Levi-Strauss explicitly
states that these distinctive features have an
objective existence from a psychological as
well as physical point of view; in other
words, they are not merely theoretical and
methodological devices, as mathematical
tools of analysis, but rather they provide a
“picture of reality,” as do the Mendelian
genetic characteristics (1969a: 109). In the
last volume of Mythologiques, LBvi-Strauss
contradicts Sartre by asserting that the
oppositions described by linguists are also
present in biological and physical reality; an
objective dialectics is inherent within the
physical world (1971a:616).
In Levi-Straus’ view, language is struc-
tured not only at the phonological level, but
also at the grammatical and lexical level, and
even the structure of discourse “is not al-
together random” (1963a:85, also 1960:33).
Let us examine the argument that he
develops from what he accepts as established
linguistic facts.
(1) Following the linguistic views of the
Prague school, he conceptualizes phonologi-
cal structures as systems of relations, and the
phoneme as “a bundle of distinctive fea-
tures” (1963a:57). For this reason, language
can be analyzed into constituent elements,
which can be organized according to
“certain structures of opposition and cor-
relation” (1963a: 86).
(2) These relations are constitutive and
determinants of language, since language
owes all of its reality to its simple infrastruc-
ture, and the infrastructure consists of small
28 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
and constant relations (1966c:35). For the
first time, modern phonemics has made pos-
sible a social science capable of formulating
“necessary relations” (1963a: 33), and an-
thropology should emulate its vestiges by
trying to establish, like the natural sciences,
“certain abstract and measurable relations,
which constitute the basic nature of the
phenomena under study” (1963a:59).
(3) Then, LQvi-Strauss, links this pre-
sumed linguistic evidence to the dynamism
of human mind: “Language. . . is human
reason, which has its reasons, and of which
man knows nothing” (1966a:252). The laws
of language “rigorously determine man’s
way of communicating and therefore, his
way of thinking” (1963c:43). Linguistics
reveals that the basic phenomena, which
determine the most general forms of mental
life, are to be found at the unconscious level
(1966c:31). It appears that LCvi-Strauss
makes two crucial assumptions in reaching
such conclusions on the basis of the highly
selective linguistic evidence he uses.
The first postulate is that the funda-
mental and objective phonemic realities,
which consist of systems of relations, are
“the product of unconscious thought pro-
cesses” (1963a:58). Obviously, LCvi-Strauss
does not mean simply that we learn, more or
less consciously, collective habits of behavior
or linguistic patterns, as it is implied by Geza
de Rohan-Csermack’s interpretation of col-
lec t ive u n co nsci ous (Rohan-Csermack
1967:145). Instead, LCvi-Strauss says that
linguistic phenomena, as well as all other
social phenomena, are “the projection, on
t h e level of conscious and socialized
thought, of universal laws which regulate the
unconscious activities of the mind” (LBvi-
Strauss 1963a:59). “ ‘Collective conscious-
ness’ would in the final analysis, be no more
than the expression, on the level of individ-
ual thought and behavior, of certain time
and space modalities of the universal laws
which make up the unconscious activity of
the mind” (Zbid.:65).
The second basic assumption for LQvi-
Strauss’ reahoning is that the “ ‘natural basis’
of the phonemic system” is “the structure of
[75,1973
the brain” (Ibid.:92); since the brain is the
basic mediator and constraining influence on
human thought (1963c:33), it is easy to
conclude that the unconscious laws of lan-
guage rigorously determine man’s mode of
thinking.
Were we t o accept these two assumptions
as self-evident, from the character of lin-
guistic structures we could conclude that
human mind has built-in internal constraints
by which it structures psychic and physical
content; since we are unaware of this set of
constraints or structures, they can properly
be called the unconscious infrastructure of
our psychic activity.
LQvi-Strauss draws on psychology and
philosophy further to strengthen and clarify
this notion.
LBvi-Stmuss and Freud S
Notion of the Unconscious
There is no doubt that in his early works
LCvi-Strauss considers the notion of the un-
conscious as a scientific discovery, since he
accepts it as one of the “main results of
modern psychology a n d linguistics’’
(1945:518) and as one of those “method-
ological instruments” offered by Gestalt and
phonemics, which alone enables sociology t o
lay its own path (Ibid.:520). Freud’s concep-
tion of the human psyche is described as an
example of “experimental study of the
facts” which “joins the philosopher’s pre-
sentments” in attesting to what things
happened and how they happened (1969a:
490); “Freud has shown me all the possi-
bilities which are open to a scientific in-
vestigation of human phenomena”
(1963c:42).
Certain partial similarities and funda-
mental differences between LQvi-Strauss’and
Freud’s notions of the unconscious can be
pointed out easily without claiming special
expertise in psychoanalysis. We already
know from the previous paragraph that LQvi-
Strauss shares with Freud the conviction
that a genuine meaning lies behind the ap-
parent one. At times, LCvi-Strauss has per-
haps somewhat forced this notion by assert-
Rossi 3 LEVI-STRAUSS: THE UNCONSCIOUS
ing that “no meaning has to be accepted at
its face value,” that “the true meaning . . . is
not that of which men are aware” (Ibid.:41),
and that “conscious data are always er-
roneous or illusory” (1972a:76). In fact, an
authoritative interpreter of Freud explicitly
says, “Nor is it true that everything uncon-
scious is the ‘real motor’ of the mind, and
everything conscious merely a relatively un-
important side issue” (Fenichel 1945:15).
One soon realizes that the differences
between Freud’s and LCvi-Strauss’ notions of
the unconscious are greater than their
similarities. Freud presented his theory of
personality in the two major versions of
conscious, preconscious, unconscious, and
id, ego, and superego. Commentators seem
to agree in characterizing the id as uncon-
scious, and ego and superego as partly con-
scious and partly unconscious, with some
disagreement in relation to the superego. For
our purposes, it is sufficient to note that
Freud conceived the unconscious as a freely
floating energy or set of impulses under
pressure and striving for discharge. The
material (content in LBvi-Strauss’ words) of
the unconscious includes sensations. emo-
tions, feelings, and also ideas and concep-
tions connected with the goal of averted
impulses (Fenichel 1945:15, 17). Con-
sequently, the unconscious is basically a
“steam boiler of basic energies” of an in-
stinctual nature (Allport 1967:145), its con-
ceptual component being only a derivative
one.
Levi-Strauss has a different conception of
the unconscious. To him, the unconscious
does not refer to emotional content. energy,
or principle of activity, but only to a form
(or aggregate of forms) empty of any con-
tent. Its function is to impose structural laws
upon psychic content, which by itself is
inarticulate and originates elsewhere. The
psychic content constitutes the preconscious
or the individual lexicon of impulses. emo-
tions, representations, and memories ac-
cumulated in one’s personal life; the psy-
chological lexicon becomes significant when
it is transformed into language, that is, when
it is structured by the unconscious (1963a:
29
203). The conception of the unconscious as
a structuring activity and the related
emphasis on form over content bring into
focus the root of the fundamental difference
between the structuralist and psychoanalytic
perspective^.^ Psychoanalysts are interested
in the question of the individual or collective
origin of myth and in the historical sequence
of events; on the contrary, LBvi-Strauss con-
siders these questions of marginal impor-
tance, since they deal with the stock of
representations or material of myth, which is
of secondary interest in relation to the basic
fact that its structural laws or symbolic
function remain the same (Zbid.:204). LQvi-
Strauss insists on this point once again in the
last volume of Mythofogiques, when he
states that psychoanalysts claim to connect
the structure of a collective or individual
work to what they falsely call its origin. This
approach amounts to reducing certain orders
of reality to their content, which is of a
different nature and, therefore, cannot act
from the outside on their form without
implying a contradiction. On the contrary,
authentic structuralism aims at seizing, first
of all, the intrinsic properties of certain
orders which do not express anything ex-
ternal to them (1971a:561). For Freud,
historical reconstruction was a precondition
for the restructuring of the psychological
personality, while for Levi-Strauss the con-
sideration of structure is the first and self-
intelligible question which offers a logical
tool to make history intelligible.
On the other hand, in his theory of
anxiety Freud himself had suggested that
“certain basic phenomena find their explana-
tion in the permanent structure of the
human mind, rather than its history.” Then,
in Totem and Taboo, Freud showed a his-
torical concern with a wavering attitude
between historical sociology and a more
modern and scientifically solid attitude,
which finds knowledge of its past and future
from the analysis of the present (1969a:
491-492). The basic concern of structuralism
with structure and form over content solves
many objections and misunderstandings
about Levi-Straus’ presumed neglect for his-
30 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [75,1973

tory. Rather than neglect, we should speak theoretical approach with a detailed observa-
of a structuralist conception of history or of tion of the concrete, as well as the impor-
history in terms of its underlying and con- tance given to the symbolic component of
stant structures. culture (Santerre 1966:140). However, one
To sum up the analysis, the priority of wonders whether these generic characteriza-
form over content implies (1)priority of the tions adequately express the specificity of
structural (synchronic) over the diachronic the Freudian approach; besides, it is pre-
perspective, (2) a priority of collective and cisely the question of the origin and func-
universal invariant structures over individual tion of symbolism which characterizes Levi-
constants, and (3) a consequent disinterest S t r a w ’ position and makes it different from
with the therapeutic aspect of psycho- the affective basis of Freudian symbolism.
analysis in favor of a concern for a theory of If, then, LBvi-Strauss conceives the un-
mind (1963b:648). conscious not as psychic content, but as a
Concerning this last point, I must conceptual structure, we must turn our
emphasize a difference between Freud and attention to what the term of conceptual
LQvi-Strauss which is already implicit in structure implies. Certain elements borrowed
what I have said. Freud was primarily in- by Levi-Strauss from Kantian philosophy
terested in the unconscious as an instinctual and cybernetics help to clarify this notion.
energy and in the conceptual component of
psychic life only as its derivative, while Kant and the Unconscious
LCvi-Strauss is interested in the permanent as a Set of Mental Constraints or Categories
and logical structures of mind (1969a: 143,
151). Since Levi-Strauss believes that anthro- The insistence of Levi-Strauss on struc-
pology can make progress only if it becomes tures and on the primacy of the intellect
concerned with “concept” and “understand- immediately reveals the affinity of his think-
ing,” he considers affectivity as the most ing with certain elements of the Kantian way
obscure and incomprehensible side of man of approaching the problem of knowledge
and, therefore, totally inadequate as an ex- (1963c:37). In a 1963 roundtable discussion
planatory factor in social sciences. Emotions with P. Ricoeur and others, Lhi-Strauss
are always a result and consequence of the admitted such affinity and defined his an-
power of the body and of the impotence of thropology as a transposition of the Kantian
the mind. Intellect is the only way left for inquiry into the ethnological field; in fact,
anthropology and psychology (1967a: he wants to discover those “categories” or
69-71). We can, therefore, conclude that fundamental properties which according to
LBvi-Strauss’ insistence in considering Freud Kant always constrain the human mind
as one of his inspirers, is justified only (1963b:630-631, 1963c:29, 38). As late as
insofar as he accepts the Freudian postulate 1972, LBvi-Strauss has reiterated such
that what is unconscious is more important affinity: “I have often claimed kinship with
than what is conscious. In fact, the notion of him (Kant)” (1972a:74). There’is, however,
the unconscious refers to affective motiva- the great difference that Kant proceeds by
tion in the case of Freud and to logical internal introspection and by studying t h e
structures in the case of LQvi-Strauss. After scientific thought of his own specific soci-
all, Boas had already denied certain psycho- ety, while LQvi-Strauss wants to use an
analytic interpretations of the unconscious empirical approach and use material from
(Boas 1920:320). the most contrasting societies in order to
Some commentators have listed various find a kind of common denominator of any
similarities between LBvi-Strauss’ and thinking activity (1969b:lO-11).
Freud’s approach, such as the dynamic While LBvi-Strauss agrees with P. Ricoeur
aspects of the unconscious, the process from that his Kantian notion of the unconscious
the known to the unknown and from what is refers to a mental activity which combines
variable to its invariants, a combination of a and categorizes, he also underlies Ricoeur’s
Rossi J L E VI-STRAuss: THE UNCONSCIOUS
statement that his notion of the unconscious
does not have any connection with a “think-
ing subject”; the categories refer t o the
“given” laws and constraints of mind, that
is, to the unconscious system of the basic
mechanisms of any mental activity. We,
therefore, understand why Lkvi-Strauss is
interested in those conditions by which
systems of truth are mutually convertible
and simultaneously acceptable to different
subjects; since they are universally common
and unconscious, these conditions have “the
character of an autonomous object, in-
dependent of any subject” (Zbid.:11).
This Levi-Straussian statement can be un-
derstood only within the context of his
semiotic perspective. For Saussure and other
structural linguists, the system has priority
over its components, whose meaning derive
from the position within the system. The
subject himself is one of the elements of the
system and, therefore, he gets meaning from
the system instead of giving meaning to it.
This is, of course, the fundamental point of
disagreement between Levi-Strauss and phe-
nomenologists, which has taken Lkvi-Strauss
to task in the long “Finale” of L’Homme Nu
(Lkvi-Straws 1 9 7 la).
Those anthropologists who might find
Levi-Strauss’ semi-Kantian and semiotic per-
spectives difficult to understand would prob-
ably find it helpful t o recall those passages
where Durkheim expresses an interest in
“relating the variable to the permanent” and
in dealing with collective representations o r
categories which are “permanent molds for
the mental life” (Durkheim 1961:487, 488,
492). These assertions bear a striking similar-
ity to Lkvi-Strauss’ notion of constraints, the
basic difference being that for Durkheim the
categories are external molders of mind
because of their collective nature, while for
Lkvi-Strauss they are more Kantian-like
internal constraints built within the mind
itself. This difference explains why Lkvi-
Strauss rejects the primacy of the social over
the mental life which is propounded in
certain passages of Durkheim.
S o m e commentators have been de-
emphasizing the Kantian aspect of Lkvi-
Strauss’ thinking to underline the semiotic
31
and cybernetic component. N o matter how
correct this deemphasis might be, the fact
still remains that in the last volume of
Mythologiques, L’Homme Nu, Lkvi-Strauss
once again expressed his perspective in semi-
Kantian terms. I n fact, he asserts that within
the understanding is built an apparatus of
oppositions which act o n the occasion of
empirical experiences; the conceptual ap-
paratus extracts meaning from the concrete
situation, which becomes an object of
thought because it is bent to the imperatives
of the formal organization of mind (1971a:
539). This formulation closely echoes the
words of Kant: ‘‘I maintain that the cate-
gories are nothing but the conditions of
thought in a possible experience. . . They
are fundamental concepts by which we think
objects in general for appearances, and have
therefore a priori objective validity . . . To
obtain any knowledge whatsoever. . . we
must resort t o experience; b u t is the a priori
laws that alone can instruct us in regard to
experience in general, and as to what it is
that can be known as an object of experi-
ence” (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, in
Jones 1969:39). The following commentary
of a popular college textbook might be more
understandable to the anthropological audi-
ence: “Both in perceiving through t h e senses
and in knowing through concepts, mind
imparts to experience certain necessary con-
ditions which mind then finds as the uni-
versal structural framework which prevails
throughout experience. Experience is the
joint product of material elements which
come to mind and formal elements which
mind contributes” (Lamprecht 1955:364).
As soon as we think we have pinpointed
Lkvi-Strauss’ thinking, his eclectic perspec-
tive evades us again with t h e introduction of
new elements. He reinforces t h e oppositional
component of the categorical apparatus with
a biological and cybernetic notion of binar-
ism.
The unconscious, cybernetic,
and the biological perspective
P. Ricoeur states that Lkvi-Strauss’ un-
conscious does not refer t o a thinking sub-
3‘2 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
ject and it is “homologous with nature; it
may perhaps be nature” (1969b:ll). To
reconcile this interpretation with the some-
what Kantian perspective of LQvi-Strauss,
one must remember that LBvi-Strauss con-
siders conceptual structures as an epiphe-
nomenon of brain structures (1967a:gO) and
mental processes subjected to social and
biological constraints. According to him, a
main difference between phenomenology
and structuralism is that the latter studies
phenomena not in “human minds,” but in
“societies, or ‘incarnated mental activities’
which are made concrete by their appearing
in a certain space and time.” Man is sub-
jected to an ever growing biological and
demographic determinism and, more funda-
mentally, man’s relationships to the world
are mediated by the instrument he uses to
conceptualize them. In this sense, the “struc-
ture of the brain” is the first constraint
imposed on human mental functioning
(1963c:31-33). According to Leach, our
brain does not perceive all things as they
actually are, but rather it reproduces trans-
formations of structures which occur in
nature and then responds to them; the brain
must follow its genetically inherited program
i n t h e f a s h i o n of a computer
(1969~547-548).
Leach’s references to the computer are
not merely incidental. In The Savage Mind
and Totemism, LQvi-Strauss adopted a
perspective borrowed from Information
Theory (1966a:19, 154, 268-269), pre-
announced as early as 1953 (Tax et al.
1953:323). Society is a machine for the
exchange of communication; social phe-
nomena are messages; the structure of lan-
guage is a code used to convert messages. As
the Morse code is based on the binary use of
short and long dashes, so does the brain use
a binary code. The contribution of structural
linguistics seems to confirm this binary per-
spective. Troubetzkoy conceptualized the
phoneme in terms of the contrastive func-
tion of sound, that is, in terms of sound
contrasts which entail different meaning,
and defined it as a bundle of distinctive
features; the contrast between two pertinent
[75,1973
features or between distinctive or pertinent
features is called opposition (Waterman
1963:69). Jakobson stressed the notion that
distinctive features are in strict binary
opposition to one another (Leroy 1967:74).
In L’Homme Nu, LQvi-Strauss reinforces
his binary perspective by observing that the
genetic code proceeds like language, that is
by distinctive combination and opposition
of a small number of elements. The dis-
covery of the genetic code gives an objective
reality to the principle of discontinuity,
which is at work within the products of
nature as well as in the mind, in order to
restrict the unlimited range of possibilities
(1971a:605). LQvi-Straussseemed to exhibit
an ingenious capacity for discovering the
convergency of Kantian, linguistic, cyber-
netic, and genetic evidence in support of his
notion of mental binary constraints. But,
how can he infer the existence of mental
constraints or binary working of mind from
a presumed binary functioning of the brain?
Along with Jakobson and many others,
LBvi-Strauss wholeheartedly accepted the
principle that the most parsimonious explan-
ation is the one closest to the truth. He
realizes that this principle rests “upon the
identity postulated between the laws of the
universe and those of the human mind,” and
raises a metaphysical problem. LQvi-Strauss
advises Benveniste to put aside the meta-
physical problem, and emphasizes the scien-
tific power of this principle which enables
the social scientist to avoid pragmatism,
formalism, and neo-positivism (1963a: 89,
90). Precisely to avoid the empiricism of
some contemporary sociologists as well as an
outmoded idealism, since 1949 Lbvi-Strauss
had endorsed the basic premise that “the
laws of thought ‘primitive or civilized’ are
the same as those which are expressed in
physical reality and in social reality, which is
itself only one of its aspects” (1969a:451).
Is LQvi-Strauss advocating a physical re-
ductionism or just an isomorphism of
mental, social, and physical laws (LQvi-
Strauss 1971a:561, 616, 619)? If the latter,
is the isomorphic hypothesis a philosophical
or a scientific hypothesis?
Rossi ] LEVI-STRA USS: THE UNCONSCIOUS
V intend to use categorical elements as a
EVALUATION
Since Levi-Strauss invokes linguistic,
psychological, and biological disciplines to
support his notion of unconscious, only a
review of contemporary research in these
disciplines can reveal whether his notion has
the credibility of a scientific truth or at least
of a scientific hypothesis.
I do not pretend to review all the basic
literature and much less to resolve issues
which are at the core of the most funda-
mental controversies in these various dis-
ciplines. I merely point out the main con-
troversial aspects of Levi-Strauss’ hypothesis
and ascertain its scientific potential on the
basis of its usefulness as a working hypo-
thesis in contemporary scientific research.
Psychological Issues
As far as the Freudian aspect of Levi-
Strauss’ notion of the unconscious is con-
cerned, one might raise questions about
Lkvi-Strauss’ modification of the Freudian
notion and about its explanatory usefulness.
In answering the first question, one must
consider whether Levi-Strauss’ intellectual-
ization of the Freudian unconscious can be
justified in terms of psychological evidence.
This is hardly the case, if such a theoretical
position claims that the intellectual or cogni-
tive component is the independent and ex-
plaining variable of psychic life in its
totality. Binet already noted that “thought
and emotions (conscious and unconscious)
are pervasively tied together, and even sys-
tematic introspection cannot dissolve them”
(Wolf 1969:233). Contemporary psycho-
logists assert that to reduce conscious phe-
nomena to logical and cognitive components
is a serious mistake (Collier 1964). One
could reply that Levi-Strauss is not in-
terested in the totality of psychic dynamism,
but mainly in its process of categorization.
Yet, certain psychological studies reveal that
motivational elements do influence even this
process (Bruner, in Jahoda 1970:44). Jahoda
suggests that Levi-Strauss might simply
33
heuristic device. Lkvi-Strauss’ procedure
would be acceptable in this sense, but one
wonders whether this interpretation is com-
patible with Levi-Strauss’ assertion that the
structures formulated by anthropologists in
psychological terms are a tentative approxi-
mation of organic and physical realities
( 1971a:6 16).
Moreover, not everyone would agree on a
structuralist interpretation of Freud which
would exclude his historical perspective.
Green, for instance, clearly stated that there
is both a historical and a structuralist com-
ponent in psychoanalytic thought; Levi-
Strauss is correct in asserting that historical
knowledge is reducible to structure in the
sense that any knowledge is subjected to the
laws of thought, but still there exists a
knowledge which is not knowledge of con-
science and, therefore, history is present
i n d e p e n d e n t l y of s t r u c t u r e (Green
1963:661). Once again, LBvi-Strauss’ posi-
tion can be interpreted simply to assert a
methodological priority of structure over
event, as a starting point of analysis and as a
tool of intelligibility. In fact, when Levi-
Strauss agrees with Piaget that structures
have an origin, he immediately adds that the
state previous to a structure must itself be a
structure. History, then, is produced by a
transformation of structures by other struc-
tures, so that the structure remains the first
datum (1971a:560-561). In this sense, the
question is one of a methodological attitude
and not of a logical reductionism; history is
not excluded but rather made intelligible
through the notion of structure.
However, Levi-Strauss’ epistemological
perspective would seem to be incompatible
with the conception of history as a set of
contingencies (Diamond 1964:44), since it
maintains that historical phenomena are
adequately accounted for only when we
discover laws which give reason for their
necessary connection (1969a:22-23); the
necessary connection is given, of course, by
their infrastructure, that is, the underlying
universal and unconscious mental structures.
In actuality, the two perspectives can be
34 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
considered complementary to each other in
the sense that a thorough examination of
historical contingencies can lead to the dis-
covery of structural continuities, unless one
maintains a programmatic exclusion or
meaninglessness of structural continuities.
The difference between these two epis-
temological positions has a certain parallel in
the difference between Sapir’s contention
that the structure of culture is a product
of mind, and Boas’ contention that the
form is not a product of the mental dyna-
mism of the individual but “the result
of i d i o s y nc r a t i c h is t o r i c a 1 factors”
(Modjeska 1968:345). One might argue that
Sapir differed from Levi-Straws when he
temporarily held that the structure of cul-
ture is a product of consciousness (Idem).In
fact, this seems to leave room for free
decisions and historical contingencies, con-
trary to Levi-Strauss’ contention that history
is the product of the unconscious working of
the mind. In the “Finale” of L’Homme Nu,
Levi-Strauss has clarified his thought in that
he does not exclude the role of freedom in
the historical and cultural development, but
instead moves his analysis to the funda-
mental level of the basic structural mechan-
isms which simultaneously permit and at the
same time limit the actualizations of man’s
active choices ( 1971a: 612-614).
If we consider now the question of the
scientific merit of the primacy given by
Freud and Levi-Strauss to the unconscious
rather than to the conscious level of func-
tioning, we immediately face one of the
most controversial issues in contemporary
social sciences. The negative reaction against
the primacy, or even the existence, of un-
conscious psychic forces has been expressed
in various forms and degrees of intensity. In
the opinion of some authors, psychoanalytic
premises have assumed the status of dogma,
since psychoanalytically oriented psy-
chologists refuse to examine the large body
of discrepant data and, therefore, impede
any scientific progress (Millar 1970). Some
experimental psychologists maintain that
there is no convincing empirical support for
the existence of unconscious motivation
[ 75,1973
(Eysenck 1964:265) and even argue that
valid empirical support hardly seems possible
because of the difficulty in operationalizing
Freudian concepts. Others find that the
Freudian postulate is not a parsimonious
principle, since it implies too many assump-
tions which are not at all needed if one
would adopt the perspective of social learn-
ing theory (Bandura 1969:592), a perspec-
tive which would avoid apparent contradic-
tions inherent in psychoanalytic explana-
tions (Bandura and Walters 1965:210). It is
argued also that a more parsimonious and
meaningful explanation would come from
the use of conscious and intentional factors
instead of unconscious processes (Papa-
georgis 1965); others assert that intentional
processes are not only more parsimonious
scientific principles, but must be considered
as the ultimate laws of human behavior
(Knowles 1966). In light of this position we
are not surprised to find Sartre rejecting the
Freudian unconscious (Conkling 1968).
In a sense, the objection of the un-
parsimonious character of the unconscious
might seem more serious than that of its
untestability, since it can be argued that it is
arbitrary to demand experimental testability
for any psychological or sociological con-
struct. However, psychologists of different
theoretical orientations are ready to defend
the notion of unconscious in terms of empir-
ical evidence and of its scientific usefulness.
Binet already asserted that “there are very
great portions of our psychic life that are by
their very nature inaccessible to conscious-
ness” (Binet 1911).More psychoanalytically
oriented psychologists are ready to cite
clinical and experimental evidence to sup-
port the theory of unconscious motivation
(Kisker 1964: 117ff.). Herron, for instance,
offers a systematic review of the literature
on the unconscious and shows that while
some of the meanings attached to the notion
of unconscious are ambiguous, the “behavior
which is undiscriminating, subliminal, un-
remembered, insightless, uncommunicable,
or repressed, seems to provide valid evidence
for inferring the existence of a dynamic
psychological unconscious” (Herron 1962).
Rossi ] LEVI-STRA USS: THE UNCONSCIOUS
T h e contemporary psychologist Irving
Sarnoff, among others, has offered guide-
lines for theoretically and methodologically
sound experimental tests of Freud’s hypo-
thesis and has expressed the conviction that
“Freud’s theory is surely as worthy as other
psychological theories for evaluation by
methods that most completely satisfy the
logical requirements of scientifically ad-
equate evidence” (Sarnoff 1971:vii). G. W.
Allport, a psychologist of eclectic orienta-
tion, asserts: “Like other writers I have been
critical of Freud’s depreciation of the role of
consciousness, but there is a residual truth in
his formulation-especially in accounting for
neurotic trends in personality that are often
due to unconscious motives and unconscious
conflicts” (Allport 1967:150). This qualified
support of a “residual truth” of Freudian
theory is outdone by a seemingly more
generous backing of J. Piaget, author of the
“excellent small book” on structuralism (to
quote Levi-Strauss 1971a:560), who asserts
that psychogenetic studies have shown that
“the mechanisms on which the individual
subject acts of intelligence depend, are not
in any way contained by his consciousness,
yet they cannot be explained except in
terms of structures” (Piaget 1970:138). A
stronger view is held by Fromm, who con-
siders Freud’s theory of unconscious as the
continuation of the work of Copernicus,
Darwin, and Marx, all of whom attacked
man’s illusion about his own place in the
cosmos, in nature, and in society; Freud
destroys the myth of conscience as the
ultimate and unique datum of human experi-
ence (Arnaud 1971:256).
As we can see, both critics and supporters
differ in the degree of criticism or support of
the Freudian postulate. One conclusion
appears to be warranted. The opposition of
many psychologists to the preeminence or
even to the existence of the unconscious
prevents its acceptance as a scientific truth.
On the other side, the central role that this
hypothesis plays in the works of many
psychologists seems to warrant its status as a
scientific hypothesis. Moreover, the pre-
s u m e d intelligibility that Levi-Strauss’
35
metaempirical analysis has brought upon
previously scarcely understood cultural
phenomena would further support this con-
clusion.
Linguistic Issues
A thorough examination of Lkvi-Strauss’
use of linguistics is beyond the scope of this
essay. For the convenience of the reader, I
mention a few points directly connected
with the question of the linguistic structures,
their binary and unconscious character.
Levi-Strauss is not the first to explain
linguistic facts in terms of mental processes.
We have seen that Boas, for instance, argues
that the presence of certain grammatical
concepts and classifications of concepts in
all languages is the product of the unity of
fundamental psychological processes; since
they are unconscious they must originate in
unconscious or “instinctive” processes of the
mind (Boas 1968:63, 67). Later on, Boas
attributed the unconscious form of language
not to the unconscious psychoanalytically
understood, but to historical factors (1920,
see in Modjeska 1968:345). Sapir shifted his
attention from the conscious and accidental
historical factors to the unconscious pattern-
ings of human mind and experience, and to
an “innate striving for formal elaboration
a n d expression” (Sapir, in Modjeska
1968:345-347; for additional material on
Boas and Sapir, see Hymes 1964 and Boas
1964).8
LQvi-Strauss accepts this notion, and un-
der the influence of Jakobson he emphasizes
that phonological structures present a binary
and unconscious character. Chomsky main-
tains that LBvi-Strauss erroneously puts
emphasis on the formal aspect of phonologi-
cal structures rather than on the fact that
few absolute features seem to provide the
basis for organizing all phonological systems;
the structural pattern of phonemes is an
epiphenomenon, while the important phe-
nomenon to reckon with is the system of
rules of t h e s e p a t t e r n s (Chomsky
1968:65-66). Given Levi-Strauss’ insistence
that culture does not consist only of forms
36 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
of communication but also of rules of com-
munication (1963a:296), one might wonder
whether Chomsky’s criticism is ultimately a
question of semantics or of different
emphasis.
There is no question that a great deal of
L6vi-Strauss’ use of linguistic method con-
sists in the application of the oppositional
method (1963a, Ch. 12). N. Chomsky and M.
Halle have defended their own adaptation of
the Jakobsonian notion of distinctive fea-
tures, since, among other things, it enables
one to build a universal phonetic theory
(Chomsky and Halle 1965:120). Sebeok ex-
presses the opinion that the Jakobsonian
notion of sound structures, based on the
theory of universal features, is much ahead
of any other kind of previous attempts
(Sebeok 1968:4), and Bondarko categorical-
ly asserts that “without any doubt the most
economic and systematic description of
phonemes is in terms of distinctive features.
At the present time no one will attempt to
deny the reality and significance of distinc-
tive features” (Bondarko 1969:l).
On the contrary, others doubt whether all
phonemic systems can be described ad-
equately in terms of Jakobsonian distinctive
features (see Scheffler 1966:73), while
others, in denying that auditory Jakobsonian
features can provide a universal framework
at the articulatory level and at the sys-
tematic phonemic level, make the suggestion
that phonologists had “better bum their
phonetic books and turn to a genuine ab-
stract framework” (Fudge 1967:23-26).
In the words of N. Chomsky and M.
Halle, “each feature corresponds to a pair of
opposed categories” (1965: 121). All lin-
guists agree in using phonological opposi-
tions in linguistic analysis even when they do
not use the concept of opposition, but they
are far from accepting the idea that the
oppositions are always binary (Mounin
1972). The rigorous binarism of Jakobson
and of the early LOvi-Strauss has attracted a
widespread criticism since a three valued
dimensionality may be a more satisfactory
alternative (Scheffler 1966:73); Jakobson
himself has introduced in the binary scheme
[75,1973
a neutral and a mixed term (Barthes
1962:121). More recently, some linguists
have argued that the binary principle is in
conflict with the criterion of simplicity pro-
posed by Halle and that multivalued features
may better fit the data without introducing
complications (Coubreras 1969:1).
While LBvi-Strauss’ binarism continues to
find wider and wider application (for a
Russian example, see Meletinsky and Segal
1971:99, 114), anthropological literature
abounds with criticisms against the assump
tion of the binary dimensionality not only
of phonological structures and of the brain,
but also of cultural phenomena (see Leach
1970:88ff., among others). In the words of
a contemporary linguist from Budapest, the
hypothesis of binary semantic oppositions is
untenable since semantic oppositions give
threefold, fourfold oppositions, etc. (Tar-
noczi 1970:82).
Has L&i-Strauss softened his position
after so many criticisms? In Mythologique
Four, he still uses the notion of binary
operator (1971a:499, 500, 501, 518) and
binarism (Zbid.:498, 621). Moreover, LBvi-
Strauss supports his basic binarism with
recent empirical research on the oppositional
and binary character of visual perception
(Ibid.:619). Linguists assert that feature
analysis has been demonstrated for visual
perception, even though little research has
been done on aural perception (Lehman
1971:273). Lbvi-Strauss finds support for
the Jakobson and Troubetzkoy’s views even
from the molecular structure of the genetic
code, which is ultimately composed of a
finite set of discrete units (1971a:612).
At the same time, L6vi-Strauss seems to
adopt a less rigid attitude when, for instance,
he suggests a possible alternative interpreta-
tion to binarism in terms of triadic opposi-
tions (Ibid.:501) or recognizes the impor-
tance of the neutral term in his explanation
of “mana” (1966c:50). For a long time,
Lki-Strauss’ notion of “opposition” has
been criticized because it encompasses the
much larger categories of “difference”; how-
ever, in asserting that the apprehension of
the “other” as an opposition is an absolute
Rossi ] LE VI-STRAuss: THE UNCONSCIOUS
truth, Lkvi-Strauss has recently explained
that the world is essentially a “disparity”
and that myth dissects the world by means
of distinctions, contrasts, and oppositions
(Ibid.:607). We can conclude that LBvi-
Strauss adopts a flexible binarism integrated
with a tridimensionality (Ibid.:617). In the
ultimate analysis, binarism is used as a parsi-
monious hypothesis to be used insofar as it
works without excluding a multidimensional
approach when the latter fits the data better.
I t is usually agreed that Levi-Strauss’
basic methodological perspective is derived
from the linguistic school of Prague. Yet,
Mounin has recently offered a drastic criti-
cism of the linguistic foundations claimed by
Levi-Strauss. Of the four basic operations
attributed by Levi-Straus to Troubetzkoy’s
structural method (insistence on relation-
ship, the notion of system, the notion of
general laws and the shift to the study of the
u n c o n s c i o u s infrastructure: 1963a: 33),
Mounin asserts that the second and third
notions originally came from Saussure and
not from Troubetzkoy,’ and the first and
second notions are not two but one notion;
moreover, since linguists have always studied
habitual and not conscious processes,’ the
fourth notion and the connection between
Freud and Troubetzkoy is a product of
Levi-Strauss’ misreading; the remaining two
notions of structure and opposition which
Levi-Strauss would have borrowed from
structural phonology are not at all specifical-
ly linguistic notions, as Troubetzkoy and
Sausure themselves had already seen (Mou-
nin 1970:201-203). Mounin’s radical criti-
que, which is directed to many other pre-
sumed misperceptions of LQvi-Strauss,might
puzzle those anthropologists who have been
trained to take Livi-Strauss’ linguistic cre-
dentials seriously.
The reader has to realize that a great part
of Mounin’s critique comes from his opposi-
tion to Jakobsonian linguistics. For instance,
he disagrees with Jakobson’s belief that
there exists a kind of Mendeleieffs univer-
sal table of phonological traits, a belief
which, according to Mounin, is shared by
few linguists. In Mounin’s view, another fun-
31
damental failure of Jakobson consists in not
having connected the notion of opposition to
that of function. For instance, in Sanskrit the
simple p and aspirated p are two phonemes
because they have the function of distin-
guishing two different meanings, while in
English they do not have this function and,
therefow, their opposition is not distinctive.
Since Levi-Strauss followed Jakobson, Levi-
Strauss has made the same mistake of not
looking for the function of his oppositions
in the cultural domain; consequently, he
lacks a criterion to assert that his differ-
ences are relevant. Levi-Strauss might be
anthropologically right, but he certainly uses
mistaken linguistic figures (Mounin 1972).
Some of the linguists I have consulted agree
with Mounin’s criticisms, while others argue
that Mounin follows the linguistics school of
Martinet and is unfair to Jakobson; more-
over, his understanding of Saussure would
reflect the interpretation of the French
academic circles (Rey 1972); still others
disagree with Mounin and assert that LCvi-
Strauss has worked in an appropriate,
phonological framework and has shown the
function of his oppositions (Durbin 1972).
As far as Levi-Strauss is concerned, he
does not seem to take the credentials of
some of his critics too seriously and leaves
the solution of linguistic disputes and inter-
pretations to linguists! ’ The ethnographic
evidence and ethnological conclusions
reached in his long career would seem to
excuse him from supporting his basic hypo-
thesis in terms of linguistic and, we shall see,
of psychological arguments. In a sense,
Livi-Strauss’ contacts with linguistics or
psychology can be interpreted more as
fortuitous circumstances which stimulated
the formulation of his perspective than
as influences to be taken in the literal
s e n s e of t h e word. The question of
whether the notions of structure, opposi-
tion, and unconscious infrastructure are
derived from structural linguistics or some
other linguistic school would seem to be a
marginal historical question for the purpose
of interpreting L6vi-Strauss’ work. The con-
tention that these notions do not have any
38 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
linguistic support, combined with the thin
similarity with psychoanalytic notions,
seems to make of Levi-Strauss’ notion of
unconscious a somewhat Kantian and a
basically cybernetic notion. Haudricourt
asserts that linguistic phonological infra-
structures have statistical value but that their
unconscious character has different degrees
and, at certain times and places, they are
clearly conscious both for internal and ex-
ternal reasons (Haudricourt 1970:606-608).
If it is true that linguistics is interested in
arriving “at the structure which lies behind
the behavior of language-users” and not in
mere “game-playing’’ (Fry 1971:6), it also
seems true that this structure can be ad-
equately conceived in statistical terms.
Since LQvi-Strauss asserts that he has
derived his linguistic inspiration mainly from
the phonetic school of Prague (or Jakobson,
as the case might be), I will bypass the
discussion on LQvi-Strauss’assertion of the
structural character of language at the gram-
matical level; the structural study of the
grammatical, and especially semantic level of
language, is less advanced, and the opinions
of linguists are even more sharply divided
than they are in relation to the structural
quality of the phonological level. As an
example, we can turn our attention once
more to the linguist from Budapest, who
asserts that “the structure is the product of a
theory imposed a priori to the analyzed
object” and that the attempts to unveil the
semantic structure of language will never
give more than conceptual structure rather
than formal structure, which is the specific
goal of linguistics; to suppose that under a
heterogeneous linguistic system there exists
a hidden coherent substructure is to invoke a
third level of abstraction and cultivate a pure
illusion (Tarnoczi 1970:81, 82).
In this linguistic context, one more aspect
of Levi-Strauss’ position would seem to
deserve consideration. Given Levi-Strauss’
assertion that logical structures are a projec-
tion of mind, one might wonder whether the
contemporary debate on the supposed in-
natism of linguistic structures might be rele-
vant here. Strictly speaking it is not.
[ 75,1973
Chomsky asserts that “it is perfectly possible
that a particular grammar is acquired by
differentiation of a mixed innate scheme,
rather than by slow growth of new items,
patterns or associations” (1966: 19). Piaget,
however, rightly states that LQvi-Strauss’un-
conscious activity is not the “innate reason”
of Chomsky, but a system of schemata
intercalated between infrastructures and su-
perstructures (1970: 111). In other words,
there are no innate rules but a mind which,
through a dissecting and combining activity,
imposes structures to empirical facts. Every-
thing is governed by the mind through
general operations without a need of special-
ized and innate mechanisms (Sperber
1968:234-237).
Levi-Strauss is likely to puzzle his ad-
mirers with his recent shift away from (or
perhaps clarification of) the notion of im-
mutable and universal structures (1969a:
491) to the notion of absolute structures as
“generative matrices by successive deforma-
tions” (1971a:33). LQvi-Strauss has made
this recent statement under the pressure of
Piaget, who considers psychological reality
as a permanent construction rather than as
an accumulation of already made structures.
LBvi-Strauss comments that he has never
conceived human nature as a set of totally
set up and immutable structures, but rather
as matrices generating structures which, even
though they derive from the same complex,
do change during the life of individuals and
throughout societies (Ibid.:561). While this
clarification of the notion of structure might
puzzle some structuralists, it seems to differ-
entiate Levi-Strauss’ position from the in-
natist position. I may dispense, therefore,
with the task of discussing the enormous
literature on the innatist controversy spear-
headed by Chomsky and Lenneberg, to
name just two prominent authors (for a
recent review, see Wardlaugh 1971), and on
the question of innate mapping mechanism
and Lailguage Acquisition Device (see Von
Raffler Engel 1970).’
Neuroph ysiological research
and the unconscious.
Rossi ] LE VI-STRAuss: THE UNCONSCIOUS
Levi-Strauss’ reference to the structure of
the brain as the natural basis of the
phonemic system (1963a:92, 94) is in
harmony with the marked interest of recent
phonetics in the neurophysiological pro-
cesses. Earlier, Jakobson had emphasized the
acoustic aspect of distinctive features, but
lately he has turned his attention to their
articulatory aspect; since what is happening
in the language has a neurophysiological
counterpart in the brain, the language
generator, the attention is directed to the
brain with the hope of discovering the un-
derlying mechanisms of speech production
(Kim 1971:35). Unfortunately, phonologists
must rely on neurologists who do not know
much about linguistics and who have not yet
turned out much material in this area in
general and, to Jakobson’s own admission,
on the problems of aphasia in particular
(Tikofsky 1970:23). It is held that the lin-
guistic system is a patterning imposed by the
brain on sensory and motor activity; the
brain uses the store of information about the
system to encode speech to be sent out and
to decode speech which comes in. However,
we do not have a direct access to the
patterns of the brain’s neural activity and,
therefore, we have to rely on the study of
the correlation between the patterns of
phonetic and linguistic behavior on the one
side, and the patterns visible in physiological,
acoustic, and perceptual data on the other
side (Fry 1971:8-9). Some scholars are con-
fident that we will eventually know what in
the brain gives man his capacity for lan-
guage, even though now it is too early to tell
(Lenneberg 1971:20). As of now, it seems
clear that the features do not correspond
one to one to particular muscles, and the
question of the physiological basis of phono-
logical features is a matter of speculation
(Lieberman 1970:320). We, therefore, can
conclude that Levi-Strauss’ reference to the
brain for the purpose of explaining phono-
logical structure has some scientific verisi-
mility among some contemporary phono-
logists, even though the specific operational-
ization of the hypothesis demands a great
deal more research.
39
In connection with Levi-Strauss’ in-
sistence on the brain, we must clarify the
question of Levi-Strauss’ supposed biological
reductionism. It seems that already in The
Savage Mind Levi-Strauss avoided the re-
ductionist shortcoming when h e asserted
that the unconscious teleology rests on the
interplay of psychological mechanisms with
the biological mechanisms of the brain,
lesions, and internal secretions (1966a:252).
In Mythologiques Four, Levi-Strauss ex-
plicitly intends to avoid a reductionist posi-
tion, since he declares that structuralism is
interested in structures conceived as intrinsic
properties of certain orders and not as ex-
pressions of anything external to them. If
one absolutely wants to relate structures to
something external, we must resort to
cerebral organization conceived as a network
of which ideological systems translate only
some properties in terms of a particular
structure (1971a:561). Structuralist ideas
are psychological formulations, which might
be nothing else but tentative approximations
of organic and physical truths (Ibid.:616)
brought to the surface of the conscious
(Ibid.:619). In the context of this same
passage of The Savage Mind, these assertions
do not imply a direct and exclusive deriva-
tion of mental from biological structures,
but rather a difference between brain and
ideological structures, organic and psychic
truths, mind and body; all that is affirmed is
their parallel or isomorphic structure, and
the basic unity of mind and body in opposi-
tion to the old dualism (Levi-Strauss 1972b).
As Green observes, chemical combinations
are unlimited in number (1963:651), and
mental structures realize only a few of these
combinations, as a product, we should add,
of the interaction of the unconscious tele-
ology of mind (itself an interplay of psycho-
logical and biological processes) with
physical reality.
While discussing neurophysiological re-
search, I briefly mention whether it has
brought any evidence to bear on the ques-
tion of the conscious versus the unconscious
level of mental functioning. Recent research
has shown that consciousness is a measurable
40 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
state of the neural system and that it is the
most important factor in giving informa-
tional value to sensory and motor messages
(Bergstrom 1967:442). The biologist R. W.
Sperry, who has tackled this problem in a
series of studies, notices that most con-
temporary behavioral scientists do not have
any place for conscious experience in brain
processes and resist the idea that the
electro-physico-chemical events of the brain
are influenced by conscious forces; accord-
ing to them, a complete explanation of brain
functions is possible without referring to
conscious mental states; at most, conscious-
ness is considered an inner aspect of the
brain process, an epiphenomenon, an
impotent by-product, or an artifact of
semantics, and, finally, a pseudoproblem.
Yet, Sperry is convinced on the basis of his
own research that experienced conscious
phenomena have a causal influence on
cerebral excitation and are an essential part
of brain processes. The influence is recipro-
cal in the sense that subjective mental states
govern the flow of the nerve impulse traffic
and, at the same time, the conscious prop-
erties of cerebral patterns directly depend
on the action of the neural component; it is,
however, clear that conscious phenomena
are in a position of higher command.
Sperry’s interpretation of his own neurologi-
cal research has also something to say on the
question of biological reductionism. He ex-
cludes a mere materialistic position, since he
admits the existence of powerful mental
forms, which transcend material forces in
the functioning of the brain; he excludes
also a merely mentalistic position, since
mental forces cannot exist apart from the
brain processes of which they are a direct
property (Sperry 1969:532-534). This posi-
tion seems to offer an appropriate interpre-
tative framework to LBvi-Strauss’ perspec-
tive, which, if it is examined in its totality
would seem to make room for both mental
and biological processes, notwithstanding
the seemingly reductionist flavor of certain
of his formulations (see 1967a:90).’
[75,1973
VII
Let us now consider the unconscious as a
theory of mind and as a methodological
hypothesis.
A Modemte Position
The previous discussion shows that if
LBvi-Strauss’ notion of binary and uncon-
scious working of mind is not a mere a
prioristic and arbitrary speculation, its
scientific and parsimonious value is far from
having universal scientific support. It is per-
haps because of this that, when directly
asked, LBvi-Strauss presents a moderate ver-
sion of his notion of unconscious. Recently,
to the question of whether he considers the
unconscious as a postulate, a reality, or a
principle of intelligibility, LBvi-Strauss re-
plied that it is up to the psychologists to
decide on this matter. He declares himself
satisfied with the fact that there are things
going on in the brain’s processes without the
awareness of the self.I4 Apparently the
statement can be interpreted to mean that
even if current linguistic, psychological, and
neurophysiological research would seriously
question, and possibly disprove, the preemi-
nence of the unconscious level of mental
functioning over the conscious one, his own
enterprise would still be warranted by the
existence of at least some unconscious
processes somehow connected with the func-
tioning of the’brain (see also his even more
radical departure from previous positions in
LBvi-Strauss 1971d; see note 6). After all, he
objects only to giving exclusive attention to
the person and to conscious intentionality
(1971a:615), and perhaps his overall empha-
sis on the unconscious processes must be
interpreted more as a methodological re-
action than as an ontological position.
One realizes, however, the importance of
the ontological perspective in LQvi-Strauss’
works. He wants to make of anthropology a
scientific discipline since he wants to dis-
cover “a number of rigorous relations as
Rossi] LEVI-STRAUSS: THE UNCONSCIOUS 41

those which regulate natural sciences.” How- existence of linguistic and mental structures,
ever, to succeed in this, Levi-Strauss must how could we consider them as the only
formulate philosophical hypotheses and adequate explanation of universal cultural
postulates; “I formulate them, and I am structures without falling into a psychologi-
aware of it: may be the difference which cal reductionism?
separates me from my colleague ethnologists How far Levi-Strauss is from such a form
is my greater awareness of how much I have of reductionism is shown by the care with
to sacrifice to philosophy” (1963c:36). which he avoids a merely mentalistic or
Ultimately, much of the criticism of “empir- materialistic explanation. He rejects the accu-
ical” anthropology to structuralism is a sation of idealism (1969b:9,1972b) aswellas
question of choosing between structuralist the notion that cultural institutions originate
and positivistic or behaviorist assumptions. directly from their infrastructure, by elabo-
rating a theory of superstructure which is
The Unconscious missing in Marx; between man’s activity and
as Theory of Mind and of Culture cultural institutions there exists the media-
tion of a conceptual scheme, or the dialectic
As a psychological theory, LQvi-Strauss’ of superstructure, which sets up facts in con-
notion of unconscious has been attacked for trasting pairs and turns them into signs; in
its ontological or ideological character. The this way, it is elaborated a system which is
question is whether we must conceive struc- “a synthesizing operator between ideas and
tures and models as ontological realities or facts” (1966a:130-131). This does not imply
just as methodological heuristic tools. LQvi- that ideology gives rise to social relations
Strauss has expressively argued for the (Ibid.:ll7) or that social categories are a re-
second interpretation (1965c:18), but all his sult of social structure, as Durkheim states;
epistemological and theoretical discourse rather, social structure and ideology in a pro-
also clearly implies their ontological con- cess of mutual adjustment translate certain
ception. This has been explicitly stated in the historical and local modalities of the relation
Finale of L’Homme Nu (1971a). between man and world, which are their
Some authors easily conclude to a dichot- common substratum (Ibid.:214). This view
omy or contradiction between the ontologi- can be considered a satisfactory beginning of
cal ideology and epistemological ideology of a theory of culture, which accounts for the
Levi-Strauss (for an example of such pre- specificity of the symbolic element and
sumed contradiction, see Nutini 1971), integrates the individual (biological and
while the point can easily be made that psychological), cultural, and historical varia-
L6vi-Strauss’ ontological premises might turn bles in a unified framework. Once again, a
out to show the plausibility of his epis- global interpretation of LBvi-Strauss’ posi-
temological and methodological views, as tion is the only appropriate context for a
some recent developments in physics might right interpretation of apparently reduc-
lead one to believe (Rossi 1972b). However, tionist passages of his notion of culture (see,
not the discovery of binary neurological pro- for instance, 1969a:xxx).
cesses correlated with phonetic or perceptual
processes, nor the discovery of ultimate The Unconscious
structural components of physical reality, as Methodological Hypothesis
seem sufficient to prove by themselves the
existence of universal mental structures Were we to dismiss the notion of uncon-
without falling into a neurological or physi- scious as an ontological position, as some
ological reductionism. Moreover, even as- structuralists are seemingly inclined to do,
suming that we could prove definitely the the unconscious would still retain great
42 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
importance and relevance as a methodologi-
cal hypothesis and principle of intelligibility.
“If, as we believe to be the case, the uncon-
scious activity of the mind consists in
imposing form upon content, and if these
forms are fundamentally the same for all
minds. . . it is necessary and sufficient to
grasp the unconscious structure underlying
each institution and each custom, in order to
obtain a principle of interpretation valid for
other institutions and other customs”
(1963a:21).
In this sense, the unconscious becomes a
methodological device which enables one to
give a unifying intelligibility to apparently
heterogeneous and incoherent social phe-
nomena; however, its scientific value can be
perceived only if we divest ourselves of the
positivistic perspective and we understand it
in terms of (1) the structuralist epistemologi-
cal premises, (2) the scientific definition of
the symbolic character of cultural phe-
nomena, (3) the methodological advantages
of this hypothesis. Since I have already
illustrated the first two points, let us briefly
discuss the last one.
Lhi-Strauss does not avoid the problem
of how to validate the analysis made by the
ethnographer. As Mauss did before him,
LBvi-St rau ss conceives anthropological
interpretation as an intersection of two sub-
jectivities (1969b:13); as suggested by Rous-
seau (LBvi-Strauss 1967a:101), through a
process of identification we relive the experi-
ence of the protagonists and, in so doing, we
bring to light an object which is objectively
very remote and subjectively very concrete.
LQvi-Straussaccepts such understanding and
empathy as a supplementary form of proof,
or as a guarantee rather than a proof. How-
ever, we can never really identify with the
“other” or we will never know whether the
“other” makes of his social experience the
Same synthesis as the observer. At the end of
fieldwork, the anthropologist will not meet
himself or the “other,” but by superposing
himself on the “other” he will reveal the
more universal and more real facts of general
functioning, at the condition that he has
carried the analysis up to the unconscious
[75,1973
categories (1966b:113-114). Once we have
discovered the unconscious we have reached
the basic mechanisms which are common to
“us” and to “others,” and therefore we have
established a real communication and media-
tion between us and them ( 1 9 6 6 ~ 3 1 ) .Of
course, this would bring a solution not only
to the problem of communication between
people of the same culture, but also between
the anthropologist and the natives of a dif-
ferent culture. One might be tempted to
characterize this thinking as a sheer and
gratuitous speculation, but if we conceive
anthropological analysis as an understanding
of mental representations by the use of our
own mental activity, we can see that our
understanding is validated only when we
discover the universal mental categories or,
in L6vi-Strauss’ terms, the logical structures
underlying both observable cultural phe-
nomena and our own psychic activity; this is
the reason why the structuralist is interested
not in the particular modalities of culture
and in the content of mental activities, but
in their underlying, binary and constraining
categories.
Perhaps we can push our analysis a little
further. LBvi-Strauss asserts that structural-
ism has the ambition of launching a bridge
between sensory and intelligible knowledge
rather than sacrificing one at the expense of
the other (1971a:618). The unconscious can
be considered a bridge between sensory and
rational knowledge in the sense that the
unconscious mechanisms of mind are the
real foundation and condition of both ex-
periential and rational conscious processes
(see LBvi-Strauss’ remarks on the role of the
unconscious linguistic code as a precondition
for the enunciation of conscious discourse
Zbid. :6 12-613).
Does L4vi-Stmuss ’ Notion of Unconscious
Exclude Conscious Intentionality
and the Relevance of
Phenomenological Analysis?
There is one last puzzling issue which
appears to be a serious obstacle in the way
of accepting structuralism as a sound
Rossi J LEVI-STRA uss: T H E
methodological approach. What is the rela-
tionship between the unconscious infrastruc-
ture and the conscious superstructure? The
quarrel of the existentialists, phenomenol-
ogists, and dialecticians is with Levi-Strauss’
explicit bypassing, if not rejection, of the
conscious level of meaning in order to dis-
cover its unconscious foundation. It would
be simplistic to assert that L6vi-Straws does
not recognize any value to conscious inten-
tionality, as one often gets the impression
from certain interpreters. Besides recogniz-
ing the genuineness of the conscious com-
ponent of reality (see Rossi 1973), Lkvi-
Strauss has repeatedly recognized also its
methodological relevance as a supplementary
form of proof or verification (1963c:31,
1966a:253, 1966b:110-113). Lkvi-Strauss
has clearly asserted that meaning is not only
intentional, since the receiver of the message
has to perceive it and understand it, and in
doing so he casts it in his own mold
(1965b:126). The preoccupation with the
unconscious is a preoccupation with dis-
covering the basic structures, which are com-
mon to the mental mold of the sender and
of the receiver of the message, and which
enable a genuine intersection of two in-
tentionalities. In this sense, the unconscious
is the only guarantee of objectivity of phe-
nomenological analysis itself and the in-
trinsic link which would make of phe-
nomenology an essential complement of
structural analysis rather than its mere ex-
ternal verification (see Rossi 1972a).
Obviously, Levi-Strauss is not interested
in elaborating such theoretical methodologi-
cal integration. The epistemological thrust of
his latest effort is aimed at reinstating and
partially clarifying his position, and in re-
buffing existentialist (1971a:614) and phe-
nomenological critiques (Ibid.:571). LQvi-
Strauss states that what we call progress of
conscience is a process of interiorization of a
rationality which preexists in two forms, one
immanent in the universe and enabling
thought to reach reality, and the other pre-
sent in the objective thought, which func-
tions rationally and autonomously before
subjugating and making subjective this
UNCONSCIOUS 43
encompassing rationality. The great merit of
structuralism consists in finding the unity
and coherence existing behind social phe-
nomena not only by focusing on the rela-
tionship between facts rather than on facts
themselves, but also by reintegrating man
into nature (Ibid.:614).
One can understand the reason for stress-
ing the intrinsic intelligibility of reality and
the essential link of man with nature, but
would also like to see made an attempt to
relate the conscious level of human function-
ing to its unconscious structures. In all fair-
ness, Lkvi-Strauss’ latest emphasis on the
proportionality between mind and the real-
ity which becomes known, and on the
isomorphism of mental and cerebral ap-
paratuses, still leaves room for phenomenol-
ogical analysis as a preliminary and verifying
phase of structural analysis. In fact, he is
against relegating the object of sciences
“entirely” to the level where the subject
perceives it (Ibid.:570) and against making
of man an object of “exclusive attention”
(Ibid.:615). Lkvi-Strauss himself seems to
use phenomenology as a kind of verification
of his own structural analysis when he
asserts that structuralism brings to the sur-
face of conscience deep and organic truth,
and “only those who practice it know by
intimate experience the impression of full-
ness given by its practice, a practice by
which mind experiences a true communica-
tion with the body” (Ibid.:619).
VII
CONCLUSION
Perhaps three conclusive remarks are in
order. Empirically minded social scientists
should start reflecting on their own epis-
temological premises and realize after the
advent of psychoanalysis and ethnosemantic
school of anthropology that we might gain
further insight into the symbolic level of
culture by moving the analysis to its uncon-
scious infrastructure. The fact that they
might be unprepared for this type of analysis
does not abolish the possibility that intuitive
analysis might still have an important role in
44 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
social sciences. As far as their preoccupation
with verification is concerned, they should
take notice of L6vi-Strauss’ remarks that the
criteria of verifiability of physical sciences
are not applicable in the human sciences
(1971b:12), and that structuralism, even
though recognizes its “pre-scientific” stage,
has its own internal (1971c:40) and external
criteria of validity (1965b: 126). Second,
those structuralists who believe in the scien-
tific potential of LBvi-Strauss’ notions (see
Nutini 1971) should start working on their
methodological implementation. Finally,
structuralists and phenomenologists should
begin to look more seriously at possible
points of complementarities between their
respective perspectives with the goal of
formulating a more adequate theoretical and
methodological perspective. They have the
legitimate right of choosing for their analysis
either the conscious or the unconscious level
of meaning, but the very point of their
differences might well be changed from what
seems an apparent mutual rejection into a
connecting link between two levels of reality
and two relative methodological perspec-
tives. This, after all, does not seem to be
alien from the programmatic integration of
essence and form, method and reality
advocated by Lbvi-Strauss himself (1967a:
91).
NOTES
‘An earlier and shorter version of this
paper was presented at the symposium on
“The Unconscious in LBvi-Strauss’ Anthro-
pology,” organized and chaired by the
author, at the 69th Annual Meeting of the
American Anthropological Association, San
Diego, California, on November 20, 1970. I
acknowledge the helpful suggestions and
comments that I have received on the short-
er version of this paper from Pierre Maranda,
Bob Scholte, Yvan Simonis, Stephen A.
Tyler, and on the longer version of the paper
from Georges Mounin and David Sapir.
‘1 fully discuss the epistemological and
methodological foundations of the struc-
turalist method in the Introduction to Struc-
turalism in Perspective, which I have edited
(Rossi 1973).
[75,1973
For the fundamental importance of the
notion of unconscious in LBvi-Strauss’ struc-
turalism see Y. Simonis (1968: Ch. 3 and
1973).
LBvi-Strauss has characterized his in-
terest in the basic mental structures as a
psy c ho-logic” (LBvi-Strauss 1972a:74);
however, since they mediate between infra-
structure and superstructure they lay the
foundation of sociology or “socio-logic”
(LBvi-Strauss 1966a:76). Barthes clearly
explained why LBvi-Strauss’ socio-logic has
to be understood as a semiology or sociology
of signs rather than as the traditional soci-
ology of symbols (Barthes 1962:119-120).
On the cybernetic conceptualization of
social phenomena as messages, see among
o t h e r passages LBvi-Strauss (1966a:
267-268, Wilden 1972). On the structuralist
notion of meaning as opposed ._ to the phe-
nomenological notion, see LBvi-Strauss
(1963b, 197l a : 57 Off. ).
David Sapir (1972) has made the com-
ment that LBvi-Strauss readily uses native
ideas in explaining myths, while he ignores
them when they are not suited for his
purposes. It is D. Sapir’s contention that a
“fine-grained” analysis necessitates such con-
scious “meta-information.”
‘However, Simonis has called my atten-
tion to a recent text where LBvi-Strauss
states: “After all, if customs of neighboring
people reveal relations of symmetry, one
does not have to look for a cause in a
somewhat mysterious law of nature or mind.
This geometric perfection presently sums up
more or less conscious but innumerable
efforts accumulated by history and all aimed
at the same end . . .” (1971d:177). Simonis
rightly remarks that this passage “seems to
indicate a certain prudence (or a certain
evolution!) of the author (LBvi-Strauss) in
his thesis on the unconscious and the human
mind” (Simonis 1972). See also LBvi-Strauss
1965c.
7The precedence given to form over
content (1963a:202) has to be interpreted
not as a formalistic opposition of form
against content, which LBvi-Strauss rightly
rejects in his critique of Propp (LBvi-Strauss
1960). David Sapir rightly observes that at
least in the Mythologiques, “the structure of
content as expressed in a dialectic defines
the overall form” (D. Sapir 1972). LBvi-
Strauss has very recently reiterated the basic
d i f f e r e n c e b e tween structuralism and
psychoanalysis by asserting that “for
psychoanalysts the final explanation is
found in content, not in ‘form’” (1972a:
76).
Rossi J LEVI-STRAUSS: T H E UNCONSCIOUS
‘G. Mounin asserts that the notion of
unconscious is important in Jakobson but
that, contrary to what LBvi-Strauss asserts, is
strongly rejected by Troubetzkoy (Mounin
1970:202).
’In Mounin’s opinion, in 1945 LBvi-
Strauss was unaware that Troubetzkoy owed
the notion of unconscious to Saussure be-
cause he had not read Saussure and knew
linguistics only through Jakobson who early
differentiated himself from Saussure and
Troubetzkoy (Mounin 1972).
One can perhaps object that this is not
the case, for instance, with Boas and E.
Sapir.
This is the impression I received in a
conversation on these issues with LBvi-
Strauss on the occasion of his recent visit in
the United States (March 28, 1972).
After all, the technical controversies
among contemporary linguists d o not direct-
ly affect LBvi-Strauss’ level of analysis. Very
recently, when LBvi-Strauss was asked
whether the development of linguistics after
Jakobson has influenced his works, he
replied that from his point of view these
changes are not so important since he took
from linguistics “only few basic ideas and
used them in a much looser way than lin-
guists do.” In this sense, the difference
brought about by the recent developments
in linguistics in general, and by Chomsky in
particular, are not important for his type of
analysis. As a matter of fact, if he were to
give a new title to The Elementary Struc-
tures of Kinship he might retitle it “Intro-
duction t o Generative Anthropology” since
this work has discovered a set of rules which
generate many types of social exchanges
(remarks made in a discussion with the
students of Barnard College, March 30,
1972).
In a recent public lecture, Levi-Strauss
replied to the objection of mentalism or
Hegelianism often addressed to him,
especially in this country. He asserted that
the structures he discovered in the eth-
nographic material are not only the result of
mental constraints, but also of the external
determinism of techno-economic, ecological,
and concrete social conditions. We do not
know the basic mental constraints a priori,
but rather we can discover them only a
posteriori, through a careful study of the
concrete data.
As far as the issue of reductionism is
concerned, one gets the impression that for
LBvi-Strauss it is a pseudoproblem which
stems from a mistaken dualistic conception.
L6vi-Strauss asserted that to set mind and
45
body as two separate entities is a question-
able metaphysical position and a form of
Cartesianism. In nature, as in the brain and
in the mind, there is the same structural
code, so that structural analysis is possible
since the same operation goes on at all three
levels of reality. In LBvi-Strauss’ words, this
conception would bring back the unity of
mind and body (see LBvi-Strauss 1972b).
Similarly, the question of whether mind
is the same as brain or its epiphenomenon
would seem to be an incorrect question,
from LBvi-Strauss’ point of view. It would
seem that for him their homologous struc-
tural functioning is sufficient to establish
their unity.
4 ~ e r s o n a l communication from Levi-
Strauss on the occasion of the symposium
on “The Unconscious in LCvi-Strauss’ An-
thropology” (see note 1).
REFERENCES CITED
Allport, G. W.
1967 Pattern and Growth in Personality.
N e w Y o r k : Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.
Arnaud, L.
1971 Review of La Crise de la Psy-
chanalyse, by E. Fromm; Marx et
Freud, by R. Kalivoda. L’Homme et la
Societ6 122 :255-258.
Aubenque, P.
1971 Language, Structures, SociBtB: Re-
m a r q u e s s u r l e Structuralisme.
Archives d e Philosophie
34(3):353-371.
Bandura, A.
1969 Principles of Behavior Modifica-
tion. New York: Holt. Rinehart and
Winston.
Bandura. A.. and R. H. Walters
1965’ Social Learning and Personality
Development. New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston.
Barthes, R.
1962 A Propos de Deux Ouvrages Re-
cents de Claude LBvi-Strauss. Informa-
t i o n s u r l e s S c i e n c e s Sociales
VI(4):114-122.
Bergstrom, R. M.
1 9 6 7 Neural Macrostates. Synthese
17 (4) :4 25 -443.
Binet, A.
1911 Qu’est-ce qu’une Bmotion. Qu’est-
ce qu’un acte intellectuel? L’AnnBe
Psychologique 17 :1-47.
Boas, F.
1920 The Methods of Ethnology. Amer-
ican Anthropologist 22:311-321.
46 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
1964 Linguistics and Ethnology. I n Lan-
guage in Culture and Society. Dell
Hymes, Ed. New York: Harper and
ROW.pp. 15-26.
1968 [1911] Introduction to Hand-
book of American Indian Languages.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Bondarko, L. V.
1969 The Syllable Structure of Speech
and Distinctive Features of Phonemes.
Phonetica 2O:l-40.
Bowman, C. C.
1965 Review of The Unconscious in
Social Relations, by 0. Machotka.
A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i c a l Review
30(2):320.
Chomsky, N.
1966 Cartesian Linguistics. New York:
Harper and Row.
1968 Language and Mind. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World.
Chomsky, N., and M. Halle
1965 Some Controversial Questions in
Phonological Theory. Journal of Lin-
guistics 6(2):97-138.
Collier, R. M.
1964 A Figure-Ground Model Replacing
the Conscious-Unconscious Dichot-
omy. Journal of Individual Psychology
20( 1):3-16.
Conkling, M.
1968 Sartre’s Refutation of the Freud-
ian Unconscious. Review of Existential
P s y c h o 1 o gy a n d P s y c h i at r y
8(2):86-101.
Coubreras, H.
1969 Simplicity, Descriptive Adequacy,
and Binary Features. Language 45:l-8.
Darnoi, D. N. Kenedy
1967 The Unconscious and Edward von
Hartmann. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff.
Diamond, S.
1964 What History Is. I n Process and
Pattern in Culture. R. A. Manners, Ed.
Chicago: Aldine. pp. 29-44.
Durbin, M.
1972 Personal communication.
Durkheim, E.
1961 [1912] The Elementary Forms of
the Religious Life. New York: Collier
Books.
Eysenck, H. J.
1964 The Dynamics of Anxiety and
Hysteria. London : Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Fabian, J.
1971 On Professional Ethics and Epis-
temological Foundations. Current An-
thropology 12(2) :230-231.
[75,1973
Fenichel, 0.
1945 The Psychoanalytic Theory of
Neurosis. New York: Norton and Co.
Fry, D. B.
1971 Future Phoneticians. Journal of
the International Phonetic Association
1(1):2-10.
Fudge, E. C.
1967 The Nature of Phonological
Primes. Journal of Linguistics
3(1):1-36.
Green, A.
1963 La Psychanalyse devant l’opposi-
tion de l’histoire et de la structure.
Critique 19( 194):648-662.
Haudricourt, A. G.
1970 Sur le degr6 d’inconscience des
infrastructures. In Echanges et Com-
munications, Vol. 1. J. Pouillon and P.
Maranda, Eds. The Hague: Mouton. p.
606-608.
Herron, W. G.
1962 The Evidence for the Unconscious.
Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic
Review 49(1):70-92.
Hymes, D.
1964 Introduction. In Language in Cul-
ture and Society. Dell Hymes, Ed.
New York: Harper and Row. pp. 3-14.
Jahoda, G.
1970 A Psychologist’s Perspective. In
Socialization: The Approach from
Social Anthropology. G. Jahoda, Ed.
London: Tavistock. pp. 33-49.
Jarvie, I. C.
1971 Reply t o Fabian’s Discussion “On
Professional Ethics and Epistemologi-
cal Foundations.” Current Anthro-
pology 12(2):231-232.
Jones, W. J.
1969 A History of Western Philosophy,
Vol. 4 . New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World.
Kim, Chin Wu
1971 A New Direction in Phonetics.
Language Sciences 16:35-40.
Kisker, G. W.
1964 The Disorganized Personality. New
York : McGraw Hill.
Knowles, M.
1966 The Explanatory Role of Uncon-
scious Determinants in Psychoanalytic
.
T h eo r y Australian Psychologist
1(1):87-88.
Lamprecht, S. P.
1955 Our Philosophical Traditions. New
York : Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Leach, E.
1967 The Structural Study of Myth and
Totemism. London: Tavistock.
Rossi ] LEVI-STRAUSS: THE UNCONSCIOUS
1969 Claude LBvi-Strauss: Anthropolo-
gist and Philosopher. I n Theory in
Anthropology. R. A. Manners and D.
Kaplan, Eds. Chicago : Aldine.
1970 LBvi-Strauss. London: Fontanal
Collins.
Lehman, W. P.
1971 Descriptive Linguistics. New York:
Random House.
Lenneberg, E. H.
1971 Of Language Knowledge, Apes and
Brains. Journal of Psycholinguistic
Research 1(1):1-29.
Leroy M.
1967 Main Trends in Modern Lincuis-
tics.-Berkeley : University of Califlrnia
Press.
LBvi-Strauss, C.
1945 French Sociology. In Twentieth
Century Sociology. G. Gurvitch and
W. E. Moore, Eds. New York: The
Philosophical Library. pp. 503-537.
1960 La Structure et la Forme. Cahiers
de 1’Institut de science Bconomique
appliquhes 99(7 ) :3-36.
1963a Structural Anthropology. New
York: Basic Books.
1963b Reponses t5 quelques questions.
Esprit 31( 322) :628-633.
1963c Intervista a Claude LBvi-Strauss.
Aut Aut 77:27-45.
1965a Tristes Tropiques. New York:
Atheneum.
1965b Risposte un questionario sullo
s t r u t t u r a l i s m o . P a r a g- o n e 16
(187/2):125-127.
1965c The Future of Kinshio Studies. I n
Proceedings of the Ro;al Anthro-
pological Institute of Great Britain and
Ireland. pp. 13-22.
1966a The Savage Mind. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
196613 The Scope of Anthropology. Cur-
rent Anthropology 7(2):112-123.
1966c Introduction iI’oeuvre de Marcel
Mauss. In Sociologie et Anthropologie,
by Marcel Mauss. Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France. pp. ix-li.
1966d A Conversation with Claude LBvi-
Strauss, by G. Steiner. Encounter
36(4):32-38.
1967a Totemism. Boston: Beacon Press.
1967b A Contre-Courant, interview with
LBvi-Strauss, by G. Dumur. Le Nouvel
Observateur 115 :30-32.
1969a The Elementary Structures of
Kinship. Boston: Beacon Press.
1969b The Raw and the Cooked. New
York : Harper and Row.
47
1971a L’Homme Nu. Paris: Plon.
1971b Interview with Claude LBvi-
Strauss, by Edwin Newman. W.N.B.C.
Television, Speaking Freely. Septem-
ber 17, pp. 1-23.
1971c A Visit to Levi-Strauss, by John
Weightman. Encounter 36(2):38-42.
1971d Rapports de Symetrie entre rites
et mythes de Peuple voisins. I n The
Translation of Culture. T. 0. Beidel-
mann, Ed. London: Tavistock. pp.
161-178.
1972a A Conversation with Claude Levi-
Strauss: The Father of Structural
Anthropology takes a Misanthropic
View of Lawless Humanism, by A. A.
Akoun, F. Morin, and J. Mousseau.
Psychology Today 5(12):37-39, 74-82.
1 9 7 2 b Structuralism and Ecology.
Gedersleeve lecture delivered at Barn-
ard College, March 28, 1972. Barnard
Alumnae (spnng):6-14.
Lieberman, P.
1970 Towards a Unified Phonetic Theo-
ry. Linguistic Inquiry 1(3):307-322.
Maybury-Lewis, D.
1969 Review of Du Miel aux Cendres,
by C. LBvi-Strauss. American Anthro-
pologist 7 1 :114-121.
Meletinsky, E., and D. Segal
1971 Structuralism and Semiotics in the
U.S.S.R. Diogenes 73:88-115.
Millar, T. P.
1970 Who’s Afraid of Sigmund Freud?
B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of Psychiatry
115(521) :421-428.
Modjeska, C. N.
1968 A Note on Unconscious Structure
in the Anthropology of Edward Sapir.
American Anthropologist 70:344-348.
Mounin, G.
1970 Introduction i la SBmiologie.
Pans: Les Editions de Minuit.
1972 Personal communication.
Nutini, H.
1 9 7 0 Levi-Strauss’ Conceotion of
Science. In Echanges et Cdmmunica-
tions, Vol. 1. J. Pouillon and P.
Maranda, Eds. The Hague: Mouton.
pp. 543-570.
1971 The Ideological Bases of L6vi-
Strauss’ Structuralism. American An-
thropologist 7 3 :537-544.
Papageorgis, D.
1965 Repression and the Unconscious:
A Social-Psychological Reformulation.
Journal of Individual Psychology
21(1):18-31.
48 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
Piaget, J.
1970 Structuralism. New York: Basic
Books.
Rey, A.
1972 Personal Communication.
Ricoeur, P.
1967 New Developments in Phe-
nomenology in France: The Phe-
nomenology of Language. Social Re-
search 34(1):1-30.
Rohan-Csermack, Geza de
1967 Ethnohistoire et ethnologie his-
t o r ique. E t hn ologia E ur opaea
6(2):130-158.
Rossi, I.
1972a Reply to Jawie’s Discussion “On
Professional Ethics and Epistemologi-
cal Foundations.” Current Anthro-
pology. (In press.)
197213 Reply to Nutini’s “The Ideologi-
cal Basis of LBvi-Strauss’ Struc-
turalism.” American Anthropologist
74:784-787.
1973 Introduction. In Structuralism in
Perspective. I. Rossi, Ed. (Forth-
coming.)
Santerre, R.
1966 La MBthode d’Analyse dans les
Sciences de I’Homme. Anthropologica
8(1):111-144.
Sapir, D.
1972 Personal Communication.
Sapir, E.
1927 The Unconscious Patterning of
Behavior in Society. In The Uncon-
scious: A Symposium. E. Drummer,
Ed. New York : Alfred Knopf.
Sarnoff, I.
1971 Testing Freudian Concepts: An
Experimental Social Approach. New
York: Springer Publishing Company.
Scheffler, H. W.
1966 Structuralism in Anthropology.
Yale French Studies (36-37):66-88.
Sebeok, T. A.
1968 Linguistics Here and Now. Lan-
guage Sciences (1):3-5.
Simonis, Y.
1968 Claude LBvi-Strauss ou la “Passion
de 1’Inceste.” Paris: Aubier Montaigne.
1972 Personal Communication.
[ 75,1973
1973 Two ways of Approaching Con-
crete Reality: “Group Dynamics” and
LBvi-Strauss’ Structuralism. In Struc-
turalism in Perspective. I. Rossi, Ed.
(Forthcoming.)
Sperber, D.
1968 Le Structuralisme en Anthro-
pologie. In Qu’est-ce que le Structural-
isme. 0. Ducrot, T. Toidorov, D.
Sperber, M. Safouan, F. Wahl, Eds.
Pans: Editions du Seuil. pp. 168-238.
Sperry, R. W.
1969 A Modified Concept of Conscious-
ness. P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review
76(6):532-536.
Tamoczi, L.
1970 Essai de critique au structuralisme
1inguis t iqu e a c t uel. Linguistics
57 :60-92.
Tax, S., et al.
1953 An Appraisal of Anthropology
Today. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Tikofsky, R. S.
1970 Review of Child Language,
Aphasia and Phonological Universals,
by R. Jakobson. Language Sciences
- I
ii :20-26.
Von Raffler Eneel. Walburea
1970 The CAD, Our Gnderlying Uncon-
scious, and More on “Felt Sets.”
Language Sciences 13 :1 5-18.
Wardhaugh, R.
1971 Theories of Language Acquisition
in Relation to Beginning Reading
I n s t r u c t i o n . Language Learning
21(1):1-26.
Waterman, J. T.
1963 Perspectives in Linguistics. Chica-
go : University of Chicago Press.
Whyte, L. L.
1962 The Unconscious Before Freud.
London: Tavistock.
Wilden, A.
1972 System and Structure. London:
Tavistock.
Wolf, T. H.
1969 Binet’s Conceptions and Measure-
ment of Intelligence. Journal of the
History of the Behavioral Sciences
5(3):207-237.